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No. E-1S0a

RESTRICTED

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

THE CREDITWORTHINESS OF BELGIUM

Economic Department Prepared by: Murray Ross

~eptember 10, 1951

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CONTENTS ----

Pas1e Statjstics •...•••••••••••••• ' ••••••••• -••••••• -••. -•••••• ,.. 1 SU"Tlmer~,- and Conclusions ...................... c .......... II.......... i1 Intro0uction ••••••.• : • .••••••••• • '. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ... • • 1 External Economic Position ......................... '.'.......... •••• 1 Exports., ............. 'oo ..................... IO ...... co .................... '.. 1 Imnort s •••••.• •••••••••••••••••••• .- ..... -~ •• 0 ••••• <t ' ••• () •• ' ....... '. 2 Role of the Congo .......................................... ' ..... '00 ............ '. 3 EenelllX ••••••••••••••• '. ' •••••• -••••••• ' ............. ' ••••• • ". '. • • • • 4 Balance of PSY'n1ent.s Prospects. ' •••• " ........................ '. .......... 4 External Debto ••••••••••• ., ••••• ~' •••••••••••••••••• !t~' •••• o... ; The Domestic Economy •••••••••••••••• ~ ••••• ~ ••• ~............. 6 Production, Employment, and National Income .............. ' • •••• 0" • 6 Pr1,ces and Hag-eEl .......... Ii •••••••••••• ~ •••• 0.................. 9 Internal Finances ••••••••••••••••••••••••• o •••••••••• ~~ ••• ~. 9 Table 1 - External Debt of Belgium Ta-Ple II - .sxternal Debt of Belgian Congo Table III - External Debt of Luxembourg Table IV - Estimated Interest ano Amortization Payments on

the External Debt of Belgium Table V - Estimated Interest anD Amortization Payments on

the External Deht at Belrian Congo Table VI - Estimated Interest ana Amortization Payments on

t21e External Debt of Luxembourg Table VII - Estimated Interest an0 ~mortization Pa~ents on

the External Debt of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Belgian Congo

i

BEL,}IUH

Basic Ste~istics

r£p'ulatiop: P,660,000 (end of 1950)

!~~ 11,gOO square miles

.QBr!;enc"r Unti.:. gien franc (sifm Efrs.)

T!~1e Stet~stigs - B~lgium-Luxembourg (1950) (inclu0 ing trace vrith overseas territories)

EXDorts: Total - Bfrs. 82.4 binion; to dollar area - Efrs. 10.05 billion Imnorts (f.o.b.): Total - Bfrs. 86.0 billion; from dollar erea - Bfrs.

21.70 billion

194~ deficit (expressed in U.S.'~) 10 49 sur1:l1u9 (exoressec in U.S. 5) 1950 deficit (exPressed in U.S/i)

~129 mill10n :) 50 million 1?190 million

~ 19!t9 lliQ (end of period)

Gold (exoressed :in UoS.~ million) 729 Foreign exchange (expressed in

624 698 5F7

U.S~) million) 9 314 199 162

External Public_Debt of Belp,ium - ~onp,-term (June ~O~Sl)

Total - equivalent of r:n77 million Dollar debt (including CanadianS) - :'~260 million

National Income 12!t2

.July 19151

595

288

1950 (i~ 'curl'e~t prices at factor cost) Bfrs. 252.3 billion Bfrs. 265.0 billion

1950 Receiryts •••••••• Bfrs. 65.9 biJlion ~xpencltures •••• Bfrs. 79.5 billion (includes Bfrs. 14.7 billion

for extraordinary bud~et) J.2j1 Receipts •••••••• Efrs. 63.9 billion

~xpenditures •••• Bfrs. 79.5 billion (includes Efrs. 15.8 billion for extraordinary buCl~'et)

~Qnev SUDIl!.l: ~pn of 19~9 Enn of 1950 Julv 1951 (billion Bfrs.) 155.9 155,,6 155.0

194,2 1950 Harch 1951 June 1951 -- (1937 alOOf Hholesale Prices 342 359 443 439 FetB"'li Prices-- 378 374 407 412 lJs&zes (hourly ~arnings2 393 410 433

7/13/51 No.482

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT l BILLIONS OF U. S. DO LL ARS )

1937 OVER-ALL

RECEIPTS PAYMENTS

DOLLAR AREA

RECEIPTS PAYMENTS

1947 OVER-ALL

RECEIPTS

PAYMENTS

DOLLAR AREA

RECEIPTS PAYMENTS

1948 OVER-ALL

RECEIPTS PAYMENTS

DOLLAR AREA

RECEIPTS PAYMENTS

1949 OVER-ALL

RECEIPTS

PAYMENTS

DOLLAR AREA

RECEIPTS PAYMENTS

1950 OVER-ALL

RECEIPTS

PAYMENTS

DOLLAR AREA

RECEIPTS PAYMENTS

o

BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG

1.0 I

1.5 I

INVrSIBLES

2.0

I.B.R.D. - Economic Dept.

8/31/51 No.483

300

200

100

o

80

60

40

20

o

200

100

BELGIUM- LUXEMBOURG

TOTAL EXTERNAL TRADE: VALUE (MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

~--------~--------.---------~---------.---------.300

1

/1 II

r

MONTHLY

EXPORTS TO BELGIAN OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

IMPORTS FROM BELGIAN OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

A/:. r_' _ ......... ,.

*Includes trade with Belgian overseas territories

TRADE WITH U.S. AND CANADA (MILLIONS OF u. S.DOLLARS)

200

100

.---------,----------.----------.---------~---------,80 MONTHLY

60

IMPORTS (C.i.f.),,--. ", t ""i " , '" ,"" '-, / \ l\,,.. .... , I /"" ""'1 .J

/

EXPORTS

40

20

TRADE WITH OEEC COUNTRIES (MILL IONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

~--------~--------,----------r---------.--------~200

100

0 1937 0 MONTHLY AVERAGES

J 1949

D J

1950 o J

1951 o J

1952 D J

1953 I. B.R. D. - Economic Dept.

8/31/51 NO.484

BELGIUM- LUXEMBOURG

TOTAL EXTERNAL TRADE: VOLUME ( INDEX, 1937:: 100)

150~--------~--------~--------~--------~--------.150 QUARTERLY

100 100

50 50

O~~~--~~----~~-*--~~~--~~~--~~~--~~~O

* Includes trade with Belgian overseas territories

GOLD AND SHORT-TERM DOLLAR ASSETS (INC.LUDING BELGIAN CONGO) (MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

1000~--------~--------~--------~--------~--------.1000 QUARTERLY

800 800

600 600

PRODUCTION: STEEL (THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS)

800

600 '.'

400 ::

200

MONTHLY

0'37J3B D~~~J~~~D~~~J~~~D~~~J..J....I....w..DD..L.L..L..J....l...J1..J....L.J...J~D-L...L...L...L..J..lJ...w...J...J...J

MONTHLY AVERAGES 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953

10

8

PRODUCTION: TEXTILES (THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS)

MONTHLY

6 .- -

.'

4 ....... " WOOL"""",.......... _, ... , " -- -"...-"' ... '" ....... .,

2 ·.... ..... . .... _ ........... ... ........ ........... ..-/' ................ - ~. "'RAVON

','

800

600

400

200

10

8

6

4

2

o ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~O

PREWAR** J D J D J 0 J 0 J 0 MONTHLY

AVERAGES 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 **1938 for wool: 1937-38 overage for cotton and rayon I.B.R.O, - Economic Dept.

(f) o z ~ ::> o :r I-

a/31/SI No.485

PRODUCTION: COAL

MONTHLY AVERAGE 1949

UNEMPLOYMENT

1950

400~~~~~~~~~~~~~ NUMBER REGISTERED - DAILY AVERAGES

I

BELGIUM

1951 1952 1953

AS PERCENT OF INSURED WORKERS

t­Z

PARTIALLY a TEMPORARILY UNEMPLOYED 10 t5

0::: lLJ Q.

J 1950

D J 1951

D J

'52 D J

1950 D J

1951

INDEXES: PRICES, MONEY SUPPLY AND INDUSTRlAL PRODUCTION (INDEX, 1936-1938 = 100)

D

'52

600 00

500 500

400~~~~~~~~ 400 ............. ~- --300 300

200 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 200 100D~~~~~D~~~~:jD~::~~ulD~~~~~D~~~~~DI00

1949 1950

REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES (BILLIONS OF BELGIAN FRANCS)

1948 EXP. REV.

EXP. 1949 REV.

1950 EXP. REV.

1951 EXP. REV.

(ProY.)

1952 EXP. REV.

1951 1952

* Extraordinary budget expenditures have been covered mainly by public issues

1953

100

I.B.R.D.- Economic Dept.

ii

Summary and Conclusions

Belgium is cm'rently enjoying very high levels of production, enploy­ment and i~come. Her major industries are prosperous and the per capita income 0:: her population is among the highest in Europe. A satisfactory level of investment is being maintained, holding out promise of future increases in pro­ductivity and of a favorable outlook for the economy as a whole.

The severe inflationary pressures which arose after the outbreak of hosti.lities in Korea have subsided and for the t~me being at least stability has been reached at high levels of output &nd prices. The need to divert a larger proportion of the nation's resources to rearmament pU.i"poseS is not likely to impose an econom..i.c burden beyond the Government's capacity to manage.,

The overall current balance of payments position of the Belgo-Luxem­bourg Economic Union is satisfactory. The Union managed to transform a deficit of )129 million in 1948 into a surplus of ;;ISO million in 1949. Under the pres­sure of extraordi:::.ar:r events a deficit of $190 million recurred in 1950, but present indications noint this year to a :::-enewed surplus whose magnitude the mor.et.:.ry authorities have already taken measures to limit in view of its infla­tionary implications.

A.lthough overall equilibrium in the balance of paYT'1ents has thus been virtually achieyed, the Belgo-l,uxembourg..:conomic Union has, as she did before the war, cont:::.nued to run substa'1tial dollar deficits, balanced by surp1.uses -ruth EUl'opca'1 countries. However, these surpluses have not always yielded C'onvertible currencies in postwar years and dollar deficits have been financed largely with EGA funds granted to Belgium to recompense her for credits she extended to other OEBe countries to finance their deficits with her" Since the inception of the European Payments vnion these deficits have been covered mainly by the EPU gold credits to the extent of roughly SlOO rr~llion. The deficit v'li.th the dollar area. decreased from ,~2S0 million in 1949 to ,,200 million in 19S0 but has risen aga.in this year', running during the first half of the year at an annual rate cf.,,2,30 l'l'illion. Belgium's gold earninss through Ei'U are likely to exceed ~130 million in 1951 and the gap vinich llay be estimated at. between ;;~SO and v,200 million can be financed readily from existing reserves.

Taking a longer view, Belgium's capacity to service additional dollar indebtedness depends very largely upon her continued ability to cope with her dollar deficit. This in turn will depe~d upon:

(a) the extent to which she is able to convert earnings of Europea.'1 currenCies into dollars;

(b) the extent to which she can increase exports to the dollar area;

(c) the e:::tent to \.,,-11i0h she can obtain supplies outside the dollar area;

(d) the development of the Congo as a source of additional dollar-saving rall~ n;ateri:ls and dollar-earning eX"Ports; and, if these means do not suffice

(e) the extent to ','ihich she can restrict dollar imports with­out su.bstantial damage to the Belgian economy.

iii

hYhl1e the prospects of achieving full convertibility of the major Euronean currencies in the near future are not Pl9rticularly encouraging, the outlooY for closing the Belgian dollar gap through 8 combination of the other foregoing measures appears reasonably good.

The annual service payments on the external debt owed or guaranteed by the Governments of Belgium end of Luxem~ourg are a very small proportion of the annual external earnings of the Belpo-Luxembourg Eoonomic Union (roughly 1%), ~nd under conditions of convertible European currenoies would not be lfi.ely to constitute any problem •. Indeed, in these circUl'lstances a substantially larger debt coulc1 be serviced without to('l much dif'ficulty •. Host of the service payments are in dollars, however, and since it cannot. be safely assumed that the BeIge-Luxembourg Economic Union will be readily able to convert into dollars the European currency suroluses "'Thich it may be exnected to earn, the risks in assuming additional dollar indebtedness are somewhat greater. Nevertheless, since Bcl;!ium r s prospects of coping with this dollar prohlem are deemed reasonable, a moderate increase in its dollar debt shouln not be be;t1"ond the Union's ability to service. The existinry sub­stantial gold and collar assets of B!=)l.~ium ana the Congo as 1.1811 as their continuing al,ility to borrow abroad, constitute an adClitional safety factor.

Additional loans of;;30 million to Belgium and ':;40 million to the Bel-i&n Congo (the latter to be guaranteed by the Bel.::ian Government) to foster the economic develooment of t~e Congo may therefore be regaroed as sound ..

- 1 -

Introduction

'Ehe ability of Belf.!ium to service additional e;~ernal loans depends on the long-run development c-f her economy and in particular her balance of pa;naentJs. Thjs will in turn depend on many i'acto'.:'s ranging from the rate of 1rae:>tment anG. the course of fiscal a!ld r;)onetary development in Belgium to ()conom:Lc conilitj_ons and commercial policies in her major trading partners:. Since the risks invol'led in further dollar lending to Belgium appear to steJ:1 Jess frota anticipations of internal weaknesses than fron the pattern of her foreign trade, analysis of the country's balance of payments prospects has been placed before the discu::sion of comestic economic developments.

Part I

2xternal Economic Position

Primarily an industrial economy, :}elgium dape;'1ds upon substa.'1tial. impcrts of foodstuffs and raw :nateriaJ.s, many of which are processed and ex­ported in the form of fiais;1ed products. Foreign trac.e accounts for roughly one-th::.rd of her na.tional income.

The fur.dakental problem in 0elgium's external economic position ar ises from the pattern of her trade - she ha.s customarily had an export sur­rlus with the "softl! currency cou!ltries and a deficit with the dollar area.

Exports

Th::; exports of the Belgo .. Lux.embourg Economic Union have been develop­ing quite favorably since the end of the war. The volume of exports in 1950 wa.s 7~10 abov'3 that of 1949 and further substanttal gains have taken place this year. Alth:Jugh export receipts dropped from the equivalent of about ,;1,750 million in 1949 to ~el,650 million in 1950 because of a .t"all in expert ?rices, hii~he:, prices and a larger volume of steel exports have raised t:le a.>mu.al rate to abo'-1t ~,;2,570 rr.iJ.lion c. uring the first six months of 1951.

Dollru~ earnings have shown a steady uv~ard trend as a reS1ilt of a greatly increased volume of exports. In 1950 dollar earnings ,-,ere :;';201 million, or 40% r:;ore than in 1949. Dur'J.ng the first five :nonths of 1951 exports to the doll ar area have been running at an annual rate of $340 million. Uost of these increases in exports went to the United states. The defense program and the high level of business acti·1ity in the Unite~ states stim'ila.ted imports of industrial diamonds and steel, and rising personal incomes creuted a higher demand for such Belgian lux~ry iMports as glassware ffild textiles. The decrease in Belgian export prices following the devaluation of 1949 also contributed to the boo~ting of sales to the United States.

Export prospects ~"lill depend largely upon the future competitive posi­tion of the metallurgical and textile industries whioh are responsible for roughly two-thirds of Belgian exports. Both groups of industries have benefited in the post-war period from investment ffi1d modernizatioq schemes, ~~d they have

thus far demonstrated their &bility to make rel.atively satisfactory adjustments to changing market conditions.

The short-r",ln outloo}: far 1elgiar1 exportsar;pe.s.rs quite favorable. Although some flsofteningllin textiles is developing, the demand for steel and for sundry metallurgical products continues very strong and may result in an overa:!.l export sucplus this year. The possible emergence of a serious steel scarcity in the united states would act as a further temporary stimulus to T~elgian e1t:ports and help her reduce the dollar gap. Development of the Congo !!iineral and agricultural raw materials during the Ten-Year Plan should help Belgian dollar exports on a more sustainj.ng basis.

The long-run outlook for Belgian exports is more difficult to assess. Chief factors involved are a) the ability of her major tradJng partners to maintain ~igh levels of production, employment, and income, and b) the con­tinuing adaptability of lelgj.um's leading industries to changing cost and price conditions. In this connection, the effective rationalization of the belgian coal industry ~~d the p~ojected assistance to her steel industry under the Schuman Plan, should prove helpful. If reasonably pr03pel"'OUS conditions are maintai.led in iestern Euro~e and in the;[estern Hemisphere, and there is continued growth in international trade, the long-run outlook for Belgian exports is not Luch less fa~;orable t!1an that for the immediate future.

Imports ~-

The value of imports by the Be1go-Luxembourg Economic Union reached a record figure in 1950 equivalent to ~l,935 rrd1lion (c.i.f.)- nearly 1B% a.bove the preceding year. For the first half of this year the value of imports has been ruanin::: at an annual rate of :,,>2,620 rni11ion. This' high level of j.mports was caused largely by the wave of domestic and foreign bu:ring which follo"vled the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Since '3elgium is primarily a lIprQcessing II country, increasing external orders and expectations of export a.er:land are preceded by a rising level of imports.

Unlike the overall level of imports, those from the dollar area rose only - from ;",1..:.28 million in 1949 to \;434 million in 1950.

imports from the United states, which becdIT!8 r.;ore expensive after deve'J.uation, dropped from ~?322 million to ~"i306 million in 1950. drop Vias more than offset by the inereased imports from Canada and the rest of the dollar area which took place during the last quarter of the year. In line with trer.d, imports from the dollar area during first 5 months of year have been running at an annual rate of ,,>571 million.

iUthough average Irlonthly imports from the dollar area during the first 5 months of 1951 have exceeded the average monthly rate in 1950, by almost a third, the ?rospects of reducing ttem substa.'1tially appear reasonably favorable on several counts. To begin with, the rearmament progl"'am of the United states may be expected to reduce the availabilit.,' of a variety of pro­ducts, particularly autor;obiles, machinery and equipment, for export to Belgium~ Although such shortages ma:l prove to be of 8. temporary nature, they are likely to provide the necessary impetus for the reorientation of Belgian

-3-

imports. Likewise, these products may become available in larger quantities and at competitive Frices in ';~estern European countries, especially Germany. j\,~oreover, ']elgium may soon find it possible to ob'l:.ain from non-dollar sources j,ncreasing q'lantlties of cotton, coffee, and various other raw materials for ';'ihieh she is currently paying in dollars to a substantial degree. It is estimat.ed that the Congo" which is now supplying Belgium annually with the equiyalent of ;';;120 million of largely doJ.lar-saving imports l may be in a posi­tion to raise this figure substantially, thereby contributing to the reesta­blishment of Belgian dollar viability.

Should all ~he foregoing developments fail to curtail dollar imports sufficiently, Belgian authorities could eliminate the remaining small gap by a stricter enforcement of the existing licensing system \tithout causing Q~y substantial hardships or dislocations to the Belgian economy_ In the light of the post-war record of the Belgian monetary aut.horities, and especially in view of thei:' recent actions to protect the nation's gold reserves, there is little reason to doubt that if the need arose, they would take timely measm'es to restrict dollar imports even though they are cormnitted to a liberal trading policy.

Role of the Congo ! I

Economic end financial relations between Belgium and the Congo are of considerable importance. The subst.?ntial capital holdings of private Beleian investors in the Congo have been increasing in recent years, thereby contributing to an acceleratio!'l of the colony's economic development" It is estimated that the in7estment of earnings and of new capital by Belgian com­panies in the Congo is currently x'unning at an annual rate of ,,,,40-50 million equivalent. On the o'Lher hand, the Congo mc:kes a substantial contribution to the Belgian balance of pa;yments. During the last feyv years Belgium has received annualJ.y around .}70 million equivalent in various forms of invisible earnings from the Congo.

Since the end of the war, the Congo has enjoyed a substantial trade su:.~plus with Belgium as well as with the rest of the world. During 1948~50 the overall trade surnlus averaged :;P116 million equivalent. Of this total, abol1t;60 mi:'..lion a year "vas used in roughly equal proportions, to finance the trunsfer of' investment income to Belgium, to pay the Jelgi9n costs of

of Congo firms as ,·lell as of the Congo Government, and to trans::er to 'elgium redttances and salaries of individuals working in the Congo. A li'Ltle over ~~20 million equivalent, of which about half went to Belgium, was used to pay freight and ins~J.rance on Congo trade, with the remainder of a.rounrl. "J30 :nillion equivalent added to Congo foreign cxchan,~e reserves, pr",ncipal1y in the form fr2n~ holdings. The gold dol::'ar reaerves of the Congo have doubled in the postwar period froIn,>40 -i:,o~j80 mill.ion.

The Gongo is already a contr-ibutor of gold an i:1 dollars to the BelGian fral1c nonetary area and is likel:: to an inc .. "easin,;ly larger one as her development program brings about a substa''1tial increase in her exports _ The net dollar surplus of the Congo arr.ounted to more than :,;10 mil­lion in 1950 and it fur'nished a'1 additional :;,,10 million in gold production to the n:onetary area. FurtheriJore, a large proportion of the :,;J120 million

-4-

equivalent of exports of the Congo to Belgium are co;;m:odities which Belgium would otherwise have to import from the dollar area., such as cotton, oils, fibres, coffee. rhe rest of the Congo's exports to Belgium, prindpally ninerals, are indispensable for Belgium's manufactures, and are in processed form in part reexported to the dollar area. It is estimated that the value of Congo exports to Belgium I'dll rise by roughly 50% as a result of ine Ten-

development program. In addit.ion, since the Congo clears its EPU trade through Belgium, it makes a substantial direct contribution to the surplus

shows in the EPU and to the resulting Belgian gold earnings. For example, in 1950 the Congo had a trade surplus of around \jjl80 million ,dth the EPU countries.

Benelux ,

Progress tm'{ard the formation of the Benelux Economic Union as evidenced by the liberalization of trade in 1950 has created, at least te:npo:-­arily, a somewhat disturbing export surplus for Belgium with the Netherla11ds. Thus far, the surplus has been financed through the EPU mechan1sm, although recent.ly the strain on the Netherlands has become tncreasingly severe. As a result, it has been just agri:;ed that Belgium should restrict exports to the Nether'lands, thereby reducing Benelux trade liberalization to t he level prev<:d.ling among O:::::C countries. Although undesirable in the broad sense, su:::h a develop::rrer~t is r.ot likely to seriously injure the Belgian economy. It will PI' 00 ably retiuee some~hat her gold earning through EPU, while it may also be expected to decr9ase her demand for dollar imports. In addition to the trade question, still unsolved a;:'e ::rra.'1Y vital relating to agri-ClLlture, watervfaYs, a COfClmon labor market and monetary policies •

. ;hatever further developrr:ents i1:ay talte place with reGard to the Benela'\{ Ecoaomic Union, are not likely c:J.terially t,C affect Belgium'S creditvrorthines3, although achievelte::1t ;Jf the =:conomic union should in the long run strengthen the an economy by establishing a larger market area.

Balance of PayrJents Prospects I

ilelgium's ability to servi~e additional dollru~ indebtedness depends lr:.rgely upon the achievement of a hig.h degree of convertibility among

major .t;;uropean currencies, or in its absence, upon the prospects of closing th,] present suostantial dollar gap of the Belgo-Luxembourg I:;conomic union.

The over~ul current balance of payments position of the Belgo­Luxembourg ;;;conotn.1.c iJnion is satisfaotory. The Union managed to transform an overall def5.cit of '..'129 million in 1948 into a surplus of ,,50 million in 19).+9. Under the pressu1'e of extraordinary events, a deficit of ."il90 million recurred in 1950, but present tndicat:ions Do:int to a renevved surplus this year. The moneta:r'~' authorities have a1!'eady taken measures to limit the anticipated sm·:;;lus because of its infl3.tionary implications.

Concurrently 'Nith the achievement of virtaal equilil)rium in the balance of pay:r:ents, the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union has been experiencing, in recent years, substantial dollar deficits. These defidts have been largely financed with :;;;CA funds by way of recompensing Belgium for her surpluses with

- 5 ..

other OEBe countries, and more recently by EPU gold credits. During the three years of the ivlarshall Plan a total of around "l530 million was made available by EGA to the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union in the form of loans and con::litional gra.'1ts. The deficit with the dolla.:=- area decreased frarr, ,;250 lrillion in 1949 to ~p200 mi+lion in 1950 but has risen again this year, running duri.ng the first half of 1951 at an annual rate of .)230 mil~ li0n~ Belgium's gold earnings through EFU are likely to exceed :;,;130 milllon this year and the gap which may be estimated at bet'l'feen ·:,)50 million and ·",100 rdllion caT). be met readily from existing reserves. Du~in~ the next several years it is very unlikel~T that other EPU members will find it possible to c:mtinue finaT).cing half of Belgium's dollar deficit of current magnitude unless U.S. military off-shore expenditur'es assume sizeable proportions ..

The prospects of coping with Belgium's dollar deficit in the face 0: rep idly declining EG.'\. aid depend upon:

(a) the degree of convertibility of principal .E.uropean c urrenciesj

(b) successful promotion of increased exports to the dollar area;

(c) increasing availabilities of supplies O1.ltside of the dollar ~ea, and diversion of imports to these sources;

(d) cievelopment of the Congo as a source of additional dollar­saving raw l::aterials end dollar-earning exports; and

(e) restriction of non-essential dollar ir:iports by the Belgo­Luxembcurg Zconomic U~ion.

[hile the immediate prospects of achieving full convertibility of European currencies are not particularly encouraging, the outlook for closing the Jelgian dol.:ar f,ap t~1rough a combination of the other foregoing lflcas:rres, apr-ears reasonably good.

External Debt

The comoined long-term external debt owed or guaranteed by the I3elgian Government (including the public deut of the ConGo outside of the 3fr .. rrlonetary area) is equivalent to about $3 Tl million as of the middle of 1951 (see Tables I and II) ~ Besides, there is the external debt of the Grand Dutchy of Luxem­bourg of :,p18.6 million (see Table III) which I!lUSt also be serviced out;, of the foreirn exchange carnings of th0 ).elgo-Luxembourg Union. Of' these combined total debts, aQout .~271~ million are in U.S. or Canadian dollars, about ;';99 million in Swiss francs, and the remainder in pounds s"t,erling or S'Ncdish ~cronor.

Service payments on all these debt.s amount to the equivalent of :;,;48 million this year-, and wEl go down to .).;.2 millio::1 in 1952 due to rapid amortization of a Swiss loan contr&.cted this spring. Payments Will drop sharnly 1:.0 ~;;26 ~illion in 19.5) and to ~;2j million in 1954, remalning on the average at this level throw,:h 1958. Until the end of 1962 vhen the post-war 'lelgian issues in Switzerland - for 'which no SlntCl.n'~ fund is provided reach maturity, servj.ce pa:J1Yle!lts rise to an annual av{~raf!,e of $32 tntllion. A sharp

- 6 -

drop to ~~19 million takes place in 1963 1 after which payments gradually decline to $9 million by 19?5. Service payments due in U.S. and Canr.rian dollars move more regularly. After reaching a neak of ~23 million in 1952, they crop to 315 million in 1960 and to $10 million in 1970 (see TaGle VII).

Tie service payments on the overall external debt of the Belgo~ LuxenboUrg Economic Union are small (on the average, roughly 1%) in relation to the Union's annual foreign exchange receipts which are at present 1n the neighborhood of i~2 billion.

Under conditions of convertibility among major European currencies, the Belgo-Luxemrourg Union could rea~ily assume additional external indebted~ ness, but such a degree of convertibility is not in sight and a dollar gap of bett.reen ~200 million and ';;250 million remains to be contended with so that the risks in assumin~ additional dollar obligations become somewhat greater.

Nevertheless, in view of the prospects of remecying the difficulties ste;t'L.lling f'rom the present foreign trpde pat '-,ern of the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, as explained above, it would armear that 8 moderate increase in the existing dollar debt woulr not be beyond the Union's ability to service~ An 80ditional safety factor lies in the possessIon of substantial gold ane no1lsr reserves by Belgium and the Cong0 1 estfmateo as being in the neighborhood of :~800 million.

Part II --~he ~om~stic Economy

The foregoing c.iseussion of Belgiumts external position and pro~ spects was based in large part on certain conclusions regarcing her L~ternal economic situation sno outlook. Since the external position is inseparably linked with internal conditions ano policies, it is now arypronriate to analyze the domestic economy in some oetail.

Pro(luc't~on, Emp]""'!l19nt z ana National, Income

A, Production

Belgium is currently enjoying a very prosperous neriod. Inou~trial production attained an unprececentedly high level in 1950 and .from all inoics;" tiona hes increased even more during the first half of this year. The over­all indeX or industrial production (AGEFI) averaged 127 during 1950 (1935-38 • 100) which represents about a 5% incre8s~ over 1949 and by June 1951, it rose to 151. Although, taken as a whole; 1950 turned out to be a record year for Belgian industry, the second half of the year "ras ,much more prosper~ ous than the first half and largely set the pattern for 1951.

The decline in the demand for Belgian steel which became evident early in 1949 and continued until the middle of 1950, was resnons1ble for e widely held viev that the post ... vlar accumulated (lemend for steel had

... 7 -

finolly been met •. Substantial new orders were not received Q~til the out-" break of hostilities in Korea when output climbed to record heights, but even with this impetus total steel productio,n in 1950 was only 3~736,709 metric tons against 3,785,301 metric tons in 1949. Judging by the perform­ance during t,he first five f:lontha, steel output in 1951 may reach about 5,000,000 metric tons.

A pa.rallel situation has prevailed in the coal lll.1.m.ng industry. The first six months of' 1950 were characterized by gradually decreasing demand and rising stocks. 3ut with the receipt of new steel orders, the picture was completely reversed dm'lng the second half of' tr.e year - del;land rOS8, stocks declined rapidly and production increased. Nevertheless, as in the case of steel, total coal output in 1950 declined to 27,304,380 metric tons as co~pared with 27,850,210 metric tons in 1949. During the first half of this year, coal production has been running at an annual rate close to 30,000,000 inetric tons.

A number of encol.lraging attempts are being made at ameliorating the basic problem of high production costs of the Belgian coal industry. Th:!:'oughout 1950 investn:.ents were [lade in new ecuipment, in rr.odernizing the mines and in improving surface Ch'1ct transportation facilities. " Valuable technical assistance being given by :~CA, )vhich sponsQred a survey of Be:gian mines by American engiileers and a visit by }3elgian e.;cperts and rrd.ners to the United 3tates to study American production rnethods~ iuthouZh the oasic difficulty of' high production costs has not been materially altered~ output per man shift increased by roughly 8% in 1950 over 1949 - from .641 tons to .693 tons.. Expert opinion of ,nini!1f engineers is encouraging 'In th regard to the prospects of reducing costs.

The consumers'" goods industrie s prospered thro1lghout 1950 and their high levels of output more than offset the somewhat depressed state of the he av,/ industri es during a good :;)art of the year.. The te).."tile industry enjoyed an excellent year, registering significant gains in all major lines of output. Production of wool yarn rose from 31,500 metric tons to )9,700 metric tons arld of cotton yarn from 81,000 metric tons to 98,000 If,etric tons between 1949 and 1950. Liberalization of trade with Holland and the post­Korean scar'e ouying in the domestic market were largely responsible for sttmulating tile demand tor Belgian textiles. The prosperity of the te~"tile industry continued into the first half of 1951; however the recent decline in domestic demand and the new export restrictions to the Netherlands have caused the textile industry to contract.

The construct:.on industry also maintained a high level of act,ivity in 1950, al tholl~h a part of its prosperity is attributable to public works .. Between 19h9 and 1950 the average monthly index of building constrt~ction rose from 104 to 113 (1936/38 :: 100) •. The increase in public works during 1950 was principally due to the highway improvement program •.. The program Was largely desi~ed to ameliorate growing unemployment and reached its r;eak duX'ing June, declining sharply thereafter as the poC)t-r~orean industrial expansion absorbed large numbers of unemployed. Unlike public works, private construction has continued thus far this year at the same high level of 1950.

B~ . Bmployment

The high level of economic activit:: has had a sal1.ltary effect on the labor market. Unemployment had been a problem since the end of 1948 and had caused the Government to expand public works,. but recent reports of labor

- 8-

shortages suggest that Be11Y,iu.TI1 is currently e).'"Periencing a state of full emnlo~~ent, or at least very close to it. Currently there are acute spot 1acor short!le;es, eSDecially 1n hazardous and skilled occunations, and a Cier"an0 he s oeve1opec for the inmortation of foreign workers. Recorced unemn10yment declined to 191,000 in June 1951 as comp~red with 208,000 a year earlier, but the reliability of these figures is qUestioDatle since a recent survey indicates that in February 1951 out of a totel of 171,4P2 re1"'lorted a s wholly unemployed, some 40,000 were e atua11y unemploye ble. . The extreme liberalit:lof the Belgian unemployment insurance system is respons­itle for the reported level of unemployment remaining around 10% of the insured vorkers in .. Tune 1951. A recently adopted stricter interpretation 0';: involuntary unerr..ployment is likely to reduce this oronortlon somewhat.

C. National Income

The overall level of prosnerity in 1950 is reflected in the real national income of Belgium which rose by about 5% from Bfrs. 252.3 billion in 1949 to Bfrs. 265.0 billion in 1950. This meant a per canita income of roughly /'615, the highest in Europe vith the exceution of S"dtzerland and S.'eden. lvioreov('r, as a result of a balanee of payments deficit of Bfrs. 10 billion in 1950 as cornnared with a balance of payments surplus of Bfrs. 5 billion in 1949, the irjcrease in gross availa~le resources in 1950 was even higher. The use of resources for private consumption rose by about 5% from Bfrs. 217 binion in 1949 to Efrs. 228 billion in 1950. The remainder of available resources Here uset'l to raise both publie and private investment to approximately 16% of the gross national product. Although some of the increases in private investment during the second half of the yeBr were in the form of inventory accumulations, there are good reasons for belie,ling that sufficient fixed investment is taJring pIece to assure a reasonable healthy end vigorous in0ustry for the future,-

Given the record Derformance of Belgian industry in 1950, when heavy industry "Jas depressed during most of the year, it is reasonable to expect higher levels of output in the future. vJith steel production· cur­rently rUnninR' at a monthly figure :1.n excess of 400,000 tons and the over­all index of ilJrustrial productionrrgistering for the first half a 17% increase over the same period last year, it does not seem unreasonable to expect a 10% increase in industrial output during 1951 over 1950,. in spite of a recently reported exhaustion of orders by the textile indUstry. The only foreseeable major obstacle to this aohievement lies in the developing raF matArial shortages. Iff' however, the voluntary materials salvage and conservation proeram inau~rated jointly by the Governmetlt and industry meets with a reasonable measure of success, and the heavy orCtera placed for iron ore ancl othe:t' essential raw materials are Clelivered on schedule, a minimum of interference with the maintenance of current production levels may be exPected.

A rise of 5% in real national income - or roughly the increase from 1949 to 1950 - 1s likely to be achieved this year. Further growth in national income may be exnected, since the prevailing level of invest""". ment anpears to assure future increases in productivity_ EVen if the Belgian steel and textile industries are again confronted with the need to lower prices, their prospects should be reasonably good. They have already pemonstrated in the postwar perioe an ability to adjust to ohanging market

-,9 ...

conditions ffild their recent prosperity should r.ive them additional strength. Furthermore, a reduction in the cost of Belgian coat either trpough improved production methods or by subsidies projected under the Schuman Plan (if it, is ratj,fied) should be helpful in preserving the competitive position of Belgian industrj' and in mainta:'nim~ a satisfactory level of output ..

Prices and ,;ag~ 9

The some1.'!hat declining trend in prices, which has been in evidence in BeJ,.gium since about the middle of 1948, was abruptly interrupted by the outbreal{ of Korean hostilities. The o"lerall index of wholesale prices rose frOI!'! 342 in 1949 to 359 in 1950 (1937 = 100) and in lc:larch 1951 reaciled 443 or a third above the same month last year. The cause of this price inflation lies both in the increases in world prices of raw materials and in the sudden spurt in demand for the products of Belgian heavJ industries. A certain degree of stabilization was ac!1:;'eved at the new high level during the second quarter of 1951 with the index of wholesale prices even receding to 430 in June.

The overall index of retail prices averaged 374 in 1950 as against 378 in the preceding year (1937 = 100). The slight but persistent decline in retail prices was also halted by the events which followed the outbreak of the l(orean war. ShlO},ish domestic demand for textiles and other products gave way to consumer scare buying as well as to speculative inventory accumu­lation and drove t~p retail pr~ces by 6% during the third quarter of 1950~, Fearing injury to "lelgium f s competi ti Ye position from price j;ncreases vinich exceeded those of' other count~"'ies, the Governr:ent launched a drive in October in cooperatio:1 V'Jith business and labor, to reduce retail prices~ ,,\ltho'Ugh the drive 'Nas partially s'clccessful, by June 1951 the retail price index reached 412 o~~ about 20%' above a year earlier.

AS a result of the rising cost-of-living, bonuses were granted to workers for the last quarter of 1950, and' in February 1951 a 4% wage increas8 was announced in key industries. Howeyer, the index of hourly earnings rose by under 10 .. ; between k;arch 1950 and March 1951, as compared w.:.th a 20ib increaE'e in retail prices, indicating th&.t the gradually rising level of real wages in Belgium d1Jring the post-war period was at least temporarily halted by the post-Korean inflationary developmentso

Internal Finances

In view of the recent expansion in Belgian economic activity and the rising level of vvorld prices, the monetary situation remained rem<Jrkably stable. Total !Loney supply increase.;;} from Efrs. 152.2 billion in l;;ay 1950 to Bfrs. 155.0 billion a year later, or by less than 2%. The allocation to the Government of the net proceeds of the re'!aluation of the gold and foreign exchange stock of the National Bank cor.tributed Bfrs. 4.3 billion of the increase in money supply. A good part of the increase was also caused by expansion in bank credit to accommodate the needs of industry, trade and consu:ners. Domestic credits of the I~ational Bank to bus5.ness interests increased from Sfrs. 4.4 billion in June 1950 to Bfrs. 9.9 billion a year later; during the san:e period credit of the banks to the business community increased from 3frs. 25.1 billion to i1frs. 26.4 billion ...

- 10 ..

The relative stability in the existing means of payment "yes pr·e­served only as a result of a ccntinuously correcting process wherebytbe ne", purchasing pOl-rer created by the banking system wes offset through the loss of reserves. HOltrever, the impaot of the credit expansion on the domestic demano for goods, and in turn on the de~and for imports, beoame acute during the third querter of 1950. As a result, a number of deflatioll­ary polioies 'Were adopted by the authorities, ino1uding the raising of· the rediscount rate of the Central Bank from .3{-%to 3-3/4% in September 1950,.

Publio finances have been in good condition reoently. According to the latest a11sileble estL'll8tes the ordinary budf,;ets for 1949 and for 1950 have yielded surpluses cf Bfrs. 391 million and Bfrs. 1,150 million respee ... tively. The improvement in business conditions durin~ the second half of 1950 "11th the consequent reduotion in unemployment, nmde possible a contraction in public investment from Efrs. 14.2 billion to Bfrs. 10.7 billiol'l. Beoause of the heavy dependenoe on indireot texes (turnover taxes, customs duties) the impact of business recovery also reacted quickly on revenues. These revenues together with receipts of Bfrs. 3.1 billion under 8 newly adopted income tax preuayment scheme for the self~mployed broudht the Government's short-term (lebt to the Central Bank to Bfrs. 3.6 billion tOHsro the end of August 1951, or to less than two-fifths of its ceiling of Bfrs. 10 billion. The ellocation to the C~vernment of the exchange revaluation profits also facilitated the covering of general Treasury requirements.

Total publio debt deolined during 1950 from Bfrs. 252.1 billion to Bfrs, 24P.4 billion. The consolidated internal debt deoreased b,y Efrs. 6.3 bill~.o:n from Bfrs.119 .. P billion to Bfrs. 113.5 billion because amortization continued regularly at the same time that highly unfavora~le market conditions discouraged nen publio loans ..

The publio finance situation will probably continue to be favorable. Revenues are liJrely to rise ;.Jell above original esti.mates; on the other hand, expenditures ,,11l:!. probably decline because of reduced need for payments to unemployed.. on b-alanoe, the projected ordinary budget surplus of Bfrs. 107 million for 1951 may veIl te surpassed. Extraoroinary expenditures may also be expected to be held down to a minimum since there is no lon~er either an economio or social justification for B large-soale publie works program. The major obsta ole in this respect is that publio works started in 1949 have incurrec commitments obligating the Government to include in the extraordinary bU0get estimates for 1951 some Bfrs. 4 to 5 billion on their account. Through the exercise of budgetary austerity and strict control over expendi­tures o~' pars statal enterprises, it should be possible to reduce the extra­orClinery bu(lr,et expenditures nOTJ estimated at Bfrs. 15 .. 8 billion.-

The mag;nltuce of the rearmament effort which Belgium is currently olanning to undertal"e does not appear unCiuly burdensome for the economy. The rise in defense expenditures from Bfrs. p.5 billion in 1950 to e pro~ jected figure of Efrs. 14 billion for fiscsl 1951, can probably be covered in lsrg;e part by the nevI,. introduced excess profits tax as iJell as by the anticipated rise in overall revenues.

The strong inflatjonary pressures to whioh the Belgian economy was subjeoted rluring the yeer since the outbreak of hostilities have no", sUbsided, both as a result of international developments and of appropriate domestic . polioies. ..Tudg!ng on the basiS of the postwar record of Belgian monetary and fiscal Buthorit1",s. the long-run outlook for internal financial stability is quite favors ble. .

• u~s ... JX)LL~ Dollar bonds

6't., 1925-1955 BelgiuID Vb, 1925-1955 City of Antwerp 5,b,

1928-1958 };,I

Total dollar bonds

u.s. Government loans EaF 22-;~, 1948-1983 Ell,I:- 2"~'~,. 1949-1970-outstanding

undisbursed Export-Import Bank 2 3/8-3~:~,

1976 Surplus jToperty 2 3/8/0,

1946-1976 3/ Total V.,S. Government loans

TABLE I

~xtern<11 Debt o.f Belgium

(in thousands)

---------Amount Outstandingas-or;-Date Shmm - June 30, 1951

In Currency Expressect in In Currency Expressed in Date of Payment U.S. Dollars of Payment: U.S. Dollars

6/30/51 :,p 1701 6/30/51 3191

12/31/50 .~5191

6/30/51 47900 6/30/51 420 6/30/51 1358

6/30/51 101016 J/

6/30/51 11153

1701 3791

5197

47900 420

1)58

101016 }/

11153

;$ 1701 1701 3791 3791

4925 4925

10417 10417

47900 47900 42.0 420

1358 1358

101016 101016

11153 11153

161847 161847

I3HD 4};G, 1949-1969-outstanding 7/31/51 undisbursed 7/31/51

12550 3450

12550 3450

12550 12550 3450 3450

'i5Qoo' 16000 Total IBLtD loan

Total dollar debt ='"=- ~t!8826h ~;r8U264

CANADIAi:j DEBT loan

19h6-1976 ,~ , 5"'7?75 van,,) It) c 57675 Shno

S'rERLING D.2:Hr Belgium 4%, 1936-1970 Belgium 4%, 1937-1960

Total sterling debt

S.\1mrSH K::{uNlI. DEBT Belgium J'~!&J 1936-1962

S , F-LtdG vEBT Swiss franebonds

Belgium J~%, 1937-1985 Societe Nat. de Chemins de Fer 1e1ges 4;;i, 1948-1960

Societe l~at. de Chem.:i.ns de Fer iJelg. es 41 4;~, 1949-1961

Societe dat. cIe credit a l'Industrie 4/ 4%, 1950-1962

La de Te"!. at Tel. 4~~, 1947-1959 J:/

Total SWiss franc bonds

Credit Suisse 2/6, 1951-1952

Total Swiss franc debt

Total debt

6/30/51 6/30/51

h 5291 1976

6/30/51 SKr 8867

6/31/51 3wfr35137

6/31/51 50000

12/.31/50 50000

12/31/50 50000

12/31/50 50000

6/30/51 112500 --,

Ih815 5533

1713

13143

11588

11588

Il t;88

11588

26072

TABLE I Page 2

-------:e 5291 14815

1976 553~

b 7267 20348

SY,r 8367 17D

Swfr 35137 8143

50000 11588

~OOOO 11588

50000 11588

50000 11588

235137 511.495

112500 26072

Swfr 347637 50567

345612

Hote: There are also the folloV{in~ short-term debts whicb Vfe have not included in our schedule of interest and amortiz.ation payments ~

Bon du Tresor 4% Bons du Tresor cedes a BR! (BIS)

Bons du Tresor a 6 mois cedes a 1a Societe de janque Suisse

Total short-term debt

6130/51 6/30/.51 6/301;1

6/30/51

In currencyof paymentExpreflsed in U.S.$ -~ t ~B6%~ . 8066 -- = -

Swfr 30600 7092

Swfr 45000 10429

25600

Not an obligation of the national :zovernment.

Table I Page 3

This obligation was listed by the Department of Commerce as amounting to iJii17,813,000 as of 3/31/50. The difference between this and the figure above is payaole in real property or local currency. This figure was taken from the June 30, 1951 statei1ent of the Export­Import Bank. It differs slightly from the figures submitted by BelgiUlIi. Not listed as obligations by the Belgian Government.

The following exchange rates were used: Swfr 1 = ~~.23175; U~S.Ol ::: can$1.054; SKr 1 = ~.19324; b 1 = ~:}2.80; f 1 :: ~.263l6.

TABLE II

External Debt of Belgian Congo ( otherthan in :efrs.)

roLLAR DEbT U.S. Government loans

Deficiency Materials Project 2~%-1970 1/

outstanding­undisbursed

BRP loan 3t%-1976

Total U.S. Govt. loans

s·JISS FW:C DEBT 4%, 19$0-.1971

Total debt

(In thousands)

_ hmount outstanding a~.o~ Date shown June 30, 1951

In currency Expressed InCurrency Expressed Date of payment in U.S.:;,; of paYment in U.S.::?

• 9 ... -

3/31/51 ;~ 641 641)" 1700 1700 3/31/51 1059 1059)# 6/30/51 _1$500 15500 15500 15500

$ 17200 17200 ~1) 17200 17200

J..2/31/50Swfr~ , 13963Swfr60000 1J9?J

3116)

TABLE III

External Debt o:f Luxembourg ( other than in Bfrs .,)

(in thousands)

Amount outsta'1ding as of': Date shown June 30, 1951

WLLAR DEBT

In currency Expressed Date of: payment in U.S.'.';

In currencY:jxprEissed of pa:;y1llent in TJ.S.;;~

Dollar bonds 3%, 1947-1971 1/

ERP 10 an 2~7~, 1949-1972-

12/31/50 :,.;

3/31/51

lBRD lean 4~%, 1949~ 1972 Y 1/ 6/30/51

Total dollar debt

STZR.LING bonds 37~, 1947-1971 1/ 12/31/50 ~

~rJ:ss F1ANC bonds 4;6,

552 552

3000 3000

10658 10658

23 66

1948-198.3 ~/ 12/31/50Sw:fr18829 4.361

Total debt

'.? 55f:

3000

10658

iHi 14210

23

S1;\'fr18727 -

The folIO-lang exchange rates were used: b l' =;2.00; Sw:fr 1 = ;w.2.3175.

552

.3000

'10658

14210

66

4340

18616

1/ Also payable i~ Luxembourg francs at current rate o:f exchange. 2/ Of the total nm loan outstanding, ,.632,000 is not held by the Bank. !' ~ T"_l

j There is also the equivalent of :';9 ... 2,000 payable in ;::elgian francs to the rUD.

4 Also payable in Luxembourg francs at Swfr 1 = Lu..xfr 10.14.

TABLE V

~~ .. ;!.Jnterest and .'Unortization Payme;::ts on the E'rlernal Debt of !3e1gian Congo

(Sxpressed in thousands of U.S. dollars)

----~~--.-------------------------------~--------------~~--------Total Debt

Year Amount Payments Outstandin~ xmo~tizatio~Int--er--e--st~

19~1· , .... 31163 - 8ll 195231163 53 1106 1953 31110 106 1104 1954 ,31ooh 106 1101 1955 ,30897 106 1098 1956 30791 384 1096 1957 30407 676 10'19 1958 29731 695 1057 1959 29035 1877 1037 1960 27159 1687 967 1961 25273 1898 896 1962 23375 1918 828

. 1963 21458 19i.J.l 755 1964 19517 1953 685 1965 17555 1987 612 1966 15568 2011 540 1967 13557 2036 466 1968 11522 2062 392 1969 9460 208S 317 1970 7373 2074 240 1971 5299 895 16, 1972 4404 924 136 1973 34dO 954 106

. 1974 2526 986 74 1975 1540 1018 42

;.;,

ToW 811

1159 1210 1207 1204 1480 1755 1752 2914 2854 2794 2746 2696 2648 2599

·2551 2502 2454 2405 2314 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060

Service Payments '0" currencies

--~-,-. .....-..'-~ U.S. Dollars Swiss fr~~c6

252 _. 559 600 559 651 559 648 559 645 559 921 559

1196 559 1193 559 1191 1723 1178 1676 1165 1629 1163 1583 1160 1536 1158 1490 1156 1443 1154 1397 1152 1350 1150 1304 1248 1257 1103 1211 1060 1060 1060 1060 1060

TABLE VI

~~ated Interest and ..!Jllorti ~ation Payments on the EXternal Debt of Luxembourg

(in thousands of U.S. dollars)

Total Debt Service Payments by Currencies Year -xmou:nt - Payments -SWiss ...

Oust andj.ng Amortization Interest Total Ik>11ars francs Sterling 1951 18658 156 647 + 803 560 241 2 1952 18502 448 676 1124 879 241 4 1953 18053 464 693 1151 912 241 4 1954 17589 Lao 67) 1153 908 241 4 1955 17108 L95 654 1149 904 241 4 1956 16611 ~.·68 631 1199 954 241 4 1957 16045 585 609 1194 949 241 4 1958 1,460 602 585 1181 942 241 4 1959 14860 59) 562 1155 910 241 4 1960 14266 613 5'36 1149 904 241 4 1961 13653 638 512 1200 955 241 4 1962 12965 708 484 1192 941 241 4 1963 12247 728 457 1185 940 241 4 1964 11529 749 428 1177 932 241

, 4

1965 10779 .. 773 398 1171 926 241 4 1966 10005 849 366 1215 970 241 4 1967 9155 813 333 1206 961 241 4 1968 8281 898 299 1197 952 241 4 1969 7.384 925 263 1188 943 241 4 1910 6459 951 227 1178 933 241 4 1971 5508 980 191 1171 926 241 4 1972 4528 966 151 1117 876 241 ... 1973 3562 291 120 411 170 241 :.;.

1974 3271 297 110 407 166 241 1975 2974 )03 101 404 163 241 .,.

TABLE VII

Esti.mated Interes'c and Amortization Payments on the EXternal Debt of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Belgian Congo . i

(Expressed in thousands of u.s. dollars)

-- Tot8.1 Debt ____ Pay~.ts __ Service P§L menta by ~~d.es

Year Amount !\.mort- Inter- Tot?l u.S. Canad- Swiss Sterling Swedish Outstand- ization est Do11ars ian francs kronor ing Dollars

1951408705--7f~2 100S?) 47648 15990 3873 2S226 2306 247 1952 374098 30362 11188 41550 18880 3805 16310 2308 247 1953 343850 15166 11101 26267 16905 3740 )067 2308 247 1954 )28741 12494 10614 23108 13812 )674 3067 2)08 247 1955 316304 1)608 10152 2)760 14529 3609 )067 2,308 247 1956 29982) 13217 9710 22927 1)763 3542 3067 2,308 247 1957 278001 12914 9203 22117 13018 3477 3067 2308 247 19$8 268094 12526 8790 21316 12797 3412 3067 1193 247 1959 256010 24411 8170 32581 12124 3346 15587 1328 196 1960 2Lf1619 24287 7295 31582 11896 3231 15017 1328 1961 206506 25259 6316 31575 12467 3214 14566 1328 1962 181256 25350 8506 308:;:6 12322 3149 14057 1328 1963 155906 13856 4822 18678 12077 J083 2190 1328 1964 142070 13951 4370 18321 11831 3018 2144 1328 1965 128130 14056 3909 17965 11588 2952 2097 1328 1966 121602 10955 3440 14395 9219 2886 20')1 239 1967 111632 10785 3099 IJ88h 9056 2820 2004 4 1968 100872 10843 2769 13612 8895 2755 1958 4 1969 90042 lot~04 243.3 12837 8232 2690 1911 4 1970 791[+9 9879 2125 12004 7512 2623 1865 4 1971 68694 8693 1835 10528 7312 2558 654 4 1972 60096 8n'l 1596 10313 7167 2492 654 1973 51339 8031 1354 9435 63$4 2427 654 1974 43318 8128 1131 9259 6244 2361 654 1975 35200 8176 907 9083 6134 2295 654