OUR COMMITMENTS IN ASIA

',' , ' , 1!E!Il'Ol''!',TIfE" : ,,' 'i,,'

I. ,SUBCO:MMITTEE"tm "', ,'. " ASIAN ANDPACIFIC.AEtAI~i. ,',

• SI!lOOND SI!lSSION

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MAROH 13, 20, 27, 28; APRII:',8'IJ.U.N1!l12i:'~;"i' "', ' " , " O(J{I)OBI!lRd!, :.Il))!

l'rlntM for theus.'bffui> Ohiill:tllttee on 'FOtelgtl'Mi>lrs ,

I1;S, ,GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFIOIII

WASIfINGTON I 197<

COMMITTI!lE ON FORIilIGN AFFAIRS THOMAS E. MORGAN,: \tI'ennsYlvanla, OhoWman

CLEMENT 3', ZABLOCKl, Wisconj3tn WAYNE L. HAYS. Ohio L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina DANTE B. F ASeJiJLL, :BUOrida. CHARLES C. DW-OS, J'a"lMlcliigan ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota BENJ'A·MIN S, RQSENIl'HAl.t. iN,ew York JOHN 'C. Cep'VER, Iowa LEE H. lIAMILTON, Indiana ABRAHAM,KAZJllN • .J-a., .Tea. LESTER L. W~LIi'I!, )\lew ''¥otk JONATHAN 13. B1N<JlIA'M. l-iew York GUS YATRON, Pennsy.lvanla. ROY A. TAYLOR, N otth 'Ca'roUna JOHN W. DAVIS, Georgia OGDEN R. REllD, New York MICHAEL HARRINGTON. Massachusetts LEO l~ RYAN, California CHARLES WILSON, Texas DONALD W. RRllGLE1 .. ·JB., ~lObtg8.n'

PETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey WJLLU:.;M: S. BROOMFIELD, Mtchigan H. It. GROSS, Iowa JilDW MtO J. DERWINSK1, Illinois

''VE-:kNON W. 'TH0MS6N, Wisconsin PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois JOllN BUCHANAN, Alabama J. HEJtBJ!lRT ,BUBJ{E" Florid_a l'(lUY -Y4.!lD:Ji)a. JiAGT, Ml!!htaan ltOBllUtT H.' S1:H1EIJn, Qonnecticut ~mRB.E S. DU PON'r, Delaware 'eJif.jt~SW.\WlII,I.bEN.,lra.,Ohlo ~:~T B. (BOB) 1KA.'tIttAS~ 'Californta EDWARD G. BIESTER. JR., Pennsylvania LAllRY WINN. J.It.) -Kansas BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York TIllIIliIY,SON GUYER, Ohio ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California

MARIAN IA. CZAlnmORI; ;OMel 01 Stall

Sll'IIQP1ol>ll;'mElll ,QN ,ASJAN AND PAOIll'IO AFFA.\lIS

ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania. Ohairman

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana LESTER L. WOLFF, New York JOHN W. DAVIS, Georgia ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carol1na LEO J. RYAN, California DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan

WILLIAM S, BROOMFIELD, 'MIchigan VERNON W. THOMSON, Wisconsin J. HERBERT BURKE, Flortda PIERRE S. DU PONT, Delaware TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio

THO'U"S R •. KlIINNaDY, Subcommittee Stal! Oonsultant .DONNA GAIL wYNN, SWl! .4s8i8tant

WITNESSES Wednesdat Ma.oh 13, 1914:'. .' .•. . '. P •••

Petul, ,itOlaJb.'(I', ~1it'erney.,'eJt 'Law, ,tormeD'counsel; Subeom~lttee on t U.S. Secm:i-tY,A.greemiro-ts Abr.oad, U.S. 8en~te_ .. __ .... __ .. _,':' ... !..',~_,,",___ 2

Pitlt)us, "Wltiter" rex~eu"M'Ve ~ditot, :New -Reputill'O, 'fOllm6r 8t~.ff.,conBult-Mlt, Sul:>"otnmi~1Ie •. ~t\' U.S,. 'Socllrity 'Ag,ee",entsabfoatl, U,K

Wedn~~:;teM;'~h"jj(hg~c+ -,'~';'-' -~ - -- ;i--, '-'-; ""; - --;- -,--- .. ', ~i~ HaJ.l>~rih, !hth~rtdn',}ll." forrnet-lTI>eplity AS'8ist~nt 'S~c}letn.ry ;0C- ,r)etettl3'e

'on<l <s~niot.'>I. •• dciate· 'MJlIml1y ll:illslrige''O;t. ~he' Na;ti~t1Ill· 'Se,olllu\Iy . CounClL __ "--'-,-" _"".--" __ "" __ , ____ ""' ___ "_. __ " __ ,,' _._, '" _.,_.-. g&, WedneSday, March <27, f9\'i4: '., .' ". • .

. F_r· 'Hotl'. Dohltltl Mi, 'aRepreBen'tative it\·Q)b.ngI' ... · f'?ln the State of. <Minnesota.. •. ,. ......... ';.' ... _ .';"'_'- _"M_:' _'- __ ,. _'- ___ :.:. ::,_ .,f.. .";' _:.: _':,. __ .:. __ '""..:.:'" _ _ \ '5g

9~Ii!!,h;:R!'I\'Jh' N".~i"r 'fellow, !!Irl)"\<itlgs 1~~~~l'tidn~ ~"h~~~~{)n, 6" l);lIJ~ J<!rrner !StaAl" Dep8lJ'tnl'ent ,,!I!~lal_ - - - -- -- ,--- -"" --~" - -"'c _ ..

. trhursday'I . .-M-Q.I:.ch 28, 1-97:4::. ',_ _ .. . . _. ., _ _ ~!;-,. ,r" (

R!!I'};iruwPwight 'H':II)I;"". t'~lld:!tstlttlt\\j!Hla;r"ll1>t\>(UnW~ty _, _', _,_ ' 'SO lVedn~~J AViiilrJ8" 1'97~:' >1. l '.' "'" . J~' "'j J: n, '

Doolin, ~1l:J., Deputy >l.Bs\s~.nt SO\cr'ltalW >(If Wefli ... M6t··llll!$t·,A~i ... . and Pacific ____________________________ , __________________ "_ 94

Inge~on, Hon.- "Robert S., ,Assistant Secretary of State for'- East AsIan and Pacifi.c Affairs;..!ormer Ambassador to Japan_:..________ 88

Wednesday, June 12, 1974: _ _ " CranstoDJ Hon. Alan, a U:S. Senator from the State of CalIfornia____ 119

W-ednesday, June 26, 1974: " Hummel, Hon. Arthur W." Jr" Acti~ Assistant Secretary of State,

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific A airs ... ___ ~.,._--------·-------- 133 Ladd, Jonathan F., Director, Secm;ty' Assistance and- Sales, Depart-

Smi:~tD~~:i'::,-§P~;;i~-ASsist;~t-to-,fi;;eAd~it;i-peet~,DePMtme~t 146 of Defense ______________ • ____ " __ " __ • ______ , ___ • _ __ _ _ _ ___ __ _ _ 148

• Wenge!, Robert H., East Asian Bureau,Department of State_________ 152 Wednesday, October 2, 1974: ,-', ,'.

LeB;der, Dr. Stefan H., staff assooiat_~" _.c,ent,~t',c1'or Defense Informa .. tIon _______ ~ ___________________ .. ___ ;. __ ~ .,: .. : .. ___ ~;.. ..... _________ -'_ _ 158 Walker, Richard, director, Institute of,. Int'e.rj)ational,.S~udies, Uni-

versity of South Carolina _______________ "'-:..:~ .. _,-·-,'.:. __ ,;:_':"-----,.:..;,-_ 168

MATERIAL SUBMITTEDF<)I} TflRECORD

Publication by Morton H. Ha:1perjn erititled, I'The :'Next-~h8se of ,tQft Foreign PQlicy-U.S.-Jal:)Qn6S~, Relations"-__ :_~- .... ,-- .. -'-'~::'--,~':sr\-'~''':~;,~'-:;.', .. ~ ': 45-

Statement on Asian troop, reductions, ',July ,31, 1973_~_:,_..:.:..-:~'.;.',~':;.;(f_~»., ...... ;J",- ,;. -- '<60,: Department of Defense estimated annual operating CQ,stsf Qt, w,ijjhM:intiig ).

U.S. military forces in Asian countries and areas ($1nillions.~ ___ ,. ... ~ .. _ ... _... 91 N~~rlr~~so:n c~h~iDne~e~~~t 4~~~Oh~,~I~~! ~b:_ ~~~~~~~ _o_o~_~~~~~r_s _ ~~~ ~~~ :::':~'( In\?[e~::~!~fO~:~~~~~ _ ~l~ ~~~_t~_,:!~~~'~ :~~~~~_ ~-~ ~~~~~a_v~ ~~~, ~~f~~~ .,':';:l-oO,:':: S:~;~ .. Response to a: question'Taised by HQn. Le:~,ter',"Woltf, at_ April 3, app~~rt¥:c'e ,,-,' ~iti;:;~:~~~,~,'\;,i;;:,~~):,

of Assi~tant ~ecrt-t~ Rol)ert S. Ingersdll ,r6gardi~g narcotics~f~spo~i'~,~_: ". A",,:" by Department of State ___________________ ,~.~~ __________ , __ ."_.".,· . toS, . ';,,0'.,

Department of Defense military and civilian personnel 'and depePc!.e:p.'ts,:'~P:t :,:',_ ~ .•. ~":' (': the East Asia and',P;:tOific Region, and U.S;'.territories in tht Paoiflci~ ... ~_:-,';,;,:,'~~: t:,~q~~,;,':'\i'

Letter from Hon. Hel;lry Kissinger on various aspeq-ts ()f U.S. polroy tow,ij,)-£l. :'j" ,"'.-'~ _1-

~e~~i~~~i~:ked-b"Y'-Qh~ir-rii;~ ~Nj~ a~;d resPQ;s~Yftom Se~at~; Alan~ 6.~%~~J~Fi~:;;,;,~~~,~}:-:,~: .:,~ '-'--, on Defense Commitments in Asia~",,:~~,:, __ :-,~'~-_.l .. -... - __________ ,.. _ ;:~:. ~i',i t';;,.! i·~·ti1:~ <

Statel!lent of Senator Alan pranston~'_-:: ___ ';. ,_:..:\,:.,.. ___ ..: ___ ~ .. ~ ___ (' ~ .;-_,;,,,~~~,{ '" >,:!~4 Questions. as~ed by- ,Mr. NIX !],nd alW,wers '.from :Depa,l'tment' 0 St~ile:po",!.~,'::~:, ';

economiO and mllitary aJd_w;" __ .. __ -1<'" ___ ,.'~ __ ,:". ____ .. ___ • _ ~'_.:.. "!","::~ih .. ~.,' 'i{:--..l?~,)

" " , ,- (W),~', '. " . ',',:s;.:~;r>::,':""'-~~'- ;<.,.': "'," .'\',1«,

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IV

APPENDIX • "" •• ",';_ ':' • r '~ ';

Supplementary in!luiries forwarded "to Department of State by Chairman Robert N. C. N,x, June 11,..1974. •. ___ ._. _____ , _____________________ _

Questions and answ~rs trom vepartment of State related to Vietnam aid proposals, July 30, 1974 __ :- __ _ .. _~ .. '~ _ .,.:.::': .... w .. __ _ ~ __ _________________ _

OUrreut status of certain treaties whioh th(:l United, States entere.;! into between 1778 and, the' start. of, World War n, Department of State, June 25, 1974. ___ .... __ ."'.":" __ .. w_ .. _,.;"' ...... .., ___ .,., .. : •• _ "'_ ... ~-",-,.. ..... w ....... _..!~

Exohange of ,cP'ATespondence ,between· Asian· and Baci-fic -Aff·ai;rs SUbQOm~l mitt~e 'and friends .. oL -M,i<}J,'pnesit';,.oo)l<\erping c9Pstruc,tion ,of',a majQr

. multiservice airb.Q!:Je and supply depot o~ Tinif,!.u Island In the Marianaa~,~ Study done by William M. Yarmy, School 01 Publ,io'a)lg ~)ltel'natiopal

Afl'airs+The, .George ,;Waah\T\gto. n Un1v,epsity, entit~.ad., /~Jlloml,ll€!se ·,Eoo .. : ' nomio" .C~mlllarciol, a)l~, ·Marithnelnte~es\S 'In 11\911th ••• t "Aaia-c-All

'_ EX8tnlnatlOn of Int~ests ___ .. ___ ,..-_--,..------ ____________ .. ___ -' ... ~_ .. _'_ "The Co-Responsibility of Oongress in Foreign PoUoy/", by "Thomas ,R. :

Kennedy, Asian, and P$:oifio Affairs Subcomm,it.tee -staff ,QonsuJ-tant,: . Committee on Foreign Affail'S; _____ .,. ____ ,_, _____________ .. _,_,-: .. '-iI- .. t.·' .. -i ... _

The pefenseMonltor, Center for, Defonae. Information, /lJ'tio,lll.entltled" ~ "U.S. FOl,'ces in the Paoifio and. lndian Ocean: -Build .. ,Up:,Ql':-Ji,eQuce?"

, AJ;fM~~jllJ~~;'iioj,-,j,rQyrd;diliy~tii:e-6i;;£e~~i~fj)~eu;~'I~f~~;.t(';;i'

Pase

177

186

189

190 ·"i

201

'263

267

subsequent to appearance of Stefan H. Leader befo~e,oAs(an '1I1l<li fMifio. AJfa~ .Suboommltlee hea$lg,Qn·Qoteb!l\'.2,,·!P7t,_,· •• ,"., •••••• _ ........ '274

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<I','

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-: •• 110'\"

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OUR COMMITMENTS IN ASIA " ' , : " "

WEl>NESDAYI' MAlteR, 13, 1974

:lIOUSP1 'OF:Rm>runSP1Ni'AriVP1s;' ' "'Col\{~~NFOllEiGN AFFAIRS, • '

StiBOOM'MiTrEEON ASIAN AND PA01l!'io ~\lAm~,

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, , .' "." 'WaBliVngton,J).O. , '1'he subco=ittee met, at 2 p.m./in pooroH-;;36,the Capitol, Hon.Robert N. C. Nix (chairman of the subconimitt~e) presidiI\g.

Mr. NIX. The subcommittee will come to order. " ", ' Today we are beginning hearings on ,our. defense comqiitriie,nts in

Asia in tile hope that we will also gathednforI1lation as to the alterna­tivesto our present Asiandefense position·., . . " .,

Becal\se Gr. thesi~e of ol\r defense budget; 4ll\ei'icans must have th" asSurance that'other nations in 'the future ",ill take on the burden of their own' defense, while the United States provides the nuclear umbrellawhich pmtects allnon-Conllnunist )tations. '.

Today, we provide with, our basesseeudtyfor many nations which. have very small defense buileets, while their ecoI\Olmes prosper. .

This, haB happe\led in partbeca]lse we inherited what amounted to an American e!Upire at theel)d of the Second World War. Behind the American defellse shie]d,oldnations rec,overedfrom the agony of war, and new nations were born and prospered'.' .

It is time to loo,katthisdefense$hield .al)d·its cost toPhe, A!Uel'ican people, si.,nce other nations may be rea;dy to Mth~trsh,u;e, <;>r'shO)lld be, at least. '. '" . . .. L.

The mission· ~his s~iela serves abroa~has chanl!'~(1; . Some of our troops are statlOned III foreIgn countrles for llo)j,tlCal::rll<ther' ,t)lan military purposes. That is they are there as evidence.of our good faith, where our written promises do not suffice. " . ' • '

The'requirements of 1974 differ from those of 1945. GnerI'illa war­fare reqUIres domestic reforms and Asian varieties of democracy to meet internal subversion. Intercontinental ballistic missiles and shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles which do not hiwe to be aiined since they are heat seeking, have changed the'threat to pooce. Extensive overseas -bases with large garrisons do not deter either guerrilla wars' or intercontinental attack. These bases are then obsolete . .' Such bases may be mOre out of date, they may be tempting to

I(uerrilla forces. Consider for example our airbases' in Thail",nd; the shoulder-fired heat seeking missile may be fired at plttnes landing or taking 6ff by a single terrorist. Planes 'crashingon landing or tak­ing off would probably kill .their crews. Proooctionforplanes and crews would require large garrisons which would have 'to fan out ~roD)!:>ases~n jungle patrols. .

;,.:'~t:;)~: t,' ,', ' . (1) ,

2

Recently, a large contingent of British. tanks and infantry had to cover the grounds of the vast London AIrport to protect one man and one plane, and that man is the American Secretary of State, Mr. Henry Kissinger. This had to be done becanse Palestmian terrorists had acquired the$e weap.~lls'w:hich a,reno;/>tlt!Jer<thal!l a bazooka and can be easily handled. British intel1igence had fearned of a planned attack on the other side of the coin. The U.S. version of these weapons, the Red Eye, has been issued to the White :ijouS<) Secret Service detail to protect the Presideht 'ngaihst a repetition of'the Skyjacker's plot to crash an airliner. into the Whit\l HQuse and the February 18th landing of a. stolenhel.i~,llter outside the White House windows.

If London:.$:.irport and the White House are puotseted with great effort, the di$eultyof protecting our airbases in Thailand is ObVIOUS.

In any case, our ~eeds at home are growing so fast that the expa.n­sive missions assigned to the Defense Departmen:t in Asia and other areas must 00 trimmed. For instance, a marton School of Finance study estimates that it will cost $132 billion in private and GOV'6rn­ment investment to insure American self-sufficiency in energy by 1~82,

If we neglect our needs at home, if we refuse to face iSSll~S wl'\i<)h, involve .the life of the American peo~le, we wllI. endll.\lg:er.d~mo~rl\cy' at home. If that happens; other natIOns of the wortli ",!II h.ave l;\o, democratic SOllrce of streng;th to turn to" There is no distincti\>1\ 1;\.".' tween foreign policy and domestic policy since neither set of isSue~ can be neglected for IIny pi)J;iod of time. ]jjach liM to be kept in bl\l(l,llce with the common purpose of serving the AniericlIJl people who a,rJ).\n, fact "the last best hope of e~rth." The Defense budget must betllmed.

Our first witness. is .Mr. :R?I~nd Paul, a~tornei at law, lind author, .of the volume, "AmerIcan MIlitary 'Comm1tments Abroad."

I welcome you, Mr. Paul. It is really a pIsasure to have you here.,

STATEM:ENT (IF:JtOUND PAUl!, ATT(lRNEY AT LA'W,AUTlIOXtOf "AMERICAN MILiTARY dOM:MITM:ENTS ABMAD,"'11)13; ;FORM:Ell, COUNSEL, Sl!lBGOMIMIIJITEE ON U.S. SECUlUTY. AGREEM:ENTS ABROAD,UiB.SENATE

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Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. . ,You haye invited me to testify on American commitments'in Asia­

a term which varnous people use in different ways. depenrung'up"n the' context of the discussion, and sometimes depending upon ",hrut they PT." trying to' pvove. The fairest definiti(}ll of a commitment that ] caJl. deyiBe is 'any set of circumstances, other than an intrinsic or'strlltsgie relationship, that '''ould. strongly tend toward re'1uiring the United States to come to,the defense of another country, even if, IIt,themomenu' of crisisl · it would non otherwise be in the American· interest to do"so. Such a definition ineludes : ..• . " " . ,

1. Treaty C,olI)lrt;tments. ,'" : j:" c', " 2, The'stationinA' "f larp:e numbers of our troops in al).other'<!\1011lMy., 3 .. Congressi0nlll, resolutions and declarations o;I!. s",pp.<I>~t, 1>y other:

American ,officials. , , . .', " ,j.:,,,,;, 4. Circ\lmstances which may be termed m.oral commih.ments. :h: ' , ":

. 5. Binding involvements thllt IIrise from the ihherent dynamics of. any large ongoing program,' what might be call~dbureau~ratic commitments, and ' ,

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6. Morebro!ldly based identification between this country and another country, such as elements in .our relationship with Israel. . .

However, commitme1\ts in all of these forms are not neady so. important as. sQnie people assume i1\ determini1\g the 'course of American .im[olvement. abroad or the level of our military-related expen.:l,itures. Far nior~important is the perception .of American interests as. seen by !lUy N ation'sJeaders.. .' .!.

These i.ilterests mclude, first, the preventIOn .of nuclear calamIty, inchlding the av.oidance .of deadly superp.ower c.onfrontations and nuclear proliferatioI)., and s~cond, .the averting .of. political c.ollapse witJi.ill this country generated by press',..es, anxieties. or debacles abroad. Toward these ends, the United State~ has songht to projeet an image of streng!;habroad so as to influence the, lead~rs . .of other important. countries al.on.g lin. esc con.d .. u. cive,to these, American. inte.rests, and to arrest the momentum. of d{mg,erous te*dencies far enough forwa)'d to keep them well away from areas or issues of primary importance. . .

In, desiglling the size and shape, o£ our militalJ' establishment abroad, ajso factors such fl,S th<)assessment of the threat, to the. fore­goinll interests and a iudgmentasto, the margin, of tolerable error in Teadmess are probably more imp"",tant than is a determination as to. what.our so-called commitment\! are. '

That, is not to, say,h.owever, that such commitments play no role at all in determining .our action awL O,ur force abroad. In at least one instance, Vietnam" a preexistirig, commitment played a very significant role, I believe, in l~aditlg the United States to undergo great sacuifice in, very unfavorable circumstances. ,

The conclusion to be drawn, it se.ems to ma, is that both extremes shQuld be. aVQ)Qed. ,'l'I)@ United. States, ~hould not order its affairs so, as to ,require it to resp!>nd: 1;!J eYers.' slii~t in powet.a.b\Oa:d, eVlln where the VIctors are, closely. IdentIfied. wItb, .oltr adv!ersatl.es, but 011 the other hand, it should also avoid the appearance that Americlln intervention is el\treIMly. unlikely, l~ thi~. r~ard. ~ 'Y0,\'ld ,~dm,;>!J.i~h ag~inst the

, recent .1I~!kctIce oicre,atmg hIW,1y. VISlhk, 'lq!,l9,o~ltmellts, such ,~s congreilSlonal resolutIons barrmg .An/erLcan . 'forces froID certaIn

COtt~~~(mablY vi~ible c?mmitnlent, ,~"t~~~"~~~iS ,~ot ull~uly threaWUlng to t):le other SIde, s,eerns,appr.oprrate !llIougl'i#here that co.mrnitl!lent.i.s,.likely t .. 'o.b. e eff .. "C.tive. a.s ~,de.,41 .. rr.~n.t!,.·.g.ai~$tth.~. J.:eI. evant t~rea,t" b.u~, ~ lo~>:profile, or ,at leasf,anarn\JIg.\''o~~o~e,!~Jl,ttmg'r!''her~ hIg]I YISIbl~jt~.WIll not, be, so ~fl'ectlye. Two of tl'\e,hest ~~ampNs\ m th~

hEard·Ea. st.d,tQ.L'.'.'U .. ustr~te! th.'heIS 4h'. sti.lld,9tlOll.' I}~e p~r.Ji .. ~p..'s .Ko.rea, (it). tl].e,.<>;.l,l:e., an",an, .ao~,\oJ.1,,~e.~.t ~ .~". "'''' ,'. 'I ,.,' 0'" '. ~ :tto~ea s~e\lls~m~ to. be~Il,Illstall¢~ mW!l1ch.~ ]Ilghl:y'v\$Iple Ame~I'

can commItment has be~n efl'ective,Ii! preventIng'. war, for 'lnqrll than ~Oyears! and has,'1vell G,ontrillUt~d to, It. ch,ang'l: iii.;t1i,esltuMfojV ftlilli mtens!,.cpn£rpn~ation t~ a , s?~<)f,deten.~e:;)\i8 ,1i1t;e' as"l~~?, ~qrt~ Korea's behavjotwas,chru:a¢tenzed by 'SeIl1,ure olan AmerIcaIi '{ieS~8eJ shootin 'd6w.!). (If 9ur aircr,iLft, infiltration.a~s~~irilltjon. t\lJl):ns, '. , un. fi ts. alon tl\.e 'I')N,[Z. But' T" 'fl1'7~alf~cteil to a6nie"eictrcln~,'

II, btg. t1t'h '"jig,,,,,,,, 'j'Q;'" ." ,'!c,. "I'jG"x.'" ')rhltl!"'~'~"'fi"'H!' dou .. ~ e b }9:1\!>e, 1\ y !\p-AWetl\lan re' vn~ 0 ' . .velt. "n '.,

SOllth, "hla'tcio,k soruHerill iv" tes'b£!th 'r'oWn 'i ' Mil fiei iriiitua~' iilia¥Iiin; ttjs'lIafd~r'U~thi\1ih;1ry;'c.?~~t~t~~~~%flr~ljt

4

m~nt tha:t. ~utwelg~s 20 yea. rs. !'C'tllout .. mo,j?r warfare II) It place. where wIthout the AmerIcan comnptmen,t such. warfare would have been llighly likely. . . ." ..•. . .' . . "In taos, howeWr,the threat has. taken th~.~Qrm of 10w,level.small­u!"~t, p.periJ,fipl'S. In such . a situatiori, l!l;rge ,scaie. ,l\mericft)1, preorisis V,S,b,l!tywqllld )i1ot. seel1' ve'tYejfer~f'yeas a .d~teFent. Th,s 18 n()t to say, however, that the AmerIcan l1'.lhtl1ry 1,'ole .need be ~ero. Indeed, Laos demonstrt,ttes tqat the. United States in certai)l cirCl!Ji\starices can playa very 'effective role without Cre!!-tip.g an,l'nd)1e ciminntl1'ellt; lJ'or more than $. year~l the .unit~d· States provi.ded ~ili~i}rysJlPp6rt fQr the. non,Colllll}u,nl~. rgoverp.m~)lt .therell-galllst the. Pll,thet .Llt.9. fwd th81r N' orth Y letnamese 9,111es., TillS ~u.Pport to(jk the ~or.m of mI]Ita,ry advise~s, ma4lri';l\bpm~ing;, ;l!-n<\t1\.ird-~ountrytroo'ps.' ,..... .' •

Even thougl;l ~hlS support .• becltm~.qUlte .sugs~ant!alf'1ra tll'le, f?l' example more.~h\'llllQO h?mb~n. for . .$0.' .rtl~s.a. d .. ay m . .th. e ja.te,.i96P'S. ,,,l.t .st.' 1. II remamed relatIvely low In VI~bIhty. T)lere were no large AmerICan bases in Laos, and tew America,: casualties. Perhaps equally sigtliffcant was the fact that world attentlOllwas fixed on the much )arger war !(oing pn,l).el't door in South Vietnam .. In t\lese circuljlstances., certain Americanmilitl1ry activities such as those 1. have just n)entiimed can 1;le conduct~d, without serious risk. 'of overinvolvement, even i(things. do not work out the way he would like. '...' .... . ..

There can be no dqubt hut that if the United States had n6t sup­ported theLaotiw>.Gov'ernment in the way it did"LaoBwould have fallen to theCommuni~ts. EMt instead, iI) the peace s~ttlement .of 19731 it is worthnotinK that the npn'Communists recelved virtually all ot the important portfollosin the clI-binet, and 80 percent of the popula­tion remained in territory controlled by goyernmel).t 19fces. This ~oes not, of course, resolve the very close questIOn. whether. the AmerIcan interests b.eings.·erved. justified t.h.esa.cri.fice.wh. ich th.e.Laot.Ja.'.n .. shad to endure: I think it 'does, however,.uj1dercut the ar/I:Ument that l\:merican military power .cannot be effective in a Southeast Asian tYPll of conllict.. . . .

I would like now wcomment briefly on the.other countries in the crescent of Asia where the United Stllit'eshas a niilitarypresence,

By far the most important of these countries 'is Japan. 'We have reduced our militltry presen~esf>m(jwhat in the last few years, hut we still have large. air and .naval oltses . an.d. other major fltcilities there, including Okinawa. ;r 'believe tbatfUl;'therreducti011s, (Ire ap­propriate,.and will inevitably be made: 1'h.e subcommittee ma,y"want to look hard, for instance, ~~Xoh;otaAirbaSe andYakos',1,llia 1'1:ay~l Base, both very close to Tokyo. HQwever, I would hope that our,mlh­tary presence in Japan would not have to be ,terminatedel).tirely in the next few yel1rs, because it constit)1tes a direct. link between ~r apan's security and our own, a very re~eva)lt,factor in regard to Japan's nonnuclearinclil).ation.. . . '. .... . . '. •. .

W eha ve minor facilities .on .Taiwan:· Secretary Ki!l!!inger haS test!, fied before the Senate Foreign .ltelatiol).s Committee 'that this pres­en"!l is not a ma:jorpr<?b~eU1 i)li;mrrelatjonShip with qo~munist Ch!na. Most of the 14 !llllhonpeopleon TarwMl, both the llldlgenous TaIwaneSe and the maInlanders, ,q.o,.nl)t want tocol1'e ,1lnd'er ,th~dom­ination of lted C;hina .. I 11m nqt~J,lre what major Amet1Jlmlriterest has been served by 9)1r·commitn1~~toTaiwan, but I am cei'taim that it has benefited those people. .. . . , .

5

In the Philippines, we have two large facilities, Subic Bay Nay~l Base, and' Clark Air'Force Base, and a few other posts. These faClh. ties provide a reareche,lon for staging into Southeast Asia if that should ever be America's policy again. They also support American naval forces in the Western Pacific and may possibly serve in the future as the homeport for some of these forces, a program which is likely to be more significant hereafter for budgetary reasons.

The domestic situation in the Philippines has not 'been particularly good in recent years, but that fact is essentiaIIy .irrelevant ~o our 1I.'ilitary presence, t.here.~ !'ave heard the suggestl?n f~om time to tIme that an AmerlCan .ffilhtary presence in countrIes WIth unstable governments is likely to embroil us dangerqusly in the internal affairs Qf that country, Such .involvement has just not been the case. Con· sider, for example, Greece, Turkey, Libya, Thailand, South Korea, Ethiopia, and the Philippines. All have experienced internal crises at times when American military units were stationed there; our forces have either remained or gone, but there have been n.o pitched battles between American forces and the dissidents and no significant American'casualties.

In Thailand the ,United States now has six Air Force bases. one large port facility, and other lesser instaIIations. These facilities represent a e element in the Vietnam ,eace settlement as substan' ,

j!Vli'd!!n!ce!ltlh~a!titlleii!n!l!lw!!!!ltesl!l!!!~;Ic!ai!al'n!!!rlo!!!ei!tl!ei!o!u!t!h~ let am men with air su . n the e a renewe ver the order, attac y North , sim J

i . e rIO., e preservation 0 the Vietnam settlement is ~ an Importantmterest oUhe Uniwd States, in light of what this coun· 1 ""­try has invested to achieve it, and I believe that it is, thElU, the contino uation of at least some of these bases in Thailand is appropriate. '

No discussion of American commitments in Asia would ,be 9qmplew without some reference to the situation in Vietnam., One of ,the major factors prompting this country to send ground forces to Vietnam in 1965 was our existing commitment to, that country through the pres­ence ,of, 23,000 ,Aroeriean servicemen, whos~, withdrawal under the circumstances inVietnani ip. early. 1965 wo\dd have ,constituted a highly visible foreign policy debac1e for the United StaWs. On b!ll­anee,. however" I think ,it, would have been the ):>etwr COurse to have bitten t)\.e buI1e~,acceptedthe ne!l'a£iV'e GOl),seI\U~uCeS from SUCh It defeat, lind to,have, taken steps elsewher~,.to<?Jl'~ett;lle~~,I'()!lS~queM~s tp SOme extent., Flir ~x!,ll'\ple, a better ch.'l).ce1ll"those, ,d",y~ J:\l!lY Ijitve, ,been to send",A~e, ric, a,'!!-, trQop~ to,' T, h,a, il!ti\d, ':1\, S th" ~ 1', ,)i~i~, w~re '!Jeg, ',ging" uS to. d.Q, at that t1m~ and as we had done m tl;le past. . , ' , .' , " ' As~o~ the presentsitulttion.in South Vietnll-m, lwc)uidorily,observe.

thatthejlea, ,c,e, Se,ttli\lnen,t ))la, YhRv,e been inOrll: favorl'ple-'to,' th"e,.!lo,n-, COmmuni~t ,side ,than ~ome have implied. Over 80' ercent oftll.~ 0 u, lation is . ,'" ," ' , , , " ; ans the needir,e predictions 0 that Gmrnrnment'ecoll@se do ,not,

=,!, ~!,!i,'t:~~,;, :,oJlr~",!!:~~\~4t,.~~,~te, ~hf"th)~,', e," ,n,4:l, ~~,~",'~,t, ~,o~!,~a,~: avol(b):i(;;~y,9,ret.-~!llIIlt,m~p~, lri4~d .w~ mftY: ha;veR;verr~ll~teil somewhiit 1n' bUl.'c6ncerPtqai!~ld.Q;, QOmllUtJ!)el'lt.,I peUe.ye the 1Jmwd States has' some 'inte~estin warilingofl' It Commm:iist taKeover in

6

Cambodia. The hard question, of course, is whether that interest, real but not overriding, .is worth. the sacrifice which the Cambodian people IIIfe uudergoing. In this regard, however, the number of fatalItIes un,. der the .present circumstances, especially ,1IU)ong the non -Communists, may be just as high as they would have been nail the bombing con­tinued. /:lome American airpower, ,possibly plus a few advisers, as in Laos, would have ,probably assured that the Communists would not have taken Cambodia, and I doubt j·f that support would have over-

r committe. d us even iHt had failed to aChieve. its p. u.rpose .. 1. m .. ust re. port an uneasy feeling that congressional action in ;precluding these meas-ures was not as appropriate as it may 'haveappeafed at the time.

In conclusion, I w!>uld think on 'balance tnat the negative conse­quences would outwe1gh the positive ones if· thiscoun:try formally repudiated any of its present commitInents in the Far East, whether they be in the form of treaties or in the form of troops stationed abroad. I see no need,.however, of reemJ?hasizing. th~e obligations. To allow them to declme ,toward convement ambigUIty may ,not he inappropriate. The new ·form of American commItment-making ~es~ ture may well be the more ambiguous, and hence mpre a.l>proprlate, method of deploying American aircraft ,carriers near areas of con­cern. This was·done during the 'lndo-Pa:kistan war of.Decetnber 19'71, and also ,during the recurring Middle East crises. .'

As a budgetary matter, it may also be littingto ,phase down the size of our military and naval.forces in tlie Far East. But consistent with the need to project a militarily strong im~e abroad t!) 'llvoidunfor­tunate miscalculations by adversaries or allIes, I would hope that we would not entirely withdraw our militllrv' forces from any region ()f the Far East where they are presently statlGned. '

Thankyou very much"M".chli:irman. Mr. NIX. 'rhank you, AttorneY Paul. '. . Onfage9 at the bottom ,of your statement you stated: "In conclu-

sion, . would thi!11< on bal~nce~hat the negatIVe .conseqB~nces would ~>utwelgh the PO~ltlve on.esd thIS countIJ formally.r!l;ptla)ated anY,of Its present commItments m the Far East.' . , .... '.,

Hold inhere. Now we do have commitment!!, that,i;g, ~f CotlrBll,agteed to. ~t compelling ,interest, is, it ,to the United States of America to mamtam those commItments! '., .

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman,the interest that w~ have I would'like to emphasize is stri~tly an American iritevest. We are not .and we oer-, ~ainly shoul~ not b~,doin¢ this, tor ·t4e .intereatr< ot otheq>eople if. it mterf~res w,th Ameol:':\can mteresis, ~)it It'seelU$ b/iSlcto 1I1.e, Mr. Ohalr­man, that the image lit the'Un'ited States as It powerful conntry a~r<l\Ld,

not .. ju~t ... 'Wit. v.~l\ .. , i.t.S.,o,w .. n b.(j~.ders' .. I?e ... ma.in .. ta'.i.n .. ,e. d .. :r.t ... ·l.·.s .. v.er .. y.' ••.• ~ .. p,o .. ,r;.ll:n. ·.t. to aVOId n1].q~e,!lr .'!:ISkf!. r, am thinln'\ft.vartIC,ula~l~, ~or eX, "le",~if,

~u .. ? .. Iellr pt. Qh,:t<iklttf.!?n ..... '.' a .. n.' ... a.,. m .. ' o.fe.,spe~lfj,c.iJ,l. LY .. '.in.' .t. h. e ~1I.r. ';Ej~. ~' .. ". ' .... fJI, .. ~. W.lt .. ' It IS ",orJ;h Ii ,1ll\l,C~,t(j ~ee, t4!'t J"lP8J) tioes .",at IiQq?ire ,1;11tqI. It: "il'~a;,(i~l\s ~1~~tk~~!lo'r Of .\>~in:~ 'lVlt~OlltPtoFrchon.aga.mst .r!OS~, il~ ,j)u?I~ar

'rhi~ WIl0Ie~ch~e of • m~ric"-n mijitarv. ''''~~elide:'tn;~''' ~"£Q't';;,of c/) ., I'llii' 'ts" ·e1ft I' to'lliaii'ifu''6''d'K' ~f" c'''~ r I" 'I{\\" . J.i it st:tgfh'~rb~li" .1'ca·'~eHac:fhll~~ r)'r~cl'l*i, .f. ~~.!..f.:~. r,eason'S'.'t''ere'j] "r 'biit6'"e~ t't"~ i"" .. . .:hili. "~1'1~1'" f(}rnuII~y ~~~YJ~7?i~~~!iWW(~*i'~~fR'~~~'~;: q;:;,~: I,;:: r:,;';!:

7

MI'. NIX., Do you believe that the bf'nefits a~ruing to the United, States of Al;llerioa outweigh the cost in dollars and deprivation .toth~, people of thIS country' " , " ,

Mr. PAUL,. Mr. Chairman, the question of the cost of our military' establishmelltiu terms ,!f t~e I\lilitary budget ,:,hi"h]' ~hmli: is too higli; must be answered by lookillg at our worldWIde mIlItary P0StuI'e. It dQes not make tJaat much, difference whether a division is stationed in O~inawaorin San 1!'rallcis9,,'asfar as the, C?~t ofsupporting it. So y?u must look at how many ground force d,V,SIOns we have, how many' aircraft task forces we have, how many air wings we have, cut the total, and then de,pl"y the remaining units as thought appropriate.

thave written that we don't have 'to keep the total I\umber that we now have. Some of them can se,rve dual functions if they were ~tationed in the United States or the Far East withC5-As and the mH>. They can be moved rather rapid~y from one theater to another, but hriI\ging them home does not challgethat position. ' ,

MI'. NIX. See, what I am trFing to express is what most people don't seem to understand. The foreign ,policy of any count,y is designed to aid the intereSts of that particular country. There is nothing humani., tarian about it. It is ~OnipletelY selfish.

Now if we, having 9ul;lsc,ibed to that theory, continue along the line that we are g0ing 'without diminishing returns, linancialreturns in this country, it would seem ,to be 'logical to ,assume that the American pea' pie wilJ at SOme point, and in the nbt too distant future,suffer more than they are suffering today because of the inability in this country to finance the advancements or thil opportunities ,that theyhave been led to believe are in the offing.

In other words, I don't see how we can cltrry the burden that we are ca;r,Yl'?:lt now 11l?-2I\fuat we h~ ve carrien in the past in:t.o the futur~. What IS; your thln1nnll",,: , ' ' • ,,', .. .. ,,' , ' ,

Mr. PAm,. Mr., ChMrniall, I would po'you a dIsserv1<lelf Isug-gesled (lo1lll1lel)ts:which I am l!-otqu(l;lified t? make~ T~e overall:fiScal PQsi~!on of the U lllted: Stl!-teS is notSi>rr>;e1':h!ng on.whlCp, 'f ani itn a'ulfuot1ty; You are, and that Iayour responslbIljty. ' :,' ,:, I',' "

Mr. 'NI±~ Imigllt say this. Ma'uY,l'i<1<,>'ple in Ami)rjca'lLre i£1t'rm0re lmow ledgeable than I am on that, anC/. ':froni !the' Illtit!lca eJlittt; 't 'tMliive from my cOlllltituen,ts I am, convinced that they are Wiliblyi;Usturbed nbout'the '!)xpeMifum inherent in these'l'lperatiolISthlit we,'hMe under discussion. "(~,,, !".,,' "',:, ")'

Mr. du Pont. ' " .-' , .;, . Mr. DU !':ONT. ThM!k 'you! M~.cn:a1i'Ihiut~. . " . ' ',; I, aPOI~'ze :for a,rt1VIllg III lJhenird(lle'Ofthe, Wltll, ess's, ,Wgt'i,tnl)l)Y; " 8.ever ,questions ,occur to, m,e, Fh'!Ip;'tallting /lJ1X>1it 'ou.'tbltSeII'in

~apan: ,a'ttlo Y'0u':tliliiktli~:]jl\l$s'add 't,o (A) Japa'r\esiltloou14tv ' IlloonesiS, and (B}o]lr'i>wn SeCul'i't~~'" '.' ','" ,.,tt"

Mr. 'P"trtJ.Mt. an 'Pbnt;'I'~d h6M-'tlhli;tith\lSe!ba~sjare'th~r~.'~\'I' he1p! America'S security inlletils1is,: l\lit'tJiese MWiiffipillclt 'i'tf'ou.i';t~liif' tionship witjl JaP!lJl, which is a vO)l'y important part·:(jf'lA'iIli.eM.btr~ seontity'booauseC;£' Japan's etM'Illot/s ~1'iIJ:lot'lla'ucil ih"thll''''"f/JiJI.'''iJ!'l!.bse bases provid~ a l>ac~u,p for Korea a;n,d, secondL>thijY!!.Jl~olvi.\l.lllfl~s)'f ~, 'Hille,' <I.' ~t'iIi Iii, Y,; st, ateWr, eI>,,~' ·~tlmi\, 'lillik I ~,' itllif .1'9),' \l'Iti'ito 1!llrUOti, ,M" g, e lfapa.l;:;fi'6macq\:l'iring't1treJ~1iJt wlla'potlS.",: I, ;."" "i! ',I ·,if!!" '" ifW

"Y\s'I 's/l,iaeIW1ier;t1iis"a~rn:oort"i~ij;j worth 'apric~ fiJ~'iJh'; Uftidt~<ll States to pay to keep Japan from a~quiring nuclear weapt>n~,'a;ha'(It;li'~

8

imp()rt~nt countries. We have done pretty well in limiting the nuclear club since World War II. Some countries have joined, but it has been less fashionable than it could ha v,e been. I would like very much to avoid an abundance of countries having these nuclear weapons, espe­Cially important countries such as Japan, Israel, and Egypt, to n~me the most obvious.

Mr. DU PONT. Do you think that the presence of the U.S. bases in Japan gives them a feeling ·of security, if you will, sufficient not to make them go ahead with the development Of' nuclear weapon~ j .

Mr. PAUL .. I think,Mr. du Pont, that first We can cutdown our bases in Japan. In fact when Mr. Pincus and I visited Japan with the Sen­ate subcommittee .in. 196j) it seemed quite obvious to both of us there were far too many bas<jS in Japan at that time. Shortly thereafter there was a significant reduction in bases. .

Still, I think we can doa lot more to phase them down. A lot will depend, upon what Japan's attitude toward our bases is land. to­ward this country and our military relationship. I don't think we sho~ld forc~ t~e J apan~se to let us keel? those b~ses t~ere. I am just saYIn/l' that It IS a very Important Amel'lcan consIderatIOn that every mormng Premier Tanaka gets up and asks himself, "Shall I lJ,(lquire nuclear weapons!" He has to answer that. question implicitly every Dlorning on behalf of the J ",p",nees people. .

There a~e three points tha.t would come tp his mind that relate to that questIOn. One IS the fellhng.th,a,t the Japanese are not verY' much in danger today. Th~y feel very se\lure tosIRy from the possible t~rea~s. The second reason IS he lmows the U mt<)d States would not lIke It. The third reason .is it costs a good deal of money.

The first t,wo reasons relate very much to what the Up.ited States does in the Far East and Japan is part of this total plcture.As I have said, we .don't have to keel? those. bl)S~ t):lere if the Jll-panese don't w.ant them, but I don't thInk, w,; sh,>ul~ rush ,to leave there ~ntirely because t~ese bases. are proof \lt0]).r nuclea:1,' umbrella •. S.lm-liar to our troops m Germany .. , '." •... .

Mr. miT PONT.' Mr .. Cjlairmal)., 1l:>.a;v,elUl9~h,<\r q\l!lS~ion, but do 'you want to !Lnswer the quorum callI:. , ,.,: '..', .. '.

Mr. NIX. I think we better. ", ..,. ". ' , !he subcommittee will be i,n recess. witht.pe apolo!!i.of .the.subcoln, mlttee for the interruption.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.] ,<:.. . ... Mr. NIX. The subcommitteewiHibein order, ,., • /' i" :

Mr. du I',?nt h.,as '!'n.additiollal'\Ju,es,ti.on" .. " '.' , .• ',' ."".', .. , M~. Hanulton, WIll youproQ~.. . . ',. i>,.

Mr. HAMILTOI'!. Mr. rrttru,l.W.9.1.I1d like to getin my.mind. alittlQ more precisely' what. it is that you, recommend. You conclude yol1or lJl;atement at least by saying we 'sliLouldnot !lntirely: withdraw(mr military forces from any reglOn in, the Far East where they are'PWs,

enWh~~!~iS~you rec~lllmend i~ter\1ls of speciflos i Wn~re sIHmld we cut and how much i ' .' iii' . . .' • i, i,' •

Mr. PAUL. I would tend to think; :t)1at we could reduce in: m,ostevery country where we presently are, a,nd that would include.1);ol'i\~. and Japan, I must confess I am not:up .on Taiwan as, far .as: 'l'\'hll-t our present level is. '

9

Mr. HAMILTON. We have:abo~t 8,000 there. . . . Mr. PAUL. It was 10,000 d~ring the height of the Vietnam war.

The total number there is relatively small but probablY that eonldgi> down, too, I beli!)ve. B!)rora. Vietnlini. it was arQund 3,000. So that is

th~ o~~d\~i~fi:h~~allle' is.: tru~:;# the: 't>hllippines, though those have been reduced pretty mi;leh !would tend to thmk. . '. .

In Thailand we have si:i'alr' force bases: I would Wid to think we e()uld place seyeral of those biii,bsonstandby. tI)."~a<it, one of the pro­grams developed by the tJ.S;:Ait Fo~ce isealled~bare base operation. These bases in Thailand would be, even without American personnel, above that . level. But you don't need a large mimber, of American forces on those bases even if. yOh wanted to reactivate them very promptly.

So that would be my suggestion., I have suggested to another 'con­gressiOnal group and have written also th!tt I be .. 'lieve that the Defense .budget could be cut in these nonnuclear forces. I have suggested the re,ductionjerhaps of ,three ground f(>rce division.s, thre~ air force wmgs, an three carrIer task forces on a worldWIde basls,and my estimate ofthe savings would be about $6 billion annually.. .

Mr. HAMIW'(>N. The figures I have suggest. that we have about 173,000 troops in Asia today. That does not include civilian personnel, and it. does not include dependents. That figure is substantially higher than the number of troops we had in Southeast. Asia prior to the ,vietnam,buildup. You are suggesting we moderately reduce in almost every country, isthat correct! . .

Mr. PAUL, Yes, sir. . Mr.,llAMILT?N.What doyoumean:l0 percellt, 20 percellti' . Mr. PAUL.. I would h(>pelt wou,ld be ,more than 10 percent, Agam

I don't wish to state. things with precisi(lll that I am not qualified to state. . , .

Mr .. HAMILTO~. Let ,me ask this. Suppose we didll't have a sing~e tro. op m. E ... ur. ope tod .. a. y .. , .m ...... e. re.do you th.Illk we ought to place AmerI~ can troops to protect the .;\.merican national interests! .

Mr'. PAUL. Some of them in Europe ... ' '.. " . Mr.HA",l,uroN; Well,let's tali<; a~ut.Asia. .

Mr. ~.At;rL. The, f.act that We have been the~e present~a problem of' dynamICS, 'a traI\SItlOn. ..' .. ..

Mr .. HAMILTOJ;. What I am really trying;. to get. at is wh!)re.in South­east Asia do We have sufficient national ihtere$t thl\t we nee!!ti> haye Ameri<)lt,n trooJ!s therein substantial nUmpersand 'Why! " ...• • .. ' ' . . Mi'. , .p.' A. UL. ' Mr'.'.'.lI. "'.m. iIto.,n,.7. 0 per~nt of the. f!laS?!,. '.t.ha. t.~~ u.'.n. d.e.',r-.' went the great cost'l'e dld.Ill Vietnam, accordmgoo t4e ~ple who itll!,~et4a~. decisipn in 19~5, 'l'.as,if I can quote it exactlt 'roo proteCt Our Image as a guarantor. " • , . . . . , ..

Obviously.those QQJlntriesgeographically ,are not parti6ul1\rly im­portant to us, bi;lt .tlre,geographic dimension is not tire imP<lrtallt .4imension in thisma,tter. il'bg important dimension is-I wish Ihad a. b'lt,~:r w(>rd fOl,'it--'-"ima.ge."lt is meailt'illa very im,port!11J.t. sense and 1'9Ilfi1»a,wviaI ~nse. In this nucle&r ~wh~n!>.~hl!~<;6~trie~have nufll~~,~%yon.sr whether !heY' hav~ bOO1).ll4v.~~rleso~~!!,;Ve been. alheSj \\t~ ·iJ:6n't,want 'any mIscalculation that w6i1Jd'.-ll,e@ala.u:utous. . " . '.-." ,-".;, :

10

I apologize for not answeri~g yoiIr 4ueSfioiJ. in aiew, words butt am answering it as pJreciselyas ~ can_ It is because we have created !IJJ

importaI\OO in SOllt)1east Asia over, t)le la~8 :Y<lars, parti~nla;ly Viet· nam, that sonie 1'1'100 and some attempt to preserve V,etnam from ~ailing is. impo~ant to the U!,ited States .. The way I look atit, that IS not so lmposslbl.il at all., I~ IS. wor1;~ ~ ppce. , .. . , In other wordS" I have Bald m anoth~r contest, It IS worth a 1'1'100 to keep Japan from acquiril)g nnclea~ weapons. To do that we are aroun.d J ap~, ~e a~e com~ortablya,v'ailable, we )u1ve not gone. away. 'That 18 what IS mvolved up m.that part of the world. Down m Vietnam in Southeast Asia it is highly clear that Vietnam is a very important symbol in the U.S. foreign policy. '

.Mr. HAMILTON. You are not suggesting that we put troops back into Vietnam, are you i, '"

Mr. PAUL. No, Mr. Hamilton; r am suggesting we have a peace

(

-Settlement in Vietnam in which 80 percent of the population is in , areas controll, ed by the South" Vietna, mes, e ,GO, ve,rn, ment, and t, hose ,air

force bases in Thailand are part of keeping it that way. That is all. Mr. HAMILTON. In what c.ountries do you perceive the American

national interest to be greatest in Southeast Asia i Mr. PAUL. If you mean in Asia, it is clearly Japan, 'but that is North·

east Asia. , , Mr. HAMILTON, You would support the presence of a SUbstantial number of American troops in Japan i

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Hamilton, I don't mean to get philosophical' but th,e whole thing is sort of in an invisible world. It is not the taI\gible world of how many troops we have in those bases,itis,the invisible world of Prime Minister Tanab'sperception and Chou En·lai's perception. 'Our whole projected military. force in ,the Far East, which can chang~ 'as budgetary interests reqmre, is the key to maximizing Aril{ir~can security in th",t regard. '

Mr. HAMILTON. AI! right. I 101m willing to, go along with you on that but where does thlOlt leave you in term~ o£.numbersi

Mr. PAUL. In JIOIpan I am sayingthlOl~ if. the Japanese str<mgly took the position we should lean1 we should lea,YIi, but I See no reason why

, .we should invite them to !tSli: us, to lelOlve in tho; present situation. By being there they say, "Well, we know the American troops IOIfe here, so that we know that if Japan .was con~ivlOlbly IOIttacked by nuclear weal" ons, Americans would, be killed IOInd, therefore, it is WQrth relying on tht>: AmericannucIear umbrella".

So it is thlOlt kind of indirect IOInd intangible role thlOlt these forces -serve.1'hlOlt can be done in lesser numbe.s , than they now have. 'l'here 'are al)'roI;,ts to the Japanese sel;lsitiviti~ in someO,f these cases,for instance, in the Tokyo arelOland the Kanto Pla,in area, IOI:(ld th<\lj(} seMi" ti "ities should be catered to. , , .' , ,,' '". -~ Mr. HA, MILTON.'l'h,' ere are, 100, a1, people sug,' giJst,' , iug to'dn.y, thttt SEATo.'is inactive. How do you feehboutSEATO'i. " ," , Mr. PAUL. I feelth~twe s)'iouJdnot fovmlOllly repudi!tte SEA.TQ'or

r,~ny of the other treaty c().niIllrtm~ntsl booll;u.se tl,te dyn!LllU,cs .0,~reEud~at. Wt:, C!, eats,s,a d~w, ~w,' ar,'4. 1m, ,R,re~s,lOn,',mthls a,,rea.otE, e, ,rce, ' ptjQn,' ,.~."J;, • thi,' uk the sltn,atlOn wjth,~EA'l:'O: ~an l\e'complOlred With CEN,TO. :iji~ve Jiou heard from that recelitly' i- ' . "

Mr. HAMILTON. I just met with the Secretary General of CENTO 2 days IOIgo.

11

Mr. :PAlll:,.:pe~hapsI Slxoul~ dot have I?~r~seit.it tna~*a'Y' ' , .. ' Tli'll?()jnt is that ClllNTO IS notvery YISIble In the Important hst<>f

American CbUunltrrlents. It' has fallen illto silenoo·and oblivion, 'arid it is all right with we rr SEATO moves in that direction tQo. , .'"

I~ han gets into seriQUI! trouble, I .am ~ure the Shah is g0!ng ~o remmd us about CENTO, but that IS not as bad 'RsrepeatIng It everyday.. . ' "

Mr. HAMILTON. What do you think would be the consequenCes of American unilateral trooJ;> withdrawals in Southeast Asia i'

Mr. PAUl,. I think it win substantiidly inc.rease the likelihood of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. Furthermore, may I say this. It may happen, regardless of. our. e~o~ts that Japan acquires nuc~ear weapons, but even so I thmk It IS Important the waysheacqmres them. In other words, that she does it in a pro· U.S; mold, that we are dose 'and harmonious allies when she does.

I Mr. HAMILTON. When do you see our troop commitments in South·

east Asia. ending! Areyou a.t the po. int Where. you are, just willing to keep the levels that we now have there, perhaps reduced by 40 or 20 percent, for as far in the future \ls you can see i

Mr. PAUL. There may be another 2,0 percent later on. It does not b?ther me. You n:ust .ask ?,ourse]f why you want them red!lced and have that clearly m mmd, If I may suggest. If you are worrIed about budgetary reasons, it does not matter where ?,OU put the troops; if you put them in Thailand or ill Ca~ifor:nia, It is about the same. There is a bl ce·of. a ments roble' 'eh I would reeo . and that isa cost ut 1 It m s e co a n !'tuc ear wea ons, an 2 ,1etnam bemg lost. I know that this last 'Item IS per aps II u 0, cer am qUllrters, but the J:lsy, chological dynamics after the United States has paid all that. itha.s in Vietnllm with the prospects being wlia.tthey are that it won't be tllken over by North Vietnam, those things seem worth II price, Clearly the price in balance of payments,

Now if you lire worried about the, fact tht these troops may get us involved in another Vietnam, 'my andysis says, that if you aue alert to what yOU are doing, that is not very likelyio happen in any of these places.

Mr .. HAMlL'OON. Let me 'ask speciftcaUYllbout Ko~ea. I am not sure just what you recommend in your statement, but w~ now hawe, I thi~~,.~bollt.42,000 troops there. South Korea has.'one of the larger arJiiles m As,a. ' . ' , . '

It'l:ms had a lot of experience very r~Cently. Wha,t is the r~aSoll for us to hllve 42,000 t~oops i\l SouthKQrea.i ,'. . ,

Mr. PAUL. I wQnld certainly recommend" as,,Ithil;lk I did a few Il!inut~s ago" tllat that nqrnber could go dow!! $j~ificantly. I could VIsllRhzet.hat n.ulnber ,1Ii<> .. 'lllgd.own ~y .. 5. O .• perG~!!t ... +w, .. ,ell. t.'y th<lU,s.alld wollld ful~l1, as I See It ,the ..:\.merlcan lllter,est, I\lld a presence 1n Korea durmg these days. ilrhat 4:0,000, can riow, Qf 5.0',OQO,eould in 1970, ~nd60,OOO a few. ':y;ea,rs, be. i.?r, e th.at, So if]'o,u. 'q,~ .. a~kipg me should It not go dow!!, ~. agrej) ,,\,lth, YlJU, Mr. If(tJllII~on, It could well go downby a sulbstanbalrriargill. ':" '. ' ' " '

Mr. HAMILTON. Would you slJigle out Korea as the country where we could perhaps have the greatest reduction in troop levels with· out an adverse impact on our interests! .

12

Mr. PA~L. In. making such .n st~tement ~ woVlil have .to compa:e rather carefully other, countrIes Ilke ThaIland ,where we 'have SIX Air Force bases. If a North Vietnamese attack over the horder is not imminentper!)aps tl).ere ,couldb.i"three Air,Force bases, for 'instance, that order of magnitude. . ' . Mr. HAUiLTON. So those two countdes atleast cometomind,Korea

and Thailand, as areas where reductions could occur. " Mr. PAUL. Yes, sir. r was going to venture that a substantial reduc-

tion could be made in Japan too.. .' Mr.HAu~LTON. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take too much time. Mr. NIX. Mr. du Pont. , Mr.Du PONT. Thankyou. ',. '

. ,.1, have one more question, and it. is linked units what Mr. Hamilton has heen pursuing.

Given that our military policy in Korea seems tohave been suc­c.eilsful, that is, since the hostilities stopped in the fifties: there has ll.'ffi'it'!!'.reasonabl<; degree of peace.the~e, though th<;re is ~rlCtion back and forth. But gIven that we accomphsned somethmS', gIven that the wat was fought and brought to a reasonable conclusIOn, once having made~h",~ commitment, how can you ever stop j How can you ever ~.::tt.4q~,a.:~. an., '3; forces witho.ut running the riSk.O. £.,a.ppea.ring to abandon ItlThls.applies as well to any other country,partlcularly Korea. ", .:Mr. PAUL. Well, in various responses to other questions I have al· luded to pieces of the Itllswer to. your question;jI1:r. du Pont. One is a gradu~l decline in the vi$ibilityof a ,<)Ommitment, or the representa· oon,O'£." ~me.,'I don't kno",,: w.hether I Ca.I.1. s"y. p .. has.e·out entirely or not.

NUl'\lper two, as I ObvIOusly made clear, I am not too bothered by how long it goes on in the indefinite ~uture. NATO. has lasted since 1949, and Korea since 1951. It does not make that much difference if it is working, it seems to me. I am just questioninl/ the importance, the desirability of getting out. I don't know if it IS in the best in­terest of this country to do' so, but as I repeat, they can tend to' phase down and possibly out. . ' . ' ,

For example, the Tahyan, ,Resqlution,of 1958isvi~tually a. dead letter now. In fact I thmK 'It was proposed a couele years !1go to rescind it ~ormally and nobody got too upset. I don tknow tliatthat ever actually happened, but anyway nobody refers to it. How<iver, I must confess there itre several other commitments to TaiWan, includ-ingthe treaty, so that was only one element,. '. .... ..

Mr. DU PONT. No~,vthereas?n for the phasequt was the ~u~!licion that maybe, we could acc()tnp'hsh. the s.ame foreIgn p.ol~cj .• g9a~ :\'t a smaller cost by not 01l1y brmgmg .some of .those dIVISIOnS bacK to California, but when you get them theredoi:ng am-ay with thein. "

Mr. PAUL. You certainly can save some money if yqti,r~iice~hem . somew~at. As I have saia to. Mr .. :a:a'!liIt?n,,fQ:~Xlttnpl'e! ll~ttii):g'.,the troops m Korea won't make much dIfference m our cQl1lmltlnent to . Korea for the interest they serve in this ~ontext.:! have the. susP10ion that .one of the reasons :l'0r the North K@rean.Mtente is to see iI,they can mduce. us to get those tr09ps out o£ the~e but I don't think it makes mu~h difference whether itis, ~O;9dO Il:ud ,40,P.()'o since, it. seems rather unhkelythat the North KOl,'eans wOl1tdm fact reqmr<\)Is to USe them. . .,. .,' .

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you.

13

Thank you).MriChaiw.. . ali. Mr. NIX. ThltIlkyou. Atto~ney PauI,on behalf .of . the subQommitt(\ll 1 want to thank

. you very much for your presenpe anq for your pa~iciplttion. Mr. PAUL. Thank you. It is a pleasure. Mr. NIX. The· next ,witness is Mr. Wltlter Pincus, executive editor

of New Republic and former stltff consultant fQr the Senate Sub­committee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments . Abroad.

We welcome you, Mr. Pineus,and you may begin.

STATEMENT OF WALTER PINCUS, EXECUTIVE EDITOR, NEW RE­PUBLIC; FORMER S.TAFF CONSULTANT, SlmCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECUlUTY AGREEMENTS ABROAD, U,S. SENATE

, Ml'. PINCITS. Th'lIJik you very much, Mr. Chaivman. I am sorry I don't have a prepared statement. I spend all my time

writing, ItIld when you don't have to write I sort of enjoy it. What I would like to talk about, because I have reltlly not spent

that much time and dealt as closely as I think I would be useful to the committee in talking about the speCifics of. the commitments in Southeast Asia, is really to talk more Itbout a technique that a com­mittee such as yours ought to apply in trying to deal with this area.

III some cases I would like to pick up on the diseussion before and a Uttle bit or what Roland is saying. :As you sit here and try to decide whether to cut 10 percent, 01'20 percent, or where we can make a large cut and where we can make a small cut, essentially the Congress hIS­torically has beenw.orking with really superficial. mfovmafion. When you t!lilk about cuttmg 10 percent of the troops m anyone country, you should be interested really in what the troops are doing, what their ipUrposes are, what kind 'Q£troops' alie 'therel what your commit­melitlilspecificallYltre inthatoouhtry atoa specific time. Werea].ly were trying to get the Senate Foreigril1elaitlions Committee sOme detailed information on whattheU:S. military situation was abroad.

Each known milita1';Y!ci>hul!lltment was drawn together by the Sub­"committee on' U.S. Security ~greements Abroad in 1969; The ap­proach We took at t4at time was to find out in as much detltilas pos­sible whatthe Uiritlld States had in these, specificCQuntries in which it was khown that the U.S. military Was present. ' ". ' .

I would !,ike to take an 16Utline thati\Vas f6110wedhack in, 1969 and as' an' ei;;~ml'le j11'!t d~lwith' onJ iciiiulfitry; 'tltr&! PhiliPPinesh'as an iI­lus~ration pf 'W'h~t! l' ,t~iturJitl-ilUJ3&)f)ljrtf\lM1!'ISUChas yourss ould try to 6b~alrr ftoti"l' tlie"))'ii ·'a/ittm<)il:t.'\)~, i)!let~$l)'·!l.nd the Department of State in order to'1iei'\6W ;rd.lscuss<'tl1~lilti,\iliJll pfttuestipIT8 thllit ypu are

rltt~w~iltetheC6~gi'~~:i:~w~YSa~~'d~~~V!l.;t~ when it has to talk in. large pet'lentia~ aiJd.gen~ralit!i.Mi:tt'Cla4 itlways.beMup by any­

. body . fr6mtlle. State'Dl!partn'ient itlili'1iheDe'i'ehse Department on the '.g .. r .. 'ou ... h.d~ . .1 t.l)~tI.·f'.)' .. liU. ·~.cti .. t,1.0. pe ... rOOl'tt.,Or.Y.dh ... cut .~.~.!,p.,el'ce ... nt., >,.Oll are elllll,iliatmgjSOiJIe 1>:iWl"functIon,aQout ,wMch you .mow noth,mg. '.'. It.liirl~. tli.~; .. ·.ei'.' . .p . ~r\~n.c~ .. ".!b. f .. · .. 6u.r. ,BU.bCOIliIiri. 'tt:!l.,e'-. a.'.:h.' d .. :you Can 'go into almost IlJlY®Uhfry.thMtl\r~ went intq-wals1ihat you 'foundthatvou

. ihJ~~~l ~~:t%~~~f:~!~E;:~~i;ri!~~t::~{\~~:J!~e av:Eis~~d 41-~21--74-----2

14

but new purposes are developed, usually.bythemjllitary 01' State De­partment people in th,at country, and used as a v0hiele' to increas0"the. military presence rather tlia1't to"d'ecreaseit. ,It! is, very muehliike a domestIC progtamthat once started'can nevel1l!>B'fuIished., The Ameri' can military presence in a country oMe started dwelops many different hats and many diffe~nt {,urp<lses,but the main purpose is that the presence always remams and new purposes for It develop. "

If you want to approach the subject seriously, one method is to gather here in Washmgton in·formation. on It country-by-country basis. This performs two fun!'tions: Qne, it develops facts for the committee to permit discussion· i,:, ~h~,ter,!"s used, b;y·'tlil.e De'partJl!i<!llts themselves as to wliy yon are, IllllItarlly mspeclfm c@untnes. '

Second, as outsiders y."qJ)'IJ,oI~ ,at these fuW)tialls, the military Junc­tions, and even the foreign policy function in each of these countries with new eyes. Yautend t@,.aisenew'questionsthat our own Govern­ment people, because they are fixed in their own judgments or fixed by past decisions, don't raise. Y@u may suddenly find yourself asking questions that they themselves"never asked.

As an illustration, look at our situation in 1969\ and use the country of the Philil"pines, and just l!>riefly run through the kind of procedure we followed.

We originally took the Philippines, and we sought out everything that was written or stated in terms of ,whllt commitments are in effect. These are treaties and executive agreements. We then asked for information on all. the U.S. forces and. facilities, but not a geneval piece of information, nat the overall total. We rea;lly wan.ted to know what the functions were and what their purl"0ses were.

, At that time them also was a Philippine lUlit in Vietnam, a unit that in effect represented the Philippine comlllil," tm .. nt to th, e American/ Vietnam ef!ovt, although it was couohed in. terms @f secrecy. We re­quested all theinformatian that had t@,do with the, ]l>aymel).t, t)l:e ori­gins o:li that oommitment,and what the :Un~te,d States WaS, doi;ng to support it., ," ' " '" '." ,,'

We then went in.to the questioli\ ,of the milita;ry: l\SSista:n.c;e programs that we have. Again,not da'lilar,figur~s----n@t,g.nevaliities, butspecjti.c pregrams: ' " , ' ,

I sho1l,ldsay ·as yeu g<?-t into, these, an.d maybe' you will stop w~th military assistance, whioh is a good e:8:ample-as you got into that you found, out on. or the thinl(S we' were doing was supporting, a Green Beret type )mit within. the Philippines back in 1969. T4at, was sup­posedly -in the very i\"eogral"hicIlVea;s"th1lJt are now in rebelliOn,doing civil action work. 'We,ape'~\ilen<i1.illg ~!*\!\<illl,a)'>l. povtion~,o£ time down there supposedly helping,»l}twoilrtc.aotiC!J,l, ~~pg):a~;, ",: .' ' .

There also was a, counterinsurgency 'program at that t,me whlC,h I ~hink ,may, still .eXli$t..yti,i,·<)}).; sliQuld be,:Q,ll\plored. What is; ,the coin­mltment ~,oth,e!l!l..1 w:il,' llif.,'{.,:.tiJ<: /li!I,'hesllJ" ,tJ;te l1e~,ults of, th,oes' pl\Og~ams, i "',

Thete lsa ma;,rOI1,Pllo!JillE!.m.at 'Cl/!il,'k An: Fo:vce B,ase and some other Air ForClll hl).$es, crhne tl'<l\d;.~or~1jption "lfe~tingQoth the, Am~ii.can troops!lnd the )?hilip.pi,MJqc'aIS, and" w, "eoPtajll,e,dlt, gre, at.deal of~I)­;ilol'lllatlQn there, I~ tm:»)ed. out that tJ1~ atealil,llg or ..\\.1ll~rl~It!l' weap­ons"pllJrtiqul!l'rl)T, M,..Ws,.w.;as the, ~oqr:ce, of. al<!t''i'£,$e,jp:i~~juen~

,th\l't were,goJjl).g:,llothw P,lV!1te. c~ti~~IlS,all& "'ntlgoverl);11)Emtg~?1.'ps, pVlvate; goyerl)1llent ,gJ:oUps,i IlldlVldlja~and $aqhe JO/il\;l,FiJ,lWnc:>s

t5

and even the 'Philippine Governinent would not cooperate with the America,u military to do a way with that problem. .. '. .

Another area that we went into that we considered important was the question of joillt planning. The U.S. military in most every coun­try in which we have people do joint planning wIth local governments to meet different kinds of contm~encies. These take the form super­ficially of war games. But again m playing the game as to what the United States and the Philippines will do together in the case of certain contingencies you develop' at least with the military the idea that that exact performance is goin~ to take place. So I think you really have to understand what is gomg on even in term. of things like joint planning. We discovered that for years the United States and the Taiwanese were having a'joint exercise in which the U.S. forces were in this game joining with the Taiwanese and holding an invltsion in different areas. We did some joint war games in Korea. We did some in the Philippines also.

Having gotten a list of bases, we tried to get some information on what the U.S. military saW as the future of those bases. What kind of future planning were they doing, or were they just allowillgthese things to go along;. That turned out to be the case in many of them.

Then because the Vietnam war was on, there were special situations that involvellthe Vietnam war, but I think even in the present circum­~tance it is worth inqui~ng ~s to :w)lat. kind of continge!,cy plans a,re m store fora: country like the Phrhppmes for exanrple m the case of the reopening of eijfuer 11 bombing situation, or the return of American tr~ops to :Vietnam. 1't is tha~ ltind of pro~ram, by using the qu~ion­nOlres whiCh we used' as a primary begmnmg; and then followmg It up with a stajf visit to the Phi'lippines, because I think you can learn t,,:"ic~ as muclJ:iil th~ country involved as you can learn, here. You elimmate the Washmgton bureaucracy of the, State and Defense

'Departments who answer questions anybody has wdtten and teil the least amount of information. The fact IS. when you get into the field I think IOU findlthatboth the military and State Department officials abroa ate much mOre open and much mo.re eager to c<)Operate and at least~x~!ain'.what is ~here. I think with that kind of informatio.nJ even revlewlUg It as outSIders, you wouldbeama~ed at what you COuld diScover. '

I noti~ in. going thr'ough this tnthe PhHippin!l$ we came across anl1il'base with an annual operating cost of $1.4 miHiorr a year when we 'Went there. It had 600 personn.el. The mili1larydiqu't particularly want us to go down there. 1't was 'Way out of the, way. 1't was just a stopover for-American airplanes on their way to Vietnam.

, In fact wjJ.en you got down there you Saw thiswas a Philippine commercial airport that in fact was 'being supported by theu.'S. mili" tary. That there were four U.S. mi!ita,ry Rlal'\eS ~oful~gthrQugh there a ?al' '1'0 suppo)."t those four landlU~ a Clay we'wereiay,lng out $1.4 ml1hoh to.' operate the base Olld then.~he cost of the 600' people-who were down tbere. Very shortl;tafier our heari11gs QU tl\~ Pl\ilip'pines were' published they announced that that particu;l,l1l'il.irbase was being closed. ' ,. , . . , I a~ very ]}ias~ to. the~ ~,inds of deta,iisi~1it tlJa,t ia. as important In the overal~. p6hll~Ming as are the hroll:d: ~nerl1hzatlOnstllilt tepd ho be th~ bas/s"<!>nwhl&r iliinjts areargued'ltjtddebated when you: I?;'lt up here m Congress; 4nd really, they are th," grounds' on which: State

16

and ·Th)fense experts that develop the arguments would much rather focus on today. .. '. ' •

· Roland. and I havehadonr' disagreements in the past ",hich made, .Ithirik, for our investigation being as good its it was. But there is an element in his statement that I think is. worth' questioning philo­'sophically; I think Roland represents II point of VleW that really is ,the basic point of view both held by the. administration to some degree by people who deal with foreign policy up here. That is things are don" becaUSe they have to be done, t]lat you make commitments and

.YQw raise th.e~ and lQwe.: t.h. em. reall.·y}? .Sl1.it ,the Am~rican i~terest, and they aVOId the quest\onof who decIdes what the mterest IS, and whllt does it take to make tflOsecommitmerits. ." . . · On the question of LtlOS,.I have heard .. ~t.argued that the AIDerican invQ.bi~ment in Lao8c"-and'~ think Ro1i1l1d.talks abo.ut it toa degree here-was really the way thingsshou)d hav,a lJ>ilen h[l;Ud)ed .. The.argu­ment was made that the American 'presence" was very low key-very Jew Americans were killed, We didn't have any lasting commitment, although we are still there. We were not drawn into this war.

• What that misses is twofold. One, that we have .destfQyed almost · third of that country which now is sort of refugee in character. · It dOll'lnot 'deal at all with the Laotians. In fact, what.theirinterest .is or th!\t We have any resJ?onsibility for them. The so-called beauty .of th~'"American presence.m La:os is made possible by the fact that

'. they d,dn't tell the AmerlCan people we were there, that there are ,certain sorts .(If rules and regulations as a basic. part, that we do not . fight a. war without congressIOnal approval even if it is another way , to do it; and if it doe~ not make a lasting commitment. .

I thmk one .thing more than any other; tIiat ·the sul;>committee .tried to 'get, out when it de:veloped the Lilotiru{'presence and.made · tIie'i'ssue' (If Laos, is 'that as nice and clean as I1lltjQe stratetpcargu­meNtS' can be, this ~ally is just not th~waYthe Am.eij:kan .<;tovern­ment ought to,fuuctlOn. If you aregomg to fight ;iN.a ,country you ha;vetoge.t aut]lority to fight there ... I fe.lt as.str.o.ngIY .... ~bout La.os. as I ,did because I was told when.~ was there ,and told w]lenl came

· b""k,. tho at .~aos .• WIIB. going to b. e. the .futu. re V. ie.tJ;Iam,tha .. ~nq louger are you,gomg to puoAic1y acknowledge what you aredomg ,because if you don't publicly acknowledge it you don't really have to debate it. YOIl can really. make ,tbe.issu. e: 'Are' y. au. dO.iug. (tny.t]lin. g.,. '

A very short time aiter we cllIDe back you had ;the Cambodian'iuvlt-si()n-:!lpd t]lap is, w~at it W!lS, it was''l-Caiub~ianiinv:a$iori. Cal! it what y,?u want .. We m'Va~ecj an?thoc,cQUntrYi I1nd.ra~her t]langolng to the Issue of. whet]ler It IS l'lg]lt or wrong to do It,. whether the Pllblic.could. be co .. n . .vi.nc.e.d."."t was i.ll. "t]l .. ei.rinterest .rather than. doing that theadlUinispration did whatJt,h'a.';!;done ill .t,.aos,Itwent ahead .an..d. let the. pifbJic .. trytolind. ,oll~illbQIl1lj it rather thj).:r,Ijo t.eN tli~.m.

W." .]lat .. ]l. a.l.p .pene. d.'ll. ,Ca.1lll.ib.~.' ?.d.' .. "a. w. !1rked. i /))1. t .w., tIie .Am.Ql'lc. RPi 1llterest .. JI) CambOdia, tile ¥qrp]l VletnamElSe '1ll0ved'lnto Call1Qod,ilJ., . pot be-'iIlU ... set.4ey ... Wer,e .trym. gto, ... g.ep .. there but,.becaus. e.theJ' hacl .. tq to.".pr.o. teet ~b,el'r.~ccess to SQ!lthVie~n,!\ID,So, we V\'ent and destroyed .and are m the process of stllI destroymg auother country. We failed to.Sllpport ~.rl. on. cei?i]l .. an.PU.k.;WhO did :l,1otid0iat~.]l ... !It t.im. e. exactly ... w.hat. we;wa., I!ted

,hIm t6; i/o. In retrospect]le wJtsdomg w]lat we wauted to (to more · tpau th.·.e. Gove. 'pun.' e.ut. ever aokno. wleaged, H. e. wa~ ,.pe~mitHng us to oomb secretlYlIlpng,the border areas., .. " . ., .

17

When the opportunity came with his overthrow to move in w,et~led to wipe those things out. The temptation was just too much and "the military went in. We may have cleaned. out the sanctuaries 'tem­porarily. We may have stopped. the invasion of the North Vietnamese. We may have protected the American line, but we did two things: We involvedanotlier country in: the war, and'we did somethingi:hat really is against th~ manner in whic~ thi~ Gove~h~en:tis supposed. t<:> operate.

r ,,;m argumg for the ~chm9.1'!e. of asslgnmg t~e subcommIttee, a.nd argumg for really the responsibilIty of the Congress to act on detaIls, to try and find out what is going on. I really thmk that you areargu­ing for the ability to bring back into order the manner in which we go into these kinds of commitments. It will make commitments more <:iifficult because you will haye to get publieand congressional support, and it won't be as neat as people who believe in keepIng world balance, keeping presence, dealing with the subtleties of foreign policy would Hke it to be.

I have no doubt that there are subtleties to it, hut there are subtle­ties that go beyond what the American system I?"rmits. I think foreign policy in the last 10 years has dropped that pomt of view. I think one of the things that helps to reinstate it is committees such as yours taking a mUM more active role at least in the initial step of trying to find out what is going on; uot in geueral terms but in specific terms and therefore are better able to question, notto set forelgnpolicy. I think that is a difficult thing for Congress to do. But instead to raise the kinds of que~tions and perform the oversightfuncti?n that I think. h,,:s b~,very much ,missing in the l!tst 10 years, the lac~ of questIOnmg m many ways has permItted all kinds of wars and' all kmds oitragedieS th!l,t weha"e andstill have. . '

Mr. NX:i!:.Thank you. , Mr. G;uye!'. ...... '. .. ,

, Mr. ,~-.:r::EIt. No .. I ~n:joye~ this ysry.much. Iamsorry I was not here j),t thei~gtti!ljpg,'ll;t:. ChaIrman, I WIll reserve comments.

Mr. NIX. Mr. HamIlton. .' . . '. Mr. JIAMILTON .. Afj;er you mad~ all that analysis of tl)e Pllilf.ppi!les,

where did you come out i . . " .',". Mr. }'INOUS. Well, two things. OUe, we cut dQwn thenHtribe'i' &l,the

bases .. T,W .. '" We.P. \lil.iPPiUeS.isO.n.e Oft. h. ,es.e .... co. u~.tr.i~s.'W4!'i~· .•. J.fh.!!1k'.t1t.' .. e .•. sma.lle.r ,~he '.I1'.:.ese .. n.ce the. b.ett". " .. "' .. 1 .. c. anno .. t'tal .. k p~.:r~.·.~p..4.,g.i~'1 '." Ii..'u~ ... 1 .. am ~uc~ mot~ liit~lest~in theuni ~th,,:~ 1i.''llfi~r(~lr .'lv, , . ,I\eir: :fu~c-tIOn IS., .butl· oU .. , get. mto.th. e. se u .. n\t~ ~.ha. t..h. aye ... t~~m ...• e~ .. '. St .. ~t.Og'iA.t .. l.(). tltlJ!\ on them:,I. tl1eyhave got ~jl~,P,h!,hllPln~,~t.l\I?,,;!'!ld~,!':l,h, 1H?t,sur~ th"t,.they.do---,when I W'a~ th,,,ri~,tll~y;werelP;.~h~),wdst?Ibul1<),ip.g u~ S. U~IC .. .1~8,.'y. Vf .. h .. e, Fe there IS. a. q.?"n~~t.tt1qJ!l'h .. ~ .• ~)V.)~~);\.'." ,suo ~~c J3.lj>y '. ~.' .d .. ,.~ gu~ If 1"1\8 1Il;Japan,.rh!lNa~ h9:1·1i~~6\l~hIgnava.). tIW11.'tyt(l repMfshlPS pnor to the Vu>,tnam War.'Wlien: we got out\lliere IS.wRli a. comp ... e. tI .. ·t •. i.on 1:>et.w. ea .. n .. SU.hic BII.y ..... and tho .ePhilil1.pi .. nes. '. a~d;!#.· :,Tapan . . Well, e~h one hl\8.a p~rt. People i1,lSubic' ~y wl\nt j:.O,~ttl.ythere,

and some m ~ aj;>ap .want to, stay there. ". . . . ." '. '. ', . . , ~r:I4MI1i;l'9N,Pid YOp; do thiS kind Qf analysIs in all;(~Mounfde's l):l,Asla·t", .. ,.. .,. .".. '. ., ." { ""

. . ..•. ~~ .. ~Jti~.lllit:~~:1.i,.~~ .. of 'I ~It.;% .. 'ptipl1. what are yoJr, ~~~rai cQItclti-. ~sio)i$iiJ;'QUt:01ir troop levsl]liOday r . . .. . . . , .. '" - ..

18

Mr. PINOUS. Today!, " ' Mr. HA:.:tILTON. Yes., ' Mr. P~NCJJS' . .l think they are too high all over the:place. I mean I

was amazed 'when you said 42,000 in Korea. I don't know how good my m8m!?11 is, it w!lS48,(JOO att,he height"and it went ~o 48,OO~ because of the CrlS)S when we ramm~ m a whole bunch of al1'Craft. The talk they ,gave us was that now pecause we hav.e e",tensive airoraft there we can start moving out ,ground troops, but when we Were there they wer,e fighting over one of the ,th;n~ I guess we accompliShed. We used to have Ii com.pany up ,on the line m the DMZ. There was no rationale in the world why they aught to he there but it was gre!Lt training. It was the only place you could be-and this is the kind of det!Lil that I think is important-that the DM;!: in Korea was the only country out­side of V.ietnam, and some lines along Europe, but because there woere incidents in the DMZ it was the only plaoe you ~ould send patrols out for 24 hours that really had to worry about bemg shot. It was great training, and £ar that reason we used to do it, and that reason we used to do it, and that isthe way they looked aUt.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Pincus, I appreciate your testimony, and I think you have ~iven some helpful suggestions to the subcommittee. I have to meet Kmg Hussein heve in just a £ew minutes. I am sorry I have to run. away; I would enjoy listening to the rest of your comments and Mr. Paul's. '

I do want to try to get a feeling oihow you look at the total picture as quickly as I can. I take it that you would m",ke very substantial reductions in our tr.oop commitments throughout East Asia, and that :you think we can, do th",t without harm to the American national mterest.

Mr. PINCUS. I don't believe in the downward disengagement. I think people are either going to be with us or not be with us" either support us Qr ·notsupporjo us, either have .faith or not have ,f!1l'th based on wh!1t we teU them. We think the faith theyh",ve in the Govern­ment is import!1nt and not whether there are io,ooo ,tr(>q,psthere,.of 50 O<lO troops ~hene,or.lQO,OQO tl100pS there. "' ..

Mr.I]\{AMturoN. Where would you keep troops in Sq,utheast Asia, lJ,l\d at :what level,!

.... -.M. r .. :Pr,NO, .;g,~, ,xv:, "e~k\,l11~."e:p"re", -Y, ~etn. ani level was not. a v, ery bl.·g 'level. '['hey were 00clI: in. yKli~awa with a Iml£ division of marines. I think you 'h!,.v.e if;O\'b.,:e·,.r4~hst~o:;r t.,N,nlt, i,t w,.",Hl,,'be. ,·\I,~.on."g, .d".ay, ,in hEi11 h,efore

bAmerloan,grolliid tt'60Ps,go inti> Sou:t"li,lea~t,~slil ititd.·.pro, babl)' should ~ , .. . I don,it t~~k we \t~ kiddirgthe ,Ohin~se',to gob~ck to why they

'\V~~ there int~e, ~rst,Plac~. 1:1001), 1i:~sli: 'IV~S afrlli4o( the.:<Jlr!nese m.' ,ov~ng t~r.o. ~ 'S" ou'thel!~t,'~, ',~ si.1li •. , ,W, '.' \'1,;:':.1,.+ 'IV,' ~., I)r6. (no~ ,a£., raId, ,0" f ~he C, h, m. es,.' e .. ' :~vt~fre~W)i\ ~6/lil~~a~ :~~ WI'Y r~ ~ ;?~ V~:},t?, ~¥P~, ~~~u:t whyt~/jy

1: dis.!\gr<l8#it\l't.1i~:j'lip~Ji\lSfo j{lic,'Wdi',\, h. ed*, :Wl\.Iill~t, iWill'th,' Ii .1~l?", aness ib.'te"rtlst ~bl!tllV~ nuclllil1' We!i~!lRsal;\sr\~' )!i~il';\lh~l~ l~ad~nt th lI),they Itr~gQl,\g,Wha'l\~therli· )W¢'q!W:!'~'e''l-tl6;l!lp9,~ri:lqris tl1ld' ou~ t)Wh Jwe1ipons'th~t~'lihtl. 'i'£ .~on:'t'iliitki~M\! ,~Hfure:iiCe''t'h~yd.on't want 'Yeapons now, It IS a politlC!1l probl~m,,If~e w,/re th<)r~:ornot th~re It: would not matter. They h!1ve I!-n:~~fittide"tbwMd','I/;u:61lfar .. w~ripons 'th:l:t l' tlllnk 'Wls tolhlf to ~~ '~!l#I, 'd.!iier~W)lisW·dv'elicblhe,

, .·(jUnJ~i~:'! i ){f·.'i'J;to'iJ'~I'.,"""·

19

and when they get them they are going to use them in their own inter-est as,e:very country. ,

Mr. HAMILTON. Would you station troops in any Southeast Asian ootintryi

Mr. PINOUS. My own instincts are that once you have a firmjolicy, ana-tional policy, ,wd you 'set it you begin an orderly phase with­drawal; that is, a-nnounce,almown geal and a known purpose. You can withdraw all~eUild troops, I think, 00 Okinawa.

I 'lVould thInk the Philippines in the future are going to cause us great trouble. I think the ,day of American troops all over ,the world is gone.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much. I apologize to both of you for leaving and also to theohairman.

Mr. NIX. I understand, certainly. Mr. du Pont. Mr. l'>U PONT. Thank Y(}II, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Pincus, I, like Mr. Hamilton, ,enil,eyed your testimony, but there

is one strain or theory that I detect in your conversation that you never really specified. Y:ou talked about destroying a part of Laos and turn­ing it into a refugee zone. Am I right that you somehow feel that we should not haye done that, that somehow we were impinging on the people by doing that I

Mi'. PINOl1S. Laos hecame a tool in the Vietnam war for us. The North Vietnamese were using the HoChi Minh Trail, which was not tlhroughtbe hea'l't of Laos, it was away from the people's zone. If you 11:0 hack in the hri.sooryof bombing Laos, you w, iU find that we initially tried to get the Royal Laotian Government to bomb the North Viet­namese on the ,trail and ,that in order then to get their permiSSion for us to bomb the trail they 'asked if we would perform what they euphe­ll)'Listiaaliyoalled ,armed reconnaissance in Nerth' Laos, which' essen­tially was the Pathet Lao territory. The Communists were fighting with the Royal Laotian Government) again 'another civil war,sitU'ation. 'f,ll\l,t,armed nooonnlll4lsance was usmg' ftghter-bornbers which to me yo,u J>;!IO.w i ~~, ;sLi;ghtLy ,different than' the &thetLa" ,on the ground; l,'~,' IteQ,llt£h.":,:f, ,Ol'lI\o£ d;estruc, tjqn ,lin ip,laees 'W,her,e, 'Ver ;we t~~ught there W,$l!e l?,l}~het, Jilaos, whri.ch ,were essentl'O,ll,y, the ;town~ and, Cltles. '

Mr. DtT l~oN'~. I 'am .fishing fer sO\llethmg here :that I am /lot makin.g v~ry cl~"';j'~ 1Illdel'atandth« military ,~rg\ltrlent, andyo1VifeeJ.ing that ina.y~ni,ihtarily, we should ,not have dOlle it, 11.\1.(00 ,yOR J¥l,y.e, Ii, feeling 114!1t '~Il4id.n't d!lal,~airly \)l,iph ~he~' , ,e\lPl~lY"Hi¥l~mto$u,gg6f!~ i.,nyour l!eX\W'l(~.thltt somel;l/j\w, eV,~lJ.t4o., ' rt)i\\Qp,y'~ll'l,~, en,trr,e\l1\, \lilt, eq", ~t,.tllat I\<'l:\llph!lw:weshonld,npth~v!ld~.~ '''''';'''[(1).(;'''':;,, • " ",' : )(,M~" .l?U!.CtJ13. ,WeI1, I th!!l"~~'~s: 'll;'!17.\fIWl'\~ElP "w\WY, MIll (fov;~ment l'\Illq.~~j;ed, ' It'',1'\le,Gii,' '1\,'", rI)l'il~lI,tw, If},,~, ;.w;:llqW~r ~,~!E!!, :lWA ,~f, i'~~ u., ,.SS,' • ~)!-I?',' Ji)!lI%,. There IS no, .conni,ry;·m the:W,\iilf<j;th\\;flt4llIijmj;~~9\t!l~ !has J:iad

, or at least at thtit£ime 1ia~.ti· t1gbwr?pn~r4l:Ml}p.fl,'~,l}I~;YAw"",i~, :t~, e Laos , Government, and w~ gave them more m'i'p,~Yi'Mj[}llj'#t,\try a)d than

thl!Yc,' "ha,d,o, fgro~" ~atl,'o, ~l, ,p,.r,.041j()~."",,; ,. p, ' ,""',"I,I'..!..,' '::,dl (" ',', ',,' , ',llhel:j"OBw.ar~as,l~:a: d~re.pn lnt~r~~ ~M;;2~:y!\re,flgntlUg

over control o~ the, countryh;\f.r)/.trp)..o~ ,'e, \W¥Ii1i@1M't!~jffi'p,,\1rtan,t ?~. cause o-f the control,of thetrall, a-n.l: we ftmy61'v;e~l#bb:¥.ll.ghtJUIh­tarily. I mean th/l,hi!IM~~!.ffiiIlJlq~~e ;r!~on'tWiW1ll!1MY, caJWet vj>r~ much.

&~¥~~<t::iy:e~::r~~,J\~;'¥ ~~M.~~~~. ,9~~~~~~/;Y:rthe,~0~h Vle~:

20

Mr. DU PONT. The final questron in the chain is; do we consider in making our. foreign policy decisions, and in this . case our military, foreign policy decisions, simply dealing with the government· in a given country, or is there some other responsibility to take into consid-"ration I .

Mr. PINous. There is one other elementvhat is mil<3ing in all this .and that is when you say "we". In the Laos Government you reaUy don't have to worry about the people. You deal with the King, and maybe you deal with the general, but this is.notright. That decision to go into Laos and to bomb in Laos, and in effect to fight. in Laos, was made in this country in the same manner as it was made in that coun­try. It was made by the Government and by tJhemilitary; and I over­emphasize that because I have heard people talk 'about the beauty of that system, but it is not the system. . '.

If in this country the President had done what I think constitution­ally he was supposed to do, which was to explain to the ·public and to the Congress what he was doing, and get 'authority to do it, then I think you would be in a much stronger position to tllJlk 'about our going ahead. But because it was done the way it was done, I think we made policy that the public could not support and didn't support, 'and that is the basis of a lot of our problems.

Now, in all these countries we essentially deal with either a democ­racy or an undemocratic country. We are dealing with their leaders. You cannot avoid that. Certainly in many countries the leaders doh't represent the interests of the people. In some caSes it is enlightened 1eadership, and in some cases it is not.

Mr. DU PONT. But in those cases we still have to deal with it any­wayl

Mr. PINOUS. Yes, but the corollary of that is that is not the situation here. . '.

Mr. DU PONT. Absolutely; . Mr. PINous. I think in any ldnd'of debate or discussion.that would

have come up. If that is debated and discussed and it is'decrdedwe then ~ant t.o go ahe~d and do that-in Laos, then Ithirrkyou know that !,ssen~Ially IS the polley. You .accept t~atltnd try:t? turIY1t ariiund.'!:he Idea IS not .that you conceal It. That 'stheoff~ns'~e part.," '. '. ".

Mr. Dl! PPl>/T. Iappreciatel:he very Ehtlosoph~cal dH!~ussion; and what I want~d ,to heary<;m say ..yaB. what you JUst.sald, that you really do have to deal with thembecauss thlW are elected or established leaders of thecounti'Y:'$d.ofterr ill o.ur foreIgn pol1cydebate youlhear the theme that you would. not,deaJwith Hie go~ei'hnl\jnt, it ',doesn't represerit' th~ peopl~.lt ~a:salw.a;ys be~h one of' myth\lllries tflat yOU must deal Flth ;IV hOllyer IS runmng the couhtryitnd leave the mterrral

. repreE!8ntation t.o thepeople.themselv~s. ''From your vantagepoinb I was mterested my()~tt~inkmg~ '1;h,a,?-k you.' . .' ,. .'..... . '.

Thank you, Mr. Chalrm'an.· , . '. ....... . •. ' ,,' .. . . . . Mr; NIX:. M,r.Pincus, you m.ent\ol.lWea:Hie:t~haf.'l'e'should have

.. natlOnall!,!hcy, andafter.)I'14ch w~$h()uldarrlv<, atthe method of the phasedwlthdra..yal. Do y,()li te\llfl), that! . .' ' .

Mr. Pm01;1s. Yes. .' ".,.. '.' ' .' . . ¥r. Ntx:: How woU~<l'you ~rriveil:t'lt natioD:Q;I,poIicy I . .', . .

M:, P:rNOU~ .. 'I think you go thr01,1l5h the functIon of having ~h(l PresIdent dehvera message. There IS a state of the world. l,thlilk

21

the implementatiol)..of P91~cy',su\l)las,~h\'t i.f. the p . .oli~y:i~ ?pen.ly dis­cussed and .openly debated IS then mpher appr.ove<;l.or dlsappr.oved based .on the actions.of the Congress.. .'. . ,', ' ,

Mr. NIX. Theny,.ou would expect the president, as he is,required to d.o, to iW'.ormthe CongresS ari<;l ,tlje country or 'the natiQnal p.olicy that,he, suggestil f.or. ~he COUllt~ and that natiQhal PQlicy is deb~ted in theC.ongl'ess .of the United Statesll;ndthe pe.ople.oH):le Umted States win c.ommuniQite.'their ,wish~totlje Members;of the CQngress, the, con,sensus wi I} ¥,II-rrived,,:~jn the C<ingre~ QHhe United States, }Vlpch m"turn Wlll,betransm1tted t.o tlie,I:'.esldent bef.oreanythmg IS Implemented. ,"" ", . . '

Mr. PINC'!1S" This all ~ec.ogI\izes, th\'t the P~esi,dent ,has extraordi­nary educatIOnal p.owers m terms .of b.oth the publIc and the C.ongress, andH he cann.ot convince theC.ollgr'eSs.on the,J;Ilerits.of his argument and ap.ythingelse he wants to,oh.o.ose to ulje tl),en r w.ou~<;l think that tJ:ere is something· II\jSf!ing, ~n e~tl:er, ¥.s, ,p.olicy . Or his I"billty to, c.on-vmee pe.ople that thatrs the rIght dlrect/Qn to g.o. ., ,,'.

Mr. 'NIX. Then WQuld y.ou say that something is missing in' the times in which we are living i' , .., .. "

Mr. PINCUS. N.o d.ou!>t. , . .' ' Mr. NIX. Mr. Paul, could yQU give usthe benefit .of yQur thQughts

Qri thwt,i.. '",,' . ', ,., ' Mr. PAUL. As to what Mr. Pincus had tQ say in general,'or just the

lastquestiQni. '" '. ,. " " Mr. Nu;. N.ott4~,W:tq1,lestIOn., '." " . ,'" ' Mr. PAVL. hppre~}atethat.,· , Mr. NIX. ne p,eople ,.of the CQl)Utl'y Illake me a ware .of their thinking

.on the last qUestIOn. : .. . , Mr. PAUL, Very gQod.' " ." Mr. Chairman, I dQ have'sQme reservati.ons ab.outa few .of the CQn,

clusi.ons that Mr. Pincus drew in temis, of various items. I will be v~rybriet" ' .. '.' ,'. ' ' .. ' .

O.on~erning L\,Qs,oneQftli~;?enefits:wh.\~h tpe subc0!llmit~ee which Mr. P.lncus 1\Jl~ ~. M<;l. the ,prIVll~ge ,Cif Jiemg s~ff to <;lId brmg. to ~h" !'ttentlOnCif theAm~rycan .peQt>I~ ;What,was gOIng .on III LaQs, I thl,:,k ~t wa. s tQ th. e cre41t6'ftli~t Syn!m~ton sUbCOmII\ltteethat pr . .oper dls­clQs,}re,'was ma\'la and sh.o'11d hav~ been m~deandt agl'ee with that. I~ dId not destr.oy .or termm'?-t~ the .ope~aW~n, and the .operat.i.on c.on­tl,!lUei/. S?YQU can have pUb~IC mf01'1?atl,.on aste;> theseoperatl9ns and ~l~l n.ot make an overCQmmltlI)ent; It must be (l.onellal'(lfully. There was1ioo much visibility"which we ,terided£ofa~>in the 6a)rly 1geO's,

President Kennedy Qncesaid'all6ut Uaos,"Our security runs with th!\t ,?f:Laos." That was a teri:i!Msta~l'neI\tt()rp.a~~, r~.ould submit. 'l',hat .kind of overenthusiitsm IIQout wHat we are domg IS wr.ong. But tile disclOSed transcnpt Of our liearings.-:.and it was well repQrted in the presse-was very good. , •.. ' ','... ..... . ' . . • .

It Oli tb,e legafright:s t.o intiirvenevis-a·vis Camb.odia; I WQuid say

th.e}J . .ongre.s.'s ShOUl.d ... hlt. ve its .. r.o.le: A, .~ lQn.g,.as the Gu .. J£ .of TQnkin res. ' 0.­lutIOn was .on thehoojrs, the mVa:BlOn .of CambodIa was legally ,aF" prdprJate .llI\der .our constitutional system. . . "" . '.' .

Thll l)roblem with LaOs w,asthr!t:thl;it which was goinlLon in north-ern U!>iHeally was very iridirecf!1;\1'related to the war in Vi(!tn\i;ln, and, therefore, may nQt have b~Al!1 justiffed -by the., cQngtessi0.uitl acti.on

22 t~kenin th'eG"Ho£' Tonkin r~olutiqh, anti' to thrut extent it was not appropriately in a legal' mold; ...'

My,relllarks went, to, the ~tra~e$ic rofe. l'it resolving ~he~ ~ard questIOns, these blll<Jdy questlons, In, ~rms o~ w~ether It IS J.u~tlllied or not" you (1.1ways ha",e to count· bodIes and· est"1$ates of' bodIes .(}j! how many Laotians. lire g,oing to be killed, and 'how maliy Americans ar~ !l;oingi to be kilJed',.and yOl1 have to weigh that against how many would' have been killed if we. didn't do anything. After you weigh t1ul;t, th.t;n you have to weigh it agJriI.lJlt ~he American inte~est. The mterp$ m Laos was to Jl:oop the Commlmlsts oft' of the 'Fhal blJl;d.j,r, and to facilitate Ou~ hombiIJ.g the. Ho .Chi Minh Trail, which related to' Vietnam. These were very important interests and other lives' were saved. '

I know (}n the HUI was not very wen received in th<>se days. Walter

1 F.inallY.", on. CambodilJ" a'.S.fa.r as. th. e incursion. was concerned. ,Wh. icl\:

and I were here at that time. 1;he lIves hI' South Vietnam that were saved and. the 8uo<leBS of the American military operation in Vietnam was enhanced by that, and thos.e were important interests.

Mr. NIX. I see. DnvoIJ. b.ave any comments on that, Mr. Pincus! Mr: PINOus. No; just let it rest for the present. Mr. NIX. I take it that is, because you are in perfect agreement

wit.h it,

1 Mr. PINCUS. No; I have a hard time thh,l,kiug first that the invasion

of O!>mbodia was a military success, and l3ec<>nd, that we have really bre", very creative in Vi.etnam. at all, J.lprdo I think "' .. e .. were ~ictorious. I thmk we !rot out as we could have gotten out 8 years earlIer.

Mr. NIX. Now let us say the Cambodian incident had some justi­fication to it. When the coJ.l;flict spilled over into Ltws, if the military j.ust;ifiedit,then· who could gainsay that.!. .'

Mr, PINOUS. Well, this fits into something else that Roland men­tioned of noncol,Umi~rnent.Th!) alllil».dmj\~ts thQ,t prohibited'Amedcan t~oops from gomg mto I;aoii' and. Thailand came '¥I a result .0£' our dlscl0sures ru\)put the, Ll¥ls Ip.votveW:ent, and, We .. )j1ould have had a simi.lilr amendment toCaJll:bodi(l.lmt Carnbodia'IYl\Ii)leutr. ~l Il-tthe (imll we passed the. ar$t one, T1i/ffl~. 1jI0nci)mJ;llitmentS" in. elfect you h,l).d J;'eaahed a point whew, you reaJly hail,'to prohibit the military f rnTY1considedng.that oPJe~lJ,tjol,l,,··.. . . What I 9,1lI gettipg at is, the U.S. military did,not pe.rticipate in the SOli\tjJ. Vietnamese h\vasion.otLl),o~, and, aCQond)'ng to.Se~retary J<!IIird,. it was. p'd~ly. b\llj~lls~ th~re.was ,lllgis~lI~ol,l,' on ,~he books tjlat did pr.oh1blt It. '.1.:he' leg~s.~t\tlOIJ.i;l\l8ij nQt. PI;ohlh).t anytlnnp, ... What it sa:ys is., that the .I1re¥d.en.t hll!lfO,. ,g9~IIt.rlth. qrit.y, .. f.h.·' ,.o,th~f.:.lI'i' r~. iq.,he. PresldeI.lt has to hv,e up,to hls.,l\?llstiBut!PlW1 ~mulreWffl.' .g!\1<tjl)g the CO'ngress to approve a warHke action hef@1;~'4eq\\lit\l>1j;ei,'!Jona6ll we essenti,ahly WafI' doil)gili} sp.mwe.f'l:wr.itmg;.wl\I!'R~\t't1tY:qqp.YJliQllght was th. II staini .. 8 .q.'1.o. The (lfl:eqt '\'i 9. !tvmg.t .... h.llt ~!p~~\ttlOn Q,l1.tM ... li>. oo~ inI-aos~!>S that the.lJ)ilita)jqoll!#,.jiQt thin\< o#t,1Jf! 1\ prot~cJ~v.!i I!;'(~ion becaus. e It was. proh .. iblted ~ecM.I. ~~' .. f. p.~. 'K .. ,ws~~n()~(I\i. out.tq, PR1'l.,.jl, hac),. ,to Oongr,ess. ,I ~aPPIlI), ~ l1el.i,:v:e,tJ?a~,OIp; militil:~J! was; creljtIv.s ~no'ugh t.o ,4~Slgn.., the1T,p14IJJIlng,t'j> r,nt\1i'e.I.~ ntwhate.ve~ ,th~ la;w: T\lll1l1r.es. ,Mr.NIl\'"A.ndthatw,a~dc;>p.e! '. '. . ",',.,.. . Mr. PINous. And that was done.' '.

23'

. Mr. Nix .. Anq, r;,ensid~~ing that it Wf\S c;lone,~llf\t is that decision violativeoH"" .', ..' . . . '.

Mr .. Pu.Gus.' Well, the dooision was to stay onto Hail they g<)ne into Laos after the, ClIJllboi/i,l),n inyasion" had Am:erican ground troops gone into Lf\os,m violatiil)ll)£.t!l;e law--. . '

Mr. NIX. What r am: 'talking about 'is they devised a method to circul)lVenUI)0 decision. ' . .. '., .

Mr. PIN,jUS.W~ll . wAat tl)ey did was to semfVietnaniese ,~roops into. Llips. a,rmed by Im:erica. We1b maybe thi.s is a )?ltradox, and that is, the same, "lay I :feel IIP@,ut t\l.e ()ambQdian invaSlOn:. The intent of Congress was to m:ake the' President come to Congress if he wa.S' to undertake acts of which the Cambodian invasion was case N Q. 1. '],he fact that the Congress has not be8n--'

Mr. NIX. Wasnot-,- . Mr. PINCUS. Was not far looking and did not prohibit it. You \vere

in a situation where when Congress and the President do engage in games-and I think we had gone through a period in which Congress by these kinds of amendments is trying to reassert rights it gave up.' The administration has taken all this authority to go do these things, and I think you are now in a situation where you have to get them back.

Mr. NIX. I think Congress is acutely aware of that fact. Mr. PINOUS. I hope so. Mr. NIX. And I think actively engaged in an effort to reassert its

prerogatives, its powers and authority, its constitutional responsi­bility. I am convinced of that.

Mr. PINOus. Exercise essentially like this. I guess I keep reem­phasizing the gathering of information other than the information fed to you. I mean it is information basically~because I am a jour­nalist I believe information is essentially power, 'and I think your channels of information should not just be those that the administra­tion sets up for its benefit, that yO'll have rights and in some ways responsibilIty to develop your own channel and thereby have a way of weighing and challenging the information given to you.

Mr, NIX, Mr. Paul. Mr. PAUL, Mr. Chairman, there is no argument here as to the riEht

of the Congress to participate in these decisions. But what has oeen implied here that should not go unchallenged is that it is the cor­rectness of the decision to preclude these activities. Certl\inly Con­gress should participate in the decisions of waror no war, definitely. The question that I addressed myself to you, I\S a representative of the Congress in making that decisionbis that some of these operations are perfectly proper and highly desira Ie.

I don't know that it was necessarily wrong to preclude American air support to the South Vietnamese forces that went into the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. I would remind you, if I may, that South Viet­namese forces with American air support were highly effective to repel the North Vietnamese ~pring' offensive of 1972 in which the Nort4 Vietnamese sent out of their country virtually all of their' ground forces and gained little. 1

If there was an American interest in not losing Vietna,m, and I honestly disagree that Vietnam has been lost-and if you just look at who is in control there now, I think you will appreciate that-

24

then, the forces to maintain that s)lOuld not be so shackled as to pre­clude tnat;It h~'to'be'done in nieasured steps. We have a tendency to overreact... . . . . "

T~il. overoonunitI1wnt to Vietnam In. 1965' was . a/histake, so now we are way over on the other side and ",6 .canrrot do anything militar­ily, q~rt!,in people suggest. I think aUlore"ln.oQulatedreliponse is approprIate. .' ., ".' .... '.', . Mr .. NIX. G,entlemen; I "jVant to, exprllasthe,.gratitude ,of the .sub­

Co. =, " tt.ee fpf. yo~r p.res~n.e~ .. X~lUh .. av. e,.:bee~l1'l.,.osrhetp.:fu .. l;W~a. r~.pot !l~tuaI1y gro.p)ng m th~ .d!l~JI: .• I;tLtlllS sUP,cQmrtnt(:ee,and mthese hear­mgs, bu.fI (!d c~>1lfess that It IS not va,st~1).t\1iltht. We are trying to do the best we possIbly can. .' . . ", . . . . ,

Mr; PAUL. Thank you; '. "',.' . '. Mr. NIX. The subcollllllittee is adJoumed;' , '. .

" [Wl1ereupmI,at 3 ;40,1l'1U; the,s~b~0'Amittee,.~?j?urnea.]·

:, :'.

OUR, POMM~1'M}lNTSIN .ASIA . ' - . iii

WEDNESDAY,' lItAlICR 20. 1974 '

• ., 'HO~SE OJr;J}lil'~SJilN'rA~B;./. .,' " .• ' .', i' '. QO¥~I:rTji)E ON.]),Ol)EIGN ~MJ!B, •

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PAOII[l;q.~Am~" .' W fJ1JhimJgton, D.O.

The su:1:Jc6mm1ttee lUeD 'at~2' JD.ln. 'in l'o(iffi 1[-236, thl:\ CIliRitol, Hon. Robert·N, e.,Nix (,chaiv.'!'111KP~ the sul>\'<lmm~ttee) ·pr~hling.

Mr. Nm.f4e~u~II':n:"t~~(')Vi)lc,9~et? orQ.e~t' ,.,. , l '" c': ' .. i Today we are contmumg our h.earmg~ on the questIon as to wnether

or not o\\r. baile·system ill. Asia is.tied.to mHitary needs or political inertia. . , '

Whatever militIWY Fole tiw United ,States.cqntinuesto play inAsia, it will be tied toa naval long range role with primary relil\n~ ona developirlg .nfJ,Va)., ;miflSile capab.iLity, ,Ithal\i1lready ,I)een n()ted by informedob.flelfYers PhatAmericaJ;i policy in. Asiaqan be ana).yzed by observing tlw, ID()YceJ.Uellt of the 7thFJest fr()m the Pacific tQthe Indian Oceal!-. Ye~!,w,e,lUl\J.ntaillAO,OOOior so footsoidiers in,Sollth Korea, anatlPn i\'Hth!lE,I\"lI!edr'fo~~e ofjts own of over 630,000 or 200,000 mora menthl\lil the entl~e.Ilrltls1l4\.rmy. " , "" .' ' ...

We 'maintain 38,000 men in the Okinawa area wh~ch, is.part of Ja­pan and. 1.\\OOOW ... eni:n.the.,home ... is.la.nds.fJap.an,which i.s,thethird greatest, incl,ust,ial nation, ,mltintains an a,rmed force: :o.f :)59,000 by spandingol)lY li parcllntafits gl'oss,natiol,ul<l.prodllct.· :',' .

Thlls wa, mailltaill •. 98,POOm~ll ilJ. ~alJ. area .wh~re Qllra,lli~s already have a.forc~of,thair o\yn'ofover 80Q,000 man with tha ca,pa~it.Y to·eil:sily douhle~that lllllUber .. Japanha.sa ,popula,t)on OT 106milllon, whila South Korea has a popUlation of 33 milUon with a militia which: wo1lld double it.s army. . . ' • We,-.supporta cOntingent;o£ 35,0.o0.!Jlenin Thail!lnd attach~d tQ ,our bO!ll1;l~r,'bases which do not pr.ot~.ct_ Thailan<ilhlltar.estationlld,there for possrhla bombing missions in South. Viatnam which is forbidden hY'all: act of ·COllgreSS .. Of coursa, ,Qongress could change its -mind­Ido1!ht,it,howevar., At the' sllime ,tima jt:~h;9l11d.l;le PQil\ted 01lD that s1!ch,bom1;>jng%'uadbe~carriad 01lt. from-Guam and was duri!lg the South Vietnam war.. "!~. .: , ," "i.".

The ,QnlY\lOncl]1.sioJ;l.thatcanhe drawn then is.that ourmenare in place infol'Wardpositierii!oin Asia ae hosta,ges, standing bond for our word which has· bean established. already with 100,OQO. del,lthsill' the Korean war and the South YietlJ,amwar. Thl!lf;is;"onlythe.ide~ths of Americans .will insureollr dafen8~. of .others. ;It $bould also. be obvio1lSthat. thEiV:,lted S~!liteS has the I?ng,rangeCiJ,I1~city .topunish from .the mld·Pawfic, any aggressor Without ·the'need for forward bases. .

(25)

26

This subcommittee at least can frame issues for tJ,e American public so that it can decide the real value of the tripwire or hostage theory. "Ve can also inquire when the time comes whether or not we are now in for~ard position~ in Asia i,; order ~o reass!,re t~e People's. Repu~lic of Cluna that we wIll take theIr part m COnfl,ct wIth the SovIet Uruon. We are well awaue,that ,new missions.can.be,thought of for old bases. If theyha ve been, we would Iike:to·know whattheY1l.re.

It seems at the'outset that lOO,ODO,ft.roericans could be hrought home with no loss of defense to us or our allies.

Our witness todayis liIon: ~,~erin, farmer Deputy Assist­ant Secretary of Defense, and ,a Senior Associate of Dr. Kissinger with the National Security Coonc1L

Thissuooommitteei'Sind<eed pleased to have Dr. Halperin before us. You nniy!procse'd. , .. ' , ", " , .

SIri&Tlll'4p:r Om' wmTON ,ltI:'IIi.M.Pl:BlN, .FeHER !ilEPUfItASSIST­ANT 'BEOB,ETl\RY . 'OF DEi!'l!lNSE . AND'SEl'lroJi. AS$OCIATE OF ~F.NRY:s,:ISSUlGER .'AT' Tn'E1q'A1I;OI~$1llOtt1t'I't'f 'CQUNCIL

. IMr. HaLPERt",.1'l'hank you, Mt.'Ch>liirman. It is myp~easure to be herp. '

TllIive ... short statement and I would, with your· permission, propose ta ~citd it.

1 'reifi;g~"1le~ukf<Yl"~he oP1?ortumty'to participaMin these hearings on , U,1S."dMense ic<!m'jtn'itmellts 1n 1\:.ia. A C)I'J'eftl'llook at this ·s1Xbject i. clang )(}\Terdue'n<Jt a!'lly beilaul!Ei the United Stats$ eohtinullS to Spend 'billions ()f'dolllal'13ea<lh.yea~ to fulfll~ secllt'i'fiy 'Commitments in Asia but ,alllO'becausethO'M commitments ha,ve em'b)!oiled uS'ill two major, lI!i1itary conflicl:$and a number of othehlrlses ahd cou;1deasily do so a/r9:irt III th,,'ftit1iilll." ','

''rhere wte anUrirber of elements (}four defense commitments in Asia ·of !&elttsi~fi.oortce, including the measur~' nooessM'y to 8ust~n our relations 'WIth J1>pam,tlie 'future'of 'our rlllltti(lns' with Korea and the

',,!,,htF ppines; 'and th\\"fll'tuIie of the American coml)lit!"ent to :Tai wall III lIght ofour)'}:ew .rtilations with the People'S Repl1hhc OfC/ilria,. H I do' not: ·addTess theSe questious, it is not beMUse o:f' ~heir lac!> ofim­pov~l>lI~indeed, I would be hwPPJ' to reSpond to "lu'~stions, about them. .," '., , 'm view of tHe Ihni~ed timeavaila:ble, it seemed ~bme8ipprot>riat,e to foo'u:~ ona single questiOn Mid one <;mwl;Iich T hl\vea preciserecol)l-'mertdaltion. " " , ., ", '

'My 'subject is SEATO. And my adl'ice, to put it simply, is thdt tl;Iti UnitMStatss 'sh'ould Setlkt6 'l1egotiatsan 1m.;! ,to the treaty; Fail­itig)'I!h!lt;' we'sh@uld ~'V'e the 1-yoor 'notice''6£ ren®eiation ,C~p~ifled in article X) and wIthdraw., ' ,', .:"... ,d '" ,', '.

, 'SEATO/wlt~',,,,lie:lof the rMu,\ts"hf,"t'h¢ "pap'lJl)mallra} oHhe.·1950's. 'I'he'~ot(th\lli:st, !kfliw,Cbllective De:t'llhse I'!J1'PM<fly'was siWietl irtManlIa, 'S~pt.ember"8, 1\\5'<),; ta~d;tatfflc .. tiori!ldvi~ed,''bY th~ U.S. Sen9Jts on l1'EilJl')la't;:Yl; '~Ill),5,"'IlJ!ie ;he~ty provides! ~hat:, ,,, I ..,,' ," "

,·Eli'd~ (>a~jy r~cJ(!I1.1.~~k' t\ia{ !;gh~S!llori b;;m~aps, of. a~eii:"'~tack In <the t"e",ly. #.It !"galnsb an:rol the ·Partlesor agalnllt any ·.State, "rterrltory wltlch

; th'e''-,parlies 'by ·una:nim:ona "a:gi:l'~eDlent 'may, belleaiter; desftgnIttei 'would endanger its own peace and safety, and agree that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional procednres.

.27

The lJnited Stl'tes immediately issued an "understanding" limiting its ~mmitrnentto "Comnnmist a;ggression." , , For the United States the treaty was seen as necessl'r;), to $hore up 8@l1titeast .Asia in light of the success ,of the Sino-Soviet bloc in gain­ing oontrolof.pant. of Vietnam: .At Arnerica!1 urging, Laos, Cambodia, and.the ":Ilree tenrltory" of V,etnam Wffi'll Included as so-called pro­,tocol,stJa,tes proooated by the tu~ty. China-Red China-was seen as a tool of Soviet aggression. SEATO w'as,neceSSl>ry to p.revent the dllmmoe!l,il'OmialliJ;jg. , . . ,Much ,lmsqhl'nged since the treaty was signed but unfortunately, .. wther than """'sider renouncing the treaty, the administration re­affipms its .aupPQrt for it 'and for the I'\pecial meaning it has come to hav<I. The ,signiliicant changes ,a/focting the meaning of the treaty as it was ,ratlifiedhy the Senate.andsllPported by appropriations from the Congress include: The Sino-Soviet split; The SlIlo-Arnoncl'n reap­pl'oo1mment and ,the .han~ Amencanperception of Pekin's aggres­siveness; .. udthe post-Vietnam ,reevaluation ·of American .interest.. in ~utheRst Asia. . , " , .

'il1hese ®ll-lIl.ges areim1'Ortant to any'teev,aluation of the importance ,0£ SEATQ ' but ,so .are other changes less ,clell-fly "'nderstood.

Most Qf the memhersofSEtA'rOJo.a,ve withdrawn from the Organ i-,zation,withViQ;lj\'m.g.degrees of'formaJitiY. . . " '.

pj).kistan has iQrml'Hyrenounced Jl!lembership in 197a. \F.rq.nee, hItS lcmg, been inactivilaIJ.Q. ,pay~ nQ funds toward the sup-

"port ",f, th~,miwm\tlcommon orgll-ns. '. . 'I,a,os and CambQdia; h.,tvl\ ,renounced their status as ",protocol"states. The Philippines l!ely primarily. on its bilaterll-ltreaty w,ith the

U nited,8j;ates. " ' " , ", , " . . ,'. .' . G're!tlrBllitai,n ,remains ,I' member out of (le£erence, .to, U,s. inter~sts

,but ihas<$t!lted i~~;ilJ,tention not t@ deploy,ol1'en,gage~s military force~ east of Suez.' . ". , ..

That leaves the United States and Thailimd.For all intents·and pnrposesSEA TO is now a bilatera].seeurity'pay,t providing ill Amer­,~oan 'g1];a)lantee ,of Thai " security agaip.st QI)m,fflul).ist· inv~sion, or ,6UPVergI<;>Il. . " "., ",: ,,' ''''i, , ", ','

. 4merican, military and ,civili~'ltliciaI~ h.lI;v~ long rVie.w'~H-. SEAT!) ~n'lus~ these teTIUS. Th~s,!t~~.:EorfII!'I'<:~~l~tl"P1'lpOIJ¥lliFtr,"r$tudv of CQllill4utments ' ~"elll~,)Thar: ll-l;ldAml)Pf'IIA ;!»'i1~t\l{lW·!!lI~jJJ).,ere. Ji~ ve d~Il-'\'ffi "'P '~utw~"n:.'Cy,<p.lal4s ,~oo;'J.~I\Ijt~~I';\,IjliAA. f.I'N:.,. '.' l'i'll!?~I\> ... .t~<!.,.n~.'Il))P.Jp­matlCaJily, SEtA TO ... ""as., "t .. UI;M.. q, ,~l\ti\\:lltl !WJl:t"l~~.ffi'/la,y,mil~~" .~. ,!s"l>;­Thlllhat co:m.mU~lque :0£~1I;l'i\l ((\,; ;L9.6~,\rp.r~h,q.t r!,<g,\,~)lhithe, l1iI)~t~~ St";tes,,,sser,~ed that lte., .wIll!'. at'O)1,.up-.. ~~11 i;Ii.~f1tr.e ~!th.Y .. ,,~~~~AA .'. ,es. n. ot 'd~ .. p.,e.llil ,UPQU the pl'llQragreem%J,t,of;aU,t;,l;\Ii:'P1'!lM'iPilf!1t!WI"tp,lJl;ie treaty, !MOO this.4'!"\ty ol;>ligatiqn.is ,in:dt~¥1)H\lr, ~;,W;$}l\."J;;~l;Wciflv~?~· +:n: ;M:i),p~~

. agam m. July of 1969, :jec;etary o~. S. tate .vvI!l.ialXl)1Q~ .. f.~Jl'~4lJif!U~,a <thll-t Rusk,T:hall!>t c9m,w1llm\1ue all\L:lt,,~~ill$ Aille,pca1!l;P0B'lt',o 9;1' at l,:"st the.pohcy of the e>:ecutive.bmnch.. . '. :'! Lin)' ')t' .,:,

. . It .sh0ul~ ,~!notedthat P,res~<ilient ,I\f~l'PIl, w.iP'I~entmg)\l~f.~oy~rme !Itt Gu:'l'm'~IJ..,'~9~Q,:S. t.~. ted :ilpeQ], .. fi.,cal1y"t .. h. at. ,'~.'w.'\\ :;Wl.Jl('lf~~fM.I'~. "\Rffil'tr. com!ll:'~IjIJ.~1!lte, ,Olilr"trea~,y .cP,lIlm.'tf\lllllu<"fw'd'l" .. !. p~~. uWWi. ,'.\;hlilf!/}. i1a under SEATO," And m his 19'13 Report rffill· ;?fl:J!; elgp;;'~A1icy, Presiii1ll1l~ ,N~l\!I>Pf Jl'~~rme\1,Phwt ':'t)W' V-\'\ite%. J '~~n't~~p '~n ite treaty commltmente;" and ne contmue~~'~I\$, Il,-m'l't I;rp~jPFl,*,Wle, lljIi\~ . ..

28

as a m~tter of p~eserv'ing:t~esta~ilit'yof:Asia,w~made'itele~r:that the U,\utecl States would,n~\ierrepud1!~te Its pledged "%rd nOl'betray an ally;", : ", .:, '"" ," . " .' . ,'" : .' . ' '. '

Thus we are told thatc6mmltments, once made, must bemMntained forever. Regardless o:l'h()w, th~ worlc1's and our' perceptionof,it may change, we,mllstnot "be£r!1Y" ,0urttIlies. And Congress and' the Amer­can pu~Iic ')-re ,asJied' ,:,o~: t,?"r,e!)udijtte" ~'multilateral J;>ledge even though ,thasbeen turned ItitO a bilaterai'treaty,' ,','"'' ' •. '

Plainly th~ United Sta!es , has a, rig4.t to recohsider'i~~onll)1.it" mentE! \,s every sM.edoes."~.etray":I" mlght,?c?urIf,ha,vlll~' no'ti re­nOUliced SEATO, we refused t,?,esptmd when the ThaIs called, for help, 1M to give ,warning now tl\linhe United'States'will ,at'soine future time no .IOIiger consideti1iiattatik:orrTha~llj.tldas an action which, necesSarily threateQs Ariiericitn"sec:u:rity is 6D.ly to reflooUhe sentim,el!tso'~thr,Ameri~anp,oo,pl~,",." .' '. , ".' "', ' .. ' .NOWIS the tIme fora car~fulanalysls, Qf'Amencan securltYln­terests. Now; when"; threa.t'tb' 'I'halIaindappears'i'emote, is the time to decid!l wj'letJ!.~tp.f\, U;Wted~~ate~. ~ho1\ld m,ain~.in, bi1paJl.i.litre's'i;t1: rts base,lme fpbYJ,!.eitr,\wp';u~e w~<!,s~j)rn~ary,j\ish~c~tron,tst1i~lt:',P}jt~l)'hal use III Southeast X.,a,. NbwlS tlie~ll'leto deClde'if we IWlint' AmerICan boys to dieohce' agiti'; in th:ejungleso£' Southeast Asilii N oIN,i$' the time to de~ide if 0';11': (r~~ations,~\th" ('jhi,n~ or the S?Vie't Union 'j~s,tif'y ,iI secunty C()lIlWlf.!l'l.eJlt to 'rhl\llilncr; 01' w'h;ether the,commitrrlentlSjUsh. fied on other grouWds. We'sI\:ouldi actrrowso"as hot'to be confronted later. with the need to live. up to! ali, anacht'o\listic oommitmentthat we failep totel:minate ,in onder'to i)iltke bredl!)le olit \liintihuingvital commitments iii Western Europe'arid Northeast Asi8!i!' i ' .

. A~.J: ,h'lv.e,al~~qy,p~ted, the SEATO}'reaty itselfcont~ins a:~pe­ClficproyuMrr',l>el'llllttmg' any' state to'wlthdraw'aftel;' One yeat's no.­tice~ Should the 'UiiitedSta'tes fail to get agreement to disband the trT~nke;;~.uld,IbeIiev,~,takethatsteP' . ,,! !, ..'

Mr. Nix:: Thank you; Mi'. Halpel'in. Is it the basic Am~Hcan!lnilitary doctrine that in brush fire wars

Am,er.ican t.roops ...... a. r. e. 0h. ~)n .. tr. qd~.c.ed ... i.~ol'der.to.ga,il! time to train native troopsl Is that 'a fl\1r mterpl'etstJon 'as you see Itl ..

Mr. HAtl'EliiN" Well, I think Preliiderit.Nixon has said that the enibodiment of thEi N'ixon doctrilie was whitt we did in Cambodia which seems to sugges/; 'th\'t dU'rpoJjcy 1s that 'where' wafee] We M"El an inter­est wewi1I llse'wh!ttev~r American forces 'are necessary. We obviously would prefel' to rely on 1ocliJtroops and us~ o~lfAmeri:~il.i1 'Iliir· and sea­pow~r"but where we~on"tf~el tMt'is~tiffici~nt and where the Cori­,gress hilS not hiterposed an effective dbjeqtionby legiSlation, I think it is clearly t!J.epoHc;i,o~thisa:dl:riinistrationto )JBe AmeriCAn troops

.as i.r~\r~~~~~~riestoT~aliaila'as wella.s'to any !spot";ny~here in the world j '.,,, . '. , ' ). " , , . . " M\.'FIAtrFlIilN. ~ th'in~ 'Ce~inlJ' rtapJ;>lies i;o'ThailltIldwhere the UnH.ed States' eOjltmues to have' a treaty c6mmltmentwhich' slIIys that we:vj~witri attlickon Tha;ilai1d,':a~' a threat toAm~ri4n. security.

Mr. Nrx. Mr;'HMnilton. '." . " .'..! ' ,

"Mr •. :aAMWib~, '!:h!"uk youliMr .. Ohairml).rr. ~r. Halperin, I a,ppre-elatE! yc!>ur'statelnentv~ry.niUC ; " " '

29

Do yon tjlinkthe SEA,:{,().I]'reatycan.now.serveas an mnhrella for the reintroduction of Am1\dcan troops;nwB\>Uthea,st Asia I "

Mr. HALPERIN. I don't thinlfthere is any que~tionofit. The United States remains committed to thestatem<mt that ·an attack on Thailand by Communist forces would threaten American'security, and li think as long as that treaty is on the booksit can .servE> as a jU$tifiClltion for reintroduction of American troopS.,

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it the only legal authority existing now to pel'lllit us to do that ! ,. '!'" ..

Mr.HALPERIN.Ibelievethatitis.;,yes.·,,'·' '. ,,' , ., ' ''Mr. HAMILTON. The Assistant Secretary, Mr. Ingersoll" said the,

other day that SEATO had not outlived its usefulness and if we Were, to withdraw from it; as you are.' advocating, it would create doubts, and uncertainty. How do you respond to that observation!.'

Mr, HALPERIN. Well, I think there are alreadr doubts, and, uncer­tainties among all our allies as to whether the Umted States will meet any of its commitments in view of reaction to the Vietnam war. ,l think those doubtsll,nd',uncertainties are increased by our maintaining, commitments that do 'not have the support of the American people., If we have a commitment to Thaj}and whi<Jh mostof the American public does not support. an,d which the a. dminjstrat\on itself suggel'lts IS obsolete-'that" SEATO IS rewlly' onli\' an eConomic· treaty arrange-, ment, then countries with whom we have other treatieS-Australia, New Zealand, Japan"andc0untries of Western Europe--have to ask themselves: Do any of our ,treaty ,COJ;nmitments.' mean anything or do we consider them economic arrangements. It seems tome we, would enhan~e thec~~dibility of tho~~ commitments ;ive really ,feeJllre im­portant, by gOjng'to the countrIes where we have commitments that We know' are nilt importan't such as theSEATEl,Tneaty anqren<;>unc­ing Or negotiating ,those and then tUI'naround.andsay to Japan" A ustraliiii, New Zealand; and, th~ countries of ' Western Europe" the treaties which we are' keeping are the ones,we beHeve in • .sp Lthink itwouldenhan~ our remaining commitments rather,th"nis\ibtra~t from., .. """.,' · Mr. HAMILT(jN. If we did,renounce the treaty, what would·;bejth~:

status of <')ther Awerican troopewstationed. in Southeast Asia .1 'Would there be any doubt!\bout our leg'al authorIty to hairS them there 1 "

Mr. HALPERIN. Well~ ",. '.,. Mr. trAlIIILTON'. What is the tie'in,. if any, at. that poin:ti:, . . ." Mr. HALPERIN. The only troops we now havestationedoll·the main',

lal).d of Southeast Asia afein TJiailan:drand those 'troopsm terms of ihternnti'onililaw' couliilbe'ke-pt ,thereif,the Thais permitted it. In terms of the President's: authorIty to station 'those tro,ops,oVerseas,that, it seellll! would depend on'.whetherthe.Congress asserts what I beli"vs' to ~e its ?onstitutional ri~ht to determine whet,her troOJj)smay be statIOned III any country, 'whether or not theI'e'IS' a trea~y. 1; don't believe the:SEATO Treaty itself gives the. President th,e dght to station troops in Thailand, I believe he has that,right only if the Con­gress aftlrmativelyor byd<ifault gives it to him. . · Mr. HAMIUl1ON; Where would you keep sujJstftutial numbers of U.S.

tlxJopsin'Asia today! .. ,. ' .. ' ,',.'. . · Mr ... HAj:.PERIN:I ~uess that a little bit depen~'on yout .definition of

"substantial." I don t think I would keep substantiaLtroops anywhere,

41..j527-74----3

30

r,woVld keep BOm~')1\.Ip.eric~n ,tr:6o]>sJ\I1).1ib4litill.~'i1lblu&ihg Qkinl1;Wa, I thjl\J~iI wowld:ikll'l\I";ru)sma./,l,numher OO'Jmo'orlS ilill.Kt>r~!»,lrwo"ld :keep s.m.e'troops ru1«'Oait' witl:t,tj'le. Jlth,Fwet; U\lp1illtl bOlll that 1. 'beHave ,that ~e shatilil phllSe outtl:te 'r"tnB;~ing, A:mellicati milita~y £o~Ce.. , 'Mt. lI~Ml'LI1'ON. ¥tm SBB no ,reaS@J1 for troops 111 Thl111ll.nd, 1 . , , , , Mr. ilrALPEDtN. 'IJheonlycortceiv.9Jble pU"Pose .&or"tro<:>ps in Thai,

land-in fact, I believe explicitly statedb;y,the,admlJiaistration.,.....is,to baclr up:the admiriistratilli>ls th",sa/ll"f<'>r the ,resumption of the bQmj);ing of North Vietnam. I do not:believe that we should resume t1le bOIJlbing inN orth Vietnam under any ciI'Cumat;aIIiwe8.Tdo Mt beli<l'Ve we snonld threaten t,hebolnbing 'of]S'orlh V;-"tnam"and Tlbelieve the 'CongMss could show its dete~minationnot'to permit'th-e; reSumption of that bOinbing 1:1y mandating the withdrawal of the troo]>s from Thailand.

Mr. HAMILTON. We have, I think, roughly M,OOO troops in J I1pan today. How does that figure strike you 1 '

Mr. HALPERIN. I think it is much too high and it is really based On an anaehronIsm. The island of Okinawa was run by an American gen­eralas It kind of colonial territory. It is, quite !li.ttuJ'ralwhen yen have a territory that is your own to put a lot of trollps'a,ndlilot of 811(pport facilities on that island. I"wolllril eXpect and certainlY,iurge a Slibstan­tial reduction o,f troops. J"believdhe Japanese wo\Jld prefer that we hav~ fewer rather than more t:reopsin,Japan, so t4!}t'yOll don't have the problem that you have in Germany where theG"rmans Itre urg~ng

, us to keep the treops there. So I'belhive there could be and should be a sl1bstantiaheductionfrom that.56,OOO. " '

Mr. H .. :MILT<'lN. Let [)1e a$kyou'afso about the phi]jppi~les. We 'have about 14;000 t'r'oops ·there, according to Iny understanding, . "

M'!'; HALPERIN. I dCilnlt believe that thllre i. any,jl'lstification£orthe maintenartee of AmeI'f6wit troops In the Philippines. The Philippines are not threatened by any external !l!gigression of any kind. There isa ' great',deal of internal unrest in tbePhilippinesbutI don't beli~vethat Internal unrest in any way' affects the security",f the, United States.

Mr. HAMILTON. You support a reduction of,tmops in,SoutiLKorea but w~ have about 42,000 there. How sharply would. Y9ureduce that" n)lmbei·I' , "".'" ,,',,' '.'':' , ' , Mt. HALl'l<lRIN. Lwould cut that'in h!l!lf. " ,: ,~"" '<,',: ,:, .. , .'

Mr. HAI,biLToN.We have about 8;000 on Tltiwan. ;"iii,; , ~ •. 'dj,; Mr. HALPERIN. Those, I believe, should go. 'I\h~setroops ",~e ~)1:el'e

as II parto£ the huildup for the80utheast Asia'colrtmitlrtf)ntl/.,I p"lfwve they should go. . ' , ,,,

Mr., HAl\I:wroN. All rig-hili I w0uld like youto com\n~nt\ If you Wol'l<l." . Dr .. Halperin, on the adminjstmtianreque8t for an additiona,};$l!.74 n~!niol\ ~nsl1pplement!l1 militttry a,~d ttl Saigon a,nd a~ a'dditiona41~R~ mllhon Insl1pplf)mental economIC ald. ]low do you think we oiight~ deal With 1ihll,tj '. '. .', . .' '. :'. " , Mr, jIALi(EilIN.,~ think 'the supplementalrequoat should be donied '

aird T thln'~,tJdngl'Ms should make it clllar that it intends over 9,;vel",· tively small nnmoor of yeM's to phase out ,11111, Md .toS!)uth Vie~n,\II11h We are now in a si~uatian where the Slouth-V'hltuamese Govemment, has abSOlutely refused:to p~ with' th"/,J.6goti/l,~ion£or ap@litie'ai reco,!,.c.,ilia,tio"n inBo, u.thVietnal!" T. ~eir Pol:icyis .. eleiilrlY 1JQ:.hOldO.Il.lI!IJ.d: contmlle to filtht the 'war unde,r th!l \issUJnl:JI>~'on'thab the:Qongress Ililld the.Americith public 'wlll conti)\ue fopa,y foHlM ammunitiolh "'.

8~

L Mr. Hi",MILTON. ,Do you putt1!-~ w1w~e' ,bla,IIle. 0X\),.filQllth. Vi~tnain~ IOU say South Vl'etnam 'has refused to proceed., a ,that alSo true,r~

N c:: it~z~~~J. t thi~kthat is hard toteh'beCaWl~in:t$.e~l?sence ot awiillingp.ess on the ,part to£,treSM~on Governme'Y- !'<> ,ri~got:i#e, it is v(>,ry hard to tell,whether .~he ot)J.er sIde wOlllq:be whlb,llg to or not. The q>ther 13jd~ crontin:n!l$;in ',' ts pr.opaganda to tl.'1k a.boll. tthe virt.lleS of the. qeaSil-fire~eement that is sIgned and 1 thmk that they would try.,for ,weric:>d oUime to:ome to pow~rby ,political melltus if the So~th \1ie~­nam .Governmeljf IS prepared to. gIve ~hem. a Chance .. I th~nk iiltl: !Uate~y ,they wruld use whatever £OI;ce IS lj.~~ry to:Ua~e".yer, th~ S .. outh. I don't <believe I\!l;:vthihg :rou. I.d change t~'!'t q'i.te~llllnatlOn, b~t I think they are prepared for a tIme to try a polItICal rOnt!" to power It . they ar,e,given a chance to do so .. ', . , . ,. . .,'

Mr. H4MILTON. You support, I take it,a ~!l'ther rapid. phaseout of inilitiu:y and economic assistance to South Vietnam I .

Mr. H4L'P>1RIN .. YeR.. . . ' . , . '. ' Mr. HAMIIlfoN.W}tat would. be tre c6nseq1,lences ()£ th~tin Yl"ur

judgment, in South Viet!'amq " '. . ' .', : , Mr. HALPERIN. I behey-e the conse,quellces of tha~ wol1ldbe the b~ginni)lgs ,ofnegotiatiol)s among the political groups ~I~ the .,Stmfu which I thmk would be first to form some sort of 'coalItIOn govern­ment. ~ suspect a number of the current r,11,ler8 in South Vietnam would mOve to the Riviera and you '\Vould get' i1 n~w government. I thinI!: gr"duaUy it would be taken over by the NLF forceR in the South. J believe the oUly, alternative to f:h!tt is a period of the kind of staleriuit.e we now have foliowed by, resumption or large-s.cale fighting whiyp, unless the United States IS prepa~ed to go back m;,would endin lihe NJi,F o,?ntt-,ollip.g the ,~outh atiy~aiY; Ifhinkwe a~etconlrop.tedwith tlJ,echolCe lIi South Vletn,am to eIther stay and fight,~oreveror ,there .'WIn be a takeove,r., nil'. the NLF. i " ".. ",,' .' , .

Mr, !:MILT~, 't1Qa~k yoq,very mljch, Dr. Halperin: ' ";;'

,e' ~~Nli.0~ha~Q~lID~lIailtbn", .... " .,' ... ': . ..•. ~~eb,~l'l~ ranl!(W~iieago.1 th;nkit"'Q.v,~<J!ibe'wis~to. ~~~"ss: tho ,h~aFl\lgs.,~O: that we cang?,over alilil. vote andcogreblfC1 •. W:0u14 yoy

klnd;~l~~~n::t am I1-v(l,t1.tbie., . ;';. .: ;": ~ereuPoii, a sliort'reooss was taken.] , '. ' Mr'lrx. The,sl1beommittee will cOn\e to order. ;' " Dr" a1perin, ~u ~nted to clarify sOJ?1~t~fug fu your .tat8melilt. Mr;, e "LP,ERIN. ,f ~s. '1/Ian1): liOn, Mr. dp,a"rma~., .;

Ne~:l~if;J~1;O;~ttt~ntlQS~Xt~~~~~~f~:~t~::,tr~~~h;'~ ,o.f",t . .Il.~ W:.'~ .. '. ~.W.':.' .,o'r.g .. ap.!z .... ~~.'.O;~., u.1. t. h,W.· ,areaj~o. ,;ll1h. ed'VV1 .. t.h .. us .. ini. the .A. \+)~Ii"il'!.!\~t$!i!' fh~. t. l.~ ~~A. ',r{'J ~~rep.onnceC\ We wouidcontinuet.Q h.aW;fwptyq~@tg\~!J)ft~~~ 111'1. th \:hem, . . .i'~ ) , ",

M'r.,N~x.l\ .. h.i,~uPb .. ~. '. ,", .' , . . r:\';'~~~@1i'\~~P.~ffqf!; 1ft'f!!I~irm~n. :,):,;L .' "t, ; .' .:~rl" fl ... ' •. ~!'.l'r\";.'~. ~ J, ... ~m.,.fl. .. , ... ,.~.j)., .. "'.ilIll .. Uf'P'i".·<I!t. .. p.g .. "",ssi! .. , .. ',. '. ~p.t.!.".I .. '9.\~!ll. '" ll!l J1}~f;fI~W\~lUI1'U~\ I).vwg I\""e~g .\~'Ilge(W;lt . ,,;'JiI , . " ~,Ol}.~n;,W!yw,l\l ~?d s.a:d.~q~., ,.t~.l() 'll<'.' .J ,L.!>.B.·" ~n' ... P 'if.' ;;i¥~ .. :' .• ~.\IiN .. ~ . .' 1E.. . ~ ~.?,u .::m.~ ' •.. !¥i~ .. t.~.t.;:\Ve, 1 n9 ge ,,ny,qJ!~-ai%U.ei,?(jtni$liU .. qj'..Nort\ll;. ,J~~n!\nrl\glj/.l:n...:W!lS t{1

32

take ourtr6opS O)1t· ofThail~nd. Of course sihce we bombed the last time we have a war powerS bill that 'prohibits the bombing without a vote of Congress, so don't 'you think we have SOme pretty good protec· tion against the bombing as it is! . "

Mr. HALP!'RIN .. We!I" iny understanditig,~f the war, powers bill, jt would permIt the Umted States tobombVretnam' for '30 days. There

. is the fund cutoff which :r t4ink does legally prohibit the bombingo£ North Vietnam "'1thout the concurrence of the Congress. My point is that the administration is now threatening the N orthVietnltmese thitt if they resume.an offensive in the South that we, will resumetIie bOlIl;birtg in th~ North ann itisipoiriting tothe A~etican ~ombers in ThaIland as eVIdence that we really mean thatcomI'nltlhent. '

There will he it resl1IX1ption ofthe6ffensi";" iitthe Sputhby'theN orth Vietnamese, if not this ;year, nel't year or the following year unless there is a political sett16ioent in the' South. The President will be be­

. fore the joint session of the' Congress in a day saying, "We warned the North Vietnamese and they have ,now gone ahead in the face of OUT warning and if we fail to res)1me'the bombing nobody will ever believe \lny of om cQmmitments ilnywhere."If you say, "What right did you have tdmakethiscom!h'j,tment'Whim Congress had to approve itl" the answer/will be the same 'as the commitment they made to the :Russians for MFN. .

The administrwtion has gone ahead arid made comniitmentsand threats even though they neeG.ed cOngressiontl:l support without having it. I think the Congress has an obligation to the countries of South­east Asia and the whole world to makE< it Clear that that threat is not an A,merican GoverIimentthreat, it is a threat of the President of the United States whioh he is not free to make. without the support of ,the Congress, Ana.'tlll\ way the Congress can add to that is by mandatirtg tho",: t't66.psgJ<ou~ of ThaiMud beca~se that would he saying to the Presldent,. andsaymg to the So,;th VIetnamese. Government.: "Don't c.Qunt Q. nthoseb. omJ:Jers to prote<Jt y. o .. u. ' YOll,have. g.ot .... to.·~ .. ~ego.t.iat .•. ~;". .

Mr. DU PON<l'. Well, this kiod of ties hi with aJ:R>tYl~ /itateme:o;t;yoll, made i~. r~sponse ,to .. Mr. H\lIT!ilt6h whje)! t~t,h~fy}J\l we~f\An"!liv:or of phasmg o)1tall aHl:,,~onom,\c ,and w1l1tary, to South V11~j)1):ambe,­cause they 'have hElen recaltltrant'in" going forwlird, withithe', n~w negotiations. Is it your thesis thalt Ameri<l'aIl aid, both econql)1icaild m~lita~Ylforall naltions, who do not li\>'euj;> to a e:>mm~tine1itthat we thmkIs Important 'be phased out! .. "..,.. .. '. '

Mr. HALPERIN. ,No. The sacrifice, thatthe United States'h1\SIDltde for the Governnientof South Vietnam goes fal' beyond the'sacrifice )nade for aIW other coul1try. 1 thill~,:"ecansay' to SOlli!'! Vietul!om: We. have spIlled o)1r hloodand,tre~sute' for you,.ll>t least 'as muchll,s you .aeserv~, if. 1l0t a great deal morel' aI}d t4at isil! you~~e entitle\! to;, TheUmted States I):as ot.h. e.~ ca. m. 1)1 .. ltrrte. ~~ ... '.aIl.' .. li.,:t>. the.r ~~<¥lf.or:fun.ds. at 'home 'and you are on your own. You Will have toaeclde what YO\! want to do. If you want to fight on'yonr owU:,' Y())l ,are free todilso. JfYQ)1 want to negotiate-;--.. ,;,,' ,'J..:" .' .. : '

Mr. DU PONT. yon alffei'entIat!l:~tween economiel!oId ta d!louth , VietnMI) ahd letrs say economio aiHb"Brazil on the basis th~t we

have <;lone a 1"11; £br;~outh Viet,:,a:jll;ll;~d hot yer:Y ~uch for/e~aztI. Mr. H;<'II.PEllIN.No,'.on the (bitSIS ,th~tthe, South V,etIia\Ueseare m

It striIggl'e' with oth~r forces fIi 8o)1tllVietnaIU which I believe will

33

either, be resolved by politi()l\l negotiation or '1>;)' militaryc(;mflict. r, d.o not believe that is 'the C~El with most, if not all, the '?ther countries ,~o whom w~ give economic~'ndmilitary aid: " c. •

Mr. DU PONT. Well, I havetrouble, r think, with your ,thesiS. r thlllk what YOll are sayin/l" is 'that 'fe ought ~o take these things on an ad hoc ha,sis in South Vietnam asa very speCial case. ' " '

M\;; HALPER!'N. Yes." " " " " ' ,. , , M:r. DU PONT. Now what ram s8li,rching for i.$ if you,have a gener~

theory that $,ays .<when we go "ahead with' ai<1, programs' and when we decide not 'to. ' , , ' . Mr., HALPERIN; Well, ram l.'ot sure I have. a Jotal theory. My view I>! thwt the resources oitha Umted States.are very~carce and ,we ought to use them where it is consistent with ouHhteresta. I think that 'has to Plla judgment on each c<)MtrYand aboufwhat theyiire doing with t,he ai<,l. The South, Vi~tnamese are using the Il;id to m!'i'ntaina govern­,ment III power whlChmthe absence of tht\:t aid I b"heve could, not re, main in pOwer, and I just think We have 'given themenough,aid . .so

, that I don\thiilk I can, gO any further than J:}laYllalreadx on your generalthesl$., " , " ' ,

Mr. DU PONT. All right. Onefinalqj1estion. Perh'~ps YOll touched upon this before I came in.." ",.'

I can understand and, even sympathIze with renwving troops in Southeast Asia because it is not in our interest to have them there and too expensive to have th<VII there and so forth, but ,tile, thrust of your ;attack on .sEA,TO really seemed to be not on the purposes of the treaty somncl),. IlSthe i,act that most everybody elseh\l4 dropped out of it and ,

, therefore 'We ought to drop out of it, too. CO)llCi you distinguish on the' treaty ita,elf,a differenCe boc,weenSEATO l\,nd NATO! , ,,' '

Mr. HALPERIN: Let ,me try to Irr",\l;emy argument It little clearer. My view is that the security interests of, the, United States 'ai'e not sufficiently tied in with the future o~ the government in Thailand that the United States ought now to undertake to maintain a commitment which says that an,/tttack on Tlaailand' is a threat to the security of the United States. I don't think most of the A,merican people tnink So and the,:",fore I d~n't think we oUg'ht t?oontinue.w ~aye .on the 'books a commitment which 'we don't behevemand whlCh Iflt IS threatened we are either confronted ,then with n, oj; liVing up 00, our commitment 0, r living np to it but for reasons not connected 'with our security.

, The point about the changes in SEATO a,nd their commitment tQ It goes to the question' of whether it is legitimate for usto'renounce this commitment. In my view, it ought to be sufficient te say that w~ have now decided th~titisno, lOn;ger in 0';lr int,erest to ,nm;intain thiS treaty and therefou~,wi!\could renounce I't, but there IS ,wlwa~ the danger thatotheJOP~ople win say: "Mayl.Je some day you 'Yill renOUl1Ce NATO." It IS not onlythecasB that we have toreevll!luate it, it is the case thwt most of the people who signed that'treaty have also reevaluated their views., ' "j" '"

When We signed the 'trti,aty what we believed we' were'undertaking was Il!commitment jointlY with the ,British and' the ]1rench and a number of the countries<'>f 'the region'to C<J))is,to the .aidof Thai­land' and, a number of oth~r Muntrilis.That, is no longer 'the case. The British'and French are ,out Mid ,most o~ the other countries are out; so'it i$'ll<wa qtiestiohr'"i' ouri,sim'ply"sayiilg we haive ch!lllged our ":t· ,:',fj ;r," ";; i ," 'I::> ".,'j'.-, .• ;!; -n,:',!- ':".- .,'1', ,i:!;, ,,", ,;.:

".' '.

mind. It is ~quE)§tiort of tl\'~ who,l'} framework o,fthe tr~ltty li'Ii'Vl.i\g lShartged' and th~re£ore I' thi~kWjthllrWIJll.,'would be l~ pitiitfhfand f4~\i:~ah~~~l/w~ ~"no,unt)'}q.~he,t~~t~~it~ +ustr~Ia Where ~QtIlt .

,itr. Dtr Po,NT. One/final'questrDn. 'Do, you thll)k a l1l)htiLry''ltiJtack.Dll 'Greece Dr Turkey wo,uld be ',It 'tlit-eat to, the's'lCuritj. of theUIiited 'States! Obv.i9uslv. YOU'Cll,n.see. what.i.s. be.)lind'l1l.yq\lestion: 'If it is '·oodfor$E.A:TD'whYill>'t o,i!d£QfNATOi" '., .. :. ..... .:. g 'Mr. HdPERIl\':'I£liinkt~ere is''aquestio,n wl\.etrreJ' ~~hould hiL'I[lI Spo,nso,red Gre~\l<l ap.d Turkey to NATO. I tljin.k it is cleat' th!1~ ~~ce !lpd Turkey ar~n?~j;heftank:'?£ NATO, and !fUybodywho S!I-~~t)la.t sl>o,u\d;.1<\Ok,at!/<l1l1h~~:,y g¢graBhy, ...' ":~, .' ,. '.' Ithlll~ ~ht\': 'p'ro,kl~l1lWli'eli :t><ATO IS. tMt Q~l' C?m:Iilftm:ellt to t1:$ centr\,-l rewo,n,. j!lltJ:,t\cularly GeTI11.Q!riJ:',}~ '!O'f vita/I.' Il1lpoI'tl\Ji~e to~;'e security o,l'the 'f)'nlted St9i~. I do,1).'t s\'!>'any W9iY'I)OW tJronegotiate tb.e Greek and T~rl<ish piij'tio,I) o,f the tr~atJ:'\'Plt!te~t sll,g,gestingfu 'th~Ge1'lllaJlst)latit 1~ really a pr!,lwle to, atotitl AEe~~:mitildrawa\. Oft t~e ohh~~'lI,an~;I tit'> no,t b~hev:e that weaii>~,oblyged'ul):sr~tthe trea~:r . to gIVe m:lhtar:y:,o~ eco,no,ml?(e,.ld?~ t~ st,l\~X?!'Am:'!'F~Ntlliro~p~m ~reelle; I do, !1otbeheve f1iat w:e sho,ulcr do, thQ'S~ thm~.~, 100nS' (II! there IS no, restoratlo,no,fdel1locracy m Gre'lCe.' .' ~. ," .

. Mr, D1)' PO\':r.:rrhil,nk you:' '.' .". ..,.. . . . Thankyoll. Mi'.Chai~fuati. .... '., .,r:

. :M,r, ~P\· Mr',1fa!pet\hl,a~ to, yo,\lf 197'3"~i'yrcle'in:the BroQki.n~ I?-,StJtlltl,?n l?ubhcatlOn'el;ltlt~ed: ."TM N~><;t:l'liase of FOl:eign Poli¢Yl': 1''Wo,uldhketo,a$.kthe~o~~d}'\mg. Y01J~'IY: ..... . ... ' ........ " .

. In. the c.". se of S~. uth~ .• 'it. ! A~i~. I). OOUn,.~Ili"s, .un.ite .. ~. ,s,t~te .• ·:til.'tilJ' .• ~.~,tfW.O. I'I.q, ~i>" ~efl;ned b¥ tl1,~ ~ap'anese i,l,lt~r~~~~. W~ -Wq:pJt\. Pr?t, If:\te-T,yenR }n -qie.s~ ~ollntl1ies unless Jap'all',_'wa~_'prepa.re(J:,_~o. support o'Uf: intervention, in, 'R :way cOllsist~t with Hs dotfiestic' constraints ·jbr·,we: Wol11d 'lp.fervene -hf\thes~; eountries Qnly If. We felt this n.ces~ty to cOlltinu~':r'Wanese oon1l.qel).~e: In the,amerlcan deter· r~~,t and tp cl~Sflll harmonio~s,U;S.~,"f~))1l:~~~~ relq,t19p.." ;;' .,' ,:, '. I, ,:

. 'Wouldyo,u.eJ<;pla>inthat!··' " '." . '"" . " Mr. :l!IALl'JilJ.>JjN. r;;think one caUi ask the questi'o'n of wlaether .the 'U!I1it~dL States has .. (t,secmlity, iritere;;tin a particular Degl.o,n. Q£the "World i;n,t;wo wa.ys .. One, dLFectly, We wOJilcil>'have in' the Cllileo,£J~pan . IIl1lQI Ge.1llll!1ny, and, othe.F\!OUl)triJ)s., .amfthe other is linQiJ:~I.IL'hat i8 to, say.,. oJJ.ricred~&ility ahd eff(lq,tbveI>.ess. Dur, comm.itment ,~~ '\llIllj>aIn :furlelii~lIliF10\,d*ends' bn:wh~ hruppetis, il!<I..:or.ea., so thatithe~lnjlban. Ii Security Ill.terest l.n Korell. stems. from the Japanese per~eptlQn.t:hll;t tM s.ecurimy 0,:1) So,uthEo,rea is)i/!> the, Japanese s'lCumty mterest !1n.d tlierefone isrinthe·AI1leFican int!!I1@t." ..... :. : ,l, , .' .'

What I wllISisayingabont .southea,st A:~ia.is.lthat, the, only !j,rglJjJl)~nt thq,t lequ~Q: conceive,<i>t.,:i!0r AJilWriMl'l: ssll],1.'pity ill. SOl\~heast.A:,si& 'Il. M tM,. argl1lUent ,that the JiapliDi\ese .v>o)1llq]: ~eel tba,t th~r, ~e~uVlty,WIj$ uhreat!'lileil.'if.·uhere, "'!is !li'Ch!1~'11j goVE\l1IlWletlt lll,Th{lIJltl'ld'o,,r Q~her So,utheast Asian countries. I do not believe ,j;JiUI,tis.thll case.,~ 1i><I'1ii.eye tilMit i:i!'Y0U! tallito th~ JapaiiesetheY;W\luld ·MJ)'~1l J;fP,QMt AJitw1liQl.\!lliWli­tafy acti0n.i.fiI11hailimd,wolJllQIl1'i1t:li>e,l,'n'IlPl\#edy,q,p1i1:bli.oly, 1lM'll'/ tt, !l<,ll,;! to,>'Pilt the.JilllP!1nesa,po.l!id;i0 ... ·a181,l]lJlil,\w. t1iil;1Ir~NJltd,il;'i.Q;.,1jh. iljj,S~t,~~~p. a,; ti"Q' ill 'uhe ~enSethati it' ig i!n,.,·thll, j,u,terll!it,~if .BtpiWl! i!WIil ;th;e,'lJI.ijj]e4

~t~'NtlKi D6R\t'YO~;b~~fuili~;i~i~'1l,'~@~~; .~~\l f,9~ h~' 8ubco,mtnitteeto ~~am:ine an of the o,utstan4tng: U.S. ~11l~1J8 to

35

36

~Mch lell>d.s tp a settlem<;nttbiwt they.w!lliaunch !1 mo),'Oe!fEl<it\ye9fl'en­slvee ... Nothings11ggests that t~e Hanol1ead~rsh.p:Ms IPv~tlllp:.ona . united': V:ietnll>m,;jIliid eveery .iLIlte.rJ:lationl!lag~eementjthll>t ,we·.U!,"e signed·anilwgDeed to sllPp.i>rt.:c.ertifte's thl$. .k.'· ;C,;':.' i'"

Mr .. RLEGJ;J!}. W.ell, If youset''SE1).TQ.aslQ,e, '\lAd try t'? lp<:>kat mst , . South.Vietn/tm in terms of, our qlwnstr'lteg!c.int~~ests--m.lli,tl).ry 1M'

,tors" eCPllolU~e.' .fao. tor .. s .. '. 4~.eo. p. 0. ~tl<l ....... ltlJa.,~ors,a,tld. '.'. f.1.·~. ,ga,ll)l.VIl1' any: o~l;ier.· ~trategICltelU:-,do;you find'll>ny s1l'pport!ng argmp,ent@ ~b~\Qur cQntmu-lll,gtOPlU. g.l"l,m.oU6JY'. /0f that size to mll(m~am th .... estll,tus.'l.l:lo ... '....... "J

. Mr.liALPERIN. Yes; I remember wresthng with tho$e,when I was m ~he Pentll>gotl; yop'i\lsed toSlilnd them. tOlls.. .:..f' . . . I.don't .. fthlnklt,Js;.In.RlWt, I thmk l~ Iscounterp~duct~ve beca,use I~ L'~n;l flghtthat the~e IS gOlll,g. to, com~a~da:lf~h~.ll: ,!,her,,!:-,s. an olfen­slv.el.n'.theS.oJ.l1lh . .I I ~hmk the ... mamquest)O:tht)ien l.sg61.ng.t~.~~.h.aveJw.,e created e,,~ectatlOn m the. mm.dsofthe Rl:lssians, the Chinese, :!I'nd 01]>1' allies in Asia andcthrougho)1t the world thatwe wil~intelWene wh~n that happens. If we'feel we have cre(tted 8Mh .expeptations. that Will be.thestron~est~~gum~.ntto:in:te.rvejw,.. ". ,,:V:, :I.', .:r';.. "

The Pl"slde!lt'~.speech,whi<)hilwoul~ write for ,lnUl,w~l1.$Ili~,'\r warned the RUSBl'anS, I. warnEid the' Chmes\.> .we wo\dd.. back up 01ft economic.!!nd military 'aid withthe}esumption of the bombing and thl1t is w.\ty.tho~eJ>1il.n:es were in 1'4ailand and .Qpcng,ress. knew tha~ fs why they Were m Thal~d,and.t.liereforewe h(tve·:tO:!jo m;'t'·" ... '

If, Ollfthe other han';\fwe n.owout.pfl' 'our\ecQno!l:qe,an,dn:JJ1h~l1ry aid and withdraw those airplaI,les £r(')m' Thai;j~l'l.!'\,'then'w" wr~te:iJ.ing , the South Vietn~mese and we are telling"tj\.lli;'peijl; ,,1 our ,dUiss ,in the world and the Russians:and the Ohinese'that,South,,,VietnalJl is no ','

longer: s~mething that we are. obligate? to..!jrO~8t~"Thenjf}bere is/ '.' . !In ojJ'enSlvewe can say we h~ye been. telhng the Sal.goil:.g9,yernlJlenU<)r , .. :r . 3. years that if they do not negotiate in:gflodfaith .1!f\d.e1!the c;,ase,fiI'e .' this wQuJd happen to.them and we are .t\otgoing til. be there .. I thiI,lk then the impact on our. other alli,es would. he' very smitl}, r:dQn't.thinlt there isa government ill the :world tljat thiJlks~.t,needs an'ytjIing l~ke the support we gave the SQuth Yietnamese:(toyernmerit in the past 10 .years tosuryj-ge: S.o the'~rgumeiJt we aUwi)lgiye you\s.w?a~ we ega. ve.to .. South '~ ... etri.am. o~.e.:r; the la.st.' .10 ye. ar~ does. not c .. O.~liti;.ltls.more

, . tban eno\lgb. to. inaintaiif±·tb.is. ,: .. .' . " .' Mr: R,mGLE.: S~pPQse we decided tbat 'Ill's right and' we ought to

back away. Can. we do ipall at once or do we start sOlUl'tliil)gth'lt 'miEht be called economld! . ' " '. • ,.,'"

. Mr. HALPERIN .. W~ll, I .think that is what we do. We tell the;'Si.;i- . ,.¥(In government llli1i. t~r:\.'. ai.d. ,is o.Y. er,.·; if. ':),.011 wa.nttW?~Y.~~:Il\m. unit~~~ .....•. '. on the world marjtet, It IS for sale,ap-yposly can buy It; .VN:e aregomg, to J?hase out and aft~r,.tp!tt yoU a1!e' <)/1 your .own. You have. 3 ye~rsfW: ~:~1~~ what yo1iwanttj)Ao.T4?se.0rYq,~; W~Q want,togo,totbe Riviera

. M;r.ibiioLE.~oi\1 d~~lil'g'wl'tjIlthts lat,';$~blldget r,~q)1~~ frO~';tbe Wb.lte;EiO),we,.!f)'l1!, '1<~t~ <to.~N,t~'~t~~as'1h!Nl;, :"'e;,.s~,oHrl1 n?tget locked J}'lWan N'gtirn,ent, lihat ;If.1S:lI;n~r llotJjm~, P\l,t)q'l)e;;~)l:~figure down t. o;what}.s n9ug)l.ly.~e£e~il>. k1;l. ,pt Whic.h .... lSb.11.1tS.·Wii. ·.y,toz,e.ro . . ' Mr; Rf'):.P~1RIN .. lthmk,CM~!(e~ ~i1ght.t9,'beable to do. 'sbmE11I\m,g­raJIg~ :plan\l1.ng; jt <)ughtt!> 'P,ea,I\)!\fi;o saYJ~tbe$oV.tb.V!i~~l),am~s~

; illn~1o~rt~~!;~~J'lfut~~1i~i;i~~~M~t:l~~r!;~1t!~muh? .. ;

37

Mr. RIEOLE. Do you have ailys~nse for what the Soviet, Union is doing with respect to the aid it is' giving Vietnam now!, '

Mr. HALPJ::RIN' I think it is pretty clear that both the Russia. nsand the Chinese a're limiting their military aid to North Vietnam and urging them not to engage in a resumption of the fighting and urging them to negotiate. I think that will last for a while.

Mr. RIEGLE. Are they doing- less thanwein Vietnam! Mr. HALPERIN. Historically they have done somewhere between 1

and 10 percent, depending on whose numbers you want to believe, and I don't think that has changed. . .

Mr. RIEGLE. So it is probwbly still in that kind of ratio now! Mr. HALPERIN. Yes. . , Mr. RIEGLE. Should we adjourn and go vote, Mr. Chaimnan! Mr. NIX. I think I wil) stay. . . , Have you other questIOns ~ .. Mr. RIEGLE. Maybe one or two more. Mr. NIX. Proceed. ' Mr. RlEGLE. I 'would like to talk some more about Cambodia and

Thailand. You probably spoke about Cambodia before T clime iit: ' I would like to think of the three areas separately, and· then region­

wide. I think we nailed down Vietnam and talked a little bit about Thailand. _

Mr. HALPERIN. I don't understand what the American interest in CBlmbodia is. It is clear that despite our efforts to describe it as a North Vietllamese invasion that it is in fact lal'g<llyan indigenous conditiOIl. It isa civil wal'; and it is a civil war in which I think we have no intereSt and I think we ought to get out of it; I think the American military has shown"":if yo~ believ:e .stories in the Washing­ton POSt-t~Blt when on,~. sends Amel";can .mllItary o~ to any country wh~n there IS a war, he canJ?-ot colltam hmiselfj 'Jl~ IS a~ expert ~<i. tramed and when he sees thmgs done badlyh~_(j(Yrrects It. That Is.a civil war .and~hatever the people in Canrbopiaare doing it isnoi'

. going to affect the security of.thfU 1l1ted States;' '.. . ..' Mr. R':l'?LE.One '?£ the'~hl.n~ .• thatI worry'abou~l~I mail',).ust'

. offer an aSIde hel;e--lS'tJ1a~ It ls"<hifficult'to beaweli!pertm Soutl):-'VleV namor for that matter any placein$'outheast Asia, when you·h:ave· a kind of instability in the executiv¢,1Iranch creating uncertainty that is difficult to deal with. What I feil' 'mt/Sf is what could happen in the next 90 days'that could be given a false ineaning, . .

So every time we lock ourselves into a framework which seems­to me to be the thrust '0£ your paper, we give a way our' fle:dbility. The siWation; as yous"y; h!l$i(lJilangedTthe framew,ork is different. I worry' about behig drawn in thel'e'almoS'tl asadiversion.ary tactic and. create events· over whi?h we have no 'p.imtroL Congress wouldp:oth:!!VIHtny control over that;I!'aEiltlMh as:X 'would'HltE1to see 'ilshit:Ve'.it,'l have great concern; Bspemallyx,now. ,'", ;,' (,J', "_. ,_"i l ""_'_'" "-,.,,_.

,M;r. I,I~Li>~IUN .I' think tha~ is a p'r91i1\j~il. ~n' my vi~w th;e:a:4m,ini~­tratlOlllS unhkely to take fOreIgn actIOn'.IIS a:dlivel'genee to .thil''G!imeatIc situation., Tll;e, President -,y.Q1l1d not get the suPp,ort that, he ne~s" fr?m ;the' S~creta\'Y.b£ St!tte and !~ec~eta'il'·.,b!f' Defell$~;.j;6~liI:o that:. I thmkfM'<;Htl1ger ls;that 18111 oHh{nf wll1t feel 'th\lit 'Ifu;~:l!i'ir<li~goveii!)..r menM 1l~llk~lre iW1!itelf '8trate~!is 110W 80 '$eall'tlf~1(lc!in,: get 'aiwaY'ifitht, . pus4wg 'us <9;voundan<;t that ;ther~orll,,!/)l)g'fmu$t resp",~d 'vi~rotlslr' not.,roajfect t~e ~~Qat~athl)mebutin:il1~~'e~~rSho!,,-, '

:Mr.:RIEGliE. But it adds up to the same thiug. . Mr. HALPERIN .. Yes. It goes.a little bit to the question of '1llotive. I

think thatl9ongreSsought to bec<')ncerned about .thatP,roblem. It o1lghtto!thmk .!lb,mt ways that· reduce the speed wIth whICh the ad­ministration . can react, and the bombers in Thailand .are. It perfect example. If Congress insisted as I believe, without question it cquld in legislation 8ruy that thebom.bers not be stationed in Thailand and thahhoae bases be disbanded. Then the speed with which bombing of North Vietnam coul<1 take place would be substantially reduced. You are only talking about a few days when they Were returning to the area. 1 would apply that 'to' Gu",m:aa well. '

So if the bombers were back in the United States and you had warn" ing, you saw: the'bombers begin! to ,fly out, then CongresS could act to prevent the bombing of Thailand. I think if you begin thinking this way, what are the things we can do which either put locks on the President's action as the funds !\recut.off or put the delays, how, fast there can be reaction, that that is one way to get in.

,Mr.iRIEGIlE. 'I:think·that iSdon excellent 'suggestion. I don't know wily we ·have to have bombers in .Tl1ailand ready togo on a minute's n@iice. I think the ~ltct that ,they are there ready togo makes them easier to use, o,nd @·that;PQjnt I!lgree,with you. The thing I W01"'1 about it how the dynamics start. I think you are right that different people in the executive,hl'anch w/mld view it different-and,theywould react for different reasons,but I think it alllldds up to the same thing. ·1 think we could be back into this ina big way overnight and everybody wotlld .sot!t of be trailing along and that is the one thing t don't .want tosee,happen.

That is all'fQr' me, Mr. Chairman. . Mr. NIX. Mr. Hamilton, ...

. Mr. Hkl>l:IbTON. ·Mr. ,Halperin, ,if we did renounce the SEATO Treaty, . what would·be 'the impact as far asChina·and 'the Soviet Union are ctmcerned!

Mr. HALPERIN. I thillk,the··Chinl)$e w.o\lld be:wol'l'ied that it w"sthe beginning of1an.%m<ll'icalunilital'Y withdl'a'l'lll\l from Asia which they WOFI1 ,about,beGause ,it would ·l,<ie1p :1ihe Rnssiaj1s, I . don't -be1ie;ve ·tlie ll.u8Sl",ns :WOI\ld· b~ ",ifected,by it"atl111but I ,belie'Vethatit ds ,paradox- '. i~al as ·>itseemswe,cl@uld j!iive'the·Chineseassu~arrcjes 'that this 'WaS noMhe ,beginning of a .totlllwithdrawal. . .,

Mr· HAMI':TON. Youwould.Mt ,e2!1pect the Chinese to .takll any partlCular:aotJOn !,

Mr .. JiI~U/1iIRIN.No. iIwould .n<ltthinkit ,would .be . wille for,either tl;l.e Russians·ol',theGhinese to 'c@nclude ,that the United ·Statesno lOi;lger has, cOlnmitme1'ts,As I ilugge$ted, before, ;itsl;l.ow8 that 'we ha;ve, rnai,lltllinedlthe :comrnitm~nte. ' , .. ' ' , ":",. .'. ,''Ntr. H~~~. Y !Jud<1nltfSeei!t .iMtriy'waty'1t/!·a,destabm",inglllc;we-.

therenunmatJOnoftheSEATQ.Treatyl, ii". ',. • " Mr".JiI4LP'»lw.:N 0,-1 <ilon'~,tll:iInk any·ooUI1trw,lb!tlie world 11880 .etcrse

to a deei,siGn to in'Vade.'Fhadland ,thatrthe renunciation, of ,this t'l'eaty ... ould-....· ',.. ': "., '0.".:·':,· .,: ,'"'' : .

Mil'. H~~ui)T9l'f .. 1AC'tl1lallyolW ,0W __ ti<'\llBurtderSE-AIJ.lO . at ,this poi,,;>t -are'Mt .v:~rYi [great, It'Fti ~b/ly I ,iy,lYuii<:!ooe ,it iin term!l ro£, lIrhu<'»)!t, fl, Ihilltte~oJ.lltreatw. It ,dollS' n<')t ,0981; 'U!iVBl'l)' ,1lIlc11c:ib.,lntOUe,1 ito·rtllml\tJl;m . SI)[i\Ve'lll)1:1,1d Ji,mt .leave d-t ",arit is'. \':"OU !thus '$ovoid tiny, "Di$k"rh(>i\'\1~~, .

. -.(( ': '\!)':0 j", • ::-'oii .' , ,," ~)': j Iff

~'

39

gr~at?r smal~,of,destabHi¢atio,!-and ·there i~not any:realj)robilible commJtJn(illt III ·te~ms of AmerlCttn :troops,· IS there, for Southeast Asi,,(saottv.ities 1 Theyoollid not :be used iu Thailand, for ex"""ple; or in the Philippines! That is what T Mn really driving at. .

Mr. HALPERIN. Why not Je!tve it alone! . Mr. HAMILTON. Yes: why not leave it !tlone just for the sake or drawing it out a little bIt more?

Mr. HALPlllRIN. Well, there is an attempt by the administration to say that SEATO now is just an economic arrangement. The fact remains that the Senate of the United States has consented to the ratification, the United States has ratified the treaty which says that an attack tm Thailand would endanger the peace and safety of the United States and that we will act to meet that common danger.

Mr. HAMILTON. According to our Constitution. . Mr. HALPERIN. According to 'our constitutional procedures which

in my view means that Congress will have the right to decide what we have to. Under the War Powers bill for 30'days the President c",n do what he decided he had to do. I don't think the United States Shollidcontinue the treaty which (a) we don't believe in and (b) we would not want ·to act on if they came to pass. I think it is very unlikely that there would be a OOmmunist invasion eibher by North Vietnam or by China of Thailand·hbut I dO.n. !t; believe We should put ourselves in a J;>osition to give t e ThaiS.' a blank check with the' knowled£e that rf they are attacked we are obliged to come in. 1 just believe the credibility of our commitments is much stronger if we only maintain those oommitmel).ts that we believe in.

As to whether it oosts us money or ,not; this is a -..:ery slippery prob, IBm beeause the troops neeessary to meet any oommltment are So much of a matter of judgment Itnd 'argument that whatever the treaty com, mitments of the United States, the .roint Chiefs of Staff would claim thIDt fihe trooDS were toosmal!; I s~ppose m",ny critics would say they are too big. So even if we eliminated the SEATO Treaty, tjle argUr ment would still bOo made. I think, by ,the Secretary of Defensethat .w~ ought to .go back from'IS to 19 divisions rather than stay at l~orgo to a Jowernl}mber. , _ ' '~I·,·.

I believe that argument to be much harder to mltke that in .fact the argumeht~hat 16 is certain~y enough:llsth~ . .pr;esidentsaid4~t year and fhat m fact probably tjle number .,,?nslderabl:1;Tb.~low 16.,1~

.. en0tl.l!'h tOibe,m1;lch eaSIer to sust.aln bOth ,pohtlCal1;y and, mtellectull11y !£w.l1uid1Vithdraw1;l our convnitment.~o Thailana bec)1ll~e in Nort4, east Asia 't4erequire\nent for troops is reallyveny difficult to ma.k.~,

';l'll. ,~.South. K." .';)F~ns 4. ave mqr. e me!, .. under '!l.rm.s, J.li<p. an.l." N .. ei ..... !?; .. , ... ea.latliI. ' and.the flllhppmes ,/I're I).ot. subject to allY :grO)ln<;i.tpre!),ts. So by re,M.uncingthe: SEATO Treitty you woujdbevi)::tuah~ elimfuliting ~~b"tantjalgro1;l1;lds fOrM), A:si\\n .coj:lnni!mellt l!'n~ thl\t· 'r~)\ild, . I b~~ &tii ma~:r!~,e ~r~lllents thatt~e'Ar~y IS too bll' fub~t!tntlal1y bettl\: .

Mr.fJ?&MIr,TON. tn It ver'yoroitd senSBwhat i!lttiati{'~k rIo you think' !.Ws<3:qyeu!lp\~!lt ought to be tlLk-ing /lOw with ,~~ita~1l 'tr Asian :p()licy,

l~il' i~ !~~,~" : ':«tW.,'~'b~Wev~, ~n i'fWillf~?~,:,iriw b:llt ~~ alr~i'tt* . t~ 1_ ~~\~ -.<tlWt.:mt -, ',_ q i'-i,. 1.1". j!1~::,1,; ", ,'; ,",1 hi _ -,-"'J"; . -:' -'ill" ':~l!-.d.-', -; ~ .(;.:./ '" , '.B:A~ .~, ", ,,,,,:] '4(lfi,t,:W:ant:to ~n~e~,~t<!,,"'~Y:m!l~~,j~,iihwj qe ens~,t1)~l'ti~~, ,~ " ~~", "." '., ""P ,." 'i,)!!;'., . ',.,:;'\ .' r,

40

Mr. HALPERLN.lthink there is a much stronger' case thatcan.be made for Malaysia and Sing!>pore; If We have a. treaty with somebody in SO\ltheast Asia; I would prefer those tw(fcountries to Thailand but I am not advoca,ting a treaty with either. " . i .'

I think we should withdraw military forces from Taiwan, I can see no reason to keep them there. I do not believe we should renounce our treaty commItments with Taiwan or any other countries we have in the area. I believe we should urge the Koreans into negotiations with the :North Koreans leading to a recognition of both countries and creation of a nuclear free zone in Korea. I do not believe the United States shouldi>tation nuclear weapons anywhere in Korea. , It continues to be the policy of the executive branch that the presence of the nuclear weapons in any cOuntry outside the United States can neither be confirmed or not so I am not prepared to volunteer infor­mation, but insofar as there are any I beheve they should be removed. I certainly do not beHeve they should be maintained where they run the risk or being overrun by enemy forces, and I believe there are some that run that risk.

Mr. NIX. May I interrupt a momelit. I understand this is the final passage. .

Will you takeover! Have you voted! Mr. HAMIL1:<.lN. I hD;ve voted., ' Mr:Nlx. Take over while I vote. ,Mr. HAMILTON [preSiding]. To continue, what .other initiatives do

you think we ought to take in As~a! Wllat aj:Jout Japan! , ' Mr. HALPERIN. I believe the American security relationship with'

Japan is of vitalimportance to the United States and should be con, tained. I think we should continue our process of closing bases in Japan lind Okinawa to going down to a residuaUorceof a single air­base and a single naval faCIlity in Japan. I believe that we should begin a dialog wJth the Japan,ese which would be toa mutualddini­tiou by the two. countries of what the seclirity threats are in ASIa arid what we each proppse to do about it. As. It matter of .fact, I thinJ!: we should start' insisting' that the Japanese' take some responsibility at least politicall:\r. for what security commitments we co;ntiJ;me. I do not believe ';"Bsh?uld encour,\/l,"e,them to ;de.velop !liiiitary ~apabilitiesf~r use outslileJapan. I don't thllik that)8 llCour mterest or would be wel-comem Asia. " " ". . .. '.> ' ...... '

Mr. ~MILToN.Apartfromthe stepsrelating, to sec)lf~ty ~~t~· ments In the area, do you foresee any lither steps.thaty()~ think we ou'ht to be toikirig! .. ' '. ,'. ,. '. .... ..,., .... ;':. .' "

fir. H,;).'LPERlN:. I thfrilHhe Secretary of State ought .to,takea trip to JapaId"h~re he stOps,iriChina for o1)oe rathe.r t?a!, al,,\,!l.ys be,!he rJ:v .. ers. e: ~~h.,1. nk.' we c.ontlll .. u .. ~ to .. tr. ea .. t J .. :ap,a,n as. If .. It IsCey. ~o .. n, :W ... }.~)i aBologIes to Qeyl,?n.) .guess It hilf;alsoch!illged .Its ~me. We 'C,?ntI')ue to treat ~ apan ,as Iht IS a ,:ery'sma)~ and llisIgmfic"nt coulltryl11st8li:~ . ?f Ath~ t41r~ lI!ajor~or0II!\C £9,\,:e1',lll the "",orId alid t.~~maJ~r. power In 81a . . ', "_ ,_', _," _,

That is proolMya 'matter d:i'attitude. ltisa 'matter' of whether.?ur ~cretary<if~t-ate g~ ou~,ther~ ~n~j~~~stop~ o'l-(the."IV:~Y b!tp~.J'(; is a matte1'<if.,.W".~the1' w~cons~lt 'YIt~.t. helti Jje.fOr(\'Wiec.l1.~ 9,.'ff. ~ji~\l'.~Y' beaus aft'lr' .£or:y,eav~]~cturmg ,them .o~·how a. )"eI!ponsfble., llou1].~ry . wo. iir~ .. ih#I$'6JlI\'~"tin~.'i~F(>.·1 'ritthe United: iSt!t. ~~tn. s. t~p,dp.f'It.1 ~9" .. illg~l(ejr. ..,. own, .It,.19a matter wheth,er we consult w.lth th~!fibaf6re We moya w ...

41

C)lina afterprom;sing faithfully!or 20 years that we would do so. This seems to be an assumption that either it is inevitable that they become our antagonists or that it is desirable or. that we are so grossly inept in our dealings with Japan. Since I refuse to accuse them of ineptness I am stuck with one of the other two. In'Japanit has to do with the form and the style as it does with the substance.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Riegle. Mr. RI,JilGLE. What do you think our role should be in South Konea

as it relatl's to. Japan! I gather you talked on that before I got here, but more specifically shouhlwe continue to do what. we are doing now or does it ever mattl'r what kinds of things we do as a part of a Japanese strategy. .. .

Mr. HAl,PERIN. I would do three things: One, I would withdraw some of the troops but not all of them, . ' Second, I would tell the Koreans that we are simply not going to

continue to provide economic and military aid to the government which shows itself less and less concerned about the civil liberties and Civil rights of its own citizens, that it is for them to decide how they want to operatl' own government but it is also for us to decide whether we want to military and economic aid.' ..

I don't that we should continue to suggest indifference to, whllt . it is the p.oll"cy 0"£ this admini.stratioI,l, that

~"~_.,, long as theysnppor,t our foreIgn pollcy we. at home. I don't believe that. is the attitude

and I believe the .United States has indicated might say, it is mnch more fruitiu],of coun­

than it is with the Soviet Union. In the io~~._~lfr~~~::~~(t.~(;-mruch less likely to have an ejiect than tl the Greeks.

is to encourage, an effort to renunciation of force '

42

bolder than they have been prepared'to do at hamethaiIi th&y have beenintl:tepast. "", '"

I \IleRn the Korean abducting of the leader' of, the opposititln party from, Japan, bringing, him to, Korea and putting him u,nder house anvest. Ada,. as: I can tell; the :ur uined Sta,tes ha~ S!}idnothing aJiout it and the Japanese did and; got some satisfuction,though not a' great deal. "

1 think our policy ought to be. one :which. says to foreign /l"0vern­ments that wh"t they do at home IS theIr b)l$mess and tl:te,marmes are: not going to land. H<lwevl\r the natu,re an\l ext,ent of, the American !,upport, milita,ry aid and cred,ts, will depend. on our assessment oJ' whether they are maintaining th,e kinds of government we want to be associated with and S]lPpoFt" It is not clear t<! me how much good that will do, r think it varies from country to country, but it, is SOme­thing we ought to do becauSe itis what we believe to be right; whether or not it is going to, make, a subst'l"ntialdifferellJ)e. I think in Greece; there is no quest,ion if we' had'c\pne that righh I),way it would have made a difference. I think in Korea there may be a substantial differ-ence. I think in other couJ)tri&s, it might well alsQ. , '

I certainly don't think we'shoriltl do as 'we did in Chil~; na\lle\y, i'llterferring ,against themljecause we don't like what we ,think. t,heir foreign polici!'S might be and creating situations in which authoi'i" tariall governments'come to power and then announce ,this as a great succes<;;fur American foreign policy. I thin\<: it'i$ a disaster for Ameri­can policy ahd it, affects the way we see what h~ppenedinOhilea& in our interest. ~t affects how we feel. aboll,t what, happens in our own society. It certainly affects people. ,', ' " '

We have discovered that man.J: of tl}e t>eopJ.e who thoughtit was tegal; to " somebody's office m the Unitl>d Sta,teo;I wel"\l people who were " " a\)~honz,iilg bu.rglari&a in for,eighcoJl:ntrje~, and' it is very " ' l111x~d up. I think we hllve leI11'lJ,'li!fha,t;w.jl Just c\1unot, ~".lt~2:~t:e~t!l:M'~'l; 1\t.'leal1t,to be true to oiI~IYe$lj''l OUg!it to $4>p these

1::<'hold '''' democratic front apq not ~ i1t4ill'er~nt

, , ,

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the'Y is sj;am)?edin, the: Pt!JS\dent's name ia stamped.on tlW hottom andthe·thing ~sdon:e. . . .. '. ... . . .. '

Congrese \8: n,qt' ~arrymgol1t. ~ts resp:onsrblltty by, cu.ttm:g; oJffffilde ,except.lUhe Presidentshallsigp. Xbecal1se ~"';,?ll find.:xi .and 1>he Congrese lins to be l'repared to. wke theresponSrbIhty to'say : We have weighed the harm .that will' comefl'omthis cutoffrand· We find the aid that should.be cutoff-because of· ",h .. t i~ g!'ling·on. Congress must not take the easy way out imd saywa.will gi"eth~ President the rigi;tt.to waive;

Mr. RIEGLE, I just would like to ask one more question if I may, Mr. ChairmaI). "

Mr. NIX. 'Go ahead. Mr. RIEGLE. This is a. broader question but it relates to what weare

.discussing here. The world's needs in terms of problems be their pollu­tion, population, or resource allocation, alw .. ys·create an attempt to deal with everybOdy's problems and the other difficulty is dealing with our own foreign 1'01. icy and everybody. else's foreign policy on the basis .of everybody's strategic interests. So you get- the whole bataU<leof powerpolici"s in the way of trying to solveprolYlems and: neither seems to be working. .

It'seems to me we are falling. furlherand further behind in terms .ofthe criti~al issu<iBtha.t ha.ve to be addressed. It. is a very complicated world and planning has to g<? on. and there is'rrolYah awful lot of time left to do it. I am wondering how we get from' where we 'are now in the absence of that kind of a mechanism to the development of such ;a mechrmisIU., ,,'

It seems'to ~ethatwe aTe .. t l\~?~nt""he~e we should:Iiftour~lves out of the.dass."al debate-on-these'Iss11es as Importa.p.t·as they are·and ·yeally,think.apoll,t:the key thin!\1'thatare happ"nirrg 'Y0r~d:wide.lam JUst wonderm:g wlint though'tsyou m .. y'h!l.vea;long thiS hnBor people that' You are talking witi;t hav" a.longthis line. How do we go about

. ",tartirrg·to·sort'of bridge into'a b,and new way of d.ealing with prob-lems that b'elo,ngto everybody and won't go away! . .

Mr; HALPl!lRI:It: I think that is a verr hard ·question. My thoughts .on. that I guesi! b~gi~ and maybe end WIth what Floren"" 'N'lghtiul,!'ale sard' about, hosp)tals .. She saId first Qf all tlley should not' spread ~~=~. ~~n )'()1l;8(>lve that proble~, th~n}ou canw?p'yab~ut

I . to say United 'States .' .' . to the '" before