Human Relations

Human RelationsPFR

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM,petitioners,vs.ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA,"respondent.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:In this petition for review oncertiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1and Ruby Lim assail the Decision2of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision3of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution4of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him.6Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of course."8Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant.9At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.10After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.11In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.14Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.15Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.16Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees.17Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotels Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.18One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.20The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.21At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.22Mindful of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.24As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.25Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.26Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.27When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached.28Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto,i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.29Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait.31When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.331awphi1.ntDr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49.35When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited.36All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.37Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38She ignored Mr. Reyes.39She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.40After trial on the merits, the courta quodismissed the complaint,41giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs.43The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filarts invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.. . .The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).44Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered."46Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in I. NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OFVOLENTI NON FIT INJURIACONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHERII. HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILARTS INVITATION"III. DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYAIV. IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARDV. IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGSPetitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine ofvolenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."The doctrine ofvolenti non fit injuria("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury"47) refers to self-inflicted injury48or to the consent to injury49which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.50As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law.51One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.52The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower courts findings of fact.First, let us put things in the proper perspective.We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotels former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet table? How close was she when she approached you?A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?. . .A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.56Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.57Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.58Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,59is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.ntElsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible."60The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties.61These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.62Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.63When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law64which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.Article 2165refers to actscontra bonus moresand has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done withintentto injure.66A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.68As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."69The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.Parenthetically, themannerby which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity."70Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages72especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latters lowly station in life.l^vvphi1.netThis has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees.73The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the case and the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.netIt is not disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines."74During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income75and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Nikko Hotel vs. ReyesTITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. ReyesCITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist.

There are two versions of the story:Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filarts group. She wasnt able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesnt want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close because we nearly kissed each other. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden et al vs. Reyes G.R. No. 154259

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a AMAY BISAYA, respondent. G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005

FACTS:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution and the decision of the Court of Appeals whereby making the petitioners liable for moral and exemplary damages. Amay Bisaya was having a coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko when an old friend, Dr. Filart, asked him to join the party of the former manager of the said hotel, Mr. Tsuruoka. When he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ms. Lim approached him and said to leave the party for it was intended for a number of guests. Amay Bisaya claimed that he was humiliated by the manner Ms. Lim asked him to leave. He alleged that Ms. Lim asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the other guests. He was accompanied by a Makati policeman in leaving the penthouse. He was more embarrassed when Dr. Filart denied that she invited him on the said party.

ISSUE:Whether or not the act of Ms. Lim constitutes an abuse of right to make the petitioners liable for damages caused to Amay Bisaya.

HELD:No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Amay Bisaya might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone. It is unlikely to happen that Ms. Lim exposed him to ridicule and shame because admittedly, Amay Bisaya stated that Ms. Lim was very close enough for him to kiss when she asked him to leave the party. It was intended to be heard only by Amay Bisaya. Nevertheless , his reaction to the request must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Since Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Amay Bisaya to leave the party for being a gate-crasher, neither she nor her employer be held liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden et. al. v. Reyes

Persons and Family Relations. Human Relations. Article 19 and 21 Civil Code.NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN ET. AL. V. REYESG.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J

FACTS:Mr. Reyes attended the personal party thrown for the hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuroka, on account of Dr. Violeta Filart vouching for his attendance, to which she agreed. While in the buffet table, Ruby Lim, executive secretary of Hotel Nikko, allegedly ordered him to leave the party in a loud voice, effectively embarrassing him in front of many people. Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that she asked the respondent to leave in a discreet manner. Petitioner prays for the reversal of the decision of CA against them.

ISSUE:Did the petitioner violate articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code thus entitling the respondent for compensation of damages?

HELD:Petitioner did not violate articles 19 and 21 for there was no intention on her part to humiliate Reyes as demonstrated by the fact that she was close to be able to kiss the respondent while she was asking him to leave. Decision of CA was reversed and of RTC Quezon City affirmed.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs REYES Case DigestNIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIMVS. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA2005 Feb 28G.R. No. 154259

FACTS:In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, respondent was invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in celebration of the birthday of the hotels manager. During the party and when respondent was lined-up at the buffet table, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the party. Shocked and embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was herself a guest. Not long after, a Makati policeman approached him and escorted him out of her party.

Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstances painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and discreetly. Mindful of the wish of the celebrant to keep the party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when she saw him by the buffet table with no other guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to leave the party after he finished eating. After she had turned to leave, the latter screamed and made a big scene.

Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that she invited Mr. Reyes to the party.

Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages and attorneys fees. The lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, consequently imposing upon Hotel Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant petition for review.

ISSUES:Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited by the celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel Nikko, as the employer of Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable with her.

RULING:The Court found more credible the lower courts findings of facts. There was no proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose him to ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes version of the story was unsupported, failing to present any witness to back his story. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employees.

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Article 21 states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act cannot amount to abusive conduct.

The maxim Volenti Non Fit Injuria (self-inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court, that is, to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury, that consent to injury precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, vs.CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.D E C I S I O NVELASCO, JR., J.:The CasePetitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City.The FactsOn October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).8In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character.10Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.The IssueWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11The Courts RulingThis petition must be granted.The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of theCriminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to ExistUnder the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,13 are:The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.We cannot agree with private respondent.First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had."14 In the instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system."16 This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i lIn other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we said:Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.19Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondents positions cannot be left to stand.The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal ActionIn any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.We find for petitioner.It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.20Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled:It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.)Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.netTherefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.No costs.SO ORDERED.PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate JusticeWE CONCUR:CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate JusticeChairpersonMINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate JusticeANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate JusticeDIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate JusticeA T T E S T A T I O NI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate JusticeChairpersonC E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., vs.JaniolaG.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

Facts:This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal proceeding filed by the petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial question with respectto the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent. The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied Dreamwork, through its President, and Vice-President, filed a Complaint Affidavit against Janiola for violation of BP 22 at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. Correspondingly, the former also filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, Janiola, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the ground that private respondent claim that the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case. Petitioner opposed the Respondents Motion to Suspend criminal proceeding based on juridical question for the following grounds;(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC but denied the petition. Hence, this petition raised.

ISSUEWhether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case on the basis of Prejudicial Question , with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.

HeldThis petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC. 7.Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are:(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandigan bayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case filed by the State with the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.T he Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action. Even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, is absent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS CLEOFE JANIOLA AND HON. ARTHUR FAMINI, GR NO 184861, JUNE 30, 2009FACTSPetitioner, filed a Complaint Affidavit against private respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Afterwards, private respondent, together with her husband, filed a complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter, private respondent filed for a Motion to Suspend proceedings alleging that for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. ISSUEWON the court seriously erred in not perceiving grave abuse of discretion on the part of the inferior court when the latter ruled to suspend proceddings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 on the basis o f prejudicial question in Civil Case No. LP-06-0197.[RULINGPrivate respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code. The Court does not agree with private respondents argument that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action and that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had.In the instant case, the phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of subsequent directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.[17]In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.This interpretation would harmonize all the mentioned laws. Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL,Petitioner,vs.MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseBefore the Court is a petition for review1assailing the Decision2of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.The Antecedent FactsThe facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.The Decision of the Trial CourtThe RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.SO ORDERED.4Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,5the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.The Decision of the Court of AppealsIn its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision.The IssueThe only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.The Ruling of this CourtThe petition has no merit.Civil Case Must be InstitutedBefore the Criminal CaseSection 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6provides:Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information7for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8Respondents petition9in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Questionin Criminal Case for ParricideFurther, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.10A prejudicial question is defined as:x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.11The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,12which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."13The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder14or homicide.15However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.16At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1We cannot accept petitioners reliance onTenebro v. Court of Appeals17that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as thevinculumbetween the spouses is concerned x x x." First, the issue inTenebrois the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled inTenebrothat "[t]here is x x x a recognitionwritten into the law itselfthat such a marriage, although voidab initio, may still produce legal consequences."18In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned."19In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.WHEREFORE, weDENYthe petition. WeAFFIRMthe 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.SO ORDERED.ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate JusticeLUCAS P. BERSAMIN*Associate JusticeROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**Associate JusticeA T T E S T A T I O NI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeChairpersonC E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice

PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010Persons And Family RelationsOn 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. CA that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL VS MARIA CHRYSANTINE PIMENTELG.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010Facts: Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In addition, petitioner received summons to appear before the Court for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Subsequently, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.The RTC and CA denied the motion hence this petition for review before the SC.Issue: whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.Ruling: Negative. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.The issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could stillbe held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to responden

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL VS MARIA CHRYSANTINE PIMENTELG.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010Facts: Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In addition, petitioner received summons to appear before the Court for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Subsequently, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.The RTC and CA denied the motion hence this petition for review before the SC.

Issue: whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

Ruling: Negative. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.The issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could stillbe held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to responden