. . I Republic of the 'Philippines. '" ",,':;':',. . I

IOFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT I

a MCLAREN INTERNATIONAL LTD., APPEAL NO. 14-02-06 I

Opposer-Appellant, INTER PARTES CASE NO. 4211 Opposition to: Application Serial No : 89495

-versus- Date Filed: 24 November 1 95

EMPRESAS LA MODERNA S.A. DE Trademark: "McLAREN" C.V.,

Respondent-Applicant-Appellee.

NOTICE OF DECISION

QUASHA ANCHETAPENA & NOLASCO Counsel for Opposer-Appellant Suites 1008-1009 Paragon Plaza Bldg. EDSA corner Reliance Mandaluyong City

AnY. MANUEL CASES Counsel for Respondent-Applicant-Appellee 6th Floor, First Bank Building 371 Sen. Gil. Puyat Avenue, Makati

DIRECTOR ESTRELLITA B. ABELARDO Bureau of Legal Affairs Intellectual Property Office

DIRECTOR LENY B. RAZ Bureau of Trademarks Intellectual Property Office

DIRECTOR CORAZON T. MARQUESES Bureau of Administrative, Financial and Human Resources Development Service Bureau Intellectual Property Office

GREETINGS:

Please be informed that on 08 May 2003, the Office of the Director Gener I rendered a Decision in the above-titled case (copy attached).

Makati City, 09 May 2003.

Very truly yours,

~~'r'A-7f AnY NG~A~.B~ OIL

Attorney VI i

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY lFFICE IPO Building, 351 Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue. Makati City, Phi, ippines

, . ,I e·' \ Republic of the Philippines

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT I

I

MCLAREN INTERNATIONAL LTD., Opposer-Appellant,

APPEAL NO. 14-02-06 I INTER PARTES CASE NO. 4211 Opposition to:

-versus-Application Serial No.: 8949 Date Filed: 24 November 19 5

EMPRESAS LA MODERNA S.A. DE Trademark: C.V.,

Respondent-Applicant-Appellee.

RE: DECISION rendered on 08 May 2003

Copy for: QUASHA ANCHETA PENA & NOLASCO .Atty. Mario R. Frez Counsels for the Opposer-Appellant 6th Floor, Don Pablo Building 114 Amorsolo St., Makati City

i I

I

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WFICE IPO Building, 351 Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue. Makati City, Phi ippines

·' Republic of the Philippines

OFFICE OF THE~PRESIDENT OfFfICE COpy

MCLAREN INTERNATIONAL LTD., APPEAL NO. 14-02-06 i

Opposer-Appellant, INTER PARTES CASE NO. t211 Opposition to: Application Serial No. 89495

-versus- Date Filed: 24 November 1195

EMPRESAS LA MODERNA S.A. DE Trademark: "McLAREN" C.V.,

Respondent-Applicant-Appellee.

NOTICE OF DECISION

QUASHA ANCHETA PENA & NOLASCO Counsel for Opposer-Appellant Suites 1008-1009 Paragon Plaza Bldg. EDSA corner Reliance Mandaluyong City

ATTY. MANUEL CASES Counsel for Respondent-Applicant-Appellees" Floor, First Bank Building 371 Sen. Gil. Puyat Avenue, Makati

DIRECTOR ESTRELLITA B. ABELARD~­Bureau of Legal Affairs Intellectual Property Office

f

DIRECTOR LENY B. RAZ Bureau of Trademarks Intellectual Property Office

~ ~l'l/~

DIRECTOR CORAZON T. MARQUESES Bureau of Administrative, Financial and Human Resources Development Service Bureau Intellectual Property Office

RECEfVED MANU":! (' ~ c JR.. ..._" .... .. ~ •"l :J I

& ,~(" ," "','" ~. r:

r

• )' ". ,'", r\' 1:.;)

PAnT;"'':';, i ;1J[ t?MARKS COPY"\i ':H-. ..3 t: ICENSING

DATE: 01 qj~ TU,'cBY' --1_.... -- - , ,vi .... --~

'-- ­

GREETINGS:

Please be informed that on 08 May 2003, the Office of the Director General rendered a Decision in the above-titled case (copy attached).

Makati City, 09 May 2003.

Very truly yours,

rA-:Z~loIL1N~~orneYVI i

i I

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WFICE IPO Buildin~_~5 ~ ~e,!, Gil Puyat Avenue. Maka~i~C::i~:.. !..hil 'Pines

" . Republic of the Philippines 1'1 I

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

MCLAREN INTERNATIONAL LTD., APPEAL NO. 14-02-06 Opposer-Appellant, INTER PARTES CASE rtoJO. 4211

Opposition to:iIt

Application Serial N .: 89495 j

versus - Date Filed: 24 Novemb r 1995

EMPRESAS LA MODERNA S.A. DE Trademark: "McLAR N" C.V.,

Respondent-Applicant-Appellee.

)(-----------------------------------------------)(

DECISION

This concerns Order No. 2000-270 dated 25 May 2000 prom Igated by

the Director of the Bureau of Legal Affairs (Director) dismissing the opposition

case filed by MCLAREN INTERNATIONAL LTD. (Appellant)' to the trademark

application of EMPRESAS LA MODERNA S.A. DE cv. (Appelleer' for the

trademark McLAREN for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable len~th of time

I

pursuant to Rule 2, Section 11 of the Implementing Rules and Reg~lations on

Inter Partes Proceedings.

The controversy involves the determination as to:

WHETHER OR NOT THE DIRECTOR ERRED IN HOLDING T AT THE APPELLANT FAILED TO PROSECUTE ITS OPPOSIT ON TO THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF . HIE,' TRADEMARK MCLAREN

I , I I

1 A corporation under the laws of United Kingdom with address and place of bUSine~s at Woking Business Park, Albert Drive, Woking, Surrey, GU21 5JY, England. 2 A Mexican corporation with Office address at F.1. Madero 2750 Pte., 64000 Mo terrey, N.L., Mexico. I

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY l;JFFICE IPO Building, 351 Sen. GilPuyat Avenue. A!aka~i_C!.ity: ~h4ippines

, • I . '.

Records show that on 24 November 1993 the Appellee filed wi

I ~

I ~

h the now

defunct Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BP TT) of the IDepartment of Trade and Industry (DTI) an application for registralion of the

trademark McLAREN with Application Serial No. 89495 for cigareres under i II

Class 34 of the International Classification of Goods", The apPli1ation was f

published for opposition in Volume III, No.3, page 94 of the May- une 1995 ! issue of the BPTn Official Gazette which was released for circulation

2001.

On 20 September 1995, Appellant filed a Motion for Extension

File Notice of Opposition seeking additional thirty (30) days from 21

1995, or until 21 October 1995, citing as reason the fact that it ts a foreign

corporation and that the counsel, who was at that time just recently be~n retained

I to undertake the opposition, needed more time to comrnunlcate with the j

l 1$

Appellant for the preparation of the Notice of Opposition and the Irequestedj 1 authentication by the Philippine Consular Office in the country of ex cution as

required by the Rules. The Director granted the motion in an Orde

October 1995.

Accordingly, on 20 October 1995, Appellant filed an Unverifie

Opposftion in which he alleged that:

! In 23 May t J

i !t

of Time to i eptember

1 i I I

dated 04

Notice of #'. 3 Commonly referred to as the Nice Classification, it is based on a multilateral treaty ldministered by WIPO. The treaty which is called the Nice Agreement Concerning the nternational Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks and considered in 1957, is open to states party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.

age 2 of 17 McLAREN

!~

II

t I j

t

I i i

1) The registration of the mark McLAREN in the name of A pellee will

violate and contravene Section 4(d) of Republic Act No 166, as

amended, because it is identical to the Appellant's mark McLA EN, such

that, when applied to or used in connection with Appellee's oods, will

likely cause confusion or mistake or deceive purchasers thereo .

2) McLAREN is an internationally famous or known mark exclusi ely owned

by the Appellant, hence, the registration of the Appellee's ide tical mark

would breach Article 6bis of the Convention of Paris for the Pr tection of

Industrial Property (Paris Convention).

3) McLAREN is a tradename of the Appellant and the registra ion of the

Appellee's identical mark would violate Article 8 of the Paris Co ventlon."

4) The subject trademark application is fraudulent and in bad f ith as the

Appellee has prior knowledge of the Appellant's use of the mark

McLAREN at the time of the filing thereof.

5) The Appellant has spent much for the promotion and advert sement of

the mark McLAREN and its business and goodwill will be da aged and

1suffer irreparable injury if Appellee's application is allowed.

~. 4 "Article 8. A tradename shall be protected in all countries of the Union without the bligation of filing or registration whether or not it forms part of a trademark."

age 3 of 17 McLAREN

6) By virtue of the Appellant's deep involvement in the Formula

racing, the mark McLAREN is no doubt a world famous mark,

that Formula One is the pinnacle of motor racing. A global SPOring event

comprising of sixteen Grand Prix races annually, it attracts p!enomenal

worldwide media coverage with an estimated more than hal billion of

people watching every two weeks for nine months in a year. It~ popularity

is rivalled only by the Summer Olympic Games and the tO~d Cup

Soccer both of which only happen every four years. I

competition for two coveted prizes - the Formula One Wo

Championship for the most successful driver and the World

Championship for the builders of the most successful car

f

ne motor f

onsidering I I I1

I involves

Id Drivers

onstructor

McLaren

lnternational Limited (Appellant) has won several chamPionshi,s5

McLAREN being a world famous mark deserves a more

scope of judicial protection in geographical markets suc

registration thereof by any other party violates Article 6bis 0

Convention which is enforced in the Philippines by virt

expansive

that the

the Paris

e of the

Memoranda of the Minister of Trade dated 20 November 19to and 25

5 Unverified Notice of Opposition, dated 20 October 1995, page 3. 1974 Emerson Fittipaldi Drivers and Constructors 1976 James Hunt 1984 Nikki Lauda 1985 Alain Prost 1986 Alain Prost 1988 Ayrton Senna 1989 Alain Prost 1990 Ayrton Senna 1991 Ayrton Senna

Drivers Drivers and Constructors Drivers and Constructors Drivers Drivers and Constructors Drivers and Constructors Drivers and Constructors Drivers and Constructors

~. ,

age 4 of 17 McLAREN

October 1983 to the Director of Patents to cancel and/or reje

unauthorized registration that are identical or confusingly

world-famous marks.

7) To protect its proprietary right, Appellant has registered and h1s pending

trademark applications for its mark in various classes of goods in major

countries among which are the United States, Australia, Austri ,Benelux,

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland and t

Kingdom.

l

refuse all

similar to

I ~

i:

I ! r I

e United

II,

i I8) While Appellant is not directly dealing with cigarettes, it has 1ince 1974 I

entered into commercial partnership with Philip Morris throug its world- l I

leading cigarette brand Marlboro forming the Marlboro cLAREN f fpartnership which is now being considered as one of t longest

partnership in sporting history. Appellee in adopting and uSin~ the mark

McLAREN for cigarettes is apparently taking a ride on the p:pularity of

the Marlboro McLAREN partnership to their damage and prejudice.

I9) Further, due to immense popularity of McLAREN and its assoc ation with t

e

!

the Marlboro mark, a world-known brand for cigarettes, th

registration by the Appellee of the identical marks for cigarette

cause confusion, mistake and deception to the public as to the

sponsorship thereof.

t use and I

iwill likely l

source Iffi . r-J I

~

,f: r

fage 5 of 17 McLAREN

~

Consequently, on 14 December 1995, Appellant submitted its V

Authenticated Notice of Opposition reiterating the foregoing allegations

On 07 February 1996, Appellee filed its Answer to the oppositi

that:

1) The registration in its favor of the mark McLAREN for cigare

Class 34 does not and will not violate and contravene Section

rified and

n alleging

es under

(d) of RA

166, as amended, because the mark McLAREN alleged to be owned by

the Appellant is not registered with the BPTTT to cover Class 3f or under

any other class. Neither has said party been using or previousl

mark in the Philippines for goods under Class 34 or for goods

under other classes.

t

used the

r services

I i t !

! t

J

f

g

t2) McLAREN is not considered in the Philippines as an inte nationally f

II

famous mark and is not known worldwide to be exclusively owed by the

Appellant on all goods and/or services covered by all the in ernational I

Iclasses as enumerated in the Nice Agreement Concerning the

l International Classification of Goods and Services for the purpobes of the

Registration of Marks", as well as on all the goods covered by ule. 82 of Ithe Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases which states clearly he official

classification of goods and services registrable in the Prlnclpal Register. 116 I 6 Supra. ft/r

\ t

Rage 6 of 17 , McLAREN

Further, Article 6bis of the Paris Convention provides that to

known mark it has to be considered by the competent auth

country of registration or USE' to be well known in that count

already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this con

be a well-

as being

ntion and

used for identical or similar goods. There has never been any rule,

regulation, memorandum, or declaration by any agency or off cial of the

government specifically establishing the Appellant's mark as a tell-known

mark or internationally famous as required by Article 6bis. The

mark thus, cannot be considered a well known mark, using the

by Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.

I 3) Appellant's alleged tradename is "McLaren International L

reflected in the Notice of Opposition and not only McLAREN.

registration of the Appellee's mark McLAREN does not in any I f Article 8 of the Paris Convention.

ppellant's

riteria set

mited" as

Thus, the

ay violate

4) The Appellee's application for registration is not fraudulent or Jbad faith

because it has, for a long time, owned the mark for cigarette and has

registered it not only in the Philippines but in other countrie as well.

Appellee did not have any prior knowledge of Appellant's use 0 the mark

in the Philippines or in any other country for cigarettes because Isaid party

never used the mark as such before, during and after the time 9f the filing .

of the subject application, Appellee is in good faith because it knows that i~

f !~age 7 of 17

McLAREN

I

originally and always owns the same for cigarettes. It is a

Appellant which is in bad faith in filing the opposition knowing t

I I !

tually the r

at it does

not own the mark for cigarette and does not have a registratijn nor has

r filed an application for registration for cigarettes under ciassI34 or for

goods under other classes.

5) While Appellant mentions its use of the McLAREN mark in

racing which may fall under Class 12 if used as a trademark, 0

if as a servicemark, in no occasion did it state that said

previously and/or currently used by the Appellant for Cigarejes under

Class 34. Motor car racing and cigarettes are totally different th ngs. Also,

since there has never been any formula or G.T. motor car rajing event

held in the Philippines, it is apparent that most Filipinos do not k ow of this

mark that it is owned by the Appellant. As "majority" of FiljPinos are

smokers and, there being a thriving tobacco industry in th country,

Filipinos would know more about the Appellee's mark MCLARE~ as used

for cigarettes under Class 34 than the Appellant's. I

6) Appellant has never attempted to file a trademark apPli!atian for

registration in the Philippines for the mark McLAREN under anr class or

goods or services, giving the conclusion that it does not really I have any •

proprietary rights to protect herein. I {t

motor car

Class 42,

ark was

Page 8 of 17 i McLAREN

t i 1 f } I ~

I

1

1

,I t \ t

I l

,l

7) The Appellant's alleged partnership with Philip Morris in formula car racing

under the Marlboro McLaren team does not indirectly make it ts already

dealing in cigarettes. Said partnership is not even a trademar , and if it I becomes one it would still pertain to sports. i1

!!

,! 1 r

I

Accordingly, a Notice of Pre-Trial Conference dated 08 March 1996 was I I

sent by the BPTIT to the parties infonning them that the confejence was

scheduled on 24 April 1996 at 2:30 p.m. The Pre-Trial Conference, h01ever, was I Ipostponed to 30 May 1996 at 2:30 p.m. upon agreement of the couns Is for both

parties. The BPTIT subsequently, upon request of counsel for R~spondent f

without objection on the adverse counsel, issued a Notice of Hearin~ dated 31

May 1996 cancelling the hearing set on 30 May 1996 and resetting it Ito 05 July ,I1996 at 2:30 p.m., with a warning that no further postponement shall +allowed.

Nevertheless, the hearings scheduled on 05 July 1996 and 09 Aupust 1996

were also postponed, the latter being attributed to the absence of the Appellant's

i(

counsel. The subsequent hearings set on 09 September 1996, 09 o+oor 1996

and 20 November 1996 were all postponed/reset. i

II

IIOn 20 November 1996, the Appellant submitled its Pre-Trial ~rief which

merely reiterated its allegations in the Notice of Opposition. All the tame, the It

hearings scheduled on 07 January 1997, 12 February 1997, 19 March 1997 and

~

18 April 1997 were postponed. fP1

!1

{ \

age 9 of 17 ~ McLAREN

I~

1

1

I

. , , I I

Finally, on 23 April 1998, the Director" issued Order No. ,8-143 the i! }

pertinent portions of which reads as follows: J

"Records of the case show that after the issues have been joined a N tice Iof Pre-Trial Conference dated 08 March 1996 was issued by this Office infor ing the parties that the pre-trial conference will be held on April 24, 1996 at2:30 .rn. However, no such hearing was conducted as the scheduled hearing was Ipostponed upon agreement ofCounsels ofboth parties and was further reset 30 May 1996. The subsequent hearings were likewise repeatedly postponed ca sing inexcusable delay in the prompt determination ofthis case." I

x x x t

"IN VIEW THEREOF, the hearing of the above-entitled case ishereb.l. set for the last time on May 22, 1998 at 2:30 p.m. for Pre-Trial Conference ~ITH WARNING THAT SHOULD PARTIES AGAIN FAIL TO APPEAR, THIS 1SE SHALL BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND FOR LAC OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT-APPLICANT."

Despite receipt of the Order as shown by the Registry Return RLeiPt, the

t counsel for Appellant, still failed to appear on 22 May 1998. Hence, t1e Director

~ j

promulgated the assailed Order, the dispositive portion of which reads t" tallows: J l I

I "WHEREFORE, for failure of the Opposer to appear at the scheduled pre­

trial conference, the instant opposition is, as it ishereby, DISMISSED for failu e to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time pursuant to Rule 2, Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings.

"Accordingly, Respondent's application bearing Application Serial No. rI,

89495 for the registration of the trademark lIMcLAREN" under Class 34 sha I be GIVEN DUE COURSE. I

II

"Let the filewrapper of this case be sent to Administrative, Financial and Human Resource Development Service Bureau (AFHRDSB) for appropriate a tion I

t 7 On 01 January 1998 Republic Act No. 8293, also known as the Intellectual propertY~COde of the 1 Philippines (IP Code) took effect. The Act, among others, abolished the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) of the Department of Trade and I dustry and I transferred its functions to the newly created Intellectual Property Office. II

J ptge 10 of 17

McLAREN

in accordance with this Order, with a copy thereof furnished the Bureap of Trademarks (BOT) for information and update of its records." I

Consequently, the Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration

2000 alleging that the erstwhile handling lawyer, Atty. Felino L. Padla ,informed

it that the pre-trial conference on 22 May 1998 was not attend d by the

respective counsels of both parties. The reason cited by Atty. Padlan, according

to the Appellant, was that the counsel for Appellee has intimated that e has not

yet secured a Special Power of Attorney and that he will just inform A y. Padlan

on the availability of the needed document. The Appellant alleged furt er, that it

was never the intention of Atty. PadIan not to appear during the cheduled

hearing on 22 May 1998 and that the Appellant itself is still very much interested

in pursuing, and has no intention whatsoever to abandon, the case.

In denying the motion for reconsideration the Director in her rder No.

2000-490 dated 21 November 2000 observed that: I t

"x x x. Foremost, records of this case will show that this Office ave received the copy of the Special Power of Attorney constituting the firm Ma uel t Cases Jr., and Associates as the true and lawful Attorney in Fact for Empresa La I

Moderna, SA de C.v. as early as 20 November 1996. Secondly, it is the du of a Counsel to serve his client with competence and diligence (Canon 21, Cod of IProfessional Responsibility). That he will exert his best judgment in the ! prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted him and to exercise reason ble and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application 0 his I clients cause (Hodges V. Carter, 80 SE2d 144,45 ALR2d I (1954), Me Cullo gh V. Sullivan, 132 A. 102,43 ALR 928 (1926)). He should not have relied on ere allegations made by the Counsel for the opposing party, instead he should ave Iexhausted all efforts to confirm the truth of the matter like, say inquiring upon this (1(. I

t ~

Office. Lastly, Rule 1803 of theCode of Professional Responsibility provid s to

!it

f r

II

wit:

)90110117IMcLAREN

1

j "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, an his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

The Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 04 December 2000.1 However,

the Appellant was able to file its Brief on 23 April 2002 only afte~ three (3)

motions for extension. In its Brief, the Appellant alleged that the Direct r erred:

1) In dismissing the case for the alleged failure to prosecute: and

2)

Appellant which was not disputed by the counsel of the Appell e.

Since the Appellee did not file its Brief, this Office ordered on ~5 August

! j 2002 that the appeal is deemed submitted for decision.

1

f!

!1 t ~After due consideration of the foregoing and review of the re ords, this

Office finds no cogent reason to disturb the assailed decision. I

I f !The Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedinqs'' is explicit in provldlnq that if

the petitioner/opposer does not appear at the time and place deSign~ted in the

I!

Notice of Pre-trial Conference or a Notice of Hearing or in a SUbSeqUe~t order, or

failed to prosecute his case for an unreasonable length of time, or fail to comply

r

i f

with these RegUlations or any order of the Bureau, the petition or notice Of;/j!/' i

8 Rule 2, Section 11 (a). r-V

P ge 12 of 17 IMcLAREN

!

I

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" ,

opposition, as the case may be, shall be dismissed for failure to prosecute and

judgment rendered in favor of the respondent, provided, howeve, that the

Bureau may cancel the patent or trademark registration where it find

independent of the petitioner's submission. On the same vein, the p

the Rules of Court? on failure to prosecute also applies suppletorily.

Jurisprudence has held that dismissal of case for failure to pro

matter addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. The availabi

I t

recourse must be determined according to each case's procedur I history, f

situation at the time of the dismissal and whether, and under the circ

of the particular case, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due d

failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude."

On this the correct obse

evidence

ovision of

ecute is a

ity of this

Imstances

Iligence in

t j

I!

ofscore, imperative justice requires ance

indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dis

Procedural rules, the Supreme Court held, are not to be disdaine

technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience 9f a party.

Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of s~bstantive

rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Thes

not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to

rules are

rovide for 1f 9 Rule 17, Section 3. "Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.- If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails I

to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the com laint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these ules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant r upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his ounterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjud ation upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court." 10 Calalang vs. C.A., G.R. NO.103185, 217 SCRA 462, (22 January 1993).

ptge 13 of 17 McLAREN

I

authority

I f I j (!

f

a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and m I at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whos

they acknowledge. It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules ave their

own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Just ce has to

fbe administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrarines , caprice,

and whimsicality."

The High Court explained that the danger wrought by non-obs t E

the Rules is that the violation of or failure to comply with the rocedure 1

I!

prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of the questions raised by 1

the parties with respect to the merits of the case and makes it ne essary to

It

decide, in the first place, such questions as relate to the form of the a ion. They

are matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be c anged or

I regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an acti f

I!

singular convenience."

j As the records of the case would show, after the issues have b en joined I

I a Notice of Pre-Trial Conference dated 08 March 1996 was issued a d sent to

j

~ the parties informing them of the Pre-Trial Conference on 24 April 19 6 at 2:30 1 "

-I

p.m. However, no such hearing was conducted as the scheduled he ring was 1 1 ~

postponed upon agreement of counsels of both parties, and was furth r reset to t I ! 30 May 1996. The subsequent hearings were likewise postpone causing i

11 Republic VS. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209,253 SeRA 509, (09 February 1996). 12 Republic VS. Hernandez, supra.

I 1,

P 1 90 14 of 17 ! McLAREN f

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!

!

inexcusable delay in the resolution of this case, such that a hearing tas set for

the last time on 22 May 1998 at 2:30 p.m. for Pre-Trial Conference ~ith explicit

warning that should the parties again fail to appear, the case shall be dismissed

for failure to prosecute or for lack of interest on the part of R spondent­

Applicant." Still, despite such warning, the Appellant and/or its couns I failed to

appear on the scheduled date.

This Office stated in its Order dated 18 April 2002, granting the

third motion for extension to file its Brief but only in the interest of justi and with

a warning that no further extension will be allowed, to wit:

''This Office notes that this is the third time that Opposer-Appellant has filed a motion for extension of time to file the same (Appellant's Brief). On re ord, the Opposer-Appellant has already been given a total of ninety (90) days ithin which to file the required Brief. Also, it is observed that the reasons cited i the instant motion are the same as those in the previous motions. While it is ow claimed in this instance that there was a change of lawyer handling the cas • all those motions and the Notice of Appeal were signed by the same tande of lawyers. These circumstances taken together apparently contradict Opp ser­Appellant's claim that the instant motion isnot intended to delay the proceedin s."

The records show a pattern or a scheme exercised by the Appellant which

caused the delay in the disposition of this case. This picture negates th

interest that the Appellant should demonstrate in pursuing its

considering that its pre-trial conference had been repeatedly postpone ,and the

reiterated warnings from the Director that no further postponemenj shall~: allowed. t1tf[

I 13 Order No. 98-143, dated 23 April 1998.

zeal and

,

I

p,ge 15 of 17

I McLAREN

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t I

" , it i

It is a basic principle in the legal profession that a lawyer is art of the

machinery in the administration of justice and, like the court itself, an i strument

to advance its ends. Thus, he is required to exert every effort and con

duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice."

forgotten, the counsel is reminded of the High Court's admonition: T

question that a lawyer not only owes to his client the duty of fidelity I I 1 important, he owes the duty of good faith and honorable dealing to t I i J

tribunal before whom he practices his profession. Inherent in that d ty is the

j obligation to assist the Court in the speedy disposition of cases." 1 i ~

i In the words of the Supreme Court, delays in litigation have al 1

ys been

P ge 16 of 17 McLAREN

1

ider it his I

Lest it be It

ere is no f

but, more ! e judicial

!

I a bane in our judicial system. In a landmark case, the high court 0

1 growing tendency of defeated suitors and their lawyers to disregard th ir duties

I under the Rules of Court, in the hope that they may stall the fin I day of

reckoning. These are the considerations, the Supreme Court said, tha impelled t

it to make a policy statement that failure to prosecute will not be 1

countenanced."

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby

denied and Order No. 2000-270 issued by the Director of the Burea of Legal

Ii

Affairs dated 25 May 2000 is hereby affirmed.

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14 Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility. t I 15 Magat VS. Santiago, G.R. Nos. L-43301-45665, 97 SCRA 1 (01 April 1980).~ \ 16 Fagtanac vs. C.A., G.R. Nos. L-26922 & 26923. 22 SCRA 1227, (21 March 1968).

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Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the ureau of I I ! Legal Affairs for appropriate action, and the trademark application as { 1

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records be returned to her for proper disposition. Further, let the Direc ors of the

Bureau of Trademarks and the Administrative, Financial and Human Resource

Development Service Bureau be furnished copies hereof for infor ation and

I guidance.

SO ORDERED.

08 May 2003, Makati City, Philippines. ! 1 I I I

I i 1 ~I~C

~~;ctor General

1<:;I i l j 1 I j , I I I !, !

P ge 17 of 17 McLAREN

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