icrc expert meeting on certain weapon systems and on implementation mechanisms in international law,...

7/28/2019 ICRC Expert Meeting on Certain Weapon Systems and on Implementation Mechanisms in International Law, Geneva 30 May - 1 June 1994 (excerpts).pdf

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International Committee of the Red Cross

EXPERT MEETING

ONCERTAIN WEAPON SYSTEMS

AND ONIMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW


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CONTENTS pageINTRODUCTION....................................................................... iv

PART IThe rationale for considering other proposals relating to theconvention and to its existing or future protocols ..................................Background documentation prepared by the ICRC for the Group of GovernmentalExperts to Prepare the Review Conference of the States Parties to theConvention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of CertainConventional Weapons which May by Deemed to be Excessively Injurious orto Have Indiscriminate Effects.

PART II- Papers submitted

1

Programme of the Expert meeting........................................... 24

A. Small Caliber Weapons Systems

{


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4.

5.

D.

E.

1.

. Unexploded submunition (Bomblets) ....................................... .by Christian SigristUnexploded submunitions (Bomblets) and the Environment.. ..........by Arthur H. Westing

Naval Mines: technical and military aspects and possible legalregulation....................................................................... .

- Swedish draft Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofNaval Mines to be added to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictionson the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be

71

75

82

Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects................. 82- Extract from the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to ArmedConflicts at Sea................................ .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 87

Information on the development of future weapons: microwave,infrasound, chemicals and genetic weapons. Possible legal. )' t 'mp lC a IOnS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..Sonic Beam Devices - Principles............................................by Ludwik Liszka

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3.

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The International Labour Organisation's Standard-Setting System:Supervision and Implementation ........................................... .by Andre ZengerVerification of Nuclear Arms Control and ChemicalWeapons Treaties .............................................................. .by Rebecca JohnsonEnvironmental Law the Development of Mechanisms forMonitoring Compliance ...................................................... .by Patrick Szell, submitted to the ICRC by Glen PlantReport of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the MontrealProtocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer

134

149

157

United Nations Environment Programme................................... 163

Annex: List of Participants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205


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PART I

I,,'

THE RATIONALE FOR CONSIDERING OTHERPROPOSALS RELATING TO THE CONVENTION

AND TO


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- 2 -INTRODUCTION

The present report has been prepared pursuant to a decision of the first meeting ofgovenunental experts that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) submit areport on "the rationale for considering other proposals relating to the Convention and itsexisting or future Protocols". In April 1994 the ICRC submitted to the group ofgovenunental experts a report pertaining exclusively to Protocol II of the 1980 Convention.This report is based on material that the ICRC has gathered over the last few years, eitherthrough its normal work or through specialist meetings. In particular, the ICRC held on30 May to 1 June 1994 an "Expert Meeting on Certain Weapon Systems and onImplementation Mechanisms in International Law", the results of which will be brieflyreferred to in this report. A compilation of documents submitted to the ICRC experts meetingwill be made available by the ICRC at the third meeting of the Group of GovenunentalExperts in August 1994.The subjects dea lt with here are those which the ICRC considers, in addit ion to antipersonnel mines, should be on the agenda of the Review Conference.Part I of this report addresses amendments to the body of the Convention itself and is focusedprimarily on implementation mechanisms. Part II looks at particular weapon systems whichinclude characteristics of particular humanitarian concern. In the view of the ICRC, someof these merit the elaboration of additional protocols.

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POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION

A. THE INTRODUCTION OF IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS

It might be considered that certain implementation provisions provided by international lawbe incorporated into the main body of the 1980 Convention. This opinion was particularlyexpressed in the Symposium on mines which the I ~ R C hosted in Montreux in April 1993.The Expert Meeting held on 30 May to 1 June 1994 in Geneva analyzed in much greaterdetail the different implementation mechanisms that exist in international humanitarian lawand in other branches of international law, viz., international human rights law, standardspromulgated by the International Labour Organisation, arms control law and internationalenvironmental law.The following proposals take into account the different ideas put forward during these twosymposia.

1. IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS ALREADY EXISTING IN HUMANITARIANLAWTREATmS

Insofar as the provisions of the 1980 Convention reaffirm the rules of internationalhumanitarian law found in other treaties, implementation measures provided for in thoseother treaties are naturally also relevant to the 1980 Convention.

a) DoMESTIC MEASURESProvision of national legal advisers

This is presently required by virtue of Article 82 of Protocol I additional to the GenevaConventions. Hereby, legal advisers should give guidance on matters relating to the use ofweapons.

Specific requirements for training in humanitarian lawThe requirement to instruct the armed forces in the law p r o ~ i ~ e d in Hague Convention IVof 1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and !herr Additional Protocols of 1977.


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- 4 -Certain specific suggestions could be made in regard to weapons regulations:

there should be training in the use of weapons in accordance with humanitarian law atcadet academies and in all command and staff training programmes;- manuals on weapon systems should incorporate the law applicable to their correct use in

the languages of the user countries;- the packaging of weapons should include warnings of the legal limitations on their use.

Incorporation into domestic lawSimilar to the provisions in the Geneva Conventions and in Protocol I of 1977 (art. 84), the1980 Convention should be translated into local languages, and appropriate national laws andregulations should be adopted.

National legislation providing criminal liabilityAgain, national legislations necessary to provide effective penal sanctions as stipulated in theGeneva Convention are equally important to ensure criminal liability for violations of the1980 Convention.

b) INTERNATIONAL MEASURESLiability and criminal sanctions

It is clear that the law of international responsibility applies in relation to violations of thelaw governing the use of mines. The difficulty lies in determining liability with respect tocompensation for damage resulting from violations of the law, and establishing which bodyshould be responsible for making such decisions. The possibility of compulsory adjudication might include the International Court of Justice, International arbitration or, if set up, theInternational Court or even a court specifically created for the 1980 Convention. In theabsence of a compulsory adjudication mechanism, the Security Council might be able toimpose suitable remedies for serious violations of the 1980 Convention.With regard to individual liability, as a matter of principle, criminal sanctions ought to beobligatory for violations of the rules contained in the Protocols of the 1980 Convention.

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International Fact-Finding CommissionThe International Fact-Finding Commission provided for in Article 90 of Protocol Iadditional to the Geneva Conventions could also be used to investigate possible violations ofthe 1980 Convention. In the context of the 1977 Protocol, the competence of the Commissionis based on consent that can either be given in advance, in the form of a declaration, or adhoc. For the 1980 Convention, the Commission would be more effective as a lawenforcement mechanism if it had an automatic right to monitor possible violations of thisConvention.

Effectiveness of these implementation provisionsThe report on the implementation of international humanitarian law presented at the meetingof 30 May to 1 June 1994 stressed the limited success of these provisions if they are notaccompanied by the supervision of a permanent impartial body. Based upon the 1949 GenevaConventions, this supervisory role is at present being partially filled by the work of theInternational Committee of the Red Cross. Despite the implementation mechanisms providedfor as outlined above, this system remains the most effective means of trying to assure acorrect implementation of international humanitarian law. Inter-State fact-finding proceduresprovided for by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977 have so farnot been used.

2. IMPLEM ENTATI ON MECHANISMS THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED FOR THE1980 CONVENTIONIt is useful to look at implementation procedures that have proved effective in other branchesof international law in order to see whether they could be adapted for the needs of the 1980Convention. Systems that used a variety of international measures, including nonconfrontational ones, have proven most effective and that key factors in these measures havebeen the existence of a permanent supervisory body and the use of non-State bodies orindividuals as part of the process.

Creation of a supervisory bodyA number of international treaties create specific supervisory bodies to help ensure theimplementation of their provisions. These bodies typically receive periodic reports submittedby States Parties on the measures they have taken to implement the treaty, receive complaintsabout alleged violations, undertake investigations and discuss the results of these activitieswith the States concerned. They also often undertake promotional activities in order toimprove compliance with the law.

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An important element in the development of labour, environmental and human rights law hasbeen the use of mechanisms which are non-confrontational, which make use of independentpanels of experts and which provide positive incentives, including assistance, for compliance.Regardless of the model chosen it is clearly necessary to establish a body to monitorimplementation of the 1980 Convention, to periodically review technological developmentswhich could undermine its purposes and to make recommendations to States Parties.A supervisory body for the 1980 Convention supported by adequate secretariat means couldbe charged with (1) the commissioning of fact-finding missions in response to alleged use ofproscribed weapons, (2) compiling reports on progress in implementation, (3) conveningexpert panels to monitor relevant technological developments in weaponry, (4) overseeingthe destruction (and possible replacement) of prohibited types of weapons, (5) administrationof assistance arrangements to States Parties, (6) promotion of broader understanding of andadherence to the Convention and (7) the preparation of periodic review conferences of StatesParties.Effective protection of civilians under the 1980 Convention might best be ensured byproviding a role for organizations which are close to civilian populations and have contacts,particularly in conflict situations, on all sides. Information on compliance should be soughtfrom a wide range of sources including States, U.N. bodies, humanitarian agencies, mineclearance specialists and other technical experts. Sole reliance on interstate diplomacy toclarify compliance issues risks allowing the Convention, so laboriously negotiated, to liedormant, with the consequent costs in terms of human suffering.In addition to providing information, nongovernmental bodies would be well placed tocontribute experts to implementation review activities; fact-finding missions or disputeresolution procedures. Such experts might also be asked to serve officially on the treatysupervisory body, if established.It has to be pointed out that multilateral mechanisms to ensure treaty compliance are oftenmore flexible than bilateral dispute resolution procedures and that the inclusion in the processof nongovernmental actors, provides for a richness of debate, checking of data, moreeffective implementation and broad support for the agreements achieved. In the case of the1990 Montreal Treaty on protection of the ozone layer, complaints can be initiated by oneState against another or by a State against itself when it has difficulties meeting itsobligations. Further, the Treaty Secretariat can request information from either States or nonState entities in order to monitor a particular State's compliance. The complaint proceduresprovided for in the Montreal Protocol aim above all to assist the offending State withcompliance, including through the provision of technical and/or financial assistance. In thecontext of mines, additional assistance with demining efforts could be linked to ratificationby States of the 1980 Convention and a strengthened Protocol II.

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Fact-finding mechanisms to investigate alleged violationsNew prohibitions on the use of anti-personnel mines, or of certain types of such mines, willneed to be backed up by a mechanism to investigate alleged violations of the non-useinjunction. This could be arranged by the supervisory body itself, through an ad-hoc factfinding mission, or by the United Nations Secretary General.

Mechanisms to oversee prohibitions on possession, production and transfer, and toensure destruction of prohibited stocksIf the Review Conference decides to include arms control-type prohibitions, States will needreporting and monitoring mechanisms on the national level to ensure that activities prohibitedby the Convention are not occurring. If the Convention does not contain a total ban of alltypes of a weapon, the monitoring of production facilities to ensure the non-production ofthe specific types of weapons proscribed should be part of national compliance. Control ofexports should also be undertaken by the relevant national authorities. These additionalobligations will usually entail little additional burden as most States already control theproduction and export of weapons.On the international level, States Parties may want to consider mechanisms to ensure thedestruction of the types of weapons prohibited, to compile data on national production andtransfer of permitted weapons and to ensure the non-transfer of restricted weapons to nonstate parties.Positive incentives could also play a useful role. The provision, through an internationalmechanism, of financial or other assistance in the destruction and possible replacement (ifthe ban is not total) of prohibited types of weapons could be considered.

Provision for regular review of the ConventionEffective follow-up will be essential if the presumed positive results of the 1995 ReviewConference are to be successfully implemented and built upon. This is particularly true giventhe fact that the Conference is expected to place limits on a weapon in widespread use: antipersonnel mines. Given the rapid pace of technological change involving weapon systems,regular review is also desirable to safeguard the standards set by international humanitarianlaw and to take action in relation to conventional weapons where appropriate. States maytherefore want to consider both the introduction of the kind of ongoing supervisory bodymentioned above and of a regular treaty review by all States Parties. At a minimum, aspecified date for review of the results of the 1995 Conference should be considered.


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3HaHQange-finding systems, which also use "low-energy" laser beams, have caused someaccidental cases of blindness, but these systems are much less powerful than anti-sensor/ antipersonnel lasers.The portable offensive systems being developed at the moment are laser rifles with aboutWaHsize and weight of a normal rifle, and anti-personnel small clip-on systems' that can beIaWHGo normal rifles. Unclassified information indicates that the rifles have already beenfield-tested. Once mass produced, these lasers would be cheap, with the rifles costing aboutas much as normal rif les, and the clip-on systems even cheaper. The systems run on areplaceable battery pack which need only weigh about 100 grams and which would produceabout 9000 "shots" per battery.With regard to the effect of these lasers on the eye, it was indicated that the extent of damageto the eye will depend on the energy and distance. The anti-personnel and anti-sensor rifleswill permanently blind a person up to a distance of a kilometre or more. Beyond this distancea person may be flashblinded, or even further away may be dazzled if a visible wavelengthis used. The exact distance at which there is no longer a permanent blinding effect isunpredictable because a laser beam is affected by atmospheric conditions and dust.Experts were clear that it is impossible to develop a laser that can only flashblind, an effectlasting only about fifteen minutes. The reason intentional flashblinding is so difficult toachieve is that the level of energy required is very close to the threshold for permanentblinding. Variable factors such as distance, atmospheric pollution and the angle of exposure,by affecting the energy delivered, render consistent flashblinding of troops virtuallyimpossible. Furthermore, it was stated that flash blinding could only be readily achieved atnight when the eye is most sensitive to low levels of light. Even then one would needaccurately to determine the exact distance and corresponding level of energy required. Theamounts of energy required to attempt flashblinding in daylight would almost inevitably causepermanent blindness instead.

The aiming of the beam is not particularly difficult as it will diverge to an area of about 50ern across at a range of one kilometre, and the very large number of shots in each batterypack means that it is possible to sweep the battlefield with the beam. The laser beam travelsat the speed of light and has a straight flight path rendering ballistic calculations unnecessary.As the weapon is silent and the beam is in practice invisible (because it is sent in the formof very short pulses), those firing them do not give their position away.Laser rifles referred to are said to be designed for both anti-sensor and anti-personnel use.However, as the energy and wavelength of a laser necessary to destroy sensors is similar tothose necessary to damage eyes, laser systems said to be designed for anti-sensor purposescould also be used for anti"personnel purposes.Anti-sensor lasers can be expected to include sophisticated target finding equipment. Onerecently developed anti-sensor laser is said to track and target the lenses of optical systems.

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Anti-personnel systems, by contrast, will typically have no specialised auto-targetingequipment and will use a range of wavelengths from the near infrared through all or mostof the visible spectrum.Anti-materiel lasers, for example anti-mine or anti-tank systems, will inevitably use muchhigher energy levels (at least 10 times greater than for anti-personnel uses). They would alsonot require a range of wavelengths and would contain fixtures to prevent beam divergence.The specialists then studied the possibilities for medical treatment and means of protectionand concluded that neither was adequate. Damage to the retina is permanent and irreparable;vision loss caused by haemorrhage might be successfully treated in only a small minority ofcases and even in those cases the long-term outcome would be doubtful. Ophthalmologicalsurgery, in those rare cases where it might have some effect (where the central retina is notaffected), requires extreme cleanliness, sophisticated equipment and highly trained specialists.These prerequisites for successful treatment were thought unlikely to exist on or near thebattlefield or in most developing countries. Even the modest resources for ophthalmologicalsurgery which exist in advanced industrial countries would be quickly overwhelmed by thereturn of large numbers of eye-wounded soldiers.Protection by special goggles would also seem to be largely illusory, as they would onlyscreen out a limited range of known wavelengths, whereas lasers can operate over a widerange of wavelengths, can be designed with adjustable wavelengths and may cycle througha number o f wavelengths consecutively. Specialists agreed that the only real protectionpossible was to save one eye by always wearing a black patch over one eye!

Functional disabilities and psychological pro blems that would be caused by blindingweapons as compared with those caused by other weaponsIn making this assessment, the specialists drew attention to a number of considerationsspecific to blindness:There is no prosthesis to reduce the effect of the disability, and in functional terms blindnessis an exceptionally severe handicap, even when compared with the worst of traditionalbattlefield injuries.Rehabilitation training for the blind is essential, but it is not available everywhere, and it alsogives rise to major difficulties:a. the learning process is long and very complex;b. a psychologically robust personality is needed to undertake this learning effort, but peoplewho have been blinded usually suffer from severe depression and cannot do it well;c. comparatively satisfactory results are seen only in persons with a good education andsound fmancial, family and social support;

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d. successful rehabilitation allows recovery of oruy a fraction of the person's previous skillsand he will always remain dependent to quite a large degree.The experts stressed that blindness almost always causes very severe depression which in alarge proportion of cases lasts for many years, if not permanently.Another matter of importance in a war context is the prevalence of an extreme fear ofblindness; for the majority of people it is the most dreaded injury and soldiers are noexception. I f soldiers are aware of the existence of weapons that can silently and invisiblyblind them, there will be an increased incidence of combat stress disorder during battle andsuch weapons will cause more mental illness in the long term. The medical experts thought that public reaction to blindness caused by weapons especiallyused for that purpose is likely to be very negative, as the public in general tend to feelspecial pity for blind persons and abhorrence at its being intentionally inflicted. They likenedthe fear of blindness and the probable reactions to blindness-inducing weapons to the fear anddisgust aroused by chemical weapons.Finally, the experts pointed out that large numbers of blind persons would put anexceptionally heavy burden on medical and social services and on society in general. Manysocieties could not bear this cost and blinded veterans would simply be left to fend forthemselves.

Foreseeable situation if here were to be widespread use of anti-sensor/anti-personnellaser weaponsThere would evidently be an increase in the numbers of blind servicemen returning fromwar. The number of eye injuries has steadily increased from 0.5% in the last century tobetween 5 and 9% in the Vietnam war. The increase is said to be due to the effects offragmentation weapons. It has been estimated that if anti-sensor lasers were used, but not totarget the human eye, eye injuries would nevertheless increase by 2-3%. If, however, laserswere to be used intentionally to inflict blindness, so that blinding as a method of warfarebecame common practice, serious damage to the eye might account for between 25% and50% of all casualties.Uruike conventional warfare, in which 60% of casualties usually recover, most of thepermanen tly blind will never recover their full ability to function independently. This willmake full reintegration into their societies impossible and costly long term care inevitable.The experts also pointed out that laser weapons could easily be used to cause terror outsidearmed conflict situations by repressive regimes, terrorists or criminals. The attraction oflasers to extra-legal groups would stem from the fact that they are small, light, easy totransport, hard wearing, arid leave no ballistic evidence when used. Energy is provided bya small battery pack. Once manufactured in large quantities laser rifles will be in a similarprice range to conventional rifles and clip-on systems probably even less. Thesecharacteristics mean that widespread proliferation will be inevitable.

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Legal and policy considerationsThe final expert meeting on blinding weapons was attended by 37 govermnent officials,participating in their personal capacity, from 22 countries. They considered the legal andpolicy implications of the information gathered by the scientists.The present lawfulness of the use of blinding weapons was discussed mairuy in the light ofthe rule prohibiting the use of weapons of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering andsuperfluous injury. One participant was of the opinion that any intentional blinding wouldviolate this rule, including the use of lasers to blind the pilots of aircraft. The m a j o r i t ~ ofparticipants, however, thought that the most controversial use of lasers would be agamstinfantry, as the latter can easily be put out of action by means other than blinding. Againstinfantry lasers are likely to be not the weapon of choice but rather an additional weaponwhich will simply add to the level of battlefield suffering. There was a division of opinion,however, as to whether such use is already illegal under existing law.The majority of participants thought that whatever the assessment of the present lawfulnessof such use, it should be subject to legal regulation because there are important ethical,humanitarian and policy reasons for prohibiting blinding as a method of warfare. Manythought that such a prohibition ought to be introduced simply because blinding weapons arehorrific and therefore totally unacceptable - the same considerations which earlier in thiscentury were convincing to the drafters of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition ofthe Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methodsof Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol). The various possibilities for legal regulation werediscussed and are outlined below.

2. POSSmiLITIES FOR LEGAL REGULATION

a) HUMANITARIAN LAW

Several approaches have been used to prohibit or restrict the use of certain w e a p o ~ ininternational humanitarian law; it is possible to consider which would be the most appropnateby analogy in the case of blinding laser weapons:

i. Prohibition o f the use of a certain type of weaponThis was the method used for chemical weapons and dum-dum bullets, because it wasrecognized that the abhorrence and dangers caused by the use such v.:eaponsoutweighed their military utility. In the case of laser weapons, this could mvolveprohibiting the use of all or of some types of a ? t i - s e n s o ~ / a n t i - p e r s ? n n e l weapons. Forexample, it could be decided that those more obviously smted to anti-personnel purposes

~ h o u l d be prohibited.


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ii. Prohibition of certain uses of a particular weaponExamples of limitations of this type are seen in some military manuals which prohibit theuse of incendiary weapons against unprotected soldiers, or state that explosive bullets maybe used against objects but not persons. In the case of laser weapons, such a regulationcould prohibit the use of lasers against persons, or against certain classes of persons, e.g .,infantry.

iii. Prohibition of the use of weapons which have a certain effect, without mentioningthe weapon by name

An example of this type of provision is Protocol I to the 1980 Weapons Convention,which prohibits the use of any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure byfragments which cannot be detected by X-rays.In the case of laser weapons, a norm of this type could read as follows:"The use of weapons the primary effect of which is to damage eyesight is prohibited. "Such an approach would have the advantage of covering not only lasers whose primaryeffect is to blind but also any other future weapons which may have this effect. Adisadvantage is that such a wording may give rise to arguments as to whether blinding isa primary effect, given that these lasers can also have other uses (anti-sensor inparticular), and that at the end of their range they only have a dazzle effect. This wordingwould not cov er intentional blinding by the misuseof other systems such as range-finders.

iv. Prohibition of certain types of behaviour without any reference to the characteristicsof a weaponThis alternative could concentrate on the prohibition of blinding or of the use of weaponswith the primary intention or expected result of permanently damaging eyesight. A normof this type could be worded as follows:"blinding as a method of warfare is prohibited",or"blinding as a method of rendering a combatant hors de combat is prohibited".Alternatively, the wording of the rule could be more specific, such as:"weapons may not be used against persons with the primary intention or expected resultofpennanently damaging their eyesight".Such an approach could also include rules that create a duty to take precautions to avoidaccidental blinding by weapons that are particularly dangerous for eyesight.

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Swedish Draft ProtocolDuring the second meeting of the Working Group of Governmental experts in May 1994 theSwedish government presented the following proposal:"It is prohibited to use laser weapons as an anti-personnel method of warfare with theintention or expected result of seriously damaging the eyesight of persons. "

b) ARMS CONTROL REGULATIONThe 1995 Review Conference may adopt prohibitions or limitations on the production ofcertain types of lasers that could be too easily misused to blind persons because of theirparticular features, e.g., tunability over many wavelengths, power, portability or the use ofcertain visible wavelengths. Other possibilities would be measures to prevent undesirableproliferation, or policies favouring eye-safe lasers for range-fmding, etc., in order to preventavoidable cases of blindness.Distinguishing features of lasers designed primarily or specifically for anti-personnel use maybe found earlier in this report (Part II A 1).


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C. SMALL-CALIBRE WEAPON SYSTEMSDuring the United Nations Conference that led to the adoption of the 1980 Convention, thegovernments of Mexico and Sweden submitted a draft protocol on the regulation of the useof small-calibre weapon systems.The C?nference felt that further research was necessary to establish more accurately the

: - v ? u ~ d m g effects of new types of bullets in order to prevent an unnecessary increase in theirlllJunous effects. The Conference therefore adopted a resolution on small-calibre weaponsystems, at its seventh plenary meeting on 23 September 1979, expressing the view that:

" .. such research, including testing of small-calibre weapon systems, should be continuedwith a view to developing standardized assessment methodology relative to ballisticparameters and medical effects of such systems."The resolution also invited "Governments to carry out further research, jointly or individ uallyand to communicate, where possible, their fmdings", and to "exercise the utmost care in thedevelopment of small-calibre weapon systems, so as to avoid an unnecessary escalation ofthe injurious effects of such systems".A considerable amount of research has taken place since the adoption of this resolution andhas confirmed that energy transfer is the most important factor for wound severity. Highenergy transfer, resulting in more severe wounds, is often caused by early turning of thebullet once it hits the body and by the break-up of the bullet. These phenomena can becaused by poor stability and by the construction of the bullet itself, especially the materialsused and the thickness and toughness of the jacket.On the basis of this information, some States have taken steps to improve the design of theirbullets, in particular to increase their resistance to fragmentation so as to conform to theletter and the spirit of the Hague Declaration of 1899 which prohibits the use of expandingbullets.During the "Expert Meeting on Certain Weapon Systems", convened by the ICRC in Genevafrom May 30 to June 1 1994, presentations made by experts, and the ensuing discussions,have confirmed the importance of the effect due to the energy released by the bullet in thetissue. As stated by one of the rapporteurs "The effectiveness of a bullet can be defined asthe amount of energy that the bullet makes available to the tissue during penetration".The report also pointed out the highly increased risk of short distance shots, i.e. < 50 m.,as at such distances, the bullet is not yet stabilized and its angle of incidence will changebetween 0,5 and 3, reaching a maximum every 1.5 to 3m., therefore greatly increasingthe risk of hitting the target with a high angle of incidence resulting in a large wound.With regard to measuring the energy deposit of a bullet, the most important factor is theplace of energy deposit. Traditional Full Metal Jacketed Bullets (FMJ-bullet) penetrate witha long narrow channel before turning and depositing most of their energy. Dum-dum bulletson the other hand have virtually no narrow channel and therefore deposit most of their

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energy when first entering the body, causing a very severe wound. Therefore, in order toavoid a wound comparable to a dum-dum bullet, the experts at the meeting of 30 May to 1June 1994 said that there should be a low energy deposit in the first 12-15 em., of maximum20-25 Joules/cm2 thus creating a long narrow channel when entering the body (the 7.62 mmNATO has a lower energy deposit than this in the first 18 em.).The effect of small arms bullets in the human body can be reduced by delaying theoccurrence of maximum energy release or reducing the energy release. Several possibilitiesare mentioned in a report to the ICRC on small calibre weapon systems. This rep ort alsopoints out that "To limit bullet's effect in the human body, it is possible to define a standardenergy release profile. Bullets with energy profiles lower than the standard should beaccepted. Bullets which energy release profile exceeds the standard should be refused"The most effective way of making sure that bullets conform to these criteria would be thestandardization of the testing of bullets which would be a very important step towardsclarification of manufacturing specifications in order to ensure that bullets do not fragmenteasily. To this end, the Swiss government has offered (in a diplomatic note of November1991) to put its anti-personnel weapon test facilities at the disposal of all interested States.Both gelatine and soap are suitable tissue simulants, soap being the most practical from thepoint of view of ease of testing and low cost.The Review Conference could consider the most appropriate way to take these developmentsinto account. The participants of the Experts Meeting of the 30 May to 1 June 1994 thoughtthat the most appropriate way would be the adoption of a resolution by the ReviewConference recommending tests in conformity with the indications proposed by the experts.

D. NAVAL MINESIn November 1991, the government of Sweden submitted to the First Committee of theUnited Nations General Assembly a working paper and a draft Protocol on Prohibitions orRestrictions on the Use of Naval Mines. This draft was presented as an additional protocolto be attached to the 1980 Convention on certain conventional weapons.The only existing treaty regulating the use of naval mines is the 1907 Hague ConventionRelative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (Hague Convention VIII).Although this Convention is still in force and has the effect of preventing the indiscriminateuse of naval mines, it is clear that it has become outdated in certain respects. In particular,it makes specific reference to automatic contact mines and does not take later technicaldevelopments into account. During the Expert. Meeting held by t ~ _ I e I ~ R C on May 30 .to.June 1 1994, it was indicated that there are different types of mmes m use today: dnftmgcontact mines which are particularly dangerous; the traditional moored contact mines whichare triggered when touched; influence mines which _use a .combination of sens.ors ( p r e s ~ u r e ,acoustic magnetic, optical or electrical field); hommg mmes (CAPTOR) wh1ch are la1d atdepth are triggered on a r e c o g n i t i o ~ of certain signatures. I t in particular ?ointed outthat there are efforts being made at the moment to change the des1gn of naval mmes so that-they are undetectable which would make their clearance difficult.


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With regard to the content of the Swedish proposal, the expert at the meeting pointed out thatthe draft Protocol had been drafted after consultation with international experts acting in theirpersonal capacity. He pointed out that important innovations in the Protocol, compared with! f a ~ e . C?nvention VIII, is that it introduces a basic rule in Article 3 prohibiting themd1scrmunate use of naval mines, together with a list of specially-protected vessels inArticle 4 (the reference to ships protecting the marine environment is de lege ferenda). Othernew provisions are those prohibiting the laying of drifting mines unless they are soconstructed as to become hartnless one hour after being laid, and the provision in Article 5that all naval mines are to be fitted with effective neutralising mechanisms that render themines hannless when it is anticipated that they no longer serve the military purpose forwhich they were placed in position, or at the latest two years after such emplacement. Theprecautionary measures in Article 6 are influenced by similar provisions in the landminesProtocol, as are the provisions on recording and removal in Articles 7 and 8.During the discussion in the meeting, it was pointed out that seamines laid in earlier conflictsare in practice still causing difficulty to shipping, especially trawlers. A particularlydisturbing development is the present move in designing undetectable seamines, which couldin time cause major problems and it may be appropriate for States to take preventive stepsin this regard.Another element that was pointed out was that the provisions in the draft Protocol for theremoval of mines are weaker than existing law. Reference was made to Article 5 of HagueConvention VIII which provides very clear guidelines as to which party is responsible forclearing mines after the conflict. Reference in this regard was also made to the San RemoManual on International Law Applicable to Artned Conflicts at Sea, recently adopted by agroup of specialists in international law and naval practitioners, which is principally arestatement of contemporary law, and which has provisions on the clearance of mines thatare stricter than the draft Protocol.Of particular value in the draft Protocol are the provisions which are aimed at reducing theindiscriminate effects of the mines, namely, the reference to specifically-protected vessels,precautions to be taken, the prohibition of drifting mines which do not become harmless afterone hour and the introduction of a compulsory neutralisation mechanism. Particular thoughtshould also be given to a prohibition of undetectable seamines.

E. FUTURE WEAPONSThe Conference of Government Experts that met in Lucerne and Lugano in 1974 and 1976,and whose findings served as a basis for the United Nations Conference that adopted the1980 Convention, discussed a number of futuristic weapons. These included laser weapons,microwave, infrasound, and light-flash devices, environmental warfare and electronicwarfare.

- 21 -The experts recognized that at that time it was too early to consider specific restrictions ondevices that were only at the research stage. However, the majority stressed the importanceof keeping a close watch on developments in order to introduce specific prohibitions orlimitations that might be necessary before the weapon in question became widely accepted.Several experts underlined the importance of national review measures, which are nowrequired under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, as well as of international reviewmeasures.As regards the futuristic weapons discussed at the Lucerne/Lugano Conference, developmentsin laser technology have raised the possibility of one disturbing application, namely, the useof lasers as anti-personnel weapons to damage eyesight. This matter is referred to aboveunder the heading "Blinding weapons".There has also been further research into other new technologies, in particular directedenergy weapons such as high-power microwave and infrasound devices. All these directedenergy weapons have one characteristic in common, namely, that the beams are invisible andgenerally inaudible.As infonnation on the research and development of new weapon technologies is mostlyclassified, it is only accessible once a weapon is available on the market or it has reached anadvanced stage of development. Additionally, the published infonnation that exists at thisearly stage is not necessarily fully reliable and therefore the only way to make someassessment as to the probable effects of a weapon that is allegedly being developed is toarrange consultations with scientific experts.For this reason, the ICRC convened in Geneva, from May 30 to June 1 1994, an "ExpertMeeting on Certain Weapon Systems". The reports presented by the experts during thismeeting, covered different types of new weapon systems.Two reports concerned High Power Microwaves and lnfrasound. The discussions showed thatthe technology for such new weapons does exist and is probably already at an advanced stageof development.High power microwaves are primarily developed for the destruction of electronic equipmentin order to, e.g. disrupt the flight of an aircraft or to destroy telecommunications systems.The effective range of beamed High power microwaves can be anything up to hundreds ofkilometres depending upon the power supply, circuit configuration, antenna design and size.High power microwaves attack at the speed of light, thus making avoidance of the beamimpossible and consequently negating the advantage of weapon systems such as high velocitytactical missiles.The report presented on High power microwaves pointed out that these devices may alsohave some effects on persons, especially at close ranges. If electromagnetic power isabsorbed by living tissue, the effect depends on several exposure parameters such asfrequency, intensity, polarisation, shape and electrical properties of the body, etc. The effectsobserved can be local overheating, e.g. in the frequency range between 200MHz and 3GHzrefraction may furthennore result in focusing effects producing spatially limited "hot spots"in the body, e.g. a considerable rise in temper,ature may occur in certain areas of the brain.


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- 22-

Additionally, some animal experiments suggest that short term exposure to microwaveradiation may result in behavioral changes. Although it is known that High powermicrowaves may have effects on persons, these are not yet sufficiently documented.Infrasound is said to have a disruptive effect on internal organs, especially the ear (causingloss of balance) and bowels. I f used in the form of a shock waves, or directed blast device,their effects on humans and fragile mechanical structures would be the same as the effectsof blast waves whose effect in humans is known as primary blast injury. Shock waves arerelatively well reflected by surfaces, which means that they may reach a target out of a directline of sight.The possible indiscriminate effects of the High power microwaves and Infrasound weaponsystems was mentioned, in particular if they are used in populated areas because theyinevitably hit everything between the source and the intended target. However, although itwas agreed that the High power microwaves and Infrasound weapon systems are likely tocome into being within a not too distant future, no precise indications were given in thisrespect during the meeting.A report was also made on the possible misuse of developments in genetic engineering andresearch for the development of possible weapon systems. The possible misuse of geneticstechnology and research could lead to weapon systems which selectively kill according to thegenetic characteristics of the targeted victims, e.g. skin colour, race, .etc. However there isno proof that such weapon research is in fact taking place. The participants were of the


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PART II

PAPERS SUBMITTED


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COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE

EXPERT MEETING ON CERTAIN WEAPON SYSTEMSAND ON IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

30 May

11.00- 12.0014.00 - 14.15

Geneva, 30 May - 1 June 1994

Programme

Registration of participants.Opening by the Chainnan, T. Pfanner


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1 June

09.30- 13.00

14.30 - 18.00

- 25 -

Information on the development of future weapons: microwave,infrasound, chemicals and genetic weapons. Possible legalimplications.Rapporteurs: L. Liszka, M. Meselson, J.P. Robinson, B. Rybeck,S. TuorImplementation procedures in international law: comparativeassessment of the success of different mechanisms in the followingbranches of international law:- international humanitarian lawRapporteurs: M.T. Dutli- international human rights lawRapporteurs: Ch. Cerna- standards promulgated by the International Labour Organisation


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- 26 -

A. SMALL CALIBER WEAPON SYSTEMSby

Beat P. KneubuehlContent1 Introduction2 Definitions3 Progress in wound ballistics since 1979

3.1 Tissue3 1.1 Muscle and other Soft Tissue3.1.2 Bones

3.2 Motion of a Bullet in a Dense Medium (Human Body)

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II'

1 Introduction

Wound Ballistics research in the seventies was characterized by a great variety of experimentalinvestigations. At six international Symposia on Wound Ballistics lots of experiments andphenomena were described ([1) - [4 ) , often without physical backgrounds, however.

For the last fifteen years the work in Wound Ballistics has been characterized byinvestigations in bullet-soft target interaction and in corresponding physical models. The goal wasto understand the known phenomena as for example narrow channel, turning motion of the bullet,its break-up behaviour and so on. An other point was to bring together the two worldwide usedtissue simulant, gelatine and glycerine soap, and showing that there are no principal differencesbetween the results gained by the one or the other.

2Small arms

Defmitions

Handguns (one hand operated weapon) and rifles (two hand operatedweapon) of a caliber up to 12.7 mm (.50").Full Metal Jacketed Bullet (FMJ-bullet). Projectile for small arms, normally inert, composed of a

core of lead, steel or another material, covered entirely (exept thebase) with a ductile metal as for example plated steel or copper alloy.For special purpose, FMJ bullet can contain a tracer.Semi Jacketed Bullet (SJ-bullet). Projectile for small arms, composed of a core of lead,covered partially with a ductile metal as for example plated steel orcopper alloy.

Hollow Point Bullet

Impact angleAngle of incidenceEnergy release

(HP-bullet). Projectile for small arms, with an axial boring at the tip.It can be composed of a lead core, covered partially or entirely, or ofa homogenous metal.Angle between the direction of motion of the bullet before impact andthe target surface.Angle between the direction of motion and the longitudinal axis of thebullet.Loss of kinetic energy per unit path.

3 Progress in Wound Ballistics Since 19793.1 Tissue Simulant3.1.1 Muscle and other Soft TissueBased on a very large number of tests made in different countries during the last twenty years,two materials became popular as simulants: gelatine and glycerine soap. Most popular is gelatine,used in varying concentrations and temperatures. Under condition of a very fast physical processit is allowed to consider both of these materials as some kinds of fluid.

With a good choice of compositions we achieve that the acting forces, penetration depth anddeformation and fragmentation behaviour of a bullet in both materials are the same as in soft biological tissue. Both materials are suitable for judging bullet's effect in the human body. Temperature and gelatine concentration are not so important as postulated earlier. However, for havingcomparable results it is necessary to have a well defined layout of experiments.3.1.2 BonesA systematic and reproducible examination of the bone shot is important for the judgment of theshot wound. This is only possible if the bone (just as the simulant for soft tissue) is normalized.The latest experiments with special plastic cylinder of constant wall thickness gave good resultsconcernig reproducibility and similarity of energy release at full penetration of the bone.3.2 Motion of a Bullet in a Dense Medium (Human Body)3.2.13.2.1.1

Full Metal Jacketed BulletsNarrow Channel and Bullet Overturning

Fig. 1

When a FMJ-projectile enters a dense medium,. he velocity is normally high. Thus the area ofcontact between projectile and medium (the"wetted area") is very small and situated only atthe tip of the projectile. The small angle of incidence causes small normal force and alsosmall overturning moment. In this phase, thegyroscopic stabilization moment is able to stabilze the projectile: the narrow channel results(Fig. 1, 1-2).

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With decreasing velocity the overturning moment increases twice: because of the increasedwetted area and because of the increasing angle of incidence. The result is a very high angular velocity and the bullet turns first in sidewise then in backwards position (Fig. I, 3-4). However, thehigh angular velocity induces a high damping moment that retards the rotational motion. Thecircular motion changes the direction and the bullet goes back in a sidewise position (Fig. 1, 6-8)that can be stable for a certain time since the center of pressure and the center of gravity are closetogether. Then the projectile turns again into backward position in which it finishes the motion(Fig. 1, 9-10).

Fig. 2: Cavity in soap of a FMJ - bullet

3.2.1.2 Broken BulletsFMJ bullets that move with high velocity in sidewise position have only a small wetted area alongthe meridian which increases from the tip to the cylindrical part and decreases along the boattail.So the acting forces on the tip and the rear part are smaller than in the middle and the bullet getsa bending stress. Under this stress the bullet squeezes and the jacket often breaks at the weakestpoint, the cannelure. Lead is pressed out at the rear or at the broken cannelure.3.2.1.3 The Influence oflmpact ConditionsThe most important impact quantities of a bullet are: mass, velocity, energy, angle of incidence,angle of impact, gyroscopic stability. Few of them are of high importance for the motion insidethe body. They are: energy, angle of incidence and gyroscopic stability.

High angle of incidence gives a short narrow channel and an early turn in sidewise position.The probability of a break up is higher than in case of a small angle of incidence. The same behaviour can be observed if the bullet has a small gyroscopic stability.

3.2.1.4 Short Distance ShotsHaving left the muzzle the projectile will be disturbed by the powder gases that exit the muzzlewith very high velocity. It begins to yaw comparable to a spinning top. This yawing motiondecreases up to 50 to 100m. The first 10 to 20 m the angle of incidence changes between 0.5and 3o. It reaches the maximum every 1.5 to 3 m.

On short distances this behaviour makes possible that the same bullet gives once a relativelysmall and once a large wound depending on the actual angle of incidence at the hitting point.

3.2.2 Semi-Jacketed Bullets ("DumDum"- Bullets)Entering dense media hollow point and soft point bullets mushroom immediately. After only 1 to4 e m of path, such bullets are fully deformed. The narrow channel measures between 0 and 2 em.Once mushroomed, the bullet moves straight up through the medium without tumbling or turningbut with a high decrease in velocity.

The analogous motion behaviour can be observed in each projectile with cylindrical head. Because of the highercross sectional density, the retardation of such a projectile will be amaller.

Ricochets of semi-jacketed and soft point bullets do not brake at all. They have the same motionin the body as ricochets of full metal jacketed bullets.

3.3 Hitting BonesWhen a rifle bullet hits a bone shortly after the impact, it penetrates the bone with only a smallloss of velocity and energy. Measurements showed that at an impact velocity of 800 m/s the velocity decreases by only 30 m/s (energy loss ca. 220 J) penetrating a femur. The resulting impulsis too low for deforming or breaking the projectile. On the other hand the penetration of the bonedisturbs the stability and after the bone the bullet turns earlier to the sidewise position. So it ispossible that a bullet which would not break in soft tissue can fragment after hitting a bonebecause of the earlier destabilisation. Bullets that hit bones with low velocities have not yet beenexamined.

4 CharacterizingBullet Effectiveness4.1 Bullet's Effectiveness and EffectA .300 Win. Mag. hollow point hunting bullet that grazes sligthly a body produces only a smalleffect. On the other hand, an air gtm pellet that penetrates the column and hit the spinal cord,lead to a paraplegia or to the death of the victim. However, air gun pellets are not more danger-

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ous than hunting bullets. So it is very important to distinguish between efkctiveness and efkct ofa bullet. Disrupting or damaging tissue is an act of (physical) work. Work can only be done if acertain amount of energy is available at this place. The effectiveness of a bullet can be defined asthe amount of energy that the bullet makes available to the tissue during penetration. It can bephysically measured using simulants. The effect of a bullet is body's reaction on deposed energy.It depends deeply on the hit point and on the course of the wounding track. Bullets with high effectiveness can produce light or heavy damage but the probability of heavy damage is higher.Bullets with low effectiveness produce mostly low effects.

4.2 The Energy Release ProfileThe energy that a bullet makes available to the body at a certain point is given by bullet's energyrelease per unit path at this point (measured in Joule per em). This energy release is a goodmeasure for bullet's effectiveness. Each bullet has a charateristic energy release profile that showseasily the wounding capacity of this. bullet along the whole penetration path.

With the energy release profile SJ- and HP-bullets ("Dum Dum"-bullets) can be clearlydistinguish of FMJ-bullets.

5 Summary of Facts5.1 Full Metal Jacketed BulletsThe following facts are related to short shooting distances (15 to 30 m). For longer shooting distances, the effectiveness would decrease because of the lower impact energy and higher stabilityof the bullet.

Each FMJ-bullet has a narrow channel of 8 to 10 em, where the effectiveness is lower than10 J/cm and one of 10 to 15 em, where the effectiveness is lower than 20 J/cm. The lengthof the narrow channel increases with increasing shooting distance.Each FMJ-bullet turns half-tum in the body. The turning motion begins at the end of thenarrow channel.Exept some special constructions all FMJ bullet break in a soft target after a penetration of15 to 25 em, if the shooting distance is short (less than 30 to 50 m).The maximum effectiveness depends on the impact energy. It reaches 200 J/cm, if the impact energy exceeds 2500 J, and ISO J/cm if the impact energy exceeds 1500 J. For7.62 mm FMJ-bullets, the maximum is situated between 20 and 30 em penetration depthand for 5.56 mm FMJ-bullets it is between 15 and 20 em penetration depth.

5.2

6

5.56 mm FMJ-bullet, whether they break or not, have a smaller maximal effectiveness than7. 62 mm bullets, because of their lower energy. But this maximum happens earlier in thewound channel.Broken or bursted FMJ-bullets are not comparable to SJ- or HP-bullets because they havealways a narrow channel.Ricochets of FMJ-bullets have about the same effectiveness as direct shots of SJ or HP-bul-.lets.

Semi Jacketed and Hollow Point BulletsEach SJ-bullet and true HP-bullet deform very quickly. They have no narrow channel. Already along the first 2 em, the effectiveness is higher than 50 J/cm.The maximum effectiveness of SJ- and true HP-bullet is situated between 0 and 10 empenetration depth. It is not higher than the maximum effectiveness of FMJ bullets in thesame caliber.Ricochets of SJ-bullets and HP-bullets have the same behaviour as ricochets of FMJ-bullets.

ConclusionsThe effect of small arms bullets in the human body can be reduced by delaying the occurance ofmaximal energy release or by reducing the amount of energy release. For these purposes thereexist several possibilities, as for example:

Increase the stability by increasing the barrel twist or by changing bullet's construction.Shorten the bullets. This gives less cross sectional density in the sidewise postion.Reducing impact energy. This will be hardly practicable because of exterior ballisticsrequirements.

To limit bu llet's effect in the human body, it is possible to define a standard energy releaseprofile. Bullets with energy release profiles lower than the standard should be accepted. Bulletswhich energy release profile exceed the standard should be refused.

6 References[I) SEEMAN T. (Editor) Wound Ballistics, Proceed. 3th Int. Symp. 1978, Acta Chir. Scand., Suppl.489, 1979[2] SEEMAN T. (Editor) Wound Ballistics,' Proceed. 4th Int. Symp. 1981, Acta Chir. Scand., Suppl.S08, 1982[3] SEEMAN T. (Editor) Wound Ballistics, Proceed. 5th Int. Symp. 1985, J. Tmuma Vol.28, Suppl. 1988

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:I

[4] WANG Z.G., LIU Y.Q. (Editors) Wound Ballistics, Proceed. 6th Int. Symp. !9 78, J. Trauma (China) Vol 6,Suppl. 1990[5] FACKLER M.L. et .al. Ordnance Gelatin for Ballistics Studies Am. Forens. Med. Pathol.9 , 218-219, 1988[6) JANZON B. Soft Soap as Tissue Simulant Medium For Wound Ballistics Studies ... Acta Chir.Scand.,Suppl.508, 1982[7) SELLIER K.G., KNEUBUEHL B.P., Wundballistik und ihre ballistischen Grundlagen, Sprioger, Berlin, 1992[8) SELLIER K.G., KNEUBUEHL B.P ., Woundballistics and the Scientific Background, Elsevier, Amsterdam,1994

250~ E 200()---,~

150ellQ)Q)a:>- 100OJ__Q)ill 50

~

00

250

E 200~ ...,~150ellQ)

Q)a:>- 100OJ__Q)ill 50

00

7.62 mm NATO FMJd = 25 m (bullet broken),' I'I I

3,500: I - i ; -_______ :________: _ ...-1 ____.;; -----------: 1t; . -,800r : i' : .I 1'1I i; II ____,_;__ 'I

II ! -

I I1: I~ / ..._

2,100

1,400

700

10 20 30 40 050

r_,10

Penetration Depth [em]

7.5 mm GP 11 FMJ (St)d = 25 m, (bullet undeformed)I""L.... ;;;

_..; III,.... .- III I

II

I'

1.. iI I/20 30 40


3,500---2,800

2,100

1,400

700

050

~--,~ >-OJ.__Q)cwell-

~....,~ >-OJ.__Q)cw~-

- 35 - - 36 -


25/39

250~ E 200-2.:::?..3l 150as

~ CDa: 100>-C>....CDtfj 5000

250~ E 200(.)2.3l150as~ CDa: 100>-C>....CDtfj 50 ...

r,00

7.62 mm Sierra MK FMJ (open tip)d = 25 m, (bullet bursted)

I ' !I -- ,.I 3,500- /- - - - - - - - ; - - ~ - - - - r - ----- - - - ~ - - - - - - - - -. I 2,800

I

l!,l,I ''' II I""' L II I....I I""' I I I II II I I.I / ...,_,.10 20 30 40

-",.I

II

10


7.62x51 mm Soft Pointd = 25 m, ("Dum Dum bullet)

-----//1,"l..,_,_

io-

20 30 40Penetration Depth [em]

--

~"")~2,100 >-Cl

....CDc:w1,400 Cii.....700

050

3,500

2,800

2,100 ~....CDc:w1 400 Cii700

050

.....

250~ E 200(.).__"" )~3l 150asCDCDa: 100>-C>....CDc:w 50

00

7.62 mm Kalashnikov FMJd = 25 m, (bullet slightly deformed)

I '' ''I I'r--- --- -- - -- '--- .J - - - - - - - -' '' !I !' 1 i'II !r-I II 'I - --i.. .,.i / II ..,_rf, I 'I I':"

10 20 30 40Penetration Depth [em]

5.45 mm Kalashnikov (AK-74)d = 30 m, (bullet undeformed)

-3,500

----- - 2,800

2,100- 1,400700

050

250,----------,------------,---,3,500

~ E 200(.).__"" )~

2,800

~"")~>-Cl....CDc:was.....

3l 1501-------------------__; __ - - -- 2,100 2>as CDc:CD Wa: 100 - - 1 400 Cii>- .,.. -e> , ." 'CD - -tfj 50 / 700I,.o ~ ~ ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - ~ L - - - ~ o0 1 0 20 ' 30 40 50


- 37 - - 38 -


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i

.......

r - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - , , 3 , 5 0 0III,2,800rI ~j ~/2,100I Q)

,400ii700

~ ~ ~ - - - - ~ ~ ~ - - - - ~ o50

5.56 mm SS 109 FMJd = 25 m, (bullet broken) .2 5 0 r - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ 3 , 5 0 0

E 20 0 ~ - - - - - - - - - - - . 2,800~- 15 0 - - - - - - - ~ - - - - . _ . .__________ - - - - - -2 ,100Q) Q)m c'; , 100 - - ... .,. - - 1,400

ill 501-------- . 700o ~ - - ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - o0 1 0 20 30 40 50


5.6 mm Gw Pat 90d = 15 m, (broken bullet)250,----------------------,3,500

~ E 200(.)--...,~

I. 2,800

5l 150 -- - - - ~ ('(lQ)

:>.2,100 OJQ) - - - I ....Q)cwa: 100:>. -1,400 ('(l2'Q)ill 50 700

o ~ - - ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - ~ o0 1 0 20 30 40 50Penetration Depth [em]

.223 Rem JHPd = 15 m, (deformating bullet)25 0 ,------------------------_-----,3,500

....... .E 200 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - ------- -- - 2,800(.)--...,-

-

:>.2,100 OJ.....,. ---.10 20 30

Penetration Depth [em]40

Q)cw1 ,400 (i i

050

-

,,I''I'I


27/39

I- 39 -

5.6 mm Gw Pat 90d = 65 m, (deformed bullet)250 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ . 1 3,500

~ E 200(. )--. . 2,800

~ 150 ----. ---- ........... ---a! >.2,100 0 )..!!1Q) ....Q)c:w: 100 - . .>.0) -,_I 1,400 "iii....Q).fj 50 700

o ~ - - ~ ~ - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ - - ~ o0 1 0 20 30 40 50

Penetration Depth [em)

-


28/39

- 40-

SMALL-CALIBRE WEAPON SYSTEMSby

Mr. Erich ProkoshDuring the preparatory meeting to the United Nations Conference in 1979 which led to theadoption of the 1980 Convention, Mexico and Sweden submitted a draft proposal providingfor the prohibition of use of small-calibre projectiles which cause high energy transfer. Theproposal listed four examples of how such transfer could be brought about. It proposed amethod of testing and an undefined maximum allowable energy release.The proposal did not succeed, principally because some other delegations contested both thesubstantive criteria and the testing method. However, the Conference adopted a resolutionon small-calibre weapon systems at its 7th plenary meeting on 23 September 1979 statingthat it was "[a]nxious to prevent an unnecessary increase in the injurious effects of suchweapon systems". The resolution called for further research and appealed "to allGovernments to exercise the utmost care in the development of small-calibre weaponsystems, so as to avoid an unnecessary escalation of the injurious effects os such systems".As noted in the Report of the ICRC for the Review Conference of the 1980 UN Convention(February 1994, p. 33), considerable research has been done since the adoption of the


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B. BLINDING WEAPONS

Excerpt fromBLINDING WEAPONS

Reports of the meetings of expertsConvened by the International Committee of the Red Crosson Battlefield Laser Weapons1989-1991

- 42 -

Military Technology- MILTECH, March 1990- 43 -

strict hazard distances for each laser. The ible. During the daytime, flash bli nding requires


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II

Blinding lasers:the nastiest weapon?by BENGT ANDERBERG and MYRON L. WOLBARSHT*

The design of a specific laser weapon is primarily determined by the target to beengaged by the laser. The characteristics of the target dictate the type of aser,wavelength, pulse length, pulse repetition frequency, and energy requirement.If he desired effect s the neutralisation or destruction of aircraft, helicopters ormissiles by burning holes through them, or of disabling tanks by grazing theirglass vision blocks, a very high-power aser (several MWs) has to be used. Sucha laser would be a true anti-materiel weapon. If the target is a sensitive electrooptical system or some other type of sensor system that is to be jammed ordestroyedby a laser operating in the counter-measure role, then the choice willbe for a low-energy aser operating within the frequency bandwidth of he targetsensor. Even in this case, the laser can be considered an anti-materiel weapon.

If he target s a soldier, a high-energy aser may be used more or ess in the sameway as a very long-range flamethrower: the beam could set fire to the uniformand other equipment, and cause deep burns injury. For many reasons however,the systematic use of very expensive high-energy lasers as anti-personnel weapons is not cost-effective.There is, however, a specific part of he human body that is extremely sensitiveto laser radiati on- the eyes. It s possible to use a low-energy laser operating inthe visual or near IR part of the electromagnetic spectrum to cause blindness.

Because of the unique characteristics of thelaser beam, its radiation is seen by the eye as ifit were coming from a point source. That is,the eye fo cuses the laser beam onto a smallpoint on the retina. The effect magnifies the brightness of the laser beam by a factor ofapproximately 100 000. This effect can befurther multiplied by any magnifying or lightcollecting optics placed in front of the eye (i.e.a sight or a binocular).This is only the case within the range ofapproximately 0.4 to 1.4 micrometers. In thiscase the eye transmits the laser wavelengths,termed by the laser safety regulations the e-

tina hazard region, thus causing damage.Because of the large degree of energy concentration possible at the retina, the level ofenergy density at the cornea that is required tocause severe retinal damage is remarkablylow, varying from 0.5 to 5 mJjcm2, dependingupon the image position (point of concentration) on the retina. This can be compared wi ththe level of energy required to destroy parts ofan aircraft (about 1OKJjcm2).At these very low energy levels existing fieldlaser devices such as rangefinders and designators are already dangerous to the eye. Thishas resulted in the establishment of very

Bripadier Anderberg is currently Head of the Planning Department for the Swedish Army Staff in Stockholmand Myron Wolbarsht s aProfessorof Biomedicine in the Department of Psychology at Duke University, NorthCarolina.

Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance (NOHD) fordirect intrabeam viewing is the distancebeyond which an unprotected person maystand in the beam with a naked eye and beexposed without injury. If the person is usingmagnifying optical devices, the hazardousrange is greatly increased. For a typical Nd:Y AG rangefinder on a Swedish light tank, theNOHD for a naked eye is 2 km, and for a personusing ordinary binoculars, 20 km. For a typicalruby rangefinder, the corresponding figuresare 10 km and 80 km. Even if the safety regulations have a safety margin of a factor more .than 10, most of these lasers deliver sufficiently powerful beams to damage the mostsensitive part of the eye - the macula.However, in spite of the safety regulations,there have been a few accidents. Investigationof these accidents, together with deliberatesurgical exposures, form a huge global database.Damage to the eye is dependent upon manyfactors. L a s e ~ wavelength, pulse energy, pulseduration, and the size of the beam at the targetare of prime importance. But one must alsoinclude the range, terrain features, water content, turbulence, and pollution in the atmosphere, as well as the biological target, todetermine any limitation in conditions or effect. The degree of pigmentation in the fundusis also of mportance. This means that damageto the eye may vary considerably dependingon a variety of ocal circumstances. All this willprobably lead the designer of an anti-personnel laser weapon to give it as high an outputenergy as feasible to widen its operational utility and cause maximum damage in accordancewith the military requirements.An anti-eye laser weapon can have two mainapplica tions : temporary visual disablement,such as flash-blindness discomfort or a veilingglare, or more permanent eye damage (partialor total blindness).

If a pilot is flash blinded for between ten andthirty seconds during the final phase of anattack, he will most certainly have to leave theaircraft or crash. Flash blinding rnay also beused in a tank-versus-tank engagement toblind one enemy tank while another tank isengaged with the main gun.The option to cause flash blinding only, andnot more permanent injury to the enemy'svision, is possible only at night when the eyesare adapted to take in as much light as poss-

such a high level of energy that not only flashblindness, but also more permanent damageto the eyes will be unavoidable.More permanent damage to the eye can beinflicted by lasers in several ways. Only thecentral 2.5 mm of the retina, the macula, isused for reading, driving, and other highlyskilled visual tasks. For aiming a rifle or makingout the finest details, only the central 0.3 mmof the macula, the fovea, is used. It then follows that, if the fovea, is used. It then followsthat, if the fovea is destroyed, a person cannotsee well enough for the accurate aiming of arifl e.lf the macula outside the fovea is affected,then driving, rapid reading, and many othervisual tasks are no longer possible, and thetarget is functionally blind, even though theperson can see well enough to walk and carryon most day-to-day actions necessary to live.Extensive visual retraining and rehabilitation .are essential in order to work or lead an independent life.It is possible to damage the eye directly onlyin, or very near the fovea, if the soldier is looking straight into the beam, or at a point close tothe enemy laser. For example, if the distancebetween the soldier and the enemy laser is1000 m and as the most sensitive area,including the macula, is 2.5 mm in diameter,the laser must be positioned within 70 m oneither side of the point at which the soldier islooking.This means that if the designer of an anti-eyelaser weapon really wants to be certain ofcausing total blindness or a serious visual loss,that is, functional blindness, the soldier mustbe lured into ooking towards the laser weaponbefore it s fired: This is easily done in the darkby lighting a small lamp. By instinct, the soldierthen looks in that direction, and if the laser ison, he will be visually disabled. It is more difficult in daytime to attract the soldier's attentionwith a bright flash or noise, but this is notimpossible.

However, if an anti-eye laser weapon is to bereally effective, it should cause severe damageto the eyes even from an oblique position.Functional loss of vision resulting from peripheral exposure may be caused either bybleeding from the retina spreading inside theeyeball to obscure the optical pathway to themacula, or by subretinal bleeding under themacula to prevent it from working.

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ious risk of peripheral bleeding caused by lasers fired from oblique positions. It is possibleto design an anti-eye laser weapon that causessufficient damage when fired at an angle atfeast 60 from the fine sight. This means thatthe laser weapon radiating towards the soldierat a distance of 1 000 m may be placed anywhere within 1 000 m from his line of sight.Thus, such a weapon will certainly have a dramatic impact on the hit rate capable of visuallydisabling an adversary. It will certainly be avery effective weapon on the battlefield.

terns best mounted on armoured vehicles,helicopters, or aircraft.An anti-eye low-energy laser weapon,fielded to blind enemy soldiers, may very wellbe hand held. It could be used independently orlined up with a rifle, machine gun, or any otherweapon that uses a direct line of sight.To use it to blind the most valuable target, itmay be directed towards optics on the battlefield. Behind the opti cs are very often the eyesof a gunner, commander, artillery observer, ormissile operator.

There has been some public information onthe development of small laser weapons. Itwas reported that the US Army is, or was,working on a portable laser device for use byinfantry to provide a soft kill)) against armoured targets by attacking sensors, including television, night vision devices, and personnel. The system, called DAZER, weighsonly about 20 lbs and cost in the region of$50,000 per device. The DAZER is basedupon a Raman-shifted alexandrite laser. Tuning the afexandrite laser can avoid countermeasures that rely on blocking of a known las-er wavelength. Whether the intention is to usethe DAZER deliberately and systematically oronly ncidentally n an anti-personnel role is notknown. However, in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 19 88, it wassaid that it is possible to create a laser beamof sufficient intensity to permanently destroythe eye, and it is possible to create significantdamage without destroying it permanently.

Hitting the target - the eyes of a soldier or asensor- is not very difficult at battlefield distances. The beam may have a divergenceangle of 0.5 to 1 mrad which means that thebeam is 0.5 to 1 min diameter at a distance of1 000 m. Directing the laser beam with sufficient care is no more difficult than directing anyother weapon. It s easy for the operator, having identified the target, to place the beam onthe right area of the human body.The damage to the eyes may vary. A centralscar on, or in the immediate vicinity of, thefovea causes complete loss of central vision,and there is no treatment. Bleeding inside theeyeball will in most cases cause loss of vision.It s possible to treat these injuries by removingthe blood mass in the vitreous body within theeye which obscures the optical pathway, or

that under the retina which interrupts retinalfunction. However, this must be completedsoon after the injury. and these surgical procedures are not only complicated but requireextremely clean operating conditions, specialinstruments, and many more skilled doctorsthan are available in peace time. Mass injuriesto the eyes will certainly overwhelm the available resources very quickly during war.The psychological impact on soldiers will besignificant once they realise that observing theterrain as well as looking towards the enemy

may entail a significant risk of being blinded.The burden to society after an armed cohflict may be tremendous. The number of eyeinjured soldiers will be enormously multipliedcompared with earlier wars.

A low-energy laser weapon may either bedesigned primarily to counter sensors and other electro-optical devices, or may be intendedonly for a.lti-personnel use. It could be portable, but that is not necessary, as it could beintegrated nto rather complex fire-control sys-

Small hand-held anti-eye laser weapons thatare comparatively cheap will certainly be verycost-effective, as they cause not only injuryand a severe medical problem but also amarked psychological effect. The ammunition,batteries, are very cheap and easily available.Even the demand for maintenance may be lim-ited.ProtectionThe methods available to protect a soldieragainst low-energy laser weapons includeblocking the beam, changing the individual'svisual behaviour on the battlefield, and usingcountermeasures.

One of the most important ways of blockinga laser beam from reaching the eyes or a sensor is by using a filter. Howe ver, this is complicated. The filter must block exactly thesame wavelength as that used by the laser.This means that unless the specific wave-

Jength(s) of the laser(s) threatening the eyes orthe sensors are known beforehand, all possible wavelengths should be blocked. By usinga tunable laser, it is possible to change thewavelengths within a significant part of theretinal-hazard spectrum to make it impossiblefor the adversary to know exactly which wavelength should be used.The need for adequate vision in a fife-threatening situation is, of course, vital to the soldier. His vision is already limited on the battle-field, by smoke, haze, and terrain features andwill certainly be even more limited at night,dawn, and dusk. Adding laser-protective filters which limit the vision even more is not aneasy or desirable solution. The visibilitythrough these filters varies to a great extentwith the level of protection. It seems todaythat a filter suitable for protection againstmany wavelengths, or large parts of the visualband, will make it more or less impossible tosee enough to fight.It may be easier to protect optical and electro-optical equipment with a filter, or otherprotective methods that can be built in fromthe design stage.Anotherway of blocking the laser beam is touse some method of indirect viewing. If thesoldier uses TV, he will not be injured. The TVmay break bu t can be repaired. The proble m is,of course. a blend of the weight, ruggedness,and the cost of protection. Indirect viewing ispossible only if integrated into fighting vehicles, ships, aircraft, or other weapon systems.It must also be remembered that no technological system that uses indirect viewing canentirely replace the direct viewing ability of thehuman eyes. In any case, indirect viewing is nosolution for the ordinary infantry soldier.One very cheap way to fully protect at leastpart of the eyesight of every soldier is to havehim wear a black patch on one of his eyes (aslong ago suggested by the British). However, itwill limi t the field of view and destroy binocularvision which may be a considerable weaknessin battle. The proposal to use a black patchmay seem somewhat primitive, but it certainlyprotects one eye.Ne w battlefield techniques

If these laser weapons are fielded, it will beessential to find out the consequences theyhave on war theories and battle techniques.What are the commanders and soldiers to betaught?

It is generally understood that the laser weapon is a direct line-of-sight weapon and shouldbe treated as other such weapons. This meansthat soldiers on the battlefield have to avoidlaser beams in the same way they avoid directfire. They can do this by using the terrain andother available protection. The problem is,how does the soldier know he is being shot atwith a laser? as he will not hear or see anyweapon signature. Because the soldier doesnot know when he is being shot at, he has tostay protected at all times.The soldier has to be warned or ordered notto use magnifying optics unless absolutelynecessary. The comman der has to use as fewsoldiers as possible to observe enemy movements and positions. The observer has to limithis field of vision to that strictly required by histask. Magnifying optics or other optical aidscan use simple techniques to restric t the visualfield. However, if the enemy laser is within thefield of vision, these methods are of no use atall.An active countermeasure is another way ofdealing with the laser threat. By using a laserdetector, it is possible to get a warning whenthe enemy is using lasers. A modern laserdetector s able to detect asers over 360" with

an angular resolution of about 3". This creates an opportunity for the use of countermeasures such as artillery fire, protection bysmoke, warning to one's own troops, and achange of tactics. However, often it is notpossible to pinpoint the enemy laser, and,thus, the countermeasures will be of somewhat limited effect. Active countermeasuresalso reveal one's own position.The designer of a low-energy anti-eye laserweapon will certainly try to circumvent allpossible ways of protection. As it now stands,there are no realistic ways of protecting theeyes ofthe soldier. It will be even more difficultto protect many of the sensors.Conclusion and consequences

For reasons already stated, low-energy laser weapons designed for use against sensorsare likely in the near future. Relatively cheap,small, and hand-held anti-eye laser weaponscould be fielded in large quantities during the1990s.The impact on the future battlefield of laserweapons will be considerable. They will affectoperations and battle techniques. The use of

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battlefield will certainly change the situation ofthe infantryman. He will have a new, silent andinvisible threat to handle. In this respect, thethreat differs from other weapons.It is necessary to include the laser threat inthe training of field units. All armies will haveto write training manuals and design trainingdevices based on new battle doctrines adapted to the laser environment.The question of medical treatment andmedical resources is perhaps one of the mostdifficult and important. The number of eyeinjuries will rise considerably, perhaps to a

tors and qualified surgical facilities will betotally inadequate. If economic resourceshave not been directed towards this medicalfield in peace time, there will not be sufficientqualified help for the treatment of injured soldiers.Another very difficult problem is to whatextent the soldier's morale will be affected. Ifthe medical resources are inadequate, therewill certainly be a morale problem. No one willknowingly risk their eyes, if there is no protection, or insufficient treatment.

DEFENSE NEWS, 5 March 1990Army tests hand-held laser riflesBut existing lasers already threaten troops, experts sayby NEIL MUNRO, Defense News Staff Wr iter

WASHINGTON- The U.S. Army has fieldtested tw o hand-held laser weapons thatcould be used to blind enemy troops and toburn infrared sensors and periscopes on enemy armored vehicles.But before laser weapons can be deployed,proponents will have to overcome widespreaddistaste for th

icrc expert meeting on certain weapon systems and on implementation mechanisms in international law,...

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