ia rte haiti_phase 2 final report
TRANSCRIPT
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INTERAGENCYREALTIMEEVALUATIONOFTHEHUMANITARIANRESPONSETOTHEEARTHQUAKEINHAITI
20MONTHSAFTER
SilviaHidalgo,withsupportfromMariePascaleThodateJanuary
2012
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The evaluators wish to express their profound gratitude to all those who shared their constructivecriticalviewsandhelpedshapetheconclusionsandrecommendationscontained inthepresentreport.
Weare
especially
grateful
to
the
Haitians
we
met
who,
once
again,
generously
and
patiently
found
the
timetocommunicateandtooffertheirconcernsandideas.
Wearegrateful for thesupport received fromConcern,OCHA, IEDARelief, IOM,UNHabitat,UNICEF,UNFPAandUNOPS.
Finally,theauthorswouldespeciallyliketothankTijanaBojanic,withoutwhosesupportthisevaluationcouldnothavebeenundertaken.
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LISTOFACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONS
CAP ConsolidatedAppealProcessCCCM CampCoordinationandCampManagementCDAC CommunicationwithDisasterAffectedCommunitiesCMO CampManagementOperationsCNSA CoordinationNationaledelaScuritAlimentaireCNE CentreNationaldesquipementsCO CountryOfficeCSC CoordinationSupportCommitteeCTC CholeraTreatmentCentreCTU CholeraTreatmentUnitDAD DevelopmentAssistanceDatabase(DAD)DINEPA DirectionNationaledelEauPotableetdelAssainissementDPC DirectiondelaProtectionCivileDSRSG DeputySpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretaryGeneralECHO EuropeanCommissionHumanitarianAidandCivilProtection
ERC
EmergencyRelief
Coordinator
FAO FoodandAgricultureOrganizationFTS FinancialTrackingSystemGACI GroupedAppuidelaCooprationInternationaleGoH GovernmentofHaitiICG InternationalCrisisGroupIHRC InterimHaitiRecoveryCommissionGBV GenderbasedviolenceHC HumanitarianCoordinatorHCT HumanitarianCountryTeamHQ Headquarters
HIC
Humanitarian
Information
Centre
HRF HaitiReconstructionFundIARTE InterAgencyReal TimeEvaluationIASC InterAgencyStandingCommitteeICC InterClusterCoordinationICRC InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossIDB InterAmericanDevelopmentBankIDP InternallydisplacedpersonIHRC InterimHaitirecoveryCommissionIM InformationmanagementIFRC InternationalFederationoftheRedCrossINFP InstitutNationaldeFormationProfessionnelle
IOM
InternationalOrganization
for
Migration
ISF IntegratedStrategicFrameworkJ/PHRO J/PHaitianReliefOrganizationMARNDR MinistredelAgriculture,desRessourcesNaturellesetduDveloppementRuralMAST MinistredesAffairesSocialesetduTravailMENFP MinistredelducationNationaleetdelaFormationProfessionnelleMICT MinistredelIntrieuretdesCollectivitsterritorialesMINUSTAH UnitedNationsStabilizationMissioninHaiti
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MPCE MinistredelaPlanificationetdelaCoopration ExterneMTPTC MinistredesTravauxPublics,Transports&CommunicationMSPP MinistredelaSantPubliqueetdelaPopulationNGO NongovernmentalorganizationOCHA OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairesOHCHR OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRightsPDNA
Post
Disaster
Needs
Assessment
and
Recovery
Framework
RC ResidentCoordinatorSRSG SpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretaryGeneralTRIAMS TsunamiRecoveryImpactAssessmentandMonitoringSystemUN UnitedNationsUNCT UnitedNationsCountryTeamUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUNFPA UnitedNationsPopulationFundUNIFEM UnitedNationsDevelopmentFundforWomenUNHABITAT UnitedNationsHumanSettlementsProgrammeUNICEF UnitedNationsChildrensFund
USAID
UnitedStates
Agency
for
International
Development
UNOPS UNOfficeforProjectServicesWASH Water,SanitationandHygieneWatSan WaterandsanitationWFP WorldFoodProgrammeWHO WorldHealthOrganization
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
2LISTOFACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONS 3
EXECUTIVESUMMARY 6INTRODUCTION 6I. INTRODUCTION 17I.1 BACKGROUNDANDAIMOFTHEEVALUATION 17I.2 METHODS,SCOPEANDSTRENGTHSANDWEAKNESSESOFTHEEVALUATION 18I.3 CONTEXT 21II. MAINACHIEVEMENTS,GAPS,LIMITSANDCONSTRAINTS 24II.1 MAINACHIEVEMENTS 24II.2 THEBIGGAPS:DURABLESOLUTIONS,LIVELIHOODS,ACCOMMODATION,COMMUNICATIONANDCONTINUEDSUPPORT 27II.3 LIMITSANDCONSTRAINTS 29II.4 PROGRESSONMAINRECOMMENDATIONSEMERGINGFROMFIRSTPHASEOFTHERTE 31III.
COHERENCE,
CONNECTEDNESS
AND
SUSTAINABILITY
OF
THE
RESPONSE
33
III.1 LACKOFCLARITYANDCONSENSUSONWHATCONSTITUTESHUMANITARIANACTIONINHAITI 33III.2 UNCERTAINPLANNING 34III.3 TRYINGINTERRELATIONSHIPS 34III.4 SUSTAINABILITYOFEFFORTS 35III.5 LIMITEDTAKEUPOFHUMANITARIANCONCERNSINLONGERTERMRECOVERYEFFORTS 35III.6 PILOTINGANDLINKINGEFFORTS 36IV. COORDINATIONANDCLUSTERTRANSITION 36IV.1 LIMITEDCONNECTIONBETWEENDIFFERENTCOORDINATIONMECHANISMSANDACTORS 36IV.2 CLUSTERTRANSITION 38V. INFORMATION 38V.1 CLUSTERDRIVENINFORMATIONSYSTEMS 38
V.2
ENGAGINGWITHOTHERACTORSONINFORMATIONMANAGEMENT
39V.3 COMMUNICATIONEFFORTS 39
VI. SUMMARYOFFINDINGSANDLESSONSLEARNED 40VII. CONCLUSION 42VIII. KEYRECOMMENDATIONS 46ANNEX1:TERMSOFREFERENCE 51ANNEX2:REPORTONTHEFOCUSGROUPHELDWITHHAITIANSTAFFINVOLVEDINTHEHUMANITARIANRESPONSE 60ANNEX3:REPORTONTHEIARTEWORKSHOPONTRANSITION 66ANNEX4:TRANSITIONSTRATEGIESOFCLUSTERSINHAITIANDOPTIONSFORLINKING/MERGINGTHEMINTOOFFICIALSTRUCTURES 71ANNEX5:TIMELINE 93ANNEX6:RECOMMENDATIONSFROMTHEWORKINGGROUPONCOMMUNICATIONSATTHERTEWORKSHOP 94ANNEX7:OVERVIEWOFCOORDINATIONFRAMEWORKS 95ANNEX8:FOCUSGROUPS,GENERALMEETINGSOBSERVEDANDVISITS 98
ANNEX9:LISTOFPERSONSMET
100
ANNEX11:SELECTEDREFERENCES 105
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EXECUTIVESUMMARYIntroduction
ThisreportsummarisesthesecondphaseoftheInterAgencyStandingCommitteesInterAgencyRealTime Evaluation of the response to the Earthquake, twenty months after the disaster event. Theearthquake that struck Haiti on January 12th 2010 had a drastic effect on the countrys human andinstitutionalpublicandtheprivatesectorcapacity.Anestimated230,000peoplelosttheirlives;300,000morewere injuredandover1millionwere lefthomeless.1Thedevastatinghumanitariansituationwascompounded by Haitis underlying vulnerabilities and high level of chronic poverty. In response, theinternationalcommunitymountedamassivehumanitarianreliefeffortand fiftyfivedonorspledgedatotalof$4.59billioningrantsfor2010and2011towardstherebuildingofthecountry.2
Given the scale of the disaster and subsequent humanitarian response, the InterAgency Standing
Committee (IASC) launched a multiphase exercise to inform decision makers at national andheadquarters levels, to draw lessons and allow corrections to be made where necessary. TheHumanitarian Country Team (HCT) is intended to be the most immediate user of the feedback andrecommendationsoftheevaluation.
The firstphaseof the InterAgency RealTimeEvaluation, completed inMay 2010, covered the initialresponse. The second phase was initially foreseen to take place in October 20103and focus in aforwardlooking manner on interagency coordination problems or operational challenges during thetransitionphase.Theprocesswaspostponed,duetotheOctober2010choleraoutbreakandthedelaysinstartingthetransitionphase.
Thissecondphasesoughtto:
Analyse and provide lessons for the ongoing response, with a particular focus on coordinationbetweendifferentactorsinvolved;
Examineoptions
for
linking
humanitarian
response
structures
with
longer
term
and/or
government
establishedmechanisms;and
Analyse theextent towhich the findingsand recommendations from the firstphaseof the InterAgencyRealTimeEvaluationhaveinformedtheevolvinghumanitarianresponseinHaiti.
MethodologicalApproach
The evaluation team4carried out the evaluation between August and October 2011, starting with aninitialthreeweekcountrymission.ThefieldworkwasfollowedbydebriefingsandmeetingsinHaitiandNew York. A workshop on the preliminary findings of the evaluation was held in PortauPrince inadvanceof theCommon AppealProcess (CAP)2012workshop.Additionaldatawasgathered later in
Haitiuntil
the
end
of
October
2011.
Interviews
were
conducted
with
more
than
250
individuals
from
Haitian institutions and international agencies (facetoface interviews, focus groups andteleconferences)aswellaswithindividualsandgroupsfromtheaffectedcommunitiesindifferentsites
1GoHfigures(estimatesofthenumberofdeadvary).
2PledgedattheMarch2010InternationalDonorsConferenceheldinNewYork.
3TwoscopingmissionsinMarch2011andJuly2011furtherfinetunedtheinitialTermsofReference.
4TheteamofthreeindependentevaluatorswasreducedtotwooneHaitian,oneinternational aftertheinitialfieldphaseof
theevaluation.
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in PortauPrince and Logane and facing different situations5. An additional debriefing for IASCmemberswasheldinGenevainDecember2011.
Section1inthereportexplainsthebackground,methodologyandconstraintsoftheevaluation.Findingsare presented in sections two to five. Summary of findings and lessons learned are in section VI,conclusioninsectionseven,andsummaryofkeyfindingsandrecommendationsarebroughttogetherinsection
eight.
A
note
on
cluster
transition,
prepared
for
managers
in
the
field
in
advance
of
the
finalizationoftheevaluation,ispresentedinfullinAnnex4.
ContextualConstraintsontheHumanitarianResponse
Atthetimeofthisevaluation,twentymonthsaftertheearthquake,thehumanitarianresponsetotheinitial catastrophe has unfolded within a context of multiple crises, including a cholera epidemic,hurricanes,andpoliticalandsecuritychallenges.Peoplewhowerealreadylivinginsituationsofpovertyand vulnerability before the earthquake are now in a situation of severe need.Despite increasingconstraintsonfunding,transitionhasbeenhighontheagendaasaresultofthegrowingdesiretomoveawayfromhumanitarianresponseandreliefandtoofferdurablesolutionstoexistingneeds.
As phasing out of humanitarian aid did not go hand in hand with concrete steps towards recovery,speedinguptherecoveryandreconstructionprocessbecameamajorpriorityin2011.Theabsenceofagovernmentformuchoftheyear2011andthefactthattheworkofInterimHaitiRecoveryCommission(IHRC) was questioned (its mandate was due to expire in October 2011) resulted in prolongeduncertaintyandinstitutionalfragility.Atthesametime,therehavebeen groundsforoptimismlinkedtothe newly elected Presidents leadership and elements of his programme. Vision, leadership anddecisionmakinghavebeenlackinginthepastinHaiti.PresidentMartelly'scommitmentsoneducationandthe16/6Projectpresentbothchallengesandopportunitiesforpositivechange.
Achievements,GapsandChallenges
Bytheendof2011,thekeyachievementsoftheresponsehavebeen:mainstreamingdisasterpreparedness;aneffectiveresponse incamps,withpopulations largelyfreeofcholera;recentprogress on the rate of rubble removal, which had been a key obstacle for recovery;developments on transitional shelter solutions; implementation of integrated neighbourhoodbasedapproaches;andprogressonimprovingwaterandsanitationinthelongerterm.
Therewasconsiderableconsensusamongstrespondentsonthedeficienciesoftheresponseandcurrentexistinggaps,withHaitianactorsfarmorecriticalofthe internationalresponseatthisstage.Themainshortcomings as perceived in AugustOctober 2011 include: durable solutions; livelihoods;accommodation; communication; and provision of continued support to address remaining needs.Internationalactorsunderlined that,despite thehugeeffortsdeployed,manycriticalconstraintshaveaffectedtheoverallresponseandthespeedofrecoveryinthisperiod.
Inadditiontoexistingcontextualconstraints,thehumanitariancommunityinHaitihasbeenfacingthreemainchallenges:
5Suchas campresidents,relocates,evictees,affectedremaininginneighborhoods,beneficiariesandnonbeneficiariesofhousesrepairedandtransitionalshelter,etc
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Acutehumanitarianneedspersistwithonlylimitedresourcestoaddressthem.Operationsarescalingdownwithoutsustainablesolutionsbeinginplace.
Assistance that does not favour durable solutions no longer meets Haitian expectations.Humanitariangoalsarenotalwaysunderstoodandthehumanitariancommunitysmethodsand instruments (i.e. forms of assistance, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) as adecisionmaking body, the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), methods of needsassessmentandmonitoring)arerepeatedlyquestioned.
Theaidcoordinationanddeliverysystemhasnotbeensufficientlyrationalisedoradaptedtothefastchangingrealityonthegroundandtheneedformoreinteractionwithotheractors(e.g.GovernmentofHaitianddevelopmentdonors).
The evaluation has identified many areas where data collection, needs analysis, consultation andcommunication,interagencyactionandactionwithgovernmentneedtobestrengthenedsothatgainsmadesofararenotlostasagencieswinddown. Themaininformationalchallengeishavinganoverallassessment of needs that can better guide the response, prioritisation and appeals. More preciseinformationontheneedsofearthquakeaffectedpopulationsandtheextentofcoverageisessentialtoplantheresponseasitmovesforward.
The evaluation found that there is a lack of continuing capacity for assessing and crossvalidatinginformation.Intersectoralcoordinationhasbeenregardedasweakbymajorityofintervieweesandhasnot facilitated furthertakeupofeithercrosscuttingormultidimensional issues.Amonitoringsystemrecently established, with clusters quarterly reporting on progress against key indicators, is basedexclusivelyondataemanatingfromtheclusters;aseachclusterhasitsownmethodsofdatacollection,consolidationofindicatorsandcorroborationofdataremainsachallenge.Atpresenttheprevalentviewamong actors is that the process is too timeconsuming and that the capacity for providing theinformationisoftennotsuffcient.Informationmanagementsystemsrequiremorebuyin,andshouldbeexpanded and connected to meet the needs of stakeholders and address progress on transition (i.e.achievingdurablerecoverysolutions).
Transition isontheagendabutneedsavision,astrategy,aplanand leadership.Theevaluationfoundthatthecoordinationandplanningmechanismsarenotfullyadaptedtothecurrentcontext.Anoverallaid coordination framework integrating all phases of assistance has been lacking. In an evolvingenvironmentwherethevastmajorityofagenciesarescalingdown,rolesandresponsibilitiesarefurtherblurredbythemismatchinthelevelofresourcesacrosshumanitarian,developmentandgovernmentalactors.There isaneed fordefiningandunderstandingnew rolesand clarifying responsibilities in themovetowardstransitionanddevelopment.
Amajorissue,consistentlyraisedwithevaluators,waslimitedfundingavailableforhumanitarianaidinthe context of a projectdriven recovery and reconstruction process. While a focus on lifesavingactivities is still required,withvulnerablepopulations facingmultiple threats, the2011 revisedCAP is
only56
per
cent
funded
and
60
percent
of
the
government
budget
depends
on
international
assistance.
InSeptember2011,donorshadonlydisbursed43percentofthe$4.59billionofthetotalpledgedforrecoveryandreconstructioninthe20102011timeframe.
The length of time required to achieve results was identified as a key limitation to planning fortransition. The organisational structures of the main agencies are considered costly and not flexibleenough,yetagenciesstillfeeloverstretchedintheircurrentcapacities.Withstructuresremainingintactandlargelyhavingtofocusonaddressingconstraintsratherthanonachievingresults,delaysinprogress
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haveconsequencesforcosts.TheresponseinHaitihasbeenmoreexpensivethaninotherrecentcrises(e.g. Pakistan, Sri Lanka) and has far exceeded initial estimates, with projects reported as exceedingthemby2.5to3times.
TheresponsehasbeenhinderedbyalackofengagementinagenuinetwowaycommunicationandtheeffectivesupportofHaitians,whofeelsidelinedandareincreasinglycriticalofNGOsandtheoverallaideffort.
The
humanitarian
community
has
been
limited
in
its
communications
by
not
having
asufficiently
clear understanding of Government of Haiti (GoH) recovery plans with respect to, for example, aresettlementstrategy.WhileplanssuchastheActionPlanfortheNationalRecoveryandDevelopmentofHaitiweredrafted inadvanceof theMarch2010donorsconference, theyoften lacked legitimacywithinthecountrybecauseofboththe limitedHaitianparticipation intheirpreparationandthe2011change of government. The commitment of the new GoH and the need to progress from the initialhumanitarian crisis response towards transition and longer term development present valuableopportunitiesforadjustingthecurrentaidarchitectureinHaiti.
Followuptoevaluationrecommendations
Whilethere
was
no
formal
follow
up
or
management
response
to
the
first
phase
of
the
IA
RTE,
progress
hasbeenmadewithrespecttothreeofitsmainrecommendations.First,thehumanitariancommunityhasincorporatedinitsresponsethechallengesofmainstreamingdisasterpreparedness.Second,thereisgreaterawarenessoftheneedforhumanitarianactorstoadapttheirresponsetotheparticularneedsofan urban environment. Humanitarian efforts have continued to focus on neighbourhoods, andcommunitybased integrated approaches are increasingly favoured and implemented. Third, specificrecommended actions were taken to make the response more inclusive. These have not yet provensufficient to effectively address the extent of the problem. Finally, the response did not manage toextenditscoveragefullytotheearthquakeaffectedpopulationsinruralareas.Geographiccoveragehasbeenextendedtosomedegreetomeetsomeurgentneedsinthecountryside(mainlycholera).
The
humanitarian
community
needs
to
improve
utilization
focused
approaches
to
evaluation.
At
this
time inHaititherearenotenoughexamplesofsystematicfollowuptoevaluations(e.g.bydevelopinganoperationalplanbasedonrecommendationsandassessingprogress4to5monthslater).Moreover,systemwide evaluations like InterAgency Real Time Evaluations should be better integrated intooperationalplanningtobeusedeffectively.
KeyRecommendations
The recommendations below are intended to offer insights into how continuing and urgenthumanitarianneedscanbemetasthistransformationtakesplace.
1. Furtherengagewith thenewgovernmentandHaitiansociety toclarifyandunderstandnew
priorities,objectives
and
strategies
and
better
adapt
the
response
and
collective
action.
Thehumanitariancommunity,incoordinationwithdevelopmentactors,needstoreengagewiththenewgovernmentandtheHaitiansocietyandtakeadvantageof institutionalchangessuchastheNewHousingAuthority toadapt itsapproach,bettercommunicateitsconcernsandjointlydefineanactionplanthataddresseshumanitarianprioritiesandprovidesclarityfortransition.Thisincludesreachingouttoand involvingthediasporaandtheprivatesector(e.g. learningfrom initiatives likeSoulofHaiti,and liaisingwithmembersofthePresidentialAdvisoryCouncil).
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Intheimmediateterm, theHCTincoordinationwiththeUNCT,shouldtaskasmallleadgroup(45 of relevant key leaders in the response) to approach the new Haitian government and tocollaborateat thehighest level in theclarificationofconcernsandpriorities.Thegroup should, ifpossible,haveRedCrossparticipationandincludeOCHA,UNDPandUNICEFleadership.
Either therecently formedadvocacyworkinggrouporanewoneshould informand followuponthe processed described above and provide information to the lead group. By working withdifferentlevelsofgovernmentandotherHaitianactors,thisgroupcouldeventuallydefineaclearerroadmaptoguidetransitionandaddressremainingneeds.Thegroupshould includeparticipationfromprotectionclusterandCampCoordinationandCampManagement(CCCM)/shelter clusters.
TheinternationalcommunityinHaitiHCT,UNCT,G12,OfficeoftheSpecialEnvoy,etc. needstoconveytheneedforacoherentprocessfor formulatinganoverallresettlementstrategyandplan.Subsequentlytheplanshouldbesupportedandusedtoalignefforts.ThenewHousingAuthorityinHaitishouldbeencouragedtodefinepolicyandstrivetoworkwithinanagreedoverallresettlementstrategy.
The HCT should also oversee a process to redefine an advocacy plan which would conveyhumanitarianconcernsandencouragegenuinetwowaycommunicationwithaffectedpopulationsandnationalNGOs.
To achieve this, additional leadership, decision making and a stronger and more strategic HCT isneeded,andhighlevelGoHpresenceat theHCTshouldalsobeconsidered.OCHAwouldalso requireadditionalsupport.
2. Reformandrationalisecoordinationtofosterintegration,advancehumanitarianconcernsandconnecthumanitarianactionwithotherphasesorcategories(i.e.recovery,reconstructionanddevelopment)andstakeholdersintheframeworkofanoverallresponse.
TheHC/RCofficeshoulddevelopaproposalforestablishinggreaterlinksbetweentheCAPandtheIntegrated Strategic Framework (ISF), includingjoint monitoring of progress against established
indicatorsand
objectives.
TheHCTshouldfurtherreviewitsdecisionmakingcapacityanddefineitsaspirationsandtargetsfor2012intermsofhowitcanengagewiththeGoH,developmentactorsandHaitiancivilsociety.
Transition and Recovery as a topic should be a consistent agenda item at the HCT and inhumanitariandonor coordinationmeetings.Similarly,humanitarianconcerns shouldbeapointofdiscussioninG12meetings.
Had the IHRCs mandate been extended, their representation at the HCT should have beenpromoted and a humanitarian aid issues focus area created within the IHRC (i.e. treated in asimilar way to DRR or other areas). OCHAs presence in Ministry of Planning meetings could beencouragedtoensurethathumanitarianconcernsareconsideredandprogressivelydealtwith inadurableway.
The
HCT
should
encourage
a
new
strategic
multi
stakeholder
exercise
and
planning
process
that
includesrepresentationfromthehumanitariancommunity,takesstockofthecurrentsituationanddevelops a more detailed plan for transition to recovery and development. This should be doneseparatelyand inadvanceoftheCAPMYRexercisewhichfocusesmorenarrowlyonhumanitarianneedsandisnotasinclusiveorHaitispecific.
3. RationaliseandtransitiontheclustersysteminHaiti
Theprocessofproactiveplanningforclustertransition,basedonobjectives,shouldbecontinued.This
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processshouldbejointlydrivenbyOCHA,UNDPandUNICEF.AdditionalsupportshouldbesoughtandprovidedbytheIASCatthegloballevel,OCHAHQ,UNDP/BCPRonclustertransitionandcoordinationonresettlement around key dates, outputs and milestones. The assessment for the rationalization andtransitioningofclustersplancanbedonethroughafourfoldprocess:
Abottomupapproachtounderstandthearrayofgeographicallybasedcoordinationneedsatadecentralised
level,
at
all
scales,
from
neighbourhood,
to
communal
section,
communal,
departmentaltonational.UNDPhasaroletoplayinsupportinglocalgovernanceandastrongerlongtermcoordinationarchitecture.
Areviewoffuturescenarios,understandingtheplansandprioritiesoftheGoHunderthenewpresidency,suchasnewinstitutionsliketheHousingAuthority.Thisshouldtakeaccountoftheimplicationsforcoordinationandtheworkcarriedoutbyclusterstodate.
Asectorbysectoranalysis , leadingtoasectorwideapproach insupportofamorecoherent,seamless response,addressing humanitarian issues, recoveryanddevelopment inparallel,aswellasstrengtheningpreparedness,decentralizationandothercrosscuttingissues.
Specificconcertedactionforkeycrosscuttingandmultidimensionalissuesidentified.
4.
Considerfunding,
costs
and
efficiencies
TheHCTandUNCTsupportedbythegroupthatwasdefinedtocoordinateprojectsubmissionstotheIHRC should oversee efforts that review, reassess and quantify funding gaps for both humanitarianactionandadequatetransitiontorecovery,anddefineacoordinatedfundraisingstrategy.
TheERCandHCshouldreachouttospecificdonorsincludingattheHQleveltoobtainfundingandadditionalstaffcapacityinpriorityunderresourcedareaslikeprotection.
The CAP instrument should be better utilized for fundraising, distinguishing between overallneedsandthehumanitariancommunityscapacitytodeliver.
Donorsshouldprovideflexiblefundingalignedwithprioritiesoutlinedinjointhumanitarianand
recoveryplans.
TheGoHanddonorsshouldemphasizetheneedforminimumtransactioncosts. Costandefficiencyconsiderationsshouldbe factoredinacrosstheresponse.Recoveryproject
implementationmechanismsthatinvolvelessoverheads,reduced levelsofsubcontracting,andlesslagtimeforprocurementandimplementationshouldbeconsidered.
Giventhecostofhumanresources,attentionshouldbepaidtoprioritisingtheuseoftimeandmoreefficientoperationalprocesses(e.g.fasterdraftingandapprovingofpolicypapers,limitingmeetings,etc.)
Humanresourcepoliciesandpractices,specificallyforUNagencies,shouldberevisedtobecomemore flexibleandbetteradaptedtotheneedsoftheresponse(e.g.hiringnationalstaff,rapidshorttermdeployments,betteruseofexistingrosters,etc.)
5. Supportcapacitystrengtheningandretaincapacityinpriorityareas
OCHAandClustersneedtocontinuetofocusonbuildingthecapacityofnationalactors. Space for focusing on key humanitarian needs should be retained in a transition framework
throughamoreconnectedOCHA(e.g.withincreasedpresenceintherecoveryanddevelopmentcoordinationefforts)andadditionalcapacityattheleveloftheHC/RCoffice.
DRReffortsshouldbeprioritisedovertimeandfurtherintegratedintodevelopment.
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More resources and capacity should be dedicated to protection issues through PROCAP withcontinuedsecondmentofcapacitytotheprotectioncluster,andadditionalresourcestoworkatthecommunelevel.
Clusterleadagenciesshouldembedclustercoordinationcapacityintheirprogrammetosupportcounterpartsandbeinapositiontohelpreactivatetheclusterifneeded.
Globallevelguidanceshouldbesoughtonthemultisectorialchallengeofresettlement.
Thetablebelowsummariseskeyfindingsandrelatedrecommendationsoftheevaluation.
Relatedfindingsandconclusions Recommendations
The international community is keen onbacking the new Haitian leadership and itscommitments.(23)
Plans and objectives of the Government ofHaitiarenotalwayswellknown.(54)
Thereisaneed
to
further
align
response
to
objectivesofnewgovernment.(54)
Top positions in the Government of Haitihave found it difficult to engage with thehumanitariancommunity.(55)
Engagement between the humanitariancommunity and government ministries hasproven difficult without a new governmentinplace.(56)
Haitianauthoritieshavefeltmarginalisedbythehumanitarianresponse(55)
The priority for transitioning beyond postearthquake humanitarian response remainsdefining a comprehensive resettlementpolicy.(17)
The goals and objectives of humanitarianresponsearenotalwaysunderstood.(52)
Twowaycommunicationismissing.(77)
R1. Further engage with the new government andHaitiansocietytoclarifyandunderstandnewpriorities,objectivesandstrategiesandbetteradaptresponseandcollectiveaction.
The humanitarian community, in coordination withdevelopment actors, needs to reengage with the newgovernment
and
Haitian
society
and
take
advantage
of
institutional changes such as the New HousingAuthority to adapt its approach, better communicateits concerns and jointly define an action plan thataddresses humanitarian priorities and provides clarityfor transition. This includes reaching out to, andinvolving the diaspora and the private sector (e.g.learning from initiatives like Soul of Haiti, liaising withmembersofthePresidentialadvisorycouncil).
In the immediate term, the HCT in coordinationwiththeUNCT,shouldtaskasmallleadgroup(45)of
relevant
key
leaders
to
approach
the
new
Haitian
government and work with it at the highest level, toclarify priorities and concerns. The group should, ifpossible, have Red Cross participation and includeOCHA,UNDPandUNICEFleadership.
To achieve this, additional leadership, decisionmaking and a stronger and more strategic HCT isneeded. OCHA would also require additional support.Highlevel Government of Haiti presence at the HCTshouldalsobeconsidered.
The
recently
formed
advocacy
working
group
or
a
new
oneshouldbeformedto followuponand informtheseprocesses,provide information to the leadgroupandwork at other levels with the GoH and other Haitianactors,andeventuallydefineaclearerroadmapthatcanfurther guide transition and address remaining needs.The group should include protection cluster andCCCM/shelter clusterparticipation.
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The international community inHaitiHCT,UNCT,G12,Office of the Special Envoy, etc. needs to coherentlyconveytheneedforandconsequentlysupportaprocessofformulatinganoverallresettlementstrategyandplanthat canbe supportedover timeandhelpalignefforts.The
new
Housing
Authority
in
Haiti
should
strive
to
work
under an agreed resettlement strategy and help definethispolicy.
The HCT should also oversee a process that involvesredefining an advocacy plan to convey humanitarianconcerns,andencourageatwowaycommunicationwithaffectedpopulationsandnationalNGOs.
Anoverallaidcoordinationsystemhasbeenabsent.(63)
Therehas
been
limited
interaction
between
recovery and humanitarian coordinationframeworks.(64)
New frameworks and approaches areneeded to overcome weaknesses incoordinationacrosssectors.(63)
Themainobjectiveshaveyet tobedefinedfor an overarching transition plan thatincorporates the humanitarian response.
(68)
There is lackof clarityon the thresholdsofhumanitarian response. Emergencyresponse and development needs areintertwined.(59,61)
There is no collective interaction betweenhumanitariandonorsandtheirdevelopmentcounterparts.(63)
There is limited takeup of humanitarian
concerns
in
longerterm
development
efforts.(63)
Thehumanitarianresponsehashelpedpilotapproaches for recovery that can becontinuedandreplicated.(62)
Assistance is being phased out without an
R2. Reform and rationalise coordination to fosterintegrationandadvancehumanitarianconcernsand connecthumanitarianactionwithotherphasesor
categories(i.e.
recovery,
reconstruction
and
development)andstakeholdersintheframeworkofanoverallresponse.
Asastart,theHC/RCofficecoulddevelopaproposalforestablishing greater links between the CAPand the ISF,includingjointmonitoringofprogressagainstestablishedindicatorsandobjectives.
The HCT should further review its decisionmakingcapacityanddefineitsaspirationsandtargetsfor2012interms of how it can engage with the Government of
Haiti,development
actors
and
the
Haitian
civil
society.
Transition and Recovery as a topic should besystematically made an agenda item at the HCT andhumanitarian donors coordination meetings. Similarly,humanitarianconcernsshouldbeapointofdiscussioninG12meetings.
Had the IHRCs mandate been extended, theirrepresentation at the HCT should have been promotedandahumanitarianaidissuesfocusareacreatedwithinthe IHRC(i.e. inasimilarwayasDRRorotherareasareconsidered). OCHAs presence could be encouraged inMinistry of Planning meetings to ensure thathumanitarianconcernsareconsideredandprogressivelydealtwithinadurableway.
The HCT should encourage a new strategic multistakeholderexerciseandplanningprocess that includesrepresentationfromthehumanitariancommunity,takesstock of the current situation and develops a moredetailedplanfortransitiontorecoveryanddevelopment.Thisshouldbeseparatefromanddoneinadvanceofthe
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effective handover strategy. Recoveryeffortsarenotpickinguponmajorareasofneed that have been covered by thehumanitarian community. As a result,continuing humanitarian needs are largelyunmet.(59,60)
CAP MYR exercise which more narrowly focuses onhumanitarian needs and is not as inclusive and Haitispecific.
There has been much recent progress onplanning for cluster transition. UNICEF hasplayed a key role in advancing clustertransition(69)
The cluster system and the IHRC facedifficulties in rectifying the initial lack ofinclusivenessandlimitedHaitianownership.(66)
Involvement of Haitian NGOs has been
largelyunsuccessful.
(66)
Focusing on sectoral tables for clustertransitionistoolimitedanapproach.(70)
The current system can be furtherrationalised throughmergingkeyobjectivesoftheresponse.(68)
The system is not yet adapted togeographicallybasedcoordination(70)
Information management has to bereviewed in line with outcomes basedcoordinationandinformationneeds.(73)
An overall needs assessment system isabsent, and the existing system is highlydependentontheclusterframework.(73)
Mayors have played a key role in theresponse.(27,68,25)
Crosssector
and
inter
cluster
coordination
havebeenweak.(28,65)
R3.RationaliseandtransitiontheclustersysteminHaiti
Continue proactiveplanning for cluster transitionbasedon objectives. This process should bejointly driven byOCHA ,UNDPandUNICEF.Additionalsupportshouldbesought and provided by the IASC at the global level,OCHA HQ, UNDP/BCPR on cluster transition andcoordinationonresettlementaroundkeydates,outputsand milestones. The assessment for the rationalizationand transitioning of clusters planning can be donethroughafourfoldprocess:
A bottomup approach to understand the array ofgeographically based coordination needs at adecentralisedlevel,atallscales,fromneighbourhood,tocommunalsection,fromdepartmentaltonational.UNDPhasa role toplay in supporting localgovernanceandastrongerlongtermcoordinationarchitecture.
A review of future scenarios, understanding plansandprioritiesoftheGovernmentofHaitiunderthenewpresidency, and plans for new institutions like theHousing Authority. Also to understand the implicationsforcoordinationandtheworkcarriedoutbyclustersto
date.
A sector by sector analysis for a sectorwideapproach in support of a more coherent, seamlessresponse that addresses both humanitarian issues andrecovery and development, as well as strengtheningpreparedness, decentralization and other crosscuttingissues.
Specific concerted action for key crosscutting andmultidimensional issues that tackle importantprioritiesthat are fundamental to address humanitarian needs,phaseout assistance (e.g. resettlement and livelihoods)and make way for a coherent framework forcoordination.
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Thereisinsufficientfundingavailableforthehumanitarian response and recovery (i.e.contributions to the CAP and the HRF). (43)
Theresponse iscostlyand itscosthasbeenunderestimated.
(38,
46)
The CAPs effectiveness as a tool forfundraisingisquestionable.(43)
IHRC isnotconsideredtobeacostefficientstructure.(21)
Areas like protection are underresourced.(37)
Lack
of
funding
prospects
acts
as
a
disincentivetoplanningtransition.(59)
R4.Considerfunding,costsandefficiencies
The HCT and UNCTsupported by the group thatwas defined to coordinate project submissions to theIHRC should oversee efforts that review, reassess andquantify fundinggaps forbothhumanitarianactionandadequatetransitiontorecoveryanddefineacoordinatedfundraisingstrategy.
TheERCandHCshouldreachouttospecificdonorsattheHQleveltoobtainfundingandadditionalcapacitythrough staff secondments in priority underresourcedareaslikeprotection.
Donors should provide flexible fundingcommensurate to priorities outlined in jointhumanitarianandrecoveryandplans.
The Government of Haiti and donors shouldunderlinetheneedforminimumtransactioncosts.
Make better use of the CAP instrument forfundraising. Distinguish between overall needs and thehumanitariancommunityscapacitytodeliver.
Factorin cost and efficiency considerations acrossthe response. Reconsider recovery projectimplementationmechanismsinfavouroflessoverheads,reduced levels of subcontracting, and less lagtime forprocurementandimplementation.
Giventhecostofhumanresources,attentionshouldbepaidtoeffectivelymanagingtheuseofstafftimeandusing more efficient work processes (e.g. ensuring
efficient
processes
for
drafting
and
approving
policy
papers,limitingmeetings,etc.)Human resource policies and practices for UN agenciesshould be revised to become more flexible and betteradaptedtotheneedsoftheresponse(e.g.hiringnationalstaff,rapidshorttermdeployments,etc.)
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Haitifacesmultiplevulnerabilities(16)andnot all elements of DRR have beenconsideredintheresponse.(36)
Theabilitytotackleissueshasdependedoninformation available, whether there is adedicated
cluster,
sub
cluster,
working
grouporhumanresourcecapacity.(35)
Protectionat thiskeyjuncture isviewedasincreasinglycritical.(37)
The absence of a resettlement policy hasbeenamajorgap.(33)
Nationalcapacitiesarestillweak.(42)
Capacitybuilding
takes
time,
goes
hand
in
handwithengagementand isnecessary forthesustainabilityofefforts.(56,59)
R5.Support capacitystrengtheningand retain capacityinpriorityareas
Prioritise DRR efforts over time which should befurther integrated into development. OCHA/Clustersneed to continue to focus on building the capacity ofnationalactors. Ensure thatspace for focusingonkeyhumanitarianneeds is retained in a transition framework through amore connected OCHA (e.g. with increased presence intherecoveryanddevelopmentcoordinationefforts)andadditionalcapacityattheleveloftheHC/RCoffice.
Dedicatemoreresourcesandcapacitytoprotectionissues at this key juncture, through continuedsecondment of PROCAP capacity to the protectioncluster,andprovisionofadditionalresourcestoworkatthecommunelevel.
Seek globallevel guidance on the multisectorialchallengeofresettlement.
Cluster lead agencies should embed clustercoordination capacity in their programme to supportcounterpartsandbe inaposition tohelp reactivate theclusterifneeded.UN human resource practices should be reviewed tomakebetteruseofexistingrosters,allow fortemporaryredeployment,consideringthecapacitiesofpartnersandtobebetterabletoplaceHaitianstaffinkeypositions.
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MAINREPORTI. Introduction
I.1 BackgroundandAimoftheEvaluation
1. Onthe12thofJanuary2010,anearthquakeofmagnitude7.0struckHaitisWestprovince,near
Logne,affecting
the
capital
Port
au
Prince
and
surroundings.
The
earthquake
had
devastating
effects
andaccordingtotheHaitiangovernment,resultedinapproximately230,000deaths,300,000wounded,andovertwomilliondisplacedpersons.Amassiveresponsewasmountedtofaceboththe immediatesituation and establish a bridge towards recovery. Constant challenges including issues with landtenure,limitedgovernmentcapacity,psychologicaltrauma,crime,extremepoverty,protectionissues,acompletelyoverburdened infrastructure system,and the arrayofactors involved foreshadowed thelonganddifficultpathaheadforHaiti.
PORT-AU-PRINCE
Cap-Hatien
Gonaves
Hinche
Jacmel
Jrmie
Les Cayes
Miragone
Port-de-Paix
Fort Liberte
LesAnglaisTiburon
Chantal
Arniquet
Camp PerrinManiche
Cavaillon
StLouisdu Sud
Aquin
GrandGoave
PetitGoave
Bainet
Pestel
Roseau
BonbonAbricot
DameMarie
Les Irois
Moron
Ansed'Hainault Beaumont
CorailPetitTroude Nippes
BaraderesAnse-a-Veau
L'Asile
La vallee de Jacmel
CayesJacmel
Marigot
Ernnery
CercaCarvajal
Vallieres
TerrierRougeTrou
du Nord
CercaLaSource
Thomassique
Belladere
Jimani
LascahobasSautD'eau
Thomonde
Maissade
Pignon
LaVictoire Mombin
Crochu
Bahon
Milot
Limonade
Dondon
SaintRaphael
Marmelade
SaintMichelde l'Attatalaye
Dessalines
Petite Rivierede l'Artibonite
Verrettes
LaChapelle
Mirebalais
Grande Saline
DesdunesL'Estere
AnseRouge
Mole StNicolas
Bombardopolis
Baie deHenne
Jean Rabel
BassinBleu
Chansolme
Anse-a-Foleur
Saint Louisdu Nord
LeBorgne
Port MargotLimbe
PilateGros Morne
La Branle
Plaisance
Anse a pitres
Grand Gosier
FondVerrettes
Ganthier
Thomazeau
CabaretArchaie
LeoganeChambellan
Perches
Ferrier
Carice
BasLimbe
Acul duNord
Terre Neuve
Boucancarre
Kenscoff
Carrefour
PetionVille
Gressier
Cornillon
Ile a Vache
Anse-a-Galets
Pointe-a-Raquette
La Tortue
Caracol
Belle Anse
Torbeck
StJeanduSud
Port-Salut
CoteauxPort-a-Piment
Chardonnieres Thiote
Roche ABateau
Ouanaminte
Monte Criste
Dajabn
SaintMarc
C U B A D O M I N I C A N
R E P U B L I C
H A I T I
SUD EST
NO RD ES T
ARTIBONITE
CENTRE
SU D
GRANDEA N S E
NO RD OU ES T
NI PP ES
NO RD
O U E S T
LE DE LA TORTUE
LEDELA GONVE
PRESQU'LEDESBARADRES
LES CAYMITES
LE VACHE
720'W7230'W730'W7330'W740'W7430'W
200'N
1930'N
190'N
1830'N
180'N
0 10 20 30 40 50
km
Legend
Capital city
Firstadmincapital
Towns
International Boundary
Port
Firstadminboundary
Disclaimer:The designations employed and the presentation of materialon this map donot imply the expression of anyopinion whatsoever on the partof the Secretariat ofthe United Nations concerning the legalstatus of any country,territory,city or area orof its authorities, or concerning the delimitation ofits frontiers or boundaries. ReferenceSystem:UTM 18N, WGS84. Map datasource:United Nations Cartographic Section,ESRI,NaturalEarth, SR TM.Population exposure source:USGS
Haiti - Population Esposed and Exposure Level
Visit http://www.reliefweb.int/haiti to access this map and other crisis information.
Light
Moderate
Verystrong
Severe
Violent
Extreme
Preceivedshaking
7,261,000
5,887,000
1,049.000
571,000
314,000
2,246,000
332,000
Populationexposed
Strong
2. In view of the magnitude of the disaster and the subsequent response, the InterAgencyStandingCommittee (IASC) launchedamultiphase InterAgencyRealTimeEvaluation (IARTE) for thecountry,toassessthedisasterresponse,informdecisionmakers,drawlessonsandallowcorrectionstobemade,inrealtimewhennecessary.Thefirstphasetookplacethreemonthsaftertheearthquakeandevaluatedtheinitialresponse.TheIARTEmissioninAugustSeptember2011ispartofthesecondphaseoftheevaluation,withthemainobjectivesto:
Analyse
and
provide
lessons
for
the
ongoing
response,
with
a
particular
focus
oncoordinationbetweenthedifferentactorsinvolved;
Examine options for linking humanitarian response structures with longerterm and/orgovernmentestablishedmechanisms;and
AnalysetheextenttowhichthefindingsandrecommendationsfromthefirstphaseoftheInterAgency RealTime Evaluation have informed the evolving humanitarian response inHaiti.
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3. BasedonthekeyevaluationquestionsforthesecondphaseoftheIARTE6thisreportfocusesonfourmainareasoftheresponse:
Mainachievements,gapsandconstraints Coherence,connectednessandsustainabilityoftheresponse Coordinationandtransition Information
I.2 Methods,ScopeandStrengthsandWeaknessesoftheEvaluation
I.2.1. Background
4. As per the Terms of Reference of the IA RTE of the Humanitarian Response to the HaitiEarthquake,thesecondphaseoftheevaluationwastocommencesixtosevenmonthsafterthe initialmissionandreflectuponrelevance,effectiveness,efficiencyandcoverageduringthetransitionphaseoftheresponse.Theprocesswaspostponed,duetotheOctober2010choleraoutbreakandthedelaysinstartingthetransitionphase.ThesecondphaseoftheIARTEintheendoccurredfourteenmonthsafter
theinitial
first
phase
mission,
from
August
to
October
2011,
with
the
terms
of
reference
fine
tuned
over
thecourseoftwofieldvisitsthattookplaceinMarchandJuly2011.7
Inpractice,however, the secondevaluationphasewas timely in that the transitionprocesswasverymuchontheagendaofthehumanitarianactors inHaiti.Themaindifficultyatthis laterstagewastheevaluationslackofcapacitytoinfluencetheprocess,givenfundingchallenges,capacityconstraintsanddownscaling or finalising of humanitarian operations in Haiti.8Evaluators also faced some difficultiesarrangingmeetingswiththeHaitianauthoritiesandotherkeystakeholdersduringthefieldphaseoftheevaluation.
1.2.2. Methods
5. The findings of the evaluation are based on a triangulation process9drawing on six types oflargelyqualitativesourcesofinformation:
semistructured interviewswithover250keystakeholdersonan individualorsmallgroupbasisinHaiti,PanamaandNewYork,10
Stakeholdergroup Numberofpersonsinterviewed
6See
Terms
of
Reference
in
Annex.
7ThefirstmissionincludedrepresentativesfromOCHAandUNICEFonbehalfoftheManagementGroupfortheevaluation;the
secondmissionwasconductedbytheevaluationmanager,accompaniedbytheinternationalconsultantfortheevaluation.8Forthisreason,anumberoffindingsandconclusionswouldnothaverecommendationsatthislaterstage.
9Evaluatorsusedtriangulationanddrewonmultiplesourcestoensurethatthefindingscouldbegeneralisedtotheresponseandwerenottheresultsofbiasortheviewsofasingleagencyortypeofactor.10ThefulllistofpersonsinterviewedisavailableinAnnexnumber9.Evaluatorsdidnotmanagetoobtainadditionalmeetings
withGoHrepresentativesor the IHRC inHaiti throughUNagencycontactsbutmetwithauthoritieswhenobserving theCGIHaiti Action Network meetings in New York and the Inaugural Assembly of the Presidential Investment Advisory Board inSeptember2011.
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Haitianauthorities 12
HaitianNGOs 67
Beneficiaries/affectedpopulationsduringprojectvisits
54
UNagencies 58
IFRC 5
InternationalNGOs 25
Donors 12
WorldBank/HRF 4
OtherInternational 15
Total 252
observationofmeetingsinHaitiandNewYork, sixfocusgroups, fieldvisitsintheareaofPortauPrinceandLeogane, feedbackfromaonedayworkshopheldinPortauPrinceinadvanceoftheCAPworkshop,
where evaluationfindingsandtransitionrelatedissueswerepresented, acomprehensivedocumentanddatareviewprocess.
6. Overone thousanddocumentsmainlyaccessedvia internet, theDRLAHaitiHumanitarianAidEvaluationDatabaseandUNICEFwereconsultedtogatherinformation,compareandcontrastdataand
establish
timelines.11
These
included
strategic
plans,
evaluation
reports,
surveys,
project
documents,
minutesofmeetingsandotherreportsandinformationavailableonHaitiangovernment,clusters,OCHAHaitiresponseandNGOwebsites.Usingtriangulation,evaluatorswereabletocomprehensivelyaddressthemajorityofevaluationquestionsandvalidatefindingsinasystematicmanner.Asoneofsevenfocusareas,theteamsetouttogatherresponsesandviewsonthelevelofinformationavailableforevidencebaseddecisionmakingandinformationmanagement.Itisonthisissuethatevaluatorsfoundthattherewaslessinformationandsourcesforpropercrossvalidation.
I.2.3. Timeline
7. The field phase of the evaluation in Haiti started in August 2011 and initially lasted three
weeks.
12
Additional
meetings
were
undertaken
until
the
end
of
October
2011.
An
initial
IASC
preliminary
debriefingtookplace inNYonSeptemberand later inGeneva inDecember2011.CAPrelatedfindingswere also shared in advance with OCHA and with participants attending the September CAP 2012
11SeeAnnexnumber??onmeetings.Firstphaseprovidedabaselineagainstwhichtoassessprogress.HaitiDecember2009
Clustercasestudygivesanoverviewofthepreearthquakestructureandsimilarissues.12Whiletheevaluationteamwasinitiallycomposedofonenationalconsultantandtwointernationalevaluators,oneofthe
internationalevaluatorshadtodropoutaftertheinitialfieldphase.Therewere,however,onlytwointerviewsthatthisconsultantconductedalone.
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workshop. The lead evaluator attended Haitirelated meetings in New York in September 2011 (e.g.ClintonGlobalInitiative,HaitiActionNetworkandMartellysPresidentialInvestmentAdvisoryCouncil).Anote for theCluster transition inHaitiwas submittedon October31st2011, to inform theongoingprocessesinlieuofthedraftevaluationreport.TheinitialdraftofthereportoftheIARTEphase2wassubmitted on November 10th 2011 and comments provided by the Advisory Group on the 7th ofDecember2011.
I.2.4. Strengthsandweaknessesoftheapproach
8. The evaluation relied on mainly qualitative methods. A survey of affected populations
perceptionsoftheoverallinteragencyresponseinHaiti,whichwastoformapartoftheevidencebase
for thesecond IARTE,wasdelayedandultimatelycancelled.Theevaluationconsideredthe resultsof
the intentionssurveyamongearthquakedisplacedpeople living incampsreleasedbyIOM,ACTEDand
CommunicatingwithDisasterAffectedCommunities(CDAC)Haiti.
9. Theevaluationsoughtinformationfromdifferentsettingsandcategoriesofaffectedpopulation
through purposive selection interviews (with population in neighborhoods and transitional shelters,
owners,renters,
people
living
in
camps,
evictees,
yellow
house
repair
beneficiaries,
people
that
were
relocated,beneficiariesindifferentcommunesofPortauPrinceandLeogane,etc.).Affectedpopulation
viewsontheresponseandcurrentconcernswerehighlycorrelatedacrosscategoriesandevaluatorsfeel
confidentthattheyhave,throughinterviewsandfocusgroups,accuratelycapturedHaitianviewsofthe
response.
10. A focus group with Haitian national staff working on the response was held during the field
segmentoftheevaluation,inordertoprioritiseHaitianviews(seeannex).13Forconsistency,thissecond
phase also sought to follow one of the methods of the first phase when using information received
throughconsultationswith theaffectedpopulation.TheRTE identifiedkey issuesat the levelofboth
directlyandindirectlyaffectedpopulation(outcomes)andtracedthembackthroughservicedeliverers.
Atthetimeofthesecondevaluationphase,however,therewasverylittletotraceback,asthebulkoftheaffectedpopulationwasnolongerreceivinganyformofassistanceandmanyagencieshadphased
outtheiraidorwithdrawn. Insomeinstances,theevaluatorswerenotabletoverifyproblemsthrough
servicedeliverersastheywerenolongerinthecountryoraccessible14.
11. TheevaluationfacedotherchallengesrelatedtotheextentandfocusofsomeofthequestionscontainedintheToR.IARTEsaremeanttoplacegreateremphasisonprocessesandimmediatelessonslearningthanonimpactevaluationandaccountability.ThequestionsintheToRfocusedontoagreaterextentonpastachievements,performanceandaccountability, rather thanon learningat thenationallevel.
12. As
the
Humanitarian
Country
Team
(HCT)
is
the
most
immediate
user
of
the
process
and
recommendationsofIARTEs,thelevelofinvolvementandownershipinthefieldisakeytoasuccessfulIA RTE. However, support to the role of the evaluators during the field phase was limited, as theevaluationwasnotcloselytiedtotheongoingstrategicworkoftheHumanitarianCountryTeamandthe
13ThisfocusgroupwassuggestedbySavetheChildrensCountryDirectorinameetingwiththeCCOinJuly2011.Fora
summaryonthecontentsofthemeetingseeAnnex??number.14AmongthosearetwogirlsrapedinCampJeanMarieVincentthatwerereferredbyIOMtoahealthfacilitybutwhocame
backwithoutreceivingtreatment,aswellasseveralcasesofpoortransitionalhousing.
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wideraid framework inHaiti.The IARTEAdvisoryBoardandamajorityof theHumanitarianCountryTeammemberswereengagedintheevaluationonan individual levelbutnotsomuchasagroup.TheevaluationwaspresentedattheHCTbuttherewerenoopportunitiestodiscuss it indetail,astheHCandthehumanitariancommunitywereoverstretchedwiththeConsolidatedAppealProcess(CAP).Theperson initially responsible for the evaluation within the office of the HumanitarianCoordinator/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC) and tasked with gathering of information onrecommendations
emanating
from
evaluations
and
their
follow
up
left
Haiti.
Actors
involved
in
recovery
and reconstructioneffortswerenot sufficientlyengaged inanevaluationwhich,although focusedontransition,wasstillperceivedasahumanitarianorattimesOCHAdrivenexercise.
13. The IARTEhighlights themainpoints related tokeyevaluationquestions,butalsoprovidesa
snapshotofthesituationatthetimefieldworkwasconducted.Anindepthassessmenttheactivities
undertaken since May 201015could not be undertaken given the weak monitoring and evaluation
systems in place. Certain questions in the IA RTE TORs dealing with accountability were difficult to
addressinthecontextofHaiti,whereinformationavailableonoverallneedsandresponseislimited.The
level of institutionaluncertainty at the timeof theevaluationalsoaffected its ability todefinemore
specificrecommendationsandtobemoreforwardlooking.
14. Recognising that one key characteristic of an IA RTE is that it can affect programming as ithappens, the evaluation sought to be useful and focus on issues of practical implementation. Aworkshop was held in PortauPrince with multistakeholder groups in advance of the ConsolidatedAppealsProcess(CAP)workshop,inwhichkeyevaluationissueswerediscussed.Contentthatemergedfrom both the IA RTE and CAP workshops were used to further crossvalidate findings. Many of theinputsoftheIARTEworkshopworkinggroupsweresubsequentlytakenintoaccountintheevaluation.AspartoftheIARTE,anoteonclustertransitionwaspreparedformanagersinthefieldinadvanceofthisreport,basedonissuesraisedintheworkinggrouponclustertransition.16Theworkshopsupportedlearningbutdidnotresultinprioritizedrecommendationsthatcouldbethebasisofanactionplanwithidentifiedtimeframesandresponsibleorganizations.
15. Asithasbeenconductedoverayearandahalfaftertheearthquake,thisIARTEdiffersinscopeand focus from other similar exercises. It has focused heavily on transition issues and provides asnapshotofasituationshapedbyaresponsethathasbeenevolvingoveralongerperiodoftimeandhasbeeninfluencedbyamultitudeoffactors.
I.3 Context
Remainingacutehumanitarianneeds
16. At the end of 2011, the humanitarian situation in Haiti remainsa challenge and still requires
internationalsupport.
At
the
time
of
the
evaluation,
the
ERC
determined
priority
humanitarian
needs
in
Haitiover thecomingyearasbeing:access to safedrinkingwater,sanitationand food,andguardingagainstgenderbasedviolenceandforcedevictionsfromcamps.17Thesituationremainsfragile,marredbythechronicstructural issuesthataffected itevenbeforetheearthquake(PortauPrincehadnocity
15Referencesinthereporttospecificprojectsorsectorsshouldberegardedasexamplesusedtoillustrateafindingandnotto
specificallysingleoutanorganisationoractivity.16SeeAnnex4.
17InSeptember2011,nearly70,000peoplehadbeenevictedfromcampswithoutalternativedurablesolutions.
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planningandadeficitofhousingfor300,000people).AccordingtoIOMdata,despiteasharpdecreaseinthecamppopulation(ataratethathasbeendecliningsinceMarch2011)over550,000Haitiansliveinapproximately800displacementcampsscatteredmostlyaroundthecapital,PortauPrince(seeFigure1). There are continuing humanitarian needs, including protection concerns. A focus on lifesavingactivities is still required with vulnerable populations facing multiple threats, such as food insecurity,cholera and natural disasters (mainly frequent heavy rains and hurricanes).18At the same time,humanitarian
donors
have
drastically
reduced
their
funding
in
Haiti
and
the
vast
majority
of
organisationshaverunoutofresourcesandarephasingoutorhavealreadyceasedtheiractivities.19TheGovernmentofHaiti lacksthemeans totakeoverkeyservicessuchascholeratreatmentcentresandsanitation. Humanitarian donors would prefer that recovery and development efforts cover theseongoingneeds.
Figure1:Internallydisplacedpersons(IDP)inrecordedsites
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,0001,400,000
1,600,000
1,800,000
Number
Households
Individuals
Source:IOMHAITICampCoordinationCampManagementClusterDTMv2.0
UpdateJulySeptember2011DisplacementTrackingMatrixV2.0UpdateSeptember30,2011
Continuinguncertaintyandfragility
17. PoliticalinstabilityanduncertaintycontinuedtoaffectHaitiin2011.Thecountrywaswithoutagovernment until October of that year, and the mandate of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission(IHRC)expiredthatsamemonth.ThenewPrimeMinisterreportedlysoughtitsrenewalbutalsowantedto strengthen the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation. While the mandate of the United NationsStabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been renewed with the support of the President, itspresence is increasinglyquestioned.Since thedisaster, thecountryhashadanegativeannualgrowthrate of minus 8.5 percent in 2010. Sixty percent of the Haitian budget continues to depend oninternationalassistance.Haitispresentscenarioisstillexplainedbyalackofleadership,decisionmakingon key issues, and an effective Government of Haitiled plan for recovery. The main priority andchallengefortransitioningfromthepostearthquakehumanitarianresponseremainsthedefinitionofacomprehensiveresettlementpolicy.
Transitionstrongontheagenda,complicatedinpractice
18. Transitionsareusuallycharacterizedbyashiftingemphasisfromlifesavingactivitiestorestoring
1845%ofthepopulationfacesfoodinsecurity,thecholeraepidemichassofarinfected450,000peopleandclaimedmorethan
6,500lives.19The2011revisedCAPisonly56%funded.KeyagencieslikeOFDAnolongerhavefundingforecastedforHaiti.
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livelihoods, achieving development goals, and an increasing reliance on national ownership throughnational development strategies. There is recognition that the focus on transition should take placeimmediately after a disaster. Transitioning is regarded as essential to avoid creating a situation ofdependency.
19. TheGovernmentof Haitihadofficially set the endof the reliefphase for July 2010 but laterextended
the
distribution
of
food
aid
until
September
of
that
year.
Cholera
and
the
2010
hurricane
seasonmaintainedthefocusonthehumanitarianemergency.Althoughspeedingupthereconstructionand recovery effort has been the priority in Haiti for 2011, the progress has been slow. For some,transitionisontheagendabutnotnecessarilyasaresultofaplannedprocessbutoffatigue(onthepartoftheaffectedpopulation,authorities,implementingagenciesanddonorswhoallwanttoseechange,tangibleresultsanddurable improvements).Forthevastmajorityofthose interviewed(approximately90 percent) reconstruction hasnotvisiblybegun.Themeansandactivitiesof internationalNGOsareincreasinglysingledoutasasignificantproblembythenewgovernment.
20. AttheInternationalDonorsConference:TowardsaNewFutureforHaiti,heldinNewYorkon31March2010,55donors(nationalgovernmentsandmultilateralinstitutions)pledgedatotalof$4.59
billionfor
recovery
and
development
aid
programmes.
For
the
combined
20102011
timeframe,
donors
hadinSeptember2011disbursed43percentofthistotal($1.97billion).Anadditional$2.08billionhasbeencommitted.
21. The InterimHaitiRecoveryCommission (IHRC)was setup inApril2010 tocover the recoveryagendaforlimited18monthperiod(i.e.untilOctober2011).TheCommissionhasbeendescribedasacumbersomestructurewithacomplicateddecisionmakingprocessandhighoperatingcosts,whosefocus on projects has also restricted its ability to operate with strategic planning and oversight.Notwithstandingitsheavyandsluggishprocedures, internationalstakeholdersinterviewedfeltthattheInterim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was at the time of the evaluation at the point where onewouldhavewantedittobeayearago,withacompetentanddedicatedteam.Indeed,inMay2011the
IHRC
was
deemed
as
not
fully
operational
due
to
delays
in
staffing
the
Commission
and
defining
the
role of its Performance and Anticorruption Office and its limited ability to direct funding to Haitianpriorities,inpartbecausethoseprioritieshavenotbeenclear. SeveraldonorsandUNagencieswere,atthetimeoftheevaluation,consideringhowbesttorationaliseresourcesandhesitantoverwhetherthey should support staffing the IHRC at this stage or empower the Government of Haiti and itsministries.ThecurrentteamattheIHRChasbeenfocusingheavilyonbettercommunicatingitsmissionandactivitiesandextendingitsmandate.
22. TheInterimHaitiRecoveryCommissionsPublicAccountabilityOfficereportedinJune2011that althoughnot allprojects provided financial updates less than$118millionhad been reported asdisbursedoutofthe$3.2billioninprojectsithadclearedforfunding. Amismatchofresourceshasalsoprevailedandbeen consistentlydenouncedby theOfficeof theSpecialEnvoy,as theGovernmentof
Haitihas
not
been
directly
receiving
sufficient
funding.
As
an
example,
at
the
time
of
the
evaluation
PresidentMartellysteamwasstillworkingoutoftents.
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Newleadership,roomforoptimismandopportunities
23. President Martellys election and his "Four E's" programme of education, employment,environmentand the ruleof law (Etatdedroit),havebeenmetwithenthusiasm.Theadministrationwouldliketoproactivelyengagetheprivatesectorandthediasporainhumanitarianandreconstructionefforts.
The
international
community
iskeen
on
backing
the
new
President
and
national
leadership.
His
effort to talkwith theaffectedpopulationabout their needs isanencouraging sign.Oneof the newauthorities flagship programmes is the longterm reconstruction of sixteen neighbourhoods andcorresponding closure of six camps in PortauPrince known as the 16/6 project. Despite someconcernswiththe16/6project,itwasswiftlyapprovedattheIHRCandmanyhavewantedtoembraceitas a model of an integrated neighbourhood approach. The project is supported as part of theHumanitarian Coordinators proactive engagement with the new presidential team. Later on, inSeptember2011inNewYork,thePresidentannouncedhisplantocreateanewhousingauthorityunderthe Primature. This move was recommended by ICG among others.20Beyond the challenges andexpectationscreated,theprospectoffreeeducationforallbytheendofthePresidentstermisalsoseenasauniqueopportunitytopushfordevelopmentgoals.Mayorsthroughoutthepastyearhavealso
exercised
leadership
and
assumed
roles
enabling
the
response
in
many
key
areas
within
their
communes.
II. MainAchievements,Gaps,LimitsandConstraints
II.1 MainAchievements
Disasterpreparednessmainstreaming
24. Preparedness was cited as a keyachievement of the response. Whenconsidering the three objectives of the
current
revised
Consolidated
Appeals
Process (CAP), most progress has beenmadeon supporting targeteddisaster riskreduction interventions focused onpreparing for andmitigating the impact ofthe 2011 rain and hurricane season. Inpreparation for the hurricane season,humanitarian actors have implementedactivities in support of the HaitianGovernment,particularlytheDirectiondelaProtectionCivile (DPC).Acontingencyplanwas finalizedandcirculated,stockswereprepositionedbydepartmentandclusterandtwosimulationexercisesweresuccessfullycarriedout,testingcoordination
mechanisms
in
the
case
of
an
emergency.
The
Direction
de
la
Protection
Civile
has
emerged
strengthenedfromthecurrentresponse.21Alargelyeffectiveresponseincamps
20ICG,PostquakeHaiti:SecurityDependsonResettlementandDevelopmentLatinAmerica/CaribbeanBriefingN25,28June201121Interviews,observationofDPCsroleinmeetingsandinthefield,OCHAIMCAPmonitoring.(Clermontetal.)DECstudyUrban
disasterslessonsfromHaitiAStudyofmemberagenciesresponsestotheearthquakeinPortauPrince,Haiti,January2010foundthattheDPChademergedstrengthenedparticularlyatthedepartmentallevel."March2011(27)
Thethreemainobjectivesoftheresponsebasedonthecurrentrevised2011CAPare:
1. "Tofillcriticalgapsandprovidetargeted,catalyticinterventionswhichenablereintegrationorrecoveryofaffectedpopulationsandillustratehowdurablesolutionscanbeproduced."
2. "Toensurehumanitarianinterventionswhichprovideprotectionandsavelivesamonggroupsmadehighlyvulnerablebyexposuretomultiplerisks:earthquakeinduceddisplacement,choleraoutbreaks,cycloneseasonthreatsorextremefoodinsecurity."
3. "Tosupporttargeteddisasterriskreductioninterventionsfocusedonpreparingforandmitigatingtheimpactofthe2011cyclone.
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25. Theevaluationfoundthattheresponseincampsandhadbeenaconsiderableachievementinachallengingcontext.22Amajorsuccessofthehumanitarianresponseisthattherehavebeennocholeraoutbreaks in thecamps.Assistancehasbeenprovidedandcampshavebeenmanagedunderdifficultcircumstances under threat of evictions, stigmatisation of camp population, insecurity, decliningassistance, and lack of durable solutions. The Camp Management Operation (CMO) units have alsoplayed
apositive
role
in
strengthening
leadership
at
decentralised
levels,
both
at
the
level
of
mayors
and
the Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC). Although there has been much discussion regarding theinternationalcommunitybeingexcessively focusedon the camps, lessvisibilityhasbeengiven to theworkoutsidecamps.
Progressonrubbleremoval
26. Debris removaland itsmanagementbecameapriority for theGovernmentofHaiti,as itwasaffectingprogressinotherareas.Theearthquakecreatedanestimated10millioncubicmetersofdebris.As inthecaseofcampmanagement,thecolossaltaskofdebrisremoval isanewneedcreatedbytheearthquake.Anestimated2millioncubicmetersofdebriswere removed in2010 (approximately650
000m
3
of
debris
through
initial
Cash
for
Work
efforts)
and
the
target
for
2011
was
to
manage
afurther
4
million cubic meters. UNDP now estimates (October 2011) that almost half of the debris has beenmanaged.23Thishasbeenachieveddespitedecisionmaking, logisticalandfundingchallenges.Strategyhadbeen initially lackingandobstacles includedobtainingpermissions fromMinistryofPublicWorks,accessingneighbourhoods,andenteringheavymachinery.Projectcoordinationamongactors involvedin debris removal and residents refusing to authorise demolition of their houses were also cited asdifficultiesaffectingprogress.
Transitionalshelter:Tshelter4.0
27. Local production and construction capacity on transitional shelter (Tshelter) has been
developed,
both
in
terms
of
agency
capacity
and
through
training.
24
While
there
is
a
preference
for
findingdurablesolutions,appropriateTsheltersarestillanoptioninthemediumtermgiventhecurrentsituationandchallenges inHaiti,providedbeneficiarieshaveaccessto livelihoodsandservices.Clusterleveldiscussionsontransitionalshelterstandardslastedformanymonthsinmid2010,duetohighcostsof all available designs, lack of materials and many logistical challenges. Criteria for Tshelters haveincludedbeingsimultaneouslyresistantenoughtowithstandCategory1hurricanewindsandlastforupto5years,beredeployableandquickenoughtomountrapidly,aswellasbeingreusable,sothattenantscan relocate. Production and construction capacity has now been created and there are many goodexamplesofhowagencieshavemanaged toadapt to theHaitiancontextand themanychallengesofneighbourhoodsinPortauPrince.25Structurescannowtechnicallysupporttheweightoflaterimprovedconstruction.Somenewdesignshaveamezzanineandcanfurtheradapttothelackofavailablespaceinneighbourhoods and the fact that houses before the earthquake could have two stories and
22Interviews,meetings,observation.Haitianssetupimpromtutentcitiesthroughthecapitalaftertheearthquake.Attheend
ofJanuaryPresidentPrevalwasappealingfor300,000tentsandinitialintentionsweretomove400,000peopletolargercamps.23EvaluatorshadtheopportunitytodiscussJ/PRHOsrubbleremovalinBristouandBobinandtheCARMENproject(Centres
dAppuipourleRenforcementdeMaisonsEndommages)24UNOPSforinstancethroughitswarehouseandproductioncentreinTabarrenowhasthecapacitytoproduce30sheltersa
dayandmount20oftheminneighbourhoods.25Averyaccurateaccountofthechallengesandanexampleoftheprogressthatagencieshavebeenabletomakecanbe
viewedonIFRCsiteandthelinkhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bsjoADopKKA
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accommodatetwofamilies.Giventhecomplexity,however,therearefewagenciesthathavebeenableto implement shelter projects successfully; costs, the need for technical expertise, procurementknowledge and especially time for community participation and dialogue have been underestimated.Majorconstraintshave included landownership issues, rubble removal in individualplots,and lackofsuitable public land for organized new temporary settlements. Mayors have exercised new roles anddemonstratedleadershiptoovercomesomeofthesebarriers.
IntegratedNeighbourhood,SafeReturnandCommunityBasedApproaches
28. Humanitarian agencies have piloted a strategy encouraging integration of key programmes intargeted urban neighbourhoods, now recognised as the Neighbourhood Approach (NA). The
NeighbourhoodApproach
isacomprehensive
and
rational
approach
to
longer
term
resettlement
and
to
helping households and communities restructure neighbourhoods and rebuild safer houses (i.e.,ultimatelybuildingbackbetterand restartingcityplanning inPortauPrince).For IFRC it ispartof itsstrategy to encourage integration of key programmes in urban neighbourhoods, involving the directimplementation of key services (shelter, water and sanitation, livelihoods support, community healthandriskreduction).26UNHabitathasbeensuccessfullyadvocatingtheSafeReturnapproachthathasbeenimplementedintheBristouandBobinneighbourhoods,amongstothers.27Theapproachalsohelpsovercome problems related to intercluster coordination, although coordination and collaborationamong different agencies remains crucial. 28 The agencies interviewed reported that they hadunderestimated the effort of consultation and participation within this communitybased approach,where processes are allimportant. Humanitarian projects that have shorter implementation periods
tendto
focus
more
on
results
than
processes.
29. The 16/6 project follows a similar rationale but is costlier (78 million USD to resettle 30,000
26IFRCstrategyandOperationsupdaten28EighteenmonthsProgressReport2November201127AcoalitionofactorshavebeenworkingunderthisprojectmainlyimplementedbySolidariteswithECHOfundingwhereUNHabitathasbeensupportingneighbourhoodcommittees,UNOPSrepairingyellowhousesandmountingTsheltersinlieuofRedHouses,J/PRHOremovingrubble,etc.TheFrenchRedCrosshasalsobeenimplementingtheapproachinDelmas.28InterviewsandDECstudy.
OtherEarthquakeresponseprogressindicatorshighlightedin2011CAPMidyearreviewShelter:64000familieshavebeenrelocatedintotransitionalshelter117200tents,1185052tarpsandover2.5millionNFIsweredistributedtorespondtoemergencyshelterneedsIn2011effortsfocusedonsupportingthereturnofaffectedpopulationstotheiroforiginortorelocationsites.Agriculture:Emergencyagricultureprojectsfacilitatingaccesstoinputsbenefitted200,000householdsandneighbourhoodsseedmultiplicationeffortsafurther25,100families.Livelihoodsactivitiestargeted48,200households.Education:371semipermanentsschoolsand139permanentschoolsreceivedassistance.
700,000school
children
received
school
material.
1,500,000
students
received
school
food
rations.
Health:17fieldhospitalswereestablished.345,000medicalkitsweredistributedbetweenJanuaryandMarch2011byPROMESS.900,000dosesofvaccineswereadministered.Surveillanceestablishedandfreeobstetriccareprovidedin63hospitalswithqualifiedpersonnel.Nutrition:NutritionalStabilisationUnits USN wereestablishedin9de artments.
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people)andmoreambitiousinscope(bothintermsoftermsof improvedcityplanningasbulldozerswillbeinvolvedtointroduceservicesandthenumberofneighbourhoodstargeted).AftertheInterimHaiti Recovery Commissions approval of the 16/6 project, the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) hasfunded an initial tranche with 30 million USD, and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) issupportingandcoimplementingit.TheexperiencegatheredbyagenciessuchasIOMandUNOPSinthehumanitarianresponsewillprovehelpfulinthisregard.
Sanitation
30. Much progress has been made on water and sanitation (WASH) in terms of supporting localcapacity, and as a result of the response to cholera. Direction Nationale de lEau Potable et delAssainissement (DINEPA) has undertaken the responsibility for sanitation infrastructure, which wasnonexisting before the earthquake. The humanitarian intervention led to the establishment inSeptember 2011 of the first excreta treatment facility in PortauPrince. In 2011 DINEPA has alsorecognisedthatwaterandsanitationforthecamppopulation liesunder itsresponsibility.29TheWater,SanitationandHygiene(WASH)clusterhasbeenabletofurthersupportDINEPAscoordinationcapacityanditsabilitytoadvocateforfundingforacutehumanitarianneedsanditsactivities.30
II.2 TheBigGaps:DurableSolutions,Livelihoods,Accommodation,CommunicationandContinuedSupport
31. In all interviews and focus groups carried out by evaluators, affected populations above allwanted durable solutions to their problems and to understand what was planned and what theirentitlements,ifany,were.Caseswherehumanitarianworkerscanactuallyrespondtodifficultquestionsarerarebecauseplansarenotknownandcommunicationisonesided,withmanyquestionsraisedandlimited answers. 31 Similar findings were reported in the Care/SCF joint evaluation: Haitiansencounteredandotherstakeholdersincludingwithinthehumanitariancommunity,increasinglyfeelthatthe humanitarian community and government are not meeting peoples expectations. They feel thathumanitarian activities and programs are financially unsustainable and are not helping Haitians toachievetheirowngoalssothattheycanmoveforwardfromastateofemergency.InternationalNGOsinthiscontexttendtobelumpedasoneandareincreasinglyquestioned,alsobecausetheyareoftenonthe front line.32 Responses that enable greater involvement of affected populations and greatercapacitiesintherecoveryphasehavebeenlimited,astheyhavebeenimplementedbyafewernumberoforganisationsandbeenmoretargeted.33
32. The focusgroupheldwithHaitianstaff involved inthehumanitarianresponsealsounderlinedthat organisations have not focused enough on livelihoods.34Organisations involved in livelihoodsprojects emphasize that coverage is necessarily limited due to beneficiary/cost considerations andimplementation capacity, with efforts needing multiyear commitments. Durable accommodation
29Interviews,Projectdocumentation.30Asaresultofphasedoutdonorassistanceinsanitation,afundingproposalfordislodgingincampswasputforwardbyDINEPAtotheIHRC.31Focusgroupswereheldinearthquakeaffectedneighborhoodswhererehabilitationhastakenplace,withpersonsevictedfromtheSylvioCatorcamp,withIDPpopulationsincampsandinterviewswithTshelterbeneficiariesinCorailandinneighborhoods.32Pressreviews,interviews,graffiti.
33Interviews,clusterparticipationpresencebygroup/sector,beneficiaryfiguresandprojectlocationsbasedonFTS.
34Forhumanitarianactors, livelihoodsprojectsareextremelycostlyperbeneficiaryandsomeactors interviewedquestioned
whetherhumanitarianfundingshouldbeusedonprovidingsolutionsforafewinacontextlikeHaitis.
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solutionsarealsolackingintheabsenceofavailableoraffordableland,asPortauPrincehadahousingdeficitfor300,000peopleevenbeforetheearthquakeandmostearthquakeaffectedpopulationwererentersasopposedtohousingowners.
33. Inpractice,HaitianpublicopinionbelievesthatInternallyDisplacedPersons(IDPs)incampsarereceiving assistance when those affected in neighbourhoods are not. At the time of the evaluation,camps
visited
were
not
receiving
any
material
assistance
and
this
coincides
with
data
reported
through
the clusters. Organisations face funding constraints and have phasedout their assistance in camps.Populations in camps are often stigmatised.35IOM,ACTEDandCommunicatingwithDisasterAffectedCommunities(CDAC)HaiticarriedoutIntentionsSurveypollingover15,000campdwellerstofindoutwhytheyarestilltheredespitethediscomfortandinsecurityposedbylivingintentsorundertarpaulinsthroughacholeraepidemicandtwoconsecutivehurricaneseasons.TheIntentionsSurveyfoundthat94percentofpeople living in campswould leave if theyhadalternativeaccommodation.Mostof thosesurveyed said if theyhad todepart immediately, theywould not have the means to pay rentor theresources torepairorreplace theirdamagedordestroyedhomes. In interviews,theevaluation foundthatcamp residentsoftenhadnootherviablealternative to remaining incampsand that inanycasetheywerenotremainingincampsbecauseofcurrentconditionsbutbecausetheyhadbeenregistered
and
could
hope
to
benefit
from
a
durable
shelter
solution
in
the
future.
A
major
gap
in
this
area
continues to be the lack of a Government of Haitiled resettlement policy that could guide bothcommunicationandresponse.
34. Based on interviews of humanitarian community representatives, the main gaps and keypriorities at the time of the evaluation were in the water and sanitation and health sectors.Organisations have been scaling down water and sanitation and cholera operations and transferringtheseresponsibilitiestoDINEPAandMinistrede laSantPubliqueetde laPopulation(MSPP).EffortstotransitioncholeratreatmentcentrestoMSPPlackedthecapacityandfunding.
Protection,DRR36andothercrosscuttingissues
35. With capacities overstretched and the present myriad of challenges, less attention has beengiventocrosscuttingissues.37AttheIARTEworkshop itwassuggestedthatdisabilityandageingwerenotreallyontheagendawasbecausetherewasnosubclusterforelderly,forpeoplewithdisabilitiesand other vulnerable groups while there is a cluster for genderbased violence (GBV) and childprotection.Thelackofdisaggregateddatainassessmentswasalsomentionedasanissueaffectingtheabilitytosupportspecificvulnerablegroups.Withtheexceptionofdisasterpreparedness,intersectoralcoordinationhasbeenregardedasweakandhasnotfacilitatedfurthertakeupofeithercrosscuttingormultidimensionalissues.
36. Atthelevelofspecificclusters,inclusionofcrosscuttingissuesislimited.Thiswascaseeveninthe shelter cluster which, when led by IFRC, was considered one of the bestrun and most
comprehensively
resourced
and
coordinated
clusters. 38Disaster
Risk
reduction
(DRR)
and
the
35AworkinggroupintheRTEworkshopunderlinedthatmanyactorshavebeenworkingwheretherewerenocampsandwere
workingincommunitiespriortotheearthquake.EvaluatorsfoundthatmorethatthebulkofeffortsareinfactfocusingonneighborhoodsbutthattheperceptioninHaitiisthattoomuchassistancehasgonetocamps.36TheconceptofDRRhasdifferentmeaningsamongactors.
37Interviews,DARA2011HumanitarianResponseIndexdata.
38The shelter Cluster Review (April 2011)found that; Technical references on the web site include links to guidance on
disability,genderandhumanrightsmanualsbutcrosscutting issuesfeaturerarely ifatall inClusterstrategicdocumentation.
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environmentwerealsoseenasnotmainstreamed intheresponse.Thereareelementsofdisasterriskreduction that have not been considered in certain shelter projects. Only on environmental issues,throughanadviserrecruitedviaWWF,didtheclustermanagetoassembleanumberofkeyresourcesrelevanttoshelter.
37. Protection in Haiti (camp evictions, gender based violence,39child protection) is viewed asincreasingly
critical
on
all
fronts.
The
pressure
in
communes
to
forcibly
close
camps
and
evict
residents
is
mounDirectiondelaProtectionCivileting.Theleadagencyonprotection,OHCHR,isseenasveryactivedespite its limited human resources.40It however faces problems related to being part of a UNintegratedmission,whichcanundermineitsadvocacyefforts.41
II.3 LimitsandConstraints
Acostlyresponse
38. According to the Financial Tracking System (FTS) data, total humanitarian funding for HaitiamountedtooverUSD3.5billionin2010andUSD493millionin2011.42 Theevaluationfoundthatthe
responseto
the
earthquake
has
been
far
more
expensive
than
anticipated.
On
average,
organisations
includingdonorsandkeyUNagencies recognisedthatprojectcostshadbeenbetween2.5to3timesmore than what had been initially estimated.43There are several factors that affect the cost ofoperationsinHaiti,including:
a. thecostoflivinginPortauPrince;b. technicalsolutionsaremorecostly inurbanenvironments (e.g. forwaterandsanitation
(WATSAN);c. the amount of traffic that leads organisations to have to either double or triple their
logisticsandstaffingcapacitybecauseofthetimeittakestogofrompointAtopointB;d. delays in implementationwhich increaseproject running costs as structureshave tobe
maintained;
e. the need for imports because of the limited amount of suppliers in Haiti and localprocurementbeingmoreexpensiveingeneral;
f. bringinginsuppliestoanisland;g. operational dynamics often entail major agencies subcontracting others, which entails
additionaldelaysandoverheadcosts.
Thestrategicframeworktemplate,ResponsePlanandClusterPositionPapernamenoneoftheissues.TheAdvocacyDocumentreferencesparticipatoryassessmentandgender,ageandHIV/AIDSstatusinanannexe.Itrefersbrieflytoenvironmentalissuesin the contextof transitional shelter funding butnowhere to human rights.Performance standards in theShelter TechnicalGuidancepaperrefertoage,genderandHIV/AIDSbutnottoparticipatoryapproaches,environmentorhumanrights.39The
evaluation
observed
that
two
girls
raped
in
acamp
referred
to
the
intended
health
facility
returned
to
the
camp
without
receivingtreatment.40AsanexampletheProtectionclusterthroughtheHousing,LandandPropertyworkinggroupissuedaproposalforredressing
RenterspositionintheHaitianHousingAssistanceasmanypostdisasterresponsesfailtoincorporatetheparticularsituationofrentersinadurablemanner.41Atthetimeoftheevaluation,aPressstatementonforcedevictionswasreleasedjustaftertheallegedabusecommittedby
MINUSTAHUruguayantroopsinSeptember2011.42FTSdata.43SpecificexamplescomparingcostsofshelterinPakistanandSriLankawerementionedbuttherearenostudiesonthisissue
orreferencestostandardunitcoststocomparetheresponseinHaititothatofothers.
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Timelinessandresults:strikingthebalance
39. Agencies found it challenging to strike the right balance between responding to targets andfocusingonbuildingcapacitiesandtransitiontowardsrecovery.Thecholeraepidemicstronglyaffectedthe ongoing operations, with even agencies not directly involved in water and sanitation or healthdedicatingtheirlogisticandawarenessraisingcapacitytothecholeraresponse(foramonthandahalfon
average).
Representatives
of
organisations
interviewed
also
found
that
decision
making
within
the
humanitariancommunitytooktoo longand,specifically,thatpolicydocuments,operating frameworksandapproachestooktoolongtobeapproved.
40. Aminorityofagencies interviewedalsofoundthattheyhadunrealisticallybeenworkingunderassumptionsofgovernmentcapacityanddecisionmakingatthenational leveland that thishadbeendetrimentalfortheresponse.Governmentcapacityhadbeenassessedpreearthquakeatdifferentlevelsandanumberofstudieshavebeencarriedoutorupdatedsincethedisaster.Clustershavealsosinceengaged in government capacity mapping at different levels. UNDP has a database on these withinformationfromdifferentactorsonthisissue.44
Multiplecritical
constraints
41. The context in Haiti has had agencies move in and out of an emergency mode. The choleraoutbreakledorganisationstodiverttheiractivitiesandshiftthefocusoftheresponse.Thevastmajorityofnonspecialisedagenciesprioritisedsensitisationactivities.45Activitiesarealsoaffectedbythethreatofhurricanesandheavyrains.
42. Political turmoil and uncertainty affected the response and placed further uncertainty ondefined national priorities, policies, institutions46 and the capacity for decisionmaking. Structuralproblems,landtenure,landavailability,lackoflegislation,limitedgovernmentcapacityandinstitutionalweaknesses, extreme poverty47, inequity, crime, impunity, an overburdened infrastructure system,
limited
resources,
the
environment,
dependency
and
limited
markets
are
all
cited
as
major
constraints.
43. The limited levelof funding isalsoperci