hunter-killer (hk) teams - attacking enemy safe havens

8/2/2019 Hunter-Killer (HK) Teams - Attacking Enemy Safe Havens

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JSOUReport10-1

Hunter-KillerTeams:AttackingEne

mySafeHavens

Celeski

Hunter-Killer Teams:

Attacking EnemySafe Havens

Joseph D. Celeski

JSOU Repor t 10-1January 2010


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Joint Special Operations Universityand the Strategic Studies Department

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to contribute toward expanding the body o knowledge about joint special

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations

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eort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions:

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William W. Mendel, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Jerey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.;and William S. Wildrick, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret. Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

Alvaro de Souza PinheiroMajor General, Brazilian Army, Ret.JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.Director o Homeland Security,

Commonwealth o Pennsylvania andJSOU Associate Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.Ph.D., Political ScienceDirector, International SecurityStudies Program, Te Fletcher School, usUniversity and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen SloanPh.D., Comparative PoliticsUniversity o Central Floridaand JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear EngineeringSandia National Laboratoriesand JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. StringhamBrigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. urbiville, Jr.Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc.and JSOU Associate Fellow

Jessica Glicken urnleyPh.D., Cultural Anthropology/Southeast Asian StudiesGalisteo Consulting Groupand JSOU Senior Fellow

Rich YargerPh.D., History,Ministerial Reorm Advisor;U.S. Army Peacekeeping and StabilityOperations Institute and JSOU AssociateFellow

John B. AlexanderPh.D., Education, Te Apollinaire Groupand JSOU Senior Fellow

Roby C. Barrett, Ph.D., MiddleEastern & South Asian HistoryPublic Policy CenterMiddle East Institute

and JSOU Senior FellowJoseph D. CeleskiColonel, U.S. Army, Ret.JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck CunninghamLieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret.Proessor o Strategy, Joint AdvancedWarghting School and JSOU Senior Fellow

Gilbert E. DoanMajor, U.S. Army, Ret.,JSOUInstitutional Integration Division Chie

Brian H. GreenshieldsColonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.Senior Lecturer, DoD Analysis, NavalPostgraduate School

Tomas H. HenriksenPh.D., History, Hoover InstitutionStanord University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. HowardBrigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.Adjunct Faculty, Deense Critical Language/Culture Program, Manseld Center, Universityo Montana and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. JogerstColonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.18thUSAF Special Operations SchoolCommandant

James KirasPh.D., History, School o Advanced Air andSpace Studies, Air University and JSOUAssociate Fellow


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On the cover

ypical American rontiersmen garb worn by independent compa-

nies o Rangers when conducting hunter-killer operations.

Te gure shown here, on display at the Kings Mountain National

Military Park museum in South Carolina, has a homespun cotton

shirt, a large-brimmed hat to keep the rain and sun o, ringed

overcoat and leggings. Rangers also wore Indian-style leggings andwore and carried spare moccasins. Rangers were equipped with

knives, hatchets or tomahawks, and either intlock-red muskets

or ries using lead ball and black powder. Powder was kept dry

in a powder horn. A haversack was used to carry ood and orage

items.

All photographs are by Joseph D. Celeski.


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JSOU Report 10-1

he JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida200

Hunter-Killer Teams:Attacking Enemy

Safe Havens

Joseph D. Celeski


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Comments about this publication are invited and should be orwarded to Director,

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 ully Street,

Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies o this publication may be

obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917.

*******

Te JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant

to special operations or potential publication. For more inormation please contact

Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director o Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569,

[email protected]. Tank you or your interest in the JSOU Press.

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Tis work was cleared or public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN ---


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Te views expressed in this publication are entirely those o the author

and do not necessarily reect the views, policy or position o the United

States Government, Department o Deense, United States Special

Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.


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Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Intelligence in Denied Areas, December , Russell D. Howard

Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January ,Tomas H. Henriksen

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream,February , Jessica Glicken urnley

Disrupting Threat Finances, April , Wesley J.L. Anderson

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

Indias Northeast: The Frontier in Ferment, September , Prakash Singh

What Really Happened in Northern Irelands Counterinsurgency,October , Tomas H. Henriksen

Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing

Adversary Intelligence Operations, January , Graham H. urbiville, Jr.

Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN the Thick Blue Line,February , Joseph D. Celeski

Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect

Approaches, February , Richard D. Newton, ravis L. Homiak,

Kelly H. Smith, Isaac J. Peltier, and D. Jonathan WhiteSpecial Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference

Manual, March

The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy: The Past as Present, the

Present as Future, April , Roby C. Barrett

Africa: Irregular Warfare on the Dark Continent, May ,John B. Alexander

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010Report of Proceedings, 4th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference

(16-19 March 2009)

Information Warfare: Assuring Digital Intelligence Collection,July , William G. Perry

Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security Environ-

ment, July , Russell D. Howard

Manhunting: Counter-Network Operations for Irregular Warfare,September , George A. Craword

Irregular Warfare: Brazils Fight Against Criminal Urban Guerrillas,September , Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Pakistans Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies,December , Haider A.H. Mullick


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vii

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................ix

About the Author ....................................................................xi

1. Introduction ........................................................................ 1

2. Background, Denition and Doctrine ................................... 7

3. Safe Havens .......................................................................19

4. The American Historical Experiencein Hunter-Killer Operations .................................................25

5. Principles of Hunter-Killer Team Employmentduring Counter Safe Haven Operations ...............................51

6. Conclusion ........................................................................57

Appendix. Recommended Readings ....................................... 63

Endnotes ................................................................................67


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ix

Foreword

The concept o hunter-killer operations deep within enemy territory

evokes a sense o excitement and adventure, especially or those

o us amiliar with the exploits o Robert Rogers Rangers o the

18th century or the operations o Special Forces and Rangers in Aghani-

stan today. In this monograph, Colonel Joseph D. Celeski (U.S. Army, Ret.),

argues that hunter-killer teams be routinely established as part o our

standing Special Operations Forces (SOF). He states that guidelines or their

employment should be included in counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, andCeleski urther advises that the use o such orces should be a routine part o

the overall COIN eort. Te idea is to aggressively pursue the enemy within

his own sanctuaries, disrupt his operations and sustainment, and neutralize

or destroy the adversary beore he can threaten a riendly host government

or project extremist operations onto the world stage.

Celeskis operational concept or hunter-killer operations bolsters the

command vision oU.S. Special Operations Command, which seeks todevelop a orce capable o distributed operations, within an environment

characterized by irregular warare and asymmetric challenges. 1 Te hunter-

killer organization, with its strike units and teams, would be reinorced with

indigenous orces, much as we saw during the Vietnam War and the early

phases o the Aghanistan war. Tis kind o orce could contribute toward

achieving the U.S.SOF mission to act with speed, aggression, and lethal-

ity to achieve tactical through strategic eect. 2

odayU.S. national security is threatened by violent extremist groupsoperating rom sanctuaries in hard to reach areas o Aghanistan, Pakistan,

Yemen, Somalia, and similar areas in the Pacic Rim and Latin America. It

seems probable that there will be a marked increase in our need to disrupt

and destroy enemy orces in multiple sanctuaries around the globe as we

proceed to march through the 21st century. Celeskis paper provides a vision

o the uture SOF wherein hunter-killer teams could have a signicant role

to play in nding, disrupting, and destroying the enemy.

Kenneth H. Poole

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department


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xi

About the Author

Mr. Joe Celeski is a senior

ellow with the JSOU

Strategic Studies Depart-

ment. His current research ocuses

on irregular warare/unconventional

warare (IW/UW) with a specialty on

counterinsurgency (COIN), terrorism,

political warare, urban warare, jointSOF warighting, and senior leader

competencies. Retired rom active duty

with the U.S. Army as a Special Forces

colonel, he served in a variety o United

States Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM) and sta positions or over

20 years o his 30-year Army career. Prior to retirement, he commanded the3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (May

2002 to June 2004) and commanded coalition and joint SOF or two tours

in Aghanistan in support o Operation Enduring Freedom. He was a ully

qualied joint specialty ocer. Additionally, he is a Middle East area expert,

trained in the Arabic language, and has served throughout the Middle East

and the Horn o Arica regions. In his capacity as the chie o sta and deputy

commander or the U.S. Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg, Colonel

Celeski was the project ocer or orce modernization initiatives, develop-ment o the commands Program Operating Memorandum input, and the

UW transormation initiatives. He was awarded the St. Philip Neri Bronze

Award rom the Special Forces community in 2002 or his career work.

Mr. Celeski is a graduate o the Deense Language Institute (Modern

Standard Arabic), the U.S. Army Command and Sta College, the U.S. Air

Force Command and Sta College, the Marine Amphibious Warare Course,

the Army Force Management School, and the U.S. Army War College. He

has a B.S. in Political Science rom Columbus College in Georgia, a Master

o Public Administration (MPA) rom Shippensburg University in Penn-

sylvania, and a Master o National Security Issues rom the U.S. Army War


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xii

College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He will begin work toward his Ph.D. in

History rom the University o Georgia in the spring o 2010.

Mr. Celeski has published works on the Somalia conict and on the useo Special Forces in Joint Urban Operations in UW in the U.S. Army John

F. Kennedy Special Warare Center and School journal, Special Warare. He

has submitted his rst draf o Special Forces History in Somalia Conict,

1992-1995 or inclusion into ArmySOF in Somalia 1992-1995, a scal year

2010 proposed publication sponsored by the U.S. Army Special Operations

Command historian. In addition, Mr. Celeski has been a keynote speaker

at a variety o orums, including the Assistant Secretary o Deense or

Special Operations and Low Intensity Conict (ASD SO/LIC) sympo-sium, the Association o United States Army (AUSA), Royal Canadian

War College, the Naval War College, and the Joint Forces Sta College on

matters o leadership, urban operations, and UW. He has also lectured in

a variety o international orums to include the Polish National Deense

University regional SOF symposium, the Special Operations Command

Korea (SOCKOR) United Nations SOF symposium in Seoul, and in a variety

oJSOU-sponsored joint mobile education teams (JMEs) or combatingterrorism conducted in Chile, Jordan, and Croatia. His prior JSOU Press

publications are OperationalizingCOINin the 21st Century (September 2005)

and Policing and Law Enorcement in COINthe Tick Blue Line (February

2009).


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1

Hunter-Killer Teams:

Attacking Enemy Safe Havens

Introduction1.

Regular forces, indeed the most elite of highly professional regular

forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF), can wage war in an irregu-

lar, unconventional way. In fact, the history of warfare shows quite

clearly that if regulars are to prosper in campaigns against irregu-

lars, they are obliged to adopt at least some of the characteristics,

including the modus operandi, of the irregular enemy.3

Colin S. Gray,Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare

During September 2008, public reporting in American and Paki-

stani press told oU.S. commandos purported conduct o large-

scale raids into the Pakistani border tribal regionpresumably

authorized by the President o the United Stateswith unrestricted rules

o engagement not requiring U.S. regional command approval or acquies-

cence o the Pakistani government. Te intent o the raids, as reported, wasto penetrate into the previously inaccessible sae haven enjoyed by aliban

militants and Al Qaeda terrorists to destroy and disrupt their training bases

and to kill or capture their key leaders. U.S. military leaders and Aghan

President Karzai praised the actionthat is, the solution to a long-standing

sae haven problem and to weak eorts heretoore on behal o the Pakistani

security orces. Unortunately, raids o this nature are o short duration and

not designed or persistent presence. Although they can be highly disruptive

to the enemy, they also can contribute to the adoption o a whack-a-moletactic to deny sae havens. Eventually, the enemy will adjust to this tactic

and make it harder or uture raids to achieve success. Te best counter sae


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JSOU Report 10-1

haven line o operation involves a series o measures to achieve relentless

pressure; the line o eort has presence and persistence as attributes.

Te most challenging strategic and operational dilemma currently acingthe U.S. military in both Operations Enduring Freedom and in the Horn

o Arica region stems rom the enemys ease o withdrawal to inaccessible

areas, where he can operate rom established sae havens and create opera-

tional bases to reorm, ret, recruit, and relaunch attacks against coalition

orces. Adoption o counter sae haven measures should include the employ-

ment o hunter-killer teams as one o the options to challenge insurgent

perception o saety and invulnerability aorded by the inaccessibility sanc-

tuary oers them. When guerrillas or insurgents are challenged in theirown space, they are orced into a tempo o the riendly orces making and

ofen must abandon their base areas in order to survive. In addition, the

ear oU.S. hunter-killer teams persistently operating in and amongst ones

perceived sae space provides its own psychological eect against ones will

to continue the ght.

In any counterinsurgency (COIN) security line o operation, counterguer-

rilla activities are required as an oensive maneuver to throw o insurgentattempts to occupy space and create alternate governance. Among the rst

steps in any government response to an insurgency is holding and clear-

ing insurgent activities in the most vulnerable spots; this activity generally

requires the government to spread their resources in static holding posi-

tions, thus negating their reedom o maneuver to take on the insurgents

head-to-head. Simultaneously, it is at precisely the same time the govern-

ment is attempting to expand its security orcesmilitary, paramilitary, and

policeto overmatch the insurgents and achieve a avorable ratio o orcesto reach a tipping point o security or its population. Conversely, insurgent

movements use this window o opportunity to tie down government orces,

thereby allowing time to build up their own armed action orces or build

orces or a move to the nal, conventional oensive that would overwhelm

the government response. Tus at the operational and strategic levels it

becomes a race between the contestantswhere the side that can prevent the

growth o a measurable combat response on the part o their enemy, while

maintaining legitimacy and the will to ght, may ultimately win.

Te government response is ofen multidimensionalor example, hold-

ing and securing vulnerable portions o the country, maintaining legitimacy,

and solving grievances while simultaneously taking the oensive to the


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Celeski: Hunter-Killer TeamsAttacking Enemy Safe Havens

guerrillas. In taking the ght to the enemy, COIN practitioners adopt coun-

terguerrilla operations (a security line o operation). Tis means taking the

ght to the guerrillas, wherever they may be ound, by raising the contactrate between government orces and the insurgents. Against the insurgent

political arm, counterorganization measures are conducted to eliminate

enemy leadership and political organization. Tis includes manhunting

techniques. At the tactical level, aggressive patrolling operations to search

out guerrillas still orm one o the best means or conventional orces.

Combined with raids, the enemy is kept o balance and denied the oppor-

tunity to choose the time and place o his engagements, spoiling his oppor-

tunities to protract or prolong the ght. Counterguerrilla patrols, however,may not reach into inaccessible areas where insurgents seek to build their

bases and establish sae havens. Although conventional maneuver orces

(normally at company and battalion level) can conduct operations deep into

enemy-occupied territory, these oen have a sweeping eect and conclude

aer a short duration.

Insurgents enjoy the most reedom o maneuver in their sae havens

(bases), along their lines o communication, and in strategic rear areas, rela-tively unhindered by the day-to-day activities o counterguerrilla operations.

It is within that shroud o security the guerrillas take the opportunity to

recruit, train, ret, and grow their orces, including developing the structure

or the establishment o a main orce army. Unhindered by government

security orces intererence, complacency about security and deense on

the part o the insurgent will begin

to set in, providing the opportunity

or specialized COIN orces to oper-ate. An outstanding reerence on

this aspect o irregular warare is the

2007 publication edited by Michael

Innes, Denial o Sanctuary: Understanding errorist Sae Haven. One proven

method o disrupting insurgents or terrorists enjoying sae haven has been

the employment o hunter-killer teams.

Te purpose o this monograph is to examine the characteristics and

attributes o sae havens, explore options or counter sae haven measures,

and then ocus the analysis on the historical and contemporaryU.S. mili-

tary employment o one o those measureshunter-killer team opera-

tions. Te monograph explores previous doctrinal attempts to describe the

One proven method of disrupting

insurgents or terrorists enjoyingsafe haven has been the employ-

ment of hunter-killer teams.


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JSOU Report 10-1

employment oU.S. military units conducting counter sae haven measures

to derive a proposed denition or COIN hunter-killer operations. It also

examines the American historical use o predominantly specialized, lightinantry employed as counterguerrillas with the mission to penetrate and

operate deep into enemy sae havens.

Te overarching lessons gleaned rom the American military employ-

ment o hunter-killer operations will orm the basis or principles required

or doctrinal employment o hunter-killer operations in COIN and other

irregular warare scenarios. Te research o the monograph concludes with

a proposed recommendation on the specic orming and use o hunter-killer

organizations as a viable measure or counter sae haven activities in anyconict with irregular warare adversaries or doctrinal inclusion in uture

revisions oCOIN or irregular warare literature. Additionally, the mono-

graph provides recommendations or the establishment o ormal hunter-

killer organizations, at least within the USSOCOM component capability,

under the operational art o unconventional warare (UW).

I seen as viable, the hunter-killer concept deserves inclusion into uture

revisions o irregular warare doctrine. Currently, doctrine is lacking on thespecic proscription o counter sae haven measures that can be conducted

by specialized orces in hunter-killer congurations (procedures on the

attack and harassment against adversary morale, their sustainment system

[war-making capabilities], and their source o strength and supporta

witting populace). Tese activities are important to the COIN orce because

they can contribute to the exhaustion and erosion o insurgent orces while

they are in their sae havens.

Te research thesis is to answer the question: Is the employment ohunter-killer operations, as a counter sae haven measure in COIN, a sound

doctrinal concept or the U.S. military? Te research did not explore oreign

concepts unless they were useul to the development oU.S. doctrine, nor

the concept o hunter-killer operations used by conventional orces against

conventional orce adversaries, although they may be unorthodox (such as

operations to detect German U-boats in World War II). Tis monograph

also does not include the common usage o technological hunter-killer oper-

ationsthe so-called sensor-to-shooterconcept (such as observer aircraf

hunting or enemy tanks, then directing the eorts o the killer)in order

to ocus uniquely on COIN counter sae haven requirements.


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Logic abounds in the annals o warare on the military dictum to take

the ght to the enemy. Irregular warare is no dierent. Its deensive compo-

nentthe use o irregulars as auxiliaryis used to augment the maneuvero conventional orce or provide economy-o-orce options. Its oensive

component resembles a variety o tools in a toolkit or irregular warare

employment: counterguerrilla operations, counterorganization operations,

counter sae haven operations, pseudo-operations, manhunting, and the

most eared by irregular warare adversaries, the employment ohunter-

killerteams.


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Background, Defnition and Doctrine2.

In the guerrilla areas, the governing authorities should commencewhat we shall call a territorial offence. As in the cases of territorial

defence and consolidation, territorial offence will require assign-

ment of small military detachments to a large number of specic

zones. Although these detachments should establish local opera-

tional bases, they should not be garrisoned in posts. Rather, they

should continuously nomad, using whirlwind (tourbillon) type

tacticsas the French describe them.4

John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War

To be considered as military doctrine a warghting concept should

be accepted by military proessionals as an agreed upon means o

practical and common usage o employing military resources. Te

concept should generally solve a dilemma posed by the nature o war

or example, oense to deeat a deense, amphibious operations to gainlodgment in enemy territory, and interdiction to deny the enemy lines o

communication. Finally, the intended action should be grounded in some

theoretical aspect o war that has stood the test o time (a belie).

An objective o this monograph is to explore why hunter-killer operations

against enemy sae havens have had little doctrinal capture, particularly as

the Department o Deense (DoD) shifs its military art in recognition o

the Irregular Warare Joint Operating Concept. As a ramework or this

discussion and afer conducting the research, the ollowing denition isproposed:

Hunter-killer operations are prolonged operations conducted in

irregular warare by a unique and specically organized orce, in

conjunction with an indigenous orce, against irregular warare

adversaries by operating behind the lines or in hostile, sae haven, or

semipermissive environments, employing unorthodox tactics, or the

sole purpose o achieving attrition and punitive actions predominantlyagainst the personnel, leadership, and resources o the enemy.

Tis denition has as its base a UW solution to an unconventional prob-

lem. Te unconventional problem is the lack o access into insurgent sae


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JSOU Report 10-1

havens due to political actors, military limitations, and/or geography (and

could also include seasonal weather).

Insurgency theorists (most notably Robert aber, War o the Flea) discussthe requirement on the part o the insurgent to juxtaposition ones time,

space, and willelements o strategic artagainst the competing actions

o the government. For space, insurgents draw strength rom having bases

and sae areas to operate rom, essential to the building and development

o an action arm, a political process (alternate governance), and the ability

to hide rom security orces, thus contributing to the protraction o the

conict (and to ensure survival).

Protraction o conict has its roots in war oexhaustion and war oerosion theories, made amous by the writings o Mao. ime can be on the

side o the irregular warare adversary i used with other strategic initiatives.

Te body o conict theory is also clear that war is a clash o wills; at the

military level, using orce successully against the enemys orce becomes

one o the paths to achieve strategic objectives.

In most COIN theory, no one course o action chosen rom elemental

truths about the conduct o this type o irregular warare will guaranteesuccess; rather, the COIN leader becomes a virtuoso o applying contextually

agreed upon COIN measures, hopeully with the right mix and balance, to

achieve the political ends o the struggle. In the aggregate, these measures

historically (and doctrinally) include not only political and psychosocial

activities but also some orm o the oen mentioned clear, hold, buildand

nd, x, destroy. o clear and hold in COIN requires a static orce (the

deensive). o nd and x, then destroy requires an active orce, basically

consisting o oensive components, which include counterguerrilla orcesand other specialized orces whose purpose is to help improve the contact

rate and raise the attrition level o the insurgent to buy time or other popu-

lace security and political solutions to work.

Insurgents ofen enjoy the ability to operate at the time and place o

their choosing; when they do, COIN orces now know where they are and

their capabilities. In these cases, casualty rates tend to avor the conven-

tional, government orces. Te larger challenge, i counterinsurgents are to

deeat or neutralize the action arm and to destroy the insurgents base o

support (bases and sae havens), is to take oensive actions to thwart insur-

gent moves to operate between the seams o a countrys vital inrastructure

and its population centers, while enjoying the ability to retreat to saety.


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Properly conducted, the military line o operation in a COIN eort

becomes the blend o antimeasures, countermeasures, and oensive

measures. Tere is a range o measures available to the counterinsurgent;however, most o these measures remain at the tactic, technique, and proce-

dural level o handbooks rather than incorporated into our doctrinal knowl-

edge o irregular warare. able 1 shows a range o operations consistently

agreed upon and utilized during irregular wararea belie o how COIN

orces approach attacking insurgent time, space, and willwhile simultane-

ously providing orce-on-orce options to attrit the enemy.

Table 1. Irregular Adversary Essential Strengths

Strength Friendly Forces Counter

Time (protractedness) Counterguerrilla operationsCOIN/FID/IDAD/UW *CounterterrorismOperation tempo

Space (e.g., sanctuary, bases) Countersanctuary (raid, interdiction)Community policingComputer network attack

Border interdictionHunter-killer operations

Will (ideology, endurance) CountermotivationCounterinfluence operationsCounterrecruitmentPSYOPsPropagandaCombat attrition

Legitimacy (alternate governance) Political warfareUnconventional operations

Counterorganization (manhunting)Countermobilization

Criminal business enterprise (support) Policing and law enforcementCounternarcoticsCounterfinancing

* FID Foreign Internal Defense

IDAD Internal Defense and Development

Insurgency theory posits the strategic balance o time, space, and will

arrayed against government strengths as a means to achieve a political

victory, all based on theories o war to exhaust or erode populace support

or the government. In the modern context, legitimate and criminal busi-

ness enterprise (or external support mechanisms that may replace lack o


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JSOU Report 10-1

external state sponsorship) are also critical to the viability o any insurgency.

Friendly military options are a mix o anti, counter and oensive measures

to spoil these ve strengths. Tese can be used to keep the enemy o balancewhile the political and civil measures o an eective IDAD plan take time

to work.

Tis discussion rests on the oensive components oCOIN and to some

extent broader applications in other irregular warare scenarios. Hunter-

killer operations are one o the options used byCOIN orces to go on the

oensive against insurgents, particularly as a counter sae haven measure.

Because there are a variety o options that can be conused with pure hunter-

killer concepts, a brie discussion o their characteristics will distinguishthem rom the COIN hunter-killer terma useul point or doctrinal distinc-

tion. Each option discussed below embodies a particular eect; hunter-killer

operations dier in that most o these eects can be combined to achieve a

synergy aimed toward one objectivecumulative activities over time that

contribute to the erosion or exhaustion o the insurgent:

Raida. is a tactical action conducted behind enemy lines (or in enemy-

controlled areas) by conventional inantry or elite or shock inantrywith a specic purpose in mind. (Tese elite units are ofen considered

commandos.) Te raid may have tactical, operational, or strategic

value. Raids generally do not achieve coup-de-main status. Raids are

intended to be short duration missions whereby the raiding orce

immediately withdraws aer the operation back to its own riendly

lines; the survival o the raiding orce is ofen predicated on this

extraction beore enemy orces respond. Raiders can hold groundmomentarily, but ofen require a linking-up action by larger conven-

tional orces i the ground, or objective, is to be secured or riendly

orces. Larger, deep-penetration raids by conventional orces can also

be conducted as punitive operations.

Interdictionb. targets enemy lines o communication and support struc-

ture in order to deny war-making capability. Interdiction operations

include various targeting methodologies, combined with detailed

intelligence and conrming reconnaissance, to increase measures osuccess. Interdiction can be perormed with direct action, airpower,

or with stando capabilities. Sabotage o war materials is one o the

unconventional measures to conduct interdiction.


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Manhuntingc. is the specic targeting o leadership and key personnel

within an enemy organization. It is a counterorganization technique.

In military parlance, manhunting is characterized by all the activitiesto conduct high value target (HV) operations against individuals to

decapitate an organization. Manhunting techniques ofen resemble law

enorcement measures used to bring a criminal to justice. Manhunt-

ing is human-intelligence (HUMIN) intensive.

Counterorganizationd. is the means used to deeat the insurgent politi-

cal arm and its organizations. In insurgency, the enemy may attempt

to establish alternate governance with their political arm, rst as a

competing option to the populaces loyalty, then as a mechanismto assume the trappings o state and secure power once victory is

achieved. In these cases, political and ront organizations are created

to counteract the legitimate symbols o state, at all levels. Te insurgent

political arm is also a necessary means to mobilize the populace. Insur-

gent politics may ultimately require the ability to handle diplomacy

at the international level. Counterorganization measures consist o

actions to identiy, penetrate, and neutralize insurgent political orga-nizations. Subversion, apprehension, or neutralization o members o

the enemys political arm, combined with a counterideology campaign,

are just some o the activities taken by a government threatened by

shadow governments. Many o the successul counterorganization

campaigns adopted the combination o military, intelligence, and

policing in joint task-orce organizations to achieve unied action

on this ront. Counterorganization should not be conused with

countermobilization (denying the orm o alternate governance) andcounterguerrilla actions (securing the populace and isolating them

rom the insurgents).

Pseudo-operationse. are most ofen paramilitary police operations

conducted to gain intelligence on the enemy. Pseudo-organizations

adopt the appearance o the guerrilla in order to gain access to the

enemys operational area. While combat may occur, this is not the

intended purpose o the operation. Te best pseudo-operations are

those that incorporate turnedinsurgents.

Te useulness o hunter-killer operations is they could achieve many o

these results within the objective o denying the enemy space and destroying


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JSOU Report 10-1

his will through erosion and exhaustion. Hunter-killer operational utility

derives rom employing an eective economy-o-orce option, achieving

persistence by operating in the same space and conditions o the enemy,while achieving a military and psychological impact out o proportion to

its size (operational or strategic perormance is achieved).

U.S. irregular warare doctrine has never quite pinned down this concept

in detail. COIN doctrine and emerging irregular warare doctrine quite

adequately address the need to deny insurgents access to sae havens and

support (tacit/unwitting; internal/external) but lack in specics or prin-

ciples and application o the measures needed. Notwithstanding, good

counterinsurgents have always devised a means or attacking the enemy insae havens. Either these were on the spot, intuitive, individual decisions

or derived rom lessons passed rom earlier practitioners without adoption

into doctrinal literature, even though some doctrinal writings through-

out history have at least come close to describing the role o hunter-killer

teams.

Te earliest attempt to capture hunter-killer concepts evolved rom

Benjamin Churchs personal memoir o his rangingactivities with speciallyormed militia into hostile territory during King Philips War (1675 to 1676).

Tese written experiences were incorporated into techniques used by Robert

Rogers, who in the French and Indian War developed his now-amous rules

or the conduct o deep reconnaissance raids.

Much o what early counterinsurgents understood about oensive opera-

tions against irregulars in inaccessible territory may have been derived rom

reading Colonel C. E. Callwells monumental workSmall Wars: Teir Prin-

ciples and Practices, which he published in nal, revised orm in 1899. Call-well described a doctrinal approach o ying columns (superior maneuver

and mobility to the irregular) and specied the purpose o raids in irregular

warare ( kill them or to wound them, or at least to hunt them rom their

homes and then to destroy or carry o their belongings 5), combined with

the need to match the enemy and adapt. However, U.S. irregular warare

experts largely relied on the personal experiences and accounts o previous

practitioners through the venue o lessons learned passed on generationally.

U.S. Army operations against the Southwest Indians, the exas Rangers

experiences against the Plains Indians, and the COIN experience rom the

Philippine War lost doctrinal capture and appeal in the shadow and subse-

quent deployment or World War I.


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It took the cumulative experience o the U.S. Marine Corps, over many

years, to codiy military activities conducted deep in enemy territory in its

Small Wars Manual, published in 1940. Much o Callwells work appears tohave made its way into the Small Wars Manual, which also set the standard

or utilizing task-organized conventional orces to conduct these specialized

operations, such as deep raids. (Specially organized hunter-killer orces to

conduct this task were still ar in the uture.)

Te Small Wars Manualdeveloped a variation on Callwells theme; there

would be a variety o means to challenge guerrillas on their tur: ying

columns, mobile columns, and roving patrols (all still comprised o conven-

tional orces). Te mobile column diered rom a ying column only in itsrange and reliance on a base o supply. O interest was the roving patrol

concept, the clearest capturing o doctrinal employment o hunter-killer

teams:

A roving patrol (at 5-21 in the manual) is a sel-sustaining detachmenta.

o more or less independent nature. It usually operates within an

assigned zone and as a rule has much reedom o action. As distin-

guished rom other patrols, it is capable o operating away rom itsbase or an indenite period o time. Missions generally assigned

include a relentless pursuit o guerilla groups continuing until their

disorganization is practically complete.

Tis method is particularly applicable when large bands are known tob.

exist and the locality o their depredations is approximately known.

Such patrols are oen employed in conjunction with other methods

o operations.O course, World War II diminished the ascination with small wars. By

World War II, the American militia and independent volunteer system was

gone (which eliminated the U.S. pool o outdoorsmen adept at ranging) to

be replaced by National Guard and Reserve structures tailored or conven-

tional war (because armies were required to ght armies). World War II also

shifed the emphasis o elite and specialized military unit employment rom

ranging to one o reconnaissance, shock inantry, and raiding (e.g., Rang-

ers, U.S. Marine Corps Raiders, and 1st Special Service Force). Finally, the

American military was not conronted with an irregular warare enemy in

World War II, so it came out o the experience with an overall penchant or


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JSOU Report 10-1

conventional warare, even though much had been learned by the Oce o

Strategic Services (OSS) conducting guerrilla warare activities.

Prior to the Vietnam War, it was the doctrine o other nations thatexpounded on oensive activities to challenge insurgent space. While not

American doctrinal solutions, these examples did provide some ramework

or urther U.S. military doctrinal approaches to COIN techniques. Roger

rinquiers treatise,Modern Warare: A French View o Counterinsurgency,

Sir Robert Tompsons work, Deeating Communist Insurgency, and David

Galulas Counterinsurgency Warare: Teory and Practice contain examples

or oensive actions within insurgent territory to attack bases and attrit the

enemy (e.g., intervention units, some orm o pursuit commandos, pseudo-organizations, and Ranger-type organizations).

One o the rst uniquely American-derived doctrinal approaches to

antiguerrilla activities afer World War II involving hunter-killer opera-

tions was oered by Lt Col Edward G. Lansdale during the early 1950s,

when he served as an UW liaison ocer to Ramon Magsaysay, the Philip-

pine Secretary o National Deense. Lansdale assisted in COIN eorts to

deeat the communist-inspired Hukbalahap insurgency. From observationsand ront-line experience, Lansdale consolidated his thoughts on eective,

antiguerrilla operations. While the document, Operations Against Guer-

rilla Forces (undated), was supported by the Military Assistance Advisory

Group (MAAG) chie o the U.S. embassy in Manila, its restricted nature

prevented widespread sharing among military proessional and doctrinal

institutions. Tus its tenets or oensive COIN, by orming specialized anti-

guerrilla units, did not become mainstream. Lansdale called or the creation

o special antiguerrilla units to penetrate and destroy insurgent personneland inrastructure, arguing or small-unit, broadly scoped missions and

specically warned o the need to maintain and support special antiguer-

rilla units to increase their viability or extended operations (the caveat was

against retasking conventional inantry or this purpose).6

COIN doctrine developed by the U.S. during and afer the Vietnam War

still did not address oensive actions into enemy sanctuaries as anything

other than pursuit, reconnaissance, interdiction, or raids (e.g., the actions

o Special Operations Group and the U.S. Special Forces B52 organization).

However, it was still apparent to counterinsurgents that denial o sae havens

(the term sanctuary was used in most military literature o that day) was

a key component oCOIN success. Te Department o the Army released


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Field Manual (FM) 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations on 1 October 2004.

Perhaps a limiting political actor in modern COIN may have unintention-

ally aected doctrinal approaches, then and now: the diplomatic repercus-sions o violating the sovereignty o another country.

Te one clear approach or taking the ght to enemy-dominated territory

emanated rom UW approaches developed by the U.S. Army Special Forces.

Still not explicitly stating a unique role or hunter-killer operations, FM 31-21,

Guerrilla Warare and Special Forces Operations (Headquarters, Depart-

ment o the Army, September 1961) came close in its page 130 discussion

o attrition measures and interdiction operations conducted by irregular,

indigenous orces:

Section III. Interdiction. 117. General

UWa. orces use interdiction as the primary means o accomplish-

ing operational objectives. Interdiction is designed to prevent or

hinder, by any means, enemy use o an area or route. Interdiction

is the cumulative eect o numerous smaller oensive operations

such as raids, ambushes, mining, and sniping. Enemy areas or

routes that oer the most vulnerable and lucrative targets or

interdiction are industrial acilities, military installations, and

lines o communication.

Te results o planned interdiction programs are.b.

Eective intererence with the movement o personnel, supplies,

equipment, and raw material

Destruction o storage and production acilities

Destruction o military installations; or positive results, attacks

are directed against the primary and alternate critical elements

o each target system.

Protable secondary results can be obtained rom interdictionc.

operations i they are conducted over a wide area; when the UW

orce employs units in rapid attacks in dierent and widely spaced

places, it

Makes it dicult or the enemy to accurately locate guerrilla

bases by analyzing guerrilla operationsCauses the enemy to overestimate the strength and support o

the guerrilla orce

May tend to demoralize him and lessen his will to ght.


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JSOU Report 10-1

Although UW doctrine was specically developed to employ Special

Forces in consort with an indigenous resistance movement, the U.S. Special

Forces during the Vietnam War adapted this doctrine or use in securityorce assistance operations and created Mobile Guerrilla Forces (auxiliary)

to take the ght to the Viet Cong in their base areas. Between this approach,

borrowing o oreign doctrine, and the earlier thoughts o the U.S. Marine

Corps on roving patrols, the elements or development o hunter-killer

operations in irregular warare doctrine could have been ramed.

COINs resurgence in doctrinal appeal came to the oreront with

the involvement oU.S. orces afer 9/11 in the two insurgencies in Iraq

and Aghanistan. (We can also add Operation Enduring Freedom in thePhilippines.)

Te U.S. collective doctrinal approach to COIN is now embodied in

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Chapter 1 clearly describes not only the benets

that sanctuary (now reerred to as sae haven) provides insurgents but also

the doctrinal prescription: Eective COIN operations work to eliminate

sanctuaries. 7 Further in the chapter (section I-98), the ollowing is oered:

imely, resolute counterinsurgent actions to exploit poor enemy base loca-tions and eliminate or disrupt good ones can signicantly weaken an insur-

gency. Te eld manual is also quite clear that the preerred method to

achieve this disruption is through the oensive actions o land orces and

an eective targeting system. However, there exists little discussion on the

role o employing hunter-killer teams or indigenous hunter-killer teams as

part o these disruptive options. Even less are any works on the analysis and

appreciation o the ramework and characteristics o sae havens.

o achieve the level o doctrinal acceptance or hunter-killer operations,the concept must be recognized as an American way o war; it certainly has

its historical antecedents. Tere must be a set o uniying principles or its

employment, and key to doctrine, an agreed upon denition o its nature;

this monograph supports that requirement. A thorough understanding o

the characteristics and attributes o sae havens and their impact on riendly

orces is necessary to develop counter sae haven measures; see chapter 3.

o rene this thesis, a review o the American historical approaches in the

employment o hunter-killer operations is warranted, primarily to ascertain

their advantages and disadvantages, utility and to dene the boundaries or

the development o operating principles. Tis work examines the American

historical approaches on the use o hunter-killer methodologies during its


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wars by the analysis conducted in chapter 4; consolidating these examples

into derived principles is covered in chapter 5.


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Safe Havens4.

. its very clear to us that Al Qaeda has been able over the past18 months or so to establish a safe haven along the Afghanistan-

Pakistan border areas that they have not enjoyed before, that they

are bringing operatives into that region for training, operatives

that wouldnt attract your attention if they were going through the

Customs line at Dulles with you when youre coming back from

overseas.

LTG Michael Hayden, CIA director, 30 March 2008

The ability o terrorists and other irregular warare adversaries to

conduct operations rom a sanctuaryhereafer reerred to in more

common usage as sae havenincreases the potential success o the

insurgent or terrorist in their struggles against government orces. Deny-

ing sae haven, thereore, is an essential part o any counterstrategy. For

instance, the use o Pakistans tribal areas as a sae haven by the alibanand Al Qaeda present allied orces with a large strategic dilemma i not

addressed (the protraction o the war and the weakening o the government

will to prosecute the campaign). Te most imposing uture security threat

may not be rogue or strong states, but rather the emergence o weak and

ailing states that can ultimately be used as sae havens by our enemies

such as we are now seeing in the Horn o Arica region, Somalia and Yemen.

Worse, the linking together o multiple sae havens creates a network o

imposing challenges to security orces charged with protection o nationalsovereignty.

Current methodologies or the creation o campaign plans have now

recognized the need or a commanders appreciation to rame the problem

prior to any sta entering the military decision-making process to develop

the architecture o the campaign plan. Tis chapter provides a way o looking

at the problem o enemy sae havens when conducting initial assessments.

The Role of Safe Havens

Tis aspect o the generational challengepersistent conict against violent

extremismposed by transnational threats operating rom sae havens was

clearly identied in the ndings oTe 9/11 Commission Report:


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JSOU Report 10-1

A complex international terrorist operation aimed at launching a

catastrophic attack cannot be mounted by just anyone in any place.

Such operations appear to require the ollowing:ime, space, and ability to perorm competent planning and staa.

work

A command structure able to make necessary decisions andb.

possessing the authority and contacts to assemble needed people,

money, and materials

Opportunity and space to recruit, train, and select operativesc.

with the needed skills and dedication, providing the time and

structure required to socialize them into the terrorist cause, judge

their trustworthiness, and hone their skills

A logistics network able to securely manage the travel o opera-d.

tives, move money, and transport resources (like explosives) where

they need to go

Access, in the case o certain weapons, to the special materialse.

needed or a nuclear, chemical, radiological, or biological attack

Reliable communications between coordinators and operatives.Opportunity to test the workability o the plan.g. 8

Afer Te 9/11 Commission Report, the U.S. Department o State (DoS)

conducted a rened study o the desired attributes that may or may not

make aplace a sae haven in order to ormulate a working denition o sae

havens. Tat denition would be useul or the conduct o diplomacy when

considering threats to national sovereignty. Te DoS denition additionally

highlighted places where the enemy could operate in relative security andperorm the unctions noted above. Regardless o the denitional sources

on the sae haven phenomenon, the ollowing denition oered by the

Interagency Intelligence Community on errorism (IIC) serves best or

the purpose o this monograph (and expanding the denition to include

insurgents):

A sae haven is an area where terrorists are able to gather in rela-

tive security and in sucient numbers to engage in activities that

constitute a threat to U.S. national security. Such activities include

attack preparations, training, undraising, and recruitment ofen

conducted in unsecured or undergoverned geographic areas. 9


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Features of Safe Havens

What are the desired eatures making a location attractive as a sae haven

or a potential uture sae haven? One o the key, critical vulnerabilities o

insurgent and terrorist organizations is the need or secrecy and security in

order to operate. Counter sae haven operations are ofen aimed at exposing

or dislodging irregular warare adversaries in these two areassecrecy and

securityto create a third vulnerabilitymovement. Another important

vulnerability is the enemys need or the support o the populace, making

isolating the populace rom the enemy an ofen-considered COIN and

combating terrorism tool. Tus, preerred eatures o the sae haven mustinclude the ability to hide in plain sight (even better i the position is near

the area o operations), to be located where it is physically nonaccessible by

government security orces, and with the ability or the enemy to operate

in a secure mannerree rom police, intelligence operatives, and legal

systems.

A supporting populace is also highly desirable in order to provide venues

or recruitment as well as needed logistical and nancial support. However,

the enemy can still operate in a sae haven without popular support; a popu-lation can be terrorized and intimidated into acquiescing to the demands o

the enemy or at least not turning the enemy over to government orces.

Another desired eature is the ability to get into and out o the sae

haven to conduct operations, requiring nonrestrictive transit routes and

transportation assets. Tis eature is urther enhanced by establishing the

sae haven near porous borders and along illicit rat lines already in use or

smuggling and other criminal activities where the participants are adept atevading law enorcement and customs agents. A nal highly desired eature

would be having connectivity to cyber systems.

Framing the Environment

Prior to consideration o any counter sae haven operation, the sae haven

area should be thoroughly analyzed with regard to its composition. Is it an

ungoverned or undergoverned area? Is it truly a sae haven that provides

sanctuary, or is it merely a base o operations? Is the area an ethnic, sepa-ratist region or is it part o the country-wide insurgency? Or like the FARC

operations in Columbia, is it an area or a criminal business enterprise?

Clear understanding o the environmental makeup o the sae haven and


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JSOU Report 10-1

the motivations o its actors will assist in the shaping o the counter sae

haven plan.

Sae havens can also be categorized by unction and by geography. Func-tional sae havens include reugee camps, prisons, diasporas, academia,

and ideology (a supportive, cultural anity to support the terrorists or

insurgents). Geographical types (physical spaces) o sae havens include

urban, rural, and virtual.

During their analysis, counterterrorists and counterinsurgent planners

identiy issues that may place restrictions and limitations on their ability to

conduct counter sae haven operations. Imposing physical terrain and issues

o sovereignty can limit operations to only the ringes o the sae havenarea. Security orces may be nonindigenous to the area and even urther

hampered by rules o engagement. Te skills and capabilities o the security

orces require review to ascertain the correct ways and means to achieve the

ends. As an example, brute orce and repression can be used to clear a sae

haven i the security orces do not have nesse; the second and third order

eect, however, may result in huge reugee populations and a devastated

area now requiring an expensive rebuild. Clearing a sae haven could endup as a protracted operationthe government must have the will and time

needed to outlast the enemy and see the operation to its conclusion.10

Counter Safe Haven Approaches

Te ollowing approaches to denying or countering adversaries operating

in sae havens were derived rom historical examples o irregular warare

conicts since the end o World War II. One may wish or the case where

the indigenous population within the sae haven rises up against the terror-ists or insurgents, but this rarely happens. Te raming o the sae haven

environment during assessment and analysis will ofen dictate the approach

considered. Te ollowing are common approaches that can be used as a line

o eort within campaign plans (individually, or in the aggregate):

Isolate, manage, and contain the sae haven (includes bordera.

interdiction)

A policing, law enorcement, and intelligence approachb.Brute orce intervention (invasion, interdiction, sweeping)c.

International diplomacy to put pressure on the supporting countryd.

Unconventional warare.e.


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Te best approach, historically, is one in which the host nation with the

problem solves it without external assistance.

Counter Safe Haven Techniques for Security Forces

Te ollowing measures should be considered or development o a counter

sae haven plan. Te plan will be multidisciplinary, with the combination

o several o the measures applied in consort with one another:

Enhance border control, customs, and immigration services.a.

Prepare human terrain databases and social-cultural mapping, applyb.

additional population control measures (e.g., control o resources,biometrics, and identication cards), and co-opt the local populace

and solve grievances to isolate population rom the enemy.

Conduct counterorganization, counterrecruitment, and countermo-c.

tivation operations in the sae haven.

Simultaneously attack any criminal business enterprises.d.

Develop and employ specially trained orces (e.g., border interdiction,e.

hunter-killer teams, and pseudo-operations teams).

Employ an interdiction and targeting plan throughout the sae.haven.

Consider adoption o additional laws and legal measures to enhanceg.

security orce and law enorcement operations.

Engage in regional initiatives or combating terrorism and law enorce-h.

ment enhancements.

Own and control the narrative and inormation operations in the saei.

haven; counter cyber threats and capabilities o the enemy.Border barriers and ences in conjunction with interdiction measuresj.

(kinetic).

During the Algerian War, the French recognized the insurgent use o

sanctuary across the borders in unisia and Morocco. Te French applied

various techniques to isolate the National Liberation Army (ALN) inside the

sae havens through the building o an eective barrier system: theMorice

Line along the unisian border and the Pedron Line along the Moroccan

border. Te barriersbarragesconsisted o wire ences augmented with

lights and mineelds and were eventually very eective in stopping enemy

inltration with a kill rate o over 85 percent. Over 40,000 troops were

assigned to static posts along these barriers supplemented with mobile


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JSOU Report 10-1

columns to react to penetrations. In consort with the border barrages,

French naval orces implemented a campaign o coastal surveillance and

high seas interdiction to close down arms smuggling. Tese measurestaken collectively orced the ALN to continue only with guerrilla opera-

tions while thwarting attempts to conduct more aggressive, mobile warare

operations.

Summary

Countering an adversary sae haven is a multidimensional problem, oen

with no single solution. Correctly raming the problem o sae haven (its

characteristics and environment) helps to identiy the approaches and tech-niques required to eectively achieve its elimination or at best, denial to

enemy orces. Some o the key vulnerabilities o terrorists and insurgents

who operate within sae havens are organizational security, physical secu-

rity, and ofen the need or a supporting populace. Government legitimacy,

eective security orces, and countermobilization o the population to sepa-

rate them rom the threat are among the most eective tools in eliminating

or denying sae haven creation.A wide variety o military, policing, and law enorcement measures are

available to the counterterrorist and counterinsurgent to achieve the desired

eects on adversary sae havens. One o those measures discussed here is

the employment o hunter-killer teams within the sae haven. Historically,

the U.S. military has employed some orm o this technique based on the

demands o the irregular warare environment and yet ailed to adequately

codiy this approach in doctrine. Chapter 4 reviews American military

employment o hunter-killer type ormations throughout U.S. history toderive the advantages and disadvantages o their use, to capture key lessons

learned about their operations, and to synthesize the best practices observed

and employed to capture hunter-killer team employment principles (chapter

5). An understanding o these principles will support the ormulation o

uture COIN and counterterrorism doctrinal input on this subject, particu-

larly in the wider area o counter sae haven operations.


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The American Historical Experience in4.

Hunter-Killer OperationsScouts without a peer, superb in woodcraft, the Indians fought

the total warfare of the barbarian hordes of the past and of the

civilized nations of the futures. Such was the military legacy of

the Indians to the garrison of Fort Stanwix, as to their forefathers

before them and to the soldiers who would come after them, an

invaluable bequest for all our later wars through Korea. The art of

using cover, of inltration, of ambush, and sudden surprise attack,of mobility. Ranger companies before and during the Revolution

practiced Indian tactics to the hilt, as would their counterparts on

into the twentieth century. In no small measure the Indian Wars

made the American Army the effective ghting force it became.11

Fairfax Downey, Indian Wars of the U.S. Army 17761865

Doctrine can be inormed by historical experience. In most scenar-ios where the American military was aced with an irregular

warare adversary, some orm o ranging or hunter-killer units

were employed as a response to take the ght deep into enemy territory. A

review o those experiences in various irregular wars ought by America can

establish the acceptance and utility o employing hunter-killer operations

as part o any American way o irregular warare.

Te U.S. military hunter-killer team employment and counter sae havenexperiences can be divided or study between the preindustrial period o

colonial and early American era to post-World War II and beyond. Some

reasons or the break and the dierences between the two periods ollow:

Rules o engagement became more restrictive and humane to limita.

harm against noncombatants (unorthodox and brutal tactics in irregu-

lar warare begin to become scorned by more proessional military

leaders).

Irregular warare engagements by theb. U.S. dwindled.

Te militia and volunteer system or the American military wasc.

replaced by the Reserve and National Guard systems, drying up

the pool o independent volunteers with the necessary independent


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JSOU Report 10-1

attributes to range and conduct hunter-killer activities as ad hoc

ormations.

O most consequence, World War II changed the role o irregular rang-

ing skills o elite light-inantry units to creation o special raider and

commando-style units patterned upon European doctrine (even though

the U.S. Army still retained Ranger-type ormations). Unortunately, the

ranging skill o the light inantryman (independent units adopting enemy

tactics and operating or extended periods in nonpermissive areas) becomes

lost in the conventional nature o the war as they soon become shock inan-

try, raiders, and long-range reconnaissance units.

Colonial and Early American Period of Hunter-Killer Operations

Te American military experience with hunter-killer operations in enemy

sae havens began in a world in which we nd ourselves today. It was during

a clash o civilizations throughout the 1600s and 1700s where expanding,

oreign imperialism crashed into indigenous populations and culture; indig-

enous cultures were manipulated by contending states to provide irregular

warriors or the ght. It was a conict between liberally governed soci-eties, ruled under a sense o recognized legitimacy, against substate and

tribal warriors. Competing ideologies o rened culture versus savagery

and barbarism ormed the backdrop o warare amongst combatants and

noncombatants alike. Whole populations lived in terror o massacre, behead-

ings, torture, wretched imprisonment i captured, and the destruction o

homelands and economies.

Tese conditions created a unique way o early-American war on therontier and ostered the employment orangingtactics as hunter-killer

operations against irregulars in their sae havens. Te operational style o

ranging initially consisted o patrolling between rontier orts (to detect

enemy activities) as well as scouting and raiding i warranted. Tus the

name or these early hunter-killer type militia units: Rangers. Te ollow-

ing examples illustrate various roles and missions o the early Rangers and

the pros and cons o their employment as hunter-killer units. Te most

comprehensive work on this way o war and a complement to any libraryon irregular warare is John Greniers book, Te First Way o War: Ameri-

can War Making on the Frontier. Hunter-killer methods became the most

eective mode o early American irregular warare military art. Tose tasks


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required long-range penetration into enemy territory and a laundry list

o destructive measures to accomplish once there, all contributing to the

attritional nature o wars o exhaustion against irregular warriors.

Attacking and destroying Indian noncombatant populations

remained the American, particularly rontiersmen, preerred way

o waging war rom the early sixteenth through early nineteenth

centuries, even aer the ormation o the regular American Army

and its attempts to move toward the eighteenth century European

norm o limited war.12

King Philips War, 1675 to 1676. Te expanding land desires o the earlysettlers in southern New England (Massachusetts Bay Colony, Swansea,

Plymouth Colony, Rhode Island, Connecticut), combined with growing

disdain on the part o colonists or the incompatibility with European

culture and values o the various indigenous Indian tribes populating the

region, led to the rst outbreak o ormal military operations. It reached

campaign scale during King Philips War, ought between 1675 and 1676,

against the backdrop o Europes 30 Years War.King Philip (with the Wampanoag Indian name o Metacom) led the

eastern American Indian tribes o the Wampanoag, Narragansett, Nipmuc,

and others in an attack against the colonists in June 1675, in the southern

border region o the Plymouth Colony. Beore the war ended, thousands o

towns, settlements, and homes o American settlers were destroyed, over

800 lives lost amongst the settlers and approximately 3,000 losses amongst

the Native American populace (resulting in the decimation o the eastern-

American Indian tribes).13Early colonial military deense consisted o a basic sel-reliance on an

armed populace and the establishment o a mutually supporting colonial

militia system, all backed up with a series o ortied houses and blockhouses

stretching across the rontier. I attacked, the citizenry would rally into the

ortied positions and allow the militia to patrol and roam between them

in an attempt to clear away the Indians. American militias were trained in

accordance with European military tactics involving lines o inantrymen

delivering volley re. Te Indians used guerrilla-like tactics, rst raiding,

then disappearing into orests and swamps as reuge and sanctuary.

As in all insurgency-like conicts, the enemys elusiveness plagued

eorts to bring on decisive military battle. In recognition o the need to


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take the ght to the Indian warriors, Governor Winslow (Plymouth Colony)

appointed Benjamin Church as the commander o the rst ull-time, inde-

pendent company o Ranger militia. Comprised o both expert rontiers-men and Indian volunteers (initially about 60 Englishmen and 140 Indian

irregulars), Benjamin Church employed his unit as the rst ocially sanc-

tioned American ranging unit with a clear mandate or a hunter-killer type

o operation:

a orce specially designed to search out the remnants o the enemy

wherever they may lurk and beat them at their own tricks o orest

warare.14

Captain Church was well knowna amous Indian ghterand had a

vast knowledge o the rontier territory. His unorthodox leadership style,

with a air or the dramatic, made him a perect leader or an autonomous

hunter-killer unit. Benjamin Church employed ranging tactics to conduct

a variety o oensive strikes against enemy sae havens. Benjamin Church

took the ranging concept to the next level, employing his Rangers deep

into enemy territory or long periods (over weeks o time) with the expressmission o destroying the hostiles and their sae haven support system. Te

Rangers ought by copying the style o Indian orest ghting and swamp-

ghting tactics.

Churchs unit almost single-handedly turned around the war eort with

a string o successes against the hostiles. His unit accounted or the death o

King Philip; the capture o Philips supporter, Annawon; and a devastating

winter raid (conducted as a combined operation with other colonial militia

units on 19 December 1675) against a ortied camp o Narragansett nearpresent-day South Kingston, Rhode Island. Dubbed the Great Swamp Fight,

this action eliminated any urther serious involvement o the Narragansett

Indians during the remainder o the war.

Benjamin Church used mixed militia and indigenous orces to his advan-

tage along with the rontiersmen knowledge o the outdoors, adoption o

Indian skulkingtactics, and well-armed units to overmatch his adversaries.

He adapted to the enemy by learning the intricacies o swamp warare in

order to expand his operations into that sae haven. His disadvantages were

limited mobility (same as his adversaryoot) and lack o means to sustain

his orces during bad weather.


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Church derived early principles rom his warare exploits utilizing

hunter-killer methodologies. His written experiences in hunter-killer types

o operations were passed on and incorporated into the style o ranging

and hunter-killer operations made amous by Robert Rogers during the

French and Indian War. Although Rogers exploits orm the lore o modern

Ranger history, Benjamin Church should rightly have the title o the athero the rst American military operations employing Rangers as unorthodox

military.

French and Indian War, Rogers Rangers. Major Robert Rogers began his

ranging career as a 14-year-old Indian ghter and went on to become the

most amous, although certainly not the rst, Ranger o the American ron-

tier. Rogers perected the art o oensive ranging with his hunter-killer units

by conducting deep penetration raids and reconnaissance missions or theBritish orces stationed along the upper state waterways o New York during

the French and Indian Wars. Rogers capitalized on integrating indigenous

orces into his units. Tey served as scouts, knowing the land well. He raised

Figure 1. Rhode Island State historical marker near the location ofthe Great Swamp Fight where Colonel Church and his Rangers par-

ticipated in a decisive winter raid against the sanctuary of the Nar-ragansett Indians (near present-day South Kingston, Rhode Island)


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JSOU Report 10-1

volunteers who were physically hardy and superb outdoorsmen, and adopted

unorthodox ghting techniques similar to the hostile Indians. With these

units he led missions into enemy territoryharassing Frenchand Indianlines, gathering intelligence, and capturing prisoners.

His most notable hunter-killer type operation was the raid against the

Abneki village on 4 October 1759, located at St. Franois in the St. Lawrence

River valley. raveling over 150 miles with 142 Rangers and indigenous

Indian irregulars, the village was ruthlessly attacked. Many o the Abnecki

warriors and noncombatants were killed or scattered, and then the whole

village was burned.15

Rogers would go on to command a Ranger contingent during the Revo-lutionary War, unortunately on the side o the British. He is most remem-

bered or his Rules or Ranging, promulgated as a result o his experiences.

Rogers expedition typied the rst derived and applied principles o hunter-

killer and ranging operations to ensure success. His men were handpicked,

including the Mohican scouts. Te rangers wore sturdy, rontier clothing

to protect them rom the elements and to blend in with indigenous popula-

tions ound in his operating area. Te Rangers were armed well enough tomatch or overmatch their adversaries. Weapons skill and care o weapons

were enorced constantly.

Te Rangers traveled ast and light (carrying extra moccasins or long-

range patrols) and ofen used canoes or boats to increase their mobility.

During winter, skates were used to rapidly transit rozen lakes and rivers,

and snowshoes were used to negotiate the eects o snow on the trails.

Combined with a cultural and geographical knowledge o their area o oper-

ations and the ability to live o the land and travel long distances behindenemy lines, the Rangers became the most eective, specialized orce in

the northeast.

Conversely, the ailing attribute o Rogers operational style was that he

was not constrained by rules o engagement when conducting his opera-

tions against combatants and noncombatants alike; i prisoners impeded

his movement, they were usually killed. Noncombatants were killed along

with warriors. Tis tactic was scorned by the conventional British Army

regulars, and Rogers was later rebuked or this operation. Te British had

made great propaganda against the French when they employed these tactics

with their Indian irregulars; the high moral ground was lost and the French

continued to allow their indigenous allies to commit atrocities.


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Operational Maneuver, Strategic Efect: Te Battle o Kings Mountain

1780. Tere are very ew examples o early American military operations

involving hunter-killer teams in achieving a strategic eect based on theoperational maneuver o its irregular orces; most hunter-killer operations

are tactical engagements. Tis eect might only be accomplished i the

hunter-killer operations are employed as the main element o a war-o-

exhaustion strategy; by the prolonged operations o hunter-killer teams to

wear down enemy insurgents; or the insurgent orce is so decimated that

victory is achieved.

Te Battle o Kings Mountain in 1780 pitted the irregular orces o the

back-country coloniststhe Overmountain Men rom ennessee and militiarom the western districts in North Carolinaagainst the proxy, provincial

irregular orces o Loyalists commanded by Major Patrick Ferguson.16

Afer stalemate in the North against Washingtons orces during the

Revolutionary War, British strategy shied to reliance on a perceived loyal

ory population in the southern states to deeat the Americans. Te English

war cabinet, in consort with its generals, believed it would be possible to

subdue the rebels in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia usingirregulars provided rom the Loyalists. Afer the attack on Savannah, British

orces overran Georgia, and then captured Charleston on 12 May 1780. From

this position o strength, British orces spread military detachments to the

countryside to consolidate their gains. In response, the American General

Gates reacted in August o that yearmaneuvering with the Continental

orces at Camden, South Carolinaand was heavily deeated. With the

absence o an American Army to thwart British gains, American patriots

turned to partisan and guerrilla warare operations to continually harassthe British.

Ferguson commanded a large, irregular orce o about 1,100 Loyalists

(which included Rangers). He was ordered by the British command into

western South Carolina (to the ort named 96, a star, earthen-work orti-

cation guarding a trade route), prepositioned to continue operations against

American Partisans in North Carolina. He soon moved his orces north,

scattering the Partisans in his wake, with the intention o linking up with

British orces in Charlotte. Ferguson believed the back country area would

provide him with a loyal populace, provisions, and terrain to support his

maneuversae haven characteristics.


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JSOU Report 10-1

In response, militia commanders Colonels Isaac Shelby and John Sevier

mustered the largest hunter-killer operation in early American history at

Sycamore Shoals (near modern Elizabethton, ennessee) on 22 September1780. With the addition o 200 Virginians under Colonels William and

Arthur Campbell, the orce o militia and irregulars let loose rom the Shelv-

ing Rock rendezvous point as aying column to search out and destroy

Ferguson. Te column split at Catawba in order to gather more Partisans

and grew to approximately 1,400 men (later dubbed in olklore as the Ghost

Legion).

Ferguson soon had word rom local spies o this irregular orce hunting

or him and stopped at Kings Mountain to gather more reinorcements.Kings Mountain was a poor choice or a deensive position being isolated

and with very little water. Unbeknownst to Ferguson, none o his messages

calling or reinorcements were getting past the hostile population.

Te American hunter-killer orce slowed to the pace o its oot soldiers.

In rustration at the pace o movement, the orce was reorganized into a

mounted column, leaving the oot soldiers at Cowpens, and pushed ahead

to Kings Mountain with about 900 horsemen on 6 October. Local oriescaptured along the way provided intelligence, and much o the population

provided provisions or the orce as it pushed orward (to include the draw-

ing o maps).

Ferguson was soon surrounded. Te Americans, using Indian tactics,

were repulsed rom the top o the mountain several times. Soon, Loyalist

muskets could not compete with the accuracy and killing rate o American

ries; they were deeated aer Ferguson was killed. American losses were

about 30; the Loyalist orce o approximately 1,100 was decimated (about150 killed, commensurate number wounded, and over 800 taken prisoner).

Te American victory ensured the British would never operate in orce

again across the southern back country. Te victory also dampened the

enthusiasm or Loyalist support or England or the remainder o the wara

strategic victory.17

Te attributes o the hunter-killer operation lending to the success o

American irregulars came rom their superior repower (rie technology

vs. musket), superior mobility on horseback, knowledge o the terrain and

populace, the innate ability o the American irregular to live o the land, the

hardiness o the physical condition o the irregulars, and the reckless, brave,

charismatic and audacious l

hunter-killer (hk) teams - attacking enemy safe havens

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