hume – lecture notes & reading list - norva lo | 勞...

Author:NorvaY.S.Lo(updated30JUNE2014)HUME–LECTURENOTES&READINGLIST

Lecturer:Dr.NorvaY.S.LoHumeTopics

IntroductiontoHume1.Reasonvs.Passion2.MoralMotivation–reasonandpassion3.MoralFoundations–reason,passion,sympathy4.ImpressionsandIdeas5.Associationofideas6.WhatCanWeKnow:twokindsofinquiryorreasoning7.Sympathy&MoralSentiments8.Animals&Nature:fromtheHumeanpointofviewSelectedReadingsforHumeTopics

ForeachHumetopic,thereisasetofreadingsselectedfromthefollowingtexts.PleaseseeeachHumetopicbelow.

& Baillie,J.2000,HumeonMorality,London:Routledge.

& Hume,D.1739-1740,ATreatiseofHumanNature.Freelyavailableonlineat:http://www.davidhume.org/texts/thn.html.

& Hume,D.1740,AbstractofaBooklatelyPublished-entitledATreatiseofHumanNature.Freelyavailableonlineat:http://www.davidhume.org/texts/abs.html.

& Hume,D.1748,AnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding.Freelyavailableonlineat:http://www.davidhume.org/texts/ehu.html.

& Lo, N.Y.S. 2009, “Is Hume Inconsistent? –Motivation andMorals”, in C. Pigden (ed.),Hume onMotivation and Virtue,PalgraveMacmillan,pp.57-79.FreelyavailableonLMSsubjectwebsite.

HumeEssayQuestions(Answeroneofthetwoquestionsbelow.)Question1.If you choose to answer this question, you must answer both part (a) and part (b), and given reasons for your answers.(a) Humearguesthatthereareonlytwokindsofinquiryorreasoning.Whatarethey?Whatarethecrucialdifferencesbetween

them?(b) GivenHume’sviewon the twokindsof reasoning, couldheconsistentlyaccept theproposition thatpeoplecandomoral

reasoning(e.g.,reasoningaboutwhatismorallyrightandwhatismorallywrong)?• IfyouthinkthatHumecanconsistentlyaccepttheproposition,thenpleaseidentifyandexplainunderwhichoneofthetwokindsofreasoningHumeshouldclassifymoralreasoning?

• IfyouthinkthatHumecannotconsistentlyaccepttheproposition,thenpleaseexplainwhyhecannot.Question2.If you choose to answer this question, you must answer both part (a) and part (b), and given reasons for your answers. (a)WhatdoesHumemeanbytheterms“perceptions”,“impressions”and“ideas”?Howdothesethreecategoriesrelatetoeach

other?How,orviawhatcapacities/facultiesofours,doweacquireimpressionsandideas?Makeupsomeexamplesofyourowntoillustrateyouranswerstotheabovequestions.

(b) Acolourchatofbluewallpaints issupposedtohavesixdifferentshadesofblueonit.Theshadesareplacednexttoeachotherfromthelightesttothedarkestshade.Butduetoprintingerror,thefourthshadeofblueismissing(seebelow).Supposeapersonwhohasneverpreviouslyseen (i.e.,neverhadan impressionof) theparticularmissingshadeofblue isnowlookingatthechat.DoesHume’stheoryofimpressionsandideasallowthepossibilitythatthepersoncouldworkoutinthemind(i.e.,haveanideaof)whattheparticularmissingshadeofbluewouldlooklike?PleaseexplainyouranswerwithintheconfinesofHume’stheoryofimpressionsandideas–whetheryouanswerthequestionpositivelyornegatively.

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Author:NorvaY.S.Lo(updated23OCT2013)

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IntroductiontoHume(BackgroundReadings:Baillie2000,chapter1)IfDescartesisthefatherofmodernphilosophy,HumeisthepersonwhogaveshapetothecontemporaryphilosophyworldbyfirstofallqueryingDescartestheoriesaboutknowledge,andthendevelopinghisownmodestaccountofknowledge,andlaterhistheoriesofethicsandaesthetics.Duringhislifetime,Humewasfamousasahistorianandintellectual,much loved in Frenchacademic circles,wherehewasknownas “David thegood” (lebonDavid). HisscepticalcritiqueofreligionledtohimfailingtobeappointedtoachairinphilosophyineitherGlasgoworEdinburgh,buthewasclosefriendswithAdamSmithwhowasappointedprofessoroflogicatGlasgowin1751.WhileSmithiswell known todayas contributing to the foundationsof economics inhis 1776 treatiseTheWealthofNations, his1759bookTheoryofMoralSentimentswasregardedasmoresignificantbySmithhimself.HumeappointedSmithasexecutorofhiswill.Hume lived from 1711 to 1776, and left us a brief autobiography “My Own Life” (accessible through the subjectwebsite). Though born in Scotland, and becoming a student in Edinburgh at the young age of twelve, HumesubsequentlymovedtoFrancesothathecouldliveonamodestincome.HesettledinthelittlevillageofLaFlèche,wherebothDescartesandMersennehad,inthepreviouscentury,attendedthefamousJesuitcollege. ItwasinLaFlèchethathecomposedhismost influentialwork,ATreatiseofHumanNature (writtenbetween1734and1737).Thefirstvolume(“oftheUnderstanding”)andthesecondvolume(“OfthePassions”)waspublishedin1739,andthethird volume (“Of Morals”) was published in 1740. His best-known later summary works are his 1748 EnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding (thebest introduction tohisoverall systemofphilosophy)andhis1751EnquiryConcerning thePrinciplesofMorals (awork thatHumehimself considered thebestofallhiswritings). Humealsowrotecopiouslyonhistory,andpublishedmanyessaysonmoral,politicalandhistoricaltopics.Bypublishingabest-sellingsix-volumeHistoryofEnglandovertheyears1754–1762,Humeeventuallybecamefinanciallyindependent.Hume’sapparentatheism(orscepticismattheleast),andhiscontroversialviewsontopicssuchassuicide,ensuredthathewasregularlysubjecttoattacksandmachinationsdesignedtopreventhimgettingpostsofinfluence(hencehisfailuretosecureanyuniversityacademicposition)andevenaimedatgettinghimfiredfrompostshedidoccupy.AsalibrariantotheFacultyofAdvocatesatEdinburgh,forexample,hebecamethetargetofattemptstodismisshimforhavingordered“indecentbooks”,anda theologianwhodetestedHume’s liberalviewonsuicide threatenedtotake legalactionagainstHume’spublisher if theessay“OnSuicide”were tobeput inprint. Theessaywas finallypublishedafterHume’sdeath.ManyofthosewhoknewHumelovedhim,regardinghimasamodestandfriendlypersonwhoworehisimpressivelearningwell.Towardstheendofhislife,hebecamefriendlywithatalentedandmischievousyoungwoman,NancyOrde,whosefatherwasan influentialScottishpolitician. Onenight,NancyplayfullychalkedontheoutsidewallofHume’shouse inEdinburgh thewords “StDavid’s Street”, the localnickname for the street inwhich lebonDavidlived. Subsequently thenameof the streetwas indeedchanged to“StDavid’sStreet”,agesture thatwouldhaveamusedHumegreatly.AfterHume’sdeath,AdamSmithwrote:“…Ihaveconsideredhimbothinhislifetimeandsincehisdeath,asapproachingasnearlythe ideaoftheperfectlywiseandvirtuousmanasperhapsthenatureofhumanfrailtywillpermit.”In the 84 years from the death of Descartes to the birth of Hume, the modern science to which Descartes haddevotedmuchofhisstudyhadincreasedinitspowertotheextentthattheeighteenthcenturyisnowregardedastheAgeofEnlightenment (ortheAgeofReason)–anagewhensciencepromisedtofreepeoplefromfalsebelief,ignoranceandsuperstitionandopenupaneweraofprogressanddiscoveryforhumankind.TheDescarteslecturenotesrefertothefollowingtendenciesascharacteristicofearlymodernthought:

Mechanism:theuniverse,thebodiesofanimals,andthestructureofplantsallseenintermsofmechanisms–thecomparisontoclockworkwasacommonanalogy.

Rationalism: the rules specifying how the world works are accessible to innate reason, and so the world isrationallyintelligible.Appealstomagicandmysteryweredismissedasirrational.

Scepticism:giventhat itwashardtodistinguishamongwitchcraft,magic, religionandscience, thenthetruth isnotobviousandwehavetobecarefulaboutwhatweclaimtoknow.


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Intellectual freedom: the combinationof scepticismwith thenewlyemerging sciences–especiallyphysics andmechanics–ledthoughtfulpeopletochallengetheauthorityoftheCatholicchurch,AristotleandtheScholasticsphilosophers. At the same time, thinkers embraced a new faith: in the power and liberating force of newlyemergingsciences,especiallyphysics

By the time of Hume, these tendencies had been accentuated and settled into core doctrines of Enlightenmentthought,exceptforthesecond–rationalism,andtheassociatedinnatism.TheappealtoinnateknowledgeandideasmadebyDescartes,waslookingveryshakyindeedbythetimeofHume.TheEnglishphilosopherJohnLockeinhis1690EssayconcerningHumanUnderstandingdeliveredascathingattackonthe idea that there could be any innate knowledge of the kind Descartes imagined. He claims that innatists likeDescartes believed that some ideas are innate in us (e.g., the ideaofGod, the ideaof perfection, the ideaof theinfinite)becausetheythoughtthateveryonehadsuchideas.Inotherwords,ifeveryoneagreestoacertaintruthsorideas, the Cartesians would regard this as evidence that such truths and ideas are innate. But Locke had twoobjectionstothis.First,eventheideasofGodandtheinfinitearenotuniversalamongpeople:“childrenandidiots,”hewrote.“havenottheleastthoughtofthem”.Second,eveniftherewereuniversalassenttosomeidea,thiswouldnotshowtheideawasborninus.For Locke, thereare rational and innate capacities in thehumanmind. He seems tohave thought thatDescartesconfusedthecapacitytocometoknowsomething(sayatheoremingeometry)withtheknowledgeofthetheoremitself.Wecanhaveaninnatecapacitytolearngeometry;butthisdoesnotmeanthatwewerebornwithknowledgeof Pythagoras’s Theorem. Stung by this attack on innatism, the German rationalist philosopher Gottfried LeibnizrepliedtoLockeinhisNewEssaysonHumanUnderstanding,composedin1704,butnotpublisheduntilnearlyfiftyyears after Leibniz’s death. Leibniz’s argument was simple and harked back to an old argument put forward inclassical timesbyPlato. Thinkof thewaythatwecanarriveatdefinitionsandproofs ingeometryon thebasisofdrawingvery irregulardiagrams. Anyhand-drawntrianglewill likelyhaveunevensides,and its interiorangles– ifmeasuredbyprecision tools –will certainlynotaddup to180O. The truthof a theoremdoesnotdependonourexperiencesof instancesofbadly-drawntriangles,sotheproofofnecessarytruths inmathematics“canonlycomefrominnerprinciples”.Locke,bycontrast,regardedthemindasanemptychamberorablankslate,andwhatwasinthemindcouldonlycomefromexperience. This iswhyLockeiscalledan“empiricist”philosopher–allknowledgecoming from experience. Leibniz, like Descartes, is a “rationalist”, believing that capacities of the mind andknowledgeofprinciplesofreasoningarealreadyinitatbirth(innateknowledge)andthatwithouttheknowledgeofinnateprincipleswewouldhavenoneof theuniversal,mathematical and theoretical knowledge that isneeded inordertohaveascientificunderstandingoftheworld.Thisdebatebetweenempiricistsandrationalistscontinues,inoneformoranother,tothepresentday.WhilearationalistsuchasDescarteslookstoexplaincertainty,andcanfindnobasisforthisinsensoryexperience,anempiricist like Hume regards probability rather than certainty as the “very guide to life” (the phrase comes fromanother 18th century philosopher, Joseph Butler, but clearly impressed Hume, who echoes it several times in hiswork).Yet,inaslytwisttothenotionofinnateness,Humeconsidersourcapacityforhavingsenseperceptionstobe“innate”inthesensethatsenseperceptionsarethenaturalhappeningsofthemind.Seeingabrightlight,feelingastrongemotion,andothersuch“impressions”areexperiencesthatnaturallyhappentous,andsoourcapacityforsuch experiencesmust be something born into us, although none of those particular experiences themselves areinnate. Hume’sempiricismisanempiricismofconcepts:fortheconceptempiricist,therecanbenoideasthatarenotderivedfrom,or insomewaytraceablebackto,experience. Whileexperience isanecessary ingredient intheformationofanyknowledge,experiencealonemaynotbesufficienttodelivercertainkindofknowledge.


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1.Reasonvs.Passion(Readings:HumeT2.3.31,T3.1.1,Mapp1.212)Humehassaidsomeveryprovocativethingsabouttherolesof,andtherelationsbetween,reasonandpassions.Forexample:

“Wespeaknotstrictlyandphilosophicallywhenwetalkofthecombatofpassionandofreason.Reasonis,andoughtonlytobetheslaveofthepassions,andcanneverpretendtoanyotherofficethantoserveandobeythem.”3“’Tisnotcontrarytoreasontopreferthedestructionofthewholeworldtothescratchingofmyfinger.”4

WhatisHume’sargumentfortheseclaimshemadeaboutreasonandpassions?Inparticular,whatdidhemeanby“Reasonis,andoughtonlytobetheslaveofthepassions”?HereisDavidLewis’sreadingofHume:

“Inthefirstplace,Hume's‘passions’aresometimesnonetoopassionate.Hespeaksofsomepassionsas‘calm’.Wewoulddobesttospeakofall‘passion’,calmandotherwise,as‘desire’.Inthesecondplace,wecallsomeone‘reasonable’inpartbecausehisdesiresaremoderateandfair-minded.Butwhenwedo,Isupposewespeaknotstrictlyandphilosophically.Strictlyspeaking,Itakeitthatreasonisthefacultyinchargeofregulatingbelief.AndsoIreadHumeasifhehadsaidthatbeliefistheslaveofdesire.Ouractionsdo,ortheyoughtto,serveourdesiresaccordingtoourbeliefs.”5

Hume’s view on the roles of reason and passions has had great influence on contemporary thinking in decisiontheories andmoral philosophy. Lewis’s take on beliefs vs. desires is a contemporary application of Hume’s earlyideas. While Hume distinguished different kinds of passions (e.g., love, regard, approval, or hatred, disgust,contempt), all ofwhichplay a role inmotivatinghumanbehaviours,many theoristsnowadays, like Lewis, use thegeneralterm“desire”togrouptogethervariousfeelingsofattractiontowardssomething,whicharepositivedesires,orfeelingsofrepulsionawayfromsomething,whicharenegativedesires.FollowingHume,whatLewisissayingaboveisthattheterm“reasonable”isoftenusedquitelooselyorinformallytodescribe a person who has moderate passions and desires. But strictly speaking, the term should be used toevaluative how well a person’s rational faculty “Reason” is functioning – not what the person’s desires are like.Strictly and philosophically, according toHume, the term “reasonable” should be taken tomean “rational”, and arationalpersonissomeonewhoreasonswell–that is,someonewhodoesvalidorotherwise legitimatereasoning.Whether the person has moderate desires is quite a different and separate matter from whether the person isrational,orsowouldHumeandLewisargue.AsLewispointsout,Humetakesreasontobethe“faculty inchargeofregulatingbelief”– i.e., itfunctionstoworkoutwhichbeliefsofoursaretrueorjustified,andwhichonesarefalseorunjustified.So,wecanthinkofarationalpersonassomeonewhosereasoningiseffectivewithrespecttoacquiringtruebeliefsandgettingridoffalsebeliefs.Whethersuchapersonwillbehavemorallyisquiteaseparateissue,accordingtoHume.Inshort,apersonmayknowthegoodbutnotdesirethegood,andevenifapersondesiresthegood,thedesiremightnotbestrongenoughtoresultinthepersonactuallydoingthegood.Letus lookdeeper into the ideaofbeing rational.Whatexactly is tobe rational– inHume’sview?Whatkindsofthings can our rational faculty do? Andwhat is its limitation?We can get some good ideas by looking at Hume’saccountofreasoninrelationtohumanmotivationandaction.Onthelimitationonwhatreasoncando,Humesays:

“Ishallendeavourtoprovefirst,thatreasonalonecanneverbeamotivetoanyactionofthewill;andsecondly,thatitcanneveropposepassioninthedirectionofthewill.”6

1Thenotation“T2.3.3.”referstoHume’sATreatiseofHumanNature,book2,part2,section3.Ingeneral,“Tn1.n2.n3.n4”wouldrefertobookn1,partn2,sectionn3,paragraphn4ofthetext.ThisnotationsystemforthetextisusedthroughouttheHumelecturematerials.Theonlinetextisalsonotatedinthisway.2Thenotation“Mapp1.21”referstoHume’sAnEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals,appendix1,paragraph21.ThisnotationsystemforthetextisusedthroughouttheHumelecturematerials.TheonlineHumetextarealsonotatedinthisway.3T2.3.3.4,emphasisadded.4T2.3.3.6,emphasisadded.5DavidLewis,“DesireasBeliefII”,Mind105(1996):303,emphasisadded.6T2.3.3.1,emphasesoriginal.


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On Hume’s account of the human understanding, there are two, and only two, types of reasoning. The first isdeductive reasoning, orwhat Hume calls “demonstrative” reasoning. This type of reasoning concerns conceptualrelations,orwhatHumecalls“relationsofideas”.Forexample,fromthepremisethatDavidisatthelibraryorinhisoffice,andthesecondpremisethatDavidisnotatthelibrary,wecandeductivelyinferthatDavidisinhisoffice.Anydeductive inference from thepremises “Aor B” and “notA” to the conclusion “B” is valid – becauseofwhat theterms “or”and “not”means, and the conceptual relationsbetween those terms,orwhatHumecalls “relationsofideas”. The second type of reasoning recognized by Hume is inductive reasoning, or what he calls “probabilistic”reasoning.Itconcernsthestatesofaffairsintheempiricalworldofsenseexperience,orwhatHumecalls“mattersoffact”.Predictionsofelectionresultsbasedonnewspaperpolls,forexample,orbasedonacertainpercentageofvotecountsaftertheelection,isaformofinductivereasoning.Now,inordertoshowthat“reasonalonecanneverbeamotivetoanyactionofthewill”,Humeneedstoshowthatneitherdeductivereasoningnorinductivereasoningcouldbyitselfproduceanymotivationforaction.AtthecoreofHume’sargumentishispremisethatpassions(or“desires”asLewisputsit)aretheultimatesourceofmotivationforaction. Hume recognizes that reason can indeed help tomove us to act in oneway or another. But without theexistenceof somepassionor somedesire for a certain result, reason alone is never sufficient tomotivate action.Deductivereasoning,Humeagrees,isusefulinalmosteveryartandprofession.Forexample,giventheinformationfromvariousbanksontheirmortgagepackages,Icanbydeductivemathematicalreasoningworkoutwhichbankisofferingthebestmortgagedealoverall.However,ifIdonotdesire(or,touseHume’sterm,donothavea“passion”for) someproperty,knowingwhere thebestmortgagedeal iswouldnotmotivatemetosignamortgagecontractwith any bank. There has to be some existing passion in us for an object, Hume argues, in order for us to bemotivated to take action about it. The passion is the source of motivation. Or, we may say, the passion is themotivation. Hence, deductive reasoning concerning relations between concepts (e.g., mathematical relations) canneverbyitselfhaveanyinfluenceonouractions.Itcandirectustochooseaneffectivemeansoractiontoachievesomeendorpurpose–butonlyifwealreadydesirethatendorpurpose.7Whataboutinductivereasoningconcerningmattersoffact,suchascausesandeffects?Caninductivereasoningbyitselfproduceanymotivationforaction?Hume’sanswerisnegativetoo,andforthesamereason–namely,passionistheonlysourceofmotivationforaction.

“’Tis obvious, thatwhenwe have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object,we feel a consequent emotion ofaversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or embracewhatwill give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. ’Tis alsoobvious,thatthisemotionrestsnothere,butmakinguscastourviewoneveryside,comprehendswhateverobjectsareconnectedwithitsoriginalonebytherelationofcauseandeffect.Herethen[inductive/probable]reasoningtakesplacetodiscoverthisrelation;andaccordingasourreasoningvaries,ouractionsreceiveasubsequentvariation.But’tisevidentinthiscase,thattheimpulsearisesnotfromreason,butisonlydirectedbyit.’Tisfromtheprospectofpainorpleasurethat the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes andeffectsofthatobject,astheyarepointedouttousbyreasonandexperience.Itcanneverintheleastconcernustoknow,thatsuchobjectsarecauses,andsuchotherseffects,ifboththecausesandeffectsbeindifferenttous.Wheretheobjectsthemselvesdonotaffectus,theirconnexioncannevergivethemanyinfluence.”8

For example, due topast experience, a teachermayby inductive reasoningworkout the causal relationbetweengivinghighmarkstostudentassignmentsandreceivinghighteachingsurveyscoresfromthestudentsinreturn.Butiftheteacherhasnodesireatallforreceivinghighsurveyscores,orifhehassuchadesirebutitdoesnotoverridehisotherdesiresthatpullhimtoadifferentdirection(e.g.,adesiretogivemarksinaccordancewithquality,oradesiretobesomeonewithintegrity),hisbelievinginthecausalrelationbetweenthemarkshegivesandthesurveyscoreshereceives,thisbeliefbyitself,wouldhavenoinfluenceonthewayshemarksstudentassignments.Inshort,reasonisthefacultyinchargeofproducingandevaluatingbeliefs–viadeductiveorinductiveinferences,oracombinationofboth.Fromthis,Humeconcludesthefollowing:

7SeeT2.3.3.2.8T2.3.3.3


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[R]eason, ina strictandphilosophical sense, canhavean influenceonourconductonlyafter twoways:Eitherwhen itexcitesapassionbyinformingusoftheexistenceofsomethingwhichisaproperobjectofit[i.e.,thepassion];orwhenitdiscoverstheconnexionofcausesandeffects,soastoaffordusmeansofexertinganypassion.9

“[’T]isonlyintwosenses,thatanyaffectioncanbecall’dunreasonable.First,whenapassion,suchashopeorfear,grieforjoy,despairorsecurity,isfoundedonthesuppositionoftheexistenceofobjects,whichreallydonotexist.Secondly,when inexertinganypassion inaction,wechusemeans insufficient for thedesign’dend,anddeceiveourselves inourjudgementofcausesandeffects.Whereapassionisneitherfoundedonfalsesuppositions,norchusesmeansinsufficientfor the end, the understanding [i.e., reason] can neither justify nor condemn it. […] In short, a passion must beaccompany’dwithsomefalsejudgement,inordertoitsbeingunreasonable;andeventhen’tisnotthepassion,properlyspeaking,whichisunreasonable,butthejudgement.”10

ThatiswhyHumesays“’Tisnotcontrarytoreasontopreferthedestructionofthewholeworldtothescratchingofmyfinger”–providedthat,wemayadd,suchapreference(whichisapassion)isnotfoundedon,oraccompaniedby,the suppositionof some “false judgement”. But even if it is, it is not thepreference, “properly speaking,which isunreasonable,butthejudgement”.Eleven years after the thirdBookof hisTreatise (1740),Hume’sEnquiries concerning the Principles ofMoralswaspublished – awork that he himself considered to be the best of his. There,Humemaintains the samedistinctionbetweenreasonandpassions:

“Thedistinctboundariesandofficesofreasonandoftasteareeasilyascertained.Theformerconveystheknowledgeoftruthandfalsehood:Thelattergivesthesentimentofbeautyanddeformity,viceandvirtue.Theonediscoversobjectsastheyreallystandinnature,withoutadditionordiminution:Theotherhasaproductivefaculty,andgildingorstainingallnaturalobjectswith thecolours,borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, inamanner,anewcreation.Reason,beingcoolanddisengaged,isnomotivetoaction,anddirectsonlytheimpulsereceivedfromappetiteorinclination,byshowingus the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery: Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constituteshappinessormisery,becomesamotivetoaction,andisthefirstspringorimpulsetodesireandvolition.”11

9T3.1.1.12.10T2.3.3.6,emphasesadded.11Mapp1.21,where“taste”isthefacultyinchargeofthepassions.


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2.MoralMotivation:reasonandpassion(Readings:Lo2009,HumeT3.1.1-2,T3.2.1-3,T3.3.1,Mapp1.21)AccordingtoHume,reasonalonecanneverdeterminethedistinctionbetweenmoralgoodandevil.Thatistosay,wecannever find outwhether an act ismorally right orwrong just by using our reasoning -whether it is deductivereasoning,orinductivereasoning,oracombinationofboth.AmongHume’smanyargumentsforthisanti-rationalistthesisonthenatureofmoralityandmoralinquiryiswhatisoftennowadayscalledthe“motivationargument”.Thepassagebelowgivessomebackgroundtothepre-dominantrationalisttradition,whichHume’smotivationargumentisdesignedtoattack.

“Thosewhoaffirmthatvirtue isnothingbutaconformity toreason; that thereareeternal fitnessesandunfitnessesofthings,whicharethesametoeveryrationalbeingthatconsidersthem;thattheimmutablemeasuresofrightandwrongimposeanobligation,notonlyonhumancreatures,butalsoontheDeityhimself:Allthesesystemsconcurintheopinion,that morality, like [demonstratively discoverable] truth, is discern'd merely by ideas, and by their juxta-position andcomparison. Inorder, therefore, to judgeofthesesystems,weneedonlyconsider,whether itbepossible, fromreasonalone, todistinguishbetwixtmoralgoodandevil,orwhether theremust concur someotherprinciples toenableus tomakethatdistinction”.12

In the passage above, moral inquiry, i.e., inquiry about moral good and evil, right and wrong, is compared toconceptual inquiry attainable by deductive reasoning about conceptual relations – or what Hume calls“demonstrative reasoning”about“relationsof ideas”. It says that there isaviewout theresuggesting that justbyanalyzingandunderstandingwhat the terms inamoral claimmean,our rational faculty could somehowworkoutwhetherthemoralclaimistrueorfalse.Forexample,perhapsjustbyunderstandingwhatthephrase“tellingalie”means,andwhattheterm“morallywrong”means,wecanusereasontodeterminethetruthorfalsityofthemoralclaim“itiswrongtotelllies”.Itisasifmoralclaimsareanalyticclaims–i.e.,claimsthetruthorfalsityofwhichcanbedeterminedjustbyanalyzingthemeaningsofthetermstheycontain.Itisimportanttonotethatinthefirstpassageabove,Humeisnotactuallydescribinghisownposition.Ratherheischaracterizing a form of moral rationalism, which he questions, opposes, and later rejects by his motivationargument.That iswhy,at theendof thepassagehesays:“Inorder, therefore, to judgeof thesesystems[i.e., themoralsystemshequestions],weneedonlyconsider,whetheritbepossible,fromreasonalone,todistinguishbetwixtmoralgoodandevil,orwhethertheremustconcursomeotherprinciplestoenableustomakethatdistinction.”GivenHume’scharacterization, thekindofmoral rationalismthathe isopposingmaintains the following fourcoreclaims:R1. Something ismorally right if and only if it is rational,whereas something ismorallywrong if and only if it is

irrational.

R2. Moral judgements,whichdistinguishbetweengoodandevil, rightandwrong,areproducedby reasonalone.(fromR1)

R3. Humans are rational beings, who will develop passions for/against, and bemotivated to do/avoid whateverReasonjudgestorational/irrational.

R4. Moral judgements, which distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong, will generate correspondingpassionsandmotivatecorrespondingactions.(fromR1,R2andR3)

PropositionR1captureswhatHumemeanswhenhedescribesthemoralrationalistasmaintaining“virtueisnothingbuta conformity to reason”.For the rationalist, tobemorallygood isnothingbut tobe rational– in the senseof“conforming” to, or following, reason. On the other side of the same coin, moral evil is nothing but a form ofirrationality,orviolationof,contradictionto,reason.Wemightwonderhowexactlywearegoingtoworkoutwhethersomethingconformstoorcontradictsreason.Therationalistwould reply that reason knows its own standard the best, and so it is by using our reason, and reasonalone,thatwecanworkoutwhethersomething(e.g.,anaction)isrationalorirrational.Butwhatismorallyrightisequivalenttowhatisrational,andwhatismorallywrongisequivalenttowhatisirrational–accordingtoR1.So,it

12T3.1.1.4.


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followsthatitisbyusingourreason,andreasonalone,thatwecanworkoutwhethersomethingismorallygoodorevil.Inshort,R2isderivedfromR1.Next,underthepictureofmoralrationalism,arationalbeingissomeonewhonotonlyknowswhatisrationaltodobutalsodesires,andthereforeismotivatedtopursue,whatisrational.Thethirdcoreclaimofmoralrationalism,R3,saysthatthathumanbeings,likeyouandI,areall“rationalbeings”,whoseemotionsandbehavioursaregovernedbytheir reason. In fact, the rationalist takes rationality to be the essence of humanity, thatwhich separates humanbeings from, and indeed puts them above, nonhuman animals. So,we are human only to the extent thatwe arerational.Finally,thelastcoreclaimofmoralrationalism,R4,followsdirectlyfromthepreviousthreemoralrationalistclaims.Itsaysthatmoraljudgementsexciteourpassionsandmotivateouractions.Butwhywillwebemotivatedbyourmoraljudgements?Accordingtotherationalist,thatisbecausewearerationalbeingswhoaremotivatedbyourreason’sjudgementsaboutrationality,andjudgementsaboutmoralityarenothingbutjudgementaboutrationality.Infact,underthemoralrationalistpicture,itisnotonlythatall“humancreatures”arerationalbeingsmotivatedbyreason. God “the Deity himself” is also a rational being, and indeed a perfectly rational being. For the moralrationalist,thesourceofhumanimmoralityisthereforetheinferiorrationalcapacitieshumanbeingshave.Therearetwowaysforustofailmorally.Firstly,wemayreasonimperfectly,e.g.,bymistakinganirrationalcourseofactionasa rationalone.Whenwedo that,weare,according to the rationalist, ineffectmistaking themorallyevilwith themorallygood.Secondly,wemayfailmorallywhenourreasonfailstocombatourpassionswhenitfailstoprovideamotivationstrongenoughtoresult inactualmoralbehaviour,e.g., ifwehavean irrationaldesiretoactotherwise,whichisstrongerthantherationalmotivationgeneratedbyreason.Forexample,myreasonmighttellmethathavinganotherbarofchocolateiswillputmyweightup,providingmeamotivationtoavoidanotherbarofchocolate.Butmydesireformorechocolatemightbeaverystrongone,andsooverridemy rational judgement againstmore chocolate. The rationalistwould say, in this case,my reason, beingimperfect,hasfailedtocombatmydesire.Hume,ofcourse,wouldrejecttherationalistwayofdescribingthesituation.Humewouldarguethathavingadesireforsomethingisnotunlikefeelinganitch,thatfeelings,passionsordesiresarenotcapableofbeingtrueorfalse,andsotheyarenottheappropriatekindofobjectstobe judgedbyreason.Regardingthestoryaboutchocolate,whatHumewould say is that there ismy desire formore chocolate, and there is alsomy desire tomaintain a certainweight. It is not reason thathas failedwhen I finally takeanotherbarof chocolate–butmydesire tomaintain acertainweight, or be health, has failed. It is becausemy desire formaintaining a certainweight, or be health, iscalmerandweakerbutmydesireforchocolateisviolentandstrongthatIendupeatingmorechocolate.ForHume,thereisnosuchthingascombatbetweenreasonanddesire–butonlythecombatbetweenonedesireandanotherdesire.Aswehaveseeninthepreviouslecture,Humearguesthatingeneral,reasonalone,withoutthepresenceofanypassionordesire,cannotmotivateaction.Inthechocolatestoryinparticular,hewouldsimplypointoutthatifIdonotcareaboutmyweight,orhealth,atall,i.e.,ifIhavenodesiretomaintainacertainweight,ortobehealthy,thenno amountof reasoning is going to helpmotivateme to avoid eatingmore chocolate. This confirmsHume’sgeneralthesisthatreasonalonecannotinfluencepassionsormotivateactions.Let us now look at the original text from Hume where he puts forwards his motivation argument against moralrationalism.Humewrites:

“[M]oralityis[...]supposed[e.g.,bythemoralrationalists]toinfluenceourpassionsandactions[...]Andthisisconfirm'dbycommonexperience,whichinformsus,thatmenareoftengovern'dbytheirduties,andaredeter'dfromsomeactionsbytheopinionofinjustice,andimpell'dtoothersbythatofobligation.Sincemorals,therefore,haveaninfluenceontheactionsandaffections,itfollows,thattheycannotbederiv'dfromreason[alone];[…]becausereasonalone[...]canneverhaveanysuchinfluence.Moralsexcitepassions,andproduceorpreventactions.Reasonofitselfisutterlyimpotentinthisparticular.Therulesofmorality,therefore,arenotconclusionsofourreason.[…]Anactiveprinciplecanneverbefoundedonaninactive;andifreasonbeinactiveinitself,itmustremainsoinallitsshapesandappearances”.13

13T3.1.1.5-7,emphasisadded.


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TherearemanyvariantinterpretationsofHume’smotivationargument.Onepopularinterpretationoftheargumentcanbesummarized(instandardform)asfollows.14H1. Moral judgements,whichdistinguishbetween good andevil, right andwrong, excite passions andmotivate

actions. (E.g., moral judgement of the form “action x is morally right (or wrong)” excites the sentiment ofapproval(ordisapproval)inustowardsactionx,whichthenmotivatesusto(ornotto)takeactionx).

H2. Reasonalonecannotexcitepassionsormotivateactions.H3. That which excites passions and actions cannot be produced solely by a faculty which alone cannot excite

passionsandactions.H4. Moraljudgements,whichdistinguishbetweengoodandevil,rightandwrong,cannotbeproducedbyreason

alone.(fromH1,H2andH3)ConsiderH1.Thispremise isactuallyoneofmoral rationalism’s coreclaims,namelyR4.ThismakesgoodsenseofHume’s statement that “[M]orality is [...] supposed to influence our passions and actions”. Supposed by whom?Supposebythemoralrationalist.

ConsiderH2.ItstatesHume’sgeneralthesisthatReasonalonecanneverexcitepassionsormotivateactions.Thisisaclaimonthelimitationandboundaryofreason.ConsiderH3.HumeseemstothinkthatH3issoself-evidentlytruethathe(asfarasIknow)hasneverdefendedit.ThatisperhapsbecausehetakesH3tobeatrue“relationofideas”–i.e.,ananalyticstatementwhichistruesimplybyvirtueofthemeaningsofthewordsitcontains.FromthethreepremisesH1,H2,H3,Humearrivesattheconclusion,H4,whichsaysthatmoraljudgementscannotbe producedbyReason alone. That is to say, reasonby itself can never determine the distinction betweenmoralgoodandevil.Wecanneverfindoutwhetheranactismorallyrightorwrongjustbyusingourreasoning-whetheritisdeductivereasoning,orinductivereasoning,oracombinationofboth.Hume’smotivationargumentisvalid–i.e.,underthesuppositionofhisthreepremisesH1,H2andH3,thetruthofhisconclusionH4logicallyfollows.So,whetherHume’smotivationargumentagainstmoralrationalismissuccessfulwilldependwhetherHume’spremisesintheargumentaretrue.LetusnowconsiderHume’swholemotivationargument,andcompareitsidebysidewiththecoreclaimsofmoralrationalism. As we have seen, H1, the first premise in Hume’s motivation argument, is actually identical to therationalist claimR4.We can also see thatH4, the conclusion inHume’s argument, is thenegation (i.e., the directopposite)oftherationalistclaimR2.Inshort,H1=R4;H4=rejectionofR2.So,whatisgoingon?WhatisgoingoninHume’smotivationargumentisthatheisactuallyemployingtherationalist’sownclaimR4asapremise, to argue against the rationalist’s other claim R2.What Hume has in effect shown is that given his ownpremises H2 and H3, the rationalist thesis R4 implies the rejection of the rationalist thesis R2. In other words, ifHume’s premisesH2 andH3 are true, thenmoral rationalism is an inconsistent position in that not all of its coreclaimscanbetrueatthesametime.Hume’smotivationargument,whichconcludeswiththerejectionofR2,alsoworksagainstanotherrationalistclaim,namelyR1,whichsaysthatthemorallygood isequivalenttotherational,andthemorallyevil isequivalenttotheirrational.WhyistherejectionofR2alsoarejectionofR1?ThatisbecauseR2,aswehaveseenearlier,deductivelyfollowsfromR1.SoIfR2isfalseorunacceptable,thensoisR1.In short,whetherHume’smotivationargumentagainstmoral rationalism is successfulornot cruciallydependsonwhetherhiscorepremiseH2istrue.Aswehaveseeninthepreviouslecture,Humearguesthatourownexperiencetells us that the existence of somepassion in us is always a necessary condition formotivation and action. Somepassions,accordingtoHume,aremorefundamentalthanothersinthatweacquirethemverynaturallythroughtheoperationofthenon-rationalfacultywhichhecallsthe“taste”.Thisfaculty,“taste”,inHume’sview,isconstitutedby

14FormoreinterpretationsofHume’smotivationargument,seeLo2009.


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some non-rational (but not irrational) psychological principles, for example, the principles that we are naturallyattractedtopleasureandobjectsthatwebelievetobethecausesofpleasure,andthatwearenaturallyrepelledbypainandobjectsthatwebelievetobethecausesofpain.TheseareprincipleswhichHumebelievestogovernnotonly human passions, but also the passions in nonhuman animals. By contrast, reason’s function (and its onlyfunction), on Hume’s view, is to regulate our beliefs (i.e., to estimate their likelihood of being true or false). Inparticular, reasonalonecanneverproduceanyoriginalpassions inus,andatbestcanonlyre-directsomealreadyexistingpassionintochoosingamoreeffectivemeanstosatisfyitself.Forexample:someonemayhaveadesireformoneyandfamebecausetheybelievethatmoneyandfamearethemeansthatwillbringthemloveandfriendship,whicharetheultimateendstheyfundamentallydesire.Whetherthebeliefthatmoneyandfamewillbringloveandfriendship is true or false is to be discovered by reason – e.g., inductive reasoning. But what original or mostfundamentalpassionsordesirespeoplehaveisgovernedbytaste,notreason.Ifreasonknowsitsstandardthebestastherationalthinks,thenreasonshouldknowitsownlimitationevenbetter.AccordingtoHume,whoisaveryrationalperson–althoughfarfrombeingarationalist,H2statesthelimitationofreason,namely:Reasonalonecanneverexcitepassionsormotivateactions.Thatiswhyhesaysthat“reasonis,andoughtonlytobetheslaveofthepassions,andcanneverpretendtoanyotherofficethantoserveandobeythem”.Here I read Hume as if he is saying: If we are truly rational, thenwewill, andwe rationally ought to, know thelimitationofreason.Now, if Hume is right in arguing that reason alone is not sufficient to producemoral judgements that distinguishbetween good andevil, right andwrong, thenwhat is themissing ingredients? This question takes us toHume’spositiveaccountonthenatureandfoundationsofhumanmorality,whichwewilllookatinthenextlecture.


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3.MoralFoundations:reason,passion,sympathy(Readings:Lo2009,HumeT3.1.1-2,T3.2.1-3,T3.3.1,Mapp1.21)Hume’smotivationargumentagainstmoralrationalismconcludesthatmoraljudgements,whichdistinguishbetweengoodandevil,whichmotivatehumanbehaviours,cannotbetheproductsofReasonalone.IfHumeisrightinarguingthat our rational faculty by itself is unable to produce moral judgements, then what is missing from the moralrationalist picture? What other human faculties need to be involved in order for us to be able to make thedistinctionsbetweengoodandevil, todeterminewhethersomething isrightorwrong? ThisquestionbringsustoHume’spositiveaccountonthefoundationsofhumanmorality.HumeaccountofthefoundationsofmoralityisgivenintheBook3ofhisTreatise,whichisrepeatedinasimplifiedway inhis laterwork, theEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals.Hume’sviewsandargumentsonmoralsarebasedon,andfurtherdevelop,hisaccountofthehumanmindgiven inBook1andBook2oftheTreatise–whichincludeshistheoryofthehumanunderstanding,andhistheoryofthehumanpassions,and,inparticular,histheoryofsympathyasahigherlevelmentalmechanismrelyingonthecombinedoperationsofvariousmorebasicprinciplesthathebelievestogovernthehumanmind.(NOTE:Hume’ideaofwhathecalls“sympathy”isequivalenttowhatwenowadaysusuallycall“empathy”.)Methodologically,inordertofindawaytodecidewhetheramoraljudgementistrueorfalse,aHumeanwouldfirstof all ask whether such an judgement is an analytic proposition concerning “relations of ideas” or an empiricalproposition concerning “matters of fact”. That is because Hume, remember, recognizes only these two kinds ofpropositions–there isnotathirdkindforhim. HowwouldHumeanswerthisquestionaboutthenatureofmoraljudgements–aretheyanalyticoraretheyempirical?WhatcanfindsomecluesbyhuntingthroughHume’swritings.Consider the following passages, for example, where Hume can been seen as giving a conceptual analysis, ordefinition,forthemoralterms“vice”and“virtue”:

“[W]henyoupronounceanyactionorcharactertobevicious,youmeannothing,butthatfromtheconstitutionofyournatureyouhaveafeelingorsentimentofblamefromthecontemplationofit.”15,16“Thehypothesiswhichweembraceisplain.Itmaintains,thatmoralityisdeterminedbysentiment.Itdefinesvirtuetobewhatevermentalactionorqualitygivestoaspectatorthepleasingsentimentofapprobation;andvicethecontrary.”17

Accordingly,Hume’sconceptualanalysis,ordefinition,of“virtue”and“vice”canbeputapproximatelyasthis:

An action or character is virtuous/vicious if and only if a “spectator” feels a sentiment of approbation/disapprobationtowardsit.

Now,itisveryimportanttonoticethatwhatHumecallsa“spectator”or“judiciousspectator”18 isnotjustanyone.Rather,Hume’s“spectator” ishumanbeingwho–on topofbeingmentallynormal (i.e.,havingamindwhere thevarious basic principles of human nature as identified by Hume are functioning, including those underlie theoperationofsympathy)–mustalsomeetthefollowingextraconditions:19C1. Havingfullinformationofallthecircumstancesrelevanttothecase.C2. Overlookingone’spersonalinterests–ifanyisinvolvedinthecase.C3. Overlookingone’spersonalrelations–ifanyisinvolvedinthecase.C4. Takingintoaccountoffactsabouthumannature.

15T.3.1.1.26,emphasisadded.16 According to Hume (T 3.1.2.2-6, T 3.1.2.11), the sentiment of approbation is a “pleasing sentiment”, and disapprobation the contrary.Furthermore,Hume(T1.3.10.2,T2.1.1.4,T2.1.10.8,T2.3.3.3,T2.3.9.1,T3.3.1.2,andMapp1.21)maintainsthatwenaturallydesirewhatpleasesusandarerepelledbywhatbringsuspain.Itfollowsthatthemoralsentimentscanexcitedesiresandthustosomeextentmotivatemoralbehaviour.Cf.Mapp1.3.17Mapp1.10,firstemphasisadded,therestoriginal.18T3.3.1.14.19SeeMapp1.11–3,T3.1.2.3–4,T3.3.1.15–8.


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If you have a normal functioning human mind, and if you also satisfy all the above four extra conditions whenconsidering amatter ofmorals, then you arequalified as aHumean “spectator” – i.e., someonewho is in a goodpositiontomakereliablemoraljudgementsaboutgoodandevil,rightandwrong,virtueandvice.Inhispursuitofa“science”ofhumannature,whichisthebackgroundtohisaccountofhumanmorality,Hume,likemanyofhiscontemporaries,believesthatallmembersofthehumanspeciessharethesamenature,inthatthemindofeveryhumanpersonisgovernedbythesamesetofbasicprinciples(e.g.,thosethathedescribesandarguesforinBook1andBook2oftheTreatise).So,Humeexpectsthateveryhumanpersonwithafunctioningmindwouldfeelthesameandcometothesamejudgementaboutamatterofmorals–shouldtheyconsiderthematterwhentheyare under the same four conditions C1, C2, C3, and C4. Accordingly, Hume’s conceptual analysis or definition of“virtue”and“vice”canbeexpoundedasfollows:H. Anactionorcharacterisvirtuous/viciousifandonlyifallhumanbeings(withanormalfunctioningmind)are

disposed,undertheconditionsC1,C2,C3andC4,tofeelthesentimentofapprobation/disapprobationtowardsit.20

According to Hume, it is via the operation of sympathy that we develop the sentiments of approbation anddisapprobationtowardssocialvirtuesandvices(e.g.,justiceandinjustice),respectively.Sympathy,aswewillseelater(Topic7),isonHume’sviewisanaturalpsychologicalmechanismofthehumanmind,by which the mind’s thoughts of the sentiments of others (e.g., my idea of another person’s pleasure) can beconverted into its own sentiments of the same kind (e.g., my impression, i.e., my own feeling, of pleasure). Forexample,whenIobserveasmileonyourfaceandlaughterinyourvoice,Idetectajoyfulfeelinginyou.Inresponseto that I can actually, by empathy, also feel a joyful pleasure in myself. When someone smiles to us, we oftennaturallyresponsewithasmileback.Whenwehearotherpeoplelaughweoftenfeelmoreupliftedandoftenlaughtoo.Likewise,whenwedetectthefeelingofdistressorfearinothers(asinamelodramaorinahorrormovie),weoften naturally also develop a feeling of distress or fear in ourselves. These different emotional reactions are allresultsofourempathyinoperation.

Ontherelevanceofsympathytomoraljudgements,Humewrite:

“[W]enever fail to observe the prejudicewe receive, eithermediately or immediately, from the injustice of others […Even]whentheinjusticeissodistantfromus,asnowaytoaffectourinterest,itstilldispleasesus;[…Thatisbecause]wepartakeof[thefeelingof]uneasiness[orsufferinginthevictimsofinjustice]bysympathy;[…]“asympathywithpublicinterestisthesourceofthemoralapprobation.[…Sympathy]hassufficientforcetoinfluenceourtaste,andgiveusthesentimentsofapprobationorblame.”21

ForHume, themechanismofempathyproducesmoral sentiments inus in response to theemotionswedetect inotherpeople - justas foramedical scientist, certainphysiologicalmechanismsproducesourexperienceofvariousbodilysensations(e.g.,thesensationsofcolour,smell,sound,andheat)inresponsetoexternalstimuli.Now, given H (Hume’s conceptual analysis of morals), what do I need to do in order to make a correct moraljudgement, for example, a judgement concerning whether one particular individual’s killing of another particularindividualisaviciousact?Thepre-conditionisofcoursethatIhaveanormalfunctioninghumanmind.IfIsatisfythepre-condition,thenIwillneedtoproceedtoputtingmyself intothefourextraconditionsC1,C2,C3,andC4inthefollowingmanner:Step(1) Igetmyself intoconditionC1, i.e.,byobservationand reasoning, Igatherasmuch informationas I can

aboutthecircumstancesunderwhichtheactwascommittedandtherelationsbetweentheactorandalltheotherpeople involved, forexample,what themotiveof theactwas,whether itwasanaccident, acaseof self-defence, or unprovoked, and alsowhat histories and relationships the killer and the victimhad,…etc.

20AccordingtoHume(T3.2.1.2-8),anactionisvirtuous/viciousonlyifitistheproductofavirtuous/vicious“motiveorprinciple”.Hence,inthecaseofevaluatinganaction,conditionC1requiresthatthespectatorisawareofthemotiveorprinciple,fromwhichtheactionwasproduced.21T3.2.2.24


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Step(2) IgetmyselfintoconditionC2,i.e.,ItryashardasIcantooverlookmyself-interestsifanyisinvolvedin

thecaseunderconsideration.Forexample,supposethevictimismybenefactorsothatIsufferamateriallossduetoherdeath.Iwillpretendorimagineashardaspossiblethatmyinterestsarenotatstake.

Step(3) IgetmyselfintoconditionC3,i.e.,ItryashardasIcantooverlookmypersonalrelationsifanyisinvolved

in the case. For example, suppose the killer is a friend of mine. I will pretend or imagine as hard aspossiblethatthekillerwereastrangerinstead.

Step(4) Igetmyself intoconditionC4, i.e., I take intoaccountofcommon factsofhumannature.Forexample,

suppose the killer has a history of suffering from long term physical and psychological abuses, I payattentiontothefactthatitispartofthehumanconditionthatpeoplesometimeslosesanityorsensitivityafterrepeatedtraumaticevents.

Now,afterhavingsuccessfullygotmyselfintoalltheaboveconditions,Ithenquicklyproceedto:Step(5) While I am still under those four conditions,C1,C2,C3andC4, I inspectmypassions to findoutwhat

sentimentIactuallyfeeltowardstheactunderevaluation.Step(6) Finally, ImakeajudgementaboutthemoralqualityoftheactaccordingtothesentimentIfelttowards

theactinstep(5)above,andalsoaccordingtoH,Hume’sconceptualanalysisofmorals.Forexample,ifIfeltthesentimentofdisapprobation towardstheactunderthefourconditionsC1,C2,C3andC4,then,given H, the act is (and I should make judge it to be) vicious. But if I did not feel the sentiment ofdisapprobation, then the act is not (and I should not judge it to be) vicious. Alternatively, if I felt thesentimentofapprobation instead (e.g.,because in step (1) I foundgoodevidence showing that theactwastakenagainstamasskillerwhowasinthemiddleofshootinginnocentpeopleataschool),thentheactis(andIshouldjudgeittobe)virtuous.

The fourconditions identifiedbyHume,C1,C2,C3andC4,canbethoughtofasconditions favourableor ideal fordevelopingreliablemoralsentiments–inthesensethatthebetterwegetourselvesintothoseconditions,thebetterindicatorsofgenuinemoralpropertiesoursubsequentmoralsentimentswillbe.Ifwecouldgetourselvescompletelyinto those conditions, then,GivenH, our subsequentmoral sentimentswould be infallible indicators: our positivesentiments of approbation, delight and esteem would indicate virtue; whereas our negative sentiments wouldindicate vice. It is unlikelyof course thatwewill completely satisfy those four conditions that are ideal forhavingreliable sentiments. So we approximate the test and get less than ideal but approximate results. We also try toimprovethetestbytryinghardertomeetthoseidealconditions.Thisishowwemakeprogressinourinquiryaboutmorals.Hume’smeta-ethicalaccountofmorals,likemanyotherdispositionaltheoriesofvaluesnowadays,“makesaplacefortruth,andinprincipleforcertainknowledge,andinpracticefor less-than-certainknowledgeaboutvalue.But also itmakes aplace for ignorance anderror, for hesitant opinion andmodesty, for trying to learnmore andhopingtosucceed.”22Inshort,underHume’sconceptualanalysisofmorals,H,themethod(fromstep(1)to(6))formoralinquiryisnotmysterious,butempiricalandpotentiallyscientific.23ItshouldbenoticedthatHume’sconceptualanalysisofmorals,H, isahumanistaswellasauniversalistanalysisofmorality. It is humanist in that it understands value and disvalue as essentially anchored on basic psychologicaldispositionsofthehumanbeing,notthatofGodoranyothersuperhumanbeings.Itisuniversalistinthatitimpliesthat something is valuable/disvaluable only if all human beings are disposed under the ideal conditions to feel apositive/negativesentimenttowardsit.Onhisuniversalhumanism,Humewrites:

Thenotionofmoralsimpliessomesentimentcommontoallmankind,whichrecommendsthesameobjecttogeneralapprobation,andmakeseveryman,ormostmen,agree in the sameopinionordecisionconcerningit.24

22DavidLewis,“DispositionalTheoriesofValues”,TheProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,SupplementaryVolume63(1989),p.123.23SeeMapp1.10,whereafterputtingforwardhisconceptualanalysisofmorals,hesays:“Wethenproceedtoexamineaplainmatteroffact,towit,whatactionshavethisinfluence[onthesentimentsofthejudicious“spectator”]:Weendeavourtoextractsomegeneralobservationswithregardtothesesentiments”(emphasisadded).Alsoseeibid.1.10.24M9.5(emphasisadded).Thenotation“M9.5”referstoAnEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals,section9,paragraph5.ThisnotationsystemforthetextisusedthroughouttheHumelecturematerials.Theonlinetextisalsonotatedinthisway.


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When aman […] bestows on anyman the epithets of vicious orodious ordepraved, he then […] expressessentiments,inwhich,heexpectsallhisaudiencearetoconcurwithhim.25

[T]hesentiments,whicharisefromhumanity,arenotonlythesameinallhumancreatures,andproducethesameapprobationorcensure.26

It isperhapshisoptimism in theuniformityofhumannature (which is, afterall, anempiricalmatter) thathas ledHume to consider universality as a conceptual component of moral terms. Those Humeans who lack such anoptimism(whichiscommonforenlightenmentthinkers)mightwanttoholdaneutralizedHumean(butnotHume’sown)analysisofmorals,whichsays:H*. Something is a relative/universal value (or disvalue) if and only if some/all human beings with a normal

functioningmindaredisposed,underC1,C2,C3andC4,tofeelapositive(ornegative)sentimenttowardsit.

25M9.6(lastemphasisadded,therestoriginal).26M9.7.


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4.ImpressionsandIdeas(Readings:HumeE227andT1.1.1–T1.1.3)Humedividesall“perceptions”(i.e.,experiences)into“impressions”and“ideas”.ThistheorydevicegiveshimamorefinelygrainedaccountoftheoperationsofthemindthaneitherLockeorDescarteshave.Impressionsareoriginal“perceptions of the humanmind” which are vivid, forceful, strong or lively. Ideas are the “faint images” of theoriginalimpressions.Inotherword,ideasarederivedorsecondary.Hume’s“copyprinciple”states:

“A]lloursimpleideasintheirfirstappearancearederiv’dfromsimpleimpressions,whicharecorrespondenttothem,andwhichtheyexactlyrepresent”(T1.1.1.7).

Whileitisnaturalforustohaveimpressionsandideas,Humethinksthecopyprinciplecaptureswhatisimportantintheempiricistclaimthattherearenoinnateideas.Noticethatcopiescansometimesbemorevividthantheoriginalimpressions, aswhen a photograph is enhanced on the computer so as to brighten up the original. So the pointabout impressionsbeingmore lively than ideas isonethatholdsgenerally–butnotuniversally. More frequently,Humeoftenreferstoideasasrepresentingimpressions–agenerallymorehelpfulwaytothinkaboutthedistinctionbetweenthetwocategories:weattainimpressionsfirst,whichthengiverisetothecorrespondingideas.Butthecopyprinciplehastobetreatedwithcaution. It ishardlyplausible, therationalistswouldsay, thatallourideasare simple copiesof impressions. Fromwhat impressiondoes the ideaof thenumber3,or thenumber79,derive. And what about Descartes’s examples – ideas like those of God, or of a triangle, or of infinity? Humesometimeswritesasifthedifferencebetweenimpressionsandideasisthedifferencebetweendirectlyexperiencingsomething,ontheonehand,andmerelythinkingaboutitontheother.Ifthisisright,thenhavinganimpressionofhow a lemon tastes, for example,will involve actually tasting a lemon. But if Imerely think about the taste of alemon,withoutactuallytastingone,thenIwilljusthaveanidea,notanimpression,ofthetasteofalemon.Likewise,to have an impression of embarrassment, or of dizziness, is different from thinking about embarrassment ordizziness. But this analogy is limited, and it is unlikely thatwe can capturewhatHume intendsby thedistinctionbetweenimpressionsandideasbyassimilatingittothecategoriesofdirectlyexperiencingsomethingversusthinkingaboutit.Better,onthewholetorememberthatwehaveimpressionsandwehaveideas:(a)allideasarederivedfrom,andsoaretraceablebackto,someimpressions,(b)ideasrepresent,byhavingcontentsresemblingto,theimpressionsfromwhichtheyarederived,and(c)generallybutnotnecessarily,ideasarefainterorlessvividthantheimpressionsfromwhichtheyarederived. Now,supposeIamgivenapieceofpaperwithanequilateraltriangleonit.AsIstudythetriangle,Iseethatithasthreeequal sides.Furthermore, Iobserve that ithas threeequalangles.When I stareat thisparticularequilateraltriangle,Ihaveanimpressionofit.WhenIclosemyeyesandrecallwhatitIhaveobserved,Ihaveanideaofit.Thesameprocessoccurseverytimewhen Iobserveanewtriangle. Afteraperiodofobservingandstudyingdifferenttriangles(e.g.,ascaleneone,anisoscelesone,oraright-angleone),Iwillhavedevelopedinmymindacollectionofseparateideasofthosedifferenttriangles.Aninterestingquestioniswhetherfromtheseindividual ideasofdifferenttriangles,couldIdevelopsomeso-called“abstract”or“general”ideaofthetriangle.AccordingtoLocke,“ideasbecomegeneralbyseparatingfromthemthecircumstancesofTimeandPlace…Bythiswayofabstractiontheyaremadecapableofrepresentingmoreindividualsthanone;eachofwhich,havinginitaconformitytothatabstractidea...”(EssayIII,iii,6).InLocke’sview,informingan abstract idea, one has to use the full powers of the mind to generate an idea of a triangle which is neitherequilateral,norisosceles,norscalene–“butallandnoneoftheseatonce”(EssayIV,vii,9).ForHume,Locke’stheoryofabstractionisnonsense.Humeregardsallideasascopiesof,ortraceablebackto,someimpressionsofparticularthings.Wehavemanyseparateideasofmanydifferenttriangles,whicharederivedfromaseries of impressions we have had of them. Hume argues that if we try to think of some feature of triangles ingeneral, a strangephenomenonwould occur. Supposewewonderwhether all the angles of a triangle are alwaysequaltoeachother(T1.1.7.8),thenimmediatelyotherideas–e.g.,anideaofsomescalenetriangleandthenanidea

27Thenotation“E2”referstoHume’sAnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding,theentiresection2.Thenotation“E2.1”wouldreferstosection2,paragraph1.ThisnotationsystemforthetextisusedthroughouttheHumelecturematerials.Theonlinetextisalsonotatedinthisway.


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ofsomeisoscelestriangle–“immediatelycrowdinuponus,andmakeusperceivethefalsehoodofthisproposition”.So, insteadof saying thatwehave an abstract ideaof the trianglewhichhas all theproperties of all triangles “atonce”asLockehadit(andthereforemakingtheabstracttrianglehavingincompatibleproperties),Humearguesthateach ideaofaparticular triangle canelicit inourmindanumberof ideasofother triangles.Whenhe says “someideas are particular in their nature but general in their representation” (T 1.1.7.10), the power of “general …representation”thatanideamayhaveisnothingbutthementalprocessofassociatingtheoneparticularideawithotherparticularideaswithsimilarcontents–i.e.,associationbyresemblance(seeTopic5below).Forexample,when I thinkabout theGerman shepherd I sawyesterday in thepark,by association I start thinkingaboutanotherdogIsawtwodaysagowhichwasaretriever,andthenthethoughtofyetanotherdogcomestomindbutthistimeitistheideaofthepoodleIsawlastweek,andsoon.WhenIamhavingachainof‘dog’thoughts,eachthoughtisseparateandaboutaparticulardog,andthethoughtsgothroughmymindinaquicksuccessiononeafteranother.ButIdonothaveanideaofan‘abstract’dogwhichisaGermanshepherd,aretrieverandapoodleall“atonce”.Withhisscepticismaboutabstractideasthusjustified,HumeisabletodismissotherideasthatforDescartesandtherationalists seemed tobe innate inhumanbeings. Forexample,wehavenoclear ideaof the infinitebecausewehaveno impressionof infinite,whetherof infinitedivision,orof infinitely small quantities. Anythingofwhichwehaveanimpressionisfinite.ForHume,allourideasareeithercopiesofimpressions,orcombinationsofideasthatare themselves copied from impressions. This is put very clearly inhisEnquiry concerningHumanUnderstanding,where the ideaofGodasbeingall-goodandall-wise is taken tobe the resultof “augmentingwithout limit thosequalitiesofgoodnessandwisdom”(E2.6).Theoriginalimpressionsandsubsequentideasfromwhichthenotionofall-good and all-wise has been derivedwere nothing other than impressions and ideas of everyday goodness andwisdom.Humetakesitforgranted–rathertooreadily,accordingtocritics–that“ablindmancanformnonotionofcolours,adeafmanofsounds(E2.7).SummaryonPerceptionsasImpressionandIdeasPerceptions(i.e.,mentalcontents)dividedinto:

(a) Impressions–originalperceptions,vividfeel,furtherdividedinto:

� Sensationsfromthebodilysenses-e.g.,sight,smell,hearing,taste,touch.

� Passions(i.e.,sentiments,feelings,emotions)-e.g.,pleasure,pain,attraction,repulsion,love,hatred,esteem,disgust,approval,disapproval.

(b) Ideas–derivedperceptions,usuallylessvividfeel.

� The“copyprinciple”:impressionsarecopiedascorrespondentideasandstoredinourmemory.∗ E.g.,impressionofpain(feelingit)Ì[i.e.,generates]ideaofpain.∗ E.g.,impressionofahorse(seeingone)Ìideaofahorse.∗ E.g.,impressionofahorn(seeingone)Ìideaofahorn.

� Insome(rare)occasions,anidea(e.g.,theideaofthetasteofalemon)canbecomeveryvivid-sovividthattheideafeelsexactlylikeanimpression–i.e.,likeanoriginalexperience.

� Simplevs.Compleximpressionsandideas.

� Ideasderivedfrompriorimpressionsandstoredinmemorycanbejoinedtogetherinourimaginationtoformnewideas.∗ E.g.,ideaofahorse+ideaofahornÌideaofaunicorn.∗ E.g.,ideaofpeoplebeingburnt+ideaofpeoplebeingcutintopieces+…etc.Ìideaofhell.

� All ideas have their origins in, are traceable back to, or analysable in terms of, some prior impressions,whetheritisviamemoryaloneorviathecombinedoperationofbothmemoryandimagination.∗ Ideaofamissingshadeofblue(Hume’sownpossiblecounter-example?(seeT1.1.1.10)


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5.Associationofideas(Readings:HumeT1.1.4,T1.3.6,T1.3.9,A3528,andE3)

WhatHumecalls the “associationof Ideas” is a fundamentaloperating “principle” (i.e.,mechanism)of thehumanmind.Theprincipleoperatesinthreedifferentways:(a) Byresemblance: Themind(often)associatestogetherideaswithresemblingcontents. Forexample,supposeI

knowMaryandhaveanideaofherinmymemory.Now,IseeapictureofMaryandformanideaofthepicture.But the content of idea of the picture ofMary resembles the idea ofMary herself somuch so thatmymindnaturallymovestotheideaofMaryherselfbyassociationofideasviaresemblance.

(b) Bycontiguity intimeorplace:Themind(often)associatestogetherideasofthingsthathavebeenobservedtooccurinclosetemporalorspatialproximity.Forexample,supposeIusedtoliveinahousenexttoapark.NowIthink about (i.e., have the idea of)my old house. Mymind then naturallymoves to the idea of the park byassociationof ideas via contiguity in place. For another example, suppose I haveoftenheard two songs beingplayedoneafteranother. Now I thinkabout (i.e.,have the ideaof)oneof the songs,mymind thennaturallymovestotheideaoftheothersongbyassociationofideasviacontiguityintime.

(c) By causes and effect: Themind (most often) associates together ideas of things that have been observed tooccur in constant conjunction in the past. For example, inmany previous instances I observed a billiard ballmovingafterbeinghitbyanotherone.Now,Ihaveseeabilliardballmovingtowardsanotheroneandhaveanexpectation(i.e.,anidea)thatitwillhittheotherone.ByassociationofideasofviatheconstantconjunctionofthesimilareventsIhaveobservedinthepast,mymindverynaturallymovesfromtheexpectationofthesecondbilliardballbeinghit(thecause)tothefurtherexpectationthatitwillmove(theeffect)afterbeinghit.

28Thenotation“A35”referstoHume’sAbstractofaBooklatelyPublished-entitledATreatiseofHumanNature,paragraph37.ThisnotationsystemforthetextisusedthroughouttheHumelecturematerials.Theonlinetextisalsonotatedinthisway.


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6.WhatCanWeKnow:twokindsofinquiryandreasoning(Readings:HumeE4,T1.3.1–T1.3.2,T1.3.7)According to Hume, all the objects of human inquiry and reasoning can be divided into two kinds (and only twokinds).Theyare“relationsofidea”ontheonehand,whicharediscoverablebyreasonindependentofrealexistenceintheuniverse,and“mattersoffact”ontheother,whicharediscoverablebyexperience.Humerecommendsthatwheneveraquestionofdebatearises,weaskwhetheritisaboutrelationsofideasoraboutmattersoffact,andthenweshouldproceedtouseeitherreasonorexperiencetoaddressthequestionordebate.(a) RelationsofIdeas

� Hereareexamplesofvariouskindsof“relationsofideas”:∗ Hume’sownexample:mathematicalrelations(e.g.,Pythagorastheoremingeometry).∗ Contemporary example: logical relations (e.g., Modus Ponens – the valid argument form or deductive

principle:“IfPthenQ.Pistrue.ThereforeQistrue”).∗ Contemporary example: conceptual relations between complex ideas and the simpler ideas in terms of

which they are defined (e.g., the complex idea “woman” is defined in terms of, and therefore hasconceptualrelationsto,thesimplerideas“adult”,“human”and“female”).

� True relations of ideas are provable by reasonapriori, or, inHume’swords, they “are discoverable by themereoperationofthought,withoutdependenceonwhatisanywhereexistentintheuniverse”(E4.1.1).ForHume,reasoncanonlydiscovertruerelationsofideabytwomeans:∗ Intuition or rational intuition (by which we discover axioms, i.e., self-evident truths, about relations of

ideas).∗ Demonstrativereasoning–i.e.,makingdeductiveinferences(bywhichwediscovernewrelationsofideas

thatareinferablefromaxioms).� Statementsexpressing relationsof ideas arenowadaysoften called “analytic statements”. InHume’s view,

(analytic)statementsthatexpresstruerelationsofideasareofcertainty–i.e.,necessarilytrue(meaning:thedenialornegationofwhichwouldbeaself-contradiction).

(b) MattersofFact

� InHume’sview,“mattersof fact”cannotbeprovenordemonstratedbyreasonapriori.Rather, mattersoffactarediscoverableonlyviaexperienceaposterioribythefollowingmeans:∗ Observation – i.e., having impressions via the bodily senses, such as seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling,

touching,feeling(bywhichwediscovereventsandobjectsintheworldandalsotheirqualities).∗ Inductivereasoning(Humealsousestheterm“experimentalreasoning”29)–i.e.,makinginductive(ornon-

deductive, or what he also calls “experimental”) inferences from what we already know from pastexperience towhatwedonotyet knowbecause ithasnotbeenobserved. Inductive inferences canbedividedintotwokinds:ö Inferencesfromparticulartoparticular:Themindofteninfersfromanobservedparticularinstanceto

an unobserved particular instance - by the mental principle of “association of ideas” via constantconjunctionof“causeandeffect”aswellasvia“resemblance”(seeTopic5above).− For example, givenmy past observations of the constant conjunction of burning and smoke being

produced as cause and effect, when I am now outside a house and see smoke coming out of itschimney,IinferthatsomethingisburninginsideeventhoughIdonotseeinside.Inthiscase,Imakeacausalinferencefromaparticulareffect(observed)toaparticularcause(unobserved).Later,whenIaminsidethehouseandseethatcoal isburninginthefireplace, I inferthatsmokeiscomingoutthechimneyeventhoughIdonotseethesmokeoutside.Inthiscase,Iinferfromaparticularcause(observed)toaparticulareffect(unobserved).

− For example, given my past experience of several computers of a certain model by a certainmanufacturer,whichallbrokendownshortlyafterpurchase,whenInowseeanewcomputerofthesamemodelbythesamemanufacturer,Iinferthatthiscomputerwillalsobreakdownshortlyafterpurchase. In this case, Imakeanalogical inference from certain qualities of several particular pastinstances (observed) to an associated quality attributed the new instance (unobserved) - via the

29E8.17,E9.6.E12.34,


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resemblancebetweenthenewtotheoldinstances(e.g.,theyareallofthesamemodelbythesamemanufacturer).30

ö Inferencesfromparticulartogeneral: Byassociationof ideasvia“resemblance”,themindalsoofteninfersfromalimitednumberofsimilarparticularinstancesofconstantconjunctionofcertaineventsorqualities (observed) to a general law or principle which it believes to universally apply to all(unobserved)similarinstances.Wenowadayscallthistypeofinference“inductivegeneralisation”.− Forexample,frommypastexperienceofa limitednumberofcaseswherecoalburningandsmoke

being produced had constant conjunction as cause and effect, I now infer the universal causalprinciplethatcoalburningalwaysproducessmoke,whichIbelievetoapplytoall instancesofcoalburning.

− For example, frommy past experience of a limited number of caseswhere computer of a certainmodelbyacertainmanufacturerallhavingbrokendownshortlyafterpurchase,andbyassociationof ideasviaresemblance, Inow infer theuniversalprinciple (which isnot a causalprinciple in thiscase)thatcomputersofthismodelbythismanufactureralwaysbreakdownshortlyafterpurchase.

• StatementsexpressingwhatHumecalls“mattersoffact”(or“whatisanywhereexistentintheuniverse”)arenowadays called “empirical statements”. In Hume’s view, there is no certainty to any matters of fact.Statementsthatexpressrealmattersoffactarenotnecessarilytrue(meaning:thedenialornegationofwhichwouldnotbeaself-contradiction).

� By “necessary”, Hume means “cannot be imagined to be otherwise without self-contradiction”. Hence, anecessarytruth isonewhichwouldbeself-contradictorytodenyor imaginetobefalse. Ingeneral,Humearguesthatifitisnotself-contradictorytoimagineaclaimtobefalse,thentheclaimitselfisnotnecessarilytrue,evenifitistrue.Likewise,ifitisnotself-contradictorytoimagineaneventnottooccur,thenthereisnonecessitytoit,evenifithasinfactoccurred.Hume’spointhereisnotwhethersomethingisinfacttrue,butwhetherthereisanynecessitytoitstruthifitisindeedtrue.Indeed,itseemsthatHumetakesunintelligibility,unimaginability,orinconceivabilityasanindicatorof(ifnotco-extensivewith)impossibility.Forexample,hewrites:

Wherein consists thedifferencebetwixt believing anddisbelieving anyproposition? The answer is easywithregardtopropositions,thatareprov’dbyintuitionordemonstration.Inthatcase,theperson,whoassents,notonlyconceives the ideasaccording to theproposition,but isnecessarilydetermin’d toconceive them in thatparticular manner, either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas. Whatever is absurd isunintelligible;norisitpossiblefortheimaginationtoconceiveanythingcontrarytoademonstration.31∗ ∗ Regardingcausalconnectionbetweeneventsinparticular,Humearguesthatitisnotaself-contradictionto

denyany causal claim in the form“eventsof typeAare always followedbyeventof typeB”. For eacheventisadistinctexistence,Humeargues,andtheideaofoneevent(e.g.,theidea“thebilliardballishit”)iscompletelyseparateinitscontentfromtheideaofanotherevent(e.g.,theidea“thebilliardballmoves”)–i.e.,thereisnoconceptualrelationbetweenthetwoideas.Hence,itisnotself-contradictorytoimagineasituationwhereaneventoftypeAoccursbutnoeventoftypeBfollows.So,acausalclaimaboutwhateventswillfollowfromwhatevents,eveniftrue,isnotanecessarytruth.Causalclaims,iftrue,aremerelycontingenttruths.

� AccordingtoHume,so-called“causalinferences”arenothingmorethanmerehabitsofthemindoperatinginaccordance to the principle of “association of ideas” (see Topic 5 above). To say that events of one type“cause” events of another type is nothing more than saying that events of the first type are “constantlyfollowed”byeventsofthesecondtype.Thebeliefinacausallaw(ora“lawofnature”)isnothingmorethanabeliefthatthefuturewillresemblethepastinthoseregardsstatedbythelaw.Theminddevelopsbeliefs(i.e.,ideas) about cause and effect by the natural operation of the principle of “association of ideas”. It alsodevelopsa confidence in thosebeliefs as the resultof themany repeatedoperationsof theprinciple in thepast. Butwhether the futurewill always resemble the past, orwhether events of one kindwill always befollowbyeventsofanotherkind(whichbelongtothecategoryof“mattersoffact”),canneverbe“proven”byreasonwithcertainty.Therefore,ourconfidenceinsuchbeliefsaboutcauseandeffectisneitherwarrantedbydemonstrativereasoningorrationalintuition.

30SeeTopic7belowformoredetailsonanalogicalinference.31T1.3.7.3.


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� “[A]ll probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation […] Objects have no discoverable connexiontogether;norisitfromanyotherprinciplebutcustomoperatingupontheimagination,thatwecandrawanyinferencefromtheappearanceofonetotheexistenceofanother.”(T1.3.8.12)

� “Thosephilosophers,whohavedividedhuman reason intoknowledgeandprobability, andhavedefin’d thefirst to be that evidence, which arises from the comparison of ideas, are oblig’d to comprehend all ourargumentsfromcausesoreffectsunderthegeneraltermofprobability.Buttho’everyonebefreetousehisterms inwhat sensehepleases;andaccordingly in theprecedentpartof thisdiscourse, Ihave follow’d thismethodofexpression;’tishowevercertain,thatincommondiscoursewereadilyaffirm,thatmanyargumentsfrom causation exceed probability, andmay be receiv’d as a superior kind of evidence. One wou’d appearridiculous,whowou’dsay,that’tisonlyprobablethesunwillriseto-morrow,orthatallmenmustdye;tho’’tisplainwehaveno furtherassuranceof these facts, thanwhatexperienceaffordsus.For this reason, ’twouldperhapsbemoreconvenient, inorderatoncetopreservethecommonsignificationofwords,andmarktheseveral degrees of evidence, to distinguish human reason into three kinds, viz. that from knowledge, fromproofs,andfromprobabilities.Byknowledge, Imeantheassurancearising fromthecomparisonof ideas.Byproofs,thosearguments,whicharederiv’dfromtherelationofcauseandeffect,andwhichareentirelyfreefromdoubtanduncertainty.Byprobability,thatevidence,whichisstillattendedwithuncertainty.’Tisthislastspeciesofreasoning,Iproceedtoexamine.”(T.1.3.11.2)


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7.Sympathy&MoralSentiments(Readings:HumeT2.1.11,T2.2.4-5,T3.2.2,T3.3.1-2)32“Sympathy” (orwhat is nowoften called “empathy”) is in Hume’s view a complexmechanism or principle of thehumanmindwhichreliesonthecombinedoperationofthreemorefundamentalprinciples,including(a)the“copyprinciple”, (b) the principle of “association of ideas” by resemblance, by contiguity in time or place, and by theconstant conjunction of cause and effect, and (c) the principle of more vivid perceptions “enlivening” less vividassociatedperceptions.(a) The“copyprinciple”(recallHumeLectures1&2above):IhavehadsomebadexperiencedinthepastwhereI

felt sad, frustrated, hurt, or angry, and I cried and screamed. These direct experiences or impressions got“copied”ascorrespondentideasinmymindandstoredinmymemory.

(b) Theprincipleof“associationofideas”(againrecallHumeLectures1&2above):� After I have had repeated experience of the similar kind, my mind has naturally associated together the

various ideas derived from the impressions involved in the experience. For example, by the principle ofassociation of ideas via constant conjunction of cause and effect, my mind has established a pattern ofassociationbetweentheideaofcryingandtheideaofsadness. SupposenowinanewinstanceIobserveapersoncryinginfrontofme.Bythesameprincipleofassociationofideas,mymindthennaturallymovesfromtheideasofcryingtotheideaofsadness.Inshort,duetomyownpastsimilarexperience,IinferfromwhatIobservetobetheoutwardbehaviouroftheperson(crying)totheexistenceofan innerstateoftheperson(sadness)whichIbelievetohavecausedtheperson’sbehaviour.

� AccordingtoHume,everyhumancreatureresemblesourselves,andbythatmeanshasanadvantageaboveany other object in influencing the operation of the principle of association of ideas. So, due to theresemblance betweenmyself and the person in front ofme (aswe are both human beings),mymind, byassociationofsimilarideas,naturallymovesfromtheideaofthepersontotheideaofmyself.

� Furthermore, according to Hume,whenever I think about (i.e., have an idea of)myself, I will also becomeintimatelyawareofmyvarious immediateexperiencesor impressions (e.g., impressionsofwheremyhandsare,howmybody is feelingatvariousplaces).Tohavean impressionofoneself, inHume’sview, isnothingmorethanhavingachainofvariousveryvividimmediateexperiencesorimpressions.So,fromhavingtheideaofmyself I now come to have an impression ofmyself, which Hume argues, is always very vivid, for it isconstituted by the various very vivid immediate experiences or impressions that I have when I reflect onmyself.

� Inshort,byobservingthecryingpersoninfrontofme,mymindisnowentertainingtwoperceptions:(a)theideaofsadnessand(b)theveryvividimpressionofmyself.Thetwoperceptionsarenowassociatedtogetherinmymind via contiguity in time – as I am experiencing them in very close temporal proximitywith eachother.

(c) Theprincipleofmorevividperceptions“enlivening”lessvividassociatedperceptions:AccordingtoHume,itisa

fundamentalprincipleof themind that ifa lessvividperception (i.e.,an idea)happens tobeassociated in themindwithaveryvividperception(i.e.,animpression),forexample,ifthetwoperceptionshappentooccurinthemindataboutthesametime(i.e.,contiguityintime),thentheveryvividonewill“enliven”thelessvividonetosuchanextentthatthelatterwillbecomeasvividastheformerandthereforeturnintoalivelyimpression.Afterall, themaindifferencebetweenan impressionandacorrespondent idea, inHume’s theory,consistsmainly intheir different degrees of vividness. A very vividly experienced idea is qualitatively no different from acorrespondentimpression.Inshort,bytheprincipleofmorevividperceptions“enlivening”lessvividassociatedones, an originally rather faint idea can become so “enlivened” and vivid and forceful that it qualifies as animpression.� Now, let us go back to the crying person in front ofme. In step 2 above, due to the various operations of

principleofassociationofideaswhenIamobservingtheperson,mymindhasassociatedtogether(a)theideaofsadnessand(b)theveryvividimpressionofmyself.Sincetheimpressionofmyself,aswehaveseen,issovivid, it“enlivens”theassociatedideaofsadnesssomuchsothattheideaofsadnessis“converted”intoanimpression (i.e.,directexperience)ofsadness. Inotherwords, Inow feel sadmyself.Or inHume’sword, I

32Forafulleraccountonthevariousprinciplesinvolvedintheoperationofsympathy,alsoseeT1.1.1.1-7,T1.1.2-3,T1.1.4.1-2,T1.3.6.13,T1.3.8.2,T1.3.10.3,T1.3.14.28,T1.3.15.1-5,T1.4.6.4,T2.1.4.2,T2.1.11.4-8,T2.2.4.7,T3.3.1,T3.3.2.1-7


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“partakeof”thecryingperson’ssadness“bysympathy”.As we have seen, in Hume’s account of sympathy, its operation of in part relies on the association of ideas via“resemblance”(e.g.,whentheideaofanotherpersonexcitestheideaofmyselfduetothesimilaritiesthatIbelieveto hold between the person andmyself). From this, Hume further argues that the greater thenumber of similarqualities(e.g.,physicalfeatures,characterstraits,temperaments,beliefs,values,sentiments,andcircumstances)andthegreaterthedegreeofresemblancethatonebelievesanotherpersontosharewithoneself,themorestronglyonewouldassociatethe ideaofthepersonwiththe ideaofoneself,andtherefore,otherthingsbeingequal, themorelikelythatonewouldsympathizewiththeperson.� Argumentbyanalogy(oranalogicalreasoning)is,forHume,nothingmorethantheoperationoftheprincipleof

“associationofideas”viaresemblance.SupposewehaveinmanypastinstancesobservedobjectsA1,A2,A3,…allhaving thequalitiesFsandalso thequalityK. SupposenowweobserveanewobjectBwhichhas the samequalitiesFs.Ourmind,byassociationof ideasviaresemblance,willoftennaturallymoveto (i.e., infer) the ideathatBalsohasthesamequalityK.InHume’swords,

“AllourreasoningsconcerningmatteroffactarefoundedonaspeciesofAnalogy.[…]Butwheretheobjectshavenotsoexactasimilarity,theanalogyis lessperfect,andtheinferenceis lessconclusive;thoughstill ithassomeforce, inproportiontothedegreeofsimilarityandresemblance.”33

� GivenHume’saccountofsympathy,onepossibleexplanationforcaseswhereonedoesnotsympathize,orfailstosympathize, with another person is that one does not think the other person is similar to oneself. Such“disassociation”or“hyper-separation”34 (let’scall it that)occurs, forexample,whenaNazi failedtosympathizewiththeJewsinaconcentrationcampbeforeandduringWWII,whenaslavetraderfailstosympathizewiththeslavesfromsellingwhomheisprofiting,whenapatriarchfailstosympathizewithhisyoungdaughterwhomheisforcing intomarriage,orwhenawelloffperson living ina richandpeaceful country fails to sympathizewitharefugeeseekingasylum(andyoucanfindmoreexamplesyourself).Itisimportant,however,tonotethatthefactthatonehappensnot tosympathizewithanotherpersonbecauseonedoesnotbelievetheotherpersontobesimilartooneself, this fact,doesnotby itselfmake it truethattheotherperson isnot insomeimportantwayssimilar to oneself. Self interest, fear, contempt, hatred, for example, can often cloud people’s observation andjudgementsothattheyfailtoobservesimilaritiesthatinfactexistbetweenthemselvesandotherpeople.Peoplemayalsosuppress their sympathybyactively ignoring,bynot thinkingabout,ways inwhich theyaresimilar toothers–forfearthatthesimilarities,oncerecognized,wouldexcitecertainunpleasantsentiments(e.g.,distress)thattheymaynotwanttoexperienceorsharebysympathy.

33E9.1.34Foraverygoodaccountofhow“hyper-separation”mayoccur,seeValPlumwood,FeminismandtheMasteryofNature,Routledge1993.


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8.Animals&Nature:fromtheHumeanpointofview(Readings:HumeE9,T1.3.16,T2.1.12,T2.2.12,T2.3.10.32)35AccordingtoHume,manynonhumananimals(orbeingswhomhesometimescalls“sensiblecreatures”36)resembleusinbothbodyandmind.Becauseofthesimilaritiesbetweenusandthem,weareabletosympathizewithanimalsinapproximatewaysthatwesympathizewithotherhumanbeings.That is,wesympathywithanimalsthroughthesamesetofmentalprinciplesthroughwhichwesympathywithotherpeople(seeTopic7above).TheBody:BelowaresomepassageswhereHumediscussesthesimilaritiesbetweenhumanandanimalbodies:

“Theanatomicalobservations, formedupononeanimal, are,by this speciesof reasoning [i.e., analogical reasoning,onwhichcausalreasoningalsorelies],extendedtoallanimals”.37“’Tisusualwithanatomiststojointheirobservationsandexperimentsonhumanbodiestothoseonbeasts,andfromtheagreementoftheseexperimentstoderiveanadditionalargumentforanyparticularhypothesis.[…]wherethestructureofparts inbrutes is the sameas inmen,and theoperationof thesepartsalso the same, thecausesof thatoperationcannotbedifferent,andthatwhateverwediscovertobetrueoftheonespecies,maybeconcludedwithouthesitationtobecertainoftheother.[…]asthestructureoftheveinsandmuscles,thefabricandsituationoftheheart,ofthelungs,thestomach,theliverandotherparts,arethesameornearlythesameinallanimals,theverysamehypothesis,whichinonespeciesexplainsmuscularmotion,theprogressofthechyle,thecirculationoftheblood,mustbeapplicabletoeveryone;andaccordingasitagreesordisagreeswiththeexperimentswemaymakeinanyspeciesofcreatures,wemaydrawaproofofitstruthorfalshoodonthewhole.”38“Theseanalogicalobservationsmaybecarriedfarther,eventothisscience[i.e.,thescienceofthehumanmind],ofwhichwe are now treating; and any theory, by which we explain the operations of the understanding, or the origin andconnexionofthepassionsinman,willacquireadditionalauthority,ifwefind,thatthesametheoryisrequisitetoexplainthesamephaenomenainallotheranimals.”39“Letus,therefore,applythismethodofenquiry,whichisfoundsojustandusefulinreasoningsconcerningthebody,toourpresentanatomyofthemind,andseewhatdiscoverieswecanmakebyit.”40

Intheabovepassages,Humeisineffectputtingforwardanargumentbyanalogy–onhowweshouldreasonaboutthe similarities that we observe between humans and animals. His analogical argument can be summarized asfollows:

Premise. Totheextentthathumansandanimalsaresimilar intheirbodilyoperations,whateveranatomical

principles/hypothesescanexplainthoseoperationsinonecasearealsoapplicabletotheothercase.

Conclusion. To the extent that humans and animals are similar in their behaviours, whatever mentalprinciples/hypotheses (e.g., the copy principle, the principle of “association of ideas”,…, etc.) canexplainthosebehavioursinonecasearealsoapplicabletotheothercase.(analogicallyinferred)

In short, if we justified in thinking animal bodies and the human body operate in similar ways because of theresemblance inanatomybetweenanimalbodiesandthehumanbody, then,Humearguesbyanalogy,wearealsojustified to think thatanimalmindsand thehumanmindoperate in somesimilarways -given the resemblance inbehavioursbetweenhumansandanimals.

35Forafulleraccountonthevariousprinciplesinvolvedintheoperationofsympathy,alsoseeT1.1.1.1-7,T1.1.2-3,T1.1.4.1-2,T1.3.6.13,T1.3.8.2,T1.3.10.3,T1.3.14.28,T1.3.15.1-5,T1.4.6.4,T2.1.4.2,T2.1.11.4-8,T2.2.4.7,T3.3.1,T3.3.2.1-7.36E12.1.7.37E9.1.38T2.1.12.2.39E9.1,emphasesadded.40T2.1.12.2,emphasesadded.


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TheMind: Hume holds that theminds of animals ofmany nonhuman species resemble the humanmind in bothcognitiveandemotionalcapacities.Animals and the “Understanding”: In terms of cognitive capacities (or what Hume calls the faculty of“understanding”),Humearguesthat it isevidentfromourobservationsonanimalbehavioursthatanimals, likeus,arecapableofhavingperceptionsandmemories,41andsothe“copyprinciple”shouldlikewiseoperatesananimal’smindinprettymuchthesamewaythatitoperatesthehumanmind.Itisalsoevident,Humeargues,thatanimals(oratleastanimalswhosebehavioursresemblethoseofahumanbeing)arecapableofinductivereasoning(orwhathesometimescall“experimentalreasoning”),whichisafterallunderHume’saccountnothingmorethanthecustomaryorhabitualoperationofthementalprincipleof“associationofideas”–although,headmits, inductivereasoninginanimals (like that in a small child or amentally impaired person) is less sophisticated than that in a normal andeducatedadulthumanbeing.Thedifferencehere,Humeargues, isone indegree,not in type. It shouldbenoted,however,thatHumedoesnotattributedemonstrativeorlogicalreasoning,orrationalintuition,toanimals.BelowaresomepassageswhereHumediscussesthesimilaritiesbetweenanimalsandhumanbeingsintheirfacultyof understanding, and the common mental principles according to which animal and human perceptions (i.e.,impressionsandideas)operate:

“[N]otruthappearstomemoreevident,thanthatbeastsareendow’dwiththoughtandreasonaswellasmen.[…]Whentherefore we see other creatures, in millions of instances, perform like actions, and direct them to like ends, all ourprinciplesof[inductive]reasonandprobabilitycarryuswithaninvincibleforcetobelievetheexistenceofalikecause.[…]’Tisfromtheresemblanceoftheexternalactionsofanimalstothoseweourselvesperform,thatwejudgetheirinternallikewisetoresembleours;andthesameprincipleof[analogicalandcausal]reasoning,carry’donestepfarther,willmakeusconclude that sinceour internalactions resembleeachother, thecauses, fromwhich theyarederiv’d,mustalsoberesembling.When anyhypothesis, therefore, is advanc’d to explain amental operation,which is common tomenandbeasts,wemustapplythesamehypothesistoboth”42“Itseemsevident, thatanimals,aswellasmen learnmanythings fromexperience,and infer, thatthesameeventswillalwaysfollowfromthesamecauses.Bythisprinciple[ofassociationofideasviaconstantconjunctionofcauseandeffect]theybecomeacquaintedwiththemoreobviouspropertiesofexternalobjects,andgradually,fromtheirbirth,treasureupaknowledgeof thenatureof fire,water,earth, stones,heights,depths,&c. andof theeffects,which result fromtheiroperation.Theignoranceandinexperienceoftheyoungarehereplainlydistinguishablefromthecunningandsagacityoftheold,whohavelearned,bylongobservation,toavoidwhathurtthem,andtopursuewhatgaveeaseorpleasure.[…]Inallthesecases,wemayobserve,thattheanimal inferssomefactbeyondwhat immediatelystrikeshissenses;andthatthis inference is altogether founded on past experience,while the creatureexpects from the present object the sameconsequences,whichithasalwaysfoundinitsobservationtoresultfromsimilarobjects.”43“Adog,thathashidabone,oftenforgetstheplace;butwhenbroughttoit,histhoughtpasseseasilytowhatheformerlyconceal’d, bymeans of the contiguity, which produces a relation among his ideas. In likemanner, when he has beenheartilybeatinanyplace,hewilltrembleonhisapproachtoit,eventho’hediscovernosignsofanypresentdanger.Theeffectsofresemblancearenotsoremarkable;butasthatrelationmakesaconsiderableingredientincausation,ofwhichall animals shew so evident a judgement, we may conclude that the three relations of resemblance, contiguity andcausationoperateinthesamemanneruponbeastsasuponhumancreatures.”44“Animals […] are not guided in these inferences by [demonstrative] reasoning: Neither are children: Neither are thegenerality ofmankind, in their ordinary actions and conclusions: Neither are philosophers themselves, who, in all theactivepartsoflife,are,inthemain,thesamewiththevulgar,andaregovernedbythesamemaxims.[…]theexperimentalreasoningitself,whichwepossessincommonwithbeasts,andonwhichthewholeconductoflifedepends,isnothingbutaspeciesofinstinctormechanicalpower,thatactsinusunknowntoourselves;andinitschiefoperations,isnotdirectedbyanysuchrelationsorcomparisonsofideas,asaretheproperobjectsofourintellectualfaculties.Thoughtheinstinctbedifferent,yetstillitisaninstinct,whichteachesamantoavoidthefire;asmuchasthat,whichteachesabird,withsuchexactness,theartofincubation,andthewholeeconomyandorderofitsnursery.”45

41T1.3.16.6-7.42T1.3.16.1-3,emphasesadded.43E9.2-4,emphasesadded.44T2.1.12.7,emphasesadded.45E9.5-6,emphasesadded.


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Animals and the “Passions”: According to Hume,many animals, like us, are capable of having a great variety offeelings, sentiments, and passions, such as pleasure and pain, love and hatred, pride and humility, fear and grief.Moreover,Humethinksthatanimalsarecapableofsympathytoo!BelowaresomepassageswhereHumediscussesthesimilaritiesbetweenanimalsandhumanbeingsintheirpassionsandthecommonmental/psychologicalprinciplesaccordingtowhichtheirpassionsoperate:

“Wemust first shew the correspondence ofpassions inmen and animals, and afterwards compare the causes,whichproduce thesepassions. […]every speciesof creatures,whichapproachsooften toman,as to familiarizethemselveswith him, show an evident pride [a passion] in his approbation [the cause of the passion], and arepleas’d[apassion]withhispraisesandcaresses[thecauses][…]prideandhumilityarenotmerelyhumanpassions,butextendthemselvesoverthewholeanimalcreation.Thecausesofthesepassionsarelikewisemuchthesameinbeastsasinus,makingajustallowanceforoursuperiorknowledgeandunderstanding.”46“Thenextquestionis,whether,sincethosepassionsarethesame,andarisefromthesamecausesthro’thewholecreation, the manner, in which [i.e., the mental principles, by which] the causes operate, be also the same.Accordingtoallrulesofanalogy,thisisjustlytobeexpected”.47“Thereare[…] instancesoftherelation[orassociation]of impressions,sufficienttoconvinceus,thatthere isanunionofcertainaffectionswitheachotherintheinferiorspeciesofcreaturesaswellasinthesuperior,andthattheirminds are frequently convey’d thro’ a series of connected emotions. A dog,when elevatedwith joy, runsnaturallyintoloveandkindness,whetherofhismasterorofthesex.Inlikemanner,whenfullofpainandsorrow,he becomes quarrelsome and ill-natur’d; and that passion, which at first was grief, is by the smallest occasionconverted into anger [by the principle of union among similar passions]. […] all the internal principles, that arenecessary inustoproduce[thepassions],arecommontoallcreatures;andsincethecauses,whichexcitethesepassions,arelikewisethesame,wemayjustlyconclude,thatthesecausesoperateafterthesamemanner[i.e.,bythesamementalprinciples]thro’thewholeanimalcreation.”48“Buttopassfromthepassionsofloveandhatred[…]astheyappearinman,tothesameaffections,astheydisplaythemselvesinbrutes;wemayobserve,notonlythatloveandhatredarecommontothewholesensitivecreation,butlikewisethattheircauses[…]areofsosimpleanature,thattheymayeasilybesuppos’dtooperateonmereanimals.[…]Asanimalsarebutlittlesusceptibleeitherofthepleasuresorpainsoftheimagination,theycanjudgeof objects only by the sensible good or evil, which they produce, and from thatmust regulate their affectionstowardsthem.Accordinglywefind,thatbybenefitsorinjuriesweproducetheirloveorhatred;andthatbyfeedingandcherishinganyanimal,wequicklyacquirehisaffections;asbybeatingandabusinghimweneverfailtodrawonushisenmityandill-will.”49“Love inbeasts isnot caus’d somuchby relation, as inour species; and thatbecause their thoughts arenot soactiveastotracerelations,exceptinveryobviousinstances.Yet’tiseasytoremark,thatonsomeoccasionsithasaconsiderableinfluenceuponthem.Thusacquaintance,whichhasthesameeffectasrelation,alwaysproducesloveinanimalseithertomenortoeachother.Forthesamereasonanylikenessamongthemisthesourceofaffection.Anoxconfin’d toaparkwithhorses,willnaturally join theircompany, if Imaysospeak,butalways leaves it toenjoythatofhisownspecies,wherehehasthechoiceofboth.”50“’Tisevident, thatsympathy,or thecommunicationofpassions, takesplaceamonganimals,no less thanamongmen.Fear,anger,courageandotheraffectionsarefrequentlycommunicatedfromoneanimaltoanother,withouttheir knowledge of that cause, which produc’d the original passion. Grief likewise is receiv’d by sympathy; andproducesalmostall thesameconsequences,andexcites thesameemotionsas inourspecies.Thehowlingsandlamentationsofadogproduceasensibleconcerninhisfellows.And’tisremarkable,thattho’almostallanimalsuseinplaythesamemember,andnearlythesameactionasinfighting;alion,atyger,acattheirpaws;anoxhishorns;adoghis teeth;ahorsehisheels:Yet theymostcarefullyavoidharmingtheircompanion,eventho’ theyhavenothingtofearfromhisresentment;whichisanevidentproofofthesensebruteshaveofeachother’spainandpleasure.”51

46T2.1.12.3-5,emphasesoriginal.47T2.1.12.6-9,firstemphasisoriginal,therestadded.48T2.1.12.8-9,firstemphasisadded,therestoriginal.49T2.2.12.1,T2.2.12.3,emphasisoriginal.50T2.2.12.4.51T.2.2.12.6.


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Inshort,Humearguesthatfromobservationsofanimalbehaviours,itisevidentthatanimals(ormammalsanyway)resemble human beings to a significant extent in their faculty of understanding (or cognition) – including theircapacitiesfor(i)perceptions,(ii)memories,andfor(iii) inductivereasoningbyassociationofideasviaresemblance,contiguity,andtheconstantconjunctionofcauseandeffect.Humealsoarguesthatmanyanimalsresemblehumansintheirfacultyofthepassions(orwhathecallsthefacultyof“taste”)–includingtheircapacitiesfor(iv)experiencinga great variety of feelings andemotions, the operations ofwhich in animals are guided by similar principles as inhumans,andtheircapacityfor(v)sympathy–notonlywithmembersoftheirownspecies,butalsowithmembersofotheranimalspecies.The question now is: If even animals,with inferior understanding, are capable of sympathizingwithmembers ofanother animal species, then shouldn’t we, human beings, with superior understanding, also be capable ofsympathizingwithanimalsbeyondtheboundaryofourownspecies?Sympathy, on Hume’s account, operates partly via the principle of association of idea by resemblance. Wesympathizewiththosewhowebelievetobesimilartous.Bysympathy,theiremotionsandpassionscommunicatetousinsolivelyamannerthatwecometoshareandexperiencethoseemotionsandpassionsourselves.GivenHume’saccount of similarities between humans and animals, his account of sympathy, and his account of the humanunderstanding (which ismuchmoresophisticatedthanthat inanimalsandtherefore ismuchbetter indiscoveringtheresemblancebetweenhumansandanimals),theanswertothequestionisclear:Weareindeedequippedwiththecapacitiesnecessaryandsufficientfordevelopingandhavingsympathywithnonhumananimals.Whenwefailtosympathizewithananimalinpainorindistress,forexample,thisfailureinsympathy,underHume’saccount, is rather similar to the failure to sympathizewith a fellow human being. Both cases can be explained intermsoffactorsthatmayblocktheoperationsofthevariousmentalprinciplesonwhichsympathyreplies–blockingfactorssuchasself-interest,fear,orfeelingofsuperiority,orgeneralinsensitivity,orevenautismspectrumdisorders.Butinboththehumanandnonhumancase,failureofsympathycanbemendedtosomeextentbythebetteruseofthehumanunderstanding,whichshouldenableustoseenotonlythedifferences,butalsothesimilarities,betweenourselvesandotherpeopleaswellasothersentientanimals.However,ifpeoplewerenotnaturallybornewiththecapacitiestodetecttheemotionsofothers,andtoreproducethesamekindsofemotionsinthemselves,thennoamountofreasoningandtheexerciseoftheircognitivepowerswillenablethemtosympathizewithothers.Atitscore,sympathyisanemotionalcapacitytoreproducepassionsofothers inoneself. It plays anessential role inourmoral judgements.Without theability to sympathize,ourmoraljudgementswouldbeasunreliableasacolour-blindperson’saestheticjudgementofapainting.Reason can present us with facts about the world, make clear distinctions that help us avoid confusions andinconsistency.Butafterallofthat isdone, it is forthepassionsproducedbysympathytotaketheroleofthefinaljudgeofmoralgoodandevil,rightandwrong.ItakethistobewhatHumemeansinpart–whenhesays:“Reasonis,andoughtonlytobetheslaveofthepassions,andcanneverpretendtoanyotherofficethantoserveandobeythem”.52

52T2.3.3.4.

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