identifying anaphoric dependencies - … · glosses adhere as much as possible to the leipzig...
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IDENTIFYING ANAPHORIC DEPENDENCIES
Elena Anagnostopoulou and Martin Everaert
University of Crete, Utrecht University
1. INTRODUCTION1
If we take two recent comprehensive publications on anaphora, Safir (2004) and Büring
(2005), what we see is that the issue of diagnosing anaphora is not a very prominent
topic. But this is not very different from what can be found in the (generative) literature at
large. Anaphors are distinguished from pronominals, and an element is called an anaphor
because it needs a ‘close’ antecedent, resulting in the element obeying principle A of the
Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981). Likewise, if an element does not allow a co-argument
antecedent, thus obeying principle B of the Binding Theory, it is taken to be a
pronominal. To escape potential circularity more is needed. Büring (2005:3) provides
cautionary remarks about the use of the notions ‘anaphor’ and ‘pronominal’ but limits
himself to the remark that anaphors are mainly distinguished from other NPs by
morphosyntactic criteria, giving the impression that he shares the widely held
misconception that anaphors are a subset of ‘pronouns’. We will return to this matter in
sections 2.2 and 3.2. Büring subsequently discusses other phenomena that seem to
distinguish anaphors from pronominals, which will be discussed in section 4. Safir (2004)
goes a bit further. Starting with the statement that anaphors are elements requiring an
antecedent, he follows up on the definition of anaphors by stating that anaphors are
referentially defective NPs, lacking ‘deictic potential’: elements like himself cannot be
used in isolation to indicate an individual in the context (Safir 2004:86). In essence, this
is the same as what Reinhart (1983) called ‘(syntactic) binding’, i.e. interpreting one of
the expressions in terms of the other by grammatical means. In other words, anaphors are
elements that require to be syntactically bound.
In section 2 we discuss some of the key issues in the discussions of binding theory,
and the anaphor-pronominal distinction that lies at its basis. Subsequently, we discuss
1 We benefitted from discussions with Alexis Dimitriadis, Eric Reuland, Ken Safir, and the
substantial remarks of two anonymous reviewers. We thank Artemis Alexiadou, Dimitra Delli,
Alexis Dimitriadis, Sabine Iatridou, Marika Lekakou and Giorgos Spathas for their judgments
and comments on the idhios data, and Winfried Lechner, Alexis Dimitriadis, Giorgos Spathas,
Eric Reuland and Danny Fox for discussion of the material presented in section 5.
The contribution of Martin Everaert is part of the research programme Universals and the
Typology of reflexives, which is financed by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific
Research (NWO).
Glosses adhere as much as possible to the Leipzig glossing rules. Apart from the standard
abbreviations,some specific abbreviations are used: ‘VR’ for verbal reflexive marker, ‘LOG’ for
logophor, ‘H’ for honorific In most cases we have followed the author(s) in glossing of lexical
items. Note that anaphoric dependencies are indicated in bold.
some of the empirical problems that have been important in redefining the notion
“anaphor”. In section 4, we discuss the diagnostics for the anaphor-pronominal
distinction. In the last part of the paper, we present a case study of an element that doesn’t
quite fit known typologies of anaphors, the anaphor ton idhio ‘the same’ in Greek. We
demonstrate that the anaphora diagnostics discussed in the preceding sections do not
unambiguously identify ton idhio as an anaphor.
2. SETTING THE STAGE
2.1 Binding Theory
Binding theory, a theory of anaphoric relations taken as syntactic dependencies
(Chomsky 1981), is one of the central theories in generative grammar. The crucial
assumption underlying this theory is that all interpretative dependencies can be
understood in terms of structural conditions on indexing. The relation between an
anaphor and its antecedent is configurationally sensitive: the antecedent of an anaphor
must c-command it, and there is a domain in which must be bound. This domain, the
governing category, is determined by the governor of and a predicational head, both
contained in that domain. Lexical elements are classified on the basis of two features <±
anaphor> and <±pronominal>, and their distribution is regulated by binding conditions as
formulated in (1):2
(1) ‘Classical’ Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981, 1986)
a. An anaphor, an element classified as <+anaphor, -pronominal> (= herself, each
other,..), is bound in a local domain D
b. A pronominal, an element classified as <-anaphor, +pronominal> (=him, she,..),
is free in a local domain D
c. An R-expression, an element classified as <-anaphor, -pronominal> (= John, the
girl), is free
This standard binding theory provides a simple and appealing picture of binding relations
in natural language. It clearly describes recurrent patterns in the various languages of the
world where reflexives and pronominals are indeed locally bound, and in complementary
distribution (cf. 2,3).3
2 Central notions relevant for the present discussion are defined in (i-iii):
(i) α c-commands β iff the minimal maximal projection dominating β dominates α, and does
not dominate β.
(ii) a. β is bound by α iff β and α are coindexed, α c-commands β (and β is in an A-position)
b. β is free iff it is not bound
(iii) γ is a local domain D if all the grammatical functions compatible with a head dominated
by γ are contained in γ. 3 Example (2a) from Finnish (Steenbergen 1991), (2b) from Hindi-Urdu (Davison 2000:406/7),
(3a) from Russian and (3b) from Icelandic.
(2) a. Pekka näki itsen-sä/*hänet
Pekka saw self-3SG.M.POSS/him
‘Pekka saw himself’
b. meerii-nee apnee-see/us-see baat kii
Mary-ERG self-with/her-with talk do.PF
‘Mary talked with herself’
(3) a. Vanja dumaet [čto Maša uvažaet *sebja/ego]
Vanja thinks that Masja admires.IND himself/him
‘Vanja thinks that Masja admires him’
b. Jón veit [a María elskar *sig/hann]
John knows that Maria love.IND himself/him
‘John knows that Maria loves him’
However, this pattern is not without exceptions. In (West) Frisian (4a), and Afrikaans
(4b) a pronominal can be locally bound, contrary to the predictions of binding condition
(manifested in the Dutch example (4c)), thus showing lack of complementary distribution
between pronouns and reflexives.4
(4) a. Max wasket him(/himsels)
b. Max was hom(/homself)
c. Max wast *hem(/zichzelf)
‘Max washes him/himself’
Quite early on it was also noted that, cross-linguistically, there were many reflexive
anaphors with antecedents essentially beyond the regular domain. The examples in (5), from
Norwegian, Japanese and Icelandic, respectively, illustrate this:5
(5) a. Jon bad oss [hjelpe seg]
John aked us help himself
‘John asked us to help him’
b. Bill-wa [John-ga zibun-o semeta to] omotta
Bill-TOP John-NOM himself-ACC blamed that thought
‘Bill thought that John blamed him’
c. Jón segir [a Péturi raki sig á hverjum degi]
John says that Peter shave.SBJV himself in every day
‘John says that Peter shaves him every day’
4 Any anaphoric dependency that points to non-complementarity of pronoun and anaphor could
be taken as exceptional, marked or not falling under Binding Theory proper. Reinhart & Reuland
(1993) and Reuland (2011) explicitly address this point and incorporate it in their (syntactic)
binding theory. But note that that is not a necessary conclusion (cf. Huang 1982, Hestvik 1991). 5 Cf., among others, Thráinsson 1976, Reis 1976, Inoue 1976, Yang 1983, Harbert 1983.
Such cases are generally discussed under the heading of long distance binding (Cole,
Hermon & Huang 2001, Reuland & Everaert 2001).6
There is another type of exception. Iatridou (1986) observed that the Greek
anaphoric element ton idio has a double identity. Like a pronoun, it must be locally free,
under Principle B, but like an anaphor, it needs to be bound, a requirement which
differentiates it from ordinary pronouns:
(6) a. O Janisj theli [o Vasilisk na voithisi ton idhioj/*k]
The Janis wants [the Vasilis.NOM SBJV helps the same.MASC]
‘John wants Bill to help him’
b. *O Janis theli [o Vasilis na voithisi tin idhia]
The Janis wants [the Vasilis.NOM SBJV helps the same.FEM]
‘John wants Bill to help her’
She proposed that o idhios falls under, what she called, Principle D:
(7) Principle D
O idhios should be bound in the whole sentence but free in the governing category
We will return to this in section 5.
2.2 Anaphors, domains, and long distance binding/logophoricity
In order to be able to properly address such exceptional phenomena as violations of the
binding theory, we need to answer the following two questions.
First, how do we decide on the partitioning of elements that are sensitive to
binding restrictions? That is, how do we diagnose that X is an anaphor or a pronominal?
For binding theoretic reasons, reflexives and reciprocals are often seen as instantiations of
‘anaphors’, being a subclass of pronouns, together with ‘pronominals’ (Pollard & Sag 1994,
Asudeh & Dalrymple 2006). This partitioning creates the impression that being an
anaphor implies being a pronoun. That might be the case for English and, for instance,
Germanic and Romance languages, but it clearly does not hold true cross-linguistically
(cf. Schladt 2000, Dimitriadis & Everaert 2004). Being an ‘anaphor’ so far seems to be a
property assigned to DP’s that cannot straightforwardly be linked to their morpho-
syntactic properties (cf. also Reuland 2011).[NOT CLEAR WHAT YOU MEAN HERE.
CORRECT] 7
However, there are diagnostics available that can be applied to decide
whether an anaphoric element is a necessarily syntactically bound element or not. We
will address this issue in section 4.
6 Following Koster & Reuland (1991) one could classify the binding violations in (5a) as of a
different type than those in (5b,c). In (5a) binding is non-local, but the non-locality is restricted to
a domain that could be argued to be reanalyzable as local. Only the examples in (5b,c) would then
be cases of ‘true’ long-distance binding. 7 Note that Chomsky is not explicit on how to interpret the features <± anaphor> and
<±pronominal> on the basis of the Binding Theory, but it is likely that these features should be
interpreted as semantic features.
Second, how do we decide on what the proper ‘domain’ is? The binding theory in
(1) simply mentions the theoretical construct ‘local domain’. We cannot ‘diagnose’ what
the binding domain D is. Note though that in Chomsky (1986) the domain D is basically
defined as the predicational domain, the maximal projection containing all the
grammatical functions compatible with a predicational head (the so-called Complete
Functional Complex). What one calls 'anaphors' are the dedicated elements for indicating
referential dependencies in the domain of the predicate, the minimal clause (cf. (8a)). In
all binding theories (with the exception of Reflexivity), there is room for debate whether
the sentential domain (cf. (8b)) could still be taken as a possible domain for binding. As
discussed above, Iatridou (1986) explicitly argues that certain anaphoric elements take
(8b) as their domain. But for all instantiations of the binding theory mentioned above,
reference outside the sentence (cf. (8c,d)) is forbidden ground for anaphors. For the
domain of discourse/deixis, we seem to have elements called pronouns and BT has
nothing to say on pronouns - being interpreted as free variables assigned a contextual
value - i.e. anaphoric dependencies in these domains.8
(8) For y = anaphor, x = antecedent of y:
a. minimal clause: ...........[CP/IP ...x...y...] .............
b. sentence: [CP ....x… [CP .....y....] ...........]
c. discourse: [CP....x...] [CP..........] [CP....y...]
d. deixis: [CP.....y....]
.................x............................
Is there a reason to assume that anaphora are partitioned this way: the simple anaphor (for
8a, and perhaps (8b)) vs. pronoun (for (8c,d)) opposition of BT? Given a sentence
grammar - discourse grammar distinction it would indeed make sense to distinguish
(8a,b) from (8c,d). And we know from the literature that ‘reflexives’ often enter
anaphoric dependencies extending their minimal clause (cf. 5) - the cases of non-local
binding, long-distance binding.
The typology of anaphors that allow non-local binding is highly complex, and it is
impossible to review it here in full detail. But one concept needs to be explained,
logophoricity.
Thráinsson (1976) was the first to observe that there is a type of anaphoric dependency
(in Icelandic) which violates standard binding restrictions and is sensitive to semantic
factors which do not seem to play any role in ‘regular’ reflexivization. Maling (1984) and
Anderson (1986) further developed this position, arguing for a distinction between (a)
(long-distance) reflexives that need to be bound by a linguistic antecedent and (b)
(reflexive) logophors which are oriented towards a semantically or pragmatically
determined class of antecedents.9 This is illustrated by examples such as (9) in which the
8 The effect of condition B is limited to pronouns interpreted as bound variables (Reinhart 1983).
9 Originally the term logophor (Hagège 1974) was employed for special series of pronouns that
occur in African languages and refer exclusively to the source of an embedded statement. As
illustrated by the examples in from Ewe (Clements 1975), pronouns of the usual type refer to a
antecedent does not c-command the reflexive, and (10) where the reflexive may appear
without a sentence-internal antecedent under the right conditions (Thráinsson 1991):
(9) Skoun Jóns er a sig vanti hæfileika
Opinion John’s is that himself.ACC lacks.SBJV talent
‘John’s opinion is that he lacks talent’
(10) Formaurinn var óskaplega reiur. Tillagan væri svívirileg og væri henni
beint gegn sér persónulega. Sér væri reyndar sama ...
The chairman became furiously angry. The proposal was.SBJV outrageous and
was.SBJV it aimed against himself personally. Himself was in fact indifferent
[...]
´The proposal was outrageous, and it was aimed against him personally. In fact,
he did not care [...]’
Büring (2005: 63) defines logophors as in (11), illustrated in (12) with an example from
Icelandic, showing the logophoric nature of the reflexive being ruled out in an
environment where the corresponding direct speech paraphrases of the embedded
sentences wouldn’t admit a first person pronoun in place of síg:10
(11) A logophoric pronoun can be used if it is embedded in a constituent c such that
(i) c is embedded, (ii) c denotes a proposition p, which (iii) can be paraphrased
as a mental state or reported utterance of the pronoun's antecedent such that the
paraphrase contains a first person pronoun in place of the pronoun.
(12) a. Hann sagði [að sig vantaði hæfileika]
he said that self lacked ability
‘He said that he lacked ability’. He said: ‘I lack ability’
b. *Honum var sagt [að sig vantaði hæfileika]
he was said that self lacked ability
‘He was told that he lacked ability’. He was told: ‘You/#I lack ability’
Logophors can be identified by a set of criteria, most notably (i) whether they can occur
without a sentence internal antecedent under certain conditions and (ii) whether they refer
to an NP in a particular grammatical function (e.g. subject) or rather to the 'source of an
non-speaker, non-addressee person and, moreover, they cannot relate anaphorically to the matrix
subject (cf ii). On the other hand, logophors can only refer to the subject of ‘say’ (cf i):
(i) kofi be yè-dzo
Kofi say LOG-left
(ii) *kofi be e-dzo
Kofi say he-left
‘Kofi said that he left’ 10
The use of the word pronoun in (11) is confusing. What is called a logophor in the literature can
be a pronoun (the Ewe example in footnote 9), or an anaphor, the latter not necessarily being
‘pronominal’ in nature (like English himself).
embedded proposition'. Two related properties following directly from the logophoric
nature of the (Icelandic) reflexive are (iii) typically occurring in subjunctive complements
of verbs of saying, thinking - prototypically the verbs introducing embedded statements
(Thráinsson 1991: 55-56)11
– and (iv) subject orientation when its antecedent occurs in
the same clause (cf. Reuland, E. and S. Sigurjónsdóttir. 1998).
To conclude, under a definition of an element as an anaphor if and only if it requires a c-
commanding antecedent, it is straightforward that the anaphoric dependencies illustrated
in (8a) and (8b) are not fundamentally different, both being distinct from those in (8c)
and (8d). We will assume that this syntactic binding requirement is what lies at the heart
of stating that the defining feature of anaphors is that they are ‘referentially defective
NPs’, rooted in Chomsky (1986) and Keenan (1988). Only if anaphors are necessarily
interpreted as bound variables, subject to a c-command restriction, barring a discourse
antecedent for reflexive anaphors could follow naturally, in parallel to what is observed
in (13):
(13) a. Every ex-husband feared that he would be neglected
b. *Every ex-husband feared that I would be neglected. He …
But note that in such an interpretation it is still not clear why the preferred domain for an
‘anaphor’ would be the minimal clause and not the sentence. Most languages (like Dutch,
Spanish, Russian, etc.) mentioned above seem to morpho-syntactically encode the (8a) vs
(8b) distinction. But for a cross-linguistic perspective on what the anaphor-pronoun
distinction is, it has to be taken into account that this might not be a logical necessity, as
we will elaborate in the next section.
Logophors are not anaphors in the way just described. Logophors are interpreted
as free variables requiring a contextual value. Why certain reflexives - like English
himself or Icelandic sig, but not German sich – are used both as an anaphor (non-deictic)
and a logophor (deictic), is yet unexplained.12
3. SOME EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS (FOR WHICH WE NEED ‘DIAGNOSTICS’)
3.1 It is sometimes difficult to classify an element called ‘reflexive’ as an anaphor
A ‘reflexive’ element is often used in more structural configurations than we might
consider calling reflexive environments. Let us illustrate this point with some examples
from Turkish.13
Kornfilt (2000) provides a thorough description of the distribution of the
Turkish ‘reflexives’ kendi and kendisin. It turns out that under local binding kendi (self)
11
Logophoric pronouns are not restricted to verbs of saying. In Ewe the subject of be happy,
know and see can antecede logophors. It seems that the correct characterization of the verbs
licensing logophors are attitude verbs (see Schlenker 1999: 31-35 and below; see Anand 2006 for
further refinements). 12
As rightly pointed out by one of the reviewers. 13
As far as we can see, Persian xod-esh (Ghomeshi & Ritter 1996) seems to exhibit a similar
distribution.
and kendisin (self his) are interchangeable (cf. 14a), while under non-local binding only
kendisin can be used (cf. 14b):
(14) a. Ahmet kendin-i/kendi-sin-i çok beğen-iyor-mus
Ahmet self- ACC/self-3SG-ACC very admire-PROGR-REP.PAST
‘(They say that) Ahmet admires himself very much’
b. Fatma Ahmet-in *kendin-i/kendi-sin-i çok beğen-diğ-in-i bil-iyor
Fatma Ahmet-GEN self-ACC/self-3SG-ACC very admire-GER-3SG-ACC know-PROGR
‘Fatma knows that Ahmet admires her very much’
However, there is one additional, important difference. Kendisin can be used deictically,
kendi not:
(15) a. Q: Ali hakkinda Ahmet ne düşün-üyor?
Ali about Ahmet what think-Progr.
‘What does Ahmet think of Ali?’
b. A: Ahmet kendi-sin-i çok beğen-iyor-mus
Ahmet self-3sg-ACC very admire- PROGR-REP.PAST
‘(They say that) Ahmet admires him (=Ali) very much’
c. A: *Ahmet kendin-i çok beğen-iyor-mus
Ahmet self-3sg- ACC very admire- PROGR-REP.PAST
‘(They say that) Ahmet admires him (=Ali) very much’
Moreover kendisin, but not kendi, allows split antecedents, taken as indication of not
being an anaphor, as we will discuss in section 4. In other words, kendi seems to behave
like a proper reflexive anaphor, while kendisin shows pronominal-like behaviour, except
that it can be locally bound (15a).14
Another case that needs to be mentioned are the so-called SE-anaphors (Reinhart &
Reuland 1993). These elements are often both ‘anaphor’ and ‘arity reduction markers’:
(16) a. Jean se voit
‘Jean sees himself’
b. Il s’est traduit trois romans
‘Three novels were translated’
c. Le verre se brisera
‘The glass will break’
The French examples in (16) illustrate that ‘reflexivity’ is not distinctively encoded: in
(16a) se seems to qualify as a reflexive anaphor, but this is clearly not the case in (16b-c),
where se could be viewed as a marker of an arity manipulation, or as an object-to-subject
promotion marker. Likewise, in Greek, for instance, the affix -te marks middle, passive,
14
Kornfilt (2000) offers an interesting hypothesis why this would be the case, but it would take us
too far to discuss that analysis.
reciprocal, reflexive or unaccusative readings, depending on context (linguistic or extra-
linguistic). I anthropi plenon-te is interpreted as “The men wash themselves/each other”.
Following Reinhart & Siloni (2003) the morphological similarity often shared by
reflexives and unaccusatives is due to the basic operation at the heart of their derivations:
reduction, either internal or external. Strictly speaking, however, it is not clear why
unaccusatives and reflexive verbs should employ the same morphology. Both may result
from the same lexical operation, reduction, but this doesn’t guarantee that,
synchronically, the same morphology (or any morphology) should be attached to them.
This problem doesn’t need to concern us here; what is relevant in the present context,
however, is that what morphophonologically looks like an anaphor is not always an
anaphor in the binding theoretic sense.
3.2. The notion ‘anaphor’ is not clear
In many languages we are used to making a distinction between reflexives, requiring a
co-argument as antecedent, and pronouns, allowing any antecedent, as long as it is not a
co-argument. In 2.1 we already discussed Greek ton idhio as an in-between case, a
pronominal anaphor. But now consider Tamil, a language from the Dravidian language
family.
Take the following examples from Tamil (Annamalai 2000: 180, 188-189):
(17) a. kumaar tann-e marand-aan
Kumar self-ACC forget.PST-AGR
‘Kumar forgot himself´
b. kumaar-ukku tann-e-yee piDikkaadu
Kumar-DAT self-ACC-EMPH like.not
‘Kumar does not like himself’
c. kumaar tann-e kaNNaaDile paattu-kiTT-aan / paatt-aan
Kumar self-acc mirror.in look.at.PST-VR-AGR / look.at.PST-AGR
‘Kumar looked at himself in the mirror.’
As can be seen, taan can be classified as a reflexive pronoun which can be accompanied
by an emphatic marker -ee (cf. 17b) and the verbal auxiliary predicate reflexive marker -
kiDu- (cf. 17c).15
Lehmann (1989) discusses the anaphoric system of Tamil and observes
that the language has two pronouns referring to 3rd
person antedecents: avan (the
obviative) and ivan (the proximate). In addition, Tamil has a pronominal form taan,
which could be viewed as the equivalent of English himself. Lehmann notes that this
element “is always coreferential with the subject of the same or higher clause.” To
illustrate this, observe the examples in (18) from Annamalai (2000: 181-183):
(18) a. kumaar tannooDa yaaro varraangaNNu keeTT-aan.
Kumar self.with who come.PRS.AGR.COMP ask:PST-AGR
‘Kumar asked who was coming with him.’
b. kumaar umaa tann-e tiTTunaaNNu sonn-aan.
15
In some instances the auxiliary verb reflexive marker is obligatory.
Kumar Uma self-ACC scold.PST.AGR.COMP say:PST-AGR
‘Kumar said that Uma scolded him.’
c. kumaar umaa tann-e tiTTunaaNNu sonn-aan.
Kumar Uma self-ACC scold.PST.AGR.COMP say.PST-AGR
‘Kumar said that Uma scolded herself.’
Whereas third personal pronouns can be used both deictically and anaphorically, the
pronoun taan is only “used anaphorically." (Lehmann 1989: 94). To put it in binding
theoretic terms, the element must be syntactically bound, c-commanded by its antecedent.
But its antecedent need not be a co-argument of the reflexive, as (18a,b) illustrate. And
for this reason, Lehmann is not prepared to call it a reflexive: “the occurrence of taan in a
reflexive construction is only one of its occurrences and there is, therefore, no
justification to call it a reflexive pronoun in the same way as there is not one to call the
first person pronoun naan ('I') a reflexive pronoun, just because it can occur in a reflexive
construction.” (Lehmann 1989: 97). To put it differently, Lehmann assumes that in order
to call taan a reflexive it should have been bound by a co-argument and only by a co-
argument.16
Likewise Safir (2004:157,174) introduces the notion U(nbounded)
D(ependent)-form to describe the anaphoric behaviour of the examples in (17-18)17
, in
order to distinguish them from ‘real’ anaphors. The latter are, thus, a subset of the class of
forms that lack deictic potential (including UD-forms).
3.3. How to approach these problems?
Binding Theory as outlined in (1) has been changed and augmented over the years, in
order to respond to these observations. See, for instance, some of the papers in Koster and
Reuland (1991), Bennis, Pica and Rooryck (1997) and Cole, Hermon and Hunag (2001),
and the monographs Dalrymple (1993), Safir (2004), Büring (2005), and more recently
Rooryck and Vanden Wyngaerd (2011) and Reuland (2011). Reviewing this literature is
impossible in the context of this article. We will limit ourselves to a few remarks with
respect to the phenomena brought forward in section 3.1-3.3.
Since the publication of Pollard and Sag (1992) and Reinhart and Reuland (1993) it
has become more or less standard to assume that a fundamental distinction must be made
between local anaphoric dependencies and non-local anaphoric dependencies. Not
necessarily in the sense of ‘two’ binding theories, as envisaged by Thráinsson (1976,
1979), but in order to distinguish anaphoric dependencies at the predicate level, seen as
restrictions on the licensing of reflexive predicates, from those outside the predicate. In
such a perspective, ‘long distance’ binding phenomena are not subject to the strict version
of Binding Theory, or should not be unified with it (Reuland 2001).
An obvious middle position is that some, but not all features of long distance
binding can be reduced to the Binding Theory proper. For instance, if (some) anaphors
undergo LF-movement, what seems to be long-distance binding is to some extent reduced
to local binding (see Pica (1984), Cole & Sung (1994), among others).
16
This not an isolated case as will become clear in section 5 (cf. Wali & Subbarao 1991, Wali,
Lalitha and Subbarao 1991 for discussion of other Dravidian languages showing a similar effect). 17
Or examples like in (14-15), for that matter.
Some of these proposals go hand-in-hand with the assumption that the partitioning
of anaphoric elements is also subject to variation within and across languages. In classical
Binding Theory there is only one concept 'anaphor', subsuming different types of
reflexives (and reciprocals). This means that there is no natural way to account for the
rich variety of anaphoric elements and their distributional peculiarities described above.
Reinhart and Reuland (1993) distinguish SE-reflexives from SELF-reflexives, just like
the proponents of a movement analysis (like Cole and Sung) assume that only certain
anaphors move, others do not. In Xue et al. (1994) it is suggested that short distance
anaphors should be distinguished from ‘long distance anaphors’, the latter being subject
to a fourth binding condition, principle Z.18
Following the extensive literature on this topic, both Büring (2005: 58-75) and Safir
(2004:156-178) draw a distinction between long-distance anaphors (command anaphors/
unbounded dependent forms) that need to be bound by a linguistic antecedent and
logophors which are oriented towards a semantically or pragmatically determined class of
antecedents (cf. section 3.3). In the latter case, the antecedent can, but need not be,
sentence-internal.
Formulating anaphoric dependencies at the predicate level, as Reinhart and Reuland
(1993) are doing, is not far removed from formulating Binding Theory (also) at the
lexical level, as principles holding on argument structure representations (cf. Reinhart and
Siloni 2005).19
And indeed, in many languages, clitics and affixes contribute to the
encoding of the referential dependency between the object and the subject. The examples
discussed in (14) are an instantiation of that.
All in all, binding is taken as modular, distributed over the lexicon, syntax,
semantics and discourse, and the partitioning of elements is more intricate than a simple
anaphor-pronominal divide.
4. WHAT ARE THE DIAGNOSTICS FOR THE ANAPHOR-PRONOUN DISTINCTION?
What is a diagnostic in the context of linguistic theorizing? Ideally we take D to be
diagnostic for a phenomenon P iff there is a theoretical framework which explains why D
has a bearing on P. Furthermore, in order for D to be a ‘useful’ diagnostic in cross-
framework theorizing, it would be helpful if the diagnostic is sufficiently framework-
neutral. (But note that the latter is certainly not a necessary condition). To illustrate the
point, let us take the distinction between unaccusative (arrive) and unergative (sing)
verbs. Suppose we take the distinction between these verbs as one of ’derived subjects’ vs
‘base generated subjects’, as discussed in Alexiadou, Anagnostopoulou and Everaert
(AAE 2004). Following the literature, AAE take auxiliary selection as a diagnostic (cf.
19a). But it is not clear how auxiliary selection could be related to a base-generated or
derived status of the subject, i.e. to NP-movement. Unless one stipulates it (as is done in
18
In HPSG the principle is formulated as “An o-commanded long-distance reflexive must be o-
bound”. In this context one could take o-command as more or less equivalent to c-command. 19
For a totally different way of approaching similar issues see Culicover and Jackendoff
(2005:355-388)).
Burzio 1986) there is no immediate reason to connect the two phenomena. Auxiliary
selection, then, is not a straightforward diagnostic. The possibility to appear in a
resultative construction (19b) on the other hand, may very well be. If resultatives are
necessarily predicated over NPs under local c-command, then the diagnostic is related to
the underlying theoretical assumptions, i.e. the movement analysis.
(19) a. Norbert is aangekomen vs Lisa heeft gezongen
‘Norbert has arrived’ ‘Lisa has sung’
b. Norbert arrived hoarse vs *Lisa sang hoarse
The fact of the matter is that the diagnostics used in linguistics often do not obey
the strict condition just outlined. For this reason, we will very briefly outline some of the
basic assumptions underlying the discussion before we discuss diagnostics for anaphors,
and more specifically reflexives.
4.1 Reflexive anaphor diagnostics
In principle, there are many ways to encode an anaphoric dependency, either using
pronouns, or reflexives, or logophors, etc. An anaphoric dependency between co-
arguments of a predicate is generally encoded through what we call a ‘reflexive anaphor’:
(20) a. Anaphoric dependency: a is anaphorically dependent on b if the reference of a is
dependent on the reference of b.
b. Reflexivization is an instantiation of an anaphoric dependency, more
specifically: an identity relation between two co-arguments, a binder and a
bindee: λx [P(x, x)]
c. Reflexive anaphors express an identity relation between co-arguments.
Can we decide, based on (20), which potential diagnostics are ‘true’ diagnostics in the
sense just outlined?
In (21) we list the diagnostics generally used for deciding whether an anaphoric
element actually is an anaphor or not. (cf, for instance, Lust, Wali, Gair and Subbarao
(2000:861-883)):
(21) a. strict/sloppy identity
b. split antecedents
c. deictic reference
d. a command restriction on the anaphoric dependency
e. domain-sensitivity
In our view, the command restriction (21d) should ultimately be derived from diagnostic
(21c) which will be discussed in detail below. The domain-sensitivity diagnostic (21e) is
either circular – α is anaphor because it is locally bound, and being an anaphor it must be
locally bound – or precisely addressing the point that is open to debate (cf. section 3).
The remaining diagnostics, (21a-c) will be discuss in the next sections. As will become
clear, none of the diagnostics is straightforward.
4.2 Strict/Sloppy identity
This diagnostic is based on the fact that variable binding (cf. 13) shows restrictions in
elliptical constructions that do not hold for cases of coreference. Consider the sentence in
(22a) and the possible interpretations in (22b) and (22c):
(22) a. Martin said that he would submit in time, and so did Elena
b. = [Martin said that Martin would submit in time and
Elena said that Elena would submit in time]
c. = [Martin said that Martin would submit in time and
Elena said that Martin would submit in time]
Putting aside irrelevant interpretations, example (22a) can have the meaning exemplified in
(22b), the sloppy identity reading, and the one in (22c), the strict identity reading. In other
words, (22a) allows both a coreference (22c) and a bound variable interpretation (22b). In an
example like (23) there is no such ambiguity:
(23) a. Every man said that that he would submit in time, and so did every woman
b. = for every x, x a man, x said that x would submit in time, and for every y, y a
woman, y said that that y would submit in time
c. ≠ for every x, x a man, x said that x would submit in time, and for every y, y a
woman, y said that that x would submit in time
In the case of a quantified antecedent a sloppy identity reading (23b) is allowed while strict
identity (23c) is excluded.
Following Williams (1977) and many others it is generally assumed that the English
reflexive anaphor triggers sloppy identity only (but cf. Hestvik 1995):
(24) a. Bill like himself and Charles did too
b. ≠Bill likes Bill and Charles like Bill
c. =Bill liked Bill and Charles liked Charles
Because of this fact it was initially hypothesized that reflexivization necessarily gives rise to
a bound variable interpretation, as reflected in (22b), explaining the parallel between (23)
and (24). However, it has later been claimed that not all elements we call reflexive anaphors
trigger a bound variable interpretation obligatorily. Without going into detail, let us mention
some of the observations from the literature that have casted doubt on the one-to-one
correspondence between being an anaphor and necessarily triggering sloppy identity.
Hellan (1988:231) observes that the Norwegian simplex seg-anaphors allow strict and
sloppy identity readings in long-distance readings like (5a) (i.e. across an ECM subject),
contrary to what is expected. Note that Norwegian seg is in many ways equal to Dutch
zich, and, for Dutch, Everaert (1986: fn6 253-254) claimed that zich only allows a sloppy
identity reading in such cases. But in subsequent work this picture has been modified.
Adding to Everaert’s observation, Lidz (2001) and Rooryck and VandenWyngard (2011)
show that, for some verbs, the complex anaphor zichzelf, always locally bound, actually
permits both a sloppy and a strict reading:20
(25) Marie heeft zichzelf erger gekwetst dan Peter.
Marie hurt herself more seriously than Peter
= Marie hurt Marie more seriously than Peter hurt Peter/Marie.
Icelandic also exhibits a more complicated pattern. Locally bound sig does not allow a strict
reading:
(26) Jón rakai sig og Pétur geri pad líka
“John shaved himself and Peter did so too”
= John shaved John and Peter shaved Peter/*John.
As discussed in Thráinsson (1991), however, logophoric sig in the non-locally bound
subjunctive case allows a strict/sloppy identity ambiguity typically associated with
pronouns:
(27) Jón telur [a prófessorinn muni fellaj sig á prófinu] og Ari telur þa líka
John believes that the professor will.SBJV fail himself on test and Ari believes so
too
‘John believes that the professor will fail SIG on the test and Ari believes so too’
= [John believes that the professor will fail John on the test] and [Ari believes that
the professor will fail Ari/John on the test]
Reuland & Sigurjónsdóttir (1997) argue that the same holds for non-logophoric, non-
locally bound reflexives in infinitives. They also show that it is impossible to get the
sloppy reading when subjunctive sig is not c-commanded by its antecedent, ie., cases like
(17) above:
(28) Skoun Jóns er [a sig vanti hæfileika] og þa er skoun Péturs líka
Opinion John’s is that himself lacks.SBJV talents and that is opinion Peter’s too
20
Note that not all speakers accept a strict identity reading of cases as (25). But more importantly
we are not convinced that the presented generalization is correct. In Dutch zelf is an emphatic
marker, and examples like (25), are actually ambiguous (depending on intonational patterns)
between a reading with the constituent complex reflexive [zich-zelf] and one with two
constituents, the simple reflexive [zich] and a floated emphatic marker [zelf], which happen to be
adjacent . Now note that the emphatic marker cannot float to the right of and adjacent to a PP
(*NP V PP zelf). And it turns out that in cases of prepositionally goverened complex reflexives
strict identity is excluded for all speakers:
(i) Jan houdt meer [van [zichzelf]] dan Peter
= John loves John more than Peter loves Peter/*John
How to account for these facts we have to leave undiscussed here due to space limitations.
‘John’s opinion is that he lacks talents and that is Peter’s opinion too’
= [John’s opinion is that John lacks talents] and [Peter’s opinion is that
John/*Peter lacks talents]
The conclusion from these cases seems to be that there is no straightforward connection
between this diagnostic and anaphoricity. According to Reuland & Sigurjónsdóttir
(1997:333), this may be indicating that what forces sloppy readings “is not a property of
the antecedent anaphor relation, but a property of the predicate”.21
4.3 Split antecedents
It is commonly held that reflexive anaphors do not allow split antecedents:22
(29) a. *?John protected Mary from themselves.
b. *John told Mary about themselves.
c. *The boys introduced the girls to themselves
If being an anaphor entails not having split antecedents, then the following examples
provide an indication that in the long distance binding cases in (30), Italian sè, Icelandic sig
and Dutch zich are ‘true anaphors’:23
(30) a. ??Maria ha presto che il capitano raccontasse queste storie di sè
‘Maria insisted that the captain tell these stories about themselves’
b. *Jón heldur aδ Haraldur hafi sagt aδ María eigi aδ vo sig
Jon believes that Harald has said that Maria should wash themselves
c. *Jan voelde Marie de theepot naast zich neerzetten op bed
Jan felt Marie the teapot next to themselves put down on bed
But Okada (1998) argues that these examples could simply be ruled out for pragmatic
reasons. He argues that, given the right context, reflexives may take split antecedents
(Okada 1998:68):24
(31) John is talking with Mary about interesting and important political ideas, while
Bill is talking with Sue only about themselves.
Once again, it is not clear that the diagnostic straightforwardly separates anaphors from
pronouns. But should it do so? How does it relate to (20)? In itself, a bound variable
21
However, a bound variable reading should lead to banning strict readings, and if such readings
are still available, one might search for reasons why there is not necessarily a bound variable
interpretation. 22
Examples from Keenan (1988:220), Wasow (1979:25)/Lasnik (1981:130) and Lebeaux
(1984/85: 346), respectively. 23
Examples from Napoli (1979), Thráinsson (1990) and Everaert (1986), respectively. 24
Volkova (2009) discusses examples from Easter Mari having split antecedents.
reading does not entail banning split antecedents, as the example in (32) shows, and,
therefore, there is no a priori reason to believe this diagnostic should hold:
(32) Every womani told every manj that theyi+j should marry each other
4.4 Lack of deictic reference
The last diagnostic we want to discuss seems to be the most straightforward one, both
observationally, and theoretically. Binding of reflexive anaphors is a case of syntactic
binding. Across theories, it is argued that the relation between an anaphor and its
antecedent is asymmetric. In standard binding theory this asymmetric relation is a c-
command restriction - a reflexive must be c-commanded by its antecedent - in HPSG and
LFG a relational hierarchy restriction, the antecedent must be higher on a grammatical
function hierarchy than the anaphor, or one could argue for a thematic role constraint (see
Everaert and Anagnostopoulou 1997 for discussion). Such hierarchy conditions are also a
feature of non-generative approaches (Givón 1995, Van Valin and Foley 1997). But
observe that these hierarchical constraints on the anaphor-antecedent relation can only be
formulated if reflexive anaphors are syntactically bound, that is, a reflexive anaphor
needs a linguistic antecedent, as formulated in (20). An anaphoric element is an anaphor
and not a pronominal, if it cannot be used for deictic purposes, it is inable to receive a
contextual value:
(33) Context: [Mary and John are sitting in a room]
Utterance: Mary looked at *himself/him
*Himself/He was reading the newspaper.
But even in this case, we need to make two proviso’s, reflexives used as logophors
(discussed above and in section 5.4 below) and reflexives used as honorifics (to be
discussed immediately).
As has been discussed above, some reflexive anaphors, generally in need of a
linguistic antecedent, can be used as logophors under certain semantic/pragmatic
conditions. Just like German sich, which is a reflexive anaphor indicating identity
between subject and object in Ralf rasiert sich (‘Ralf shaves himself’) but also a
morphosyntactic marker reflecting an arity reduction process in Die Tür öffnet sich (‘The
door opens’).
It has been observed that reflexives are used as honorifics in various languages.
Siewierska (2004: 224-228) has a section on this particular, deictic, use of reflexives. We
will mention two examples, making use of Siewierska’s work. In Kannada (Sridhar 1990)
the reflexive taavu (in the plural) can be used as a second person ultra-honorific:
(34) taavu ii kaDe banni
self this side come:H
`Please come to this side.'
In Kashmiri (Wali & Koul 1997) it is possible to express politeness by using the simple
reflexive pani as a second person honorific:
(35) pa:nas si:th' di me pakni
Self.DAT with allow me walk
`Allow me to go with you.'
Under which conditions such usage is attested is yet unclear to us.
Summarizing, none of the five diagnostics mentioned in (21) seems absolutely
straightforward. However, following the insights of Reinhart (1983) we assume that what
is relevant is syntactic binding: true anaphors require a c-commanding antecedent, thus
lacking deictic potential (Safir 2004).
Let us now turn to a case study, the case of Greek ton idhio. This is an element
that is not easily classifiable in terms of the anaphor-pronoun partition, as Iatridou’s
(1986) discussion (cf. 6-7) made clear. We will use this case as an exemplification to
which extent diagnostics can be employed to characterize its anaphoric status.
5. Anatomy of a non-locally bound anaphor: the case of Greek ton idhio
Greek has two anaphors, a local and a long-distance one, o eaftos mu (‘the self my’) and
o idhios (‘the same’), mentioned in section 2.1. (Iatridou 1986):25
(36) O Janisj theli [o Vasilisk na voithisi ton eafto tu*j/k]
The Janis wants [the Vasilis.NOM SBJV helps the self his]
‘John wants Bill to help himself’
(37) O Janisj theli [o Vasilisk na voithisi ton idhio j/*k]
The Janis wants [the Vasilis.NOM SBJV helps the same]
‘John wants Bill to help him’
Ton idhio has a double identity: like a pronoun, it obeys Principle B, like an anaphor,
however, it needs to be bound, a requirement which differentiates it from ordinary
pronouns. This combination of factors is captured in Principle D (7). In this section, three
questions are addressed: (i) Is the Principle D characterization correct? (ii) What do we
learn about diagnostics for anaphors if we apply to o idhios more diagnostics than just
domain sensitivity? (iii) Can the development of the sophisticated analytical tools which
emerged from the study of reflexivity, long-distance anaphora and logophoricity offer
more insights into the nature of ton idhio?
25
na marks subjunctives in Greek. Greek subjunctives subsume many uses of infinitives (Greek
doesn’t have infinitives) and differ from Romance and Germanic subjunctives in a number of
important respects. See Philippaki-Warburton & Veloudis 1984, Iatridou 1988/1993,
Giannakidou 1998, and many others.
We will present evidence that o idhios shows a mixed behavior with respect to an
anaphor/bound variable status. One the one hand, ton idhio can behaves like a command
anaphor, but when its syntactic position is part of a logophoric context it behaves as a
logophor, patterning like the Icelandic long-distance anaphor sig, as described by
Thráinsson (1991). So, even though ton idhio is not a typical logophor in the sense of
being embedded exclusively under attitude verbs and showing subject orientation, it can
nevertheless be classified as a logophor once a richer typology of logophoric elements is
taken into consideration.
5.1. Some basic properties of o idhios26
Ton idhio consists of a definite determiner and a nominal adjectival element co-varying
with its antecedent in gender and number. It is strictly 3rd
person, i.e. it cannot co-refer
with a 1st and 2
nd person antecedent.
27 O idhios can be used as an emphatic modifier
corresponding to ‘he/John himself’, unlike the Greek local anaphor o eaftos tu:
(38) a. O Janis o idhios elise to provlima
The Janis-nom the same.NOM solved the problem.ACC
‘John himself solved the problem’
b. *O Janis o eaftos tu elise to provlima
The Janis-nom the self.NOM his solved the problem.ACC
The Greek anaphor system thus has two anaphors, a short distance one (o eaftos tu)
which behaves similarly to himself w.r.t. locality and a long distance one (o idhios) (cf.
36 vs 37) which behaves similarly to himself w.r.t. to emphatic uses. And the latter, the
bare non-modifying o idhios, can function (i) as an anaphor when it is used non-
emphatically, and (ii) as an emphatic element, modifying a discourse topic, in which case
it does not need an antecedent in the sentence (cf. Iatridou 1986, Varlokosta 1994:11
fn3).
Hornstein & Varlokosta (1992, 1993) and Varlokosta (1994) argue that o idhios has
different properties depending on whether it occurs as (a) an object (as in (37)), (b) a
subject (as in (39) below) or (c) an accusative object of stative experiencer-object
predicates, prototypically with the verb afora ‘concern’ (‘psych-o idhios’ illustrated in
(40)).
(39) O Janisk nomizi oti o idhiosk ine o kaliteros ipopsifios
26
We are not able to discuss all aspects of all functions of ton idhio in the context of this paper.
For instance, there is a third use, o idhios used as an adjective, as in (i), but we will discard this
use in the present discussion:
(i) To kratiko laxio epese ston idhio gia triti fora
The state lottery fell on the same for third time
‘The state lottery fell on the same person for the third time’ 27
It might be the case that this relates to the fact that o idhios qualifies as a logophor (see section
5.5.2 for discussion). It seems that there is a restriction on logophors 'co-refering' with a matrix
element in the 1st person (Schlenker 1999: 32).
The Janis thinks that the same is the best candidate
‘John thinks that he is the best candidate’
(40) O Janisk diedose oti to provlima afora ton idhiok
The Janis.NOM spread.the.rumor that the problem.NOM concerns the same
‘John spread the rumor that the problem concerns him’
Varlokosta & Hornstein argue that object vs. subject/psych o idhios consistently show a
different behavior w.r.t. the following diagnostics:
(i) Requirement for a sentence-internal antecedent (‘yes’ for object o idhios,‘no’ for
subject and psych o idhios).
(ii) C-command (‘yes’ for object o idhios,‘no’ for subject and psych o idhios)
(iii) Split-antecedents (‘no’ for object o idhios ,‘yes’ for subject and psych o idhios)
(iv) Strict readings (‘no’ for object o idhios,‘yes’ for subject and psych o idhios)
(v) Sensitivity to the type of sentential complement they occur in; supposedly linked
to the operator-binding analysis (‘yes’ for object o idhios ,‘no’ for subject and
psych o idhios).
On the basis of this evidence, they argue that the Principle D description is correct only
for object o idhios, not for subject and psych-o idhios. They furthermore propose that
object o idhios is A’-bound by a zero operator in Comp along the lines of Koopman and
Sportiche’s (1989) analysis of logophoric pronouns in Abe. On the other hand, subject o
idhios qualifies as a regular pronoun, perhaps because it is emphatic and carries a focused
interpretation. Finally, psych o idhios behaves like subject o idhios, providing evidence
for a subject-analysis of accusative experiencer objects of stative psych-predicates.
While we agree on the basic distinction they draw between subject and non-subject
o idhios, we disagree on many of the properties they ascribe to non-subject o idhios,
partly because we are disagreeing with their data. According to our investigation, non-
subject o idhios shows a more mixed behavior with respect to whether it qualifies as an
anaphor/bound variable or not than assumed by Varlokosta & Hornstein. In this respect, o
idhios patterns with e.g. the Icelandic long-distance anaphor sig, as described by
Thráinsson (1991). We furthermore attempt to classify non-subject o idhios w.r.t existing
typologies of long-anaphors showing that it differs from typical long-distance
anaphors/logophors in certain respects.
5.2. Revisiting Varlokosta & Hornstein’s Diagnostics and Claims
In what follows, we follow Hornstein & Varlokosta in their claim that there is a
distinction between subject and object o idhios. We do not discuss psych o idhios (see
Hornstein and Varlokosta 1992 for the details). According to Varlokosta & Hornstein,
object and subject o idhios show a consistently different behavior w.r.t. diagnostics (i–iv),
concluding that object o idhios is an anaphor while subject o idhios is a pronoun. We do
not question the pronoun status of subject o idhios, but we claim that the anaphoric status
of object o idhios is more complex than simply assuming that it is an anaphor. To make
this clear, we will first focus on diagnostic (v) because it will have consequences for the
interpretation of the results of the other diagnostics.
Varlokosta & Hornstein (V&H) propose that object ton idhio is A’-bound by a zero-
operator residing in Spec,CP extending Koopman & Sportiche’s (1989) analysis of
logophoric prounouns in Abe to Greek (Varlokosta 1994: 16):
(41) O Janisj pistevi [CP 0j oti [IP o Vasilisk tha voithisi ton idhioj]]
The Janis thinks that the Vasilis FUT helps the same
The zero-operator in (41) must be identified by being bound by o Janis, which explains
why object ton idhio requires obligatorily a sentence internal c-commanding antecedent.
The null operator analysis predicts that ton idhio will only be licensed whenever the
Spec,CP position is free to be occupied by the operator. V&H claim that this prediction is
borne out on the basis of their diagnostic (v) sensitivity to the type of sentential
complement ton idhio occurs in. They claim that ton idhio is not licensed in relative
clauses and embedded questions where Spec,CP is occupied, while it is possible within
adjuncts, noun-complements and factive complements introduced by the complementizer
pu. In the latter category, Spec,CP is empty and can host the 0-operator. Crucially, in
contrast to Abe, any COMP, not just those under verbs of saying can be the locus of a
zero operator in Greek, provided that Spec,CP is empty.
Even though the judgments reported in Varlokosta (1994) on this point are adopted
as correct in the dissertation of Chiou (2007), we doubt the assessment of these data. In
our view, almost all their examples are ill-formed, and our informants (mentioned in fn 1)
have confirmed this. We think that the ungrammaticality created by certain
complementizers is an artifact of a restriction in the distribution of non-subject, non-
emphatic o idhios, which, to our knowledge, has not been discussed in the literature so
far. In fact, generally, o idhios is deviant when it occurs as an unstressed direct object
accusative long distance anaphor, except when combined with very few verbs, voithao
‘help’ being one of them.28
We claim that, as an unstressed complement anaphor, o idhios
is well-formed only (i) as part of a co-ordination of two direct objects and (ii) as an object
of a preposition. The following examples are perfect:
(42) O Janisj theli [o Vasilisk na xeretisi [NPton idhioj/*k kai tin ikogenia tu]]
The Janis wants [the Vasilis.NOM SBJV greets the same and his family]
‘John wants Bill to greet him and his family’
(43) O Janisj pistevi oti i Maria tha milisi [PPme ton idhioj ] otan tha exi nea
The Janis believes that the Maria will talk with the same when fut has news
‘Janis believes that Mary will talk to him when he has news’
28
It is interesting that the verb ‘help’ is prototypically a verb selecting for a single dative object in
languages like e.g. German, Ancient Greek where monotransitive verbs can take objects with
cases other than accusative. This might suggest that even in cases where accusative ton idhio is
acceptable this is actually a hidden oblique ton idhio rather than a structural accusative ton idhio.
More research into this topic is required.
By contrast, we believe that contrary to Chiou (2007) the ones below are not (with non-
emphatic/non-contrastive ton idhio):
(44) ?*O Janisj theli [o Vasilisk na xeretisi ton idhioj/*k]
The Janis wants [the Vasilis.NOM SBJV greets the same]
‘John wants Bill to greet him ’
(45) ?*O Janisj pistevi oti i Maria agapai ton idhioj apo tin proti stigmi
The Janis believes that the Maria loves the same from the first moment
‘Janis believes that Mary loves him from the moment she saw him’
Ton idhio might not be unique in showing this restriction. The Romanian bare reflexive
sine does not occur as a direct argument of the verb and must always occur as an object
of a preposition (Sevcenco 2006: 37-38):29
(46) a. *Amantul ascunde sine în dulap
Lover the hides self in wardrobe
‘The lover is hiding himself in the wardrobe’
b. George contează pe sine
George counts on self
‘George counts on himself’
In addition, as pointed out to us by Alexis Dimitradis (p.c.), Faltz (1977) recognizes a
distinct category of reflexives that are restricted to oblique argument positions, which he
calls “secondary reflexives”.
Once this factor is controlled for, judgments of relevant sentences radically change,
as we will illustrate for two cases, relative clauses (47) and questions (48) (The a-
examples from Varlokosta 1994:14):
(47) a. *O Janisj sinandise ton anthropo pu filakise ton idhioj
The Janis met the man that imprisoned the same
‘John met the man that imprisoned him’
b. O politikosj sinantise telika ton dimosiografo pu ixe epikinonisi
The politician met finally the journalist that had communicated
me ton idhioj prin apo merikes meres jia to skandalo
with the same before from some days about the scandal
‘The politician finally met the journalist who had communicated with him
29
Dutch seem to have a similar contrast in the case of non-local binding (cf. Everaert 1986:220-
223, and the discussion in Reinhart and Siloni 2005).
(i) Jan liet mij voor zich werken
John made me for himself work
‘John made me work for him’
(ii) *Jan liet mij zich uitnodigen John made me himself invite
John made me invite him
several days ago about the scandal’
(48) a. *O Janisj dhen kseri pjos agapai ton idhioj
The Janis not knows who loves the same
‘Janis doesn’t know who loves him’
b. O politikosj anarotithike pjos dimosiografos ixe epikinonisi me ton idhioj
The politician wondered which journalist had communicated with the same
gia to skandalo.
about the scandal
‘The politician wondered which journalist got in touch with him about the
scandal’
On the basis of this discussion, we conclude that Varlokosta & Hornstein’s claim
that there is a sensitivity to the type of sentential complement is incorrect., a fact which
argues against the zero-operator analysis. Moreover, the fact that direct object ton idhio is
generally degraded, potentially obscures the intuitions of native speakers concerning
diagnostics (i-iv). Only if the right type of non-subject ton idhio is tested will we be able
to draw safer conclusions on its pronominal/anaphoric nature. This is what we attempt to
do in the next section.
5.3. Testing the Anaphor vs. Pronoun Properties of Non-Subject Ton Idhio
In this section, we apply the anaphora diagnostics (i)-(iv), using the right (with oblique
ton idhio) examples.
(i) Requirement for a sentence-internal antecedent. As shown in (49), oblique ton idhio
under a non emphatic/contrastive construal cannot be free:
(49) *O Janisj theli [o Vasilisk na milisi me tin idhia ]
The Janis wants [the Vasilis.NOM SBJV talks with the same.FEM]
‘John wants Bill to talk with her’
According to this test, ton idhio qualifies as an anaphor.
(ii) Requirement for a c-commanding antecedent. (Recall that there is no such
requirement for subject/psych ton idhio). W.r.t. this test, we found that it is necessary to
distinguish between two cases:
a. When the antecedent is embedded within the subject DP, judgments were uncertain.
Our informants consistently felt that there is a contrast between the cases where the
antecedent c-commands ton idhio (e.g. 50a) and when it doesn’t (e.g. 50b), but they also
commented that the constructions lacking c-command are ‘not that bad’ or ‘not as bad as
they should be’ (according to one anonymous reviewer there is no contrast at all in 50):
(50) a. O Janisk elpizi oti i Maria tha epikinonisi me ton idhiok otan exi nea
The Janis hopes that the Mary FUT communicate with the same when has news
‘John hopes that Mary will communicate with him when she has some news’
b. ??[DPI mitera tu Janik] elpizi oti i Maria tha epikinonisi
The mother.NOM the Janis.GEN hopes that the Mary FUT communicates
me ton idhiok otan exi nea.
with the same when has news
‘John’s mother hopes that Mary will communicate with him when she has some
news’
(ii) When the antecedent is embedded inside a CP, lack of c-command leads to sharp
ungrammaticality:30
(51) *[CPTo oti i Maria aghapa ton Janik] me epise oti boro na basizome
The that the Mary loves the John me convinced that can SBJV base myself
ston idhiok to the same
‘That Mary loves John convinced me that I can depend on him’
We conclude, especially on the basis of examples like (51), that non-subject ton idhio
qualifies as a syntactic anaphor in that it requires a c-commanding antecedent.
(iii) Split-antecedents. (Recall that this is possible for subject and psych o idhios). As
shown in (52), this is impossible for oblique ton idhio under a non emphatic/contrastive
construal:
(52) *O vasiliasj ipe ston prothipurgok oti o proedros tha epikinonisi
The king said to the prime-minister that the president FUT communicates
me tus idhiousj+k
with the same-pl
‘The king told the prime-minister that the president will communicate with them’
Once again, ton idhio qualifies as an anaphor w.r.t. this diagnostic. But keep in mind that
given the discussion in section 4.3 it is not clear whether this diagnostic is really making
a distinction between pronominal or anaphoric status.
30
According to one anonymous reviewer, the judgment improves in the following example which changes
the VP in a way that, according to the reviewer, it “makes more sense given the content of the sentential
subject”:
(51’) [CPTo oti i Maria aghapa ton Janik] me epise oti iparxi akomi elpida gia ton idhiok
The that the Mary loves the John me convinced that exists still hope for the same
‘That Mary loves John convinced me that there is still hope for him’
If indeed examples like (51’) are consistently shown to be acceptable to native speakers, they should be
linked to the logophoric uses of “ton idhio” discussed in section 5.4. The prediction would be that they only
trigger strict readings in contexts of VP ellipsis (see below for discussion).
(iv) Availability of strict readings in ellipsis. All our informants agreed that strict
readings are possible for complement (oblique) ton idhio (contra Varlokosta &
Hornstein):
(53) O Janisj nomizi oti i Maria tha milisi me ton idhioj ke o Vasilis episis
The Janis thinks that the Mary FUT talks with the same and the Vasilis too
‘John thinks that Mary will talk to him and so does Vasilis’
= John thinks that Mary will talk to John and Vasilis thinks that Mary will talk to
Vasilis/John
On this diagnostic, ton idhio qualifies as a pronoun w.r.t. this ambiguity. That is, there is
a clear distinction here compared to the strictly local anaphor o eaftos tu, which does not
allow a strict reading. Still, as we discussed in section 4.2, for other anaphora some
authors have claimed that this diagnostic does not give straightforward results.
We thus conclude that non-subject ton idhio shows a mixed behavior. It qualifies as an
anaphor w.r.t. requiring a sentence internal c-commanding antecedent and not tolerating
split antecedents but as a pronoun w.r.t. strict readings.
Note that ton idhio is not unique in showing a mixed behavior of the kind described
here. According to Thráinsson (1991), the Icelandic long-distance reflexive sig, shows a
comparable behavior. On the one hand, speakers get both strict and sloppy readings in
ellipsis contexts (Thráinsson 1991:60), like in Norwegian, but contrary to Dutch (see the
discussion in section 4.3):
(54) Jóni sagði [að þú hefðir svikið sigi] og Pétur gerði það líka
John said that you had betrayed him and Peter did so too
‘Peter said that you had betrayed him, and Peter did so too.’
On the other hand, sig does not allow split antecedents, unlike ordinary pronouns, as was
discussed in section in section 4.3.
As already mentioned, a crucial property o idhios shares with sig is the fact that
their antecedent can be arbitrarily far away, i.e. both are, so-called, long distance
anaphors. The question that arises, therefore, is whether these three properties form a
natural class, i.e. whether the double nature of o idhios (anaphor and pronoun) correlates
with the fact that it can be bound non-locally for a principled reason. We provide a partial
answer to this question in the next section, where we explore how o idhios fits into
existing typologies of non-locally bound anaphors.
5.4. Ton Idhio and Other Non-Locally Bound Anaphors
In section 2.2 and 3.3 we briefly referred to the phenomenon of long distance binding.
The typology of long distance anaphors is highly complex, and it is impossible to review
it here in full detail. But for the present purposes we draw a distinction between (a) non-
locally bound anaphors (command anaphors (Büring) or UD-anaphors in Safir) that need
to be bound by a linguistic antecedent and (b) logophors which are oriented towards a
semantically or pragmatically determined class of antecedents (see section 2.2 for
discussion of the distinction).
Schlenker (1999:31-35) introduces a further distinction between true logophoric
pronouns, which can only be used in the scope of attitude operators (because they must
be interpreted de se)31
and pronouns which are not logophoric in the strict sense, since
they can occur outside the scope of an attitude operator, e.g. in a relative clause.
According to this classification, the pronoun yè in Ewe (see (10) above) is a true
logophor, excluded, for example, from relative clauses). On the other hand, the Japanese
long-distance anaphor zibun is not a logophor in a strict sense since it can occur in
relative clauses. There is a final distinction that needs to be mentioned before we proceed
to discuss the properties of o idhios. Logophoric pronouns can be either author denoting,
as all the cases discussed so far, or addressee/ hearer denoting (Schlenker 1999: 31, 110-
111; Anand 2006: 16 calls them ‘de te’ logophors). While the former are used in reported
speech to refer to whoever would in direct discourse be referred to as 'I', the latter would
crucially involve the indexical 'you'. Hearer-denoting logophoric pronouns seem to exist
in Mapun (Frayzingier 1985) and Yoruba (Sells 1987)).
We are not able to discuss the full typology of long-distance anaphors that arises
from discussion, nor the way ton idhio relates to this. For discussion we refer the reader
to Anagnostopoulou & Everaert (in progress) who argue that long-distance ton idhio
qualifies as a “non-logophoric pronoun in the strict sense” in terms of Schlenker’s
classification (it is licensed in relative clauses as was shown by (47b)) and as both author
and hearer denoting (it is not subject-oriented, as originally pointed out by Varlokosta
and Hornstein). However, there is one important point that needs to be stressed. Often
‘the same anaphor’ can behave both as an anaphor locally bound and as an anaphor non-
locally bound (Norwegian seg), or as regular reflexive anaphor and a logophor (Icelandic
sig). How to explain such dual behavior is not at stake here. If we limit ourselves to ion
idhio, we could argue that ton idhio is a command anaphor (in a specific syntactic
position, as discussed in 5.3), but when the syntactic position is part of a logophoric
context it is a logophor (of a certain type). We will give a few examples to illustrate.
Ton idhio can occur violating all its usual requirements (no need for an antecedent
within the sentence, no need for c-command, etc.) in typical logophoric contexts. For
instance, point of view narratives allow logophoric use. In (55) there is no antecedent in
the sentence and yet ton idhio is licensed without contrast or emphasis (Greek translations
of English texts mentioned in Zribi-Hertz (1989):
(55) Ksafnika ekinos ipe dinata: H ktitikotita ine diaboliki.
Suddenly he said aloud: Possessivenes is the devil
H Maggie ton kitakse: Ennouse tin idhia ke to pedhi?
Maggie him looked. Meant-3SG the same and the child?
‘Maggie looked at him. Did he mean herself and the baby?”
31
See Kaplan (1989), Lewis (1979), Perry (1979) on de se attitudes, and Morgan (1970),
Chierchia (1989), Reinhart (1990) for discussion of obligatory de se expressions (PRO and
logophors) in natural language. See Schlenker (1999) and Anand (2006) for a semantic and
typological discussion of logophoricity in this context.
In cases of intra-sentential logophoricity which includes a belief predicate not c-
commanding the clause in which a logophor occurs (see Reinhart 1990 for discussion),
ton idhio can be licensed without contrast or emphasis:
(56) Oti kanenas den bori na magirepsi kala ektos apo ton idhio ine mia apo tis pio
That noone not can SBJV cook.3SG well except from the same is one of the most
prosfates apospis/emmones tu Jani
recent opinions/fixed ideas the Janis.GEN
‘That noone can cook well apart of himself is one of the most recent beliefs of John’
Returning to the strict-sloppy ambiguity issue discussed in section 5.4., when ton idhio is
used in belief contexts not c-commanded by its antecedent it admits only strict readings,
which indicates that it is not a bound variable:32
(57) [I gnomi tu Janik] ine oti prepi na milisis me ton idhiok ke
The opinion the Janis.GEN is that must-3SG SBJV talk-2SG with the same and
i gnomi tu Petru episis
the opinion.NOM the Peter.GEN too
‘John’s opinion is that you have to talk to him and that is Peter’s opinion too’
(= it is Peter’s opinion that you have to talk to John; strict only)
A more detailed discussion of the logophoric properties of ton idhio as well as a
comparison between subject and non-subject o idhios/ton idhio in the context of the
discussion of logophoricity awaits further research (Anagnostopoulou & Everaert in
preparation).
6. Summing up
In the preceding sections we addressed the validity of the standard anaphora diagnostics
in (21), repeated here, in the context of a Binding Theory informed by cross-linguistic
research on elements not straightforwardly falling under the classical anaphor vs.
pronoun partition in the last two decades.
(21) a. strict/sloppy identity
b. split antecedents
c. deictic reference
d. a command restriction on the anaphoric dependency
e. domain-sensitivity
The existence of several types of long-distance anaphors across languages makes evident
that domain sensitivity (diagnostic e) is not a reliable diagnostic for the classification of
32
The same is noted by Thráinsson (1991:60) for Icelandic sig.
an item as an anaphor or a pronoun. We also presented some cases reported in the
literature which indicate that diagnostics (b) and (a) need to be investigated more, as they
have counterexamples. We concluded that diagnostics (c) and (d) are the most reliable
ones. Both derive from a requirement for syntactic binding (Reinhart 1983). True
anaphors lack deictic potential and must be interpreted through binding by a c-
commanding antecedent. This is a realistic way of viewing the relation between
semantics (referential deficiency) and syntax (clausal dependency).33
In the last part of the paper we studied the Greek long-distance anaphor o idhios
which lives a double life as a long-distance command anaphor and as a non-command
logophor. This element bears on the discussion of the proper formulation of Binding
Theory for two reasons:
A. It is often assumed that the bound variable status of an element is linked to local
binding, non-local binding allowing both strict and sloppy readings. Greek o idhios
shows a strict-sloppy ambiguity in the presence of a c-commanding antecedent while it
allows only strict readings when it is not c-commanded by an antecedent.
B. It is often assumed that non-local binding is necessarily subject to semantic/
pragmatic restrictions (logophoricity, point of view, or whatever one wants to call it).
Greek o idhios shows that that is not the case: non-local binding is not accompanied by
any semantic/pragmatic restrictions. O idhios can occur outside the scope of an attitude
operator and is not necessarily subject-oriented (author denoting).
On the basis of our discussion, we may speculate that there are three relevant domains for
binding theory: predicate, sentence and discourse.
(i) Anaphors are defective and must be bound. Since binding implies c-command,
binding is in principle limited to the sentence.
(ii) Locality restrictions, in the sense of necessarily being bound by a co-argument
(bound within its ‘governing category’, the predicate), could be derived from ‘reflexivity’
conditions (as in Reinhart & Reuland 1993), which are, in the strict sense of the word, not
‘binding principles’ but restrictions on legitimate reflexive predicates. Certain anaphoric
elements are subject to such restrictions.
(iii) Logophors are anaphoric elements defined by being oriented towards a
semantically or pragmatically determined class of antecedents, essentially defined at the
discourse level. Such anaphoric elements can either (a) be uniquely morpho-syntactic
indentifiable anaphoric elements (logophoric pronouns), or (b) be ‘true’ anaphors (of a
certain type) which appear in a syntactic position that is part of a logophoric context, and
33
As a reviewer pointed out to us, a connection with Negative Polarity Items (NPI) can be made
(as has been done in Progovac 1994). NPIs are known known to be subject to syntactic command.
In the approaches of Ladusaw (1979), Giannakidou (1998), and others, NPIs are described as
bound, and “narrow scope”. In Giannakidou (1998) the answer to this question, for non-‐scalar
NPIs, appeals to semantic deficiency: NPIs are referentially deficient (characterized as non-
deictic in Giannakidou in press) and therefore in need to be licensed. Thus, polarity items then are
in need of syntactic command because of a referential deficiency, and this command is not local
in the sense of co-‐argumenthood, but can be rather non-local, as we also claim for anaphors. (cf.
also Giannakidou and Cheng 2006 for Free Choice Items).
then have or allow a logophoric interpretation. We claim that with respect to the
diagnostics we discussed, the domains in (a) and (b) are not fundamentally different.
A remaining question is why one and the same item can be used both as an
anaphor (non-deictic) and a logophor (deictic), as illustrated with Greek o idhios, for
instance. Pollard & Sag (1994) and Reinhart & Reuland (1993) tried to address this point
by introducing the notions exempt anaphor/logophor, respectively. Taking a syntactic
definition of anaphor as basic, under certain conditions, not ‘needing’ a syntactic
antecedent opens up the possibility for the anaphor to get a contextual value, a logophoric
reading.
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