HYBRID THREATS AND IRREGULAR WARFARE

Col Phil SmithDirector, USMC Center for Irregular

Warfare 1

Agenda

ContextHybrid ThreatsIrregular Warfare ImplicationsUSMC and IW

IntroContext: War, all of it a political endeavor, regular irregular and in

between-compound. We can never solve the equation on the correct mix. The classical Clausewitzian Trinitarian view on the character of war: passion, politics, probability conducted by the government, military and needs support of its people, gave way to a more modern (French) view that sees people as human terrain. The IW challenges both these paradigms suggesting that, given the informational technological influence on local and social communications, that perhaps people (citizenry) may not be needed for support of a cause.

In the end it’s a study of war and its causes. Our Maneuver Warfare philosophy makes it easy for us to accommodate new/different lexicon

Definition-Context

Irregular Warfare Regular WarfareWar

Compound (hybrid) Warfare

Strategic Guidance: broader set of challenges of which the Strategic Guidance: broader set of challenges of which the

most complex would be combinations.most complex would be combinations.

LIKELIHOOD

DisruptiveCompetitors employing technology or methods that might counter or cancel our current military advantages. (capsize U.S. power)

VULN

ERA

BIL

ITY

IrregularNon-state and state actors employing “unconventional” methods to counter stronger state opponents—terrorism, insurgency, etc. (erode U.S. power)

TraditionalStates employing military forces in well- known forms of military competition and conflict. (challenge U.S. power)

CatastrophicTerrorist or rogue state employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects against American interests. (paralyze U.S. power)

Lower Higher

Higher

Lower

2006 QDR/NDS 2006 QDR/NDS ““Quad ChartQuad Chart””

Some Myth Busting

• War’s character & conduct constantly evolves

•• War is more than just warfareWar is more than just warfare• War is a contest of wills and cultures.• Different modes of warfare exist (have

always existed) and different cultures fight differently

• Different modes of warfare have different solutions or operational “grammars”

Hybrid

Hybrid threat: Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior to obtain their political objectives.

Frank G. Hoffman

“Hybrid”

Modes of Fighting or Structure?Simultaneous employment?Combinations of Modes?Fusion/mixture?Criminality?

What Hybrid Threats are NotNot

• It is not a new concept• It is not a U.S. warfighting construct like

RMA or EBO• It is not historically novel• It’s not about Hezbollah or the IDF• It may not be a subset of irregular warfare

“Any man who afflicts the human race with ideas must be prepared to see them misunderstood.”

H. L. Mencken

What Hybrid Construct Offers

• Describes evolving character of conflict• Challenges current conventional thinking

and binary intellectual bins– A concept that highlights and reinforces the

true granularity or breadth of spectrum of human conflict

• Raises awareness of potential risks and informs ongoing force posture debate

Thus, this is not just a theoretical discussion but a debate about the future, what priorities should be assigned, and how to invest and posture forces for the future.

Lower

Lower

Higher

Higher

LIKELIHOOD

VU

LN

ER

AB

ILIT

Y

Catastrophic

Traditional

Irregular

Disruptive

An American Perspective

“…“… it is common to define and divide the soit is common to define and divide the so--called "high end" from the "low called "high end" from the "low end," the conventional from the irregular; armored divisions on end," the conventional from the irregular; armored divisions on one side, one side,

guerrillas toting AKguerrillas toting AK--47s on the other. In reality, 47s on the other. In reality, ……, the categories of warfare , the categories of warfare are blurring and do not fit into neat, tidy boxes.are blurring and do not fit into neat, tidy boxes.””

“The first feature we can predict with confidence is that there is going to be a blurring, a further blurring, of warfare categories.” Dr. Colin Gray, UK

“The boundaries between “regular” and “irregular” warfare are blurring. Even non-state groups are increasingly gaining access to the kinds of weapons that were once the exclusive preserve of sates. And even states will increasingly turn to unconventional strategies to blunt….American power.” Max Boot

Blurring Modes of WarBlurring Modes of War

Networks have even shown a capacity to wage war toe-to-toe against nation-states—with some success, … The range of choices available to

networks thus covers an entire spectrum of conflict, posing the prospect of a significant blurring of the lines between insurgency,

terror, and war.” John Arquilla,

• Compound wars: regular & irregular forces that are strategically coordinated, employed simultaneously

• But forces may be geographically separated, not integrated or fused operationally/tactically

• Designed to make conventional forces decisive

• Numerous cases

In fighting hybrid threat, regular and irregular In fighting hybrid threat, regular and irregular capabilities can be fused in time and space to achieve capabilities can be fused in time and space to achieve

decisive effects.decisive effects.

Compounding nature

Alternative Conceptions

Unrestricted Warfare Techno-Guerrilla “New” Wars 4th or “N” Generation Wars3 Block War Open Source Warfare Global Insurgency Multi-modal or -variant warfare Diffused Warfare “Net” Wars Stepchild of Chechnya Wars Amongst the People Compound WarsWar 2.0

“We wanted to show that every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.”

On War, p. 593.

Possible Historical Cases

• French vs. Viet Minh, 1946-1954• Somalia, 1993• Chechnya, 1995• Serbia vs. NATO, 1999 • Second Lebanon War, 2006• Russo-Georgian conflict, 2008

-State-like capabilities– Long Range Missiles– Anti-ship Cruise Missiles– Anti-armor systems– UAVs– SIGINT

-Selected tactics—– Highly trained in traditional

and irregular modes

-Extensive preparations-Exploitation of political effects

““HezbollahHezbollah’’s combat cells were s combat cells were a hybrid of guerrillas and a hybrid of guerrillas and regular troopsregular troops---- a form of opponent that U.S. forces are apt to a form of opponent that U.S. forces are apt to

encounter with increasing frequency.encounter with increasing frequency.”” Ralph Peters

Hezbollah: Prototype Hybrid

“"The resistance withstood the attack and fought back. It did not wage a guerrilla war either...it was not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense

either. It was something in between. This is the new model.“ Nasrallah

Hybrid Threats Exist….so?

• What strategies are appropriate to prevail against hybrid threats?

• What impact do hybrid threats have on existing campaign planning methodologies and operational art?

• What potential competitors or scenarios could present hybrid threats?

• What military capabilities or capacity does the hybrid threat extend or strain?

• What impact on training and education?

Operational Implications- Force Protection-heavy vs light

- Freedom of Action/Mobility- Dispersed

- Organic Comprehensive Skills- Multi-task

- GPF/SOF Integration- combinations

- Training/Combat Advising

- Civilian-Military Cooperation

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Definition of Irregular Warfare Operations and Activities

Associated with IW

The operations/activities below comprise IW and typically represent indirect aspects of campaigns:

– Insurgency/Counterinsurgency (COIN);– Unconventional Warfare (UW);– Terrorism/Counterterrorism (CT);– Foreign Internal Defense (FID);– Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations; (Stability

Operations)– Strategic Communications (StratComm);– Psychological Operations (PSYOP);– Civil-Military Operations (CMO);– Information Operations (IO);– Intelligence/Counterintelligence (CI); – Transnational criminal activities/Law enforcement activities

DoD IW Directive 3000.07 identified five primary activities associated with IW. Do we do irregular warfare?….Yes.

Approved Definition (JP 1-02)

IW is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though

it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.

American Way of War

Aggressive—Offensive Annihilation oriented—We really do like to kill em all.Large scale-conventional Combat is face to face--manhoodFirepower is King/Queen Force on Force---machine against machine, system against systems Logistical support is goodImpatient—quick win, some one else to clean up and put it back togetherOverly Sensitive to casualties

American Way of War Industrial in natureTechnologically dependant--PrecisionClosed loop, internal comms, Info is protectedMedia/Info is a sideshowA Political-we like clear division of labor-Pol-MilA Historical (often ignore lessons that could be learned,

applied) A Strategic (overlook consequences)Principles of War =MOOSEMUS= Tactics Problem solving; Opportunistic; altruistic -

– Hope is always a COACulturally challenged—We want everyone to be like usWe are professional specialists.

Irregular Warfare

Protect the People (it’s a social system, stupid)Culture is supreme—reinforce their beliefs,

attitudes, behaviors dIntelligence is King (not artillery)Ideology Matters (What do we promise and then

what do we do) Protracted – Time/patience is a weaponThe target you are shooting at may not be your

enemy!Unity of Effort (s), first, then unity of command—

fuzzy division of laborAlternative decision, comms cycle in public domainOpens up broader aspects of the Pol-Mil spectrum

Irregular Warfare

Degrade the opponents strategy rather than attrite his force (tactics)

Strategic Principles of War—emphasis is long term-determine the nature of the conflict-identify center of gravity (yours and opponent)-criticality and risks of assumptions -Legitimacy- credible capacity to coerce-Know your opponent, what does he want, why is he fighting you? -shape w/psychological precision; influence operations-fracture, de-legitimize, demoralize, and -isolate internal and external supporters – isolate your opponents

Integrate all agencies and elements of power-Focus on undermining opponent politically-make him irrelevant

Thinking and Fighting Differently

LinearLarge Scale OperationsHard SciencesFocus on the EnemyStand-off Warfare-PrecisionHierarchical/predictable AdversaryRegular Country focusMilitary FocusState EnemiesReactiveAir, Land, Sea

Multi-dimensionalDispersed OperationsArt and LeadershipFocus on People Close contact“Non-templatable” adversaryCompoundRegional focusWhole of Government/ComprehensiveNon-State EnemiesProactiveAir, Land, Sea, Cyber, and Space, Information?

MaritimeViolent political actors

– Terrorists: Limited– Insurgents: Localized/transport– State-aided/proxy players: Game-changer

Criminals– Pirates: Somalia

‘Territorialization’ of the sea-EEZs, Security Zones, Traffic in sea lanes…– Torres Strait, Hawaiian national park, South China

Sea, Arctic

Maritime

People move out from the landNavies drawn into the coastGeography

– Complex littoral environment– Rugged coasts– Crowded port cities

Fishing/Offshore infrastructure/tourismExperiential evidence:

– NAG, Somalia, Med, etc

More People---More Disorder

War is still a contestWarfare vs war/duels, not just the shotImportance of national interestWhat makes it “irregular”?Exploitation of disorder:

– Complexity-fluidity of violence-overlap of interests– Defense of trade (counter-piracy)-conservation of

resources-restrictions on FON– Moral over material; morale over metal

Relief Operations

Show of Force

Peacetime & Crisis Low-Intensity Conflict Mid-Intensity Conflict High-Intensity Conflict

F req

uenc

y

Peace Enforcement

Selective Strike

Major Combat

Global War

Noncombatant Evacuation

Humanitarian Assistance Most Likely?

More Complex?

More Lethal?

Train/AdviseTerrorism

NationbuildingCivil War

COIN

Terrorism

Implied ChangeImplied Change

Complexity

Increasing Violence

Stable Peace

GeneralWar

InsurgencyUnstablePeace

Range of Military Operations

(ROMO)

Range of Inter-Agency Operations

(ROIO)

“BINNING” THE FUTURE ALONG A SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT IS NO LONGER VALID. WHAT IS TRADITIONAL/CONVENTIONAL WARFARE?

Implications• Strategy—Patience; End state or constant, moving goals/objectives? • Selective Engagement

– Make sure you develop capability with HN…they have a vote!– Give them credit, even if they had little or no impact

• Design of the Strategy and Campaign-– Understand the nature of the conflict– What does the adversary want?– What are the interests?– What are my forces actually capable of doing?– What are coalition and HN forces actually capable of doing?

• Consider second and third order effects– Tactical success but strategic failure– Tactical failure but strategic win

• Intelligence -HumInt

Operational Implications (drawn from historical cases & wargames)

1. Protracted multi-dimensional contest2. Global or regional context3. “Disappearing’ tactics and low signature

complicate targeting and discriminate- precision use of fires

4. Freedom of maneuver negated or limited5. Battle of narratives critical6. Force protection difficult-7. Population control vice security?

Implications for the military

• What is it we don’t do well?• People and how to think

– You will always be surprised– Mitigate it

• Ideas • Organizations designed for threat or capability?• Equipment-• Information and perception management

• Share Information– Commander’s Foreign Disclosure

Combinations.– Hard Power + Soft Power = SMART POWER

Prevailing Against Hybrid Threats

• Isolating the adversary in the Informational Domain

• Isolating the adversary from means of Financial and Materiel Support

• Gaining control of the moral and morale environment—and maintaining it

• Gaining Population Control• Winning the Competition for Security

Balance or focus?“… it is common to define and divide the so-

called "high end" from the "low end," the conventional from the irregular; armored divisions on one side, guerrillas toting AK- 47s on the other. In reality, …, the categories of warfare are blurring and do not fit into neat, tidy boxes.”

“We can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction - from the sophisticated to the simple - being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.”

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Center for Irregular Warfare

Established June 2007 by CG, MCCDC– Identify, coordinate and implement irregular warfare initiatives

across all elements of DOTMLPF-P (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities - Policy)

– Ensure IW capabilities are accurately presented to other services, DoD, interagency, and partner nations

– CIW has coordinating authority with joint, interagency, and multinational organizations

– Current Manning is 5 Ad and 5 Ctr: FOC 9/2 AD, 4 Gs, 3 CtrEvents: JIW, Maritime Stab Ops, Interagency Initiatives,

Assessments

USMC and IW

Approach and PolicyPPO (PLU-SC)

QDRDOD I IWCJCS I IWIW JOCVision and Strategy; Implementation GuidanceJFCOM and GPF Assessment

IW and DOTMLPFConcepts/Doctrine:-MCWP 3-33.1 MAGTF Civil-Military Operations April 2003 -A Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats 7 June 2006-Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency July 2006-MCWP 3- 33.5/FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual October 2007-MCRP 3-33.1A/FM 3-05.401 Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

July 2007-’A Concept for Unified Action through Civil-Military Integration’ May 2009-’Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century’ March 2009-’Evolving the MAGTF for the 21st Century March’ 2009-’Enhanced MAGTF Operations’ (draft)-Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications 2008-Revisions to the planning procedures that focuses on understanding the

nature of the problem comes before designing a solution.

IW and DOTMLPFOrganization:- Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW) - Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) initially at 44

personnel and currently expanding to 182, -Continued to refine Security Cooperation and Education and Training

Command (SCETC) and their support to the regional MarFors- Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC) - Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) as the DoD Lead for

Cultural Intelligence.- Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) as the

central USMC agency for operational culture and language training and education

- Advisor Training Group (ATG) to prepare Marines for advisory duties

- Other Initiatives; 202 K CAR

IW and DOTMLPFTraining:-Advise Train and Assist-Partner Nation Force Training and Readiness Manual-Published the Operational Culture and Language Training and Readiness Manual

*Mandatory for all personnel in unit deployments*Culture and language training packages for Home Station Training.

*Training for commanders in the use of tactical language to enhance KLE.-Enhanced Mojave Viper (30 day training package that incorporates small unit to

battalion kinetic and nonkinetic tactics).**MRX that includes a four-day assessment using culturally relevant Role Players and simulated environment.

- Marine Corps Operations and Tactics Instructors Course*Heavily focused on Phases III and IV (SSTR); *Includes IW, Human Terrain, Interagency, NGOs/PVOs, Civil Affairs, Info Ops and COIN (57%)

-Marine Corps Civil Affairs School at SCETC to train all active/reserve CA Marines. -Implemented “Combat Hunter” and “Police on the Beat” programs.

-Introduced immersion training for infantry small units.

IW and DOTMLPFMateriel:-Squad Immersive Training Environment (SITE) to formalize lessons learned and encompass

all facets of individual and small unit training, to include virtual rehearsal

-Language Learning Resource Centers at all major USMC installations are equipped withinformation technology suites specifically designed and loaded with computer-based language

courses and modeled after the Defense Language Institute classrooms to facilitate instructor based training. Rosetta Stone and Transparent Language’s CL-50 language learning software.

-The Marine Corps Cargo Unmanned Aerial System initiative to get “trucks off the road” usingautonomous cargo UASs in order to mitigate the threat to re-supply convoys.

- beyond line-of-sight with the capability to “capture” control at a remote location,- deliver 10,000 pounds of cargo in a twenty-four hour period for a round-trip distance of 150 nautical miles: demonstration successful in January 2010.

-The Marine Corps is reviewing options to modify existing load plans of Maritime Prepositioned Ships to better support activities across ROMO.

-Continue to pursue seabasing platforms, Mobile Landing Platform and Large, Medium, Roll-On-Roll off Ships(LMSR), that will facilitate conduct of a full range of IW related activities. A seabase allows for minimal footprint ashore and agility in supporting distributed operations in support of building partner capacity. Tested in Feb

MTVRThe Might Servant 3 (Think MLP)and Soderman (LMSR) were the ships used.

IW and DOTMLPFLeadership/EducationOfficer:*The Basic School and the Infantry Officers Course have incorporated IW concepts into their

Program of Instruction with 27 and 70 hours of IW related instruction, respectively. *Expeditionary Warfare School devotes 3 weeks to IW specific POI that concludes with a 48

hour practical application exercise and offers advanced war seminars to select students, as well as 4 hours of instruction in Civil-Military Operations (CMO) working with the Interagency. Students incorporate key IW-related planning considerations, such as an Operational Cultural analysis, in order to plan for cultural/linguistic factors.

*Command and Staff College (CSC): Devotes 107 hours of instruction to the activities of Irregular Warfare (COIN, transnational threats, regional cultural studies, CMO, Stab Ops and Reconstruction), concluding with the exercise “Nine Innings”: the final practical exercise that’s designed to introduce students to the complexity of Phase 0 planning within the context of the interagency environment. In addition, prior to 9-11, the curriculum at CSC dedicated exclusive lecture and seminar hours to IW themes and topics

*School for Advanced Warfighting: Incorporates an internal look at the cultural and language of specific regions, cultural/linguistic planning and staff rides to foreign countries to reinforces and validate planning assumptions and considerations.

Enlisted:*In 2006, all instruction at USMC formal schools were revised to better incorporate the

fundamentals of fighting in a COIN environment. Resident and non-resident enlisted PME have incorporated IW mirroring much of the instruction that officers receive.

IW and DOTMLPFPersonnel:

-From FY10 to FY15, Foreign Area Officers and Regional Area Officers will increase to 128.

-From FY 07-FY 09, Civil Affairs officers and enlisted billets increased to 202. This emerging capability allows the Operating Forces to field active duty CA detachments as well

as CMO planners.

-The DOD Directive for IW (DODD 3000.07) spawned the CJCSI 3210.06 for IW (DRAFT-currently in 4-star chop/approval). This effort will lead to the linkage of service-level IW reportable readiness (individual IW skills and experience to future unit IW-relevant METs and METLs). The CJCSI further directs an annual GPF (service-level) and SOF IW Assessment on IW readiness within the services. The CJCSI also directs the identification and tracking of IW relevant skills, training and experience.

Some of these IW relevant (skills, training, experience) include:1. Marines with training and experience on MTTs, PTTs, PoETTs, etc.2. Marines with Civil Affairs training and/or experience.3. Marines with IO/PSYOP experience4. FAOs, RAOs, Defense Attaches5. Those Marines with Sensitive Site Exploitation and BIOMETRICS experience.CIW currently conducts IW Manpower Skills Working Groups to identify and track these Marines to

include within the next USMC IW assessment, due in summer-2010.Obviously, some skills are easier to identify and track, because their tied to MOSs, or specific and

official schools or programs; however, the vast majority of the IW Skills will need to be tediously identified through the various IT Manpower and Training systems, local/unit databases and possibly self-identification.....

There is always a well-known solution to every human

problem--neat, plausible, and wrong.

H. L. Mencken,

BACKUPS

Implications?

• Don’t underestimate the adversary…. don’t overestimate your abilities. • Don’t let “terminology” and powerpoint prevent critical thinking. • Combinations of assets available

– Find out who is in your AO and contact them (HN, IGO, NGO’s etc)• Assessment like camouflage is continuous

– Each village, city, farming community is different • Dynamic Re-tasking

– Act on actionable intelligence…time sensitive and fleeting • Don’t let an AO limit your actions

– Coordinate with adjacent forces, operate in each others AO’s• Don’t go to the “well” too many times

– Just as you must adapt, the enemy will also adapt

RELEVANT

POPULATION

ADVERSARY

“RIDING THE ROLLER COASTER”Presence, Persistence and Patience, vs Move, Shoot and Communicate

A constant “battle” that is not irregular or conventional, but complex. Conducting complex operations with a comprehensive approach. Where you will need to

deconflict, coordinate and collaborate.

Events

Definitional Issues• Basis for definition: modes vice structural

– Admixture of different modes/methods of fighting or– Hybrid as composite of state & non-state actors

• Element of simultaneity• Requirement for all four modes?• Degree of operational and tactical fusion• How to capture information/cyber challenge?

Hybrid threat: Any adversary that simultaneously adaptively employs tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics,

terrorism, and criminal behavior to obtain their political objectives.

Campaign Planning

Critical Vulnerabilities

Cohesion/Will/ Influence

Population/Support

Hybrid Threats

IW “Grammar” Conventional Warfighting Grammar

???

Potential Hybrid ScenariosIraqIran

LebanonNorth Korea

RussiaPakistanNigeria Syria

AfghanistanBalkans

Caucuses

China is viewed as a special case China is viewed as a special case China is viewed as a special case

Posture OptionsConventional:

– Focus on great powers, preserve competitive advantages– Accept risk that force can adapt down if needed

Irregular: – Focus on most likely scenarios of state failure– Accept risk from states and advanced hybrid threats

Full Spectrum Force:– Focus on modular forces able to conduct 3 Block War– Potential risk of being suboptimal for any specific threat– Spread risk across range of military ops, invest in quality forces and

flexible training Dedicated and Separate Forces:

– High readiness for specific IW and conventional scenarios– Potential risk of lack of depth/capacity for long duration scenario– Sub-optimized for hybrid threat if optimized for two extremes