0

STUDIES ON EMERGENCIES AND DISASTER RELIEF

Report No.7

Humanitarian Aid CoordinationDuring War and Peace inMozambique: 1985–1995

Sam Barnes

1

Humanitarian aid coordination is necessary for effective use of resources. However, behindthe rhetoric of collaboration and rationalisation one finds UN agencies competing with gov-ernments for power and influence and national institutions being replaced by donors insignificant policy debates.

This study traces humanitarian aid coordination in three distinct phases:– 1985–1990: The intensification of the emergency in Mozambique and the challenge to Gov-

ernment in directing aid;– 1990–1992: Peace talks and the protracted emergency with increased UN control of Aid

Coordination;– 1993–95: ONUMOZ and donor driven resource allocation.

In addition to documenting the forms and mechanisms of aid coordination, the paperreveals how the UN often worked against itself. The changing policies on the role of the UNin humanitarian crises are followed the Mozambican context.

Ms. Sam Barnes worked with the United Nations in Mozambique from 1987 to 1994 initiallywith the UNDP Emergency Unit. After the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992,Ms. Barnes was in charge of the Assessment and Planning Unit within the UNOHAC, thehumanitarian component of ONUMOZ, the UN peacekeeping operation. She remained withUNOHAC until December 1994. Since then she has undertaken research on the impact ofhumanitarian assistance in Mozambique and worked as a consultant for the United Nationsin Tajikistan, Liberia, Angola and Somalia. The research for this work was supported by theJohn D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the writing by Sida (Swedish Interna-tional Development Cooperation Agency) in Mozambique.

Ms. Barnes’ other publications include “NGOs in peace-keeping operations: their role inMozambique” in Development in Practice, Volume 8, Number 3, August 1998; “The Humani-tarian Factor in Mozambique Peace Negotiations; 1990–92” in War and Peace in Mozambiqueby Stephan Chan and Moises Venancio with Chris Alden and Sam Barnes (London:MacMillan, 1998); “Peacekeeping in Mozambique” in Peacekeeping in Africa by Oliver Furleyand Roy May (Eds) (Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998).

Published by In cooperation with

Nordiska Afrikainstitutet(The Nordic Africa Institute)P O Box 1703 Swedish International DevelopmentS-751 47 Uppsala, Sweden Cooperation Agency

ISSN 1400-3120ISBN 91-7106-433-8

2

STUDIES ON EMERGENCIES AND DISASTER RELIEF

is a series published jointly by Sida and the Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

1. K. B. Wilson, Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees from and in Mozambique. 61 pp.Uppsala1994.

2. Jonathan Baker, Refugee and Labour Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. A review.Roger Zetter, Shelter Provision and Settlement Policies for Refugees. A state of the art review. 106 pp.Uppsala 1995.

3. Sidney Waldron and Naima A. Hasci, Somali Refugees in the Horn of Africa. State of the art literaturereview. 87 pp. Uppsala 1995.

4. Eftihia Voutira and Shaun A. Whishaw Brown, Conflict Resolution. A Review of Some Non-Governmental Practices. ‘A Cautionary Tale’. 50 pp. Uppsala 1995.

5. Toby Lanzer, The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Angola: A Model for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Assistance? 40 pp. Uppsala 1996.

6. Hugo Slim, Doing the Right Thing. Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in PoliticalEmergencies and War. 17 pp. Uppsala 1997.

7. Sam Barnes, Humanitarian Aid Coordination During War and Peace in Mozambique: 1985–1995. 27 pp.Uppsala 1998.

Indexing terms

Aid institutionsEmergency reliefHumanitarian aidEthics

ISSN 1400-3120ISBN 91-7106-433-8Printed in Swedenby Reprocentralen HSC, Uppsala 1998

3

Contents

Foreword.............................................................................................5

Introduction..........................................................................................7

Background ..........................................................................................8

Phase I: The Government leads 1985–1990 ........................................................9

The United Nations increases its role: 1987–1990 .................................................10

An expanded role for the UN ......................................................................12

The UN at odds with itself .........................................................................14

UN coordination in the field .......................................................................15

Phase II: Peace talks and protracted emergency needs—1990–1992 ............................16

Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) steps into Mozambique ...........................16

Phase III: UNOHAC—Humanitarian Coordination withinthe Peace-Keeping Operation 1992–1994 .........................................................21

Establishing UNOHAC.............................................................................22

Mine clearance and reintegration of demobilised soldiers........................................24

ONUMOZ exits.....................................................................................26

Conclusions .........................................................................................27

Selected references..................................................................................27

4

List of Abbreviations

ARO Africa Groups of Sweden (NGO)CARE An international NGO with 10 national members in North America, Europe, Japan

and AustraliaCENE National Executive Commission on the EmergencyCHAP Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance ProgrammeCORE Commission on ReintegrationCPE Provincial Emergency Commission (Mozambique Government)CUSO-SUCO Canadian University Services Overseas (NGO)DHA Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)DPA Department of Political Affairs (UN)DPCCN Department for the Prevention of Natural Disasters (Mozambique Government)DPKO Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (UN)FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN)GPA General Peace AgreementICRC International Committee of the Red CrossIDP Internally Displaced PersonIOM International Organisation of MigrationOCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)OEOA Office for Emergencies in Africa (UN)ONUMOZ UN Peace-Keeping Operation in MozambiquePKO Peace-Keeping OperationSCF-UK Save the Children Fund (UK NGO)SPQRCDT Department of Special Political Questions, Regional Cooperation, Decolonisation and

Trusteeship (UN)SRSG Special representative of the Secretary-GeneralUNADP UN Accelerated Demining Programme (Mozambique)UNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNILOG United Nations Logistics Operation of World Food Programme (Mozambique)UNOHAC United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (Humanitarian

component of ONUMOZ)UNSCERO United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations (Mozambique)USAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentWFP World Food ProgrammeWHO World Health Organisation

5

Foreword

Studies of Emergencies and Disaster Relief is a seriesof research reports on topics of relevance tothose who are working with humanitarian assis-tance. Sida, in close cooperation with the NordicAfrica Institute, sponsors the publishing of thesereports as a contribution to the dialogue betweenhumanitarian actors, in the field and at head-quarters around the world

Coordination and cooperation have been keywords in humanitarian assistance during the lastfew of years. Extensive work has been donewithin the UN system to strengthen the coordi-nation mechanisms. The division of responsibil-ity between the operative and policy-makingparts of the organisation has been one aspect ofthis. Other aspects which have been part of thisprocess include coordination on the ground,coordination between field offices and head-quarters, coordination between multilateral andbilateral donors, coordination between the UNand the NGOs. In 1997 a new office within theUN, the Office of the Coordinator of Humanit-arian Assistance was created. It replaced theDepartment of Humanitarian Assistance, set upin 1992.

The present report, written by Ms SamBarnes, addresses the humanitarian aid coordin-ation problems in Mozambique 1986–95. It is thesecond report on coordination aspects in thisseries, the first was written by Toby Lanzer whoworked for DHA in Angola. Coordinationremains an important subject on the interna-tional humanitarian agenda. By looking at casestudies, lessons for the future can hopefully bedrawn. Everyone involved in this field shouldread it.

Carin NorbergDirector Department for Cooperation with

NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance

6

7

Introduction

Coordination as applied by the United Nations,NGOs, donors and national authorities is one ofthe most overused and misunderstood conceptsin the development dictionary. Its meaningvaries depending on which of the stakeholders isemploying it at a given moment. In the contextof Emergency and Humanitarian Programmes,the sub-textual meaning of coordination approx-imates control regarding which areas needcoordination—definition of needs, planning ofinterventions, rationalisation of financing orimplementation; who should coordinate andassume the ultimate authority and responsibilityover the process.

To some degree the debate about coordina-tion is not so much about effective delivery ofassistance but rather about power. The variousstakeholders jockey to place their agency at theforefront of the process—positioning to enhancetheir own legitimacy and subsequent fund-raising capacities. The inter-agency jostling thattypifies complex emergencies has negative rami-fications for cooperative and objective discussionon how to develop coordinated mechanisms foreffective delivery of assistance.

External actors often exclude national actorsfrom both the policy debates as well as the actualcoordination mechanisms and expect that weak-ened national institutions will disregard theirown mechanisms and ‘naturally’ accept donorinstitutions as leading coordination bodies.

This paper documents the socio-politicalprocess of humanitarian aid coordination lead-ing up to and during the implementation of thepeace agreement in Mozambique. The periodunder discussion 1985–95, represents a decade inMozambique’s historical evolution which ischaracterised, for reasons of natural disasters,protracted war and regional politics, by thedecline of the role of the Mozambican state witha corresponding increase or dominance of theinternational donor community in the areas ofpolicy-setting and aid co-ordination.

Theoretically, in countries confronting com-plex emergencies, ‘coordination’ should be a toolwhich brings together governments and donorsto constructively and decisively deal with theeffects of emergencies. At the same time, theoret-ically, the UN system with its banner of‘neutrality’ should be better placed, relative to

bilateral aid donors, to coordinate internationalefforts so that the leadership of government inpolicy making is not undermined. However,when peace-keeping operations come into thepicture and government is one of the two partiesto the peace agreement, new models mustemerge which, optimally, secure the peace andconsolidate government for its future responsi-bilities.

In practice, as the Mozambique case willshow, inter-agency rivalry, divergent donorviews on the roles and responsibilities of theState, subjective personality clashes, bureau-cratic delays and careerism of individuals, at theexpense of a coordinated international effort,closely approximates the reality on the ground.

For purposes of clarity, the paper assesseshumanitarian aid coordination in three differentphases:• 1985–1990: The Emergency intensifies: Gov-

ernment capacity challenged the proliferationof NGOs;

• 1990–1992: Peace talks and protracted emer-gency needs; UN humanitarian coordinationmechanisms debated;

• 1993–1994/5: ONUMOZ and humanitarianassistance coordination.

It should be noted that the humanitarian assis-tance programme in Mozambique and thecauses that necessitated its changing foci—drought, floods, war, a shifting governmentmacro-economic policy, peace negotiations and ashifting geopolitical context—stretched not onlyGovernment leadership and capacity, but alsothose of the UN/donor community to devise acoordination mechanism in tune with the pace ofchanges as they unfolded. As a result, the con-text exacerbated the differences between theGovernment, UN and donor approaches tocoordination; at times, at the expense of coordi-nated programme delivery.

8

Background

Mozambique became independent from Por-tugal in 1975. The Frelimo Party, which led andwon the liberation war formed a government onsocialist principles. For only a few years, didMozambique experience peace and stability. Itwas ravaged by internal war, floods anddrought and subjected to external sabotage anddestabilisation by South Africa’s apartheidregime.

The internal war was to prove the mostdevastating. Fostered and financed by externalparties and driven by cold war rivalries andgeopolitical concerns, Mozambique’s alreadyweak economy, productive and social infrastruc-ture was decimated. Five million people weredisplaced, including 1.7 million refugees inneighbouring countries, by the time of the sign-ing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) inOctober 1992.

Between 1992–1994, close to 100,000 soldiersneeded to be assembled, disarmed and demo-bilised. Refugees returned and resettled, demo-bilised soldiers reintegrated into civilian societyand the difficult and long process of land mineclearance began. Multiparty elections,threatened in the last hours by political fears ofone of the parties to the GPA, were held inOctober 1994, and an elected Frelimogovernment took office in December 1994. AllONUMOZ peace keepers, military, political andhumanitarian were withdrawn by the end of1994, leaving only the mine clearance teams tocontinue their work.

9

Phase I: The Government leads 1985–1990

Generally, national governments link coordina-tion very closely to issues of political control andsovereignty. The state appointed coordinationentity defines the humanitarian emergency, isthe interface with the United Nations and thedonors and oversees the implementation of theprogrammes. The governmental emergencycoordination body therefore establishes the“legitimacy” and the “public face” of the emer-gency.

In Mozambique, the structure of the humani-tarian/emergency coordination mechanismsinitiated in the 1980’s exemplified the abovemodel: i.e. government-led coordination. TheMozambique Government appointed a Secretaryof State of International Cooperation for aidcoordination at the policy level, while theDepartment for the Prevention and Combat ofNatural Disasters (DPCCN) was tasked with theactual delivery of relief supplies. At the start ofthis period (1985), there were few NGOs whichnegotiated agreements with Government tooperate within the country in a given sector andgeographic area, encouraging a multi-sectoralapproach on a district basis. In 1986, theMinistry of Cooperation assumed the functionsof the Secretary of State of InternationalCooperation thus elevating aid coordinationwithin the governmental power structure.

During this period, the US and WFP were thebiggest donors of food aid. All relief food aidwas channelled through the governmentalagency, DPCCN, while food aid for the marketsector went through the Ministry of InternalTrade and Commerce. In order to receive a sub-stantive increase in relief food aid from the US in1983, the Mozambique Government was pres-sured to accept the American NGO contractor,CARE, as part of the package. USAID wantedthe relief food to be distributed by CARE andother NGOs, but Mozambique managed tomaintain the government policy that food aidwas distributed by the governmental body,DPCCN. CARE came in as the provider of tech-nical assistance to the Logistics Support Unit(LSU) of DPCCN (receiving more than $20million in OFDA funds from 1984 to 1992) so as

to strengthen the capacity of Mozambican insti-tutions to manage the food distribution.1

The first USAID Director, summed up thereal intentions of this assistance in an interviewwith a Swedish Evaluation team:

It has never been the USA’s political and aid-related intention to go in and strengthen Mozam-bican public administration by helping to establisha national organisation to counteract emergencies.Quite the opposite; the faster such an attempt iseroded, the easier it will be for private interestsand non-governmental organisations to assumeresponsibility for the distribution of emergencyaid and to reach targeted groups.2

For a number of reasons, government-ledcoordination was not openly challenged untilthe late eighties for a number of factors. Mostimportantly, the UN agencies, bilateral donorsand NGOs involved in support for relief ope-rations took their cues from the government. Bi-lateral cooperation was led by the Nordic count-ries whose development philosophy supportedgovernment institutions as the primary imple-menters of assistance programmes.

The regional context, in which Mozambiquewas one of the “frontline states” in the struggleagainst apartheid South Africa greatly enhancedits political legitimacy. Typical of this view wasthe Swedish support for Mozambican govern-ment humanitarian programmes, which wereseen as an integral part of their Southern Africapolicy framework supporting the “legitimateself-defence” of a regime attacked by apartheid.3

The US had not yet emerged as a dominantinfluence with the Government nor with theother major donors in Maputo. By contrast, it’sSouthern Africa policy of “constructive engage-ment was driven by the cold-war-geopolitical

1 Mozambique was on USAID’s “blacklist” until1985 and could not receive development assistance. InAugust of 1987, the first USAID mission came toMozambique, and in 1988, USAID started up itsdevelopment assistance programmes with $15million. Before that assistance had been food aidthrough PL 480.2 Mozambique: The Troubled Transition by HansAbrahamsson and Anders Nilsson, Zed Press(London, 1995) pp. 141–142.3 Interviews in Stockholm by author, June 1995 withPer Örnéus and Anders Pedersen, Ministry of ForeignAffairs.

10

framework which was hostile to the region andits perceived alliance to the “communist bloc”.

Until 1987, the emergency in Mozambiquewas defined as being caused in large part bynatural disasters i.e. drought, floods, cyclones.The emergency situation was as yet publiclypresented as tied primarily to a political conflict.At the time of independence, Mozambique pro-claimed itself as building “socialism” and there-fore those international organisations sympa-thetic to the socialist development alternativeand anti-apartheid policies were most active inthe post-independence phase. The relief pro-grammes of European NGOs such as Oxfam-UK,SCF-UK, as well as those which had a solidarityand anti-apartheid orientation (ARO-Sweden,Eduardo Mondlane Foundation-Holland, CUSO-SUCO-Canada, Oxfam-America) were workingdirectly with DPCCN or Government line min-istries. There was a strong commitment to gov-ernment responsibility in defining and manag-ing programmes. The NGOs operating duringthis phase had cooperantes working within gov-ernmental programmes, rather than runningparallel programmes implemented by the NGOwith expatriate development workers, which be-came the dominant model after the mid-eighties.

By the mid-eighties, the emergency took onadditional dimensions as the impact of thedestabilisation war overwhelmed events. TheMozambique Government recognised that itrequired more and more relief aid, as thenumbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs),affected rural populations and Mozambicansseeking security as refugees in neighbouringcountries increased. These massive populationmovements pushed the country to a protracted“complex emergency”, primarily provoked bythe civil war between the Government andRenamo, a rebel group which had its origins inand support from white Rhodesian forces andsubsequently from apartheid South Africa.South Africa’s policies of regional destabilisationwere typical of low-intensity conflicts of theeighties. Renamo’s rural terrorism devastatedMozambique’s economy bringing agriculturalproduction to a standstill, and forcing theinternal and external migration of close to onequarter of the total population. The regionalcontext and the nature of the war, consolidatedthe support of the United Nations and thedominant bilateral agencies for the Governmentof Mozambique.

The Swedish Government had had a signifi-cant aid programme in Mozambique since the

time of Mozambique’s independence in 1975.Though not an important food aid provider,SIDA allocated funds to the government reliefagency, especially for logistics and non-foodrelief. A Swedish mission to Mozambique inAugust 1987, led by Maurice Strong, accuratelydescribes the mood of the donor community.

There is generally a high degree of trust in theMozambican government, and the government isdeveloping its own capacity to monitor, particu-larly as to the needs and effects of the emergencymeasures on the recipient populations. ... Therewas unanimous agreement amongst the govern-ment and donor representatives I met with, thatthe principal cause of the emergency conditions...is the internal conflict by bands of “bandits”supported by South Africa....The emergency situa-tion can be expected to continue as long as thecurrent state of conflict and insecurity persists....4

The Nordic countries, especially Sweden andNorway, manifested their commitment to gov-ernment led aid-coordination in these first yearsof the Mozambique emergency. As a conse-quence, the Government relief agency, DPCCN,grew into a large governmental entity handlingseveral hundred million dollars of food and non-food aid with staff down to the district level.Government led coordination mechanismsemerged with the strong support of the interna-tional community. However, as the scale andcomplexity of the emergency grew, the Govern-ment mechanisms were unable to manage theoperations effectively. Too little attention waspaid by both Government and donors to devel-oping and supporting the management skillsnecessary to direct and control such a scale ofoperations. Not surprisingly, corruption anddiversion of relief supplies became more andmore common.

The United Nations Increases Its Role:1987–1990

The United Nations is mandated to support thegovernments of its member states. Therefore, ittends to promote the prominence of nationalinstitutions and governments in defining poli-cies and priorities and taking the lead in the co-ordination of external assistance. This wasparticularly true in the 1980’s before humani-tarian crises, due to internal wars, pushed theUN to expand its role and modalities of inter-

4 Report on Mission to Mozambique by Maurice F.Strong, 19 August 1987.

11

vention. In a conflict situation, however, the UNmay vary its position when its impartiality isquestioned in defining humanitarian needs andguaranteeing access to needy populations are atissue. Even in such cases, however, the UNnegotiates in the first instance with the Govern-ment to expand the UN role in the coordinationand limit that of the Government, so thatassistance gets to all civilians in need, regardlessof territorial control, with political impartiality.

UN emergency and humanitarian coordina-tion mechanisms, in their various manifestationswere attempted in Mozambique. Intermittentdrought and the intensification of war in themid-eighties, necessitated the setting up of theUnited Nations Office for Emergency Operationsin Africa (OEOA) in 1984. This was in recogni-tion of the fact that existing UN institutions wereineffective in dealing with the magnitude ofemergencies in Africa. Mozambique, as one ofthe priority countries was included in its “StatusReports of the Emergency Situation in Africa”.

OEOA Missions visited Mozambique toassess the deteriorating situation and back-upsupport was given to the UNDP Resident Repre-sentative who assumed the role of representingOEOA until it closed down in 1986. In the case ofMozambique, the OEOA coordination role was“soft” focusing mainly on information dissemi-nation on emergency needs and mobilisation offinancial support. The coordination, planningand implementation of actual operations restedwith Government, but with UNDP support tomobilise donors and NGOs. OEOA was com-mended by donors as an efficient ad-hoc opera-tion whose success was attributed to the com-bined authority of the Secretary-General withthe leadership of Bradford Morse and MauriceStrong, both of whom had international standingand could gain support from key donors andUN agencies.5

With the closure of OEOA, emergency issueswere placed under the United Nations Depart-ment of Special Political Questions, RegionalCooperation, Decolonisation and Trusteeship(SPQRCDT), since emergencies in Africa werebecoming increasingly more complex, and influ-enced as much by political issues as natural

5 Responding to Emergencies: The Role of the UN inEmergencies and Ad-Hoc Operations” by KristerEduards, Gunnar Rosen and Robert Rossborough, pp.61–113 in The United Nations Issues and Options: FiveStudies on the Role of the UN in the Economic and SocialDevelopment Fields, commissioned by the Nordic UNProject (Stockholm, 1991).

disasters. Thus it was the Special EmergencyProgramme, within SPQRCDT, which supportedMozambique as UN involvement in an Emer-gency Appeal process was sought by Govern-ment. UNDP at the field level continued to bethe focal point for coordination of UN agencies,donors and linkages with the Government.

Intensified military activities in 1985/1986increased the number of affected and displacedfrom 1.8 million to 3.2 million persons in a sixmonth period.6 Though these figures were notverifiable, local authorities and relief agenciesnoted the massive increase in affected popula-tions to at least 2.5 million persons, due to theexpanded military operations by both Renamoand the Government which had dire economicand social consequences for the civilian popula-tions.7 It was at this point that ICRC soughtapproval from the Mozambican Government tooperate within its territory in the areas con-trolled by Renamo. All other relief efforts, UNand bilateral, continued to provide assistanceonly to areas that Government defined as acces-sible, i.e. under their control.

Emergency relief coordination activities ofthe Government and the United Nations did noteven broach the question of relief for areasunder Renamo control. ICRC, consistent with itsmandate to provide assistance to those in needon all sides of a conflict, operated on its own andin liaison with Government and Renamo, butwith no contact with official coordination bodies.The origins and nature of the war conditionedthe international response. All assistance, underthe UN Appeal went through Governmentchannels and to government-held areas. The UNand donor rhetoric was firmly on the side of theMozambique Government as the victim ofapartheid aggression, the legitimate protector ofits people, and the recipient of emergency reliefaid. Renamo never achieved international legit-imacy until the final period of the peace negotia-

6 Report to the United Nations Secretary-General onEmergency Operations in Mozambique, February1997–October 1988, prepared by Arturo Hein, UnitedNations Special Coordinator for Emergency ReliefOperations in Mozambique, Maputo, October 1988.7 After the offensive by Renamo in the ZambeziValley, the Mozambique Government requested thatZimbabwean and Tanzanian troops enter into offen-sive operations aimed at pushing back Renamo fromareas in Sofala, Zambezia, Manica and Tete that theyhad occupied. Both the Renamo offensive and theGovernment counter-offensive provoked massivedisplacement of population and reduced significantlysecure areas for agricultural production.

12

tions in 1992. ICRC continued to be the onlyhumanitarian organisation to provide assistanceto civilians within Renamo held areas.8

The Government of Mozambique receivedsignificant international support for its reliefefforts, but realised that it did not have sufficientresources to stave off a human disaster. ThePresident o f Mozambique requested theSecretary-General of the United Nations in late1986 to launch an international emergencyappeal for Mozambique. This initiative was alsoa mechanism to use the UN forum to gain addi-tional political backing in its struggle againstRenamo.

An Expanded Role for the UN

In February 1987, the Secretary-Generallaunched an appeal to alert the internationalcommunity donors of the looming crisis. Conse-quently, a donors’ conference was held inGeneva in March at which $330 million waspledged for emergency relief including massivefood aid of 625,000 tons. Mozambique hadentered emergency appeal politics. The countrywould prove to be one of the most effective atsecuring high levels of international support forover a decade.

As was the practice in UN Emergency Appealmachinery, the Secretary-General appointed aUN Special Coordinator for Emergency ReliefOperations (UNSCERO) who was at the sametime the UNDP Resident Representative. Toassist the UN Special Coordinator, an Emer-gency Unit was established within UNDP, withthe mandate to support the Government incoordination, needs assessments, donor liaisonand information dissemination of the Emergencyprogramme. It was financed and staffed exclu-sively by UNDP, which eventually came to limitits effectiveness and credibility with other UNagencies with more extensive operational expe-rience i.e. UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR.

There was increasingly a call for UNDP toshow leadership within the UN system. ASwedish Mission to Mozambique on emergencycoordination in August 1987, concluded that theUN did not have a leadership role in emergencycoordination which was attributed to the lack ofcountry level UN emergency experience and

8 See “The Humanitarian Factor in the MozambiquePeace Negotiations: 1990–1992” by Sam Barnes in Warand Peace in Mozambique by Stephen Chan and MoisesVenancio (editors), MacMillan Ltd, London, 1998.

limited support and resources from head-quarters in respect to the UNSCERO functions.The mission also observed that there was astrong reluctance on the part of Government aswell as bilateral donors and NGOs to be coordi-nated by the UN. The mission recommendedthat it would not be appropriate at that time(1987) to upgrade the status of the UN Emer-gency Coordinator to be similar to what hadexisted in Ethiopia or Sudan.9

The Mozambique Government was not com-pletely supportive of the initiative to establish anEmergency Unit within UNDP seeing it as anattempt to usurp Government sovereignty overrelief operations within Mozambican territory.Its preference was for UN funds be used tostrengthen Government coordination mecha-nisms which were being developed to respondto the Emergency Appeal response. Sub-sequently, Government realised that this set-upcould be used to advantage.

So as to become more effective in the super-vision of this large scale relief programme, theGovernment created a National ExecutiveCommission for the Emergency (CENE). TheCommission was headed by the Prime Ministerbut its programmes were carried out by theMinistry of Cooperation. CENE was tasked withpolicy, coordination and day-to-day assessmentand monitoring of relief operations. CENE wasthe Government counterpart for the UNSCEROand was provided with institutional and mate-rial support through a UNDP technical assis-tance project financed through a UNDP TrustFund supported by Sweden, Switzerland andthe Netherlands. Approximately $3.5 millionwas dispersed from 1988 to 1994 to strengthennational (CENE) and provincial (ProvincialEmergency Commissions—CPEs) emergencymanagement and coordination entities. It alsofunded a small unit within CENE to support thecommission and act as UNSCERO’s day-to-daycounterpart.

In May 1987, CENE appointed a NationalCoordinator with the rank of Deputy-Ministerwith access to the Council of Ministers throughthe Prime Minister’s Office. This high levelaccess to Cabinet enhanced the Coordinator’seffectiveness in the implementation of the emer-gency programmes, providing an interface withthe various governmental line ministries (i.e.health, water, education, defence) that were

9 Report on Mission to the United Nations byMaurice Strong, 19 August 1997 (Internal Document).

13

involved in relief operations and the donorcommunity.

The CENE Coordinator held a weekly meet-ing with the UN Special Coordinator andchaired weekly meetings (Emergency Opera-tions Committee-EOC) which counted on theparticipation of Government implementing enti-ties (DPCCN, Ministry of Health, Rural WaterProgramme, etc.) and representatives of theinternational community (UNSCERO, UNagencies, donors, NGOs). UNSCERO, withCENE, prepared the meetings and acted as thesecretariat. The EOC was an important co-ordi-nation tool in this phase in which problems wereidentified, responses discussed and informationpassed from Government to implementers anddonors. In addition, the EOC minutes, preparedby UNSCERO, provided an important informa-tion dissemination function by which embassies,NGOs, journalists and Government departmentswere kept informed on the evolving emergencysituation in Mozambique.

The first CENE Coordinator, Prakash Ratilal,Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, wasan economist who had previously served as theGovernor of the Bank of Mozambique. The tiesto internal trade were critical in ensuring thatemergency programming had a foundation in amore global perspective of food security and theimpact of food aid on market structures, espe-cially the link between freely distributed relieffood and commercially sold market food aid.Ratilal understood how the UN served to furtherthe Government’s political interests and man-agerial capacity.

In the first place, the UN acted as a foundation forthe creation of a greater executive capacity withinGovernment. Secondly, it helped to make worldopinion aware of the nature and scale of the emer-gency in Mozambique and to mobilise interna-tional support for the Programme. Finally, andperhaps most importantly, the UN establisheditself as a constant and neutral liaison between theGovernment and the donor community.10

Ratilal was very adept at using the UN as amediator with those donors that had difficulty inaccepting a clear Government position. ThroughUNSCERO, messages were passed from donorsto Government and vice-versa and oftendiffused the “push-pull” relationship betweenthe international community and Government.Though the UN could assist and facilitatecoordination, there were strong signals that the 10 Mozambique: Using Aid to End Emergency byPrakasch Ratilal, UNDP, New York, 1990.

Government should be in the lead. The UN, vul-nerable to such pressure in its dealing with amember state, rocked back and forth with thegovernment vicissitudes, at times placing itselfoutside the “donor” camp.

The Mozambique Government with UN sup-port launched Emergency Appeals (1987–1992)totalling over $1.5 billion to assist the more thanthree million Mozambicans displaced or affectedby the civil conflict. UNSCERO backed up theseefforts, working with the Government and UNagencies to define the Emergency Programme.

Mozambique Emergency Appeals: 1987–1992

AppealYear

TotalRequirements

Total Pledges

1987/88 (no dollar value) $ 337,442,0001988/89 $ 380,406,000 $ 363,565,8201989/90 $ 361,790,640 $ 323,790,6401990/91 $ 135,789,026* $ 122,262,8771991/92 $ 262,522,468 $ 168,494,7351992/93 $ 447,179,020 $ 315,410,078TOTAL $1,587,687,154 $1,508,703,273

* 1990/91 Emergency Appeal did not include marketfood aidSource: UNSCERO Closing Reports

The UN can often unwittingly allow itself to beused by Governments wishing to gain credibilityfor the Emergency Appeals or be used for inter-nal political purposes. Mozambican local offi-cials had learned that inflated numbers of“needy populations” could bring more food aidto their localities, resulting in an increased pos-sibility of “diverting” a portion for public or pri-vate benefit. As a result, the beneficiary figuressent to CENE by provincial authorities werehighly inflated, at the same time as corruptionwas surfacing as a serious issue in the reliefoperations carried out by DPCCN, the govern-ment agency. These figures were immediatelyquestioned by many donors and UN agencies.

UNSCERO in January 1989, with the backingof Government and donors; organised a series ofverification missions to the affected provinces todetermine the actual number of Mozambicansthat required relief assistance. At the time therewas a generally held belief that those requestingthe assistance and the implementing institutionsstood to benefit from increases in vulnerablepopulation and therefore “inflated” the needs—“cooked” the numbers. The verification missionsserved the interests of CENE as well as the UN’s“external forces”—UN agencies, NGOs andbilateral donors in the missions could be used asthe scapegoat by CENE to pressure provincial

14

Governors to come up with an accurate and real-istic picture of priority needs, thus taking thepolitical heat off the central government in rela-tion to its provincial colleagues. Through theparticipation of government, in the missions, thefinal recommendations were accepted as“neutral and reliable” by the divergent interests.

During the same period, the Government wascoming under increasing pressure from some ofthe major donors—principally the US—over the“diversion” of food aid and other emergencyrelief. Despite the presence of CARE within theDPCCN, corruption allegations were wide-spread.11 Pressure was put on UNSCERO topush the Government to investigate the allega-tions. Consequently, the Council of Ministersappointed a Commission of Inquiry to investi-gate the thefts of relief commodities. The Com-mission’s Report did not satisfy the donor com-munity, and subsequently during the prepara-tion of the 1990/91 Emergency Appeal, the UNdemanded that the Government recognise cor-ruption as a problem in the Appeal document,and that the Prime Minister discuss it directlywith the donors at the Appeal Conference inNew York.

Government leadership in relief coordinationwas being challenged by the donor community.The inability of DPCCN, the government reliefagency, to satisfy the donors’ requirements formonitoring distribution to the beneficiary levelcoupled with the unwillingness of Governmentto take actions against those responsible fordiversion of food aid led to an erosion of confi-dence and pressure for implementation to betaken out of the hands of government.

The UN at Odds with Itself

Despite UNSCERO’s good working relationshipwith the Government, there were tensions andpower struggles within the UN regarding theprominent coordination role of UNSCERO. TheOffice backing up UNSCERO was a UNDP cre-ation which was directed and staffed exclusivelyby UNDP. Its Chief Officer was named byUNDP, without consultation or input from otherUN agencies despite their more extensive expe-rience relative to UNDP in emergency opera-tions in Mozambique. UNDP staff named to

11 CARE had been contracted to provide technicalassistance to the Logistics Support Unit of DPCCN.USAID evaluations criticised CARE for failing todirect adequate resources towards training and capac-ity building.

head the Emergency Unit, had no previousexperience in emergency coordination and wereassigned to their posts in response to personnelconsiderations at headquarters.12 As such, theyhad limited credibility and effectiveness withUN agencies, donors, and Government. As theemergency programme expanded and with it thefinancial stakes, the role of UNSCERO andUNDP in coordination was increasingly chal-lenged by the other UN agencies.

Concurrent to the discussions of UNDP’seffectiveness at the field level, by 1990 within theUN General Assembly member states were alsoquestioning the overall efficacy of the UN inemergency and humanitarian operations. Thetraditional approach (UNSCERO model) whichallocated leadership to the UNDP Resident Rep-resentative acting also as UN Resident Coor-dinator was not effective since UNDP lackedoperational experience, appropriately qualifiedstaff and the internal bureaucratic mechanismsto fulfil this role. Equally ineffective, wasUNDRO, established in 1971 to direct andcoordinate relief activities of the UN system as awhole at the headquarters level.

With the proliferation of complex emergen-cies caused by civil conflicts and ethnic warfare(Iraq, Somalia, Sudan), there was a perceivedneed to rework the institutional mechanisms ofthe UN to respond to the new post-cold-warreality. As humanitarian operations becameessential components of peace-keeping initia-tives, a mechanism to provide leadership andeffectively coordinate these activities wasdeemed necessary. Concrete proposals were putforward at a G7 Summit in London in July 1991.Concurrently, the Nordic countries had alsocommissioned studies to look into UN effective-ness, including emergency and relief operations.The need for a new institution in the humanitar-ian realm that could bring together disparate UNefforts under one common banner was widelyaccepted.

After much debate and discussion, in Decem-ber 1991 the General Assembly passed resolu-tion 46/182 “Strengthening of the coordinationof humanitarian emergency assistance of theUnited Nations”. The Department of Human-

12 The need to reform UNDP personnel policy, ifUNDP is to have a role in humanitarian coordinationat the field level, is discussed in detail within a UNDPcommissioned study, UNDP in Conflicts and Disasters:An Overview Report of the Continuum Project (UNDPProject INT/93/709) by Matthias Steifel, Geneva,August 1994 (revised version) pp. 45–63.

15

itarian Affairs (DHA) was thus established toconsolidate the UN Secretariat offices involvedin humanitarian emergency assistance activities,including UNDRO. In April 1992, the Secretary-General appointed Jan Eliasson, a Swedishdiplomat, as Under-Secretary-General forHumanitarian Affairs. DHA was to have bearingon decisions regarding the structuring ofhumanitarian coordination within Mozambiqueand the humanitarian component of theMozambican peace-keeping mission.

UN Coordination in the Field

As the emergency situation in Mozambiquebegan to constrain development planning, to itscredit, UNDP named a WFP senior staff memberwith experience in emergency operations inEthiopia and southern Africa, to be the UNDPResident Representative. He also assumed theposition of UNSCERO in his capacity as Resi-dent Coordinator. Under his tenureship, workwas accelerated with Government, UN agencies,donors and NGOs to mobilise support for theimmediate relief needs and the planning for theresettlement and reintegration of 5 million inter-nally and externally displaced Mozambicans,which would be necessary once a peace agree-ment was reached.

Previous UNDP Resident Representatives inMozambique had been conditioned primarily bytheir experiences with standard UNDP CountryProgrammes, so even in a war situation and adisintegrating economy, UNDP country pro-grammes continued to provide technical assis-tance to central ministries which, given the warhad no viable development strategy and had be-come cut off from their provincial areas of opera-tions and tied to increasingly entrenched centralbureaucracies. The UNDP Resident Representa-tive was fortunate to have a competent UNDPDeputy to take charge of maintaining this ratherstagnant country programme, thereby releasingthe Resident Representative to focus attention onhis UNSCERO role of coordination of emergencyrelief, and planning for national reconstructionafter an eventual peace agreement.

Unfortunately, the UNSCERO’s previousprofessional experience in emergency operationsdid not compensate for his current institutionalties to UNDP. In Mozambique, the role of UNDPin emergency coordination at the field level wasbeing challenged by the two largest operationalagencies—WFP and UNICEF. In support of the1989/90 UN Emergency Appeal, WFP had a

$20.6 million dollar programme, UNICEF $4.9million, compared to UNDP’s $1.7 million. By1992, in response to the Mozambique EmergencyDrought Appeal, WFP contributed $105 millionwhile UNICEF’s emergency programmeincreased to $6.7 million. In 1992, no new UNDPcontributions were recorded to support thedrought emergency.13 WFP believed it shouldbe the “lead agency” since it provided thelargest amount of assistance from the UN family.UNICEF supplied most of the non-food aid, sothe two jointly questioned the legitimacy ofUNDP and UNSCERO maintaining a hold onUN emergency coordination. AlthoughUNSCERO had a more operational approachdue to the UNDP Resident Representative’s longWFP experience, this was disregarded in thebattle for agency positioning for the lead coordi-nation role. Intra-agency rivalry thus informedall coordination discussions.

This was compounded by UNDP’s cen-tralised procedures and modalities, character-ised by headquarters control, negotiations withcentral governments and long term countryplans. These approaches were not appropriatefor the Mozambique context in which the warhad significantly weakened the government;politically, militarily and economically. The UNResident Coordinator and UNSCERO rolesplaced added constraints, since they representedthe UN to a member state government. There-fore, UNSCERO was hesitant to have direct con-tacts with the internal protagonist, Renamo,regarding the need for humanitarian assistancein Renamo-controlled areas, unless it was firstcleared by Government. This opened the way forthe initial UN overtures regarding humanitarianassistance into conflict zones being made byWFP and UNICEF.

The consequences of such UN rivalry createda vacuum in which NGOs and bilateral agenciescould move to define their own programmesseparate from and in parallel to both Govern-ment priorities and coordinated UN proposals.The post-war planning process suffered as per-sonalities took the lead in defining priorities.Concomitant to this, increasing NGO implemen-tation of emergency programmes reduced therole of government and set the stage for thedonor-driven policies that were to characterisethe peace-keeping phase.

13 See UNSCERO Closing Reports for each Appealfor comparative information on donations by UNagencies, bilateral agencies and NGOs.

16

Phase II: Peace Talks and protractedemergency needs—1990–1992

By 1989, it was increasingly apparent that thewar had become widespread with its victimsincreasingly the civil society in rural communi-ties. A negotiated end to the war thus appearedto be an option for Mozambique. Followingprotracted efforts by international actors tomediate between Government and Renamo toend the war, the two parties had their first directcontacts in Rome in July 1990. There followed alengthy peace negotiation process which culmi-nated in, among other things, a newConstitution which set the country firmly in thedirection of a democratic, multiparty system.

In the event of a peace agreement, discus-sions about an appropriate and effective strategyfor the post-war period which was to be charac-terised by massive population movements andresettlement began in 1990. However, the expec-tations that UNSCERO/UNDP and the UNsystem could respond quickly and with a“unified” plan were dashed, as UN interagencybattles came to dominate policy discussions.Certain bilateral donors moved to support theGovernment in preparing for post-war recon-struction and demobilisation of soldiers. Asearly as 1990 the Swiss supported the Ministry ofFinance to set up a unit to start planning for thedemobilisation of soldiers and their reinte-gration into civilian life. Initiatives in provincialpost-war planning were carried out and thepeace negotiations were going on as the Nati-onal Planning Commission began its process ofpreparing a National Reconstruction Plan withinputs from all the provinces. All of these wereimportant in building a national constituency forpeace and to prepare for the post-war period.

Notwithstanding UN inter-agency rivalries,UNDP’s visibility in leadership in relation toGovernment and donors was linked to its role inthe coordination of humanitarian activities.There was a close working relationship betweenUNSCERO and government coordination enti-ties which jointly defined needs and priorities.The definition of needs was very contentious,involving negotiation between Governmentagencies (CENE and line ministries) and UNagencies. Generally, UN agencies wanted to usethe appeal process to expand their own pro-

grammes. This Mozambique appeal model didnot follow the “unwritten rules” of other UNAppeals, which have as their objective fund-raising for UN agencies rather than the countryin need.

In the case of Mozambique, inter-agencyassessment missions were usually sent out fromheadquarters to work with Government andUNSCERO to prepare each appeal. However,consensus on what was a priority resulted fromdiscussions in Maputo between the UN andGovernment, and not in New York, Geneva orRome. UN agencies having become accustomedto Emergency Appeals as a fund-raising carteblanche did not look kindly at being told by Gov-ernment or UNSCERO that their proposalsshould be adjusted in accordance with agreedupon Mozambican priorities.

The Special Coordinator played a construc-tive role in bringing together donors around theneed for coordinated action in response to the1992 Southern Africa drought. This included dis-cussions on opening-up humanitarian corridorsinto Renamo-controlled areas. WFP andUNICEF had more experience with reliefoperations in conflict situations, as they wereinvolved in Operation Lifeline in the Sudan. Theidea of “peace corridors” began to be discussedin Maputo with donors and government whilethe International Committee for the Red Cross(ICRC) brought the issue up directly withRenamo in Rome. As the drought situationworsened, UNSCERO/ICRC coordination wasformalised and ICRC participated in regulardonor meetings on the drought emergencychaired by UNSCERO and held at the WorldBank.

Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) stepsinto Mozambique

Shortly after the passing of the General Assem-bly Resolution 46/182 creating DHA, UNDPsent a mission to Mozambique (February 1992)to review the UN emergency and relief coordi-nation structures, as well as UN assistance toGovernment coordination and management ofits emergency programme with the view to pro-

17

pose changes that would accommodate GA46/182. This was headed by Michael Priestly, asenior advisor to the UNDP Administrator onHumanitarian Programmes, with extensiveexperience in emergency situations (Sudan,Ethiopia).

The creation of DHA was in part a responseto the inadequacies of UNDP to undertake effec-tively its coordination role in complex emer-gencies. A UNDP commissioned study UNDP inConflict and Disasters (1994) recognised that“UNDP is often regarded as having neither theinstitutional capacity, the necessary experience,nor the human and financial resources or thepolitical clout to play a leadership role in emer-gency and post-emergency situations.” TheReport stated that the principle causes of theUNDP’s “counter-performance” in emergencyrelated situations were (1) a UNDP policyvacuum in relation to its role in complex emer-gencies (2) a vague UNDP mandate in humani-tarian areas (3) insufficiently qualified staff and(4) UNDP’s close connection to governmentsand (5) bureaucratic rigidity.14 Some parts ofUNDP realised that the agency had to come upwith a new approach if it was to continue to playa leading role in humanitarian coordination inMozambique. This framework would have totake into account DHA and the probable pres-ence of a peace-keeping mission as a result of thepeace talks.

The Priestly mission proposed thatUNSCERO be transformed into a representativeUN unit, with staff seconded from UN agenciesinvolved in the humanitarian effort, in particularUNDP, WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO andFAO. The recommendation recognised that if thenotion of UN coordination was to have any cred-ibility amongst the agencies themselves andbilateral donors, and all UN agencies must bepartners in the coordination effort. It was furtherrecommended that the new UN Unit have a newname to reflect the change that “overall coordi-nation is provided through a special representa-tive of the UN Secretary-General, reporting tothe newly appointed Under-Secretary-General ofHumanitarian Affairs”.15

The Mission foresaw the need for anexpanded relief effort into Renamo areas, duringthe negotiation and peace-keeping phases, andlarge scale population movements of internally

14 Mattias Steifel, pp.10–12.15 From draft report of the UNDP ReformulationMission, 6 April 1992, p.15.

displaced and returning refugees in the post-conflict period. It seemed clear to the missionthat the arrangements in place would notadequately meet the demands of the post-con-flict situation. Thus, the Mission recommendedthe establishment of a UN presence in theprovinces, but based upon the already existingUN agency field structures in the four provinceswhere they existed. In other words, a UN agency(in this case UNICEF, WFP or UNHCR) wouldrepresent the system in that province andcoordinate the planning and implementation ofhumanitarian activities. If necessary, the newUN Unit would later establish provincial officesas needed, based upon the new concept of a UNcoordination unit which had participation of allthe major actors.

Unfortunately, UNDP did not listen to itsown advisors. The bureaucratic wheels werealready moving in the UNDP personnel depart-ment to replace the Emergency Unit Head, with-out consultation with other UN agencies. Therewas an opportunity, in May 1992, for an over-ture by UNDP to DHA and the other UN agen-cies to have a joint selection process in whichcandidates from the larger agencies operating inthe emergency programme in Mozambiquecould be considered for the position—so as tobegin to create this new UN coordination unit.Without listening to the field or its own mis-sion’s recommendations, UNDP headquartersappointed one of its own who had no experiencein emergency situations, thereby reinforcing theother UN agencies’ opposition to UNDP’sleadership in humanitarian coordination.

As the UNSCERO structure stayed the same,the context around it was continuing to change.In March 1992, Protocol III, part IV, signed byGovernment and Renamo indicated a role forthe United Nations in the drawing up andimplementation of a plan for the return andsocial reintegration of Mozambican refugees anddisplaced persons. The newly formedDepartment of Humanitarian Affairs launchedits first Consolidated Appeal for the DroughtEmergency in Southern Africa (DESA) in June1992.

The DESA Appeal began to show an emerg-ing DHA strategy—to use the UN to promoteand fundraise first for UN agencies, ignoringnationally defined priorities. In Mozambique,the practice had been to define priority needswithin the country which any entity—govern-mental line ministries, UN, bilateral or NGO—could implement. This came in contradiction to

18

the evolving structure of “consolidated” appeals.Mozambique had written its own DroughtEmergency Appeal with UNSCERO and UNagency support. UNSCERO had to make strongarguments with DHA for the continuation of thecountry-driven rather than agency-drivenapproach for the Mozambique portion of DESA.

Concurrently, WFP, in Mozambique, wasplanning to set up its own logistics unit,(UNILOG), rejecting an initiative to have a UNlogistics unit that could serve the entire systemunder UNSCERO but with the co-participationof WFP and UNICEF. WFP decided to place itsown field monitors in each province to coordi-nate food deliveries and distribution. These ini-tiatives not only fragmented UN coordinationand collaboration, but also undermined the Gov-ernment’s predominant role in food deliveriesand provincial level food aid coordination.

There were continuing discussions on theneed for humanitarian corridors into Renamoareas and secure access to reach all Mozam-bicans in need. This culminated in the Declara-tion on the Guiding Principles for HumanitarianAssistance in Rome in July 1992, before the peaceagreement. This placed humanitarian assistancecoordination firmly within a peace-keeping con-text in which neutrality and impartiality had tobecome part of the modus operandi. UNSCEROpresided over the Humanitarian AssistanceCommittee which was set up by the declarationto supervise and coordinate the humanitarianoperations.

The possibility of maintaining peace inMozambique was seen to be closely linked to theeffectiveness of the humanitarian programme. Insome previous peace-keeping missions, humani-tarian coordination had been outside the missionand held by UNDP or a lead agency (WFP orUNHCR) creating difficulties in ensuring thathumanitarian and political priorities weremutually re-enforcing and consolidating to theprocess. There was a growing recognition thatthe various aspects of peace-keeping should beintegrated. Given that DHA had been set up,there was a strong lobby for one UN flag.

Before the General Peace Agreement wassigned, planning and consultations had gone onregarding the possible role and structure of thehumanitarian component of a UN Peace-keepingMission in Mozambique. What UNSCERO pro-vided was an institutional framework within theUNDP Mozambique Field Office which could bebuilt upon for the humanitarian component ofthe peace-keeping operation. Under-Secretary-

General James Jonah and Under-Secretary-General Abdulrahim Farah in a briefing note tothe SG on 8 August 1992 transmitted the viewthat the UN involvement in Mozambique wascomplex, that it should be integrated and thatthe humanitarian coordination componentshould be within the structure of the peace-keeping operation.16 This view surfaced in thenon-paper sent to President Chissano on 19August 1992 outlining possible modalities of UNinvolvement in the verification of a GPA. Thenon-paper refers to the fact that the Special Rep-resentative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)would also be responsible for coordinating anyactivities of the United Nations developmentand humanitarian agencies which were con-nected with the implementation of the GPA.

Chissano responded by requesting UnitedNations technical teams on the elections and thecease-fire. In Government’s view, humanitarianassistance coordination to guarantee delivery ofrelief to all Mozambicans had already been dealtwith through the July agreement which estab-lished a Humanitarian Assistance Committeechaired by the United Nations, so no additionalteam was required to look into this area.

However, despite the pressing needs due tothe drought, the implementation of the Declara-tion was slow and the hoped for access toincreased numbers of needy Mozambicans bythe ICRC and the UN was not materialising. In aletter from the SG to the President of theSecurity Council on the UN involvement inimplementation of the peace agreement a fewdays before the signing of the peace agreement(29 September 1996), the SG reported that hewould be sending the Deputy of the USG forHumanitarian Affairs to Mozambique “to devisea more effective United Nations response to theemergency situation and to expedite the openingof land corridors.”17

A General Peace Agreement (GPA) wassigned by the Government of Mozambique andRenamo on 4 October 1992 in Rome. An expan-sive role for the UN was foreseen as the GPAstipulated a broad role for the UN in the overallsupervision of the implementation of the GPA.The UN was to verify the cease-fire; superviseand monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops,

16 Interview by author with Taye Zerihoun, UnitedNations Department of Political Affairs, New York,April 17, 1995.17 The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992–1995.New York: Department of Public Information, 1995,p.104.

19

the separation of the two armies, their entry intoassembly areas, their disarmament and demobil-isation; observe the electoral process and pro-vide technical assistance and material support tothe Mozambican Government to organise andcarry out multi-party elections for president andmembers of parliament; and to assist the Gov-ernment and Renamo in drawing up andimplementing a plan for relief, resettlement andreintegration of Mozambican refugees, internallydisplaced persons and demobilised soldiers.

The humanitarian mission, headed byCharles La Muniere, Director and Deputy to theUnder-Secretary-General of the Department ofHumanitarian Affairs, arrived in Mozambiquetwo days after the signing of the GPA (6 Octo-ber). La Muniere was well known in Mozam-bique, as he had been the Director of the Officeof Emergencies in Africa of SPQRCDT in the lateeighties. He had headed several previous inter-agency missions to Mozambique starting in 1987to prepare the emergency appeals. Before joiningDHA, La Muniere was the Director of Emer-gency Programmes within UNICEF.

UN agencies and the major donors backedthe notion that the existing coordination mecha-nisms (UNSCERO) with a UNDP monopolywere obsolete, for political and operationalreasons. Given the peace agreement and theanticipated massive flow of refugees, internallydisplaced families and eventually demobilisedsoldiers to their areas of origin, active participa-tion of the operational agencies was critical. Inaddition, the Humanitarian Assistance Pro-gramme was seen as having a clear politicaldimension that had a direct impact on the peaceprocess, requiring an impartial UN unit whichderived its mandate from the Peace Agreementrather than governmental agreements (with onlyone party to the peace agreement).

President Chissano emphasised to the mis-sion that food had to be delivered rapidly andefficiently to the drought victims, as well as tothe soldiers of the two armies—Frelimo-FAMand Renamo that were awaiting demobilisation.Incidents had occurred in which workers ofrelief organisations, local administrators, aircraftand vehicles had been forcibly held by troopsfrom both sides demanding food and salaries. Ifthis continued it could destabilise the peace pro-cess. He saw the importance of UN impartialityin providing assistance to both sides.

The mission proposed the immediate creationof the United Nations Office for HumanitarianAssistance Coordination (UNOHAC) to replace

UNSCERO. It was proposed that the new struc-ture be made up of staff seconded from UNagencies (DHA, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO,WHO, UNDP) and the NGO community andinclude staff member from the Government andRenamo. UNOHAC would be headed by thethen Special Coordinator of Emergency ReliefOperations until the arrival of the SRSG, whowould review the situation after his arrival.

Further, to complicate matters at a very deli-cate time politically, UNDP replaced its ResidentRepresentative and therefore the head ofUNSCERO a week before the signing of theGPA. Peter Simkin had represented DHA andled the UN delegation to the discussions inRome in July 1992 that culminated with the Dec-laration on Humanitarian Assistance. He wasthe visible representative of the UN system inthe discussions with Renamo regarding theprovision of relief to areas under their controland was presiding over the HumanitarianAssistance Committee. He would have been thelogical link, as the experienced UNSCERO andResident Coordinator, with the SRSG. He hadalso been working closely with the Swiss on theplanning and preparations for demobilisation.Shortly before his transfer, the Prime Minister ofMozambique transmitted the Government’swish that he stay on for a transition period. Thiswas forwarded to UNDP New York, but to noavail. A new Resident Representative arrivedwho, to his credit, had previous experience inMozambique, but could not bring that vital linkwith the major actors and negotiation processthat had been going on during the previous year.

This action by UNDP was viewed by severalambassadors as an example of UNDP’s inabilityto assume political leadership due to its ownbureaucratic intransigence and lack of under-standing of UNDP’s role within peace-keepingcontexts. However, it also reflected the weaknessof the UN system which must approve changesin UN Resident Coordinators. The UN andespecially DHA, should have recognised that tochange the UNSCERO and the UN ResidentCoordinator would not be advisable if the Secu-rity Council was considering a peace-keepingoperation in the country. DHA was still in itsstart-up phase and the Inter-Agency StandingCommittee had not yet taken on the issues ofprocedures for approval of “humanitariancoordinators”.

The missions recommendations for increas-ing the effectiveness of UN humanitariancoordination left open the linkage of UNOHAC

20

to the peace-keeping structure and the questionof who should head UNOHAC; concluding thatonly after the nomination of the Special Repre-sentative would the particulars of the linkages ofUNOHAC to the peace-keeping mission bereviewed and defined.

21

Phase III: UNOHAC—Humanitarian Coordination within thePeace-Keeping Operation 1992–1994

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Aldo Ajello, arrived on 15 Octo-ber 1992 in Mozambique to set up the Peace-keeping Operation, ONUMOZ. By early Decem-ber the structure and framework for the opera-tion was presented to the UN Security Councilfor approval. The humanitarian component wasplaced within the ONUMOZ structure under theleadership of the SRSG. The ONUMOZ frame-work built upon the interrelated mandates of themilitary, political, electoral and humanitariancomponents.

Without sufficient humanitarian aid, and espe-cially food supplies, the security situation in thecountry may deteriorate and the demobilisationprocess might stall. Without adequate militaryprotection, the humanitarian aid would not reachits destination. Without sufficient progress in thepolitical area, the confidence required for the dis-armament and rehabilitation would not exist. Theelectoral process, in turn, requires prompt demo-bilisation and formation of the new armed forces,without which conditions would not exist forsuccessful elections.18

The recommendations of the DHA missionregarding the separation of UNOHAC fromUNDP were endorsed at the country level by thekey UN agencies and the donors. While therewas agreement on the need to diminish UNDP’sleadership in humanitarian coordination, theoperational agencies and UNDP quickly came toview ONUMOZ and UNOHAC as a challenge totheir power and influence in Maputo. The SRSGwas the highest UN Official in the country, andall UN agency representatives had to accept hispolitical leadership during the peace-keepingperiod.

ONUMOZ was the first major peace-keepingoperation in which DHA was included alongsidethe Department of Political Affairs (DPA) andDepartment of Peace-keeping Operations(DPKO). By the time the SRSG was appointed,the view in New York was to have a stronghumanitarian component within ONUMOZ and

18 The United Nations and Mozambique, Document 26,Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ, p.152.

strip UNDP of its humanitarian coordinationrole in Mozambique. The SRSG agreed with theplacement of UNOHAC within ONUMOZ andstated that he would have “refused to have itoutside the structure”.19 Bert Bernander wasselected as the UNOHAC Director with theagreement of the SRSG, DHA and UNDP head-quarters. Bernander, a former UNDP ResidentRepresentative, had served as UN HumanitarianCoordinator in Iraq and Cambodia and bore ahigher rank within the UN system than thecountry agency heads. He reported to the SRSGand to DHA in New York. Some UN agencies,including the then UNDP Representative inMaputo, later protested his nomination prefer-ring that the UNDP Resident Representative begiven the post, as had been the case withUNSCERO. These views reflected the emerginganti-DHA constituency within the UN opera-tional agencies,20 which eventually resulted inthe elimination of DHA in 1997 and the creationof a “softer” Office of Coordination of Humani-tarian Assistance (OCHA).

The ONUMOZ period was characterised bystrong criticisms of the UN humanitariancoordination machinery and its effectiveness.Given the high profile and cost of ONUMOZ,21

UN agencies in Maputo and some bilateral aidagencies (notably USAID) criticised the model ofplacing the UN humanitarian coordination office

19 Interview by author with SRSG, Aldo Ajello,United Nations, 3 April 1995.20 Jonathan Moore in his prescriptive essay forUNRISD entitled The United Nations and ComplexEmergencies: Rehabilitation in Third World Transitions(1996) reveals the height to which UN interagencyrivalries go. “One of the most prestigious UN opera-tional agencies actually dispatched emissaries to itsfield office in Mozambique to pass the word thatexcessive cooperation with the overall guidance laiddown by the SRSG and his staff (UNOHAC) wouldnot be appreciated back at agency headquarters.”(p.29)21 The direct costs of the ONUMOZ operation were$565 million (DPKO, 1996) while humanitariansupport accounted for $532 million in obligated fundsduring the ONUMOZ period, $60 million for electionsupport and $16 million for the Renamo and PoliticalParties UN Trust Funds.

22

within the peace-keeping operation.22 The areasof dispute were the parameters of humanitariancoordination; extent of operations thatUNOHAC should undertake as a temporarycoordination entity, programme links with gov-ernment, the role of donors, the mine clearanceprogramme and planning for the reintegration ofdemobilised soldiers. Unfortunately, in practice,much of the debate was driven by agencies’ andindividuals’ self-interest and concern for turfpreservation in relation to the encroaching PKO-ONUMOZ. The substantive issues were moreoften than not overlooked.

Establishing UNOHAC

UNOHAC’s establishment followed five years ofUN coordination through UNSCERO/UNDPwhich proved to be a great advantage forONUMOZ. The UNSCERO office was mergedinto UNOHAC and much of the staff trans-ferred. UNOHAC’s major task was to coordinatewith Government and Renamo the emergencyand humanitarian programmes of the UN agen-cies, bilateral donors and NGOs. This includedinformation gathering, assessments and dissem-ination; maintenance of a database on financialsupport, population movements, sectoral activi-ties and implementation; special support formine clearance and reintegration of demobilisedsoldiers and the management of special trustfunds established to finance humanitarian pro-jects in the context of the GPA. All of these func-tions had been within the mandate of UNSCEROwith the exception of mine clearance andsupport for demobilised soldiers.

Since UNOHAC had staff and a carryoverbudget from UNSCERO/UNDP, it was imme-diately functional. De facto, the humanitariancomponent of the PKO was the first on theground since basic agreement on the framework

22 It is interesting to note that Dennis Jett, USAmbassador to Mozambique at the time was stronglycritical of UNOHAC’s placement within the PKO.After leaving Mozambique and reflecting upon thatconclusion in a broader context he stated in corre-spondence with the author “Regarding the humani-tarian aspect of the PKO, I think everything should beunder the control and responsibility of the SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General. Some tend tosee humanitarian action as something that is goodunder any circumstances and that has to be divorcedfrom political influences. I think the military andpolitical impacts of humanitarian assistance areinescapable and need to be factored in to see whetherthey are a positive or negative element”.

for humanitarian operations had been reachedthrough the July 1992 Agreement on the GuidingPrinciples for Humanitarian Assistance. The Gov-ernment released UNDP advisors to its Provin-cial Emergency Commissions (CPEs) to repre-sent the UN at the provincial level and liaisewith UNOHAC, linking with Renamo and Gov-ernment while UNOHAC recruited its ownProvincial level staff. This facilitated the expan-sion of relief operations into Renamo-controlledterritory.

The UN agencies on the ground (WFP,UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, UNDP, FAO) withlarge emergency programmes, NGOs and theMozambican Government had worked togetherduring the war period. Unlike other PKOs, sig-nificant organisational and logistical networksfor humanitarian assistance delivery had beenestablished long before this PKO and operationsonly needed to be extended into Renamo-con-trolled areas. Renamo had little experience withthe international community and was unfamiliarwith and distrustful of the rhetoric and practiceof coordination. Relief operations were oftendelayed in the first months after the GPA due toRenamo’s reluctance and inexperience in work-ing with international humanitarian organisa-tions. Significant time had to be spent withRenamo at national and local levels to gain theirconfidence and familiarise them with the normsand codes of conduct of international humanitar-ian organisations.23

While the initial proposals to createUNOHAC included recommendations to inte-grate Government, Renamo and NGOs withinthe structure, the final formula included“international” professional staff, with the twoparties participating in committees convened byUNOHAC. Twenty-four professional staff weredivided between a central office and the tenprovinces. Eleven were seconded from UN agen-cies (UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, WFP), amultilateral organisation (IOM) and a bilateraldonor (USAID), while the remainder werefunded by the ONUMOZ budget. It had beenhoped that secondment from UN agencieswould lead to greater collaboration and coordi-nation. However, at both headquarters and fieldlevel there were divergent views between theagencies and UNOHAC on whether the sec-

23 ICRC in interviews with the author (Geneva, June1995, June 1996) stated that from the time ICRC beganworking with Renamo in 1986, Renamo had diffic-ulties in understanding the roles, mandates and limi-tations of humanitarian organisations.

23

onded staff were responsible to the UNOHACDirector or their agency representative, and thisbecame another arena of the DHA/agency tug-of war. Two major agencies lagged in theircommitment to join the ONUMOZ (UNOHAC)machinery—WFP and UNHCR. UNHCR placeda liaison officer within UNOHAC in mid-1993,while WFP only placed a staff person there in1994—18 months after the signing of the GPA.Each had large offices in Maputo with extensivefield representation and viewed UNOHAC as anunnecessary interference with their work.24

In terms of organisation, UNOHAC had twofunctional units—Assessment and Planning andInformation Management, two special pro-gramme sections—Mine Clearance and Reinte-gration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers, aTrust Fund manager and the field staff. TheAssessment and Planning unit included eightprofessional staff, most seconded from UNagencies (WHO, UNHCR, WFP, UNDP, IOM)who oversaw the needs assessment and pre-pared the Consolidated Humanitarian Assis-tance Programme (CHAP) in their sectoral areas,collaborating with the two parties to the peaceagreement and the relevant agencies and NGOs.

UNOHAC in conceptualising a transitionalhumanitarian assistance programme attemptedto link relief to development. This initiative wascriticised by USAID which stated that thebiggest problem was the “unwillingness andseeming inability of UNOHAC to understandand accept the essentially short-term nature,politically-oriented requirements of the peaceprocess, and their continual focus on long-termdevelopment issues.”25 The SRSG, Aldo Ajello,at the time echoed this criticism by stating thatUNOHAC was driven by development peopleand not peace keepers. On the other hand,Jonathan Moore, former US Ambassador to theUN and former Director of the Institute ofPolitics at the Kennedy School of HarvardUniversity argues strongly that “a valuable co-ordinating tool is a medium-term rehabilitationstrategy fashioned in close consultation with allactors under the guidance of the appropriate UNco-ordinator and working closely with the local

24 WFP actually went the extreme of prohibiting itsstaff from being international election observers,when the SRSG requested all UN agencies andembassies to contribute personnel so as to reducecosts and provide observers familiar with the countryand language.25 Cable from US Ambassador Dennis Jett to USDepartment of State, 15 July 1994.

government.”26 In referring to Mozambique,Moore’s view of UNOHAC was that it “withsome success struggled to deal with immediateneeds while attempting to lay a base for longer-term development”.

The Humanitarian Assistance Programmewas presented at a Donor Conference in Maputoin June 1993, as required by the Rome Confer-ence in December 1992. It totalled $560 millionand reflected an integrated approach to restoringbasic services in the areas of agricultural produc-tion, health care, water supply, education androad rehabilitation through both sectoral andarea-based approaches. This was supplementedby support for demobilisation, Mine Clearanceand Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers.Further updates were prepared by UNOHAC inNovember 1993 and April 1994, for a total pack-age of $775 million of which $633 wascommitted by the international community.

UN Consolidated Appeals both add anddetract from the coordination process. It isimportant to develop a programme frameworkin which international aid can be channelled, butaid providers (UN, bilateral agencies and NGOs)tend to use the process (and the document) tojustify their own funding needs. When a coordi-nation entity pushes to put some rationale andcoherence into the programme, excluding costlyefforts of technical assistance, or promoting localgovernment involvement in order to ensure sus-tainability and continuity, the coordinationentity is often accused of moving into “imple-mentation” issues that are the domain of theoperational agencies or donors.

The fielding of the military and politicalcomponents of ONUMOZ was delayed untilmid-1993,27 resulting in the humanitarian com-ponent being the advance guard of the peaceprocess. The civilian populations had to gainconfidence and the first visible sign of peace formany was the provisioning of basic necessities.This was carried out with neutrality and trans-parency under UN coordination. Weekly plans

26 The UN and Complex Emergencies, Rehabilitation inThird World Transitions by Jonathan Moore, UNRISD:Geneva, 1996.27 The delay in the deployment of ONUMOZ forceswas due to financial constraints of the PKO, finalcommitments of national contingents were confirmedonly in January and February 1993, the MozambiqueGovernment only signed the Status of Forces agree-ment in May 1993. In short, everyone wanted to buytime to prepare and position themselves politically.Militarily, ONUMOZ only became visible in May1993.

24

for relief distribution into Renamo-controlledareas were discussed and approved at a Techni-cal Committee chaired by UNOHAC whichincluded both Government and Renamo repre-sentatives as well as ICRC, WFP and NGOimplementers. Initially, the decisions were madenationally but as the Provincial UNOHACOffices opened, the real discussion and decision-making was at the provincial level and planswere sent to Maputo, more for information thanauthorisation.

The field presence was a critical part ofUNOHAC’s coordination mechanism andperhaps UNOHAC’s most effective and opera-tional coordination contribution. ProvincialHumanitarian Assistance Committees func-tioned as important bridging mechanisms inwhich, under a UN banner, Government andRenamo worked together with humanitarianorganisations to assess needs, establish prioritiesand deliver assistance to the most needy areas.Valuable information was gathered on needs inpreviously inaccessible areas, and was passed onthrough UNOHAC to the international commu-nity. In the first six months after the signing ofthe GPA, UNOHAC recorded that 16,000 tons offood, 2,000 tons of seeds and 130,000 units ofrelief supplies were distributed to civilians inRenamo-controlled areas. This increased to116,000 tons delivered to ex-Renamo areas in 75districts in all ten provinces by the end of theONUMOZ mandate in December 1994. Whileonly ICRC was working in Renamo areas at thetime of the signing of the peace agreement, by1994 more than 35 NGOs and UN agencies wereworking in what had been called Renamo-con-trolled areas.

So as to be visibly linked to the ONUMOZmachinery, the humanitarian coordination officemoved out of UNDP and into the ONUMOZheadquarters. Though part of the PKO machin-ery, UNOHAC had to struggle to gain access tologistical resources for humanitarian purposes,as the PKO mentality gave priority to militaryand political operations. Humanitarian inter-ventions in a peace-keeping context are not easyto define. On the one hand there is a desire tohave them respond to short-term humanitarianand political needs, while at the same timetaking into account longer term developmentpriorities. The SRSG of ONUMOZ criticisedUNOHAC for placing too much emphasiswithin its Consolidated Humanitarian Assis-tance Programme on medium and long-termrehabilitation needs, rather than focusing on

what needed to be achieved within the timeframe of the GPA and creating bridging withother longer term programmes of the UNagencies.28

Mine Clearance and Reintegration ofDemobilised Soldiers

Mine Clearance and Programmes for the Reinte-gration of Demobilised Soldiers were the onlypart of the UNOHAC coordination mandate thatdid not overlap in some way with other UNagencies. Both were clearly tied to the imple-mentation of the GPA, and were emerging asareas of UN and DHA intervention. The inter-national donor community looked to UNOHACto develop programmes. UNOHAC devotedlimited human resources to these programmeareas, which operated separately from the multi-sectoral programmes and reported directly tothe UNOHAC Director. The UNOHAC Directortied the coordination of these areas closely to theformal Commissions set up by the GPA.Approval for Mine Clearance Programmes wassought by the Demining Sub-committee of theCease-Fire Commission (CCF) chaired by theONUMOZ Military Commander, while Reinte-gration Programmes for the DemobilisedSoldiers were under the Commission on Reinte-gration (CORE) chaired by the UNOHAC Direc-tor. These commissions were set up to mediateand build consensus between the two parties(Government and Renamo), not to serve asdonor coordination bodies or to discuss thedetails of implementation.

Mine Clearance was targeted as a priorityactivity in the Rome Donor Conference. A list ofpriority roads for Mine Clearance had beendeveloped in mid-1992 by ICRC and UNSCEROas a discussion point for humanitarian access.This list, despite the fact that it was limited tothe central provinces and should have beenreviewed after the GPA was signed was pre-sented and approved by the Supervisory andMonitoring Commission (CSC) on December 311992 as the priority list of 28 roads for MineClearance. Donors were very keen to supportMine Clearance and contributed $7.5 million to

28 Aldo Romano Ajello, “The Coordination ofHumanitarian Assistance in Mozambique in theContext of ONUMOZ” in After Rwanda: The Coordina-tion of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance” eds.Jime Whitman and David Pocock, London: MacMillanPress Ltd, 1996, p. 202.

25

the DHA Trust fund in addition to the $18.5million provided through the ONUMOZ budget.

Despite this approval by the CSC, the mineclearance contract for these roads was onlyawarded some 18 months later in mid 1994.UNOHAC persisted in wanting approval of acomprehensive national plan by the Cease-FireCommission. Since Renamo withdrew from allcommission work in March 1993, there was apolitical paralysis for close to six months. TheSRSG gave political priority to resolving issuessurrounding the elections and demobilisation, soMine Clearance never got on the agenda untilNovember 1993. When donors pushedUNOHAC to move and award contracts in thisperiod, the UNOHAC Director refused sayingthat approval by the two parties of a global planwas necessary. At the same time, UNDP hadbeen given the go-ahead to prepare tenders forthe mine clearance of the roads but its internalprocedures and bureaucratic wrangling betweenUN and UNDP created long delays provokingdonors to threaten to withdraw funds. TheSecretary-General’s Office finally intervened andUNDP was told to award the road contract. Theremainder of the funds was taken back fromUNDP and handed over to DHA so thatUNOHAC in Maputo could begin to implementthe rest of the programme.

With the expiry of Bernander’s contract ashead of UNOHAC, a Deputy DHA Director,Felix Downes-Thomas, was dispatched toMaputo to take over UNOHAC with orders tomove forward on the Mine Clearance Pro-gramme. The UN Accelerated Demining Pro-gramme (ADP) started up in June 1994 to trainMozambican de-miners and expand both roadand area mine clearance.29 This programme andothers by Norwegian People’s Aid, Halo Trustand Handicap International are continuing inMozambique well after ONUMOZ terminatedits work. Coordination in the post-ONUMOZperiod has been linked to a National Mine Clear-ance Commission set up by the Government in1995. It has been slow in establishing itself, but is

29 See Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace,Reconciliation and Rehabilitation on Mozambique byAllistair Hallam, Kate Halvorsen, Janne Lexow,Armindo Miranda, Pamela Rebelo and Astri Suhrke(project leader), Chr. Michelsen Institute in associa-tion with Nordic Consulting Group (Oslo: The RoyalMinistry of Foreign Affairs, 1997) Chapter 7: Demi-ning, and Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action1992–1994 by Richard Synge (Washington, D.C.:United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) Chapter 5:Landmines in the Peace Process.

the centre for all documentation and informationon land mines and demining programmes inMozambique.

In retrospect, to move ahead in mine clear-ance once the approval had been given in theSCS by the two signatories to the GPA, the UNshould have set up a consultative process onimplementation, under UNOHAC. To comple-ment this, donor coordination tied to the Provin-cial UNOHAC Offices could have enhanced theplanning process and updated prioritisation ofareas for mine clearance. This would haveallowed the programmes to advance morerapidly.

UN planning and coordination of the pro-grammes for the reintegration of demobilisedsoldiers suffered from equally strong criticismsby donors as the mine clearance programmes.Though it was clear from the outset that thedemobilised soldiers were an important group,which if not responded to could destabilise theentire political process, there was a divergencybetween the parties to the GPA (Governmentand Renamo) and the donors as to whether theyshould be treated as a special group withtargeted programmes. At the December 1992Rome donors’ conference, a position was takenthat “while recognising the specific needs ofeach target group, the Conference concludedthat international cooperation should addressthe needs of all vulnerable groups in priorityareas, without discrimination. There should beintegration of programmes for the demobilised(after they have left the assembly points), return-ing refugees, displaced persons and locallyaffected populations”. The conference even wentso far as to recommend that the GPA be alteredand that “consideration could be given to expan-ding the scope of action of the ReintegrationCommission (CORE) to include, in addition tothe demobilised, displaced persons andreturnees”.30

While the parties to the peace agreement andthe UN (UNOHAC) recognised the importanceof having special programmes for the demo-bilised soldiers, the Maputo donor communityresisted until the soldiers, themselves, became adisruptive and destabilising force—looting reliefwarehouses, blocking roads and taking humani-tarian personnel hostage in mid-1993. Thedonors then looked to UNOHAC for pro-

30 “Donors’ Conference for Mozambique (Rome,15–16 December 1992)”, Document 28 in The UnitedNations and Mozambique: 1992–1995, p.160.

26

grammes, and became critical when they werenot to their liking. UNOHAC had focused on jobtraining and credit schemes, tied to governmen-tal and UN institutions. Economic reintegrationwas seen as the key from UNOHAC’s point ofview while others, notably USAID saw shortterm pacification and neutralisation as mostimportant.

UNOHAC worked well in its coordinationwith the two parties through a tripartite mecha-nism within CORE. It was weaker in its donorcoordination, and could have benefited frominformal donor working groups to develop jointprogrammes and consensus. However, it shouldbe noted that there were clear differencesbetween UNOHAC and some donors over therole of government institutions in implementa-tion. UNOHAC firmly backed the necessity ofstrengthening government and local institutionsas important for longer term development whilethe expediency argument was used by others tochannel funds through multilateral organisa-tions and NGOs.

In November 1993, the Dutch Governmentsuggested that a cash payment scheme should beconsidered in which the demobilised soldierswould be paid a salary over an eighteen monthperiod to supplement their six month govern-ment subsidy, thereby “buying” peace until afterthe elections and providing support for theresettling demobilised soldiers to (re) integrateinto their communities. This was stronglyendorsed by the SRSG and the donor commu-nity, and what became known as the Reintegra-tion Support Scheme (RSS) became the founda-tion of support for the ex-soldiers. This pro-gramme received over $35 million from Switzer-land, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Finland,Norway, Spain and Portugal.31 Overall a $95million package of cash payments, transport,material benefits, training and small scale projectgrants was targeted to the 93,000 demobilisedsoldiers.

Despite the initial policy that demobilisedsoldiers should not be treated as a special group,it was politically evident by mid-1993 that theex-soldiers, themselves, had to be convinced thatthey were recognised and receiving materialbenefits or they could derail the entire process.These programmes for demobilised soldierscontinued through 1996, implemented by

31 See Reintegration Programmes for DemobilisedSoldiers in Mozambique, an evaluation prepared bySam Barnes for UNDP/RSS, Maputo, Mozambique,March 1997.

UNDP, ILO and IOM. A final “bonus” RSS pay-ment was made to all ex-soldiers in early 1997,signalling the end of the special programmes forthe demobilised soldiers. Coordination after theONUMOZ mandate passed on to governmentinstitutions—the Ministry of Labour and aNational Commission of Social Reinsertion. Thisshift from CORE to Government, never func-tioned effectively and each individual projectcoordinated with its own donors’ communityand partner institutions resulting in no inte-grated approach.

ONUMOZ Exits

As most PKOs operate with a military frame-work and mentality, the humanitarian compo-nent was subject to the same pressures to with-draw by the end of 1994. Initially, UNOHAC wastold by DPKO to shut down one week after theelections. Pressure was exerted by DHA that thiswas impossible, and that some transitionalperiod was necessary—especially at the provin-cial level. The close-down of UNOHAC waseventually set for the end of December 1994 withthe Provincial offices closing on 30 November.

UNDP was to pick up the coordination rolethat UNOHAC had assumed during theONUMOZ period. UNDP set up a Recon-struction and Rehabilitation Unit to carry on thisrole, but it functioned as a UNDP programmeunit focusing on administrative backstopping forUNDP projects (Mine Clearance, ILO VocationalTraining for Demobilised Soldiers, and the DHATrust Fund Projects passed on to UNDP). Noactive coordination was attempted by the unit.The World Bank through its annual ConsultativeGroup process consolidated its leadershipwithin the donor community and with theGovernment in the post-war transition therebybecoming the de facto coordinator of inter-national aid.

27

Conclusions

Mozambique is often cited as a success story inthe war-to-peace transition. Given that on theaverage $1 billion per year came into Mozam-bique for emergency and development assis-tance in the period 1990–1995, it is important toexamine the role of the international donorcommunity (United Nations agencies, bilateraldonors) and governmental authorities in thedefinition of aid priorities and the implementa-tion of programmes. Though on the one hand, itwas evident that there was a definite movementfrom government-led coordination (early eight-ies) of aid to donor-driven programmes (earlynineties), the Mozambique Government man-aged to retain enough sovereignty and state

authority to influence the shape and content ofthe aid packages.

Mozambique was never a “failed state”.National line ministries and provincial govern-ments continued to function throughout theperiod of war-provoked emergency. The GPArecognised the Government, its constitution andits laws during the UN peace-keeping transi-tional period. This placed Mozambique in aposition that was significantly different fromother “transitional” countries (Cambodia,Angola, Liberia, etc.) to which it is oftencompared. Aid Coordination moved firmly fromEmergency or Humanitarian Appeals to devel-opment programming by 1995.

Selected References

Abrahamsson, Hans and Nilsson, Anders (1995)Mozambique—The Troubled Transition, Zed Books,London.

AWEPA (1995) Report of AWEPA’s observation of theMozambique electoral process: 1992–1994, African-European Institute, Amsterdam.

Donini, Antonio (1996) The Policies of Mercy: UN Coor-dination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda,Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for InternationalStudies, Occasional Paper #22, Providence, R.I.

Jett, Dennis C. “Lessons Unlearned—Or WhyMozambique’s Successful Peacekeeping OperationMight Not Be Replicated Elsewhere”, Journal ofHumanitarian Assistance (Posted 5 December 1995),www.

Mazula, Brazao, editor (1996) Mozambique: Elections,Democracy and Development, Maputo.

Moore, Jonathan (1996) The UN and Complex Emergen-cies: Rehabilitation in Third World Transitions, UnitedNations Research Institute for Social Development,Geneva.

United Nations (1995) The United Nations and Mozam-bique, 1992–1995. Department of Public Information,United Nations, New York.

United Nations (1996) Elections in the Peace Process inMozambique: Record of an Experience, UNDP/DDSMS,New York.

UNHCR (July 1996) Rebuilding a War Torn Society: AReview of the UNHCR Reintegration Programme forMozambican Returnees, Maputo, Mozambique.

Synge, Richard (1997) Mozambique: UN Peace-keeping inAction: 1992–94, United States Institute for Peace,Washington, D.C.

Vines, Alex (1996) Renamo: From Terrorism to Democ-racy in Mozambique? James Currey Ltd, London.

28