identifying and mitigating extremist activities in corrections

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYNOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE


Identifyingand

MitigatingExtremist

Activities inCorrections



(U) WARNING: This document isUNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Do not release to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without approval from the FBI. This document may contain information

exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC § 552).



Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Terminology 2

International Terrorism 3

Domestic Terrorism 10

Indicators of Extremist Activity in Corrections 16

Records of Investigative Value 19

Preventing and Mitigating Extremist Activity 20

Vetting Procedures for Contractors, Volunteers, and Staff 21

Resources 22

Information Sharing 24



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IntroductionThis guide is intended as a resource for correcti onal staff to assist in identi fying signs of potenti al extremist acti vity—related to both internati onal and domesti c terrorism threats—and preventi ng its occurrence and spread within correcti onal faciliti es.

Some domesti c and internati onal terrorist groups view detenti on and correcti ons populati ons as potenti al recruits. Unaffi liated extremist actors pose a similar threat, but are oft en more diffi cult to detect as they may have self-radicalized and maintain no apparent terrorist affi liati ons. Some extremists att empt to infl uence inmates to join or support their cause while incarcerated or once they are released from custody through other extremist inmates, contractors, volunteers, or compromised staff .

The informati on and suggesti ons in this guide were developed based on input from subject matt er experts on terrorism, correcti ons, and prison radicalizati on.

Many of the acti viti es described herein may involve consti tuti onally Many of the acti viti es described herein may involve consti tuti onally protected acti viti es and may be insignifi cant on their own. Acti on protected acti viti es and may be insignifi cant on their own. Acti on should not be taken solely based on the exercise of consti tuti onally should not be taken solely based on the exercise of consti tuti onally protected rights, or the apparent or actual race, ethnicity, nati onal protected rights, or the apparent or actual race, ethnicity, nati onal origin or religion of an inmate, volunteer, contractor, or staff origin or religion of an inmate, volunteer, contractor, or staff member, or any combinati on of these factors. Emphasis should member, or any combinati on of these factors. Emphasis should not be placed on beliefs, but rather observed behavior that is not be placed on beliefs, but rather observed behavior that is detrimental to insti tuti on operati ons or promotes criminal acti vity. detrimental to insti tuti on operati ons or promotes criminal acti vity.



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TerminologyThe below terms referenced in this guide are used to identify individuals or categorize behavior that may be associated with extremist activity.

Radicalization: The process by which an individual changes from a nonviolent belief system to one that includes the willingness to actively advocate, facilitate, or use violence as a method to effect social, political, or economic change.

Mobilization: The process by which radicalized individuals take action to prepare for or engage in violence to achieve social, political, or economic change.

Indicators: Observable behaviors that may indicate an individual is radicalizing or mobilizing to extremist violence. Indicators must be evaluated within the situational context and the presence of one or more indicators does not necessarily mean an individual presents a threat.

Extremist ideology: An ideology that justifies, condones, encourages, and/or supports violence to achieve social, political, or economic goals.

Violent extremist: A person who encourages, endorses, condones, justifies, and/or supports the commission of a violent act or crime against a country, its government, citizens, and/or allies in order to achieve social, political, or economic changes, or against individuals or groups who hold contrary opinions.



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International TerrorismInternational Terrorism: Violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the US, or of any state, that appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence the policy of a government in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization (FTO).

Examples of International Terrorist Attacks in the US: September 11th terrorist attacks (NY, PA, VA); Fort Hood shooting (TX); Boston Marathon bombing (MA); Garland shooting (TX); San Bernardino shooting (CA); Pulse nightclub shooting (FL)

International Terrorists: Individuals who are members of designated FTOs, state sponsors of terrorism, or homegrown violent extremists.

Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs): Individuals inspired by the global jihad who are primarily based in the US, primarily radicalized in the US, and are not receiving individualized direction for the advancement of terrorism or terrorism-related activities (travel, attack plotting, fundraising, material support, facilitation, etc.) from an FTO, but who may be following disseminated directives. The FBI considers HVEs to be the primary international terrorism threat to the US.

Boston Marathon bombing



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Examples of Designated FTOs Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS): Established as the fi rst al-Qa’ida affi liate, al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), in 2003. ISIS became independent from al-Qa’ida in 2014 and declared a global Islamic state emanati ng from Iraq and Syria. ISIS maintains a network of branches worldwide. Despite territorial losses, ISIS conti nues to direct, enable, and inspire att acks across the world, parti cularly through online propaganda.

Key Figures: Dr. Ibrahim Awwad, aka Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, aka Abu Du’a; Abu Muhammad al-Adnani; Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir

Publicati ons: Dabiq Magazine; Rumiyah Magazine

Al-Qa’ida (AQ): Founded in 1988 by Usama Bin Ladin and Abdullah Azzam (both now-deceased) during the Soviet-Afghan War. AQ’s ulti mate goal is to remove Western infl uence from the Middle East to enable the establishment of strict Islamic law and governance in the region. AQ works to achieve this goal by launching att acks against the US and the West, leveraging a robust network of AQ-affi liated FTOs worldwide.

Key Figures: Usama Bin Ladin; Ayman al-Zawahiri; Abdullah Azzam; Hamza Bin Ladin



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Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): Established in 2009 when AQ groups in Yemen and Saudi Arabia merged to become the regional affiliate of AQ. AQAP seeks to overthrow the Saudi and Yemeni regimes, expel Western influences from the Arabian Peninsula, and institute Islamic governance. AQAP remains intent on launching external attacks against the US and the West and aspires to achieve its goals in part by draining the American economy.

Key Figures: Anwar al-Aulaqi; Qasim al-Rimi; Khalid Batarfi Publications: Inspire Magazine; Inspire Guide; Lone Mujahid Pocketbook; Open Source Jihad

Hizballah: Formed in 1982 and based in Lebanon with military, political, social, media, and terrorist components which are capable of conducting sophisticated terrorist attacks. Hizballah continues to receive Iranian support and has pre-positioned operatives and infrastructure in the US and abroad, likely for long-term contingency planning purposes. Hizballah aims to prepare for future potential conflict with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the US, and the West. Key Figures: Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah; Members of the Jihad Council

For a complete list of designated FTOs, please visit: www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations



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Extremist Publicati onsA selecti on of offi cial ISIS and AQAP publicati ons:

Writi ngs, audio, or video produced by the below individuals should be reviewed to determine if materials contain or promote violent extremist narrati ves. The list is not comprehensive and some materials produced by these individuals are not extremist in nature.

Anwar al-Aulaqi Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi Abdullah al-Faisal Anjem Choudary Abdullah Azzam Abu Baraa aka Mizanur Rahman Abu Hamza al-Masri Yusuf al-Uyaryi Abu Waleed Musa Cerantonio Omar Bakri Muhammad Abu Qatada

ISIS's Dabiq Magazine ISIS's Rumiyah Magazine AQAP's Inspire Magazine

AQAP's Inspire Guide AQAP's Lone Mujahid Pocketbook

AQAP's Open Source Jihad



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Terms Potentially Related to Extremist ActivityThe use of the below terms is not a sign of extremist activity on its own. When the usage of these terms occurs alongside other concerning behaviors, their use may be indicative of extremist activity.

Bay’ah—allegiance to a leader Dar al-Kufr—land of disbelief Irhab—terrorism Istishhad—martyrdom Jihad—a struggle Kafir/Kuffar*—unbeliever Khalifah—caliph Khilafah—caliphate Mujahid/Mujahidin*—fighter for a religious cause Munafiq/Munafiqun*—hypocrite Murtad/Murtaddin*—apostate Qisas—equal retaliation Shahid—martyr Taghut/Tawaghit*—false God; tyrant Takfir—to label a Muslim an apostate Tawhid—oneness of God in Islam *singular/plural



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Imagery Potenti ally Related to Extremist Acti vityThe below tatt oos and drawings were found either in the cells or on the person of identi fi ed extremists in federal custody.

Term oft en used by extremists to symbolize a war against the West

Imagery containing references to Hizballah, 58:22 (a passage from the Koran that Hizballah member oft en cite), freedom fi ghters, and Islamic jihad

Mujahid holding an assault rifl e

Black fl ag used by multi ple FTOs to include ISIS, AQAP, and al-Shabaab

The use of these and other symbols portrayed in this booklet is an exercise of First Amendment rights and may not necessarily be indicati ve of extremist acti vity.



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Porti on of Hizballah fl ag Al-Shabaab, an FTO based in the Horn of Africa

A raised index fi nger is a sign of the Tawhid and oft en referenced by ISIS

Green birds are referenced by extremists as carrying martyrs to heaven




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Domestic TerrorismDomestic Violent Extremism: US-based acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the US or of any state and appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

Examples of Domestic Violent Extremist Attacks in the US: Oklahoma City bombing (OK); Oak Creek Sikh Temple shooting (WI); Charleston church shooting (SC); Dallas police shooting (TX); Charlottesville vehicle ramming (VA); Pittsburgh synagogue shooting (PA); Poway synagogue shooting (CA); El Paso Walmart shooting (TX)

Domestic Violent Extremists: Individuals, without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power, who seek to further political, ideological, or social goals—stemming from domestic influences, such as racial bias and anti-government sentiment—wholly or in part through unlawful acts of force or violence. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.Racially Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE): Encompasses threats involving the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas which are deemed to derive from bias, often related to race, held

Oklahoma City bombing



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by the actor against others, including a given population group. RMVEs use both political and religious justifications to support their ideological objectives and criminal activities.

Anti-Government/Anti-Authority Extremism: This threat encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas, and typically includes threats from the following:

Anarchist Extremists: Have primarily focused on targeting symbols of capitalism, law enforcement, and government. They remain loosely organized nationally, but have demonstrated the capability to quickly mobilize against issues they oppose, which often results in acts of vandalism or property damage and confrontations with law enforcement and others with opposing ideologies.

Militia Extremists: Have primarily focused on Second Amendment gun rights and land rights. Militia extremists have focused on paramilitary training and the acquisition of weapons, ammunition, and food supplies in preparation for criminal confrontations with government or law enforcement. Militia extremists perceive the US Government as overreaching in regard to gun and land rights, or ineffective in the face of border security issues and terrorism. Militia extremists have historically targeted the government and law enforcement, but in recent years have increasingly threatened or plotted violence against suspected undocumented immigrants and drug traffickers along the southwestern border, anti-fascists, and Muslims, whom they perceive as threats to public safety.

Puerto Rican National Extremists (PRNEs): Groups or individuals seeking independence for Puerto Rico from the US through the use of force or violence that violates criminal law. PRNEs view themselves as defenders of Puerto Rico against the perceived



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negative effects of capitalism and believe the destabilization of the US and the local Puerto Rican government will prompt the populace to accept a socialist government and revolt against the US. PRNEs also exploit secondary causes, such as environmental- ism, to gain support for their ideology.

Sovereign Citizen Extremism (SCE): Adherents to SCE ideology renounce their US citizenship on the basis that the US Government is illegitimate, and believe US Government laws and regulations, including taxes, are illegitimate as well. They have been involved with the harassment and targeting of law enforcement and government personnel with legal threats, retaliatory liens, and frivolous lawsuits. SCE violence is primarily sporadic and reactive, occurring within the context of routine encounters with law enforcement during traffic stops and the service of warrants, evictions, etc. at the home.

Animal Rights/Environmental Extremists: This threat encompass-es the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas by those seeking to end or mitigate perceived cruelty, harm, or exploitation of animals and/or the perceived exploitation or destruction of natural resources and the environment.

Abortion Extremists: This threat encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas relating to abortion, including pro-life or pro-choice.



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Racially Moti vated Violent ExtremistsThe below are publicati ons which have inspired some RMVEs. This selecti on is not comprehensive and alone does not indicate extremist acti vity.

The below are common symbols used by some RMVEs.

“14” is a reference to the “14 words”: “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children.” It oft en appears in conjuncti on with “88”

Othala Rune

“88” symbolizes “HH” or “Heil Hitler” using the eighth lett er of the alphabet

14Sonnenrad (black sun)

Totenkopf (death’s head)

Thor’s Hammer

SS Lightning Bolts

Swasti ka Variati on of a Celti c Cross



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Sovereign Citizen ExtremistsSCEs present a unique challenge for correctional staff as they may engage in criminal schemes—to include tax fraud—while incarcerated, declare sovereignty from facility regulations, and target staff with false lien notices.

Federal law prohibits filing or attempting to file false liens against federal law enforcement officers (18 USC §1521) and publicly disclosing federal law enforcement officers’ private information for the purposes of harassment and other unlawful purposes (18 USC § 119).

Similar protections may be afforded by the state to non-federal correctional staff and applicable statutes should be consulted.

Fraudulent law enforcement badge

Fraudulent driver’s license

The use of these and other symbols portrayed in this booklet is an exercise of First Amendment rights and may not necessarily be indicative of extremist activity.



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Potential SCE Indicators Claims of sovereignty, which are not necessarily indicators of criminal or extremist activity or radicalization, may incorporate terms like “freeman,” “traveler,” “natural person,” “flesh and blood,” “artificial person,” “strawman,” or “right to road travel”

Threats to “arrest” officials or use “common law courts”

Demands for oath of office or “bond”

Claims of “kidnapping” by officials

Filings of liens or illegal lawsuits

Fraudulent use of government seals or forms often accompanied by notary signature

Signatures distinguished by odd colons, dashes, brackets, the copyright symbol (©), or followed by “under duress,” “without prejudice,” “without recourse,” “Threat, Duress, or Coercion” (TDC), “All Rights Reserved” (ARR), or a red thumb print

Stamps may be used to falsely create contractual relationships

The use of these and other symbols portrayed in this booklet is an exercise of First Amendment rights and may not necessarily be indicative of extremist activity.



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Indicators of Extremist Activity in CorrectionsIn order to prevent the occurrence and spread of extremist acti vity in correcti onal faciliti es, it is important to know potenti al signs and behaviors that could be exhibited by extremist inmates, contractors, volunteers, or compromised staff . Indicators can assist staff in:

Recognizing potenti al extremist acti vity Identi fying individuals who may be planning a violent act

and allowing ti me to implement countermeasures Preventi ng the spread of extremist acti vity in the faciliti es

Inmate IndicatorsInmates who:

Each indicator listed may be, by itself, lawful conduct/behavior and may Each indicator listed may be, by itself, lawful conduct/behavior and may also consti tute the exercise of rights guaranteed by the US Consti tuti on. also consti tute the exercise of rights guaranteed by the US Consti tuti on. A totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances A totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering correcti ons or law enforcement should be evaluated when considering correcti ons or law enforcement response. No single indicator should be the sole basis for acti on.response. No single indicator should be the sole basis for acti on.

Condone violence against non-supporters of their ideology

Express a desire to travel to a confl ict zone

Possess extremist contraband

Parti cipate in military drill/marti al arts training

Communicate or att empt to communicate with known extremists

Use covert terms or codes to mask true meaning of statements, events, or acti viti es



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Possess or obtain tattoos with extremist imagery

Resist monitoring of gatherings by correctional staff

Send or receive messages—including kites, e-mails, and letters—with extremist content

Attempt to recruit or force others to conform to their ideology

Use ideology to justify group actions and activities, including violence

Attempt to assert authority over other inmates, due to their ideology

Take actions to create a separate group ruled by their standards

Refuse to be housed with inmates of other religious, racial, or ethnic backgrounds

Express beliefs that other faith traditions are unacceptable or other races are lesser

Challenge authorized service providers—such as religious, educational, or treatment providers—with extremist counterarguments

Express beliefs that violence against the US is justifiable

Disregard US laws or regulations when they are seen as being in conflict with their belief set

Express perception of existential threat against their belief set

Accuse the government of trying to destroy their belief set

Disparage moderate individuals within their belief set or members of other ethnic or racial backgrounds

Significantly change dress, hygiene, or daily routines



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Volunteer, Contractor, and Compromised Staff IndicatorsIn addition to the inmate indicators, there are additional indicators for volunteers, contractors, and compromised staff that are specific to their roles within a facility. Volunteers, contractors, and compromised staff may be engaging in extremist activity if they:

Engage in unauthorized communication with inmates

Resist monitoring of services provided

Bring or attempt to bring inflammatory or unauthorized materials into the facility (to include altering approved materials)

Direct or encourage inmates to challenge institutional authority or engage in misconduct

Favor inmates espousing extremist beliefs

Inquire or attempt to intervene on an inmate's behalf regarding disciplinary actions or seized contraband related to extremist activity



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Records of Investigative ValueIn addition to observations of inmate behavior, associations, and property, there are a number of other records that may be of investigative value and can be obtained pursuant to applicable regulations and policy.

Contacts and Correspondence:

Visitation logs

Family and associates’ contact information

Inmate address books

Inmate correspondence E-mails and e-mail contact lists Mail Kites Call history and phone numbers

Inmate associations within the facility

Other Facility Records:

Security Threat Group affiliation(s) Confiscated materials Disciplinary reports Reading materials Images Drawings Tattoos Inmate photo albums Commissary/canteen/phone account funding



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Preventing and Mitigating Extremist ActivityPrevention and mitigation methods often overlap in corrections, allowing for simple yet effective policies. It is suggested that the below best practices be implemented—in addition to standard correctional practices such as direct inmate supervision— provided they are in keeping with facility policy and applicable regulations:

Avoid allowing inmate leaders at gatherings - Create a plan for when a contractor or volunteer cannot attend a scheduled gathering

Monitor inmate gatherings - Gatherings should occur in a language monitoring staff can understand

Identify an inmate as a member of a Security Threat Group(s) if activity warrants Monitor associates for radicalizing influences

Monitor incoming literature and propaganda; remove and report contraband propaganda

Review incoming and outgoing mail of inmates of concern

Develop/task inmate sources

Consider transferring an inmate to another facility if the inmate’s extremist activities cannot be managed at the current facility - Ensure receiving facility is aware of extremist activities and prepared to mitigate



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Vetting Procedures for Contractors, Volunteers, and StaffIt is vital that effective vetting procedures be in place to help correctional agencies prevent access to correctional facilities by extremist contractors, volunteers, and staff. It is recommended that American Correctional Association (ACA) Vetting and Screening Protocols for contractors and volunteers providing direct inmate services be followed, in keeping with applicable policies. It is also recommended that staff undergo the same procedures. Specifically: Perform criminal history checks, to include NCIC criminal histories, criminal indices, and “wants and warrants” checks on applicants. These should be re-run on a routine basis for individuals with continued access. Obtain comprehensive identifiers from all volunteers, contractors, and staff including current name, birth name, DOB, POB, SSN, address, phone number(s), social media selector(s), e-mail address(es), copy of driver’s license and passport (if any), and similar information. Report to your local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) if information is developed during the vetting process with a possible terrorism nexus.

Refer to ACA Adult Correctional Institutions Standard #4-4061 and ACA Adult Local Detention Facilities Standard #4-ALDF-7B-03 for the official standards.



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ResourcesExtremism-Specifi c TrainingManaging Extremists in Correcti ons is off ered as an in-person training through the FBI Nati onal Joint Terrorism Task Force’s Correcti onal Intelligence Program. For additi onal informati on e-mail: [email protected] i.gov

Correcti onal Counter Terrorism Training is off ered as an in-person training through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Counter Terrorism Unit. For additi onal informati on e-mail: bop-cpd/[email protected]

State and Local Anti -Terrorism Training (SLATT) is off ered online and in-person on a variety of topics related to counterterrorism: www.slatt .org

Counterterrorism Guides and HandbooksCounterterrorism Guide for Public Safety Personnel: www.dni.gov/nctc/jcat/index.html

Homegrown Violent Extremist Mobilizati on Indicators (2019): htt p://go.usa.gov/xEKgd

UNODC Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Preventi on of Radicalizati on to Violence in Prisons: www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justi ce/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf



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Law Enforcement PortalsLaw Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP): www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/leep

Houses: eGuardian; National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC); Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS)

Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN):www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-information-network-hsin

Houses: HSIN Exchange; HSIN-Intel; Partner Products Pages, including one for BOP's Counter Terrorism Branch

General Training/ResourcesAmerican Correctional Association (ACA): www.aca.org

American Jail Association (AJA): www.americanjail.org

DHS Fusion Centers: www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information

National Institute of Corrections (NIC): www.nicic.gov



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Information SharingWhen potenti al extremist acti viti es are identi fi ed or suspected, appropriate chains-of-command and security personnel should be immediately informed. Depending on facility policy, either the security group or designated correcti onal offi cers should report this informati on and provide supporti ng documentati on to the local JTTF.

Why Report

Additi onal informati on may be held by another agency The inmate could be transferred to another facility, or in

the case of a volunteer, contractor, or compromised staff member, gain access to another facility Acti viti es could warrant criminal charges An inmate may pose an extremist threat to the public once

released

How to ReportInformati on may be passed to local JTTF contacts, or formal ti ps may be submitt ed to the local FBI JTTF through the FBI’s eGuardian system.

When an extremist inmate is being released either to supervision or When an extremist inmate is being released either to supervision or directly to the community, faciliti es should ensure probati on or directly to the community, faciliti es should ensure probati on or parole and the local JTTF are noti fi ed as appropriate under parole and the local JTTF are noti fi ed as appropriate under applicable regulati ons and policy.applicable regulati ons and policy.



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eGuardianThe eGuardian system was developed by the FBI in 2008 to help meet the challenges of collecting and sharing terrorism-related activities amongst law enforcement agencies across various jurisdictions. The system is:

Part of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative A sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information sharing platform The primary Shared Data Repository (SDR) for SARs, joining new SARs with SARs from existing (legacy) reporting systems Hosted through the Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP)

Steps to Acquire eGuardian Access: First obtain access to LEEP or a LEEP-partnered identity provider Those with a Law Enforcement Online (LEO) account can use their LEO log in information to access LEEP To apply for LEEP access, go to https://www.cjis.gov and select “Apply for an Account” Once logged into LEEP, locate the eGuardian icon in the list of available services and click on the “Request” button

eGuardian Help Desk202-324-6655 ǀ Toll Free: 866-672-9763

LEEP/LEO Help Desk Toll Free: 888-334-4LEO (4536)

E-mail: [email protected]



Notes



Federal Bureau of InvestigationNational Joint Terrorism Task Force

Correctional Intelligence Program

[email protected]

The nationwide Correctional Intelligence Program of the National Joint Terrorism Task Force is designed to facilitate coordination on terrorism matters between all JTTFs and all correctional agencies at the federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal level. The program's main focus is to assist with the prevention of prison radicalization in particular, and to encourage the effective exchange of intelligence regarding terrorism matters. The Federal Bureau of Prisons plays a major leadership role, and all state/local correctional agencies are actively encouraged to partner.

2020



identifying and mitigating extremist activities in corrections

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