humean scepticism as an alternative in the …...humean scepticism as an alternative in the...
TRANSCRIPT
HumeanScepticismasanAlternativeintheTraditionalMoralRealismand
MoralAnti-RealismDebate
by
CourteneyCrump
AthesissubmittedtotheFacultyofGraduateandPostdoctoralAffairsin
partialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof
MasterofArtsin
Philosophy
CarletonUniversityOttawa,Ontario
©2018,CourteneyCrump
ii
Abstract Traditionally,therealismandanti-realismdebatewithinmetaphysicshas
beenrestrictedtoadichotomybetweenrealismandanti-realism.Thisdichotomy
tricklesdowntomorespecificareaswithinthedebate.Oneoftheseareaseffected
bythetraditionalrealismandanti-realismdichotomyismoralrealismandmoral
anti-realism.Thisthesisfocusesonmoralrealismandmoralanti-realism,and
showsthatrestrictingthedebatetoonlymoralrealismandmoralanti-realismisa
falsedichotomy.Itdoesthisthroughprovidinganalternativeoptiontothetwo
traditionallygiven:HumeanScepticism.Thegoalofthisthesisistoarguethat
HumeanScepticismisaviablethirdoptioninthemoralrealismandmoralanti-
realismdebate.Thisthesisdemonstratesthatscepticismshouldsometimesbe
takenseriouslyandacknowledgedinsomedebatesthatithastraditionallybeen
excludedfrom.
iii
Acknowledgements
TheyearsofmyMaster’sdegreehavebeenastressfulrollercoasterfullof
highsandlows,andIwouldnotbewhereIam,orwhoIam,todaywithoutthe
followingpeople.
Tostart,Iwouldliketothankmyco-supervisorsDr.GordonDavisandDr.
MelissaFrankelforthehourstheyputintohelpingme,andforsuchquickfeedback
turnaroundtimes.IwouldalsoliketothankDr.AnnieLarivéeforallhersage
advice,andDr.ChristineKoggelforherclearfeedbackandguidanceduringthe
ResearchSeminar.Thisthesisalsowouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthe
DepartmentofPhilosophyAdministrator,SandraKirkpatrick,andtheDepartment
ofPhilosophyGraduateAdministrator,KristopherWaddell.Ihavesaidthismany
times,butIwillsayitagain:SandyandKrisareliketheparentsofthedepartment,
keepingusallorganized.
Secondly,Iwouldliketothankmycohort,andtheCarletonUniversity
DepartmentofPhilosophy.ThemembersofmycohortandIexperiencedalot
together,andtheyallgaveconstructivefeedbackduringtheResearchSeminarand
duringdiscussionsconcerningourthesesoutsideofclass.Morespecifically,Ineed
tothankBrandonSmithandRebeccaRobbforalwaysbeingwillingtolendanear,
andforhelpingtokeepmegrounded.
Thirdly,Iwouldliketothankmyparents,andfriendsoutsideofacademia.
Myparentshavesupportedmethroughoutmylife,andcontinuetodoso(nomatter
howlongIstayinschool).Myfriendsoutsideofacademiahaveremindedmethat
thereisalifeoutsideofacademia,andthatIneedtoenjoyittolivemylifetothe
iv
fullest.Iwouldliketoextendaspecialthankyoutotwoofmybestfriends,Victoria
MabieandRogerKorth,forstickingwithmethroughthickandthin.Iknowthe
stressofmyMaster’sdegreeandmyworkloaddidnotalwaysmakemethefriendI
shouldhavebeen.
Last,butdefinitelynotleast,Iwouldliketothankmydog,Charlie—even
thoughhecannotreadthisorunderstandwhyIamthankinghim.Thereisnothing
quiteliketheunconditionalloveofacompanionanimal.Hemademegooutsideand
getfreshairwhenIwasfeelingoverwhelmedanddepressed,andIdonotknow
whatIwouldhavedonewithouthim.
v
TableofContentsAbstract.......................................................................................................................................iiAcknowledgements...............................................................................................................iiiTableofContents.....................................................................................................................v1.LiteratureReview...............................................................................................................1
1.1.Introduction.............................................................................................................................11.2.Realismvs.Anti-Realism....................................................................................................51.3.MoralRealismvs.MoralAnti-Realism…...................................................................131.4.Quasi-Realism…...................................................................................................................201.5.“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology”byRudolfCarnap...............................251.6.Pyrrhonian,Academic,orMethodologicalScepticism?......................................271.7.Naturalism..............................................................................................................................341.8.Hume:Realist,Anti-Realist,orSceptic?.....................................................................411.9.AnInterpretationofHume’sPhilosophy..................................................................44
2.Chapter….............................................................................................................................57
2.1.Introduction….......................................................................................................................572.2.HumeanScepticisminATreatiseofHumanNature….........................................582.3.HumeanScepticisminAnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding........722.4.Hume’sMoralPhilosophy................................................................................................782.5.Hume’sMethodinAnEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals..............862.6.TheMoralRealismandMoralAnti-RealismDebate:HumeanScepticismasanAlternative................................................................................................................................902.7.PotentialImplications.......................................................................................................95
Bibliography...........................................................................................................................97
1
1.LiteratureReview1.1.Introduction
WhileIamfascinatedbymetaethics,Ihavediscoveredthatitisquite
unpalatableformanypeople.So,whenIdecidedtowritemyMaster’sthesis
onmetaethics,Istruggledtothinkofawaytomakemythesisinterestingtoa
wideraudience.IhopethatIcanmakemetaethicsinterestingandaccessible—
ifonlyforthedurationofmythesis.Iamnotsurewhy,butAncientGreek
philosophyisthefirstthingthatjumpedintomymindwhileIwasconsidering
howbesttoapproachthetopicofmythesis.Uponfurtherreflection,itseemed
tobeorganictostartwiththebeginningoftheWesternPhilosophical
Tradition,andthentracetheconceptualframeworktoHumeandEarly
Modernphilosophy.
Tobeginthemetaethicaljourneyofmythesis,Iwillgiveaquotefrom
oneofPlato’sdialogues.Mygoalinthisintroductionistostartwitha
conceptionofknowledge,workmywaytowardsmetaphysics,andthenfinally
gettometaethics.IntheTheaetetus,Plato’sSocratessaysat160e,
Sowefindthevarioustheorieshaveconvergedtothesamething:thatofHomerandHeraclitusandalltheirtribe,thatallthingsflowlikestreams;ofProtagoras,wisestofmen,thatmanisthemeasureofallthings;andthatofTheaetetusthat,thesethingsbeingso,knowledgeprovestobeperception.Whataboutit,Theaetetus?Shallwesaywehavehereyourfirst-bornchild,theresultofmymidwifery?Orwhatwouldyousay?1
Towhich,TheaetetusrepliestoSocratesinapositivemanner:indeedthisishisfirst-
born‘child’.Knowledgeisperception,accordingtoTheaetetus,andeachperson
perceivesthingsdifferently.Thiscanbeseenasarelativisticunderstandingof
1Plato,Theaetetus,inCompleteWorksofPlato,ed.JohnM.Cooper,trans.M.J.Levett
2
knowledge,andthedialoguegoesontotrytoshowthatitisafalseunderstandingof
knowledge.
WhatIfindinterestingisthatknowledgeofcold,onthisunderstandingof
knowledge,isbasedonthesubjectiveperceiverfeelingcold—samegoesforheat,
andmultipleotherphysicalsensationsandobjects.Itcouldbesaidthatour
knowledgeofphysicalsensationsandobjectsismind-dependentinthesensethat
ourknowledgeofthesethingsisdependentonusperceivingthem.Plato’sSocrates
goesonintheTheaetetustoargueforadifferentunderstandingofknowledgethatis
notmind-dependent.Socratestriestoleadustoalessrelativeunderstandingof
knowledgethat,itcouldbeargued,ismind-independent—i.e.notdependentona
perceiverperceivingit.Forexample,theconceptsof‘love’and‘beauty’canbe
thoughtofasabstractforms—unchangingandcontainingtheperfectionofthose
concepts.
Forme,thecontemplationofwhatknowledgeisthroughoutthedialogue
leadsawayfromthedialoguejustbeingaboutknowledge,andmovestowards
contemplationsofwhatthereisintheworld(i.e.ontology).Contemplating
perceptionssuchasseeing‘whitesnow’or‘abrowntable’quicklydevelopinto
contemplatingmoreabstractconceptssuchas‘love’,anddebatingwhetherthese
abstractconceptscanbeperceivedinthesamewayasthe‘whitesnow’or‘abrown
table’.Questionslike,“Doesthis[insertabstractconcept]existintheworld?”
absolutelyfascinateme.And,sothediscussionisnotjustaboutknowledge,butis
alsoaboutmetaphysics—or,perhapsmoreaccurately,whatwecanknowaboutthe
natureofmetaphysics.
3
Movingintomorecontemporarymetaphysicallanguage,thediscussion
becomescentredonrealismandanti-realism.Realism,looselyconstruedwhen
contemplatingabstractconcepts,canbeseenasstatingthatabstractconceptsare
mind-independent.SomerealistsgoasfarasPlato,andstatethatnotonlyarethese
abstractconceptsmind-independent,butthattheyalsoexistintheworld—evenif
therewasnopersontheretoperceivethem.Anti-realism,then,istheoppositeof
realism.Itgenerallystatesthatabstractconceptsaremind-dependent,and
potentiallycontingentonhumanbeings.
Mythesisisonthisrealismandanti-realismdebate,or,Ishouldsay,whatI
seetobeafalsedilemma.Mythesislooksattherealismandanti-realismdilemma
fromwithinamoralcontext,andsoIamparticularlyinterestedinthestatusof
moralfacts(orclaims,orpropositions)andwhethertheyaretruth-apt(ornot).
Therefore,thetopicofmythesis,mostgenerallyconstrued,ismetaethics.More
specifically,thetopicofmythesisisdealingwiththetraditionalmoralrealismand
moralanti-realismdebateinmetaethicswhiledenyingthatwemuststaywithinthis
dichotomytofindanswerstometaethicalquestions.TheprimaryquestionIaskis
this:aremoralrealismandmoralanti-realismtheonlyoptionsopentous?My
answerisno.Iproposethatscepticism,morespecificallyHumeanScepticism,isa
thirdoptionavailable.
ThereasonwhyIcallthetraditionaldebateafalsedilemmaisbecause,even
asfarbackasPlato,thescepticalpositionwasnottakenseriously,and,foratleast
2500years,thedebatehasbeenstructuredassolelyabackandforthbetween
realismandanti-realism.ThebigissuethatIfindstartlingisthat,eventhough
4
argumentshavebecomemorecomplicatedandfine-tuned,realismandanti-realism
havenotreallyprogressedoverthepast2500yearsofthedominantWestern
PhilosophicalTradition.Ithinkthatthisshowsthedilemmatobegettingus
nowhere.So,Iproposethattakingascepticalpositionconcerningtheontological
statusofmoralfacts(orclaimsorpropositions)mightbeanalternativetothe
traditionaldichotomy,andcouldpotentiallyhelpthedebatealong.
AsImentioned,IthinkthatHumeanScepticismcouldbethissceptical
alternative.Isay‘Humean’ratherthan‘Hume’s’,because,asisthenormwithHume
scholarship,nooneagreesonanyoneinterpretationandIhaveaparticularwayof
readingHume.MyinterpretationofHumeattributestohimamoreancientwayof
understandinghisscepticism.ThewayIseeHumeanScepticismismoreinlinewith
aparticularAncientGreekunderstandingofscepticismasepochēoragnostic(i.e.the
suspensionofjudgement).Thisisincontrasttothemorecommonunderstandingof
scepticismasamethodologicaltool(forexample,Descartes’useofscepticisminhis
MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy).
MythesisfocusesonHume,hisscepticism,hisnaturalismasmethodological,
andareadingofHumeasakindofconsequentialist.Istresstheimportanceof
interpretingHume’snaturalismwithinthecontextofhisscepticisminordertohelp
keephisphilosophycohesive,andIthinkasimilarapproachcanbetakenwhen
consideringconsequentialisminHume’smoralphilosophy.Thegoalistoshowthat
HumeanScepticismisatruethirdoptioninthemoralrealismandmoralanti-
realismdebate,andtogiveanaccountofamoraltheorythatmayworkwell
consideringHume’sscepticalapproachtometaphysics.Ithinkthatitisimportantto
5
demonstratethatanormativeethicaltheorycanfunctionwhilemaintainingan
ontologicallyscepticalposition,becauseitdemonstratesthatscepticismis
somethingtotakeseriouslyandthatitdoesbelonginthemoralrealismandmoral
anti-realismdebate.
InthewordsofsomeoneIconsidertobewise,obviouslynotme(andIdare
saynotPlatoeither),
[A]llknowledgedegeneratesintoprobability;andthisprobabilityisgreaterorless,accordingtoourexperienceoftheveracityordeceitfulnessofourunderstanding,andaccordingtothesimplicityorintricacyofthequestion.2
Knowledge“degenerates”intoprobability.Probabilitydoesnotgetyoucertainty.
Youcannotbecertainofrealismoranti-realism,soitwouldseemthatyoualso
cannotbecertainofmoralrealismormoralanti-realism(sincetheyjustoffera
morespecificcaseofrealismandanti-realism).Whynotremaintrulysceptical,and
takeanagnosticstance?
1.2.Realismvs.Anti-Realism StuartBrockandEdwinMaresbegintheintroductionoftheirbookRealism
andAnti-Realismwiththefollowingsentences,
Questionsabouttheultimaterealityofthingssometimesseemlikesillyquestionstonon-philosophers,buttophilosopherstheyarequestionsoftheutmostimportanceanddeepestsignificance.Itisnoteasyorstraightforwardtoknowwhensomecontentiousrealmofentitiesisreal,ortounderstandandappreciatewhatisatissuebetweenthoseoneachsideofthedispute.3
2DavidHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,eds.DavidFateNortonandMaryJ.Norton(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.4.1.3StuartBrockandEdwinMares,RealismandAnti-Realism,inCentralProblemsofPhilosophy,ed.JohnShand(MontrealandKingston:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,2007),1.
6
Iwillmakeastrongstatement,andassumethatthevastmajorityofpeopletakefor
grantedthattheexternalworldisReal4anddonotquestionparticularaspectsor
domainsinthe,potentially,externalworld.Mostpeople,ornon-philosophersas
BrockandMarescallthem,takeforgrantedthatthechairoverthereReallyexists.
Theappliedphysicistthinksthatcertainnaturallawsgoverntheexternalworld,and
areReal.ThebiologistbelievesthatthecellstheyarestudyingareReal.The
mathematicianmightthinkthatnaturalnumbersareReal.Questioningwhether
somethingReallyexistsintheworldonthesurfaceseemslikesomethingthatdoes
notneedquestioning—afterall,sometimeswejustneedtoliveourlives(andthat
canbehardenoughwithoutquestioningwhethercertainfactsorentitiesReallydo
exist).
But,whenwehaveamomenttoreflect,andthinkaboutwhatwethinkis
Real,questionsdobegintoarise.Perhapsquestionsaboutwhetherourperceptions
areaccurateaccountsoftheRealworld.Canwetrustthatoureyesightisnot
deceivinguswhenwemakeeverydaymistakeswhenjudginghowfaranobjectis
fromus?HowmuchoftheRealworlddoweactuallyperceive?Now,consider
numbers.DonumbersexistintheRealworld?Wecanalsoconsiderwhethermoral
factsexistintheRealworld.Doesthemoralfact,‘Itiswrongtokill,’existintheReal
world?Perhapsitisthephilosopher’sjobtoquestionsuchthingsinrelationto
metaphysics,morespecificallyontology,buttheseabstractquestionsendup
affectingbeliefandbeliefcanaffectthewayweliveourlives.Abstractmetaphysical
4WhenIusethewordRealwithacapital“R”,Imeanmind-independentlyrealintheontologicalsense(i.e.thatsomethingexistsintheexternalworld,andisnotconstructedbymentalstatesorisnotmind-dependent).
7
questionsendupbeingofimportance,andthousandplusyeardebatesoftenstem
fromthem.
WhiletherearemanydifferentsubsectionsofthedebateconcerningtheReal
world,theoverarchingdichotomyhashistoricallybeenbetweenrealismandanti-
realism.Realistsandanti-realistshavedebatedeachothersinceHellenistictimesin
theWesternPhilosophicalTradition,andthedebateisfarfrombeingresolved.The
realistsattacktheanti-realists(andviceversa),andboththerealistsandanti-
realistsdebatedefinitionsandintricacieswithintheirowncamps.Definitionsand
thefine-tuningofargumentsarefarfrombeingsettledforbothrealismandanti-
real-ism,butIthinkitisimportanttogiveadefinitionforboththesetermsinorder
togivecontexttothedebatethatIamtryingtosituatemyselfwithin.
IthinkthatBrockandMares’generaldefinitionofrealismisagoodplaceto
start,
Realismaboutaparticulardomainistheconjunctionofthefollowingtwotheses:(i)therearefactsorentitiesdistinctiveofthatdomain,and(ii)theirexistenceandnatureisinsomeimportantsenseobjectiveandmind-independent.Letuscallthefirstthesisthe“existencethesis”andthesecondthesisthe“independencethesis”.5
BrockandMaresadmitthatthisdefinitionisnotwithoutcontroversy,6butitwill
workfinetogiveageneraldefinitionthatallowsunderstandingofwhatismeant
whenIusethewordrealism.7Intheirdefinition,BrockandMaredistinguish
betweenfactsandentitieswhenitcomestothe“existencethesis”.Theydothisto
5BrockandMares,RealismandAnti-Realism,2.6Ibid,3.7Iacknowledgethatothersmayusedifferentdefinitions—thisisfinebecausethebasicinformationthatthisdefinitiongivesusispresentinmanyotherdefinitionsofrealism.
8
distinguishbetweenthosewhomightberealistsaboutfactsfromthosewhomight
berealistsaboutentitieswithinaparticulardomain.Oneexamplethattheyuseto
showthisis,“Onemightbelieveitisafactthateverythingthatgoesupmustcome
downwithoutbelievingingravitationalfields[…].”8Inthisexample,Icouldbelieve
inafactwithoutassertinganythingabouttheentitiesorpropertiesofadomain.So,
Icanbearealistaboutfacts,butnotbearealistaboutanentity(orentities)ofa
domain(andviceversa).
Thesecondthesisoftheirdefinitionisthe“independencethesis”.Thisthesis
statesthatthefactsorentitiesfromthefirstthesisare,insomeway,objectiveand
mind-independent.Objective,inthisunderstanding,meansuniversal(andnot
subjective),andmind-independentmeansthattheyexistinsomewayinanon-
reliantrelationshipwithahumanmind(orminds).Thissecondthesiscangoasfar
astoassertthatthefact(s)orentity/entitiesinagivendomaincanexistintheReal,
externalworld,butitdoesnothavetogothisfar.Somerealistsarecontentjustto
saythatafactorentityisobjectiveandmind-independentwithoutasserting
anythingaboutthestatusofsaidfactorentityintheRealworld—asIsaidabove,
thereisnoconsensuswhenitcomestodefiningrealism.
Defininganti-realismisjustasdifficultasdefiningrealism,because,again,
thereisnoconsensus.Youcouldjustsaythatanti-realismistheoppositeofrealism,
butthatisdifficulttofigureoutgiventhelackofconsensuswhenitcomesto
realism.Theantithesisoftheabovedefinitionofrealismcouldlooksomethinglike
denyingtheexistencethesis,denyingtheindependencethesis,ordenyingboth.An
8BrockandMares,RealismandAnti-Realism,2.
9
anti-realistcandenythatthereare“factsorentitiesdistinctiveofthat[particular]
domain,”theycandenythethesisthatthesefactsorentitiesofaparticulardomain
areobjectiveandmind-independent,ortheycandenyboththesetheses.
SimonBlackburngivesamoredetaileddefinitionofrealismintheOxford
DictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(though,stillalongthelinesofBrockand
Mare’sdefinitionofrealism),
Arealistaboutasubject-matterSmayhold(i)thatthekindsofthingsdescribedbySexist;(ii)thattheirexistenceisindependentofus,ornotanartefactofourminds,orourlanguageorconceptualscheme;(iii)thatthestatementswemakeinSarenot*reducibletootherkindsofstatement,revealingthemtobeaboutsomedifferentsubject-matter;(iv)thatthestatementswemakeinShave*truthconditions,beingstraightforwarddescriptionsofaspectsoftheworldandmadetrueorfalsebyfactsintheworld;(v)thatweareabletoattaintruthsaboutS,andthatitisappropriatefullytobelievethingsweclaiminS.9
Blackburnthengoesontoexplainthatthereare“differentoppositions”thatcan
takeissuewithone(ormore)ofanyoftheaboverealistclaims,
*EliminativiststhinktheSdiscourseshouldberejected.Scepticseitherdeny(i)ordenyourrighttoaffirmit.*Idealistsand*conceptualistsdeny(ii),*reductionistsdeny(iii),while*instrumentalistsand*projectivistsdeny(iv).*Constructiveempiricistsdeny(v).Othercombinationsarepossible,andinmanyareasthereislittleconsensusontheexactwayarealist/anti-realistdisputeshouldbeconstructed.10
Blackburninterestinglylumpsanti-realismandscepticismtogetherinhislistof
oppositionstotherealistclaimshementionsfirst,whichisproblematic.11ThoughI
9SimonBlackburn,“realism/anti-realism,”intheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),404.10Ibid.11Thiswillbecomemoreclearinsection1.6.“Pyrrhonian,Academic,orMethodologicalScepticism?”But,Iwillbrieflyaddresswhygroupinganti-realistsandscepticstogetherisproblematichere.Someformsofscepticismareusedasamethodortool,andcanbegroupedwitheitherrealismoranti-realism.Otherformsofscepticismremainagnostic,andcannotbegroupedwitheitherrealismoranti-realism.
10
takeissuewithaspectsofthismoredetaileddefinition,itgivesfurtherinsightinto
theintricaciesoftherealism/anti-realismdebate—andshowswhyitisdifficultto
givedefinitionsofrealismanditsantithesis.
Iwouldliketogiveanexampletohighlightabitofthetensionbetweenthe
realistsandtheanti-realistswhenitcomestotheontologicalstatusoffactsor
entitieswithinaparticulardomain.Iwillgiveanexampleconcerningpure
mathematics.JamesNicholsondefinespuremathematicsinTheConciseOxford
DictionaryofMathematics(FifthEdition)asfollows,
Theareaofmathematicsconcerningtherelationshipsbetweenabstractsystemsandstructuresandtherulesgoverningtheirbehaviours,motivatedbyitsintrinsicinterestoreleganceratherthanitsapplicationtosolvingproblemsintherealworld.Muchmodernappliedmathematicsisbasedonwhatwasviewedasveryesotericpuremathematicswhenitwasdevised.Forexample,matrixalgebraisnowthecornerstoneofvideo-gametechnologies,computer-aideddesign,etc.12
Startingwiththisdefinition,Ithinktwodifferent,thoughtraditional,ideascould
emerge:onerealist,theotheranti-realist.Therecouldbeamathematicianwho
worksonmatrixalgebrawhoisarealistaboutmathematics.Duetothepractical
applicationofmatrixalgebra,themathematiciancouldbelievethatmatrixalgebra
existsintheRealworld,mind-independently.Therecouldalsobeapure
mathematicianwhostrictlyworksinpuremathematics,andonlyworkswithinthe
abstractrealmofpuremathematics(anddoesnotworkonanypracticalapplication
ofpuremathematics).Thismathematiciancouldbelievethatnumbers,saynatural
12JamesNicholson,“puremathematics,”inTheConciseOxfordDictionaryofMathematics,FifthEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/view/10.1093/acref/9780199679591.001.0001/acref-9780199679591-e-2307.
11
numbers,areconstructedandmind-dependent,andthereforewouldbeananti-
realistaboutnaturalnumbers.Bothmathematiciansworkonpuremathematics,but
holddifferentviewsabouttheontologicalstatusoffactsorentitieswithinthat
domain.
JesseM.Mulderinhispaper“WhatGeneratestheRealism/Anti-Realism
Dichotomy?”,saysthatonewayofexpressingthedisagreementbetweenrealistsand
anti-realistsis
[that]realistsurgethattheirtheoriesdescribetheworldasitmind-independentlyis,whereasanti-realistsarguethattheverycategoriesemployedinsuchpurporteddescriptionsare,afterall,ourowncategories,andhencethattheveryideaofamind-independentrealityintherealist’ssenseisdeeplymistaken.13
So,inthecaseofthetwomathematicians,therealistmathematicianwhoworkson
matrixalgebramightthinkthattheirworkonmatrixalgebradescribestheworldas
itReallyis,mind-independently;whiletheanti-realistmathematicianmightthink
thatnaturalnumbers,orevenmatrixalgebra,arejustmind-dependentdescriptions
basedon“ourowncategories.”
Sofar,thedebatehasbeenbetweenrealismandanti-realism,andagood
questiontoaskis‘Whatcauses,orforces,thisdichotomy?’Itdoesseemoddthat
realismandanti-realismhavebeenthefocusedonoptionsforthousandsofyears
(withintheWesternphilosophicalcanon).Muldersuggeststhatwhatcausesthis
dichotomyhastodowith“[…]findingskepticismunsatisfactory,”
[W]ecaneitherbecomerealistsbutbeatalossastohowwecanadjudicatebetweenhighlydivergentrealistmetaphysicaltheories,orwecanadmitourallegedinabilitytodiscoverthenatureoftheworldasitisinitselfandmakedo
13JesseM.Mulder,“WhatGeneratestheRealism/Anti-RealismDichotomy,”Philosophica84(2012):57.
12
withtheanti-realistrestrictionofourknowledgetotheworldasitisforus—whichinturnquicklyleadstoseriousissues,suchasacommitmenttotheideaofareality-itselfthatisdeniedanycontent,thatagainmotivatesareturntorealism.14
Itisthisviewthatscepticismisunsatisfactorythatspursthedichotomybetween
realismandanti-realism,accordingtoMulder.Thescepticismhastodowith,touse
Mulder’slanguage,“theworldasitisinitself.”Themetaphysicalscepticthinksthat
wecannotknowwhetherourperceptionsof‘theworldasitisinitself’(orReal,
externalworld)areaccuraterepresentationsornot,andsothescepticsuspends
theirjudgementabout‘theworldasitisinitself.’Mulderthinksthatscepticismis
unsatisfactoryfortherealistandfortheanti-realistinseparateways.Therealist
takesissuewiththesceptic’sclaimthat“we[cannot]justifyknowledgeoftheworld-
in-itself,”andtheanti-realisttakesissuewiththesceptic’sclaimthat“truth
involve[s]correspondencewiththeworld-in-itself.”15
Thescepticalmetaphysicalpicture,accordingtoMulder,lookssomethinglike
wecannotjustifyknowledgeoftheRealworldandtruthcorrespondstotheReal
world,sothereforewecannothavetruth.16Therealist’sclaimisthatwecanjustify
knowledgeoftheRealworld(andhavetruthcorrespondtotheRealworld),andthe
anti-realists’claimisthattruthcorrespondswith“theworldasitisforus”(andso
truthdoesnotcorrespondtotheRealworld—buttoourperceptionsoftheReal
world).17Idotakeissuewiththisunderstandingofscepticism(whichwillbecome
moreclearinsections1.6,2.2,and2.3),butitdoesseemtobeanaccurateaccountof
14Ibid,71-72.15Ibid,71.16Ibid.17Ibid,72.
13
whathasforcedthetraditionaldichotomybetweenrealismandanti-realism.The
realistandtheanti-realistbothbelievethat,insomeway,metaphysicalscepticism
(asdescribedbyMulder)isproblematic;theyjustdisagreeonhowitisproblematic.
1.3.MoralRealismvs.MoralAnti-Realism
Onesubsection,ordomain,withintherealismandanti-realismdichotomyis
moralrealismandmoralanti-realism.GeoffreySayre-McCordsaysinthe
introductiontoEssaysonMoralRealism,
[…]thedebatebetweenrealistsandantirealistsisdeepandimportant.Itaffectsourontology,epistemology,andsemantics.Andinethics,itmakesasignificantdifferencetoourunderstandingofwhat(ifanything)isvaluable,toouraccountofmoraldisagreement,andtotheimportanceweplaceonmoralreflection.18
GiventheimportanceSayre-McCordplacesontherealismandanti-realism
dichotomy,particularlyinreferencetoethics,itmakesitexceptionallypertinentto
clarifythedichotomyasitrelatestomoralrealismandmoralanti-realism.
Therefore,itisimportanttodefinewhatismeantbymoralrealismandmoralanti-
realism,andgiveanexampleforeach.
IwillstartbygivingSayre-McCord’sdefinitionsforrealismandanti-realism,
but—duetohowbroadtheyare—Iwilladdmoreclarifyingdefinitions.Sayre-
McCorddefinesrealismasfollows,
Whereveritisfound,I’llargue,realisminvolvesembracingjusttwotheses:(1)theclaimsinquestion,whenliterallyconstrued,areliterallytrueorfalse(cognitivism),and(2)someareliterallytrue.Nothingmore.19
18GeoffreySayre-McCord,“Introduction:TheManyMoralRealisms,”inEssaysonMoralRealism,ed.GeoffreySayre-McCord(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1988),2.19Ibid,5.
14
Thesethesespertaintotruth-aptness,andwhatismeantisthataclaimcanbetrue
orfalseinreferencetowhatIhavebeencallingtheRealworld(i.e.thereis
somethingintheexternalworldthatmakestheclaimtrueorfalse).Hethendefines
anti-realism,
Correspondingly,therearetwowaystobeananti-realist:embraceanon-cognitivistanalysisoftheclaimsinquestionorholdthattheclaimsofthedisputedclass,despitetheirbeingtruth-valued,arenoneofthemtrue(say,becausetheyallshareafalsepresupposition).20
Here,Sayre-McCordismainlyalludingtoEmotivism(andrelatedtheories)and
ErrorTheory.Emotivistsarenon-cognitivistswhileErrorTheoristscanbeclassified
ascognitivistswhobelieveintruth-aptness(butdonotthinkthattruthvalues,like
trueorfalse,correlatetotheRealworld—orthattheyalwayscorrelatetotheReal
worldfalsely).Thisisanarrowaccountofanti-realism,butdoesalludetotheissues
ananti-realistmaytakeissuewith(inthisdefinitionofrealism).Thenon-cognitivist
(i.e.Emotivist)wouldtakeissuewiththesis(1),andtheErrorTheoristwouldtake
issuewiththesis(2).
InhisbookMoralRealism:ADefence,RussShafer-Landaugivesamore
specificdefinitionofmoralrealismaswellasgivingexplicitdefinitionsof
cognitivismandnon-cognitivism.Shafer-Landauinitiallysaysthat“[realists]
endorsetherealityofadomainanddosoinoppositiontoconstructivists.Realismis
sometimescontrastedwithconstructivismbyinvokingtheclaimthat,forrealists,
moralityismind-independent.”2122Though,hesaysthatthisisalackingdefinition
20Ibid.21RussShafer-Landau,MoralRealism:ADefence(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),15.
15
whenitcomestomoralrealism.23Hesubsequentlygoesontogiveamorecareful
definitionofmoralrealism,
ThewayIwouldprefertocharacterizetherealistpositionisbyreferencetoitsendorsementofthestance-independenceofmoralreality.Realistsbelievethattherearemoraltruthsthatobtainindependentlyofanyperspective,inthesensethatthemoralstandardsthatfixthemoralfactsarenotmadetruebyvirtueoftheirratificationfromwithinanygivenactualorhypotheticalperspective.Thatapersontakesaparticularattitudetowardaputativemoralstandardisnotwhatmakesthestandardcorrect.24
“Stance-independence”is,forShafer-Landau,awayofarticulatingthatthereisan
aspectof“something’srightnessoradmirability[depending]cruciallyonanagent’s
attitudes,”but“thedependence[…]isnotafunctionofwhatanyonehappensto
thinkofit.”25So,thereisanaspectofmind-dependence(givenmoralitybeingagent-
based),butthetruthofmoralclaimsthemselvesisnotdependentonanyone
particularagent(inthisway,theyaremind-independent).
Thisdefinitionofmoralrealismhighlightsthecognitiveaspectofit.And,on
thecognitivetheme—generallyconsideredinlinewithrealism(thoughsomeanti-
realists,likeErrorTheorists,arecognitivists)—mostsimplyput,cognitivismisthe
viewthatafact(orclaimorproposition),likeamoralfact(orclaimorproposition),
canbetrueorfalse.26Shafer-Landausaysofcognitivism,
[A]viewiscognitivistifitallowsforacentralclassofjudgementswithinadomaintocountasbeliefs,capableofbeingtrueorfalseinvirtueoftheirmoreorlessaccuraterepresentationofthefactswithinthedomain.Moralrealism
22By“constructivists”/”constructivism”here,Shafer-Landaumeansanti-realists/anti-realism.23Ibid.24Ibid.25Ibid.26Or,‘truth-apt’—cognitiviststhinkthatclaims,orfacts,leantowardstruth(orfalsity),evenifnoclaims,orfacts,endupbeingultimatelytrue(orfalse).
16
satisfiestheseconditions.Realistsseemoraljudgementsasbeliefs,someofwhicharetrue,andtrueinvirtueofcorrectlyreportingmoralfacts.27
Inotherwords,amoresophisticatedrenditionofmyverysimpledefinitionof
cognitivism.MypointinquotingShafer-Landau’sdefinitionofcognitivismis
becauseitveryexplicitlybiasescognitivismtowardsmoralrealism,andthisisnot
somethingthatisnecessarilyagreeduponwithinthemetaethicalliteratureonmoral
realismandmoralanti-realism.28Shafer-Landau’sbiaseduseofcognitivismin
contrasttootherheldviewsoncognitivismreinforcesthatthereisnoagreedupon
definition.Thisconstantdisagreementisareoccurringthemethroughoutall
domainsofrealismandanti-realism.
Gettingbacktodefinitions,Shafer-Landaudefinesmoralanti-realism,or
whathecalls“constructivism”,moregenerallyas
[…]theideathatmoralrealityisconstitutedbytheattitudes,actions,responses,oroutlooksofpersons,possiblyunderidealizedconditions.Inshort,moralrealityisconstructedfromstatesoractivities(understoodverybroadly)undertakenfromapreferredstandpoint.29
Thisistomeanthatmoralrealityfortheanti-realistisnotstance-independent(i.e.a
complicatedwayofsayingthatmoralrealityfortheanti-realistisnotobjective).He
associatestheconstructivist(anti-realist)viewwithnon-cognitivism,andstates
that,accordingtonon-cognitivism,“therearenomoralfactsortruths.”30So,Shafer-
27Shafer-Landau,MoralRealism:ADefence,17.28Thisiscontroversial.AsIhavepreviouslysaid,ErrorTheoristscanclaimtobecognitivists.But,also,viewssuchasSimonBlackburn’squasi-realismmightchallengetheideathatonlyErrorTheoristanti-realistscanbecognitivists(thereforecognitivismshouldnotbesostronglyassociatedwithrealism).29Shafer-Landau,MoralRealism:ADefence,14.30Ibid,18.
17
Landauclaimsthatfortheanti-realisttherearenomoralfactsortruths(i.e.that
moralclaimsfortheanti-realistcannotbetruth-apt).31
NowthatIhavegivensomepossibleunderstandings(i.e.definitions)of
moralrealismandmoralanti-realism,Ithinkitwouldhelptonotonlyclarifythe
views,butalsothedivide,bygivinganexampleofamoralrealisttheoryandan
exampleofamoralanti-realisttheory.Iwillstartwithanexampleofamoralanti-
realisttheorybeforegivinganexampleofamoralrealisttheory(thereasonwhyI
havechosenthisorderwillbecomemoreapparentonceIhavearticulatedthe
theories).
Themoralanti-realisttheoryIhavechosenasanexampleisGilbertHarman’s
theorythathearticulatesinhisbookTheNatureofMorality:AnIntroductionto
Ethics.Harman’smainpositionisthatethicsisrelative(i.e.hesupportsmoral
relativity),andheisananti-realistconcerningethics.Toshowthis,heusesthe
differenceinobservationbetweenphysicsandethics.Harmansays,
Theobservationofaneventcanprovideobservationalevidencefororagainstascientifictheoryinthesensethatthetruthofthatobservationcanberelevanttoareasonableexplanationofwhythatobservationwasmade.Amoralobservationdoesnotseem,inthesamesense,tobeobservationalevidencefororagainstanymoraltheory,sincethetruthorfalsityofthemoralobservationseemstobecompletelyirrelevanttoanyreasonableexplanationofwhythatobservationwasmade.32
Oneoftheexamplesthatheusestoshowthisdifferenceinobservationisthe
differencebetweenascientistobservingaproton’svapourtrailandyoujudgingthat
childrensettingacatonfireiswrong.Inthecaseofthescientist,theirobservation
31Again,Irecognizethatthisiscontroversial.32GilbertHarman,TheNatureofMorality:AnIntroductiontoEthics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1977),7.
18
ofthevapourtrailseemstoexplainwhattheyareobserving.Inthecaseofyou
judgingthatchildrensettingacatonfireiswrong,yourjudgmentisbasedonbelief
thatdoesnotseemtodirectly,orindirectly,explainwhatyouareobserving.Inthe
caseofscience,thereseemstobedirectobservationofevents(ortheRealworld)to
justifyatheory(orforcetheadaptionofatheory).Inthecaseofethics,itseems
completelybasedonbelief,andnotobservation.
Harmangoessofarastosaythatethicsisnotonlynotbasedondirect
observation,butalsonotbasedonindirectobservation.Hedoesthistowardsthe
endofhisintroductionbyintroducingmathematics.33Hesaysthatmathematicscan
indirectlysupportphysics,andthereforeobservation,butethicsdoesnotseemto
evenbeabletodothis.
IncontrasttoHarman,NicholasL.Sturgeonarticulatesamoralrealistviewin
hispaper“MoralExplanations”.34Sturgeon’smainprojectinthispaperistodeny
thatHarman’stheoryleadstothekindofmoralscepticismthatHarmanthinksit
does(somethingmorealongthelinesofmoralanti-realismthanmoralscepticism).
SturgeonthinksthatHarman’sbasicviewactuallyleadstoSturgeon’sownkindof
moralrealism.Sturgeonisanethicalnaturalist(inhistypeofmoralrealism),but
onethatthinksthatmoralclaimsarenotnecessarilyreducibletophysicalclaims
(sincehethinksthatwedonothavelanguageforallphysicalclaims,moralclaims
couldactuallybedescribingphysicalthings).And,eventhoughmoralclaimsarenot
necessarilyreducibletophysicalclaims,moralclaimsstillfactorintoour
33Ibid,9-10.34NicholasL.Sturgeon,“MoralExplanations,”inEssaysonMoralRealism,ed.GeoffreySayre-McCord(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1988),229-255.
19
explanationoftheworld.Sturgeonwrites,“…Ishallarguethatmoralfactsdofit
intoourexplanatoryviewoftheworld,andinparticularintoexplanationsofmany
moralobservationsandbeliefs.”35
Sturgeonthengoesontosay,“…itseemsplausibletocitemoralfactsaspart
ofanexplanationofnonmoralfacts,andinparticularofpeople’sformingthemoral
opinionstheydo.”36Sturgeon’semphasisisnotona‘perfect’moraltheorythat
existsindependentlyofus(asisthefocusofsomemoralrealists).Surgeonthinks,
[If]ourmoraltheoryweresomehowhopelesslymistaken,butallthenonmoralfactsremainedexactlythesameastheyinfactare,then,sincewedoacceptthemoraltheory,wewouldstilldrawexactlythemoralconclusionsweinfactdo.[…][W]eshoulddenythatitfollowsthatmoralfactsplaynoroleinexplainingourmoraljudgments.37
ForSturgeon,evenifthereisapossibilityofourmoraltheorybeingwrong,thisdoes
notmeanthatweshouldthinkourmoraltheoryisgenerallymistakenandwe
shouldstillthinkthatourmoraltheoryis“roughlycorrect”.38Thereisnoreason,
accordingtoSturgeon,todoubtourmoraltheorysomuchastothinkthatitis
completelywrong.39So,wecanuseourmoraltheorytomakejudgmentsabout
eventsandpeople’scharacters.
SturgeonisreactingtoHarman,andthisdifferenceofinterpretationover
particulardetailswithinthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate
emphasizesthediscordthroughoutrealismandanti-realismmoregenerally.There
35Ibid,236.36Ibid,243.37Ibid,251.38Ibid,253.39Ibid,253.
20
seemstobelittleagreementevenonwhichfeaturesarerealistandwhichfeatures
areanti-realist.Thishasencouragedanumberofphilosopherstoattempttocreate
ameta-physicaltheory,orametaphysicaltheoryconcerningmoralityormoral
claims(i.e.ametaethicaltheory),thatattemptstosolvetheapparently
irreconcilableargumentsbetweenrealismandanti-realism.Oneoftheseattempts
isSimonBlackburn’squasi-realism.
1.4.Quasi-Realism
BeforeoutliningBlackburn’squasi-realism,Iwouldliketomakehis
metaphysicalpositiononthenatureofethics(ormoralfacts,claims,etc.)more
clear.Blackburnsaysofhisowntheory,
Thistheoryisvisiblyanti-realist,fortheexplanationsofferedmakenoirreducibleoressentialappealtotheexistenceofmoral'properties'or'facts';theydemandno'ontology'ofmorals.Theyexplaintheactivityfromtheinsideout—fromthenaturallyexplicableattitudestotheformsofspeechthatcommunicatethem,challengethem,refinethem,andabandonthem,andwhichsomisleadtheunwary.40
Blackburnisananti-realistaboutethics—sothoughhecallshisviewquasi-realism,
heisnotarealist.And,whilehistheoryisdifferentfromotheranti-realisttheories,
itisnotanalternativetothetraditionalmoralrealismandmoralanti-realism
debate.41Heusesaspectsofrealisminaninternal(touseCarnapianlanguage)42
way,andthisiswhyhecoinshisviewquasi-realism(theCollinsPocketReference
EnglishDictionary,CanadianEditiondefinesquasias“seemingly,resemblingbutnot
40SimonBlackburn,“HowToBeanEthicalAnti-Realist,”inEssaysinQuasi-Realism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993),175-176.41Iwouldliketoclarifythatmystandardforanalternativeoptionneedstobeeitheroutsideofmoralrealismandmoralanti-realism,orneedstonotpartakeinthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate.42Thiswillbecomeapparentinthenextsection,1.5,onRudolfCarnap’spaper“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology.”
21
actuallybeing”43).But,hedoesnotthinkthattherearemoralfactsthatexistinthe
world(completelymind-independentlyorobjectivelyinthesenseofShafer-
Landau’s“stance-independence”).Hethinksthatmoralfacts,orclaims,aremind-
dependenttoanextent(whichisseeminglyananti-realistpositionontheontology
ofmoralfacts).
Connectingthisbacktothedefinitionsofmoralrealismandmoralanti-
realismwillmakeBlackburn’spositionmoreexplicit.Themoralrealistbelievesthat
therearemoralfacts,andthatthesemoralfactscanbeverifiedastrueorfalse(in
someobjectiveor“stance-independent”way).Traditionally,moralanti-realism
deniesthemoralrealistviewinsomeway(forexample,theycandenythatmoral
factscanbeverifiedastrueorfalse).Blackburn’squasi-realismdoesnotdenythat
moralfactscanbetrueorfalse,butitdoesdenythatmoralfactsareobjectivein
eitheramind-independentor“stance-independent”way.
Onp.169,ofhispaper“HowToBeAnEthicalAnti-Realist,”Blackburngives
thefollowingexample,
Wecansumupthiscontrast[betweenspatialperceptionandethicalstances]bysayingthatalthoughtheteleologyofspatialperceptionisspatial,theteleologyofethicalcommitmentisnotethical.Thegoodofspatialperceptionistoberepresentative,butthegoodofethicalstancesisnot.44
Blackburnisdemonstratingthecontrastthat,thoughhethinksthatspatial
perceptioncorrespondstosomethingthatexistsintheworld,hedoesnotthinkthat
moralfacts(orclaims,orstances)correspondtosomethingthatexistsintheworld.
43CollinsPocketReferenceEnglishDictionary,CanadianEdition,s.v.“quasi.”44Blackburn,“HowToBeanEthicalAnti-Realist,”169.
22
Heis“visibly”ananti-realistwhenitcomestomoralfacts,becausehethinksmoral
factsaremind-dependent.
BlackburngoesontoexplainamoralrealistpositionheassociateswithJohn
McDowellandDavidWiggins.Hesaysthattheirpositionhassomesimilaritiestohis
ownprojectivism(quasi-realism),butthattheydifferinthatMcDowellandWiggins
think“thatsentimentshavesomethingtodowithourcapacitytomakeethical
judgements,”and“yet[want]toretaina‘perceptual’andcognitiveplaceformoral
opinion.”45ThistiesintoBlackburn’stalkaboutspatialperceptionbeingforspatial
representationinthe‘real’world,whileethicalstancesarenotforethical
representationinthe‘real’world(i.e.theydonotrepresentsomethingtangiblein
theworldoutsideofthemind).
Blackburnfoundshismoralanti-realistview,quasi-realism,onakindof
naturalismandonprojectivism.HisnaturalismbeingwhatIwouldhaveattributed
toempiricism:everythingcanbeexplainedthroughscience(i.e.thenatural,physical
world).Hisprojectivismismorecomplicated.Blackburnthinksthat“a‘projective’
theorycanbedevelopedtogiveasatisfyingwayofplacingourpropensitiesfor
values.”46Hedoesnotgointoverymuchdetailbywhathemeansby“‘projective’
theory,”but,fromtherestofthepaper,Ithinkhemeansthathumanbeingshave
natural(referringbacktothenaturalism)reactionsandthatthesereactionsare
attitudes(orattributes,oremotions).Theseattitudestowards(oragainst)
45Ibid,170.46Ibid,167.
23
somethingarenaturalandethical.Theyaretheprecursortorationalreflection(i.e.
whatwebaseourrationalreflectionon).
Therefore,Blackburnisananti-realist,butnotarelativist.He’sananti-
realist,becausehethinksmoralfacts(ormoralpropositions,claims,etc.)areour
attitudes(notsomepropositionthatexistsindependentofthemind).He’snota
relativist,inpart,duetohisnaturalism.FromwhatItakehispositiontobe,he
thinksthatwehavenaturalreactions(orverdicts)tothingsandthisisnecessarily
so.Hesays,insupportofmyunderstandingintheprevioussentence,“Theexistence
oftheverdict,ofcourse,dependsontheexistenceofthosecapableofmakingit
[…].”47HegoesontouseHumeanmetaphysicstounderpinthisnaturalnecessity—
naturalnecessityisnaturalregularitybasedonourformingofdispositionstowards
expectation.48
WhileBlackburnusesnaturalismaspartofhisquasi-realism,itisnotmeant,
atleastnotin“HowToBeanEthicalAnti-Realist”,tomeanthatourlanguageis
reducibletoordirectlydescriptiveofthenaturalstateofphysicalaffairs.
Blackburn’snaturalismistogroundthathumanshaveevolvedtohavecertainmoral
reactionsorattributes.Moralfacts,forBlackburn,requirethefurtherstepof
reflectingonthesemoralreactionsandattributes,andsoarenotnecessarily
descriptiveofthephysicalstateofaffairsintheworld.Thefurtherconditionof
quasi-realism,projectivism,addsthatwethenprojectourmoralreactions(or
attributes)ontotheworldmakingthemcontingentonus(humanbeings),and
attributesoftheRealworld.47Ibid,178.48Ibid,179.
24
Inanefforttobecharitabletoquasi-realismanddifferentiateitfrommoral
realismandmoralanti-realism—andprobablyexplainpartlyhowitgotitsname—
quasi-realismdrawsonpartsofbothofSayre-McCord’sdefinitions,whichIthink
emphasizesthatthereissomethingoffaboutthetraditionalmoralrealismandanti-
realismdebate.Theviewshavetraditionallybeensplit,butBlackburn’squasi-
realismhighlightsthatthisisproblematic.Quasi-realismabidesbytheseaspectsof
moralrealism:“(1)theclaimsinquestion,whenliterallyconstrued,areliterallytrue
orfalse(cognitivism),and(2)someareliterallytrue.”49But,itisalsocontingenton
humanbeingsandournaturalevolutionarybiologicalreactionstothings,and
“embrace[s]anon-cognitivistanalysisoftheclaimsinquestion”50makingitvery
muchananti-realisttheory.Quasi-realismincorporatingaspectsofbothmoral
realismandmoralanti-realismmayseemcontradictory,butitisnot.Itisamoral
anti-realisttheoryonitsfoundation,butthendevelopsaninternal(or
epistemologicalorcognitive)theorythatresemblesrealismafterwereflectonour
moralreactionsandmakeourmoralreactionsintomoralfacts(orclaims).
Perhapsquasi-realismhighlightsthatthetraditionalmoralrealistandmoral
anti-realistdebatehasfailedtocapturewhatisreallygoingonwhenwemakemoral
claims.Itmightnotmatterwhatourbeliefsareonthemetaphysicallevelofrealism
andanti-realism.Whatmattersiswhatwecanshowonaninternal(or
epistemological)levelthatitisherethatwecanseewhetheramoralclaimistrueor
false—itisherethatmoralclaimsgettheirmeaning.
49Sayre-McCord,EssaysonMoralRealism,5.50Ibid,5.
25
1.5.“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology”byRudolfCarnap
Theproblemmayjustbethatwecannotadequatelycapturewhatisgoingon
inanyrealismandanti-realismdebate(includingthemoralrealismandmoralanti-
realismdebate).Thisapparentstalematedoesnotmeanthatthedebatehastoend
here.Thereareotherwaysofapproachingthedebatethatmayhelpfurtherit.
WhileRudolfCarnapwasananti-realist,heprovidedatheoryoflinguist
frameworksthatcouldverywellhelp.
Carnap,inhispaper“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology”says,
[…][W]emustdistinguishtwokindsofquestionsofexistence:first,questionsoftheexistenceofcertainentities[…]withintheframework;wecalltheminternalquestions;andsecond,questionsconcerningtheexistenceorrealityofthesystemofentitiesasawhole,calledexternalquestions.51
ThefirstquestionCarnaparticulatesinthisquoteisconcerning“theexistenceof
certainentities”withinalinguisticframework:“internalquestions”.Internal
questionsarequestionsthatareepistemologicalinnature,orquestionsaboutwhat
wecanknowfromwithinagivenframework.ThesecondquestionCarnap
articulatesis“concerningtheexistenceortherealityofthesystemofentitiesasa
whole”:“externalquestions”.Externalquestionsarequestionsthatareontologicalin
nature,andarenotquestionsaboutwhatwecanknowfromwithinagiven
framework—theyarequestionsthatareaskedfromoutsideoftheframework.
Carnap’smainprojectinthispaperistoshowthatthroughusingalanguage
framework(bracketedfromanyontologicalstatementsaboutreality52)wecan
51RudolfCarnap,“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology,”inMeaningandNecessity:AStudyinSemanticsandModalLogic,SecondEdition(Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1956),206.52BracketedfromanystatementsabouttheRealworld.
26
avoidtheissuethatarisesforsomeanti-realists(orempiricistsinCarnap’s
language,sinceheassociatesempiricismwithanti-realism/nominalism)whenusing
“certainexpressionsinalanguage…[to]designate(ornameordenoteorsignifyor
referto)certainextra-linguisticentities.”53Theissuearisesforanti-realistswhen
these“extra-linguisticentities”areabstractentities,becausetheydenythatthese
expressionsinlanguage(suchastheadjective“red”orthenumber“five”)refertoa
realentityintheworld.54
Carnapbuildshisframeworkthroughusingexamplesofdifferentlanguages
ofabstractentities(suchasthelanguagesof“Theworldofthings”and“Thesystemof
numbers”).Heistryingtoshowthatwecanstillspeakmeaningfullyaboutabstract
entitieswhenweaskquestionsaboutthemofwhathecallsan“internal”nature—to
bedifferentiatedfromquestionsofanexternalnature.55Asareminder:internal
questionsare“questionsoftheexistenceofcertainentities[…]withinthe
framework,”whileexternalquestionsare“questionsconcerningtheexistenceor
realityofthesystemofentitiesasawhole.”56
IthinkCarnap’sinternalframeworktheoryin“Empiricism,Semantics,and
Ontology”showsthatwecanstillhaveinternalphilosophywithouthavingtostate
anythingaboutmetaphysics.WhileCarnap’spaperishelpfulfortheanti-realist,itis
alsohelpfulforthescepticconcerningtheontologicalstatusofabstractentities
(includingmoralfacts).Though,Carnap’sinternalframeworktheoryisnotactually
problematicfortherealist,becauseinternalframeworksdonotassertanything53Carnap,“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology,”216.54Ibid.55Ibid,206.56Ibid.
27
abouttheRealworld(or,inCarnap’slanguage,“theworldofthings”57).So,itseems
possibleforinternalquestionstobeaskedwithouthavingtoaskexternalquestions,
whichmeansthatwecanknowthingsonaninternallevelwithinagivenframe-
work—withoutrunningintotheproblemofnotbeingabletoproperlycapturewhat
isgoingoninanyrealismandanti-realismdebate(includingthemoralrealismand
moralanti-realismdebate)duetotheexternalnatureofthequestionswithinthe
realismandanti-realismdebate.
1.6.Pyrrhonian,Academic,orMethodologicalScepticism?
IntheOutlinesofPyrrhonismbySextusEmpiricus,hestatesthatthereare
three“natural[results]ofanyinvestigation”andthoseresultsarethefollowing
threepositions:“Dogmatic,”“Academic,”and“Sceptic.”58The“Dogmatists,”
accordingtoSextusEmpiricus,“speciallysocalled—Aristotle,forexample,and
EpicurusandTheStoicsandcertainothers;”thinkthattheyhave“[discovered]the
objectof[their]search.”59The“Academics,”suchas“CleitomachusandCarneades,”
“denythat[theobjectoftheirinvestigation]isdiscoverableandconfessittobe
inapprehensible.”60And,“theScepticskeeponsearching”61—theScepticsalso
remainagnostic(epochē)intheirsearching.
NeilGascoigneexplainsinhisbookScepticism,
ForSextus,theDogmatistandtheAcademicpresentmirrorimagesofeachother:whereoneassertsthatknowledgeispossible(thatthingscanbeapprehended),theotherdeniesit.Toputthismoreprecisely,theDogmatist
57Ibid.58SextusEmpiricus,OutlinesofPyrrhonism,trans.R.G.Bury(Cambridge,Massachusetts:LoebClassicalLibrary,1933),1.1-1.4.59Ibid.60Ibid.61Ibid.
28
assumesthatwecanhavethephilosophicalknowledgethatshowsthatknowledgeispossible.Equally,theAcademicassumesthatwecanhavethephilosophicalknowledgethatshowsthatknowledgeisnotpossible.62
TheideaisthatforSextusEmpiricus,boththeDogmatistandtheAcademicare
dogmatic,becausetheydonoremainagnosticandbothasserttheirpositionstobe
true.TheScepticcannotassertthattheirpositionistrue,butcansaythattheydo
notknowwhethertheDogmaticpositionortheAcademicpositionistrueorfalse.
AsGascoignegoesontosay,
HowevertheScepticcomestotheviewthathemustgoalongwithappearancesinordertoachievehappiness,itcannotbeonthebasisofaclaimto[…]knowwhatthingsarereallylike(intheiressentialnature).63
Thatis,thatthoughtheScepticgoesalongwithappearances,64theirgoingalong
withappearancescannotbefoundedonanyclaimstoknowwhattheRealworldis
reallylike.
GascoignefurtherdistinguishesbetweenPyrrhonianScepticismand
AcademicScepticism.AccordingtoGascoigne,ArcesilausfoundedAcademic
Scepticism,around270BCE,whenhewasHeadoftheAcademy—around75years
afterPlato’sdeath.65ArcesilausthoughtthatbothStoicismandEpicureanism
(prominentschoolsofphilosophyinAncientGreece)were“Dogmaticperversionsof
theSocraticlegacy;”66andsoforwarded1)“thatheknewnothing”,and2)his
method“[suggested]alinkbetweenthe‘way’inwhichSocratesarrivedathis
‘admissionofignorance’andArcesilaus’sexplicitengagementwiththeopinionsof
62NeilGascoigne,Scepticism,inCentralProblemsofPhilosophy,ed.JohnShand(MontrealandKingston:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,2002),33.63Ibid,41.64Or,perceptions.65Gascoigne,Scepticism,41.66Ibid,42.
29
theDogmatistsofhisowntime.”67Arcesilaus’methodissimilartoSocrates’method
inPlato’sdialogues.68ThemethodPlatodetails:Socratesgoesaroundaskingpeople
whattheyknow,andthroughaseriesofquestionsshowsthepeopleheasksthat
theyactuallyknownothing.Thegoalbeingtoshowthattoonlyknowthatyou
knownothingisbetterthanthinkingyouknowsomethingwhenyoudonot.69
But,thisgetsbacktowhatSextusEmpiricussaidabouttheAcademicsinthe
OutlinesofPyrrhonism:they“denythat[theobjectoftheirinvestigation]is
discoverableandconfessittobeinapprehensible.”70AcademicScepticsdenythat
theyknowanything(concerningtheRealworld).Thisseemstobestilldogmatic,
evenifArcesilaustookissuewiththeDogmatists,andSextusEmpiricusisrightthat
AcademicScepticismistheflipsideor“mirror”(asGascoignesays)ofDogmatism.
Therefore,tousemorecontemporarylanguage,itseemsliketheDogmatistsare
realists,theAcademicsareanti-realists,andtheScepticsareactualagnosticsceptics.
UsingAcademicScepticismasatooliswhatturnsintothe‘MethodofDoubt’,
whichgetsassociatedwithRenéDescartes(specificallyhisFirstandSecond
MeditationsinhisMeditationsonFirstPhilosophy)intheEarlyModernperiod.
SimonBlackburnsays,oftheMethodofDoubt,intheOxfordDictionaryof
Philosophy,“Itattemptstoputknowledgeuponasecurefoundationbyfirstinviting
ustosuspendjudgementonanypropositionwhosetruthcanbedoubted,evenasa
67Ibid,43.68Ibid.69‘Toknow’meaningtoknowsomethingabouttheRealworld.70SextusEmpiricus,OutlinesofPyrrhonism,1.1.
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barepossibility.”71TheMethodofDoubtistoquestionanythingyouthinkyouknow
togetridofbeliefsfoundedonafalsefoundation.But,Descartesarguablydoesnot
actuallydoubtthattheextended,orReal,worldexists.HesaysintheSixth
Meditation,
[O]ntheonehandIhaveaclearanddistinctideaofmyself,insofarasIamsimplyathinking,non-extendedthing;andontheotherhandIhaveadistinctideaofbody,insofarasthisissimplyanextended,non-thinkingthing.[…]OfcourseIalsorecognizethatthereareotherfaculties(likethoseofchanging
position,oftakingonvariousshapes,andsoon)which,likesensoryperceptionandimagination,cannotbeunderstoodapartfromsomesubstanceforthemtoinherein,andhencecannotexistwithoutit.Butitisclearthattheseotherfaculties,iftheyexist,mustbeinacorporealorextendedsubstanceandnotanintellectualone;fortheclearanddistinctconceptionofthemincludesextension[…].72
ThisseemstoindicatethatDescarteswasnotanAcademicScepticoraPyrrhonian
Sceptic.HedidthinkhecouldknowsomethingabouttheReal(i.e.extended)world,
anddidnotremainagnosticeither.Forthisreason,theAcademicheritagethat
DescartesreliesonintheMethodofDoubtisonlyusedasatool,andnotused
seriously.Duetoitonlybeingusedinstrumentally,orasa“method”,IcallDescartes’
utilizationofscepticism‘MethodologicalScepticism’ratherthanAcademic,or
agnostic/PyrrhonianScepticism.
Therethenseemstobethreedifferenttypesofscepticismthatwecan
distinguishbetween:Pyrrhonian(oragnostic)Scepticism,AcademicScepticism,and
MethodologicalScepticism.IhavealreadyexplainedhowMethodologicalScepticism
differsfromPyrrhonianScepticismandAcademicScepticism,butitwouldbeagood
71SimonBlackburn,“methodofdoubt,”intheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),304.72RenéDescartes,MeditationsinFirstPhilosophy,inThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes,VolumeII,trans.JohnCottingham,RobertStoothoff,andDugaldMurdoch(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984),54-55.
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ideatomakethedistinctionbetweenPyrrhonianScepticismandAcademic
Scepticismalittlemoreclear.InBookI,ChapterXXXIII—“WhereinScepticism
differsfromtheAcademicPhilosophy”inOutlinesofPyrrhonism,SextusEmpiricus
explainshowPyrrhonianScepticismdiffersfromAcademicScepticism.At1.223,
SextusEmpiricussays,
AndifPlato[fromthefirstof,potentially,fiveschoolsofAcademicScepticism]doesreallyuttersomestatementsinascepticalwaywhenheis,astheysay,“exercising,”thatwillnotmakehimaSceptic;forthemanthatdogmatizesaboutasinglething,oreverprefersoneimpressiontoanotherinpointofcredibilityorincredibility,ormakesanyassertionaboutanynon-evidentobject,assumesthedogmaticcharacter[…].73
InBookI,ChapterXXXIII;SextusEmpiricusliststhreemainschoolsofAcademic
Scepticism,andliststwomoreschoolsthathealsothinksshouldbeincluded.74He
goesthroughexplaininghowthefivedifferentschoolsofAcademicScepticismare
notPyrrhonianScepticism,buttheabovequoteattackingPlato’s(orSocrates’)
‘scepticism’getstotheheartofthedistinctionbetweenAcademicScepticismand
PyrrhonianScepticism.
EvenAcademicScepticslikeArcesilaus,endupmakingaclaim:“allthingsare
non-apprehensible”75(i.e.thatallthingsarenotknowable).Theproblemwiththis,
SextusEmpiricussays,isthat“[Academics]affirm[thatallthingsarenon-
apprehensible]positively,whereastheScepticregardsitaspossiblethatsome
thingsmaybeapprehended.”76AssoonastheAcademicScepticaffirmsthatthey
knownothing,theyaremakinganassertionaboutsomething(inawaythatentails
73SextusEmpiricus,OutlinesofPyrrhonism,1.223.74Ibid,1.220-221.75Ibid,1.226.76Ibid.
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thattheydoknowsomething:thattheyknownothing),andthisisdogmaticandnot
actuallyScepticismaccordingtoSextusEmpiricus.
OnelastmajordifferencebetweenAcademicScepticismandPyrrhonian
ScepticismisthatforthePyrrhonians,agnosticism,orthesuspensionofjudgement
(epochē),iswhatleadstotranquillityofmind(ataraxia)andthegoodlife
(eudaimonia).RichardH.PopkinandJoséR.MaiaNetosayintheintroductionto
theiranthologySkepticism:AnAnthology,inregardstoPyrrhonianScepticism,
Theinvestigationdoesnotendwiththeinquirerfindingthetruth(whichiswhattheskepticstechnicallycall“dogmatism”),butinasituationofequipollencebetweenthedoctrinesorphenomenaexamined(thatis,onedoctrinedoesnotappearasmorecrediblethanaconflictingone)andso,unabletoassenttoeitherofthem,thePyrrhoniansuspendsjudgement(epoché).Contrarytotheinitialperspectiveofgettingridofthedisturbancebyfindingtruth,itiswhentheinquirersuspendsjudgementthatheorshefindsthetranquillitybeingsought.77
WhiletheAcademicScepticsaysthattheyabidebythesuspensionofjudgement
(epochē),theirprimarygoalistousethe‘Socraticmethod’togetridoffalsebeliefs.
ThePyrrhonianSceptic’sprimarygoalistranquillityofmind(ataraxia).
Toaddtothecomplexityofthedifferenttypesofscepticism,thereisalso
somethingcalledModeratePyrrhonism.Inhispaper“ModerateClassyPyrrhonian
MoralScepticism”andmoreelaboratelyinhisbookMoralSkepticisms,Walter
Sinnott-ArmstrongarticulatesakindofModeratePyrrhonism(inamoralscepticism
context).Sinnott-Armstrongsays,
Myscepticismisalsomoderate.Isuspendbeliefonlyaboutwhetheranyoneisjustifiedwithoutqualification.Thissuspensioniscompatiblewithrelativizedepistemicjudgements,suchasthatSueisjustifiedinbelievingthatherpetisadogasapposedtoacat,andthatsheisnotjustifiedinbelievingthatherpetisa
77RichardH.PopkinandJoséR.MaiaNeto,eds.,Skepticism:AnAnthology(Amherst,NewYork:PrometheusBooks,2007),22-23.
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dogasopposedtoadingoorhyena.78
Sinnott-Armstrong’sModeratePyrrhonismreinsintheuniversalaspectof
Pyrrhonism.Itstillremainsagnosticwhenitcomestojudgementsthatarenot
“justifiedwithoutqualification,”but“relativizedepistemicjudgements”canstillbe
madeonthisview.
Ithinkitisimportanttonowgiveageneral,contemporarydefinitionof
scepticism,andanalyseit.PartofBlackburn’sdefinitionofscepticismintheOxford
DictionaryofPhilosophystates,
AlthoughGreekscepticismcentredonthevalueofenquiryandquestioning,scepticismisnowthedenialthatknowledgeorevenrationalbeliefispossible,eitheraboutsomespecificsubjectmatter(e.g.ethics)orinanyareawhatsoever.79
ThispartofBlackburn’sdefinitionseemstobeheavilybiasedtowardsAcademic
Scepticism.IfyoucontinuereadingthedefinitionBlackburngives,itseemsattimes
thatheactuallyconflatesPyrrhonianScepticismwithAcademicScepticism.There
seemstobealotofconfusionoverthedifferenttypesofscepticismincontemporary
philosophy,andIthinkalotofthisisduetoconflatingthedifferenttypesof
scepticism.ItshouldbenotedthatPyrrhonian(oragnostic)Scepticismisnot
AcademicScepticism,andPyrrhonianScepticismandAcademicScepticismareboth
notMethodologicalScepticism.Theuseofscepticismasatoolinphilosophy(i.e.
MethodologicalScepticism)—sincetheEarlyModernperiodtopresentday—has
alsobeenconflatedwithbothPyrrhonianScepticism,orwhatIliketothinkofas
78WalterSinnott-Armstrong,“ModerateClassyPyrrhonianMoralScepticism,”ThePhilosophicalQuarterly58,no.232(July2008):454.79SimonBlackburn,“scepticism,”intheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),429.
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‘actual’agnosticscepticism,andAcademicScepticism.Ifindthisproblematic,
especiallywhentryingtounderstandspecificphilosophies(likeKant’s,orHume’s).
Ithinkitisimportanttokeepinmindtheproblematicconflationsofthedifferent
typesofscepticismwhilereadingallegedly‘sceptical’writings,andthecriticismsof
thosewritings,inordertodecipherthewritingsthatareactuallyscepticalandthe
criticismsthatshouldbetakenseriously.
1.7.Naturalism
Definingnaturalismisatrickyendeavour(notunlikedefiningrealismand
anti-realism).Theterm‘naturalism’hasbeenusedinphilosophybymanypeople
supportingmanydifferentvarietiesofideasandtheories.AsP.F.Strawsonstatesat
thebeginningofSkepticismandNaturalism:SomeVarieties,
Theterm“naturalism”iselasticinitsuse.ThefactthatithasbeenappliedtotheworkofphilosophershavingaslittleincommonasHumeandSpinozaisenoughtosuggestthatthereisadistinctiontobedrawnbetweenvarietiesofnaturalism.80
WhileStrawsongoesontodistinguishbetweenhardnaturalismandsoftnaturalism,
IwouldprefertodistinguishbetweenMethodologicalNaturalismandOntological
Naturalism(sometimesalsoconjoinedwithMetaphysicalNaturalismandreferredto
asPhilosophicalNaturalism).
Tostart,IwillfirstoutlineMethodologicalNaturalism.PaulKurtz,inhis
paper“Darwinre-crucified:whyaresomanyafraidofnaturalism,”defines
MethodologicalNaturalismasfollows,
First,naturalismiscommittedtoamethodologicalprinciplewithinthecontextofscientificenquiry;i.e.,allhypothesesandeventsaretobeexplainedand
80P.F.Strawson,SkepticismandNaturalism:SomeVarieties,TheWoodbridgeLectures1983(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1985),1.
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testedbyreferencetonaturalcausesandevents.Tointroduceasupernaturalortranscendentalcausewithinscienceistodepartfromnaturalisticexplanations.Onthisground,toinvokeanintelligentdesignerorcreatorisinadmissible.81
DavidPapineau,intheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle“Naturalism”,
moresimplysays,“Methodologicalnaturalistsseephilosophyandscienceas
engagedinessentiallythesameenterprise,pursuingsimilarendsandusingsimilar
methods.”82TheideabeingthatMethodologicalNaturalismfollowsthesame
methodasscience:usingnaturalexplanationwithoutappealtoanything
supernatural(suchGod,forexample).
Now,IwilloutlineOntologicalNaturalism.Papineaustates,withregardto
OntologicalNaturalism,
Acentralthoughtinontologicalnaturalismisthatallspatiotemporalentitiesmustbeidenticaltoormetaphysicallyconstitutedbyphysicalentities.Manyontologicalnaturaliststhusadoptaphysicalistattitudetomental,biologicalandothersuch“special”subjectmatters.Theyholdthatthereisnothingmoretothemental,biologicalandsocialrealmsthanarrangementsofphysicalentities.83
Addingtothis,Kurtzsaysmorebroadly,
Accordingtothenaturalists,natureisbestaccountedforbyreferencetomaterialprinciples,i.e.,bymassandenergyandphysicalchemicalpropertiesasencounteredindiversecontextsofinquiry.84
81PaulKurtz,“Darwinre-crucified:whyaresomanyafraidofnaturalism,”FreeInquiry,Spring1998,accessedApril22nd,2018,AcademicOneFile,http://link.galegroup.com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/apps/doc/A20633103/AONE?u=ocul_carleton&sid=AONE&xid=e7e2f9f7.82DavidPapineau,"Naturalism",TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,ed.EdwardN.Zalta(Winter2016Edition),accessedonApril22nd,2018,https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/naturalism/.83Ibid.84PaulKurtz,“Darwinre-crucified:whyaresomanyafraidofnaturalism.”
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And,so,MethodologicalNaturalismstatesthatitfollowsthesamemethodas
science,andOntologicalNaturalismstatesthateverythingintheuniversecanbe
explainedby“materialprinciples,”andisconstitutedof“physicalentities.”
Bothrealistsandanti-realistscanadoptMethodologicalNaturalismquite
easilyasitmakesnoontologicalclaimsabouttheRealworld—itmakesexplanatory
claims.Wherethingsgetmorechallengingfortheanti-realistiswhenitcomesto
OntologicalNaturalism.Though,ananti-realistmaynottakeissuewithOntological
Naturalismforeverydomain.Ananti-realistdoesnothavetobeananti-realist
whenitcomestoneuronsfiringexplainingbrainstates,buttheycanbeananti-
realistaboutabstractentitiessuchasmoralfacts(orclaims)—asHarmanis.85
But,IwouldliketogoastepfurtherandsaythatOntologicalNaturalismdoes
nothavetoentailanontologicalcommitmenttoattributingscientificexplanations,
likeneuronsfiringexplainingmentalstates,totheRealworld.Youcanverywell
explainmentalstatesbywayofneuronsfiring,evenifyouareanagnosticsceptic,
becausetheexplanationyougivecanbebasedonappearancesratherthanon
makingastatementabouttheRealworld.Thescepticcansay,“Itappearsthat
neuronsfiringexplainbrainstatesasfarasIcanknow.”Thisdoesnotassert
anythingabouttheRealworld,butrathermakesaclaimbasedonappearances
allowingthesceptictoremainagnosticabouttheRealworld.Thescepticcannotsay
thatthisishowtheworldis;theycanonlysaythatthisishowtheworldappears.As
quotedinsection1.6,inreferencetoPyrrhonianScepticism,“theScepticcomesto
85Referbacktosection1.3.
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theviewthathemustgoalongwithappearancesinordertoachievehappiness.”86
Thescepticstillneedstolivetheirlife,anditisunrealisticforthemtolivenot
acknowledginganything.So,ratherthanmakeclaimsrelatingtotheRealworld,
theymakeclaimsrelatingtoappearances.87
InSection2.2,thatfollows,natureismentioned,“Naturehasnotleftthisto
hischoice,andhasdoubtlessesteem’ditanaffairoftoogreatimportancetobe
trustedtoouruncertainreasoningsandspeculations.”88Humereferencesnature
countlesstimesthroughoutATreatiseofHumanNature,andAnEnquiryconcerning
HumanUnderstanding.Hume’snaturalismplaysaroleinhowtherestofhis
philosophyisinterpreted.OnewayofreadingHumeasarealistisbyusinghis
naturalismtodiscredit,orreducethepowerof,hisscepticism.Anotherwayof
readingHumeisthroughacceptingthatheendorsesbothscepticismandnaturalism,
butthathisphilosophyisnotcohesiveattimes.Ithinkitisimportanttounderstand
howHumeisusingnatureinordertounderstandwhatkindofnaturalismarisesin
hisphilosophyinanefforttobetterunderstandtherelationshipbetweenhis
scepticismandnaturalism.IfindthatHumeusesnatureintwoways:1)toreferto
humannature,and2)torefertoourunderstandingoftherulesofnaturethrough
ourperceptionsandexperiences.Thefirstuseofnatureisdependentonan
understandingoftheseconduseofnature.
86Gascoigne,Scepticism,41.87Appearancesarebasedonperceptions,andmay,ormaynot,beaccuraterepresentationsoftheRealworld—butthescepticcannotmakeaclaimaboutwhetherappearancesareaccuraterepresentationsoftheRealworldornot.88Treatise,1.4.2.1(p.125).
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IntheTreatise,Humesays,“Wemaydrawinferencesfromthecoherenceof
ourperceptions,whethertheybetrueorfalse;whethertheyrepresentnaturejustly,
orbemereillusionsofthesenses.”89Wemakeinferencesviatheknowledgewegain
throughoursenses,andtheimplicationhereisthatwecannotknowwhetherour
perceptionsgiveusaccurateknowledgeofnature(intheReal,externalworld)or
not.90ThisisinterestinggivenhowfrequentlyHumefallsbackonnatureinhis
explanationsthroughoutboththeTreatiseandtheFirstEnquiry.Iwillattemptto
reconstructHume’sunderstandingofnatureinordertounderstandhowitfitsinto
Hume’sphilosophyasawhole.
Tostartwith,Humedifferentiatesbetween“RelationsofIdeas”and“Matters
ofFact”.91RelationsofIdeas“arethesciencesofGeometry,Algebra,andArithmetic;
andinshort,everyaffirmation,whichiseitherintuitivelyordemonstratively
certain.”92Hegivesexamplesofwhathemeansbytherelationofideas,suchas,
“Thatthreetimesfiveisequaltothehalfofthirty,expressesarelationbetweenthese
numbers.”93Relationsofideasexpressarelationshipbetweentwoideasthatwecan
knowwithouthavingtorelyonexperience(perceivingsomethinghappenmultiple
times),andwhosenegationimpliesacontradiction.
89Ibid,1.3.5.2(p.59).90ItshouldbenotedthateventhoughwecannotknowwhetherornotourperceptionsgiveusaccurateknowledgeofaReal,externalworldornot;thecoherenceofourperceptionsstillallowsustomakeinferences,andassessthetruthorfalsityofperceptions.91WhyIambeginningwiththisdistinctionwillbecomemoreclearatthesectionprogresses.92FirstEnquiry,4.1(p.18).93Ibid.
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Mattersoffact,ontheotherhand,arenotdemonstrable94,andsosomething
anditsnegationcanbothbetrue.TheexampleHumegivesisthat“thesunmaynot
risetomorrow”,orthatthesunwillrisetomorrow.95Bothstatementscan
potentiallybetrue,andacontradictioncannotbederived.Theothermainfeatureof
mattersoffactisthat“[a]llreasoningsconcerningmatteroffactseemtobefounded
ontherelationofCauseandEffect.”96Humesaysthatitisbythis“relation[ofcause
andeffect]alonewecangobeyondtheevidenceofourmemoryandsenses.”97
Reasoningconcerningtherelationofcauseandeffect“arisesentirelyfrom
experience.”98Humegoesontomaketheevenstrongerclaim“thatcausesand
effectsarediscoverable,notbyreason,butbyexperience.”99Hume,then,goesonto
giveafewexamples.Oneoftheexampleshegivesisof“theexplosionof
gunpowder.”100Theideabeingthatyoucannotknowthatgunpowderexplodes
priortoexperiencewithit.101
Iamnotsomuchconcernedwithrelationsofideas,butwithmattersoffact.
Mattersoffactarehowwegainperceptualknowledgeofthenaturalworld(i.e.
94Alogicalproofcannotbegiven.95FirstEnquiry,4.1(p.18).96Ibid,4.4(p.19).97Ibid.98Ibid,4.6(p.19).99Ibid,4.7(p.20).100Ibid.101Imean,youcanreadaboutitinabook,butthepersonwhowrotethebookwouldneedtohavegainedknowledgeofgunpowdersomehowandthewaytodosowouldbetohaveexperiencewithgunpowder.Though,Idothink,forHume,thatreadingthatgunpowderexplodesinthebookisnotexactlyknowledgethatgunpowderexplodes.Youwouldneeddirectexperiencewithgunpowder,preferablymultipleexperienceswithit.
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externalworld).102So,itwouldappearthatthenaturalismfoundinHume’s
philosophyisonebasedonperceivedexperientialrelations(suchascauseand
effect)ratherthanconcreteknowledge,andthereforeallyoucanhavearenatural
relations(orrulesorfacts)thatcanonlyeverleadtoprobabilityandnotcertainty.
Thisisaverydifferentpicturethansomemodernreductionistformsofnaturalism
whereitisbelievedthatnature(andthewholeexternalworld)isreducibletothe
smallestdiscoverabledenominationinscience(forexample,quarks).ForHume,
onecanreducenaturetothesmallestdenominationdiscoverableinscience,butthis
wouldallbeconjecture—becauseitisbasedonexperience(i.e.senseimpressions/
perceptionscombinedwithourexperienceofthesesenseimpressions/perceptions)
andhasthepotentialtobetrueorfalse(wecannotknowforsurethetruthorfalsity
ofsomethingbyattemptingtoreferenceittotheexternalworld,wecanonlyassess
truthorfalsitywithinagivenframework).103
Itisworthadding,givenHume’sscepticalviewsconcerningmetaphysics,that
wecanneverhaveaccesstotheknowledgeofwhatanyultimatecausesorfirst
principle(s)are,makingnaturealwaysprobableandnot100%certain,
Hencewemaydiscoverthereason,whynophilosopher,whoisrationalandmodest,haseverpretendedtoassigntheultimatecauseofanynaturaloperation,orshowdistinctlytheactionofthatpower,whichproducesanysingleeffectintheuniverse.Itisconfessed,thattheutmosteffortofhumanreasonis,toreducetheprinciples,productiveofnaturalphaenomena,toagreatersimplicity,andtoresolvethemanyparticulareffectsintogeneralcauses,bymeansofreasoningsfromanalogy,experience,andobservation.But
102Thecontentofourknowledgeoftheexternalworldconsistsofperceptions.Thismeansthatwehavenodirectknowledgeoftheexternalworld,weonlyhaveknowledgeofourperceptions.DirectknowledgeoftheexternalworldisnotsomethingwehaveaccesstoforHume.103Itdoesnotgiveyouthecognitivistrequirementthatwecanknowthatatleastsomeclaimsaretrue.
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astothecausesofthesegeneralcauses,weshouldinvainattempttheirdiscovery;norshallweeverbeabletosatisfyourselves,byanyparticularexplanationofthem.Theseultimatespringsandprinciplesaretotallyshutupfromhumancuriosityandenquiry.104
So,thoughwecanreducenaturetogeneralrulesforgreatersimplicitythroughour
experiencesandobservations,theultimatecausesandfirstprinciple(s)ofnature
canneverbeknowntous(humans).ThisemphasizesthatReal,externalrules(or
laws)ofnaturearenotthingsthatcanbedirectlyknown.Therules,orlaws,of
naturethatwecanknowthroughperceptionandexperiencearebasedon
probability,notcertainty.ThisthenentailsthatHume’snaturalismisnotbasedon
assertinganythingintheexternalworldwithcertaintythatcanbeknowntobe
true—thatis,Hume’snaturalismisnotarealistorcognitiveassertion.Natural,or
physical,objectsthatwebecomeawareofviaperception,thethingsweperceivein
theworld,cannotnecessarilybeequatedwithReal,externalobjects—wecannot
knowtheconnectionbetweentheobjectofourstudy(thephysicalobjectofour
perception)andtheReal,externalobject.
1.8.Hume:Realist,Anti-Realist,orSceptic?
DifferentpeoplehaveinterpretedHumeasarealist,ananti-realist,ora
scepticintheireffortstounderstandhisphilosophy—thereisnoconsensusasto
whichHumeactuallywas.Becausethereisnoconsensusintheliterature,Iwill
havetogivemyowninterpretationofHumewithsupportinthefollowingchapter.
Inthissection,toshowthelackofconsensus,Iwillbrieflygiveanaccountofeachof
thedifferentinterpretationsofHume.Tostart,IwilllookatBarryStroud’srealist
interpretationofHume.Secondly,IwilllookatThomasReid’santi-realist104FirstEnquiry,4.12(p.22).
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interpretationofHume.And,thirdly,IwilllookatRobertJ.Fogelin’ssceptical
interpretationofHume.
WhileBarryStrouddoesacknowledgeHume’sscepticalpassages,hethinks
thatHumeisultimatelyarealist,
‘Obstinatenature’canobliterateourscepticaldoubtsinamoment,and‘carelessnessandin-attention’affordaneasyremedyforourdistress(p.218).Thisisnottosaythatnaturesomehowrefutesscepticismandshowsthatitisnottrue.Ournaturalinstinctsdonotsuccessfullymeetorresolvethescepticaldoubts;theysimplysubmergethem.Manissoconstitutedthathemustbelieve,forexample,intheexistenceofbodies,eventhoughhecannotdefendthatbeliefwithanygoodreasons.Norwillanyaccountofgoodreasoningfreehimfromthescepticaldoubtsarisinginevitablyoutofreflectiononthegroundsforthatbelief.But,wedogetfreefromsuchdoubts,nevertheless.105
StroudthenquotesHumeandcarriesonbysaying,
Wecannotavoidseeingtheresultsofourphilosophicalreflectionasartificialandcontrived,andwewillinevitablyyieldtonatureandaccept‘thegeneralmaximsoftheworld’(p.269)despiteaconvincingphilosophicaldemonstrationoftheunreasonableness,oreventhefalsity,ofthosebeliefs.106
AccordingtoStroud’sinterpretationofHume’sphilosophy,wecannothelpbutto
fallintodoubtwhenwereflectandphilosophize,but,intheend,werevertbackinto
arealistpositionaswe“yieldtonature”.ItisarealistinterpretationofHume,
because,accordingtoStroud,Humethinksthathumansnaturallythinkthatbodies
existintheexternalworld—notjusttheappearanceofbodiesintheexternalworld,
butReal,externalbodies.
ThomasReid,ontheotherhand,seemstohavehadananti-realist
interpretationofHume’sphilosophy.ReidwasacontemporaryofHume,andwas
highlycriticalofHume’sphilosophy.ReidinterpretedHumeasallowinghis,
meaningHume’s,philosophytoleadHume“todisbelievetheexistencebothof105BarryStroud,Hume(NewYork:Routledge&KeganPaulplc,1977),115.106Ibid,116.
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matterandofmind.”107AccordingtoReid,Humedeniedthatanythingexistedinthe
externalworld,whichaPyrrhonianScepticwouldcallnegativelydogmatic,
AcademicScepticism,oranti-realism.108Tofurtherelaborate,Reidsays,
MrHUMEadoptsLOCKE’Saccountoftheoriginofourideas,109andfromthatprincipleinfers,thatwehavenoideaofsubstance,corporealorspiritual,noideaofpower,nootherideaofcause,butthatitissomethingantecedent,andconstantlyconjoinedtothatwhichwecallitseffect;and,inaword,thatwecanhavenoideaofanythingbutoursensations,andtheoperationsofmindweareconsciousof.110
Again,ReidsaysthatHumenegativelyassertsthatwehavenoideaofsubstance
(thisalsomeansthatwehavenodirectideaoftheexternalworld).Reidalsosays
thatHumeassertsthatallwecanhaveideasof,knowledgeof,are“oursensations,
andtheoperationsofmindweareconsciousof”—thiswouldmeanthatourideas
aremind-dependent.Thecombinationofnothavinganyideaofexternalsubstance
andallourideasbeingmind-dependentmakesReid’sinterpretationofHume’s
philosophyananti-realistinterpretation.
RobertJ.FogelinarticulatesaninterpretationofHumeasatruescepticinhis
paper“TheSkepticsAreComing!TheSkepticsAreComing!”,
Hume,whomItaketobeanurbanePyrrhonian[ModeratePyrrhonianSceptic],explicitlymakesthismove[toshowthatthedogmatists’program,suchasAcademicScepticism,“actuallygeneratesaradicalskepticismratherthanavoidsit”]intheTreatisewhenhetellsus:“Itisimpossible,uponanysystem,todefendeitherourunderstandingorsenses;andwebutexposethemfurtherwhenweendeavourtojustifytheminthatmanner.Asthescepticaldoubtarisesnaturallyfromaprofoundandintensereflectiononthosesubjects,it
107ThomasReid,EssaysontheIntellectualPowersofMan(Edinburgh:PrintedforJohnBell,ParliamentSquare,andG.G.J.&J.Robinson,London,1785),187.108ReidisalsotakingissuewithHume’stheoryofmindinthepreviousquote,butIamfocusingonReid’sinterpretationofHume’stheoryofperceptionandmetaphysics.109ReidsaysinthepreviousparagraphthattheoriginofideasforLockeissensationandreflection.110Reid,EssaysontheIntellectualPowersofMan,189.
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alwaysincreasesthefurtherwecarryourreflections,whetherinoppositionorconformitytoit.”SinceHumeheldarustic111interpretationofancientPyrrhonism,hedistancedhimselffromitinthesewords:“ButaPyrrhoniancannotexpect,thathisphilosophywillhaveanyconstantinfluenceonthemind:orifithad,thatitsinfluencewouldbebeneficialtosociety.Onthecontrary,hemustacknowledge,ifhewillacknowledgeanything,thatallhumanlifemustperish,werehisprinciplesuniversallyandsteadilytoprevail.Alldiscourse,allactionwouldimmediatelycease;andmenremaininatotallethargy,tillthenecessitiesofnature,unsatisfied,putanendtotheirmiserableexistence.”Takingitasrustic,Humerecommendsaphilosophicaltoniccontaining“onlyasmalltinctureofPyrrhonism.”IfhehadinterpretedPyrrhonismasurbane,hecouldhavecounseledafullquaffoftherealstuff.112
Fogelin’sinterpretationofHume’sphilosophyintheabovequoteunderstandsHume
asmitigated,ormoderate,PyrrhonianSceptic—thekindthatassentsto
appearances,butremainsagnosticaboutthemetaphysicalstatusoffacts,objects,
etc.,intheexternal,Realworld.HumeisnotaradicalPyrrhonianSceptic,according
toFogelin,anditispreciselyradicalPyrrhonianScepticismthatHumespeaks
against.But,tobeaPyrrhonianSceptic,Humeneednotberadicalinhisviews.He
canacceptamitigatedPyrrhonianScepticism,orModeratePyrrhonianScepticism,
andstillbeatruesceptic(intheAncientGreekunderstandingofscepticismas
withholdingjudgement,epochē).
1.9.AnInterpretationofHume’sPhilosophy
IdothinkthatHume’sscepticismandnaturalismarecohesive,113andthathis
moralphilosophyisalsocohesive.Notonlythat,butthatHume’sphilosophyis
cohesiveacrosshisscepticism,naturalism,andmoralphilosophy.Inthissection,I111“Treatedasrustic,thePyrrhonistispicturedassettingasidesubtletyandflatfootedlyseekingsuspensionofbeliefonallmatterswhatsoever,includingthepracticalbeliefsconcerningeverydaylife.”RobertJ.Fogelin,“TheSkepticsAreComing!TheSkepticsAreComing!,”inPyrrhonianSkepticism,ed.WalterSinnott-Armstrong(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),163.112Ibid,164.113BycohesiveImeanconsistentandmutuallysupporting,andnotresultinginacontradictionorincompatibility.
45
willbeprimarilyusingsecondarysupportfromDonGarretttohelpshowthatthese
componentsofHume’sphilosophyarecohesive.IwillfirstlookatapaperbyDon
Garrettcalled“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’:SkepticismandNaturalismin
Hume’sScienceofMan”(withsomereferencetoRobertJ.Fogelin’spaper“The
SkepticsAreComing!TheSkepticsAreComing!”)beforeturningtoChapter9:
“MoralEvaluation”inGarrett’sbookCognitionandCommitmentinHume’s
Philosophy.Afterconsidering“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’:Skepticismand
NaturalisminHume’sScienceofMan”and“MoralEvaluation”,Iwillshowthe
connectionsbetweenthemwiththegoalbeingtodemonstratethatHume’s
philosophyiscohesiveacrosshisscepticism,naturalism,andmoralphilosophy.
InthefirstpaperIreferredto,Garrettsays—attheveryendofhis
introduction—”Hume’snaturalismandhisskepticismaremutuallysupporting.”114
ItishisgoalinthispapertoshowthatHume’snaturalismandscepticismarenot
inconsistent.Garrett’salternativegoalistoshowthatyoudonothavetosupport
oneattheexpenseoftheother—forexample,youdonothavetoholdthatHumeis
actuallyanaturalistattheexpenseofhisscepticism;bothnaturalismandscepticism
canholdsimultaneously.115Afterhisintroduction,Garrettexplainsaclassification
systemofscepticism.UsingRobertJ.Fogelin’sclassificationofscepticismtostart
114DonGarrett,“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’:SkepticismandNaturalisminHume’sScienceofMan,”inPyrrhonianSkepticism,ed.WalterSinnott-Armstrong(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),69.115OnceitisestablishedthatHume’sscepticismandnaturalismarecohesive,Iwillthenshowthathisscepticismandnaturalismarealsoconsistentwithhismoralphilosophy.IstartwithsupportingHume’sscepticismandnaturalismfirst,becausetheyinformhismoralphilosophy.
46
with,Garrettdiscusses“sixdifferentdimensions”thatscepticismcanbebroken
downinto:domain,character,object,origin,degree,andpersistence.116
GarrettdefinesFogelin’s“sixdifferentdimensions”ofscepticismasfollows.
OfdomainGarrettsays,
[T]hesetsofpropositionstowardwhich[varietiesofskepticism]aredirected.Thedomainofagiveninstanceofskepticismmaybeeithergeneralorlimited.Generalskepticismconcernsallpropositionswhatsoever;limitedskepticismisdirectedonlytowardpropositionsofaparticularsubjectmatterorotherkind.117
Garretdefinescharacter,ashesaysFogelindefinesit,bysplittingitintothree
subcategories,
[Character]maybetheoretical,prescriptive,orpracticing.Theoreticalskeptic-ismisapositivestancetowardtheviewthatthatthereisalackof“rationalgrounds,warrant,orjustification”forassentingtothepropositionsofaspecifieddomain.Prescriptiveskepticismisapositivestancetowardstheviewthatoneoughtnottoassent—typicallyissuinginarecommendationtoresistorrefrainfromassent—tothepropositionsofaspecifieddomain.Practicingskepticismisastanceofactualdoubting,orrefrainingfromassentto,thepropositionsofaspecifieddomain.118
Hethensaysthatobjectcan“beeitherepistemologicalorconceptual,”
[E]pistemologicalskepticismdoesnotconcerntheintelligibilityofadomainofpropositionsbutonlythebasisforassentingtopropositionswithinit,whereasconceptualskepticismconcernstheveryintelligibilityofadomainofpropositions.119
Afterobject,Garrettsaysthatoriginis“eitherantecedentorconsequent,”
ThedistinctionbetweenantecedentandconsequentskepticismisoneoftwodistinctionsthatHumehimselfdrawsandemphasizesinsection12ofAnEnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding.AsHumeexplainsit,theformeris“aspeciesofscepticism,antecedenttoallstudyandphilosophy,which…recommendsanuniversaldoubt,notonlyofallourformeropinionsandprinciples,butalsoofourveryfaculties”(EHU12.3).Hecontraststhiswith
116Garrett,“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’:SkepticismandNaturalisminHume’sScienceofMan,”69.117Ibid,69-70.118Ibid,70.119Ibid,71.
47
“anotherspeciesofskepticism,consequenttoscienceandenquiry,whenmenaresupposedtohavediscoveredeithertheabsolutefallaciousnessoftheirmentalfacultiesortheirunfitnesstoreachanyfixeddeterminationinallthosecurioussubjectsofspeculation,aboutwhichtheyarecommonlyemployed”(EHU12.5).120
Thesecondtolastdimension,ordifferentiation,isdegree.Degreecan“beeither
unmitigatedormitigated,”
Forexample,anunmitigatedtheoreticalskepticismaboutadomainembodiestheviewthatassenttoanypropositionwithinitisutterlywithoutrationalground,warrant,orjustification;amitigatedtheoreticalskepticismembodiesonlytheviewthattherationalground,warrant,orjustificationofassenttosuchpropositionsislimited,orminimal,orlessthangenerallysupposed,orlessthandesirable,orotherwisefallsbelowsomespecifiedorimpliedstandard.121
And,finally,GarrattsaysofFogelin’sdimensionofpersistence,
[T]hepersistenceofskepticismmaybeeitherconstantorvariable.Itisconstantiftheskepticmaintainsthesamedegreeofskepticismthroughtimeandreflection;itisvariableifthedegreeofskepticismincreasesordecreaseswithchangesintheskeptic’sperspectiveorfocusofattention.122
Garrettusesthese“sixdifferentdimensions”todissectHume’sscepticismin
ordertoclassifyit(viahowheunderstandsHume’sscepticism).Though,Garrettis
notcompletelysatisfiedwithFogelin’sinitialsixdifferentiations,andtothemhe
figuresintwomoreformsofscepticismthataremeanttoreplacewhatFogelincalls
“theoreticalskepticism”—whichfallsunderthecharacterdimensionofscepticism.
Thesetwonewdifferentiationsare“rationalsupportskepticism”and“epistemic
meritskepticism”.123Garrettdefines“rationalsupportskepticism”as“theviewthat
assenttopropositionsinagivendomainwilllackrationalsupport.”124,125And,
120Ibid.121Ibid,71-72.122Ibid,72-73.123Ibid,80.124Garrettsaysthat“[a]beliefhasrationalsupportifandonlyifithasepistemicmeritbecauseofthemannerinwhichitisproducedbyreason.”And,“[a]beliefis
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“epistemicmeritskepticism[…]istheviewthatassenttopropositionsinagiven
domainwilllackepistemicmerit.”126,127
Hereplacestheoreticalscepticismwithhisdistinctionbetweenthesetwo
newcategoriesinanefforttosupporthisconclusion.Garrettconcludesattheendof
“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’”,
Thus,naturalismleadsnaturallytoacrisisofunmitigatedpracticingscepticaldoubt,andthepsychologicaldefeatofthatunmitigatedpracticingdoubtincorporatestheadoptionoftheonlyprincipleofepistemicmeritthatcannowsustainareturntonaturalism.Thisreturntonaturalismcanoccur,however,onlyinconjunctionwithaprescriptiveandepistemicmeritskepticismthatisbothconstantandgeneral—butmitigated.128
Leadinguptotheabovequote,Garrettwrites,“Hume’sprocedureisnaturalistic
fromthestart[…][and]amitigatedandlimitedendorsementof[Hume’s]own
relianceonreasonandthesenses,anendorsementthatcanwithstandhis
awarenessofthemanylimitationsofhumancognitivenature[is]discovered.”129
Though,this“mitigatedandlimitedendorsement”isqualifiedbythelimitednature
ofhumancognition,whichnaturallyleadstodoubt(bywhichImeanscepticism).
Interestingly,Humedoesnotidentifyhimselfasamoderateormitigated
PyrrhonianScepticasGarrett’sdiagnosisofHume’sscepticismas“aprescriptive
andepistemicmeritscepticismthatisbothconstantandgeneral—butmitigated”
producedbyreasonifandonlyifitresultsfromanoperationoftheinferentialfaculty[theabilityforrationalinference].”Ibid.125Ibid.126Garrettsaysthat“[a]beliefhasepistemicmeritifandonlyifitdeservesorisworthyofbelieforassent.”Ibid.127Ibid.128Ibid,90.129Ibid.
49
wouldimplythatHumewas.Though,GarrettandFogelinbothagreethatHume
maynothavehadextensiveknowledgeinancientformsofscepticism.Garretsays,
Humerecognizestwoancientscepticalschools:PyrrhonianskepticismandAcademicskepticism.AsJuliaAnnashasrecentlyargued,Humedoesnotexhibit,andevidentlydidnotpossess,deephistoricalknowledgeofthesetwoschools.130
So,whileHumeknewthatthereweretwoAncientGreekschoolsofscepticism,he
didnotknowthedifferentiatingfactorsbetweenthem.
AsFogelinemphasizesinhispaper“TheSkepticsAreComing!TheSkeptics
AreComing!”,
Hume,whomItaketobeanurbanePyrrhonian[ModeratePyrrhonianSceptic],explicitlymakesthismove[toshowthatthedogmatists’program,suchasAcademicScepticism,“actuallygeneratesaradicalskepticismratherthanavoidsit”]intheTreatisewhenhetellsus:“Itisimpossible,uponanysystem,todefendeitherourunderstandingorsenses;andwebutexposethemfurtherwhenweendeavourtojustifytheminthatmanner.Asthescepticaldoubtarisesnaturallyfromaprofoundandintensereflectiononthosesubjects,italwaysincreasesthefurtherwecarryourreflections,whetherinoppositionorconformitytoit.”SinceHumeheldarustic131interpretationofancientPyrrhonism,hedistancedhimselffromitinthesewords:“ButaPyrrhoniancannotexpect,thathisphilosophywillhaveanyconstantinfluenceonthemind:orifithad,thatitsinfluencewouldbebeneficialtosociety.Onthecontrary,hemustacknowledge,ifhewillacknowledgeanything,thatallhumanlifemustparish,werehisprinciplesuniversallyandsteadilytoprevail.Alldiscourse,allactionwouldimmediatelycease;andmenremaininatotallethargy,tillthenecessitiesofnature,unsatisfied,putanendtotheirmiserableexistence.”Takingitasrustic,Humerecommendsaphilosophicaltoniccontaining“onlyasmalltinctureofPyrrhonism.”IfhehadinterpretedPyrrhonismasurbane,hecouldhavecounseledafullquaffoftherealstuff.132
130Ibid,77.131“Treatedasrustic,thePyrrhonistispicturedassettingasidesubtletyandflatfootedlyseekingsuspensionofbeliefonallmatterswhatsoever,includingthepracticalbeliefsconcerningeverydaylife.”RobertJ.Fogelin,“TheSkepticsAreComing!TheSkepticsAreComing!,”inPyrrhonianSkepticism,ed.WalterSinnott-Armstrong(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),163.132Ibid,164.
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Hume’sapprehensionofPyrrhonismcomesdowntohimnothavingathorough
understandingofAncientScepticism,and,though,hedeniesbeingaPyrrhonian,he
isaModeratePyrrhonianSceptic.And,ModeratePyrrhonianScepticismis
compatiblewithHume’s“scienceofman”(naturalism).133Iinviteyoutothinkback
toGarrett’sargumentthatHume’sscepticismandnaturalismarecompatibleatthis
point.
Garrettarticulates—inmorewordsthannecessary—thatHumeespousesa
kindofmitigated,ormoderate,formofPyrrhonianScepticism.And,thismitigated
Pyrrhonismiscompatiblewith“[t]henaturalisticcognitiveandconativepsychology
thatconstituteswhatHumecalls“thescienceofman”,because“thescienceofman”
isaninvestigationoftheoperationsofhumanfaculties,whichfacultiesinclude(amongothers)imagination,memory,thesenses,thepassions,themoralsense—andreason.ItisoftenclaimedthatHumeusestheterm“reason”inmanydifferentsenses.Infact,however,heconsistentlyusesitinasinglesense—asatermincognitivepsychologydesignatingthefacultyofmakinginferencesandengaginginargument.134
Hume’sscepticismandnaturalismareinterconnected,andreliantoneachother.
ThisgivesHumetheaddedbonusthathisscepticismdoesnoteliminatereason(or
rationalinference)duetohisnaturalism(whichentailsthecognitivepsychologyof
humans).135
133Hume’s“scienceofman”(naturalism)canbedefinedjustas“theprogramofprovidingcausalexplanationsformentalandotherphenomena.”Garrett,“ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism,”68.134Ibid,79.135Thecognitivepsychologyofhumansisthementalabilityofhumanstohaveaccesstocertainknowledge.ThisharkensbacktotheCarnapianunderstandingofinternalinthatwecanonlyaskcertainkindsofquestionsbecauseweonlyhaveaccesstocertainkindsofanswers—inthecaseofhumans,wecanonlyhaveaccesstointernalquestionsandcanonlygiveinternalanswers.
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Hume’sscepticismandnaturalismareinterconnected,butwhatabouthis
moralphilosophy?Atthisstageinthesection,Ithinkitwouldbeagoodideato
switchovertoChapter9:“MoralEvaluations”inDonGarrett’sbookCognitionand
CommitmentinHume’sPhilosophy.Garrettstartsthechapterbydistinguishingbe-
tweentwocompetinginterpretationsofHume’smoralphilosophy(focusingon
moralevaluations).Oneinterpretation,Garrettcalls“nonpropositionaltheories”,
andtheotherinterpretationhecalls“propositionaltheories”.136,137Ofthe
nonpropositionalandpropositionaldistinction,Garrettwrites,
[The]questioniswhethermoralevaluationsdoordonotaffirmgenuinepropositions—thatis,dotheymakeassertionsthataresusceptibleoftruthorfalse-hoodandthatcouldthereforeprovidetheobjectsofgenuinebeliefs?138
Nonpropositionaltheoriesassert,insomeway,thatmoralevaluationsdonotaffirm
thetruthorfalsityofmoralpropositions,whilepropositionaltheoriesassertthat
moralevaluationsdoaffirmthetruthorfalsityofmoralpropositions.
Hume’sposition,withinhismoralphilosophy,hasbeeninterpretedaseither
nonpropositionalorpropositional,orseenasinconsistent(inthathe,onthesurface,
seemstocontradicthimself).ThecontradictionthatHumegetsaccusedofisthat
“thefirstsectionofBookIIIoftheTreatise[isdevoted]toestablishingthat‘moral
distinctions(are)notderiv’dfromreason,’”139while“inTreatiseIII.iii.1(“Ofthe
originofthenaturalvirtuesandvices”),Humedescribesvariouswaysinwhichwe
136DonGarrett,CognitionandCommitmentinHume’sPhilosophy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1997),188.137Garrett’s“nonpropositional”vs.“propositional”distinctionsoundsquitesimilartothenoncognitivevs.cognitivedistinctionmorebroadlyintherealismvs.anti-realismdebate.138Garrett,CognitionandCommitmentinHume’sPhilosophy,188.139Ibid,187.
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‘correct’ourmoralsentimentsbyreflection”140(whichseemstoimplythatmoral
distinctionscouldbederivedfromreason).TherolethisplaysinGarrett’schapteris
thatHumesometimesappearstobetakinganonpropositionalpositiontowards
moraldistinctions,andsometimesHumeappearstobetakingapropositionalposit-
iontowardsmoraldistinctions(inthecontextofmoralevaluation).Garrett
concludesthatHume’stheoryisbothnonpropositionalandpropositional,andthatit
isnotcontradictoryforHumetoholdboththeseseeminglycontradictorypositions.
GarrettclarifieswhatHumemeans“[…]whenHumedeniesthatmoral
distinctionsarederivedfromreason,”infirstsayingthatHume“doesnotusethe
term‘reason’inavagueormerelyhonorificsense”:
Rather,[Hume]usesitasatechnicalterminhiscognitivepsychology.Itis,hereaselsewherethroughouthiswritings,thetermthatspecificallydesignatesthefacultyofmakinginferences.Heisnot,therefore,askingwhethermoraldistinctionsarewarrantedorjustifiable;instead,heisaskingwhethertheiroccurrencecanbeexplainedasaproductofinferenceoperatingonrepresentationsoftheobjectsofevaluation,orwhetherwemustinsteadrecognizetheoccurrenceofsomespecificallymoralnoninferentialelement.141
Therefore,accordingtoGarrett,Hume’sunderstandingofreason“designatesthe
facultyofmakinginferences.”ForHume,reasonisnotjustavaguerationalfaculty.
Thisisimportant,becauseinferencetiesbacktoHume’smetaphysics(especiallyhis
scepticismandnaturalism).Followingthisfirstclarification,Garrettmakesasecond
clarification,
Hume’sargumentsaredirectedtowardansweringthegeneralquestionofwhethertheoriginofthecapacitytomakemoraldistinctionsdependsonlyonreasonoronsomethingelse(suchasdistinctivelymoralimpressions).Heisnotaddressingthemoreparticularquestionofwhetherornotsomeonewho
140Ibid,190.141Ibid,193.
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alreadyhasthiscapacity,basedpartlyonhisorhernoninferentialendowments,couldinferthecorrectnessofamoralevaluation.142
ThesecondclarificationisaimedatshowingthatHumeisaddressingwhetherthe
source,ororigin,“ofthecapacitytomakemoraldistinctions”reliessolelyonthis
inferentialreasoning,orifthesourcecouldpossiblyrelyonsomethingelse(i.e.what
Garrettcallsmoralimpressions;Humealsousestheterm‘sentiment’).
And,asGarrettalsoremarksintheabovequote,Humeisnotaddressing
whethersomeonewhohasinferentialrationalendowments(partlybasedonmoral
impressions/sentiments)couldmakeamoralevaluationabouttherightnessor
wrongnessofamoralproposition,etc..Humeisconcernedwiththeoriginofthe
moralevaluation,notwhetherrationalanimalscanassesstherightnessor
wrongness(i.e.correctness)ofamoralproposition(moralfact,act,etc.).What
spursthemoralevaluationtobe‘moral’?AfterHumearticulateswhathethinksis
theoriginofmoralevaluation,hecanthengoontoarticulateafurther,more
developedunderstandingofmoralevaluation(whichincludesreflectionand
inferentialreasoning).
ForHume,theoriginofmoraldistinctionismoralimpression/sentiment.As
Garrettsays,“Humeinsiststhattofeelamoralsentimentisitselfamoralevaluation
andthemakingofamoraldistinction(e.g.,atTHN471).”143But,thekeyastowhy
Humeisnotcontradictinghimself,assomeinterpretersmistakenlythink,liesin
Hume’smovementfrommoralsentimenttoreason.Garrettexplainsthismoveas
follows,
142Ibid.143Ibid,196.
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Oncewehavefunctioningabstractideasofvice,virtue,andtheirvariousdegreesandspecies,wecanformulatepropositionaljudgmentsorbeliefstotheeffectthataparticularpersonisvirtuous,orthataparticularmentalcharacteristicisespeciallyvicious,orthatanactionoughttobedone.[…]Althoughsuchjudgmentsarepropositionalincharacter,theyareneverthelessdependentontheexistenceofmoralfeelings[i.e.sentiments]intwoways.First,themostcommonwayofmakingsuchajudgmentinvolves,asapreliminary,imaginativelytakingupasteadyandgeneralpointofview,soastohavemoralfeelingsasaresultofthesympatheticreactionsthatareelicited.Second,andevenmorefundamentally,nopersoncouldhavethenecessaryabstractmoralideasinthefirstplaceunlessthatpersonhadpreviouslyhadmoralsentimentsfromwhichsuchabstractideascouldhavedeveloped.Moreover,itismoralfeelings,notthemoraljudgmentsthatresultfromthem,thataredirectlyandindependentlymotivating.144
Wefirsthavemoralsentimentbeforewecanhavemoraljudgmentsthatare
propositionalinnature(andthereforebasedoninference—andrational).Thisis
whyHumesays,asGarrettquoteshim,“moraldistinctions(are)notderiv’dfrom
reason.”145Moraldistinctionsarenotderivedfromreason;theyarederivedfrom
moralsentiment.But,thisdoesnotmeanthatmoraldistinctionscannotbecome
propositional,basedoninferentialreasoningforHume,oncetheinitialmoral
sentimentsarefelt.InordertoknowsomethingforHume,wemustexperienceit
first,andpreferablymultipletimesbeforewecanformamoreabstractideaofit.
Oncewehaveamoreabstract,orgeneral,ideaofwhatwehaveexperienceof,we
canthenreflectonitmakingitpropositionalandrational.146ForGarrett,thismeans
144Ibid,197-198.145Hume,Treatise,III.i.1.146Apotentialproblemcouldarisehere,butIcannotgointogreatdetailinexplainingoransweringtheproblemduetotimeandspaceconstraints.Theproblemisthis:itcouldbesaidthatapropositionthatonlyreportsone’sownsentiment(basedonone’sownexperiences)isnotamoralproposition,becauseitdoesnotreportwhatisrightorwronginanuniversallyapplicableway.Aquickanswer:theissuewiththisproblemisthatitignorespartofwhatHumewastryingtosay.Ourexperienceofsentimentisonlypartofthemoralpropositionstory.Itbeginswithsentiment,butafterthesentimentwecanthenreflectonthatsentimentinordertoweighwhetheritisrightorwrong.
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that“Humerecognizesbothnonpropositionalmoralevaluations(moralfeelings)
andpropositionalmoralevaluations(moraljudgmentsasdistinctpsychological
events.”147Nonpropositionalmoralfeelings(i.e.sentiments)donotconflictwith
propositionalmoraljudgements,forHume,becausewemustfirsthavethemoral
feelingbeforewecanhavethemoraljudgement(theyareinterconnectedrather
thancontradictory).
AfterechoingGarrett’swordsthatHume’sscepticismandnaturalism
“aremutuallysupporting”;IwouldaddthatHume’sscepticism,naturalism,and
moralphilosophyareallmutuallysupportingandcohesive.Hume’smoral
philosophyisbasedincognitivepsychology,asGarrettsays,whichrelatesbackto
Hume’s“scienceofman”(i.e.naturalism)andHume’sdesiretounderstandwhat
makeshumans‘human’.Hume’snaturalisticapproachisthatof,whatwewouldcall
inmorecontemporarytimes,anaturalscientistandpsychologist.Hisgoalwasto
lookforthesourceofknowledge,andthesourceofmorality.But,interestingly,
Hume’ssinceritytowardsnaturalism(or,perhaps,moreaccurately,akindof
scientificmethod)makeshimacknowledgethelimitsofhumanknowledge,and
doubtoccursintherealmsthatsurpasswhatisimmediatelyknowablethrough
experience.Thismakesdoubtnatural.But,thisdoesnotmeanthatthekindof
doubtthatDescarteswasfamousfor,suchastheMethodofDoubt(Academic
Scepticism),isnatural.Naturaldoubt,forHume,isthesuspensionofbeliefdueto
thelimitsofhumancognitiveabilities(or,asGarrettreferstoit,cognitive
psychology).
147Garrett,CognitionandCommitmentinHume’sPhilosophy,199.
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Naturaldoubt,orthesuspensionofbelief,orPyrrhonianScepticismdoesnot
meanthatwecannotliveourlives—thiswouldentailamuchmoreradicalformof
scepticism.Itmeansthatwemustacceptappearancesduetothelimitednatureof
humancognition.We(humans)shouldsuspendbeliefwhenitcomestomattersthat
gobeyondourlimitedcognitiveabilities;butthisdoesnotmeanthatwecannot
makejudgements,haveknowledge,ormakemoralevaluationsbasedon
appearances.Itonlymeansthatinoursearchforthesourcesofsuchthingsas
knowledgeandmorality,forexample,wemustkeepinmindthatwearelimitedto
humanabilities(andcannotknowanythingbeyondhumanabilities).Hume’s
philosophyboilsdownto:naturalismasthemethod,knowledgeandmoralityasthe
result,andscepticismasasideeffectduetothelimitsofhumancognitiveability.
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2.Chapter2.1.Introduction TherearemanydifferentinterpretationsofHume’sphilosophy.Hehasbeen
interpretedasarealist,ananti-realist,andascepticineffortstoexplainhis
metaphysics,andreconcileitwithhisnaturalismandmoralphilosophy.148Different
approacheshavealsobeenused:fromacceptingthatthereare‘twoHumes’to
effortstoreconcilehisphilosophyascohesivetoacceptingthathisphilosophyisnot
cohesive.149ManyaspectsofHume’sphilosophyarehotlydebatedstill,242years
afterhisdeath.Itwillbemyeffortinthispapertojointhedebatesurrounding
Hume’sphilosophyinanefforttobetterunderstandHume’sphilosophyasa
cohesivewhole.InordertobetterunderstandHume’sphilosophyasacohesive
whole,Iwillneedtoaddresshismetaphysics,naturalism,andhismoralphilosophy.
IwillbeginbysupportinganunderstandingofHumeasascepticthrough
usinghiswritingsinATreatiseofHumanNature(2.2.)andAnEnquiryconcerning
HumanUnderstanding(2.3.)assupport.Afterwhich,IwilltouchonHume’sposition
concerningmoralfacts(2.4.).IwillthenmakesomequalificationsonHume’smoral
philosophy(2.5.),whichwillhelpsupportHumeanScepticismasanalternativein
themoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate(2.6.).Finally,Iwillventuresome
thoughtsonotherpotentialimplicationsHumeanScepticism,giventhatitisan
148Humehasbeeninterpretedasarealist,ananti-realist,andascepticwithregardtohisviewsoncausation,theexternalworld,theself,andmoralfacts.149JaniHakkarainendiscussesthisbrieflyinhispaper“Hume’sScepticismandRealism”.JaniHakkarainen,“Hume’sScepticismandRealism,”BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy20,no.2(2012):283–309.
58
alternativeinthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate,mayhavefor
metaethicsingeneral(2.7.).
2.2.HumeanScepticisminATreatiseofHumanNature
IwillstartoffbyconsideringHume’spositiononscepticismwithregardto
theexternalworld.Therearemanywaysinwhichsomeonecanbeasceptic;they
donothavetobeaglobal,orradical,sceptic.But,Ithinkthatthefoundationformy
interpretationofHume’sscepticismstartswithhisscepticismoftheexternalworld,
andmovesforwardfromthere.Scepticismwithregardtotheexternalworldisthe
foundationformyinterpretationofHume’sscepticismforonemainreason:it
providesahelpfulframeworkforthinkingaboutscepticismasanalternativeinthe
realismandanti-realismdebate.
InHume’sinfamousBookI“OftheUnderstanding”inATreatiseofHuman
Nature,hesaysinPart4“Ofthescepticalandothersystemsofphilosophy”,Section
2“Ofscepticismwithregardtothesenses”;
[T]hescepticstillcontinuestoreasonandbelieve,eventho’heasserts,thathecannotdefendhisreasonbyreason;andbythesamerulehemustassenttotheprincipleconcerningtheexistenceofbody,tho’hecannotpretendbyanyargumentsofphilosophytomaintainitsveracity.Naturehasnotleftthistohischoice,andhasdoubtlessesteem’ditanaffairoftoogreatimportancetobetrustedtoouruncertainreasoningsandspeculations.150
Humeisaddressingscepticismwithregardtotheexternalworldinthisquote.In
myreadingoftheabovequote,Iunderstandwhatisbeingarticulatedtobeaformof
ModeratePyrrhonianScepticism.151WhileHumedoessaythatthesceptic“must
150DavidHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,eds.DavidFateNortonandMaryJ.Norton(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.4.2.1(p.125).151Isay“ModeratePyrrhonianScepticism”here,thoughthiswouldjustfallunderwhatSextusEmpiricuscalls“PyrrhonianScepticism”.Iusetheword“Moderate”
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assenttotheprincipleconcerningtheexistenceofbody,”hequalifiesthisstatement
whenhesays,“tho’[thesceptic]cannotpretendbyanyargumentsofphilosophyto
maintainitsveracity.”Thescepticcannothelpbutgiveintotheappearanceofbody,
“Naturehasnotleftthisto[thesceptic’s]choice,”butthatdoesnotmeanthatthe
scepticcangiveanargumentfortheexistenceofbody(ortheReal152world).153A
ModeratePyrrhonianScepticcangiveintoappearances,solongasthey
acknowledgethattheyarejustappearancesandremainagnosticwithregardtoany
argumentfororagainsttheseappearances—since,accordingtoHume,our
“reasoningsandspeculations”concerningthissubjectareuncertain.
deliberatelyinordertodistinguishthescepticismIamreferringtofromthemoreradicalPyrrhonianScepticismofPyrrhohimself.Pyrrho,accordingtoanecdote,didnotgiveintoappearances,whichresultedinhisfollowershavingtolookafterhimsothathedidn’tdie.ThisisnotthePyrrhonianScepticismIamreferringto.Iamreferringtotheagnostic,suspensionofjudgement(epochē)kindofscepticismstartedbyPyrrho,butamoremoderateformthatacknowledgesthatonemustgiveintoappearancestolivetheirlife.152WhenIusethewordRealwithacapital“R”,Imeanmind-independentlyrealintheontologicalsense(i.e.thatsomethingexistsintheexternalworld,andisnotconstructedbymentalstatesorisnotmind-dependent).153AccordingtoHume,thescepticcannotgiveaphilosophicalargumentfortheir“assenttotheprincipleconcerningtheexistenceofbody,”thoughthisdoesnotexplicitlymeanthatthescepticmustgiveintotheappearanceoftheexternalworld.Itmeansthatwhatwenaturallygiveintoistheidea,orprinciple,oftheexternalworld(i.e.“theexistenceofbody”),thisidea,orprinciple,issomethingthatwecannothelpbutbelieving—eventhoughwecannotprovideanyphilosophical,orrational,argumentforourbelievingintheexternalworld.Itendsupbeingthecasethatthescepticgivesintoappearances,becausewhentheyreflect,orphilosophize,theybecomeawarethattheycannotgiveanargumentforwhytheythinkthattheexternalworldexists.Oncetheyhavethisrealization,theyacknowledgethatwhattheycanknowisonlythattheyhaveideas,orperceptions,oftheexternalworld,andwhattheycando,whiletheycannotgiveanargumentasforwhy,isassent(orgiveinto)theseideasorperceptions(otherwisecanbecalledappearances).
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InsupportofmyunderstandingofwhatHumesaysinthepreviousquote,we
cangobacktoBookI,Part2,Section6ofATreatiseofHumanNature(theTreatise
fromhereon),
Alikereasoningwillaccountfortheideaofexternalexistence.Wemayobserve,that’tisuniversallyallow’dbyphilosophers,andisbesidesprettyobviousofitself,thatnothingiseverreallypresentwiththemindbutitsperceptionsorimpressionsandideas,andthatexternalobjectsbecomeknowntousonlybythoseperceptionstheyoccasion.Tohate,tolove,tothink,tofeel,tosee;allisnothingbuttoperceive.Nowsincenothingiseverpresenttothemindbutperceptions,andsinceall
ideasarederiv’dfromsomethingantecedentlypresenttothemind;itfollows,that’tisimpossibleforussomuchastoconceiveorformanideaofanythingspecificallydifferentfromideasandimpressions.Letusfixourattentionoutofourselvesasmuchaspossible:Letuschaceourimaginationtotheheavens,ortotheutmostlimitsoftheuniverse;weneverreallyadvanceastepbeyondourselves,norcanconceiveanykindofexistence,butthoseperceptions,whichhaveappear’dinthatnarrowcompass.154
“Perception”canbereplaced,insomeinstances,bywhatIhavebeencalling
“appearance”tobetterunderstandtheconnectionbetweentheabovequoteandmy
descriptionofthepreviousquote.155Humestatesthatallwehaveaccessto
(“presentwiththemind”)areourperceptions,impressions,and/orideas—Iwillput
theseallundertheumbrellaoftheword“appearances”,anduse“appearances”and
“perceptions”interchangeably.156,157Therefore,ifallwehaveaccesstoareour
perceptions(appearances),theneverythingweexperienceisnothingbutperception154DavidHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,eds.DavidFateNortonandMaryJ.Norton(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.2.6.7-8(p.49).155Theterm“perception”isanumbrellatermforHumethatincludesawiderangeofmentalphenomena.Theterm“appearance”isoftenmorestrictlyusedtojustrepresentphysicalobjects(forexample,torepresentinformationgainedviathesenses,sensoryimpressions).156MentalideasandimpressionsareperceptionsforHume;justasanythingperceivedviathesensesareperceptions.157“Appearances”areoftenassociatedwithsenseimpressions(perceptionsgainedviathesenses),though“appearances”canbeusedmorebroadlytohavethesamemeaningasHume’sunderstandingof“perceptions”(andareusedmorebroadlyinthecontextofAncientorPyrrhonianScepticism).
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(whetherourperceptionsbeoftheReal/externalworldorofourownemotions/
affects/thoughts/ideas).
Interestingly,partoftheabovequote,
Nowsincenothingiseverpresenttothemindbutperceptions,andsinceallideasarederiv’dfromsomethingantecedentlypresenttothemind;itfollows,that’tisimpossibleforussomuchastoconceiveorformanideaofanythingspecificallydifferentfromideasandimpressions,158
expressesadirectattackonrealism.Hume’sconclusionfromonlyperceptions
being“presenttothemind”,andsomethingcomesfromsomethingbeforeit,is
thatwecannoteventhinkofanythingexternal,ordifferent,fromthemind
(perceptions,orappearances).Wecanonlythinkofperceptions,becausewe
onlyhaveaccesstoperceptions.Thisisanattackonrealism,becausethereis
nowayforustohaveaccesstoanythingmind-independent.Forexample,the
chairthatIperceivemyselftobesittinginis,andcanonlybe,knowntome
throughmyperceptionsofit.Thereisnowayformetohaveknowledgeofthe
chairoutsideofmyownperceptions.Realismrequiressomestatementabout
mind-independenceorobjectivity,but,accordingtoHume,thereisnowayfor
ustoknowanythingbeyondthemindandthatisalwaysbiasedsincethemind
consistsofourownperceptions.
Humemakestheclaimthatperceptionsarecausedbyotherperceptions(ina
kindofantecedent-consequentrelationship),and,therefore,wecannoteventhinkof
anythingotherthanperceptions(“ideasandimpressions”).Hetriestoemphasize
hispointbyimploringustothinkabouttheheavensorthefarthestreachesofthe
universe—ourthoughtsofthesethingsarejustthat,thoughts(orperceptions).This158Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,1.2.6.8(p.49).
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isbecause“weneverreallyadvanceastepbeyondourselves,norcanconceiveany
kindofexistence,butthoseperceptions,whichhaveappear’dinthatnarrow
compass.”159Wearestuckwithintherealmofourperceptions(ortherealmof
appearances).Duetothis,wecannothelpbutgiveintotheseperceptions/
appearancesinordertoliveourlives.But,thatdoesnotmean,asHumesaysat
1.4.2.1.,thatwecangiveanyreasoningforthoseperceptions(concerningthe
existenceoftheexternalworld)—atleastnot“byanyargumentsofphilosophy”,by
whichItakeHumetomeanexternalarguments(ormetaphysical/ontological
arguments).160Wecannotgivethesekindsofargumentsforourperceptions,be-
causewedonothaveaccesstothem(sincetheproof/justificationforthemseemsto
bebeyondourperceptions).
At1.4.2.4.,Humesays,
Thatoursensesoffernottheirimpressionsastheimagesofsomethingdistinct,orindependent,andexternal,isevident;becausetheyconveytousnothingbutasingleperception,andnevergiveustheleastintimationofanythingbeyond.Asingleperceptioncanneverproducetheideaofadoubleexistence,butbysomeinferenceeitherofreasonorimagination.Whenthemindlooksfurtherthanwhatimmediatelyappearstoit,itsconclusionscanneverbeputtotheaccountofthesenses;anditcertainlylooksfurther,whenfromasingleperceptionitinfersadoubleexistence[…].161
By“doubleexistence”,Humeisaddressingthedistinctionbetweentheperception
itselfandtheexternalobjectthattheperceptionwas,apparently,perceivedfrom.
159DavidHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,eds.DavidFateNortonandMaryJ.Norton(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.2.6.8(p.49).160SeeRudolfCarnap’spaper/chapter“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology”foradetaileddistinctionbetweeninternalandexternalquestions.RudolfCarnap,“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology,”inMeaningandNecessity:AStudyinSemanticsandModalLogic,SecondEdition(Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1956).161Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,1.4.2.4(p.126).
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Theproblembeingthatoursenseimpressions(perceptionsgainedviathesenses)
donotgiveustheexistenceofboththesenseimpressionandtheexternalobject—
senseimpressionsonlygiveussenseimpressions,wedonothaveaccesstothe
externalobjectthatwehavecometobelieveindueto“reasonorimagination”.I
interpretHumetobereferringtospecifically—whenheexpressesthatno
philosophicalargumentsfortheexternalworldcanbegiven—metaphysical
argumentsthattrytoargueforsomethingbeyondourperceptions.And,thisseems
tobeafurtherattackonrealism,aswellasanattackonanti-realism.Itattacksboth,
becausebotharedogmaticinassertingsomethingabouttheexternalworldthat
Humedoesnotthinkwehaveaccessto(becausetheirassertionsarebeyondour
perceptions).Therealistassertsthatthereissomethingbeyondourperceptions
andwecanknowit,andtheanti-realistassertsthatthereisnothingbeyondour
perceptionsandwecanknowthatthereisnothingbeyondourperceptions.
ItisalsoimportanttonotethatHumeaddressestheimpressions(i.e.
perceptions)wegainfromoursensesspecifically,
Astothoseimpressions,whicharisefromthesenses,theirultimatecauseis,inmyopinion,perfectlyinexplicablebyhumanreason,and’twillalwaysbeimpossibletodecidewithcertainty,whethertheyariseimmediatelyfromtheobject,orareproduc’dbythecreativepowerofthemind,orarederiv’dfromtheauthorofourbeing.Norissuchaquestionanywaymaterialtoourpresentpurpose.Wemaydrawinferencesfromthecoherenceofourperceptions,whethertheybetrueorfalse;whethertheyrepresentnaturejustly,orbemereillusionsofthesenses.162
ItisclearthatHumeistakinganagnostic(sceptical)stancewhenitcomestowhatis
the“ultimatecause”oftheimpressions(i.e.perceptions)wegainfromthesensesin
sayingthatthe“ultimatecause”is“inexplicablebyhumanreason”—thereisno
162Ibid,1.3.5.2(p.59).
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philosophical(metaphysical)reasonwecangivetojustifytheultimatecauseofour
perceptions(thatwegainviathesenses)beingdirectlyfromtheexternalobject
itself,createdbyourmind,orcreatedby“theauthorofourbeing”(forexample,
God).Humethentakeshispositionastepfurtherbysayingthattheultimatecause
ofourperceptionsisnotimportanttoourpresentpurposes,becausewecan“draw
inferencesfromthecoherenceofourperceptions.”And,thatitdoesnotactually
matterwhetherourperceptionsaretrueorfalse,163representtheRealworld
correctly,oraremerefigmentsofourimagination(mentalthoughts/ideas).The
import-antpointisthatwecanassenttotheseperceptions(orappearances)viathe
inferenceswemake“fromthecoherenceofourperceptions”.
Humeseemstobeingsayingthatwecanmakeinferencesviathe“coherence
ofourperceptions”,andnotbotherourselveswiththeultimatecauseofour
perceptions.ForHume,itdoesnotmatterwhattheultimatecauseofour
perceptionsis,becausewehavenowayofknowingwhattheultimatecauseis.But,
thisdoesnotmeanthatwecannotmakeinferencesviathecoherence,orregularity,
ofourperceptions—thoughtheseinferenceswillnevergiveyou100%certainty.
IntheTreatise,Humemakesadistinctionbetweenphilosophyandthevulgar
(orthephilosopherandthevulgar/commonperson).Humemakesthisdistinction
163TrueorfalseinthesenseofcorrespondingtotheReal,externalworld;aswellasverifiablytrueorfalsewithrespecttothiscorrespondencetotheReal,externalworld(andwecanknow/haveaccesstowhetherourperceptionsaretrueorfalsewithrespecttothiscorrespondence).Thisdoesnotmeanthatthroughsomeothermeans,suchasthecoherence(orconstantconjunction)ofourperceptions,wecannotprovideanalternativegroundsforourperceptionsinwhichwecanassesswhethertheyaretrueorfalse.Humecanbeinterpretedassayingexactlythat:wecanassessourperceptionstobetrueorfalse(orsomeperceptionstobemoretruethanothers)withreferencetothecoherenceofsomeperceptions,forexample.
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toshowthatthephilosopherandthenon-philosopherarebothinakindoftrouble.
Thephilosophertriestogiveargumentsforbeliefs(suchasthebeliefoftheReal
existenceoftheexternalworld)thattheycannotgiveargumentsfor,whilethe
vulgar,orcommonperson,cannotgiveanyargumentsatallfortheirbeliefs.Ofthe
twopositions,Humesays,
[W]hateverconvincingargumentsphilosophersmayfancytheycanproducetoestablishbeliefofobjectsindependentofthemind,’tisobvioustheseargumentsareknownbuttoveryfew,andthat’tisnotbythem,thatchildren,peasants,andthegreatestpartofmankindareinduc’dtoattributeobjectstosomeimpressions,anddenythemtoothers.[…]Forphilosophyinformsus,thateverything,whichappearstothemind,isnothingbutaperception,andisinterrupted,anddependentonthemind;whereasthevulgarconfoundperceptionsandobjects,andattributeadistinctcontinu’dexistencetotheverythingstheyfeelorsee.[…][A]slongaswetakeourperceptionsandobjectstobethesame,wecanneverinfertheexistenceoftheonefromtheother,norformanyargumentfromtherelationofcauseandeffect;whichistheonlyonethatcanassureusofmatteroffact.Evenafterwedistinguishourperceptionsfromourobjects,’twillappearpresently,thatwearestillincapableofreasoningfromtheexistenceofonetothatoftheother:Sothatuponthewholeourreasonneitherdoes,norisitpossibleitevershou’d,uponanysupposition,giveusanassuranceofthecontinu’danddistinctexistenceofbody.ThatopinionmustbeentirelyowingtotheIMAGINATION[…].164
Alongwiththedistinctionbetweenphilosophyandthevulgar,hemakessome
interestingclaimsintheabovequote(allfromthesameparagraph).Ataninitial
glance,thetwopositions,thephilosophicalandthevulgar,arenotcompatible—
philosophyproducesarguments,whilethevulgarnaturallyconfoundperceptions
andobjectstoproducethebeliefof“adistinctcontinu’dexistence”(ofexternal
objects/theexternalworld)withoutmuchthoughttothematter.
Thevulgarposition,theconflationofperceptionsandobjects,165doesnot
allowus,accordingtoHume,todifferentiatebetweenperceptionsandobjects,or
164Ibid,1.4.2.14(p.129).165Real,externalobjects.
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giveusanargumentforcauseandeffect.Itdoesnotallowustoinfercauseand
effect,becausethevulgarviewdoesnotallowustoinfertheantecedentandthe
consequent(whichiswhatgivesuscauseandeffect,accordingtoHume).166Evenif
wecoulddistinguishbetweenperceptionsandobjects,ourreasoningislimited,and
cannotactuallygiveusanadequateargumentfor“thecontinu’danddistinct
existenceofbody”(ortheReal,externalworld).167Thephilosophicalposition,for
Hume,isnotonstronggroundseither.AsHumesays,
[W]hateverconvincingargumentsphilosophersmayfancytheycanproducetoestablishbeliefofobjectsindependentofthemind,’tisobvioustheseargumentsareknownbuttoveryfew,andthat’tisnotbythem,thatchildren,peasants,andthegreatestpartofmankindareinduc’dtoattributeobjectstosomeimpressions,anddenythemtoothers.168
Whateverargumentsphilosopherscanproduceinordertoproveexternalobjects
areknowntoveryfew;thevastmajorityofpeopletakethevulgarposition.Though,
again,thevulgarcannotprovideanyargumentsfororagainsttheirposition(ofthe
conflationofperceptionsandobjects).Boththephilosopherandthevulgarperson
areinbadpositions—botharenotjustifiedingivingarguments(evenifthe
philosopherthinkstheyare),butatleastthevulgardoesnotattempttogivean
argumentfortheirposition.
Humegoesontosay,
Nowwehavealreadyobserv’d,thathoweverphilosophersmaydistinguishbetwixttheobjectsandperceptionsofthesenses;whichtheysupposeco-existentandresembling;yetthisisadistinction,whichisnotcomprehendedbythegeneralityofmankind,whoastheyperceiveonlyonebeing,cannever
166Thinkbackto1.2.6.8(p.49).167Duedohumanreasonbeinglimited,whetheryouareeducatedasaphilosopherornot,thephilosophicalpositionandthevulgarpositionbothcannotgiveadequateargumentsfor“thecontinu’danddistinctexistenceofbody”.168Treatise,1.4.2.14(p.129).
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assenttotheopinionofadoubleexistenceandrepresentation.Thoseverysensations,whichenterbytheeyeorear,arewiththemthetrueobjects,norcantheyreadilyconceivethatthispenorpaper,whichisimmediatelyperceiv’d,representsanother,whichisdifferentfrom,butresemblingit.Inorder,therefore,toaccommodatemyselftotheirnotions,Ishallfirstsuppose,thatthereisonlyonesingleexistence,whichIshallcallindifferentlyobjectorperception,accordingasitshallseembesttosuitmypurpose,understandingbybothofthemwhatanycommonmanmeansbyahat,orshoe,orstone,oranyotherimpression,convey’dtohimbythesenses.169
Thevulgar(or“generalityofmankind”or“commonman”),canonlyconsenttotheir
impressions(orperceptions)ofexternalobjects.Thevulgarcannotdistinguishbe-
tweenanexternalobjectandtheirperceptionofthatobject,andcannotgivean
explanationastotheconnectionbetweensaidexternalobjectandtheirperception
ofit.Thismeansthatthevulgarpersongivesintoappearance.But,givinginto
appearancesdoesnotmeanthatonecangiveanexplanationandsodoesnotassert
knowledgeofthecauseoftheperception.ThisisstillaformofModerate
PyrrhonianScepticismthatHumeisarticulatinghereforthevulgarposition—itis
justthatthevulgarpersondoesnotrealisethattheyaregivingintoappearancesto
livetheirlives.170
Returningbacktothephilosophicalposition,Humewrites,
Therearenoprincipleseitheroftheunderstandingorfancy,whichleadusdirectlytoembracethisopinionofthedoubleexistenceofperceptionsandobjects,norcanwearriveatitbutbypassingthro’thecommonhypothesisoftheidentityandcontinuanceofourinterruptedperceptions.Werewenotfirstpersuaded,thatourperceptionsareouronlyobjects,andcontinuetoexistevenwhentheynolongermaketheirappearancetothesenses,weshou’dneverbe
169Ibid,1.4.2.31(p.134).170Thevulgarpersongivesintoappearancewithoutargumentationorexplanation,whichiswhattheModeratePyrrhonianScepticdoes.TheonlydifferencebetweenthevulgarpersonandtheModeratePyrrhonianScepticisthattheModeratePyrrhonianScepticrealizesthattheygiveintoappearance,becausetheyhavereflectedandacknowledgethattheycannotgiveanargumentfortheirbeliefintheappearanceoftheexternalworld.Itisanappearanceofanexternalworld,becausetheyonlycanknowtheirperceptions(andperceptionsareappearances).
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ledtothink,thatourperceptionsandobjectsaredifferent,andthatourobjectsalonepreserveacontinu’dexistence.171
Thephilosophicalpositionisactuallyinaworsesituationthanthevulgarposition,
becauseitstartsfromthevulgarpositionandthentriestogiveanargumentforthe
separateexistenceofperceptionsandobjects.Thephilosophicalpositionstartsoff
fromthevulgarposition,becauseeveryonestartsfromthesameposition:unableto
distinguishbetweenexternalobjectsandtheirperceptionsofthem.But,thevulgar
positionstopsthere,itdoesnottrytogiveanargumentfortheexistenceofexternal
objects.Wherethephilosophicalpositiongoeswrongisintryingtogivearguments
fortheexistenceofexternalobjects—andHumedoesnotthinkthatsucharguments
canrationallybegiven.Thevulgarmaynotbeabletogiveanargumentfortheir
position,butthisisactuallybetter,atleasttoHume,becauseinnotgivingprinciples
(orproof)theyalsodonotmakeupsomethingthatisnotfoundedonproperreason
(asHumeaccusesphilosophersofdoing).
ItactuallyappearsasthoughHumeisarguingagainstrealisminhisargument
againstthephilosophicalposition.Directlyaftertheabovequote,Humecontinues
hisargumentagainstthephilosophicalposition,
Astothefirstpartoftheproposition,thatthisphilosophicalhypothesishasnoprimaryrecommendation,eithertoreasonortotheimagination,wemaysoonsatisfyourselveswithregardtoreasonbythefollowingreflections.Theonlyexistences,ofwhichwearecertain,areperceptions,whichbeingimmediatelypresenttousbyconsciousness,commandourstrongestassent,andarethefirstfoundationofallourconclusions.Theonlyconclusionwecandrawfromtheexistenceofonethingtothatofanother,isbymeansoftherelationofcauseandeffect,whichshows,thatthereisaconnexionbetwixtthem,andthattheexistenceofoneisdependentonthatoftheother.Theideaofthisrelationisderiv’dfrompastexperience,bywhichwefind,thattwobeingsareconstantlyconjoin’dtogether,andarealwayspresentatoncetothemind.Butasnobeingsareeverpresenttothemindbutperceptions;itfollowsthatwemayobservea
171Ibid,1.4.2.46(p.140).
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conjunctionorarelationofcauseandeffectbetwixtdifferentperceptions,butcanneverobserveitbetwixtperceptionsandobjects.172
Atthispoint,Humemovesawayfromexplicitlytalkingaboutthescepticismwith
regardtotheexternalworld,andmovesmoretowardsscepticismwithregardto
causation.Itisimplicitlyaboutscepticismwithregardtotheexternalworld,
becauseitisnotthatHumedoubtsthatthereiscausation;hedoubtsthatwecan
knowcausationotherthanfromthe‘constantconjunction’ofcauseandeffect.
Humere-emphasizesthatwecanonlybecertainoftheexistenceofperceptions.
Thisisknowledgeonaninternallevel,andstatesnothingontologicalaboutthe
externalworld.Wecaninferfromcauseandeffecttheexistenceofonethingto
another,butsincethisisbasedonpastexperience(ofconstantconjunction),andall
pastexperienceisbasedonperception,allthisgivesusistheexistenceofone
perceptiontotheexistenceofanotherperception—nottheexistenceofaperception
totheexistenceofanexternalobject.ForHume,youcannotjumpfromexperiencing
theperceptionsofseeingapenfalloffadeskontothegroundtostatingthatthepen
Reallyexistsjustbecauseyouexperiencedperceptionsofit.Throughseeingthepen
falloffthedeskmultipletimes(theeffect),perhapsyoucaninferthatthereisaforce
actinguponthepen(thecause)—butyoucannotgiveanargumentoranaccountas
towhatisbeyondyourperceptionsintheexternalworld(theultimate,Realorigin
ofthecause).So,whileyoucaninfer,basedonyourperceptions,acauseandan
effect,thatcauseandthateffectarestillonlywithinyourperceptions.
Thisseemstobeanargumentagainsttherealistposition,becauseitargues
thatwearenotfounded,byreason,toasserttheexistenceofexternalobjects—and172Ibid,1.4.2.47(pp.140-141).
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mostrealistsrequirecognitivism(thataclaimcanbetrueorfalse,andsomeclaims
canbeverifiedastrue),whichgenerallyrequiresbeingabletoverifythetruthor
falsityofsomethingagainsttheRealworld.IfweneverhaveaccesstotheReal,
externalworldandallwehaveaccesstoareourperceptions,thisseemstostate
that,intheveryleast,realismisnotbasedonreasonforHume.Ifrealismisnot
basedonreason,thenitisanirrationalpositiontohold.Intheveryleast,the
burdenofproofisontherealisttoproveaReal,externalworld,andhowwe
(humans)haveaccesstoit(i.e.canacquireknowledgebeyondourperceptions).
Itwouldseemthatsinceallwehaveareourperceptions,wemustrelyon
inference(notcertainty),andthatwecannothelpbutliveourlivesbywayof
appearancesthatHume’spositionisanagnosticpositionwhenitcomestotheReal
world.173ItisagnosticinthesenseofModeratePyrrhonianScepticism,andisa
formofscepticisminrelationtometaphysics—morespecificallyontology.Hume
doesnotthinkthatwecanassertanythingabouttheRealworld(i.e.external
objects).ThislackofabilitytorationallyconstructanargumentfortheRealworld
under-minesanydogmaticposition174towardstheRealworld.Itdoesso,because
therealistcannotrationallyargueforexternalobjectsoutofonlyperceptionsand
theanti-realistcannotassertanythingalongthelinesthatourperceptionsdonot
matchtheRealworld(becausetheycannotknowthateitherfromonlyperceptions).173Hume’spositionisagnostic,orsceptical,becauseassertingthatwecanhaveknowledgebeyondourperceptionsisnotrationalforHume.Wehavelimitedknowledgebasedonexperiencegainedthroughperceptions(whichdonotgiveusdirectaccesstotheexternalworldbeyondourperceptions).Theagnostic,orsceptical,positiondoesnotproveordisproverealismoranti-realism.But,itdoestrytoshowthatassertinganythingdogmatic(viarealismoranti-realism)isnotbasedonanythingwehaveaccessto,andisnotrational.174Dogmaticpositionsreferringtoarealistoranti-realistposition.
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Theonlyrationalpositionisthescepticalposition,becauseitdoesnottryto
overstepitsbounds.
HefurthersupportsthathisunderstandingoftheReal,externalworldis
understoodthroughascepticallenstowardstheendofBookI,Part4,Section2;
Ibegunthissubjectwithpremising,thatweoughttohaveanimplicitfaithinoursenses,andthatthiswou’dbetheconclusion,Ishou’ddrawfromthewholeofmyreasoning.Buttobeingenuous,Ifeelmyselfatpresentofaquitecontrarysentiment,andammoreinclin’dtoreposenofaithatallinmysenses,orratherimagination,thantoplaceinitsuchanimplicitconfidence.Icannotconceivehowsuchtrivialqualitiesofthefancy,conductedbysuchfalsesuppositions,caneverleadtoanysolidandrationalsystem.Theyarethecoherenceandconstancyofourperceptions,whichproducetheopinionoftheircontinu’dexistence;tho’thesequalitiesofperceptionshavenoperceivableconnexionwithsuchanexistence.175
Humestatesthathehasnofaithinhissenses,andItakethistomeanthathehasno
faiththathissensesgivehimknowledgeoftheexternalworld.Hissensesgivehim
perceptions,andperceptionsmaybeaccurateornot—wecannotknow,atleastnot
ontologically(withreferencetotheexternalworld).Anyphilosophicaltheoryor
systembasedonfalseattributionstotheexternalworldisnotmetaphysically
foundedandnotrational.Itistheregularityofourperceptionsthatgiveusour
understandingofthecontinuedexistenceofexternalobjects,thoughwehaveno
wayviaourperceptionstoprovethecontinuedexistenceofexternalobjects.
Though,Humedoesindicatethatpeoplewilloscillatebetweendifferentpositionson
theReal,externalworld,butsays,“Carelessnessandin-attentionalonecanaffordus
anyremedy.”176Itakethistomeanthatthevulgar,orcommon,positionistheonly
easyanswertoontologicalproblems.Thevulgarpositionallowsustoassentto
175Ibid,1.4.2.56(pp.143-144).176Ibid,1.4.2.57(p.144).
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appearanceswithoutargument,andliveourlives.Eventhough,thevulgarposition
isnotanymorerationalthanthephilosophicalposition,exceptthatthevulgar
positiondoesnotattempttogivephilosophical,ormetaphysical,argumentsforthe
externalworld(whichredeemsthevulgarpositioninthatthevulgarpositiondoes
nottrytoargueforthingsbeyondanyhuman’scognitiveabilityoranyhuman’s
accesstoknowledgeviaperceptions).
2.3.HumeanScepticisminAnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding
AtthebeginningofSectionXII“OftheAcademicorScepticalPhilosophy”,
HumeaddressesAcademicScepticism,andDescartes’MethodofDoubt.Humedoes
notthinkthatAcademicScepticism,orradicaldoubt,isfeasible,becausehedoesnot
thinkthatitispossibleviaachainofreasoningtodeduceanyfirstorfoundational
principlethatisnot“fallaciousordeceitful”(sincealltheotherprinciplesappearto
be“fallaciousordeceitful”).177Ifyouaregoingtodoubtalmostallyourprinciples,
whywouldyounotalsodoubtyourfoundationalprinciple(s)?Ifyoucandoubtmost
things,wheredoesthedoubtstop?AsHumesays,
TheCartesiandoubt,therefore,wereiteverpossibletobeattainedbyanyhumancreature(asitplainlyisnot)wouldbeentirelyincurable;andnoreasoningcouldeverbringustoastateofassuranceandconvictionuponanysubject.178
Thiskindofradicaldoubtis“incurable”,andtherewouldbenowaytoknowany-
thing—noteveninternally.179But,weneedtobecarefulwhenconsideringthis
criticismofAcademicScepticism,orradicaldoubt,becausethiscriticismdoesnot
177DavidHume,AnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding,ed.PeterMillican(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),12.3(p.109).178Ibid.179“Internally”hereismeanttobeunderstoodintheCarnapiansenseof“internal”.
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meanthatHumeiscriticizingallformsofscepticism.Humecanstillbeopentothe
ideaofPyrrhonianScepticism,though,aswe’llsee,heendorsesModerate
PyrrhonianScepticism.Humeshowsapprehensiontowardsanykindofradical
philosophythroughoutthewholeofAnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding
(referredtoastheFirstEnquiryfromhereon).
Humewritesthat,accordingtothecommonorvulgarposition,peopleare
boundtoassumethattheexternalworld“wouldexist,thoughweandeverysensible
creaturewereabsentorannihilated;”180and
philosophy,[…]teachesus,thatnothingcaneverbepresenttothemindbutanimageorperception,andthatthesensesareonlytheinlets,throughwhichtheseimagesareconveyed,withoutbeingabletoproduceanyimmediateintercoursebetweenthemindandtheobject.181
PhilosophyappearsatconflictwiththecommonopinionatthispointintheFirst
Enquiry,becauseitgoesbeyondbeingboundtothinksomethingandattemptsto
giveanexplanationforsomethingthatitcannotactuallyexplain.But,then,Hume
goesontosay,
But[…]philosophyfindsherselfextremelyembarrassed,whenshewouldjustifythisnewsystem,andobviatethecavilsandobjectionsofthesceptics.Shecannolongerpleadinfallibleandirresistibleinstinctofnature:Forthatledustoaquitedifferentsystem,whichisacknowledgedfallibleandevenerroneous.Andtojustifythispretendedphilosophicalsystem,bychainofclearconvincingargument,orevenanyappearanceofargument,exceedsthepowerofallhumancapacity.182
Theproblemforphilosophyariseswhenittriestojustifyitselfby“chainofclear
convincingargument”,becausethisisbeyondthehumancapacityforreason(we
cannotgetoutsideofourselves,ortracebacktoanyfoundationalprinciple,toseeif
180Ibid,12.7(p.110).181Ibid,12.9(p.111).182Ibid,12.10(p.111).
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ourchainofreasoningiscorrect).183Thisiswhythephilosophermustendorsethe
scepticalposition,orfallbackintothecommon,orvulgar,position.Thephilosopher
mustendorsescepticismorfallbackintothevulgarpositionduetoalackof
grounding184foranydogmaticposition.Thescepticalposition,meaningthe
agnosticposit-ionrecognizesthatwecannotgiveametaphysicalargumentforthe
externalworld/basisofourperceptions,whilethevulgarpositiondoesnoteventry
togiveametaphysicalargument.
Thephilosophicalposition,whenascepticalphilosophicalposition,isnotin
conflictwiththecommon/vulgaropinion,becauseneitherattempttogivea
metaphysicalargumentfortheexistenceoftheexternalworld.Hume’ssceptical
approachisarticulatedinSectionXII,PartI,Paragraph12ofhisFirstEnquiry,
Itisaquestionoffact,whethertheperceptionsofthesensesbeproducedbyexternalobjects,resembling:Howshallthisquestionbedetermined?Byexperiencesurely;asallotherquestionsofalikenature.Buthereexperienceis,andmustbeentirelysilent.Themindhasneveranythingpresenttoitbuttheperceptions,andcannotpossiblyreachanyexperienceoftheirconnexionwithobjects.Thesuppositionofsuchaconnexionis,therefore,withoutfoundationinreasoning.185
Whileweperceivethe‘external’worldviaoursenses,weneverperceivethe
connectionbetweenourperceptionsandtheexternalworld.And,so,noaccount,
noteventhroughexperience,cangiveusanargumentorfoundation,becauseallwe
183ThisbothsupportsthecriticismfoundintheTreatisethatwecannotgetbeyondourperceptions,butitalsoisacriticismagainstAcademicScepticismintheformofCartesianScepticism/Doubt.ItendsupbeingacriticismofCartesianScepticism/Doubt,becauseCartesianScepticism/Doubtendsupbeingdogmaticinthatittriestoassertafoundationalprinciplethatwesomehowknowwithcertainty.Humedoesnotlikeanydogmaticphilosophythatoverstepsitsbounds,andtriestoassertthingsthatarebeyondwhathumanbeingscanknowviasolelyperceptions.184Bygrounding,Imeanphilosophical,ormetaphysical,argument.185Ibid,12.12(p.112).
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perceiveareourperceptions—andnottheconnectionbetweenourperceptionsand
theexternalworld.Nomatterhowmanytimesweperceiveabookthatweownor
thepenthatweliketouse,weneverperceivetheconnectionbetweenour
perceptionofthatbookorpen,andtheRealbookorpen.Allwehaveaccesstois
ourperception(s)ofthatbookorpen.Experiencecanhelpusmakeinferences,like
thatofcauseandeffect,butitcannotgiveusanexplanationforanyconnection
betweenperceptionandtheRealworld.Thisassertionthatwecannotgivean
explanationorargumentorproofofanysortdoesnotmeanthattheconnectionmay
notbethere.Itmeansthatwemustnotmakeanargumentforsomethingthatis
outsideofour[human]reasoning.Therefore,Paragraph12assertsanagnostic,or
Pyrrhonian,formofscepticism.186
Hume,interestingly,giveswhatlookslikeaseriouschallenge,onthefaceof
it,toPyrrhonianScepticisminSectionXIIoftheFirstEnquiry—whichcouldbeone
ofthereasonswhysomepeopledonotinterpretHumeasasceptic.Hesays,
ThegreatsubverterofPyrrhonismortheexcessiveprinciplesofscepticism,isaction,andemployment,andtheoccupationsofcommonlife.[Sceptic]principlesmayflourishandtriumphintheschools;whereitis,indeed,difficult,ifnotimpossible,torefutethem.Butassoonastheyleavetheshade,andbythepresenceoftherealobjects,whichactuateourpassionsandsentiments,areputinoppositiontothemorepowerfulprinciplesofournature,theyvanishlikesmoke,andleavethemostdeterminedscepticinthesameconditionasothermortals.187
186Paragraph12doesnotassertananti-realistposition,becausetheanti-realistpositionstilltriestoassertsomethingtoomuchabouttheexternalworld—forexample,thatweknowthatourperceptionsarenotproducedbytheexternalworld.ForHume,reasondoesnotsupportanyclaim,positiveornegative,abouttheRealexistenceoftheexternalworld.,and,therefore,wecannotsayanythingaboutitorgiveanymetaphysicalargumentforsuchdogmaticclaims.187Ibid,12.21(pp.115-116).
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IthinkitisimportanttoclarifythatHumeisreferringtoexcessive,orradical,
Pyrrhonism,morealongthelinesofwhatPyrrhohimselfwasreportedtopractice.
CommonlifetakesoverevenforthosewhoendorseradicalPyrrhonianScepticism,
whethertheylikeitornot.Theyhavetoassenttosomeperceptions,forexample,or
theydie.188And,so,Hume’schallengetoradicalPyrrhonismmakesagoodpoint
thatisdifficulttorefute.
Though,thisdoesnotmeanthatHumeisnotstillasceptic.AsIsaidbefore,
Humedoesnotseemtohavelikedanykindofradicalopinion;thisincludesradical
scepticalopinion.HumehighlightsthatradicalPyrrhonismisnotviable,whilealso
highlightingthatcommonpeoplestillcannotjustifytheirbeliefs:
When[theradicalPyrrhonianSceptic]awakesfromhisdream,hewillbethefirsttojoininthelaughagainsthimself,andtoconfess,thatallhisobjectionsaremereamusement,andcanhavenoothertendencythantoshowthewhimsicalconditionofmankind,whomustactandreasonandbelieve;thoughtheyarenotable,bytheirmostdiligentenquiry,tosatisfythemselvesconcerningthefoundationoftheseoperations,ortoremovetheobjections,whichmayberaisedagainstthem.189
Mankind,orbothcommonpeopleandphilosophers,cannotjustify“thefoundation
of[their]operations,”andsoendupinamoderatescepticalposition:theycannot
justifytheRealworld,theymustjustassenttoappearances(i.e.perceptions)and
livetheirlives.
This“mitigatedscepticism,”accordingtoHume,can“bebothdurableand
useful.”190Itisusefulbecauseitshowsthat
188Likeeatinganddrinkingduetohungerandthirst,orthecommonbeliefthatyouarealivesinceyouareperceivingandexperiencing(suchasyouarehungryorthirstyandneedthesethingstocontinuebeingalive).189Ibid,12.23(p.117).190Ibid,12.24(p.117).
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[t]heilliteratemayreflectonthedispositionofthelearned,who,amidstalltheadvantagesofstudyandreflection,arecommonlystilldifferentintheirdeterminations:Andifanyofthelearnedbeinclined,fromtheirnaturaltemper,tohaughtinessandobstinacy,asmalltinctureofPYRRHONISMmightabatetheirpride,byshewingthem,thatthefewadvantages,whichtheymayhaveattainedovertheirfellows,arebutinconsiderable,ifcomparedwiththeuniversalperplexityandconfusion,whichisinherentinhumannature.Ingeneral,thereisadegreeofdoubt,andcaution,andmodesty,which,inallkindsofscrutinyanddecision,oughtforevertoaccompanyajustreasoner.191
Thisharkensbacktothephilosopherandthecommonpeople.Though,the
philosopheriseducated,thisdoesnotmeanthattheyareinapositionthatisany
betterthanthecommonperson.“[A]smalltinctureofPYRRHONISM”canshowthe
educatedthattheyarenotanybetteroffthantheuneducated.Noneofuscan
explainorgiveanargumentfortheconnectionbetweenourperceptionsandthe
externalworld—wecannotstepoutsideofourperceptionstoreceivesomespecial
knowledge.Weareallonthesameplayingfield.Whilethecommonperson
automaticallydoesnotattempttogiveanexplanationofhowourperceptions
correlatetotheexternalworld(ornot),theeducatedperson(thephilosopher)
requiresModeratePyrrhonianScepticisminordertounderstandthattheycannot
giveanexplanationofhowourperceptionscorrelatetotheexternalworld(ornot).
TowardstheendofSectionXII,Humewrites,
Theexistence,therefore,ofanybeingcanonlybeprovedbyargumentsfromitscauseoritseffect;andtheseargumentsarefoundedentirelyonexperience.Ifwereasonàpriori,anythingmayappearabletoproduceanything.Thefallingofapebblemay,foroughtweknow,extinguishthesun;orthewishofamancontroultheplanetsintheirorbits.Itisonlyexperience,whichteachesusthenatureandboundsofcauseandeffect,andenablesustoinfertheexistenceofoneobjectfromthatofanother.192
191Ibid,12.24(pp.117-118).192Ibid,12.29(pp.119-120).
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Thisisagainaboutcauseandeffect,andagainhasitsrootsinHume’sscepticism
abouttheexternalworld.Howwegainknowledgeofcauseandeffectispurely
throughexperience,andnotthroughhavingdirectaccesstotheexternalworld.
Experienceisgainedthroughperception,andthereforeanyexistenceweperceiveis
basedonperception.Wecannotreasonaprioriabouttheexistenceofexternal
objects,likeDescarteswouldhaveusattempt,becausethatwillleadusdowna
worseroad.Wecannotrelyonanyultimatecauseorfirstprinciple(s),becausewe
havenowayofaccessing/knowingthem.
2.4.Hume’sMoralPhilosophy
Thepurposeofmorality,forHume,issocialinconstitution.Moralfacts(or
claimsorpropositions)areasetofrules(orlaws)tolivebywithinagivensociety.
Theontologicalstatusofmoralfacts(orclaimsorpropositions)issimilartothe
statusofnaturalfactswithinHume’sphilosophy.Arguably,Humeespousesatypeof
consequentialism,morespecificallyatypeofindirectconsequentialism,inhisAn
EnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals(IwillalsorefertoitastheSecond
Enquiry).193And,so,tobeginwith,Iwillgivebriefdefinitionsofconsequentialism
andindirectconsequentialismbeforeoutliningmyinterpretationofHume’smoral
philosophy.
WalterSinnott-ArmstrongintheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle
titled“Consequentialism”,definesconsequentialismasfollows,
193Istartmysentenceoffwith“arguably”,becausethereisnoconsensusonwhetherHumewasanykindofconsequentialist.IamreadingHumeasaconsequentialist,becauseithelpsfurthermypurposeofusingmyspecificinterpretationofHumetogiveanalternativeoptioninthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate.
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Consequentialism,asitsnamesuggests,istheviewthatnormativepropertiesdependonlyonconsequences.Thisgeneralapproachcanbeappliedatdifferentlevelstodifferentnormativepropertiesofdifferentkindsofthings,butthemostprominentexampleisconsequentialismaboutthemoralrightnessofacts,whichholdsthatwhetheranactismorallyrightdependsonlyontheconsequencesofthatactorofsomethingrelatedtothatact,suchasthemotivebehindtheactorageneralrulerequiringactsofthesamekind.194
Theemphasisinconsequentialismisontheconsequencesofanaction,andlikein
mostformsofconsequentialism,theactitselfhasonlyinstrumentalvalue,whereas
desirableconsequenceshaveintrinsicvalue(thevaluethatultimatelyjustifiesthe
actwithsuchconsequences).Thisputsanemphasisonutility(insofarasactsare
concerned),becauseifanactisnotusefulinbringingaboutacertainend—thenit
hasnovaluewithinaconsequentialistframework.Underthebroaderheadingof
consequentialism,thereareanumberofdifferentforms.Oneoftheseformsof
consequentialismissomethingcalledindirectconsequentialism,andSinnott-
Armstrongsaysthat
anindirectconsequentialistholdsthatthemoralqualitiesofsomethingdependontheconsequencesofsomethingelse.[…]Themostcommonindirectconsequentialismisruleconsequentialism,whichmakesthemoralrightnessofanactdependontheconsequencesofarule.195
Therefore,underindirectconsequentialism,theconsequencesarenotjust
dependentontheact,butonsomethingelseoutsideoftheact(thatinfluencesthe
consequencesoftheact).Astheabovequotesays,ruleconsequentialismisthemost
commonformofindirectconsequentialism.Ruleconsequentialismtriestoassess
thedifferentconsequencesofdifferentsetsofrules(intermsoftheimpact(s)of
194WalterSinnott-Armstrong,"Consequentialism",TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,ed.EdwardN.Zalta(Winter2015Edition),accessedonMay29th,2018,https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/consequentialism/.195Ibid.
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possiblesystemsofrules),andtheconsequencesofanactare,therefore,dependent
onasetofrules(orlaws).Thissetofrulesischosenbythesocietyitgoverns,andis
whatmakestheact(andtheconsequencesthatfollow)morallyrightorwrong.The
goalofconsequentialism,ingeneral,istoproduceoptimalconsequences.Oftenthis
getstranslated,asitdoesinutilitarianism,asanact(whethergovernedbyrulesor
not)needstoproducethemosthappinessorpleasureforthesociety.Themost
happiness,orpleasure,isthemostdesirableconsequence.196
IdothinkthatHumeexpressesakindofindirectconsequentialisminthe
SecondEnquiry.197Preparingus,thereaders,attheendoftheFirstEnquiryforthe
SecondEnquiry,Humesays,
Itisonlyexperience,whichteachesusthenatureandboundsofcauseandeffect,andenablesustoinfertheexistenceofoneobjectfromthatofanother.Suchisthefoundationofmoralreasoning,whichformsthegreaterpartofhumanknowledge,andisthesourceofallhumanactionandbehaviour.198
IthinkitisimportanttonoteherethatIthinkthatHume’sconsequentialismis
dependentonhisunderstandingofmetaphysics(whichhisunderstandingof
perceptionsandtheirroleinourunderstandinginhowweknowtheexternalworld
196Forexample,itcouldbearguedthat,forHume,theoverallhappiness,orpleasure,ofagivensocietyisthemostdesirableconsequence.Inaddition,itcouldfurtherbearguedthatHumeeithermeansthistobeappliedtoaparticularsociety(eachsocietycouldhavethesamegoalofhappiness,buttheformulationcouldbeslightlydifferentineachseparatesociety)ortothewholeofthehumanspecies(orfuturehumanity).197Though,consequentialismisa,potentially,problematictermtorefertoHume’snormativemoralphilosophyas,becauseitisatermthatcameafterHumewasalive.198FirstEnquiry,12.29(p.120).
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isalsobasedon).Experienceisthefoundationofmoralreasoning,andtherefore
moralreasoningisintherealmofmattersoffact(notrelationsofideas).199
Incontemporarymoralphilosophy,wetendtoseparatenormativemoral
theoriesfrommetaphysics(ormetaethics),butIdonotthinkthatissoeasilydone
inHume’sphilosophy.200Hume’sprojectintheTreatise,aswellasintheFirst
EnquiryandSecondEnquiry,istogiveacomprehensiveunderstandingofphilosophy
(especiallythephilosophicalissuesthatwereprominentduringhistime).Todo
this,hebeginswithmetaphysics(i.e.theexternalworld,andhowwecometo
associateourperceptionswithexternalobjects),andusesthisasabasistobuild
bothhisnaturalismandmoralphilosophyon.
ItwillbemygoalinthissectiontogiveanarticulationofHume’smoral
philosophy.MyultimategoalinthispaperistoshowthatHumeisconsistent
throughhisunderstandingofmetaphysics(i.e.thatheisaModeratePyrrhonian
Scepticwhenitcomestometaphysics),andhisunderstandingofmoralphilosophy
inordertogiveanalternativepositioninthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realism
debate.Hismoralphilosophycannotbeunderstoodwithoutunderstandinghis
metaphysicalpositionthatunderpinsthemboth.Therefore,Hume’smoral
philosophycannotonlybeunderstoodthroughanormativelens,butmustalsobe
understoodthroughametaethical201lensaswell(sinceitsunderpinningsaremore
199Isaynotintherealmofrelationsofideas,becauserelationsofideasareaprioriforHume.Mattersoffactarebasedinexperience,andexperience“isthefoundationofmoralreasoning.”200Or,inanyone’sphilosophywhoistryingtogiveacomprehensiveandwholeanalysisofmostofthemajorareaswithinphilosophy.201Definitionofmetaethics:“Thesecond-orderactivityofinvestigatingtheconceptsofmethodsofethics,ratherthandirectlyengagingwithpractical(‘first-order’)
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abstract).Morality,forHume,isdefinitelywithinthepracticaldomain,butits
foundationinmetaphysicsistheoretical.
InSection1“OftheGeneralPrinciplesofMorals”oftheSecondEnquiry,Hume
laysoutthemetaethicaldebatethatheissituatinghimselfwithinasfollows,
Therehasbeenacontroversystartedoflate,muchbetterworthexamination,concerningthegeneralfoundationofMORALS;whethertheybederivedfromREASON,orfromSENTIMENT;whetherweattaintheknowledgeofthembyachainofargumentandinduction,orbyanimmediatefeelingandfinerinternalsense;whether,likeallsoundjudgmentoftruthandfalsehood,theyshouldbethesametoeveryrationalintelligentbeing;orwhether,liketheperceptionofbeautyanddeformity,theybefoundedentirelyontheparticularfabricandconstitutionofthehumanspecies.202
ThedebatethatHumeislayingoutisametaethicaldebate:howmoralsareformed,
orwhatthesourceofmoralityis.Hepositionshimselfwithinthemetaethical
debatebeforegoingontoarticulatehisnormativemoraltheorybasedonhis
positionwithinthemetaethicaldebate.
Moralphilosophyhasoneaim,andtwomainaspectsforHume.Itsaim“isto
teachusourduty;and,byproperrepresentationsofthedeformityofviceand
beautyofvirtue,begetcorrespondinghabits,andengageustoavoidtheoneand
embracetheother.”203Thisaimisachievedbytheunderstanding,andbythe
affections(oremotions/passions).InsupportofthisHumesays,
[Inferencesandconclusionsoftheunderstanding]discovertruths:Butwherethetruthswhichtheydiscoverareindifferent,andbegetnodesireoraversion.
issuesofwhattodoandhowtobehave.Thedistinctionisapttoblur,inthatdifferentviewsaboutthestructureofethicsusuallyhaveimplicationsforthefirst-orderdecisionmaking.”SimonBlackburn,“metaethics,”intheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),302.202DavidHume,AnEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals,ed.TomL.Beauchamp(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.3(pp.73-74).203Ibid,1.7(p.75).
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Theycanhavenoinfluenceonconductandbehaviour.Whatishonourable,whatisfair,whatisbecoming,whatisnoble,whatisgenerous,takespossessionoftheheart,andanimatesustoembraceandmaintainit.Whatisintelligent,whatisevident,whatisprobable,whatistrue,procuresonlycoolassentoftheunderstanding;andgratifyingaspeculativecuriosity,putsanendtoourresearches.204
Aftersayingthis,Humegoessofarastosay,intheSecondEnquiryat1.8,thattoget
ridoftheaffections,astheypertaintomorality,wouldmakemorality“nolongera
practicalstudy,nor[have]anytendencytoregulateourlivesandactions.”205Then,
at1.9oftheSecondEnquiry,Humemakesthestrongclaimthat“reasonand
sentimentconcurinalmostallmoraldeterminationsandconclusions.”206Hegoeson
toexplainin1.9howreason(theunderstanding)andsentiment(affections)both
playaroleinmorality,andinvestigatingthisistheoverarchingfocusoftheSecond
Enquiry.
Inhissearchfortherolesthatreasonandsentimentplayinmorality,Hume
saysthatthereisoneprinciple,aconsequentialistprinciple,thatmoralityisguided
by,andthatprincipleisutility.207Inregardtothisprincipleofutility,Humewrites,
Inalldeterminationsofmorality,thiscircumstanceofpublicutilityiseverprincipallyinview;andwhereverdisputesarise,thequestioncannot,byanymeans,bedecidedwithgreatercertainty,thanbyascertaining,onanyside,thetrueinterestsofmankind.Ifanyfalseopinion,embracedfromappearances,hasbeenfoundtoprevail;assoonasfartherexperienceandsounderreasoninghavegivenusjusternotionsofhumanaffairs;weretractourfirstsentiment,andadjustanewtheboundariesofmoralgoodandevil.208
204Ibid.205Ibid,1.8(p.75).206Ibid,1.9(p.75).207Notallofmoralityisguidedbythisprinciple,forexample,religiousformsofmoralityarenot,butHumethinksthatarationalsystemofmoralityshouldbeguidedbyit.208Hume,SecondEnquiry,2.17(p.81).
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MoralityforHumeisnotunchanging,andisbasedonexperience.Weneedto
experiencemultiplecasesofmoralitytobeabletomakeinferencespertainingtothe
goodorevilofaparticularmoralactorfact(i.e.claim),andthemoreexperienceswe
havethebetter(astheyinformourinferences).Givennewexperiences,wecan
changeourinferencesconcerningwhetheraparticularactorfactisgoodorevil.
And,theprinciplethatguidesourinferences(thatwemakeviaexperiences)is
verifyingbasedonwhetheranactorfactisgoodorevilthroughitspublicutility.
ToreiteratewhatIsaidtowardsthebeginningofthissection:
consequentialismemphasizestheconsequencesofanact,theactitselfisnotso
muchimportantastheconsequencesorendsthatitbringsabout.Thisputsan
emphasisonutility,becauseifanactisnotusefulinbringingaboutacertainends—
thenithasnoutilitywithinaconsequentialistframework.Theconsequencesofany
moralaction,forHume,areweighedinlightoftheirpublicutilitywithinasociety.If
experienceshowsus[withinthesociety]thataparticularactionisnolongergoodin
accordancewithpublicutility,thenwecanchangeourguidelineswithrespectto
suchactions.
Humebasesthevalueofhistwomainvirtuesforthebettermentofsociety,
benevolenceandjustice,onpublicutility.But,Humedoesnotmeanvirtueinthe
moretraditionalvirtueethics,orAristotelian,understandingofvirtue.Avirtuefor
Humeisavirtueonlybecauseitisusefulinhelpingtocreateoverallhappiness
withinasociety.Humesaysat2.22oftheSecondEnquiry,
[It]seemsundeniable,thatnothingcanbestowmoremeritonanyhumancreaturethanthesentimentofbenevolenceinaneminentdegree;andthata
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part,atleast,ofitsmeritarisesfromitstendencytopromotetheinterestsofourspecies,andbestowhappinessonhumansociety.209
Benevolenceisavirtue,becauseofitsutility;itisusefulinpromotingtheinterests
andhappinessof“humansociety”.Humegoesontosayofjusticeat3.1,
Thatjusticeisusefultosociety,andconsequentlythatpartofitsmerit,atleast,mustarisefromthatconsideration,itwouldbeasuperfluousundertakingtoprove.Thatpublicutilityisthesoleoriginofjustice,andthatreflectionsonthebeneficialconsequencesofthisvirtuearethesolefoundationofitsmerit[…].210
Humeagainstressespublicutility.Justiceisonlyavirtue(orvaluable),becauseof
its“beneficialconsequences”forsociety—ithasnoothervaluethanitspractical
applicationandthebeneficialconsequencesthatarisefromit.
Thesetwovirtues,benevolenceandjustice,helpsocietyfunctioninsucha
wayastocreatethemosthappinessforthepeoplewithinsociety.Againreferring
backtowhatIsaidatthebeginningofthissection:forindirectconsequentialism,the
consequencesaredependentontheact,butinsuchawayastoaccountforoutside
influencesontheact.Therefore,underHume’smoralphilosophy,itisnotjust
performingabenevolentactthathasdesirableconsequences(forexample,
happiness),but,wheneveryonewithinasocietyseesbenevolenceasavirtue,it
becomesaguideforaction(andthegoodconsequencesstemnotonlyfromthe
benevolentactsbutfromthevirtueofbenevolenceaswell).Inthisway,Humeis
expressingakindofindirectconsequentialism,becausetheconsequencesstemnot
justfromactsbutalsofromsomethingexternaltotheactsguidingthemaswell.
209Ibid,2.22(p.82).210Ibid,3.1(p.83).
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ForHume,morality211hasitsoriginsinsentiment.Sentimentiswhat
motivatesustobemoral(i.e.“Whatishonourable,whatisfair,whatisbecoming,
whatisnoble,whatisgenerous,takespossessionoftheheart,andanimatesusto
embraceandmaintainit”212).Reason,though,isstillneeded,becauseitisonly
throughmanyexperienceswithacts,etc.,withinsocietythatwecanthencometo
inferwhatismoralthroughtheunderstanding.Whatitcomesdowntoisthatwe
needreasontomakeinferencesfromexperiences,butwhatmotivatesustobe
moralissentiment.
2.5.Hume’sMethodinAnEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals
DespitethewayIdescribedHume’spositionintheprevioussection(2.4.
Hume’sMoralPhilosophy),thereisnoconsensusonwhetherHumewasanykindof
consequentialistornot.ItisdifficulttopigeonholeHumewithregardtohis
normativemoraltheory.Inthissection,IwillqualifyHume’smoralphilosophyby
givinganaccountofhowonecanunderstandHume’smethodinAnEnquiry
concerningthePrinciplesofMorals.Thisqualificationisimportantfor
understandingscepticism’sreachinHume’sphilosophy,andtyingtogetherHume’s
understandingofmetaphysicstohisunderstandingofmoralphilosophy.
Hume’smethodthroughouttheSecondEnquiryisareflectivecomparisonof
casesthatdoesnotseemtohaveanyintenttoassumethatitwilladduptoanything
intheend.FromHume’smethodofcomparisonofcases(orinstancesofwhatmight
bemoral),hedrawsakindofgeneralaccountofwhatmoralitymightconstitute—
211IamreferencingthemoralitythatHumeprescribesto—notallofmorality(generallyspeaking).212Hume,SecondEnquiry,1.7(p.75).
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andlookstoseehowreasonandsentimentmightfactorintomorality.Thiskindof
methoddoesnotassumethatitwillfindtheultimatefoundationofmorality,butis
moreofacontemplativeguessataframeworkthatmoralitycouldpossiblyoperate
within.Sinceitdoesnotseektofindtheultimatefoundationofmorality,itdoesnot
makeanydefiniteassertions.Inthisway,Hume’smethodkeepshismoral
philosophyinlinewithaModerate,ormitigated,PyrrhonianScepticism
understandingofhismetaphysics,whichunderpinsHume’sphilosophymore
generally.
In1.10oftheSecondEnquiry,Humelaysouthismethod,
Theonlyobjectofreasoningistodiscoverthecircumstancesonbothsides,whicharecommontothesequalities;toobservethatparticularinwhichtheestimablequalitiesagreeontheonehand,andtheblameableontheother;andthencetoreachthefoundationofethics,andfindthoseuniversalprinciples,fromwhichallcensureorapprobationisultimatelyderived.Asthisisaquestionoffact,notofabstractscience,wecanonlyexpectsuccess,byfollowingtheexperimentalmethod,anddeducinggeneralmaximsfromacomparisonofparticularinstances.213
Humehimselfsaysthatmorality“isaquestionoffact”,meaningthatmorality
pertainstoexperience,andisnotsomethingthatwecandeduceapriori(priorto
experience).TheexperimentalmethodbasedonexperiencethatHumespeaks
aboutintheabovequoteisnotperfectandinfallible.Wecannotgettoanapriori
foundationofmoralitythroughreasoning.Thereneedstobe“acomparisonof
particularinstances”(or“cases”asIsayinthepreviousparagraph)—whichcan
onlybeaccomplishedthroughexperience—andthiscomparisonwillonlyeverallow
ustoinfer“generalmaxims”ofmorality.214
213Ibid,1.10(pp.76-77).214Ofmorality,butmoralityasHumeunderstandsit—notmoralityatlarge.
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Thisisamethodologythataimstogeneralize.215Youhavethismethod,its
objectistofindgeneralizations,butdoesitfindgeneralizations?Ifitdoes,dothose
generalizationsamounttoanykindofcertaintyorultimatefoundation?Hume
seemstoinfersomegeneralizations(suchabenevolenceandjustice),butthereisno
certaintythatthesearetherightgeneralizations—whichmeansthatthereisno
certaintywhenitcomesmoralgeneralizations.Thesegeneralizationsareinferences
tothebestexplanationthatHumecanfindthroughhiscomparisonofcases.There
isnothingthatwouldpreventfurthercomparisons,andfurthergeneralizations.
EvenHume’suseofutilitycannotbeusedasafoundation,becauseallitisisa
potentialcandidateforafoundationthatseeminglyhasthepotentialtoproduce
desirableconsequences(whenacomparisonofcaseshasbeendone,itseemsthat
utilitycanhelpexplaincertaingeneralmaximsthatpeopleseemtotakeasvirtues,
likebenevolence).But,whileutilitymighthelptoexplainmoralitywhencomparing
certaincases,Hume’sattitudeintheSecondEnquiry,isstilloneofuncertainty—an
attitudethatisunderpinnedbyscepticism.AsHumesays,attheveryendofSection
1oftheSecondEnquiry,
The[…]scientificmethod,whereageneralabstractprincipleisfirstestablished,andisafterwardsbranchedoutintoavarietyofinferencesandconclusions,maybemoreperfectitself,butsuitslesstheimperfectionofhumannature[…].Menarenowcuredoftheirpassionforhypothesesandsystemsinnaturalphilosophy,andwillhearkentonoargumentsbutthosewhicharederivedfromexperience.Itisfulltimetheyshouldattemptalikereformationinallmoraldisquisitions;andrejecteverysystemofethics,howeversubtileoringenious,whichisnotfoundedonfactandobservation.216
And,then,finishesSection1oftheSecondEnquirywith
215Like,consequentialism,orutilitarianism.216Hume,SecondEnquiry,1.10(p.77).
89
Weshallbeginourenquiryonthisheadbyconsiderationofthesocialvirtues,benevolenceandjustice.Theexplicationofthemwillprobablygiveusanopeningbywhichothersmaybeaccountedfor.217
ThisisthetonethatHumesetsfortherestoftheSecondEnquiry.Hecontraststhe
experimentalmethodthatheseeshimselfasusingwiththescientificmethodmore
associatedwiththerationalistswhotrytofoundtheir“generalabstractprinciples”
orfoundationalprinciplesonsomethingthatisnotbasedinexperience.
Hisemphasisonexperience—thathedoesmakesoundlikethebetter
option—isnotsomethingthatwillgetyoucertaintyinthewaythatarationalist
wouldwant.ThebestHume’smethodisgoingtogiveusis“probably”and“may”.
Thissupportforamethodthatcanonlygiveusuncertaintyatbestisunderpinned
byanunwillingnesstoacceptaprioriprinciplesthatwehavenojustificationfor
(basedonwhatwecanknow).Hume’smethodleadstoakindoftentative
hypothesis,notasurething.Humeistellingus(thereaders)inadvancethat
whateverhecomesupwithforafoundationistentative.Thisisakindoffallibilism:
providingtentativeanswersthatmayormaynotberight(withtheawarenessthat
theanswersmayormaynotberight,andtheacceptancethatwemaynotever
knowtherightanswer).Whilefallibilismdoesnotnecessarilyentailscepticism,it
doesopenupthepathtoscepticism(orcantendtowardascepticalposition);
especiallyforsomeonelikeHume,who,throughouthisphilosophy,isfavourably
disposedtowardsscepticism.
217Ibid,1.11(p.77).Myitalics.
90
2.6.TheMoralRealismandMoralAnti-RealismDebate:HumeanScepticismasanAlternative
Therealismandanti-realismdebateinmetaphysicsisnotanewtopicof
discussion.IntheWesternPhilosophicalTradition,ithasrootsbacktoPlato’s
dialogues.Thedebateisentrenchedinmostotherfieldsofphilosophy.Takethe
philosophyofperception,forexample.Assoonasweaskwhetherourperceptions
arerepresentationsoftheexternalworldornot(orifourperceptionsareaccurate
representationsoftheexternalworldornot),webecomeembroiledintherealism
andanti-realismdebate.Realismstates,generally,thatfacts(orentities)exist,and
thatthesefacts(orentities)areobjectiveandmind-independentinsomeway.218
Anti-realismdeniesatleastoneaspectofrealism;itcandenythatfacts(orentities)
exist,itcandenythatfacts(orentities)areobjectiveormind-independent,oritcan
rejectbothoftheaforementionedrealistclaims.
Thedebateisfurthermadecomplexbythecognitivismandnon-cognitivism
differentiation.Cognitivismistraditionallyassociatedwithrealism,andnon-
cognitivismistraditionallyassociatedwithanti-realism.Cognitivismistheview
thatafact(orclaim,orproposition),likeamoralfact(orclaim,orproposition),can
betrueorfalse.Non-cognitivism,broadlydefined,istheviewthatafact(orclaim,
orproposition),likeamoralfact(orclaim,orproposition),isnottruth-apt(cannot
betrueorfalse).Theimportanceofthisdistinctionismostnoticeableinlogic-based
arguments,becauselogic-basedargumentstreattruth-aptnessandtruepremises
(andsoundarguments)ashighlyimportant.Therefore,forcognitivismtobe
218Iacknowledgethatthisdefinitionisnotwithoutcontroversy,butitsufficestooutlinethedichotomybetweenrealismandanti-realism.
91
associatedwithrealismandnon-cognitivismtobeassociatedwithanti-realismhas
itsconsequences.Realiststhinkthattheyhavetheupperhand,becausetheycan
giveargumentswithtruth-aptmoralfactsmakingtheirlogic-basedarguments
stronger.Theproblemisthattherearesomeanti-realistswhoarecognitivists,
thoughsometimesinqualifiedways(forexample,ErrorTheorists).Overall,the
associationbetweencognitivismandrealism,andnon-cognitivismandanti-realism
ismisleading—andcognitivismandnon-cognitivismshouldnotbeassociatedwith
realismoranti-realisminparticular.
Ithinkthatthisalsoholdstruewhenitcomestoscepticism,specifically
ModeratePyrrhonianScepticism.Scepticsintherealismandanti-realismliterature
oftengetlumpedinwiththeanti-realists,andsoareassociatedwithnon-
cognitivism.But,associatingModeratePyrrhonianScepticismwithnon-cognitivism
isnotanexplicitassociation,andneedsfurtherexplanation(whichisnotusually
given).APyrrhonianScepticremainsagnostic(withholdsjudgement,epochē)when
itcomestofacts(orclaims,orpropositions)concerningmetaphysics.Thisdoesnot
meanthattheyoutrightdenycognitivismortruth-aptnesswhenitcomesto
metaphysicalfacts(orclaimsorpropositions).Italsomeansthattheydonotassert
cognitivismortruth-aptnesswhenitcomestometaphysicalfacts(orclaimsor
propositions).ItistheiragnosticismthatputsPyrrhonianScepticsinaposition
wheretheycannotaffirmordenyanythingabouttheReal,externalworld.Now,this
doesnotmeanthattheycannotassertmoralclaims.Itjustmeansthattheycannot
argueoverthemetaphysicalstatusofmoralclaims.
92
AModeratePyrrhonianScepticwhilemaintainingagnosticismaboutthe
externalworlddoesconsenttoappearancesinordertolivetheirlife.Inconsenting
toappearances,theycanconsenttotheappearanceofclaims.Theissuetheyhaveis
withassertingametaphysicaloriginofthoseclaims.Inthecaseofmoralclaims,the
sameistrue.AModeratePyrrhonianScepticcanassertthemoralclaimthat
“Murderiswrong,”butwhatneedstobeunderstoodisthattheyarenotasserting
anythingmetaphysicalabouttheputativemoralclaim.Whattheyaredoingis
sayingthatbasedonappearances,murderappearstobewrong—thisisaninternal
endeavour,notanexternalendeavour(touseCarnapianlanguage).
ThistypeofModeratePyrrhonianScepticismcanbeattributedtoHume.
HumesaysinBookI,Part4,Section2oftheTreatise,
[T]hescepticstillcontinuestoreasonandbelieve,eventho’heasserts,thathecannotdefendhisreasonbyreason;andbythesamerulehemustassenttotheprincipleconcerningtheexistenceofbody,tho’hecannotpretendbyanyargumentsofphilosophytomaintainitsveracity.Naturehasnotleftthistohischoice,andhasdoubtlessesteem’ditanaffairoftoogreatimportancetobetrustedtoouruncertainreasoningsandspeculations.219
Eventhoughthescepticcontinuesto“reasonandbelieve”andcannothelpbutgive
into“theexistenceofbody”(i.e.theexternalworld),theydosowithoutthesupport
ofmetaphysicalarguments.Duetothefalliblenessofthehumanmind—something
thatcannotbehelped(asisthewaythathumansare)—theexternalworldis
deemedbythesceptictobesomethingthatcannot“betrustedtoouruncertain
reasoningsandspeculations.”Thescepticisleftwithassentingtotheworldof
appearances,thoughtheycannotgiveanargumentforthemetaphysicaloriginof
thoseappearances.ThescepticismthatHumearticulatesisaformofModerate
219Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,1.4.2.1(p.125).
93
PyrrhonianScepticism,but—sinceHumehimselfshiedawayfromattributing
PyrrhonianScepticismtohisownphilosophy(duetoalackofknowledgeof
PyrrhonianScepticism)—IwillcallHume’sModeratePyrrhonianScepticismjust
HumeanScepticism.220
Onthefaceofit,itwouldseemlikeHumeanScepticism,aswithModerate
PyrrhonianScepticism,wouldhavetotakeanon-cognitivestanceonthetruth-
aptnessoffacts(orclaimsorpropositions)—giventhataHumeanScepticwouldnot
beabletojustify,basedonanymetaphysicalargument,thetruthorfalsityofthe
facts.But,aHumeanScepticcoulduseCarnap’smove(whenitcomestoabstract
entities)tobeabletoapplyakindofqualifiedtruth-aptnesstofactswithinan
internalframework.Carnap’sinitialmoveistodifferentiatebetweeninternaland
externalquestions.Internalquestionsarequestionsthatcanbeaskedwithina
specifiedframework(i.e.epistemologicalquestions),whileexternalquestionshave
todowithaskingabouttherealityorexistenceoftheframeworkasawhole(i.e.
metaphysicalquestions).AHumeanScepticcannotaskexternalquestions,butthey
canaskinternalquestions.
Tobringthisbackintoamoralcontext,takethemoralclaim,“Murderis
wrong,”again.Perhapsthesocietyyouareapartofpracticesaformof
consequentialism.Murderiswrongwithinyoursociety’sconsequentialistmoral
framework,becausealawwascreatedstatingthatmurderiswrong.Thislawwas
createdinordertobringaboutthemostpleasureorhappinessforthesocietyasa
220IalsocallitHumeanScepticism,becauseitisbasedonmyinterpretationofHume’sphilosophytofurtheranargumentinmetaethicsratherthananinterpretationofthehistoricHumeasapieceofHumescholarship.
94
whole,becauseotherwisepeoplemightliveinfearthattheymaybemurdered
(whichisanunpleasantandunhappywaytolive).So,fortheoverallbenefitofyour
society,murderwasdeemedtobewrong.Withinaspecifiedframework,inthiscase
yoursociety’sconsequentialistmoralframework,afact(orclaimorproposition)can
berightorwrong,ortrueorfalse.Itcanbetrueorfalse,becauseforsomeone
withinyoursocietytostatethat“Murderisnotwrong,”forexample,wouldbefalse
giventheagreeduponlawwithinyoursociety’sconsequentialistmoralframework.
Thiskindofqualifiedtruth-aptnesswillnotgiveyouthetruthorfalsityofafact,etc.,
with100%certainty—itcanonlygiveyouaprobabletruthorfalsitybasedonthe
conditionswithintheframeworkatagiventime,andcannotstatewhetherafactis
trueorfalseintheexternalworld(inametaphysicalsense).
ToconnectbacktoHume,letusthinkbacktosections2.2,2.3,and2.4ofthis
paper.ForHume,moralityisasocialconstruct,andhowwelearnitisbasedon
inference(aftertheexperienceofsomethingisexperienced,preferably,multiple
times).Thisinferenceviaexperienceisbasedonourexperiencesoftheappearance
oftheexternalworld(i.e.ourperceptionsoftheexternalworld)—sinceourhuman
facultiescanonlygiveus“uncertainreasoningsandspeculations”221andcannotgive
uscertainmetaphysicalarguments.ForHume,wecannotknowwithanycertainty
thatourperceptionsoftheexternalworldaretrueorfalse.But,wecanassess
whetherafact(orclaimorproposition)istrueorfalsebasedonourinferencesand
theframeworkweareoperatingin(sinceframeworks,inthisunderstanding,area
221Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,1.4.2.1(p.125).
95
social,internalconstructionanddonotstateanythingabouttheReal,external
world).
UnderHumeanScepticismandHume’smoralphilosophy,themoralclaim,
“Murderiswrong,”istrue.Itistruebasedonappearances,andwithinagiven
internalframework.Itcannotbeknownwhetheritistrueorfalsefromanexternal,
metaphysicalstance—theshortcomingsofhumanreasoning(cognitiveability)do
notallowustoknowthis.Inaninternalsense,moralfactsarecognitive(though,
withanon-cognitiveorigin).Inanexternalsense,wecannotknowtheultimate
metaphysicaloriginofmoralfacts.But,whatisimportantisthatmoralfactsare
truth-aptforHume(justinaqualifiedwaybaseduponaconsequentialistmoral
frameworkthatissociallyconstructed).Ifthisistrue,andHume’sphilosophyis
cohesive,itlookslikeHumeanScepticism(combinedwithHume’smoral
philosophy)providesuswithanalternativetothetraditionalmoralrealismand
moralanti-realismdichotomymakingthetraditionaldichotomyanactualdebate.
2.7.PotentialImplications
ThepurposeofthissectionistoconsiderpotentialimplicationsofHumean
Scepticism,Hume’sphilosophybeingcohesive,andHume’slackofcleardistinction
betweenhisabstract,metaethicalmoralphilosophyandpractical(normativeand
applied)philosophy.IfHume’sphilosophyisanactualalternativetothetraditional
moralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate,andhisphilosophyiscohesive;thenit
isimportantthatwetakeseriouslyhowweseparatefieldsinmoralphilosophy.
HumeconflateshismetaethicsandpracticalphilosophythroughouttheSecond
Enquire,but,asshowninsection2.6ofthispaper,thisdoesnotimpedethe
96
cohesivenessofhisphilosophy,nordoesitproduceanycontradictioninhismoral
philosophy.
Thepotentialimplicationbecomesaquestionforethics:istheseparationof
metaethicsandpracticalethicsanarbitraryseparation?Ifitisanarbitrary
separation,thelinebetweenmetaethicsandpracticalethicsisblurryatbest,and
theyinterconnectinwaysthatmakethemnotsoeasilyseparable.Thisisatopicfor
futurethought,butaquestiontoaskiswhatarethemetaethicalconsequencesfor
practicalphilosophy,ifthereareany?And,whatisthesignificanceofthose
consequencesforethicsingeneral?Mysecrethopebehindthispaperwastobring
attentiontohowwetraditionallyviewandunderstandtopics(orfields)in
philosophy,andquestionthosetraditionalviews.Goingforward,Iwouldlike
readerstoconsideralternativewaysofapproachingatopic(orfield)—notonlyin
philosophy,butalsoinallareasofstudyandknowledge.
97
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