huntington, s. (1991). democracy's third wave

8/13/2019 Huntington, S. (1991). Democracy's Third Wave

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1DEMOCRACY S THIRD W VE

Samuel P Huntington

Samuel P Huntington is Eaton Professor o the Science o Governmentand director o the John M Olin lnstitute or Strategic Studies atHarvard University. This article is based upon the 1989 Julian J. Roth-baum Lectures at the Carl Albert Center o the University o Oklahomawhich were published as The Third Wave: Democratization in the LateTwentieth Century. Copyright 1991 by Samuel P Huntington. Publishedby the University o Oklahoma Press.

etween 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries made transitions todemocracy, just about doubling the number.of democratic govemmentsin the world. Were these democratizations part of a continuing and everexpanding global democratic revolution that will reach virtually everycountry in the world? Or did they represent a limited expansion ofdemocracy, involving for the most part its reintroduction into countriesthat had experienced it in the past?

The current era of democratic transitions constitutes the third wave ofdemocratization in the history of the modem world. The first longwave of democratization began in the l 820s, with the widening of thesuffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the UnitedStates, and continued for almost a century until 1926, bringing into beingsome 29 democracies. n 1922, however, the coming to power ofMussolini in Italy marked the beginning of a first reverse wave thatby 1942 had reduced the number of democratic states. in the world to12 The triumph of the Allies in World War II initiated a second waveof democratization that reached its zenith in 1962 with 36 countriesgovemed democratically, only to be followed by a second reverse wave(1960-1975) that brought the number of democracies back down to 30At what stage are we within the third wave? Early in a long wave,or at or near the end of a short one? And if the third wave comes to ahalt, will it be followed by a significant third reverse wave eliminatingmany of democracy's gains in the 1970s and 1980s? Social science


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Democracy's Third Wavecannot provide reliable answers to these questions, nor can any socialscientist. It may be possible, however, to identify some o the factorsthat will affect the future expansion or contraction o democtacy in theworld and to pose the questions that seem most relevant for the futureo democratization.

One way to begin is to inquire whether the causes that gave rise tothe third wave are likely. to continue operating, to gain in strength, toweaken, or to be supplemented or replaced by new forces promotingdemocratization. Five major factors have contributed significantly to theoccurrence and the timing o the third-wave transitions to democracy:

1 The deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes in aworld where democratic values were widely. accepted, the consequentdependence o these regimes on successful performance, and theirinablity to maintain performance legitimacy due to economic (andsometimes military) failure.

2) The unprecedented global economic growth o the l 960s, whichraised living standards, increased education, and greatly expanded _ theurban middle class in many countries.

3) A striking shift in the doctrine and activities o the CatholicChurch, manifested in the Second Vatican Council o 1963-65 and thetransfonnation o national Catholic churches from defenders of the statusquo to opponents o authoritarianism.4) Changes in the policies o external actors, most notably theEuropean Community, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

5) Snowballing, or the demonstration effect o transitions earlier inthe third wave in stimulating and providing models for subsequent effortsat democratization.I will begin by addressing the latter three factors, retuming to the firsttwo later in this article.Historically, there has been a strong correlation between WestemChristianity and democracy. By the early 1970s, most o the Protestantcountries in the world had already become democratic. The third waveof the l 970s and l 980s was overwhelmingly a Catholic wave. Beginningin Portugal and Spain, it swept through six South American and threeCentral American countries, moved on to the Philippines, doubled backto Mexico and Chile, and then burst through in the two Catholiccountries o Eastem Europe, Poland and Hungary. Roughly threequarters o the countries that transited to democracy between 1974 and1989 were predominantly Catholic.By 1990, however, the Catholic impetus to democratization hadlargely exhausted itself. Most Catholic countries had alreadydemoeratized or, as in the case o Mexico, liberalized. The ability oCatholicism to promote further expansion o democracy (withoutexpanding its own ranks) is limited to Paraguay, Cuba, and a few

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Samuel P HuntingtonFrancophone African countries. By 1990, sub-Saharan Africa was theonly region o the world where substantial numbers o Catholics andProtestants lived under authoritarian regimes in a large number ocountries.

The Role o xterna} ForcesDuring the third wave, the European Community (EC) played a key

role in consolidating democracy in southem Europe. ln Greece, Spain,and Portugal, the establishment o democracy was seen as necessary tosecure the economic benefits o EC membership, while Communitymembership was in tum seen as a guarantee o the stability odemocracy. ln 1981, Greece became a full member o the Community,and five years later Spain and Portugal did as well.

ln April 1987, Turkey applied for full E membership. One incentivewas the desire o Turkish leaders to reinforce modernizing anddemocratic tendencies in Turkey and to contain and isolate. the forces inTurkey supporting Islamic fundamentalism. Within the Community,however, the prospect o Turkish membership met with little enthusiasmand even some hostility (mostly from Greece). ln 1990, the liberation oEastern Europe also raised the possibility o membership for Hungary,Czechoslovakia, and Poland . .The Community thus faced two issues. First,should it give priority to broadening its membership or to deepeningthe existing Community by moving toward further economic and pliticalunion? Second, i it did decide to expand its membership, should prioritygo to European Free Trade Association members like Austria, Norway,and Sweden, to the East Europeans, or to Turkey? Presumably theCommunity can only absorb a limited number o countries in a givenperiod o time. The answers to these questions will have significantimplications for the stability o democracy in Turkey and in the EastEuropean countries.The withdrawal o Soviet power made possible democratization inEastern Europe. l the Soviet Union were to end or drastically curtail itssupport for Castro's regime, movement toward democracy might occurin Cuba. Apart from that, there seems little more the Soviet Union cando or is likely to do to promote democracy outside its borders. The keyissue is what will happen within the Soviet Union itself. If Soviet control. loosens, it seems Iikely that democracy could be reestablished in theBaltic states. Movements toward democracy also exist in other republics.Most important, o course, is Russia itself. The inauguration andconsolidation o democracy in the Russian republic, if it occurs, wouldbe the single most dramatic gain for democracy since the immediatepost-World War II years. Democratic development in most of the Sovietrepublics, however, is greatly complicated by their ethnic heterogeneity


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6 Democracy's Third Waveand the unwillingness of the dominant nationality to allow equal rightsto ethnc minorities. As Sir lvor Jennings remarked years ago, thepeople cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people. tmay take years if not decades to resolve the latter issue in much of theSoviet Union.During the l 970s and l 980s the United States was a major promoterof democratization. Whether the United States continues to play this roledepends on its will, its capability, and its attractiveness as a model toother countries. Before the mid- l 970s the promotion of democracy hadnot always been a high priority of American foreign policy. It couldagain subside in importance. The end of the Cold War -and of theideological competition with the Soviet Union could remove one rationalefor propping up anti-communist dictators, but it could also reduce theincentives for any substantial American involvement in the Third World.American will to promote democracy may or may not be sustained.American ability to do so, on the other hand, is limited. The trade andbudget deficits impose new limits on the resources that the United Statescan use to influence events in foreign countries. More important, theability of the United States to promote democracy has in some measurerun its course. The countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe,and East Asia that were most susceptible to American inflence have,with a few exceptions, already become democratic. The one majorcountry where the United States can still exercise significant influenceon behalf of democratization is Mexico. The undemocratic countries inAfrica, the Middle East, and mainland Asia are less susceptible toAmerican influence.

Apart from Central America and the Caribbean, the major area of the .Third World where the United States has continued to have vitallyimportant interests is the Persian Gulf. The ulf War and the dispatchof 500,000 American troops to the region have stimulated demands formovement toward democracy in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia anddelegitimized Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. A large Americanmilitary deployment in the Gulf, if sustained over lime, would providean external impetus toward liberalization if not democratization, and alarge American military deployment probably could not be sustained overtime unless some movement toward democracy occurred.The U.S. contribution to democratization in the 1980s involved morethan the conscious and direct exercise of American power and influence.Democratic moveinents around lhe world have been inspired by and haveborrowed from lhe American example. What might happen, however, ifthe American model ceases to embody strength and success, no longerseems to be the winning model? At the end of the l 980s, many werearguing that American decline was the true reality. If people aroundthe world come to see the United States as a fading power beset by

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Samuel P Huntington 7political stagnation, economic inefficiency, and social chaos, its perceivedfailures will inevitably be seen as the failures of democracy, and theworldwide appeal of dernocracy will dirninish.

nowballingThe impact of snowballing on democratization was clearly evident in

1990 in Bulgaria, Romania,. Yugoslavia, Mongolia, Nepal, and Albania.It also affected movements toward liberalization in some Arab andAfrican countrics.. ln 1990, for instance, it was reported that theupheaval in Eastern Europe had fueled demands for change in theArab world and prompted leaders in Egypt, Jordan, Tunsia, and Algeria

to open up more political space for the expression of discontent.'The East European example had its principal effect on the leaders of

authoritarian regimes, not on the people they ruled. President MobutuSese Seko of Zaire, for instance reacted with shocked horror to televisedpictures of the execution by firing squad of bis friend, Romanian dictatorNicolae Ceauescu. A few months later, commenting that You knowwhat's happening across the world, he announced that he would allowtwo parties besides his own to compete in elections in 1993. lnTanzania, Julius Nyerere observed that lf changes take place in EastemEurope then other countries with one-party systems and which professsocialism will also be affected. His country, he added, could leam alesson or two from Eastem Europe. ln Nepal in April 1990, thegovemment announced that King Birendra was lifting the ban on politicalparties as a result of the intemational situation and the risingexpectations of the people.

l a country lacks favorable internai conditions, however, snowballingalone is unlikely to bring about democratization. The dernocratization ofcountries A and B is not a reason for democrati.zation in country C,unless the conditions that favored it in the fonner also exist in the Jatter.Although the legitimacy of dernocratic government carne to be acceptedthroughout the world in the 1980s, economic and social conditionsfavorable to democracy were not everywhere present. The worldwidedemocratic revolution may create an extemal environment conducive todemocratization, but it cannot produce the conditions necessary fordemocratization within a particular country.

ln Eastem Europe the major obstacle to democratization was SovietcontroJ; once it was removed, the movement to democracy spreadrapidly. There is no cornparable externa] obstacJe to democratization inthe Middle East, Africa, and Asia. l rulers in these areas choseauthoritarianisrn before December 1989, why can they not continue tochoose it thereafter? The snowballing effect wouJd be real only to theextent that it led them to believe in the desirability or necessity of


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8 Democracy s Third Wavedemocratization. The events o 1989 in Eastem Europe undoubtedlyencouraged democratic opposition groups and frightened authoritarianleaders elsewhere. Yet given the previous weakness o the former andthe long-term repression imposed by the latter, it seems doubtful that theEast European example will actually produce significant progress towarddemocracy in most other authoritarian countries.

By 1990, many o the original causes o the third wave had becomesignificantly weaker, even exhausted. Neither the White House, theKremlin, the European Community, nor the Vatican was in a strongposition to promote democracy in places where it did not already exist(primarily in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East). It remains possible,however, for new forces favoring democratization to emerge. After all,who in 1985 could have foreseen that Mikhail Gorbachev would facilitatedemocratization in Eastem Europe?

ln the 990s the Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WorldBank could conceivably become much more forceful than they haveheretofore been in making political democratization as well as economicliberalization a precondition for economic assistance. France mightbecome more aclive in promoting democracy among its former Africancolonies, where its influence remains substantial. The Orthodox churchescould emerge as a powerful influence for democracy in southeastemEurope and the Soviet Union. A Chinese propohent o gl snost couldcome to power in Beijing, or a new Jeffersonian-style Nasser couldspread a democratic version of Pan-Arabism in the Middle East. Japancould use its growing economic clout to encourage human rights and

d ~ m o c r c y in the poor countries to which it makes loans and grants. ln1990, none o these possibilities seemed very likely, but after thesurprises o 1989 it would be rash to rule anything out.

A Third Reverse WaveBy 1990 at least two third-wave democracies, Sudan and Nigeria, hadreverted. to authoritarian rule; the difficulties o consolidation could lead

to further -reversions in countries with unfavorable conditions forsustaining democracy. The first and second democratic waves, however,were followed not merely by some backsliding but by major reversewaves during which most regime changes throughout the world werefrom democracy to authoritarianism. f the third wave o democratizationslows down or comes to a halt, what factors might produce a thirdreverse wave?

Among the factors contributing to transitions away from democracyduring the first and second reverse waves were:1 the weakness o democratic values among key elite groups and thegeneral public;


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-Samuel P. Huntington 92 severe economic setbacks, which intensified social conflict and

enhanced the popularity of remedies that could be imposed only byauthoritarian govemments;3 social and political polarization, often prouced by leftistgovemments seeking the rapid introduction o major social and economicreforms;4) the determination o conservative middle-class and upper-classgroups to exclude populist and leftist movements and lower-class groupsfrom political power;5) the breakdown o law and order resulting from terrorism or

insurgency;6) intervention or conquest by a nondemocratic foreign power;7) reverse snowballing triggered by the .collapse or overthrow ofdemocratic systems in other countries.Transitions from democracy to authoritarianism, apart from thoseproduced by foreign actors, have almost always been produced by thosein power or close to power in the democratic system. With only one ortwo possible exceptions, democratic systems have not been ended bypopular vote or popular revolt. ln Germany and ltaly in the first reversewave, antidemocratic movements with considerable popular backing carneto power and established fascist dictatorships. ln Spain in the firstreverse wave and in Lebanon in the second, democracy ended in civilwar.The overwhelming majority o transitions from democracy, however,took the form either o military coups that ousted democratically electedleaders, . or executive coups in which democratically chosen chiefexecutives effectively ended democracy by concentrating power in theirown hands, usually by declaring a state of emergency or martial law. lnthe first reverse wave, military coups ended democratic systems in thenew countries of Eastem Europe and in Greece, Portugal, Argentina, andJapan. ln the second reverse wave, military coups occurred in Indonesia,Pakistan, Greece, Nigeria, Turkey, and many Latin American countries.Executive coups occurred in the second reverse wave in Korea, India,and the Philippines. ln Uruguay, the civilian and military leadershipcooperated to end democracy through a mixed executive-military coup.n both the first and second reverse waves, democratic systems werereplaced in many cases by historically new forms o authoritarian rule .. Fascism was distinguished from earlier forms o authoritarianism by itsmass base, ideology, party organization, and efforts to penetrate andcontrol most of society. Bureaucratic authoritarianism differed fromearlier forms o military rule in Latin America with respect to itsinstitutional character, its presumption of indefinite duration, and itseconomic policies. ltaly and Germany in the 1920s and l 930s and Braziland Argentina_ in the l 960s and l 970s were the Iead countries in


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I 10 Democracy's Third aveintroducing these new forms of nondemocratic rule and fumished theexamples that antidemocratic groups in other countries sought to emulate.Both these new forms of authoritarianism were, in effect, responses tosocial and economic development: the expansion of social mobilizationand political participation in Europe, and the exhaustion of the importsubstitution phase of economic development in Latin America.Although the causes and forms of the first two reverse waves cannotgenerate reliable predictions conceming the causes and fonns of apossible third reverse wave, prior experiences do suggest some potentialcauses of a new reverse wave.

First, systemic failures of democratic regimes to operate effectivelycould undermine their legitimacy. ln the late twentieth c e n t u r y ~ the majornondemocratic ideological sources of legitimacy, most notably MarxismLeninism, were discredited. The general acceptance of democratic normsmeant that democratic govemments were even less dependent onperformance legitimacy. than they had been in the past. Yet sustainedinability to provide welfare, prosperity, equity, justice, domestic order, orexternal security could over time undermine the legitimacy even ofdemocratic govemments. As the memories of authotitarian failures fade,irritation with democratic failures is likely to increase. More specifically,a general intemational economic collapse on the 1929-30 model couldundennine the legitimacy of democracy in many countries. Mostdemocracies did survive the Great Depression of the l 930s; yet somesuccumbed, and presumably some would be likely to succumb inresponse to a comparable economic disaster in the future.Second, a shift to authoritarianism by any democratic or democratizinggreat power could trigger reverse snowballing. The reinvigoration ofauthoritarianism in Russia or the Soviet Union would have unsettlingeffects on democratization in. other Soviet republics, Bulgaria, Romania,Yugoslavia, and Mongolia; and possibly in Poland, Hungary, andCzechoslovakia as well. It could send the message to would-be despotselsewhere: You too can go back into business. Similarly, theestablishment of an authoritarian regime in India could have a significantdemonstration effect on other Third World countries. Moreover, even ifa major country does not revert to authoritarianism, a shift to dictatorshipy several smaller newly democratic c ~ u n t r i e s that lack many of theusual preconditions for democracy could have ramifying effects even onother countries where those preconditions are strong.

l a nondemocratic state greatly increased its power and began toexpand beyond its borders, this too could stimulate authoritarianmovements in other countries. This stimulus would be particularly strongif the panding authoritarian state militarily defeated one or moredemocratic countries. ln the past, ali major powers that have developedeconomically have also tended to expand territorially. f China develops


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Samuel P. Huntingtoneconomically under authorjtarian rule in the coming decades and expandsits influence and contro'I in East Asia, democratic regimes in the regionwill be significantly weakened.Finally, as in the l 920s and the 960s, various old and new forms ofauthoritarianism that seem appropriate to the needs o the times couldemerge. Authoritarian nationalism could take hold in some Third Worldcountries and also in Eastem Europe. Religious fundamentalism, whichhas been most dramatically prevalent in lran, could come to power inother countries, especially in the Islamic world. Oligarchicauthoritarianism could develop in both wealthy and poorer countries asa reaction to the leveling tendencies o democracy. Populist dictatorshipscould emerge in the future, as they have in the past, in response todemocracy's protection o various forms o economic privilege,particularly in those countries where land tenancy is still an issue.Finally, communal dictatorships could be imposed in democracies withtwo or more distinct ethnic, racial, or religious groups, with one grouptrying to establish control over the entire society.

Ali o these forms of authoritarianism have existed in the past. It isnot beyond the wit o humans to devise new cines in the future. Onepossibility might be a technocratic electronic dictatorship, in whichauthoritarian rule is made possible and Iegitimated by the regime's abilityto manipulate information, the media, and sophisticated means ocommunication. None o these old or new forms of authoritarianism ishighly probable, but it is also hard to say that any one o them is totallyimpossible.

Obstacles to emocratizationAnother approach to assessing democracy's prospects to examine

the obstacles to and opportunities for democratization where it has notyet taken hold. As o 1990, more than one hundred countries lackeddemocratic regimes. Most o these countries fell into four sometimesoverlapping geocultural categories:1 Home-grown Marxist-Leninist regimes., including the Soviet Union,

where major liberalization occurred in the 1980s and democraticmovements existed in many republics;2 Sub-Saharan African countries, which, with a few exceptions,_remained personal dictatorships, military. regimes, one-party systems, orsome combination o these three;3 Islamic countries stretching from Morocco to lndonesia, whichexcept for Turkey and perhaps Pakistan had nondemocratic regimes;4) East Asian countries, from Burma through Southeast Asia to Chinaand North Korea, which included communist systems, military regimes,personal dictatorships, and two semidemoeracies (Thailand and Malaysia).


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2 Democracy s Third WaveThe .obstacles to democratization in these groups of countries are

political, cultural, and economic. One potentially significant politicalobstacle to future democratization is the virtual absence of experiencewith democracy in most countries that remained authoritarian in 1990.Twenty-three of 30 countries that democratized between 1974 and 1990had had some history of democracy, while only a few countries thatwere nondemocratic in l990 could claim such experience. These includeda few third-wave backsliders (Sudan, Nigeria, Suriname, and possiblyPakistan), four second-wave backsliders that hd not lfedemocratized inthe third wave (Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Burma, Fiji), and three first-wavedemocratizers that had been prevented by Soviet occupation fromredemocratizing at the end of World War II (Estonia, Latvia, andLithuania). Virtually ali the 90 or more other nondemocratic .countries in1990 lacked significant past experience with democratic rule. Thisobviously is not a decisive impediment to democratization if it were,no countries would now be democratic but it does make it moredifficult.

Another obstacle to democratization is likely to disappear in a numberof countries in the l 990s. Leaders who found authoritarian regimes orrule them for a long period tend to become particularly staunchopponents of democratization. Hence some form of leadership changewithin the authoritarian system usually precedes movement towarddemocracy. Human mortality is likely to ensure such changes in theI 990s in some authoritarian regimes. ln 1990, the long-tenn rulers inChina, Cte d Ivoire, and Malawi were in their eighties; those in Burma,Indonesia, North Korea, Lesotho, and Vietnam were in their seventies;and the leaders of Cuba, M o ~ o c c o Singapore, Somalia, Syria, Tanzania,Zaire, and Zambia were sixty or older. The death or departure fromoffice of these leaders would remove one obstacle to democratization intheir countries, but would not make it inevitable.

Between 1974 and . 1990, democratization occurred in personaldictatorships, military regimes, and one-party systems. Full-scaledemocratization has not yet occurred, however, in communist one-partystates that were the products of domestic revolution. Liberalization hastaken place in the Soviet Union, which may or may not lead to fullscale democratization in Russia. ln Yugoslavia, movements towarddemocracy are underway in Slovenia. and Croatia. The Yugoslavcommunist revolution, however, was largely a Serbian revolution, and theprospects for democracy in Serbia appear dubious. ln Cambodia, anextraordinarily brutal revolutionary communist regime was replaced bya Iess brutal communist regime imposed by outside force. ln 1990,Albania appeared to be opening up, but in China, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba,and Ethiopia, Marxist-Leninist regimes produced by home-grownrevolutions seemed determined to remain in power. The revolutions in


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,amuei P Huntington 3tflese countries had been nationalist as well as communist, and hencenationalism reinforced communism in a way that obviously was not trueo Soviet-occupied Bastem Europe.

One serious impediment to democratization is the absence or. weaknesso real commitment to democratic values among political leaders in Asia,

A f r i c ~ and the Middle East. When they are out of power, politicalleaders have good reason to advocate .democracy. The test o theirdemocratic commitment comes once they are in office. ln Latin America,democratic regimes have generally been overthrown by military coupsd tat. This has happened in Asia and the Middle East as well, but inthese regions elected leaders themselves have also been responsible forending democracy: Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee in Korea, AdnanMenderes in Turkey, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Lee KwanYew in Singapore, Indira Gandhi in India, and Sukarno in Indonesia.Having won power through the electoral system, these leaders thenproceeded to undermine that system. They had little commitment todemocratic values and practices.

Even when Asian, African, and i d ~ l e Bastem leaders have more orless abided by the rules o democracy, they often seemed to do sogrudgingly. Many European, North American, and Latin Americanpolitical leaders in the last half o the twentieth century were ardent andarticulate. advocates of democracy. Asian and African countries, incontrast, did not produce many heads o govemment who were alsoapostles o democracy. Who were the Asian, Arab, or Africanequivalents o Rmulo Betancourt, Alberto Llera Camargo, Jos Figueres,Eduardo Frei, Fernando Belande Terry, Juan Bosch, Jos NapolenDuarte, and Ral Alfonsn? Jawaharlal Nehru and Corazon Aquino were,and there may have been others, but they were few in number. No Arableader comes to mind, and it is hard to identify any Islamic leader whomade a reputation as an advocate and supporter o democracy while inoffice. Why is this? This question inevitably leads to the issue o culture.

ulture

It has been argued that the world s great historie cultural traditionsvary significantly in the extent to which their attitudes, values, beliefs,and related behavior pattems are conducive to the development of. democracy. A profoundly antidemocratic culture would impede the spreado democratic norms in the society, deny legitimacy to democraticinstitutions, and thus greatly complicate if not prevent the emergence andeffective functioning of those institutions. The cultural thesis comes intwo forms. The more restrictive version states that only Western cultureprovides a suitable base for the development of democratic institutionsand, consequently, that democracy is Iargely inappropriate for non-


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14 Democracy's Third WaveWestem societies. ln the early years of the third wave, this argumenJwas explicitly set forth by George Kennan. Democracy, he said, was a \form of govemment "which evolved in the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies in l\iorthwestem Europe, primarily among those countries thatborder on the English Channel and the North Sea (but with a certainextension into Central Europe), and which was then carried into otherparts of the world, including North America, where peoples from thatno1thwestem European area appeared as original settlers, or ascolonialists, and laid down the prevailing pattems of civil government."Hence democracy has "a relatively narrow base both in time and inspace; and the evidence has yet to be produced that it is the natural formof mi for peoples outside those narrow perimeters." The achievementsof Mao, Salazar, .and Castro demonstrated, according to Kennan, thatauthoritarian regimes "have been able to introduce reforms and toimprove the lot of masses of people, where more diffuse forms ofpolitical authority had failed. "3 Democracy, in short, is appropriate onlyfor northwestem and perhaps central European countries and their settlercolony offshoots.

The Westem-culture thesis has immediate implications fordemocratization in the Balkans and the Soviet Union. Historically theseareas were part of the Czarist and Ottoman empires; their prevailingreligions were Orthodoxy and Islam, not Western Christianity. Theseareas did not have the sarne experiences as Westem Europe withfeudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the E . lightenment, theFrench Revolution, and liberalism. As William Wallace has suggested,the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the lron Curtain mayhave shifted the criticai political dividing line eastward to the centurieso]d boundary between Bastem and Westem Christendom. Beginning inthe north, this tine runs south roughly along the borders dividing Finlandand the Baltic republics from Russia; through Byelorussia and theUkraine, separating westem Catholic Ukraine from eastem OrthodoxUkraine; south and then west in Romania, cutting off Transylvania fromthe rest of the country; and then through Yugoslavia roughly along theline separating Slovenia and Croatia from the other republics. 4 This linemay now separate those areas where democracy will take root from thosewhere it will not.

A less restrictive version of the cultural obstacle argument l)olds thatcertain non-Westem cultures are peculiarly hostile to democracy. The twocultures most often cited in this regard are Confucianism and lslam.Three questions are relevant to determining whether these cultures nowpose serious obstacles to democratization. First, to what extent aretraditional Confucian and Islamic values and beliefs hostile todemocracy? Second, if they are, to what extent have these cuJtures infact hampered progress toward democracy? Third, if they have


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Samuel P Huntington 5significantly retarded democratic progress in the past, to what extent arethey Iikely to continue to do so in the future?

onfucianismAlmost no scholarly disagreement exists regarding the proposition

that traditional Confucianism was either undemocratic or antidemocratic.The only mitigating factor was the extent to which the examinationsystem in the classic Chinese polity opened careers to the talentedwithout regard to social background. Even if this were the case, however,a merit system o promotion does not make a democracy. No one woulddescribe a modem army as democratic because officers are promoted onthe basis o their abilities. Classic Chinese Confucianism and itsderivatives in Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, and (in dilutedfashion) Japan emphasized the group over the individual, authority overliberty, and responsibilities over r i g h t ~ Confucian societies lacked atradition o rights against the state;-to the extent that individual rights didexist, they were crnated by the state. Harmony and cooperation werepreferred over disagreement and competition. The maintenance o orderand respect for hierarchy were central values. The conflict o ideas,groups, and parties was viewed as dangerous and illegitimate. Mostimportant, Confucianism merged society and the state- and provided nolegitimacy for autonomous social institutions at the national level.

ln practice Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have beeninhospitable to democracy. ln East Asia only two countries, Japan andthe Philippines, had sustained experience with democratic govemmentprior to 1990. ln both cases, democracy was the product o an Americanpresence. The Philippines, moreover, is overwhelmingly a Catholiccountry. ln Japan, Confucian values were reinterpreted and merged withautochthonous cultural traditions.

Mainland China has hal no experience with democratic govemment,and democracy o the Westem variety has been supported over the yearsonly by relatively small groups o radical dissidents. Mainstreamdemocratic critics have not broken with the key elements o theConfucian tradition.5 The modemizers o China have been (in LucianPye's phrase) the Confucian Leninists'' o the Nationalist andCommunist parties. ln the late I 980s, when rapid economic growth in

. China produced a new series o demands for political reform anddemocracy on the part o students, intellectuals, and urban middle-classgroups, the Communist leadership responded in two ways. First, itarticulated a theory o new authoritarianism, based on the experienceo Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea, which claimed that a country atChina's stage o economic development needed authoritarian rule toachieve balanced economic growth and contain the unsettling


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6 Democracy's Third Waveconsequences of development. Second, the leadership violently suppressedthe democratic movement in Beijing and elsewhere in June of 1989.

ln China, economics reinforced culture in holding back democracy. lnSingapore, Taiwan, and Korea, on the other hand, spectacular growthcreated the economic basis for democracy by the Iate l 980s. ln thesecountries, economics clashed with culture in shaping politicaldevelopment. ln 1990, Singapore was the only non-oil-exporting highincome country (as defined by the World Bank) that did not have ademocratic political system, and Singapore's leader was an articulateexponent of Confucian vatues ~ opposed to those of Westemdemocracy. n the 1980s, Premier Lee Kwan Yew made the teaching andpromulgation of Confucian values a high priority for his city-state andtook vigorous measures to limit and suppress dissent and to preventmedia criticism of the govemment and its policies. Singapore was thusan authoritarian Confucian anomaly among the wealthy countries of theworld. The interesting question is whether it will remain so now thatLee, who created the state, appears to be partially withdrawing from thepolitical scene.

ln the late 1980s, both Taiwan and Korea moved in a democraticdirection. Historically, Taiwan had always been a peripheral part ofChina. lt was occupied by the Japanese for 50 years, and its inhabitantsrebelled in 1947 against the imposition of Chinese control. TheNationalist govemment arrived in 1949 humiliated by its dfeat by theCommunists, a defeat that made it impossible for most Nationalistleaders to uphold the posture of rrogance associated with traditionalConfucian notions of authority. Rapid economic and social developmentforther weakened the influence of traditional Confucianism. Theemergence of a substantial entrepreneurial class, composed largely ofnative Taiwanese, created (in very un-Confucian fashion) a source ofpower and wealth independent of the mainlander-dominated state. Thisproduced in Taiwan a fundamental change in Chinese political culture,which has not occurred in China itself or in Korea or Vietnam-andnever really existed in Japan. 6 Taiwan's spectacular economicdevelopment thus overwhelmed a relatively weak Confucian tegacy, andin the late l 980s Chiang Ching-kuo. and Lee Teng-hui responded to thepressures produced by economic and social change and gradually movedto open up politics in their society.ln Korea, the classical culture included e1ements of mobility andegalitarianism along with Confucian components uncongenial todemocracy, including a tradition of authoritarianism and strongman rule.As one Korean scholar put it, people did not think of themselves ascitizens with rights to exercise and responsibilities to perform, but theytended to look up to the top for direction and for favors in order tosurvive. 7 ln the late l 980s, urbanization, education, the development of


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S(\llluel P Huntington 7a)ubstantial middle class, and the impressive spread o Christianity allw ~ k e n e d Confucianism as an obstacle to democracy in Korea. Yet itremained unc1ear whether the struggle between the old culture and then4w prosperity had been definitively resolved in favor o the latter.

The ast sian ModelThe interaction o economic progress and Asian culture appears to

have generated a distinctly East Asian variety o democratic institutions.As o 1990, no East Asian country except the Philippines (which is, inmany respects, more Latin American than East Asian in culture) hadexperienced a turnover from a popularly elected government of one partyto a popularly elected govemment o a different party. The prototype wasJapan, unquestionably a democracy, but one in which the ruling party hasnever been voted out of power. The Japanese model o dominant-partydemocracy, as Pye has pointed out, has spread elsewhere in East As ialn 1990, two o the three opposition parties in Korea merged with thegovemment party to fonn a political bloc that would effectively excludethe remaining opposition party, led by Kim Dae Jung and based on theCholla region, from ever gaining power. ln the late 1980s, democraticdevelopment in Taiwan seemed to be movingtoward an electoral systemin which the Kuomintang (KMT) was likely to remain the dominantparty, with the Democratic Progressive Party confined to a permanentopposition role. ln Malaysia, the coalition o the three leading partiesfrom the Malay, Chinese, and Indian communities (first in the AllianceParty and then in the National Front) has controlled power in unbrokenfashion against all competitors from the l 950s through the l 980s. ln themid-1980s, Lee Kwan Yew s deputy and successor Goh Chok Tongendorsed a similar type o party system for Singapore:

I think a stable system is one where there is a mainstream political partyrepresenting a broad range o the population. Then you can have a fewother parties on the periphery, very s e r i o u s ~ m i n e parties. They areunable to have wider views but they nevertheless represent sectionalinterests. And the mainstream is retumed ali the time. 1 think that s good.And I would not apologize if we ended up in that situation in Singapore.8A primary criterion for democracy is equitable and open competition

for votes between political parties without govemment harassment or, restriction o opposition groups. Japan has c1early met this test for

decades with its freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, and reasonablyequitable conditions o electoral competition. ln the other Asiandominant-party systems, the playing field has been tilted in favor o thegovemment for many years. By the Iate l 980s, however, conditions werebecoming more equal in some countries. n Korea, the government party


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Samuel P Huntington 19voluntarism are central themes in lslam. The high culture form ofIslam, Emest Gellner has argued, is endowed with a number offeatures-unitarianism, a rule-ethic, individualism, scripturalism, puritanism, an egalitarian aversion to mediation and hierarchy, a fairlysmall load of magic that are congruent, presumably, with requirementsof modemity or modemization. They are also generally congruent withthe requirements of democracy. lslam, however, also rejects anydistinction between the religious community and the political community.Hence there is no equipoise between Caesar and God, and politicalparticipation is linked to religious affiliation. Fundamentalist Islamdemands that in a Muslim country the political rulers should bepracticing Muslims, shari a should be the basic law, and ulem shouldhave a decisive vote in articulating, or at least reviewing and ratifying,all govemmental policy. 9 To the extent that govemmental legitimacy andpolicy flow from religious doctrine and religious expertise, Islamicconcepts of politics differ from and contradict the premises of democraticpolitics.

Islamic doctrine thus contains elements that may be both congenialand uncongenial to democracy.\ ln practice, however, the only Islamiccountry that has sustained a fully democratic political system for anylength of time is Turkey, where Mustafa Kemal Ataturk explicitlyrejected Islamic concepts of society and politics and vigorously attemptedto create a secular, modem, Westem nation-state .. And Turkey'sexperience with democracy has not been an unmitigated success.Elsewhere in the lslamic world, Pakistan has made three attempts atdemocracy, none of which lasted long. While Turkey has had democracyinterrupted by occasional military interventions, Pakistan has hadbureaucratic and military rule interrupted by occasional elections.

The only Arab country to sustain a form of democracy (albeit of theconsociational variety) for a significant period of time was Lebanon. Itsdemocracy, however, really amounted to consociational oligarchy, and 40to 50 percent of its population was Christian. Once Muslims became amajority in Lebanon and began to assert themselves, Lebanese democracycollapsed. Between 98 and 1990, only two of 37 countries in theworld with Muslim majorities were ever rated Free by Freedom Housein its annual surveys: the Gambia for two years and the TurkishRepublic of Northem Cyprus for four. Whatever the compatibility ofIslam and democracy in theory, in practice they have rarely gonetogether.Opposition movements to authoritarian regimes in southem and eastemEurope, in Latin America, and in East Asia almost universally haveespoused Westem democratic values and proclaimed their desire toestablish democracy. This does not mean that they invariably wouldintroduce democratic institutions if they had the opportunity to do so, but


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20 Democracy s Third aveat least they articulated the rhetoric of democracy. n authoritarianIslamic societies, by contrast, movements explicitly campaigning fordemocratic politics have been relatively weak, and the most powerfulopposition has come from Islamic fundamentalists.ln the late l 980s, domestic economic problems combined with thesnowballing effects of democratization elsewhere led the govemments ofseveral Islamic countries to relax their controls on the opposition and toattempt to renew their legitimacy through elections. The principal initialbeneficiaries of these openings were lslamic fundamentalist groups. lnAlgeria, the Islamic Salvation Front swept the June 1990 local elections,the first free elections since the country became independent in 1962. lnthe 1989 Jordanian elections, Islamic fundamentalists won 36 of 80 seatsin parliament. ln Egypt, many candidates associated with the MuslimBrotherhood were elected to parliament in 1987. ln several countries,lslamic fundamentalist groups were reportedly plotting insurrections. Thestrong electoral showings of the lslamic groups partly reflected theabsence of other opposition parties, some because they were undergovernment proscription, others because they were boycotting theelections. Nonetheless, fundamentalism seemed to be gaining strength inMiddle Eastem countries, particularly among younger people. Thestrength of this tendency induced secular heads of govemment in Tunsia,Turkey, and elsewhere to adopt policies advocated by the fundamentalistsand to make political gestures demonstrating their own commitment toIslam.Liberalization in Islamic countries thus enhanced the power ofimportant social and political movements whose commitment todemocracy was uncertain. ln some respects, the position offundamentalist parties in Islamic societies in the early 1990s raisedquestions analogous to those posed by communist parties in WesternEurope in the 1940s and again in the 1970s. Would the existinggovernments continue to open up their politics and hold elections inwhich lslamic groups could compete freely and equally? Would theIslamic groups gain majority support in those elections? f they did winthe elections, would the military, which in many Islamic societies (e.g.,Algeria, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia) is strongly secular, allow themto form a government? If they did form a govemment, would it pursueradical Islamic policies that would undermine democracy and alienate themodem and Westem-oriented elements in society?

The Limits o ultural ObstaclesStrng cultural obstacles to democratization thus appear to exist in

Confucian and Islamic societies. There are, nonetheless, reasons to doubtwhether these must necessarily prevent democratic development. First,'


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Samuef P. Huntington 21similaf cultural arguments have not held up in the past. At one pointmany Jscholars argued that Catholicism was an obstacle to democracy.OtherS. in the Weberian tradition, contnded that Catholic countries wereunlikely to develop economically in the sarne manner as Protestantcountries. Yet in the 1960s, 1970s, and l 980s Catholic countries becamedemocratic and on average, had higher rates of economic growth thanProtestant countries. Similarly, atone point Weber and others argued thatcountries with Confucian cultures would not achieve successful capitalistdevelopment. By the 1980s, however, a new generation of scholars sawConfucianism as a major cause of the spectacular economic growth ofEast Asian societies. ln the longer run, will the thesis that Confucianismprevents democratic development be any more viable than the thesis thatConfucianism prevents economic development? Arguments that particularcultures are permanent obstacles to change should be viewed with acertain skepticism.Second, great cultural traditions like Islam and Confucianism are, highly complex bodies of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, andbehavior pattems. Any major culture, including Confucianism, has someelements that are compatible with democracy, just as both Protestantismand Catholicism have elements that are clearly undemocratic. Confuciandemocracy may be a contradiction in terms, but democracy in aConfucian society need not be. The real question is which elements inIslam and Confucianism are favorable to democracy, and how and underwhat circumstances these can supersede the undemocratic aspects ofthose cultural traditioils.Third, cultures historically are dynamic, not .stagnant. The dominantbeliefs and attitudes in a society change. While maintaining elements ofcontinuity, the prevailing culture of a society in one generation maydiffer significantly from what it was one or two generations earlier. lnthe l 950s, Spanish culture was typically described as traditional,authoritarian, hierarchical, deeply religious, and honor-and-status oriented.By the 1970s and 1980s, these words had little place in a description ofSpanish altitudes and values. Cultures evolve and, as in Spain, the mostimportant force bringing about cultural changes is often economicdevelopment itself.

conomicsFew relationships between social, economic, and political phenomenaare stronger than that between the levei of economic development andthe existence of democratic politics. Most wealthy countries aredemocratic, and most democratic countries lndia is the most dramatic

exception are wealthy. The correlation b.tween wealth and democracyimplies that transitions to democracy should occur primarily in countries


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22 Democracy's Third Waveat the mid-level of economic development. ln poor countriesdemocratization is unlikely; in rich countries t usually has alreadyoccurred. ln between there is a political transition zone : countries inthis middle economic stratum are those most likely to transit todemocracy, and most .countries that transit to democracy will be in thisstratum. As countries develop economically and move into the transitionzone, they becoine good prospects for democratization.

ln fact, shifts from authoritarianism to democracy during the thirdwave were heavily concentrated in this transition zone, especially at itsupper reaches. The conclusion seems clear. Poverty is aprincipal-probably th principal--obstacle to democratic development.The future of democracy depends on the future of economicdevelopment. Obstacles to economic development are obstacles to theexpansion of democracy.The third wave of democratization was propelled forward by theextraordinary global economic growth of the l 950s and 1960s. That eraof growth carne to an end with the oiJ price increases of 1973-74.Between 1974 and 1990, democratization accelerated around the world,but global economic growth slowed down. There were, however,substantial differences in growth rates among regions. East Asian ratesremained high throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and overall rates ofgrowth in South Asia increased. On the other hand, growth rates in theMiddle East, North Africa, Latin America, and the Cribbean declinedsharply from the 1970s t the 1980s. Those in sub-Saharan Africaplummeted. Per capita NP in Africa was stagnant during the late l 970sand declined at an annual rate of 2.2 percent during the l 980s. Theeconomic obstacles to democratization in Africa thus clearly grew duringthe 1980s. The prospects for the 1990s are not encouraging. Even ifeconomic reforms, debt relief, and economic assistance materialize, theWorld Bank has predicted an average annual rate of growth in per capitaGDP for Africa of only 0.5 percent for the remainder of the century. 1f this prediction is accurate, the economic obstacles to democratizationin sub-:Saharan Africa will remain overwhelming well into the twenty

first century.The World Bank was more optimistic in its predictions of economicgrowth for China and the nondemocratic countries of South Asia. The

current low leveis of wealth in those countries, however, generally meanthat even with annual per capita growth rates of 3 to 5 percent, theeconomic conditions favorable to democratization would still be long incoming.

ln the l 990s, the majority of countries where the economic conditionsfor ciemocratization are already present or rapidly emerging are in theMiddle East and North Africa (see Table 1 . The economies of many ofthese countries (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran,


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Samuel P Huntington 23

Table 1 - Upper and Middle lncome Nondemocratic Countries - GNP PerCapita (1988)INCOME ARAB- SOUTHEAST AFRICA OTHERLEVEL MIDDLE EAST ASIAUpper (UAE) SingaporeIncome (Kuwait)(> 6,000) (Saudi Arabia)Upper Middle (lraq) (Gabon) YtgEhvBlncome (lran)( 2,000- (Libya)5,500) (Oman)*Algeria*Lower Middle Syria Malaysia* Cameroon* ParaguayIncome Jordan* Thailand*( 500-2,200) Tunsia*1,000-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Morocco* Congo*Egypt* Cte d'IvoireYemen* Zimbabwe

Lebanon* Senegal*Angola

Note: ( ) = major oil exporter* = average annual GDP growth rate 1980-1988 3.0%Source: World Bank, World Bank Development Reporr 199 (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1990), 178-181.

Libya, Oman) depend heavily on oil exports, which enhances the controlof the state bureaucracy. This does not, however, make democratizationimpossible. The state bureaucracies o Eastern Europe had far morepower than do those o the oil exporters. Thus at some point that powercould collapse among the latter as dramatically as it did among theformer.n 1988 among the other states of the Middle East and North Africa,

Algeria had already reached a levei conducive to democratization; Syriawas approaching it; and Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and NorthYemen were well below the transition zone, but had grown rapidlyduring the 1980s. Middle Eastem economies and societies areapproaching the point where they will become too wealthy and toocomplex for their various traditional, military, and one-party systems ofauthoritarian rule to sustain themselves. The wave of democratization thatswept the world in the 1970s and l 980s could become a dominantfeature o Middle Eastern and North African politics in the 1990s. Theissue o economics versus culture would then be joined: What forms of


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SamuTI P Huntington 25of goyernment for their societies and for themselves. They will also needthe skills to bring about the transition to democracy while facing bothradical oppositionists and authoritarian hard-liners who inr.vitably willattempt to undermine their efforts. Democracy will spread to the extentthat those who exercise power in the world and in individual countrieswant it to spread. For a century and a half after Tocqueville observedthe emergence of moderh democracy in America, successive waves ofdemocratization have washed over the shore of dictatorship. Buoyed bya rising tide of economic progress, each wave advanced further andreceded less than its predecessor. History, to shift the metaphor, doesnot sail ahead in a straight line, but when skilled and determined leadersare at the helm, it does move forward.

NOTES1 New York Times 28 December 1989, Al3; lnternational Herald Trib1me 12-13 May1990, 62 The Times (London), 27' May 1990; Time 21 May 1990, 34-35; Daily Telegraph29 March 1990, 13; New York Times 27 February 1990, AIO, and 9 April 1990, A6.3 George F. Kennan, The Cloud o Danger (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 41-43.4. See William Wallace, The TransfiJrmation o Western Europe (London: RoyalInstitute of Intemational Affairs-Pinter, 1990), 16-19.5. See Daniel Kelliher, "The Political Consequences of China's Reforro," ComparativePolitics 18 (July 1986): 488-490; and Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York:Alfred A Knopf, 1985).6. Lucian W. Pye with Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The CulturalDimensions o Autlzority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 232-236.7 New York Times 15 December 1987, A14.8. Goh Chok Tong, quoted in New York Times 14 August 1985, A13.9 Emest Gellner, "Up from Imperialism," The New Republic 22 May 1989, 35-36; RStephen Humphreys, "Islam and Poltica Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria,"Middle East Journal 33 (Winter 1979): 6-7.to. World Bank, World Development Report 199 (New York: Oxford University Press,1990), 8-11, 16, 160; and Sub-Saharan A/rica: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth(Washington: World Bank, 1990).

huntington, s. (1991). democracy's third wave

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