Identities in Dialogue An engagement of Paul Knitter's sotenocentnc pluralism

Boyd Stephen Blundell

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Regis College and the Theology Depariment of the Toronto School of Theology in partial fblfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Theology awarded by the

University of St. Michael's College

Toronto 1998

O Boyd Blundell

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Identities in Dialogue: An engagement of Paul Knitter S soteriocentric plwu1ismM

Boyd Stephen Blundell Master of Arts in Theology Department of Theology University of St. Michael's College

This thesis analyres Paul Knitter's theology with regard to interreligious dialogue.

Examining Knitter's original exposition in No Other Narne? (1985) through to Jesus und

the Other Names (1996), the author traces the development of Knitter's pluralkt theology

through to its present soteriocentric form as expressed in his 'correlational and globally

responsible model for dialogue.' An extensive analysis of Knitter's model identifies

'cosmological faith' as its foundation. B y engaging postliberd theo logian Stanley

Hauerwas, secular philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and pluraiist theologian Mark Heim.

the author demonstrates that Knitter's model is problematic with respect to its necessity.

appropriateness and coherence. Any attempt to m e r one critic will correspondingly

open Knitter's model to more devastating criticism frorn other sides. The author

identifies two significant tensions in Knitîer's 'cosmological faith' which make this

quandary unavoidable. and concludes with the suggestion that Paul Ricoeur's

hemeneutical approach to religious tmth may provide a way fonvard.

Introduction

Part 1 : Paul Knitter's Sotenocentric Pluralism

Knitter' s "dialogical od y sse y"

A correlational and globally responsible mode1 for dialogue

Didogue

Religions are many Religions are true Religions are incomplete Religions are different

Model

Correlational

Globally Responsible

Foundations of the model: cosmological faith

S=w

Part II: Criticism of Soteriocentric Pludism from Three Directions

Introduction

From Inside: Postliberal Theologian Stanley Hauerwas

Plurality

Threat of Annihilation

From Outside: Secular Philosopher Jürgen Habetmas

Discourse Ethics

Correlational Theology

Habermas' critique

From Alongside: Pluralist Theologian Mark Heim

Addressing the Critics

iii

Part III: Identifying Issues Implicit in the Discussion

Faith and Ideology

Truh and Modemity

Conclusion

The Hermeneutic of Development

A Way Forward

Works Cited

Introduction

Rooted deeply in the democratic heritage of the West, there is a sentiment that al1 should

have an oppomuiity to speak and be heard. in tecent times, however, this desire for fiee speech

and inclusiveness has become sornething approaching an obsession. 'Talk shows' in the

broadcast media continue to proliferate, and no topic is deemed important unless there is a panel.

parliament or focus group assembled to discuss it. In this, theology is certainly no exception.

There are dozens, if not hundreds, of ecumenical and interreligious dialogues which are in

process at present, which creates difficulties for the observer (or participant) who wishes to know

why these conversations are so popular, and what they hope to accomplish. In the area of

interreligious dialogue. this has given rise to a discussion (or meta-discussion) of how

interreligious dialogue might best be conducted. This discussion. which takes place primarily

among Christian theologians. revolves around two major issues: the attitudes of the participants

toward their interreligious dialogue partners, and the style of the dialogue. Dominating the

discussion at present is a position which argues that participants should be phalist in their

ani tudes to ward their interreligious dialogue partners (pluralism), and that al1 interrel igious

dialogues should be centered on issues of social justice (soteriocentrism).

The terni 'pluralism' cornes fkom Alan Race's classification of Christian attitudes toward

other religions into exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism (Race, 1 983). Pluralism points

broadly to the many positions that are taken regarding religion and its place in human affairs,

and acknowledges that this fact has to be taken into account when doing theology. A pluralist

rejects the notion that a theologian can simply dismiss the views of other religions as 'wrong',

while their position is 'right'. Examples of this 'exclusivism' would be the religious right, or

pre-Vatican II conservative Catholicism. Further, the pluralist is suspicious of any quick

1

resolution of the tension between any two positions by vaiidating anothergs religion with

reference to one3 own paradigms. The most obvious example of this 'inclusivism' is Karl

Rahner's 'anonyrnous Christian'. who follows anothrr religion but nevertheless is sficiently

'religious' in orientation to be counted as a Christian even without her knowledge (or consent).'

Pluralism is clearly a work in progress, which rnakes addressing the mode1 complicated but

there are some identifiable elements to their position. Pluralists do not deny the traditionai

claims of Christianity. but feel that they m u t somehow be recast in order to make sense to the

contemporary Christian living in a global environment. Failm to do so wodd M e r relegate

Christians to the fringes of an increasingly pluralistic society. speaking a language understood

only by ourselves. and rob us of our chance to participate in the improvement of our global

situation. This approach to dialogue involves coming to the table without any beliefs that are not

open to change, and excluding no one Grom the dialogue a priori.

Who-ügh there is a broad range of views on the particularities of dialogue within pluralism.

identifjmg a pluralist is not an impossible task for they tend to have several things in common: a

disposition toward dialogue. with pluralists and non pluralists: a disposition towards revision. so

that their positions are constantly k i n g modifieci (to the point where it may be more accurate to

refer to a p l d i s t trajectory rather than a position); and a tendency to create and participate in

forums of ecumenical and inter-religious dialogue, such as the Parliament of the World's

Religions which took place in Chicago in 1993.

' Another example wodd be chapter 15 C.S. Lewis' The Lari Batrle. the concluding book of the Namian Chronicles. A man meets Aslan, the Christ figure, and confesses that he has woahipped another God (Tash) his entire life, and hated the name of Aslan. Aslm m e n : "if any man swear by Tash and keep his oath for the oath's sake, it is by me that he has truly sworn, though he know it not, and it is 1 who reward h i m . .unles thy desire had been for me thou wouldst not have sought so long and so truly. For d l find what they tnily seek" @ 149).

2

The term 'soteriocentrism~ was coined by Paul Knitter to modi@ his 'pluraiist' position in

light of his work in liberation theology. Soteriocentrists are deeply concemed with the plight of

the suffering, and believe that interreligious dialogue should be dedicated to addressing this

problem. Furthemore. they assert that the best way to address the problem is fhrough

interreligious dialogue. Entenng into such dialogues is considered by soteriocentrists to be a

mandatory practice for al1 religiously aware persons, and they often issue ominous wamings that

if we do not enter the dialogue, the consequences will be dire. Hans Küng writes:

The catastrophic economic, social, political and economic developments of both the fïrst and second halves of this century necessitate a world ethic if hurnankind is to survive on this earth (Kling 1 99 1.25).

Leonard Swidler issues an even stronger warning:

The future offea two alternatives: death or dialogue. This statement is not over- drarnatization (Swidler 1 990, vii).

Soteriocentrism and pluraiism merge in the theology of Paul Knitter. He is a key pluralist

figure, and his 1985 book No Other Name? (which argued for a theocentric plurdism) has set the

agenda for most of the discussion that has happened since. He also embodies the qualities

associated with pluralists: he expresses himself clearly and often: he refen to (and is referred to

by) other pluralists constantly; he also addresses bis critics openiy, and revises his position ofien;

he was a delegate at the Parliament, a signatory on one of its major documents. and has

participated in numerous inter-religious dialogue over the decades. Knitter is also the key

soteriocentric figure; not oniy did he coin the terni, but he has written or edited five books on the

topic in the last ten years. His sotenocentric approach to pluralism is also of special interest

because it short circuits the criticisrn that religions have conûibuted greatly to injustice in the

world by making 'justice' the primary criterion by which any religion is to be evaiuated.

To explore Knitter's 'position', 1 will begin by tracing the '~rajectory' of his life and

thought, beginning with his initial training as a Divine Word missionary. From there I will

follow his progress in Rome during Vatican II, and the development of his thought as a doctoral

student in Germany. 1 will then address his pluralist position as it is first outlined in No Other

Name? (1985) and trace its development through to his recent trilogy: One Eurth, Many

Religions ( 1 999, Jesur and the Other Names ( 1 996)' and The Uniqueness of J e s u ( 1 997).

Whether the analysis results in a 'trajectory' or a 'position' will prove to be a crucial question for

this paper, for the tension between the two words is reflected in the tension between views on

interreligious dialogue. Knitter sees hirnself as travelling dong a trajectory (his "diaiogical

odyssey"). and this has a profound effect on how he organizes his theology.

1 will then delve into Knitter's "correlational, globally responsible model for dialogue".

Taking my cue from the label. 1 will analyze Knitter's position on 'dialogue', his proposai for a

'model', and his arguments for why the model for dialogue m u t be both 'correlationai' and

'globally responsible'. This analysis will lead to a question about the foundations of the model.

and 1 will unpack a key term which grounds Knitter's entire theology: cosmological faith.

It is no accident that pluralism is such a prevalent approach to dialogue, for it has much in

common with the modem western democratic notion of what constitutes an authentic dialogue.

In other words, with a pluralist approach, maintaining dialogue is enough of a priority that suc h

an approach nuis the least risk of prematurely foreclosing any given dialogue. Nor is the

prevalence of 'soteriocentrism' a surprise, since Knitter's notion of soteria will prove to be

grounded in 'justice' as dehed by modem critical social theory. This conspicuous relationship

to modemity has not gone unnoticed, and the critics are many and varied. In the second section,

I have selected three major sources of criticism, representing three different directions: inside,

outside and alongside. Knitter is a pluralist theologian who has stmng ties to modemity. Inside

refers to inside the Christian tradition; a more theologically conservative position. Outside refen

to the modem critical philosophy with which Knitter's theoiogy is intertwined. Alongside refen

to other pluralists who stand on the sarne fiontier as Knitter.

From the inside, 1 will draw on the postliberals. They protest that there is no need to

modiQ or restate Christian beliefs in any way based on the demands of modernity; indeed. it is

utterly inappropriate. For this position. I will be examining the views of Stanley Hauerwas, who

questions the necessity of seeking out and organizing interreligious dialogue on the basis of

social justice. From the outside. 1 will be drawing on one of the premier philosophers of

discourse, Jürgen Habermas? whose "discourse ethics", is virtually identical to Knitter's model.

As Habermas has no particular use for religion in his philosophy (explicitly excluding it from his

model of discourse for what turn out to be theological reasons), he is uniquely qualified to

challenge the appropriateness of using his "bdiscourse ethics" as a model for theological

discourse. The position alongside will be represented by Mark Heim, a pluralist theologian

whose primary cornplaint is that Knitter is not plurdist enough for his liking. He examines the

sharp separation of 'justice' and 'religion' which is crucial to the integrity of Knitter's position.

challenging the internai coherence of the Knitter's model.

One of Knitter's most admirable qualities is that he responds to vimially anyone who

addresses anything he has written, and seems genuinely appreciative of even the most lethal

attacks. Given this, 1 will attempt to take points fiom his most recent work as answers to the

three critics 1 have assembled. He is quite creative in finding room to maneuver, and it remains

to be seen whether his model will survive the process. Going through this process, however, will

raise a new question: what are the foundational concepts that undergird soteriocentric pluralism?

1 will demonstrate that there are unavoidable tensions in soteriocentric pluralism that Knitter

cannot avoid by adjusting his model, for the tensions exist in the foundation of his model: his

'cosmological faith'. Two of these tensions will corne under examination: faithlideology. and

tnith/modernity. This will uncover the strongly apologetic nature of Knitter's project, and

explore the consequences of trying to cater to both modem and religious concepts of truth. The

tension in this will prove to be destructive, and l a v e Knitter's soteriocentric pluralism in need of

rehabilitation.

1 will conclude by suggesting possible ways that this might be done. Knitter, like anyone.

has certain filters through which he views the world. His most obvious filter, or hermeneutic. is

one of development. He sees himself, his theology, al1 theology. and literally the history of the

universe in terms of development. This henneneutic blinds him to the inconsistencies of his

soteriocentric piuralism. which is built around one concept that Knitter does no! interpret

developmentally: justice. Drawing on the work in hermeneutics done by Paul Ricoeur, 1 will

suggest a more appropnate hermeneutic with which to engage other religions. enabling a more

honest and miitful interreligious dialogue. Knitter's project points beyond the specific task of

mediating interreligious dialogue, extending to the foundational question of what constitutes

Christian identity in the modem world. Thus the concem is not only to see that Christian identity

is not lost when entering interreligious dialogue, but also to ensure that Christian identity and

modem identity are brought into dialogue.

Part I - Paul Knitter's Soteriocentric Pluralism - Paul Knitter

Kiritter's 44dialogÏcal odyssey"

Knitter begins both No Other Name? and One Earth Many Religions with the observation

that "dl theology is rooted in biography", and proceeds to present an autobiographical sketch,

which he calls his "dialogical odyssey". 1 will begin my presentation the sarne way; introducing

Knitter in a manner that relies largely on how he sees himself, which will help to explain why he

organizes the conversation in the categories he does. Whether his assessrnent of theology is

accurate generally, it is certainly tnie that Knitter's own theology is rooted in biography.

The theme of Kniîîer's autobiographical sketch is his encounters with the 'ûther', and how

these encounters led him fiorn an 'exclusivist' position to his present 'pluralist' position. He

began his theological career as a Divine Word Missionary (Societas Verbi Divini), with a rather

inflexible attitude toward other religions. He was not really interested in dialogue at this point:

he wanted to convert people to Christianity. This monological approach is the starting point in

what he calls his "dialogical odyssey", an approach typical of Catholicism in the United States in

the 1950's (Knitter 1995, 1). The first step away fiom the monological darkness was in his

seminary training, where the concept of 'missionary adaptation'-finding points of contact in

other religions-was king taught. This recognition of value in other religions and cultures was

a real advance, but since it was a pragmatic strategy to more effectively convert them to

Christianity, it was a small one. The Others were still "heathens" who needed to become part of

the Christian Church to achieve salvation. This led to an unsettling challenge to his position. In

the course of studying the backgrounds of those religions (in order to convert them more

effectively), he found much to admire in their art, their culture, and even their religious practices.

This softened the exclusivist, ecclesiocentric ground in which he was rooted.

In October of 1962, Knitter moved to Rome to continue his theological studies at the

Pontifical Gregorian University. With Vatican 11 in session. this was an exciting time to be a

student in Rome. Knitter was exposed to documents regarding the "Declaration on the

Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions", which stnick him as a 'hinllng point" in

Roman Catholicism. He also heard Karl Rahner who was a guest professor in Rome at the time.

Rahner's approach to other religions had a profound effect on bitter's thought:

Rahner's theologically honed case that Christians not only can but must look upon other religions as "legitimate" and as " ways of salvation" was a breath of fiesh, liberating air for me. It enabled me both to make sense of what I had been seeing in the religious world beyond Christianity and to shake fiee of what 1 felt was the ungrounded hubns of Christian claims to be the only authentic religion (ibid., 1995,5).

Knitter moved to Münster to do his thesis under Rahner, but eventually transferred to Marburg to

write his dissertation ("Toward a Protestant Theology of Religions") under Car1 Heinz

Ratschow; the first Roman Catholic to do so. In his youthful zeal, he applauded the Protestant

recognition of 'revelation' in other faiths, but cnticized their inability to extend that recognition

to 'salvation'. Knitter had moved fiom his original ecclesiocentric position to Rahner's

christocenirc one, and was openly critical of anyone (including his own advisor) who did not

take the sarne step.

While in Germany, m e r met Rahim, who was a fellow student and devout Muslirn.

Rahirn's devotion to Islam, his ethicd purity, and contentment with his own faith presented a

troubling problem to bitter's theology. It seemed that Knitter was as rnuch an 'anonymous

Muslim' as Rahim was an 'anonymous Chri~tian'.~ The "finality' of the Christ event was called

into question by the inappropriateness of interpreting Rahim7s faith through the paradigm of the

anonymous Christian. Knitter was ready for another step, but this time, there was no one in

particular to follow. Ham Küng had criticized Rahner's position in On Being a Christion but

Knitter felt that Kiing's retention of the "findity" of the Christ event prevented him from moving

beyond the central problem of anonymous Christianity.

The results of this step can be found in No Other Nome? ( 1 985), in which Knitter argues for

a move to a theocenrric approach to both chnstology and interreligious dialogue. This seminal

work has become the centerpiece of pluralist discussion. and sets the agenda for al1 Knitter's

following contributions. While he has since modified his position substantially in light of strong

criticism (which I will examine momentarily), it is important to note that b i t t e r still operates

within the same general parameters:

And though 1 want to clarify and correct particular arguments in No Other Name? (and will do so in the following pages), 1 have continued to move in the direction it set for me (1995,8).

In 1987 Knitter and fellow pluralist John Hick organized a conference on p l d i s m , the

results of which were published under the title The Myth of Christian Uniqueness (1987).

Through this entire process there was a new current added to Knitter7s approach to dialogue:

liberation theology. Having done some previous study, the issue had been brought to life for hm

when he met two Salvadoran refugees in 1983. Knitter became increasingly involved in justice

The 'anonymous Christian' is Rahner's most recognized (and controvenial) term. It stands as a way of accounting for the possible salvation of those who have never heard the gospel: 'There is and has to be an anonymous yet real relationship between the individual person and the concrete history of salvation, including Jesus Christ, in someone who has not yet had the whole. concrete. historical, explicit and reflexive expenence in word and sacrament of this reality of salvation history" (Rahner 1978,306) . This is sometimes taken to be a stronger statement than it is (Kiing 1977,97-8); it is a tentative proposal which attempts to satisfy the demands presented by his theological anthropology (humans are created by God and destined to union with God).

9

issues in El Salvador and Nicaragua, to the point where his contribution to n e Myth of Christian

Uniqueness was on the subject of liberation theology's contribution to the discussion on

pluralism. It is here that he makes his fourth step:

If Christian attitudes have evolved from ecclesiocentrism to christocentrism to theocentnsm, they must now move on to what in Christian symbols might be called 'kingdom-centrism' or more universally 'soteriocentrism' (Knitter 1987, 187).

Added to the voice of the 'religious mer' was the 'suffiering Other'. sometimes embodied in a

single peson. As b i t t e r moved more fully out of his original monological model, he became

more acutely aware of the necessity of giving everyone a chance to speak, which entailed the

emancipation of those whose voices were deliberately silenced. This position was reinforced

during his tirne in India in 1991, where he was continuously and dramatically confionted with

'religious' and 'suffering' Others.

The most men t step was to M e r nuance the notion of 'soteriocentrism' (a concentration

on human well-king) to include the Earth herself (eco-human well-being). This springs

partially fiom his participation in the 1993 "The Land and the Hurnan Presence" conference.

where he dialogued with many Native Amencans, and was sensitized to their views on the

sufferings of the Earth. This was f i d e r reinforced that same year, when Küng's "Declaration

Toward a Global Ethic", which quite explicitly deals with eco-hurnan justice, received formal

endosement at the Parliament of the World's Religions held in Chicago. Based on these events.

Knitter decided to update and revise his position from No Other Name? by publishing a trilogy

of books both to address the criticisms of his position, and to expound and defend his new mode1

- -

'This somewhat simplified notion that Knitter has of 'ûther' will be a point that 1 will take up in section 3. The Indian Hindus are examples of the 'religious Other', which implies that 1, as a Western Christian, am somehow not 'Other'. The oppressed and threatened people of Bosnia are examples of the 'suffering m e r ' , the implications of which are even more unclear. Does Knitter consider me to be 'non-suffering'? At what point does a person become an 'Other', and what are the criteria? bitter 's use of this term paints over crucial issues surroundhg identity.

10

of a 'bcorrelational. globdly responsible model for dialog~e'~ (1995, 15). Before 1 move on to a

proper analysis of this model. let us pause a moment and review how Knitter's biographical

experiences have given rise to his conceptualization of interreligious dialogue, for the two are

intimately intercomected.

There are two related but separate conceptual perspectives from which Knitter operates: the

'centering' of interreligious dialogue, and the 'othemess7 of religions. 'Centering' refen to

identiwng concepts or terms which wil1 function normatively in the dialogue. Knitter's

classification has four stages, which range h m a Mly monological to a hlly dialogical

approach. Ecclesiocentrism, where the center is completely inside the church, is hl 1 y

monological when it cornes to interreligious dialogue. Since religious truth and salvation cm

only be found in the Christian Church, there can be no dialogue outside of one's own faith

community, only proclamation and strategic pseudo-dialogue (which Knitten claims is actually

monologue), that attempts to convert. This is what had been taught to the young Knitter when he

joined the Divine Word Missionaries. The second stage is christocen~ism, where there is a

recognition that the universai salvific will of God is operative outside the church as well. though

ultirnately mediated through Christ. There are a variety of positions on how this might work, but

the finality of the Christ event (norma normanr non normata) is the essential element of this

position. Knitter, in light of his time in Rome under Rahner, wrote his dissertation in Marburg

fiom a christocentric position. The third stage is theocenfrism, which uses 'God', rather than

Jesus or the Church, as the n o m for the dialogue. As Knitter points out:

Just as, within Christian ecumenism, Christians adrnitted that their narrow understanding of church was an obstacle to dialogue, so within ecumenical ecumenism they are beginning to realize that their narrow understanding of Christ is a similar obstacle (1985, 166).

11

Knitter moved into this position in trying to account for his fiiend Rahirn in his theology,

and subsequently in No Other Name?. In the aftermath of this publication, however. Knitter

quickiy realized some of the inadequacies of this position and was already on his way to the

fourth stage. Soteriocentrism. acknowledging that the word 'God' is unable to properly center a

dialogue without emptying 'God' of its content, adopts instead an ethical center. While the

religions rnay differ on what is meant by and constitutes human well-being, this heuristic is

tangible enough to be useful in grounding the dialogue, and the details cm, indeed must, be

worked out in the dialogue. This is the Knitter of today who, in light of his experiences in Latin

America and S n Lanka is proposing his correlational and globally responsible model of

dialogue.

The second, more commonly accepted model concems the attitudes towards the 'othemess'

of other religions, and there are three categories: exclusivism. inclusivism and pluraiism.' Since

1 mentioned these in defming ' pluralism' in the introduction, 1 will merel y point to how they

Aligning the Models

Monological D ialogkal

* For a brief statement in Knitter's own words, see Kaitter 1997% 3 n.2 ' See Knitter 1995,26.

12

Exclusivist inclusivist Pluralist

Ecclesiocentric Theocentric Christocentric Soteriocentric

Evangelical

Roman

Mainline

Karl Rahner

Catholic

Protestant

No Other Name?

John Hick

Unitarian

One Earth. hdmy Religions

correspond with the stages of the 'centering' model. Exclusivists, who advocate only one tme

swing religion, correspond closely to ecclesiocentrists, although some could be considered

christocentric. Inciusivists, who argue that while there are many true religions, the Christian

church is the final, Nfilling nom, are generally christocentric. Pluralists are generally either

theocentric or soteriocenttic, and often a combination of both."

As with any model, these levels of 'opemess' are somewhat artificial, and any attempt to

apply them rigidly will only result in confusion. Car1 Braaten notes that while Karl Rahner and

Karl Barth are examples of Catholic and Protestant styles of inclusivism, respectively, there is no

easy way to put them in the same category (Braaten 1987). Given the chart above, Barth would

be lurnped in with the conservative evangelicals, though they would differ profoundly. But if we

do not demand too much of such classifications, they can help to focus the issues at hand. At

any rate, Knitter classifies himself firmiy in the soteriocentric and pluralist side of the spectrum.

No Other Name?

As I noted, this book signals Knitter's move from christocentrism to theocentrism. and the

most controversial aspect of such a move is its chrktology, which is necessady non-

christocentric. He leads up to it slowly and carefully beginning with a thorough survey of the

attitudes toward religious pluralism. Part I concerns itself with secular approaches. ranging fiom

Troeltsch to Jung. Part II surveys Christian attitudes, and serves to generate the examples for the

'opemess' model (i-e. Evangelical as exclusivist). In this analysis he points to the move fiom

ecclesiocentrism to christocentnsm (dso exciusivism to inclusivism), and explores the

ramifications of such a move. From this, he proposes that this is not a simple, one-time shifi in

Christian consciousness, but rather a trajectory that is pointing dong an increashgly dialogical

However, Heim and others argue that soteriocentrists are in fact quite inclusivist, and that a true 13

path. Thus, his theocentric proposal is not presented as a revolutionary new direction but rather

the next logical step in our growing awareness of our position as Christians with respect to the

religions of the world. The christocentric view. whkh is suitable for centering ecumenical

dialogue, does not have the breadth to center interreligious dialogue.

But as this wider ecurnenism %?th other religions intensifies. a new evolutionary awareness is emerging . . . Traditional christology . with its insistence on finality and normativity, just does not fit what is king experienced in the arena of religious pludism. We are in the midst of an evolution from christocentrism to theocentrism (Knitter 1985, 166).

The final two sentences are based on Knitter's appreciation for the work done by Raimundo

Pannikar. John Hick, John Pawlikowski. Rosemary Ruether and Tom Driver.' He sees them as

pioneers in theoiogy, whose theocentric approach will eventually become the mainstrearn.

In Part III, Knitter tums to face the chrïstological problem head-on. Theocentric christology

reverses the te- of traditional christolog~. Rather than Jesesus king the unique means by which

we corne to know God. and thus the linchpin of theology. God becomes the means by which we

interpret Jesus. This raises difficult questions: Why did the New Testament writen refer to him

as the on& Son of God? Why did they claim that he was resurrected? Knitter addresses these

questions openly and honestly. marshallhg the arguments of Pannika.. Hick A.D. Nock and

Rahner to present a coherent christology to constmct a plausible interpretation of the New

Testament accounts of Jesus without requiring a literai interpretation. This is not to degrade the

value of the gospel wimesses. Knitter argues that they were confessing their love for Jesus. who

they accepted as their Lord, not making metaphysical claims regarding his statu with relation to

God. The propositional language of the Greeks, which lent itself so easily to highly conceptual.

p l d i s m has yet to be worked out. 'See Chapter 8 for Knitter's surnmary of theK contributions to theocentrism. In his treatment of Ruether and especially Driver, we can see that Knitter is already working in a soteriocentric model.

14

exclusive tnith claims. is but one way h which they could have professed their love. and we

need not be beholden to it. This means that apparently exclusive claims need not be taken su

literally, but rather can be seen as "love language".

No m e r Nome? elicited passionate responses fiom many directions. which moved the

J o u m ~ I of Ecumenical Studies to hold a public debate.' Mark Heim wmte an article entitled

"niinking about Theocentric Christologyn. which challengeci Knitter's argument: five others

responded to Heim's article. and Knitter was given a chance to respond to them dl. This is an

extraordinarily informative debate. which allows anyone unfamiliar with the problems

encomterhg pluralia theology to become acquainted with them in a few pages of reading.

Heim questions the theocenrric mode1 in ternis of its appropriateness. its plausibility and its

content. Regarding appropriafeness. Heim points to JSnitter's linear approach to the trajectory

h m ecclesiocentrisrn through christocentrimi to theocentrimi. and how the first move is used to

justiS the second. Heim objects that while the fkt move may well have been appropriate. this

by no means implies that the second one is a s well. The first move was a retrieval of a basic truth

which could facilitate the unimg of the body of Christ. The move to theocentrism does no<

have the same agenda: its agenda is global Furthemore. how effective is theocentrism

in its ecurnenical task when there are other religions (e.g Buddhism) who have no analogy for

theos? Regarding plausibilify. Heim points to the fact that the early church itself had a plurali'y

of cultures in which they operateci: the majonty of our records of the t h e chronicle the clashes

of varying cultural interpretations of Christianity (Heim 1987. 11). It is disingenuous to argue

that they naively expressed themselves with exclusive propositional statements because that was

' see Jolanrrl ofEcumenicuI Studies 24-1 Winter 1987. pp. 1-52.

the only way they knew. Regarding coherence, conflicting approaches to community can be

mediated with reference to Jesus, but this is because Jesus has a substantial identity. both through

his teachings and the accounts of his life. It is unclear how this translates when applied to

theocentrim. While a dispute about church may be settled with reference to Christ (that is to say

his teachings, or his style of interaction), what precisely is one refemng to when one refen to

'Godo to resolve disputes about savior figures? What is the content of the word *Godo in a

theocentnc christ~logy?'~ These same questions occurred to Gavin D'Costa who noted:

Knitter, in his urgency to remove normative Christocentrism fiom the dialogue situation (thereby replacing it with an equally problem-laden normative theocentrism, especially in dialogue with non-theists) has necessarily to import a new cnterion for religious mith. It is not the revelation of God in Christ. but a seemingiy more acceptable (to whom?) Jungian notion of religious tmth! (D'Costa, 1985).

This attack on the content of theos was indeed to the point, but Knitter had already heard it, and

responded to it. John Cobb, who had k e n working with Knitter in the time foilowing the

publication of No Other Name?. responded to Heim's article by noting that "Heim's critique

misses his moving target" (Cobb. 1987,22). Knitter had already moved to a new position on the

issue, and the signs are al1 there in No Other Nome. As Elouise Renich Fraser points out in her

response to Heim:

The question is whether Knitter is talking about theocenhic Chnstology or some other kind of Christology ... The question regarding God is clearly not absent fiom Knitter's

These differing raise another question: Is "ecumenical ecumenism" an appropnate synonym for 'interreligious dialogue', or is it attempting to import credibility fiom a process (ecumenism) with which it has little in common? 'O bitter's Chrktology is highly nuanced and &en very confusing. A full investigation of this issue is impossible in this context, and much of the response to Knitter's position has been on this issue (Swidler and Mojzes, 1997). This is not as crucial an issue as it might seem, since Knitter's prionties are quite clear. He has a soteriocentric view of God, a (soteno)theocentric view of Christ, and a (soterio-theo)christocentnc view of church. The fim notion grounds dl the others, and it is that upon which 1 am concentrating. So to be extremely bneE the words 'tnie7, 'universal', 'decisive', and 'indispensable' are appropriate words to use in describing Jesus, while 'only', 'full', 'definitive', and 'unsurpassable' are not. This is al1 interpreted through the lem of soteriocentrisrn.

16

approach, but it is clearly not that point of reference for Christology which bitter 's ownership of the term 'theocenbic Chnstology' leads one to expect. If God is to be named in Knitter's approach, it would have to be on the assurnption that religious cornmitment to God lies behind cornmitment to love and justice (Fraser. 1987.33).

Ln his response, Knitter acknowledges that this is a particularly incisive observation. and that

what was clearly driving his thought (but was not clearly articulated) was a soteriocen».ic model

for interreligious encounter. Uncornfortable with one-word labels such as 'pluralist' or

'soteriocentric', Knitter worked on a more complete articulation of his position, culminating in

his "correlational and global1 y responsi ble model for dialogue".

A Corrdational and Globally Responsible Model for Dialogue

Knitter's passion for interreligious dialogue is m g l y evident when he is discussing his

correlational and globally responsible model of dialogue. In his preliminary discussion of the

model, he revisits the exclusivist/inclusivist/pIdist model to set up why he sees the project as

important. He has both 'negativeg and 'positive' reasons for his pluralism. and regarding the

negative he does not mince words:

Simply stated, as a pluralist 1 believe that given our present encounten with the religious and suffering Others of this wodd, as welf as our understanding of the original witness and history of the Christian cornmunities, neither the exclusivists not the inclusivists are k i n g faithful to what God is revealing in Jesus Christ and the world amund us (1 995.29).

This is an example of the refkeshing candor that Knitter brings to the discussion. Even though he

is clearly aware that this will have an alienating effect on a significant segment of his audience.

he is honest and forthright enough to say what he actually believes. His willingness to do so in

No Other Name? elicited the criticism that allowed him to M e r develop his views and nuance

his position. Had he made opaque references to obscure concepts, dways careful to cover al1

flanks, the conversation would still be addressing his theocentric model, and still be wondering

what it meant,

It is still quite a strong statement, which can be better understood in light of the 'positive'

rasons for his p ld i sm. Knitter values dialogue immensely, not only for its potentid for

human enrichment, but also for its practical uses in ensuring human survival. It is this kind of

dialogue, one which enriches the participants and promotes cooperation in alleviating suffering,

wbch KNtter believes is "'one of the highest goods" for Christians. Given this, it is

understanciable that he also believes that exclusivists and inclusivists, insofar as they are not

committed to correlationai, globally responsible dialogue, are somehow shirking their duties as

cornrnitted Christians. We will see, however, that of the two modes of revelation that Knitter

cites (Jesus, the world), it is the latter that grounds his theology. With this in mimi, let us tum to

a more systematic analysis of his model.

There are four major concepts that appear in the label (correlational, glo bal1 y responsible.

model, and dialogue) and each needs to be unpacked. Knitter himself does not present his model

in an overly systematic way. partly because the terms are interpenetrating, so 1 will deal with

each term in a sequence that moves fiom the general to the specific. First, 1 will deal with the

concept of dialogue. and why Knitter sees it as occupying such a crucial place in Christian

theology and practice. Next, 1 will hini to how he sets up the parameten for his model. and why

he believes that a specific model is necessary for dialogue. Ln light of this, I will delve into the

model itself, and explore why Kniîter believes the model must be a) correlational, and b)

globally responsible, and what these tenns mean in the context of a model for dialogue. As will

become increasingly clear, the c o d t m e n t to correlational theology and global responsibility in

turn infonns why dialogue (and this model in partïcular) is so important, but the reverse is true as

well. Finally, 1 will examine bitter's "cosmological faith", which proves to be the foundation

for the entire project.

Dialogue

Religions are many

Plurality, argues Knitter, was not always an experienced reality. Until recently, the idea that

there were Muslirns and Hindus 'out there'. and that they engaged in different practices and

believed different things, was something that took place on a purely theoretical level. The

people involved in such theorizing about other religions rarely had any contact with those

religions. The idea that there were other established religions with long histories was

intellectually troubling, but if one chose not to engage the issue, it could quite easily be avoided.

Such a picture bears litde resemblance to the situation today. A *world' which was

populated only by Christians (i.e. the vast majority of a person's encounters are with Christians)

could be effectively addressed by a theology of religions that accounted only for Christianity.

Situating Christianity today is quite a different project when colleagues, acquaintances, fiends

and even family are members of other religions. This tangible, daily experience of the other.

says Knirter, requires a suitable modification in Christian theology:

Up until now, for the most part, religious communities have understood themselves from within the circle of their own experience and tradition; as this century slips into the next, they are king challenged to expand their ways of knowing who they are by allowing their circles to touch and overlap with othen. That is how 1 have understood my own Christian religious identity and story; I have corne to know more clearly and meaningfully who 1 am by talking and acting with other religious penons. Both the nature of our intercommunicative world and of the crises this world faces offer and require such a dialogical, correlational manner of religious self-understanding (Knitter, 1995,22).

This is another instance of Knitter's biography shaping his theology. His expenences with other

religious persons are understood as the defining moments in the shaping of his identity as a

Christian, and he universalizes this into a claim about the nature of Christian identity itself. Not

only do we interact daily with the 'religious Other', we fmd that they seem to get dong quite

nicely, and often have insights into issues that occupy our minds. The option that we are simply

19

right and they need what we have is removed in the face of regular contact. The religiously

aware person who has no ties to Christianity, and has no dissatisfaction with their own religious

situation (Le. Knitter's friend Rahim), exists as a challenge to Chnstians to expand their view of

religious huth in dialogue.

Religions are true

The challenge cornes, says Knitter, at least partly because there are insights available in

other religions that are simply unavailable to Chnstianity as long as it does not t u . outwards.

This is because the other religions not only 'contain' truth, something which is accepted by the

inclusivists, but the other religions are true. This, of course, goes against the grain of traditional

religious language, which uses 'true' in a very exclusivist way. tying it to the law of identity, and

the corresponding law of non-contradiction." This is an especially dificult mindset to

overcome:

If this has k e n the Westem understanding of tmth in general. it was especially so for religious tnith. A religion is true because it either excludes or includes al1 others (Knitter, l98S,2 17).12

" This is evident in what is known as the Tarski test for truth: the statement '-the snow is white" is true if and only if it is the case that the snow is white. The law of identity 'simply' declares 'A is A'; a thing is what it is. The law of non-contradiction disallows 'A and -A7; something carmot be both (for exarnple) 'a chair7 and 'not a chair' at the same time. This 'correspondence' view of truth will be investigated in the third section, when we take up Ricoeur's cornparison of mith as 'manifestation' with tmth as 'adequation' . '' This is quite misleading. Concem with contradiction has been sornething which has largely k e n irnposed on Christianity fiom the outside, and thus less true in Christianity than in Western culture in general (whenever the two codd be distinguished). Christian ties to the more narrative approach of the Jews, which exists in constant tension with the propositional approach of the Greeks, resdted in an initial incredulity toward the Christian message by the Greeks. Thus, the rigorous application of rules of identity and contradiction mattered much more to Robert Boyle or Bertrand Russell (see Shapin 1994) than they did to Augustine (Cunfessiom xxiii) or Aquinas (scholastic dicturn "seldom to afErm, never to deny, fiequently to distinguish"). The importance of this is that it undermines much of the rhetoric which accompanies plurdism, heralding an expanding of Christian consciousness and a more complete experience of the divine, by demonstrating that what is needed is not an imention or an evolution, but a retrievai.

20

Knitter believes that such an accounting of 'truth' is no longer viable. In its place he draws

on postmodem criticisrns of modemity to propose a relational version of truth, which, "by its

very nature. needs other truth" (2 19). This kind of truth can only corne about and be 'proven' in

relationship to other truth. which is what happens in dialogue.

Religions me incomplete

The consequence of this need for relationship is that the "Christian tradition. like any

religious tradition. is incomplete if it refuses to converse with other traditions" (Knitter 1996.

157). Our own self-understanding lacks the perspective required in the emerging global

community. In fact, an isolationist understanding of ourselves is not only dificult to maintain. it

is a breach of our integrity to do so, since the dismissal of the idea that these people who we

encounter might have something to offer us is entailed in our isolation. Theologians must give

some account of our differences:

If 1 recognize that you are really different from me, and if 1 also recognize that what is different can also be true and valuable, 1 cannot ignore you . A i s mode1 insists on the radical and inextricable differences and particularity of religions, it also recognizes the relatedness-to-others stemming from the incompleteness-in-themselves of al1 religions (ibid., 33-4).

This is not merely a descriptive statement; there is a forcehl assertion being made. Chnstianity,

in this reading, not only does not, but camot account completely for the richness and complexity

of our experience. The Weltanschauung whose parameters are defined by the Bible and the

Christian tradition is simply not adequate to the task. A question inevitably arises, however: if

my 'mth' needs to be related to your 'truth', in what way are we "really different", and how

b'radicai" are our "differen~es"?'~

'' This is an important issue, for it situates 'truth' in Knitter's hierarchy of values. If religious tmth can be radically different, yet the religions still be "incomplete" and ' k la ted , there must be some unifying standard which supersedes religious truth in importance, which also sets the criteria for 'completeness'.

21

Religions me different

The danger in allowing many religions to be tme is that it opens one to accusations of

syncretism. Knitter is sensitive to this problem. and makes every effort to avoid the "Jbcile

universalism" which he sees in the Treoltsck Toynbee, Jung. Swidler and the early Hick

(bitter, 1995. 184111 O)." To help avoid this pitfall, he t u m s to David Tracy's terse assessrnent

of the issue:

There are family resemblances arnong the religions. But as far as I can see, there is no single essence. no one content of enlightenment or revelation. no one way of emancipation or liberation to be found in al1 that plurality . . .their various narratives doctrines, symbols, and their often conflicting accounts of the way to authentic liberation are at les t as different as they are similar. They are clearly not the same (Tracy 1987% 90,92: in Knitter 1995, 125).

Knitter is eager to affirm the differences, but ultimately cannot afirm incornmensurability. The

incompleteness of our tradition, dong with the tnith of other traditions, impels us to dialogue.

The plurality and difference of the religions, however, presents a challenge. Knitter feels that

there must be some commonality arnong the religions, even if we cannot point to what it is. It is

an ethical, rather than a logical move. He turns to Gregory Baum to help hirn express why he

feels this must be so :

To negate the existence of human nature [as a basis for cross-cultural conversation], to deny that people in different religions and different cultures hold sorne values in common, to reject dialogue across the boundaries on principle and to regard as illusory al1 utopias of emancipation-leaves no hope for humanity (Baum 1994, 10; in Knitter 1996, 158)."

This is not to say that people of different religions do hold values in common. However, the

dialogue must proceed on the hope that such a human nature is something we will find that we

'' He also cites himself in No Other Name? as not paying sufficient attention to the issue. ''In part III, 1 wili corne back to address the implications of Baum's assertions; namely that to deny 'human nature' necessarily entails rejecting dialogue across boundaries, which in turn necessarily entails the abandonhg of any hope for humanity.

have in common, admitting that we have no basis for claiming that such a thing exists.I6 He

bomws Langdon Gilkey's notion of "rough parity". which afirrns something akin to 'farnily

resemblanceso while denying 'common essence'. to allow for diversity while not foreclosing

dialogue altogether.

Model

One of bitter's most controveeial moves is that he proposes a model for interreligious

dialogue, not just a set of principles or an ethereal vision. He recognizes that there are many

foms in which dialogue cm take place: cornparison of texts. doctrines. themes of founder: the

exchange of stories. or participation in each other's practice (prayer. liturgy, etc.). Amidst these

possibilities, Knitter feels that there is the very real danger that there will be a degeneration into

'inauthentic dialogue' (dialogue which is not globally responsible). While he appreciates the

value of each of the above forms, he is unwilling to endorse a haphazard approach:

Such an undefined open-ended catch-as-catch-can pluralism of types of dialogue is not what 1 am recommending in this book. Although 1 resolutely affirm the value of al1 three types of dialogue ... 1 would d l 1 want to achieve a clearer and more demanding comectedness between the various forms of dialogue. And yes. I do want to sel prioriries among the way religious persons can corne together (1 995. 153).

He goes on to note that h i s concem is not with the inherent value of each type of dialogue. but

rather with the practicality of each given our global situation today. Working with other

religions at a leisurely Pace and occasionally finding interesthg points for our reflection is not

sufficientiy attentive to the problems that we face. Knitter proposes a specific mode1 for how

religious persons can corne together because he has a specific purpose: promoting eco-hurnan

well-being. This specific agenda stands in tension with his pluralist notions of truth as

fundamentally relational (with what does this 'tmth' relate?) will be taken up M e r when we

''In an extensive ffootnote, Knitter engages Schubert Ogden's skepticism regarding our ability to even assess the truth value of other religions by arguing that Christians have good reasons to

23

investigate the foundations of the model. To better understand the model, however. we must

unpack its two prirnary characteristics: it is correlational and globally responsible.

Correlational

For Knitter, the word 'correlational' does not modify the word 'dialogue' so much as it

emphasizes its tnie definition. 'Correlational' serves to anchor dialogue, preventing it fiom

drifthg toward the monological tendencies of inclusivism and exclusivism. He defines a

correlational dialogue as "a dialogue in which al1 sides are able to hear and be challenged by the

others and at the same time to speak and challenge in return". This position necessarily negates

certain historical Christian practices, such as using "absolutist" language to describe the truth

found in the Bible. With regard to questions regarding the presence of revelation and salvation

in other religions, Knitter States:

1 am suggesting that answers to such questions, like dl answers, are not simply "given" in the Christian scriptures and tradition; they must be worked out through the praxis of dialogue between Christian tradition and that of other religions. To fashion a theology of religions outside the praxis of dialogue would be as inappropriate as it would be for a tailor to make a suit without taking the customer's measurements (Knitter, 1985.206).

This is a curious analogy. The inappropriateness of the tailor's work lies in his ignonng who the

suit is k ing made for. This implies that a Christian theology of religions is k ing fashioned for.

and thus must be acceptable to, non-Christians. I do not see why this must be so. To daim that a

theology of religions must be acceptable to al1 religions assumes, rather than argues, that such a

theology is bo t . possible and desirable. In fact, in the fmt sentence ("like al1 answers"), Knitter

seems to be saying that there are no questions that Christian c m answer without first engaging in

dialogue with other religions. This raises questions as to Christianity's cornpetence to govem

itself, what constitutes appropriate theology, and in what that theology is to be grounded.

assert that there are in fact other tnie religions (see Knitter 1 995, 1 84-5). 24

Knitter's model of dialogue is explicitly grounded in the correlational theology of Tracy.

and a brief exposition of how this functions will shed some light on the assumptions of the

model.I7 Tracy presents a picture of the theologian as mediator. As a Christian. any theologian

has a cornmitment to the sacred texts and practices of Christianity. As a modem academic. the

theologian also has a cornmitment to rational scientific inquiry. The task of the theologian is to

correlate the two; to bring Christian doctrine and "common human experience"" into harmony,

or, better, to restore the haxmony that inherently exists between the two. However. Tracy also

believes that theology should be public. and this requires that theology submit itself to rational

scnniny, and when forced to choose between the two, it is tradition which cornes out on the short

end:

In principle, the fundamental loyalty of the theologian qua theologian is to that morality of scientific knowledge which he shares with his colleagues. the philosophers. historians, and social scientists. No more than they. c m he allow his own-or his tradition's-beliefs to serve as warrants for his arguments (Tracy 1976, 7).

A theology which stubbomly refuses to engage in correlating its positions to competing positions

in the context of scientific modemity runs the nsk of king ignored. It would no longer have a

voice in the public arena; lacking the means to express itself, it would quickly becorne an archaic

club whose language is known only to its mernbers. Essential to the project is an optimism

regarding the possibility of such a correlation; the belief that Cbristianity is rationally defensible.

and has littie to fear from submitting itself to such scrutiny. The ground for this optimism is that

the secularist has a faith in 'the ultimate significance and final worth of our lives". and this faith

is hdamentally like the theologian's faith. The secularist, however. lacks the '-existentially

---

I7Tracy is the single most quoted person in One Emth Many Religions, often in extemio to help clai& components of KNtter's model. l8 This problematic terni of Tracy's has no precise definition, but its general rneaning can be gleaned fkom Tracy's claim that cornmon human experience can be anaiyzed according to .'a phenomenology of the religious dimension" present everywhere in human life (Tracy 1975.52).

25

appropriate symbolic representation" by which to express his faith, and it is the Christian

tradition (and only the Christian tradition) which can provide this (ibid.. 8-9).

Kniner envisions the task of theology to be the correlation of "contemporary human

experience" and the "Christian iradition " (Knitter 1996.27)' and he cites Tracy as a reference.I9

He does not make precisely the sarne demands for argumentation as Tracy (that they must be

rationally redeemable), but it is no accident that his criteria for the 'validityg of Christian truth

claims (that they lead to eco-human well-king) involve the recognition of those clairns as true

by non-Christians. Indeed. with Francis Schussler Fiorenza. he would have littfe trouble

p r o c l d n g that his theology "takes contemporary pluralism so seriously that it surrenders the

idea that theology represents a privileged cultural and linguistic form of life" (Fiorema. 1992.5).

Since Knitter is more explicitly concemed with inter-religious dialogue. he would emphasize that

'theology' means 'Christian theology'. but the idea that Christianity cannot be self-contained is

one that Knitter expresses in much stronger terms dian Tracy.=* Indeed he implies that it needs

outside supervision:

We cannot preserve ourselves from this barbarous or self-indulgent abuse of our own tnith. Just as we need others to tell us when o u breath is bad, so we need others to tell us when o u - religious truth has become ideological abuse (Knitter 1996,32).

The arena for this ideological breath check might be cailed a 'religious public realm'. where each

religion cornes to discuss any claim that is soteriologz'cafly redeernable. This is a curious shik

wtiich ostensibly takes the focus away fiom modem rationality, instead grounding it in suferia.

l9 it is interesthg to note that Knitter opts for 'contemporary' instead of 'common', which his reference to Tracy would seem to require. It may be that he is trying to avoid the criticism that has been leveled at Tracy regarding how 'common' human experience is. If so, he does not try very hard, and retums to the use of 'common' on the same page. 'O Tracy is a chnstocentric inclusivist in Knitter's classification. Tracy believes that theology can play Habermas' game and win, providing Christian symbols by which everyone can express their 'faith'. Knitter expresses no such optimism regarding the fortinide of Christianity, but rather stress its inability to stand without outside help.

26

However, since Knitter's notion of soteria is one that is generated by modem social theory. the

shift is largely ill~sory.~' It is also worth noting that since Knitter argues so strongly that

dialogue is imperative. the notion of 'public' resembles Tracy's much more than it would

otherwise. The 'religious public realm' exists whether we in our Christian 'lifeworld' want it to

Globally Responsible

Insofar as Knitter is a plurolist. concemed with the 'religious Other'. he expresses it in the

'correlational' part of his model. lnsofar as Knitter is soterioceniric. concemed with the

'suffeting Other', this is where it is manifested. The reason he is proposing a model in the fint

place is because he is intent on avoiding a casual approach to pluralistic discourse. which he sees

as fundarnentally irresponsible. He once again tums to Tracy to make the point:

whenever any affirmation of pluralism, including my own. past and present. becomes simply a passive response to more and more possibilities, none of which shail ever be practiced then plurdism demands suspicion ... Such a pluralism masks a general confusion in which one tries to enjoy the pleasures of difference without ever committing to any particular vision of resistance and hope (Tracy 1987. 90: in bitter 1995,55).

1 noted earlier that Knitter proposed a specific model which favored a certain style of

dialogue Ui light of our global situation. He is quite forcefûl on this point, and spends an

immense amount of time describing and interpreting the present state of the world in tems of

human suffering and environmentai degradation. The soteria in soteriological cornes to be

defined as "eco-human well-being" (ibid.. 124), which roughly corresponds to Hans Küng's

notion of humanum." Küng formulated this definition as part of his proposal for a "Declaration

toward a Global Ethic," which was presented at the Parliament of the World's Religions in 1993,

''In Heim's critique, we will look at the extent to which Knittefs correlation is necessarily tied to moderaity despite his intentions.

and endorsed by 15 1 delegates (includhg Knitter himself) representing 15 religion^.^ He also

alludes to Panikkar in defining sotena as ''the well-king of humans and planet that results from

feeling and living in the immanent transcendent Mystery" (Knitter 1995,99).

Knitter. having made his case for soteriocentrisrn, clairns that other. non-soteriocentric.

styles of dialogue are somehow deficient by asserting that if they "do not in some way. at some

time, make connections with the plight of the suffering ... then there is sornething senously

lacking in these foms of dialogue." He goes on to question. ''whether interreligious sharing that

refuses to concem itself in any way with the reality of eco-hurnan needs c m be authentic

dialogue" (ibid., 153). The strength of his claims is a reflection of the urgency he feels. not only

from the k a t to the fùture of humanity (see Kiing and Swidler in the introduction), but also the

palpable challenge that is exerted on us when we choose to open ourselves to the suffenng

Others of our world.

Foundations of the Model: Cosmological Faith

The most serious question for Kniaer's mode1 addresses its foundations: what is the basis

for his criterion for eco-hurnan well-being? The answer as presented in One Erirrh, lkiany

Religions is somewhat confusing. He presents a "cornrnon cosmological story" which also

provides a common religious story, in that "it tells us who we are and how we might f u d the

Tmth that religions seek; it provides us, in other words, with a cosmological myth in which we

can understand our religious myths" (Knitter 1995, 1 19). Over a span of five pages, he paints a

provocative picture of what this cosmological myth has to offer. Using terms such as "meta-

Küng defines humanum as %at which is trdy human and specifically [based] on human dignity and the basic values which are subordinate to it" (Kiing, 1 99 1,90).

If shodd dso be noted that Küng asserted: "It doesn't make any difference how you arrive at this global ethics, whether via philosophy, Christianity, Islam or some other route." Küng, in panel discussion at the Parliament of the World's Religions.

28

discourse", "meta-religious". and "grand cosmologie", Knitter finally suggests that perhaps "we

can even use a term that theologians have bandied about for centuries: universai revelation"

(ibid., 1 18-124).*' The startling part is that the cosmological story that Knitter presents is the one

given to us by n a d science. It is diEcult to see what a naturalist model has to offer to

discourse that concerns the transcendent.

In Jesus and the Other Names, he makes the point more concisely. Taking his cue from

Juan Segundo's "anthropological faith", Knitter presents his own "cosmological faith. which is

"ou. fundamental commitment. animated by an often inexplicabIe hope. to overcome what

threatens and to advance what promotes human and ecological well-being" (Knitter 1996. 35).

This is not a specifically religious faith, but is andogous to Tracy's notion of a *secular faith'.

and can be felt by any secular humanist in ternis of an evolutionary drive. Cosrnological faith

takes precedence over al1 expressions of it in religious ternis, and will fùnction "as a basic

criterion for religion in general" (ibid.). Any religion which does not promote eco-human well-

being is simply and finally not authentic religion. We can see how this cosmological faith will

function in much the same way as secula. faith functions in Tracy's mode1 by considering the

... insofar as reason is genuinely dialogical or communicative in any historical context. it is no& in principle, limited to that context ... Any act of understanding addresses al1 others with a daim to its validity-a validity that, in principle, the inquirer is obliged to redeem if challenged (Tracy 1992,234).

This statement applies directly to Knitter's correlational model. No one religion can have any

intrinsically 'vaiid' daims; al1 must be redeemed if challenged - only in KnitterTs case, instead of

s ea r ckg for 'good reasons', the search is for 'just consequences'. If any religious claim can be

show to lead to (or tend toward) negative eco-human consequences, it fails the test. There are

-

" This reference to naturai law sets up one of the key questions for Part III: what does Knitter 29

some problems with this (such as why religious claims need to be "redeemed, and how this

rnight happen) which will be addressed in Habermas' critique. Although bitter refers to his

notion of tmth as "processive-relationai", the ethic he presents is firmly deontological.

Knitter's rather stark profession of a 'faith' which is not oniy not Christian but actually

presumes to judge al1 religion is another example of his admirable candor. The foundations of

eco-hurnan well-king did not need to expressed so clearly. and are extremely problematic. The

most serious problems are a) the implications of his uncondi tional acceptance of SC ienti fic

cosmology. and b) the deontological nature of his ethic; both of which 1 will retum to in Part III.

Summary

Knitter's theological journey is strongly iduenced by his life experiences. His original

exclusivist stance has gradually developed toward a pluralist stance in light of the 'Others' that

have corne into his life. Karl Rahner helped to move hirn fkom ecclesiocent.rism to

christocentrism, Rahim pushed him M e r to theocentrisrn, and experiences with Sdvadoran

refugees brought him to soteriocentrism. This çoteriocentnc model has k e n refined into a

correlational. globally responsible model of dialogue. Dialogue in necessary due to the

incompleteness of any one religion, and the truth that is found in other religions. It is productive

because the many religions are indeed different, and have much to learn from one another. The

best way to go about this is correlationally; it is the oniy style of dialogue that is fully dialogical.

It is as ready to leam as it is to teach or proclaim. Nor is the dialogue simply for personai

enhancement, as important as this may be. Soteriocentric dialogue seeks first the kingdom of

God, and thus addresses the issue of eco-human-well being. It is imperative that al1

interreligious dialogue be concemed however tangentially, with the realization of nght

consider to be 'faith'? 30

relationships in this world. This can be done because we share a common cosmological story

which can serve as a meeting ground for the religions. Now that we have a sketch of his

position. let us to tum to his critics. and hear the other side of the story.

Part II: Criticism of Soteriocentric Pluralism from Three Directions

Cnticism of Knitter's position appears on many fronts. 1 will limit myself to three general

directions of criticism-inside. outside and dongside-which will challenge soteriocentric

pluraiism on three distinct (but related) points: necessity. appropriateness, and coherence. ( I )

From a more theologicaily conservative position inside the tradition cornes the challenge of

Stanley Hauewas. An eminent ethicist in his own right, Hauerwas cm meet Knitter on his own

'ethical' ground. and thus address the 'globally responsible' part of Knitter's model. As we have

seen, Knitter's project is driven by a sense of urgency regarding the immanent dangers to our

survival and the intolerable suffering in the world. The inability of existing non-pluralist models

to properly address these problems make the pluralist option is preferable by default. Whatever

problems it presents theologically cannot be suficient to dismiss it, since there are no other

options. Hauerwas rnakes the case that not ody does this cnterion not stand up as the defining

critena of a theology (indeed it cannot). but that there is also at least one other option for

addressing these problems. Thus, from the perspective of the Christian tradition, there is the

question of whether the pluralist option is necessary. (2) From a position outside the tradition,

there comes the challenge fiom secular philosopher Jiirgen Habermas. Habermas, who (dong

with Ham-Georg Gadamer) is regarded as the premier philosopher of discourse today. can speak

to Knitter's desire for a 'model' for dialogue, and offers an interesting perspective on the

'correlational' part of the model. It is Habermas who first presented formal niles Br public

discourse which require that 'lifeworld' claims pass through a process of argurnentative

justification. Knitter (via Tracy) appropriates this model, demanding that religious claims must

32

be 'redeemed' in dialogue. Habermas presents, fiom a perspective outside the tradition. the

question of whether Knitter's model is appropriate for interreligious dialogue. (3) Of the three.

only Mark Heim addresses bitter directiy; taking the time to outline Knitter's position and

pointing out its inconsistencies. His sympathies for the pluralist program enable him to navigate

the intricacies of Knitter's model with confidence. making his criticism d l the more incisive.

While dlowing that Knitter's is the most compelling pluralist model. Heim wonden whether

Knitter's pluralist position even merits the label 'pluralist', mising questions as to its coherence.

From Inside: Postliberal Theologian Stanley Hauerwas

The difficulties presented by suffering and war are a contact point for Hauerwas and Knitter.

In Agakt the Nations, Hauerwas deals directly with the issue of nuclear war in a theological

context. He begins by presenting a general outline of his 'postliberal' position, in order to situate

himself before developing the position by applying it to the question of war? He tums to

George Lindbeck. who coined the tenn 'postliberal' in his controvenial book. The Nature of

Doctrine (Lindbeck l984), to help him present this ~utline.'~

The main thnist of the postliberal argument is to contrast a *cultural-linguistic' model with

the liberal bexperiential-expressivist' model that dominates theology today:

LiberaIs start with expenence, with an account of the present, and then adjust their vision of the kingdom of God accordingly, while postliberals are in principle committed to doing the reverse (ibid., 125-6).

This confiontational statement is indicative of what many liberal theologians fuid mistrating

about the postliberal position, but the claim is not made Iightly. The liberal approach has a

cornmitment to k i n g relevant; to being involved in the broader social issues of the day in such a

To Hauerwas nuclear war, while an extreme case, is not categorically different fiom conventional war.

way that theology has an impact. Simply muttering among ourselves (or. worse. shouting from

our soapboxes) that contemporary social practices violate the standards presented to us by the

Christian tradition will serve only to relegate Chrktianity to an increasingly powerless position

on the margins of society. Liberals argue that we must dialogue with contemporary society, and

explain to them how Christianity offers some of the very insights that they need. We must

'translate' our Christian 'doctrines' into a language that the secular listener can understand, so

that we can meet them halfway. This serves a double purpose (as al1 'correlational' dialogues

do), since we wiil better understand ourseIves as well. The demanding nature of scientific

inquiry enables us to examine our own tradition, helping us to shed our more naive pre-

suppositions and m e r develop Christian thought in a new context. A classicai. dogmatic

accounting seems implausible (not to mention irresponsible), even to us as Christians. so how

can we expect it convince non-Christians? We caanot reasonably expect them to simply accepc

it. We, as Christians. will ultimately rise and fail on the basis of how well we "articulate or

represent and communicate that imer experience of the divine ... which is held to be cornmon to

them dl" (Lindbeck 1984,47)."

This approach. says Lindbeck, gets it precisely backwards. His cul~uraI-linguistic approach

describes religious faith as a comprehensive totaiity which forms us; it makes little sense to

speak of 'experience' which precedes it. Religion is "a kind of cultural a n d b linguistic

hmework or medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought" (ibid., 33). The crucial issue

to be decided is where one is to begin, and a postliberal points out that there is no definitively

- --

'91arnes Gustafson's assessrnent of the postliberal position as "a pemicious, sectarian temptation" was o d y one of the many heated responses to The Nature of Doctrine. "Lindbeck may be thinking specifically of Tracy, who wrote that ''to speak in a public fashion means to speak in a manner that c m be disclosive and transfomative for any intelligent, reasonable, responsible human being" (Tracy 1 98 1 , 3 5 1 ).

34

'better' place to begin than the gospel. For every question that is directed toward Chnstianity,

there is an analogous question which can be asked in return. Whenever one queries the gospel in

tems of rationaiity. modemity. personal expenence. Hinduism. science, etc.; the question is:

what are your 'terms' precisely, and what is their c l a h to primacy? What do they claim that

supersedes the claims of the gospel. and what are your criteria for making this judgement?

Questioning the gospel in ethical terms, as Knitter does. explicitly presents criteria (in this

case sotenocentric) by which the gospel should be judged, and forces a very particular reading of

the text Hauenvas wants to know where these criteria corne from. and why they should have

primacy. The history of Christianity is fidl of figures who shaped the wodd in t ems of the

gospel (Augustine, Aquinas, Luther), and any attempt to alter that either a) assumes that the

world simply is, and does not need to be shaped, merely described; or b) shapes the world in a

different way? To be sure, the manner in which Christians shape the world is not static, but the

method of change is to take foreign insights and incorporate them into the Christian tradition.

On the other hand. to take (for example) modem criticisms regarding the plausibility ' of the

resurrection or the divinity of Jesus senously on their own terms, and attempt to modi6

Christianity in light of these criticisms, is theologicaily unsound. It presents a change that is

discontinuous with the tradition that it proposes to change, with a corresponding fracture of

identity ."

Hauerwas identifies the problem that the liberals are trying (wrongly, he thinks) to address:

" Option 'a' is becoming increasingly untenable in light of cnticism by philosophers such as Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend. Bruno Latour and Steven Shapin. The presentation of scientific methodology as objective is increasingly seen as a pre-emptive move to shape the world in a way that discourages questions as to how the shaping is done. 29 Hauerwas presents artistic creativity as an analogy, noting that the mastery of any given art fom invariably precedes any alteration that an artist makes to that form. Playing a jumble of

Chnstiaoity is at an awkwardly intermediate stage in Western culture where having once been culturally established it is still not clearly disestablished ... the biblical heritage is just present enough in our culture to make redescription a useful means to keep many people vaguely related to the church ( H a u e m 1985, 8).

When western non-Christians find the underlying reasons for theologicai claims (which they

might othenvise find acceptable) offensive or implausible, liberal theologians scrarnble to

'correlate' our underlying reasons with elements fiom the modem western tradition (generally

Enlightenrnent reason). thus preventing M e r disestablishment."

The end of this particular road is reached by Knitter. The finality of the Christ event.

through which Christians have interpreted and chdlenged the world for its entire existence. is to

be dropped because it seems arrogant or offensive to non-Christians. How, wonders Knitter. can

we have a genuine dialogue if we enter already convinced that Jesus is the final word? He even

goes so far as to cal1 it idolatrous." When he attempted to remove the offensive, particularistic

content, however, what was left (theocentrism) was too vague to ground a dialogue. Knitterk

notes that has never been played before is not king musically -creative0. d e s s one is deliberately pushing the limits of a f o m that has k e n mastered. 'O The extent to which Chnstianity is disestablished is a significant one. It would seem that even fiom a liberai perspective. it is clear that Christianity is on the fringes. else why appeal to modem venions intelligence and reason rather than arguing fkom an explicitly Christian perspective? The question is then a strategic one: do Chrïstians attempt to positively infiuence the societies in which they live by trying to bring Christianity into the conversation. or do they instead concentrate on maintainhg their own communities in isolation? Are the two even separable? This is M e r complicated by the (at least) implicit presence of the Christian tradition in Western social structures. There are many elements in modem Iiberal democracy which are heartily endorsed by Hauerwas, but the extent to which they require a citizenry familiar with Christian 'logic' is a difficult question even to address. '' In response to this, John Sanders professes that if claiming that Jesus is unsurpassable is idolatrous, then he is cornfortable in his role as idolater. Knitter's response is telling: "If Sanden were reaily convinced that the Bible was proposing idolatry. would he accept such a proposal? 1 honestly don't think so. Archbishop Desmond Tutu once declared that if he found that the Bible actudly propounded or justified apartheid - he would abandon the Bible. 1 think Sanders would too. Certainly I would try to convince him that he should" (Knitter 1 997. 1 47-8; see also 8, 1 23). The two are taIking past each other. Sanders proclaims that his faith in Christ as manifested in the Biblical witness is normative, while Knitter appeals to 'justice' as a super- criterion for judging normative claims.

36

subsequent move to soteriocentrism matches up perfectly with Hauerwas' description of a

theologian who "tries to locate the 'essence', or at least what is essentiai to religion, in a manner

that k s religion from its most ernbarrassing particularïstic aspects" (Hauerwas 1985. 24). In

Knitter's case, we have 'eco-human well-being' a s the 'essence' which is at least potentially

palatable to al1 involved. Hauerwas argues that not only is this not an appropriate way for

Chnstians to engage non-Christians, it is also inherently self-defeating, since, "if what is said

theologically is but a confirmation of what we can know on other grounds ... then why bother

saying it theologicall y at dl? (ibid., 25)."

This rnight provoke a fiustnited rebuttal fiom Knitter that at least he is doing something

which addresses the issues. Whatever one thinks of pluralism as a theory, the plurality it

addresses is undeniab le. We cannot simpl y retreat into our theo logical caves. Furthemore, even

if it were not clearly immoral to abandon the world, it would certainly be foolish. It is not

simply that people will behave badly and kill each other, the entire planet is at n s k with us on it.

Whatever the faults of correlational, globally responsible dialogue, it is the only thing we have.

By al1 means, work to improve it. criticize its inadequacies and propose new approaches. but at

least it addresses the problem. Indeed, our hurnility regarding our lack of a final solution is what

impels us to dialogue, says Knitter. Do the postliberals arrogantly claim to actually have the

solution, or are they simply abandoning hope? Both options seem rather unappealing.

Hauerwas, however, contends that the postliberals ignore neither (a) the plurality; nor (b) the

threats to the Earth and ail of us who live on it.

'' This argument will be explored more Mly when Habermas raises this question fiom a secular perspect. ve.

37

Plurality

If we are going to engage in dialogue with our culture, no matter how diverse, it is best to

begin by articulating what is meant by 'we'. It is not until this question is at least provisionally

resolved that 'we' can enter dialogue. Are 'we' like the 'they' with whom we propose to

dialogue? A positive answer to this crucial question is what undergirds Knitter's entire model."

Hauerwas is not so sure. Recalling the history of apologetic theology. he notes:

The apologist of the past stood in the church and its tradition and sought relationship with those outside. Apologetic theology was a secondary endeavor because the apologia never assumed that one codd let the questions of unbelief order the theological agenda (ibid.. 24).

The language of 'inside' and 'outside' casts the issue in an interesting light. Can someone

who is outside a faith tradition fully comprehend what is going on inside? Consider the impact

that Et ter ' s fkiend Rahim had on his theology. It is the first time Knitter relays any information

on his experiences with interreligious dialogue, and it does not seem to meet his present criteria

for authentic dialogue. Nowhere does Knitter imply that Rahim was remotely pluralist in his

He was also a devout Muslim who prayed five times a day and ordered apple juice when the rest of us cailed for beer. We became dose fiends and ofien discussed religion.. . Rahim was entirely content with his Muslim faith: ethically, he surpassed most Christians 1 knew (Knitter 1995,6)."

Being a "devout Muslim". Rahim presumably held the Qu'ran to be authoritative. His

contentment with his faith implies that he did not look to extemal sources to justi& his

commitment to Islam. Did this impede the dialogue? On the contrary, it seems that Knitter

'' A crucial flaw in Knitter's model is exposed by noting that a negative answer is also required by Knitter's model, else the entire theme of opening to the 'Other' collapses. This will be taken up M e r in the section on identity. Y It is worth noting that what fascinated Knitter about Rahim was his ethical purity and his commitment to his religion. Ironically, however, Rahirn seems to be precisely the kind of religious believer who would be excluded fiom Knitter's model of dialogue.

38

found him an i n t e h g and reflective interlocutor, but it is not clear the extent to which he

understd him. In fact. since he had no particular reverence for Mohammed. and have not been

formed in an Islamic tradition was it really possible to fill'y understand any explanation that

Rahim gave for his faith? Rahim's perspective was ni11 interesting and insighdul. and obviousl y

influenced Knitter deeply. but it influenced him to mflect on their conversations in light of hir

own Christian faith. This is why postliberals advise us to stay in our own 'theological

backyards?. This is a simple recognition of what is required to theology. and the fact that the

other person doesn't share it. While Knitter and Rahim may each have had an impact on how the

other approached theology . they were not engaged in a joint theological project not least because

they neces-ly differed on what comtitutes a theological project.

This does not mean that those of different religions will never speak to one another. There

may well be conversations over the backyard fence. as it were. and these rnay be richly

rewarding. But these conversations require no 'model'. but will progress naturally according to

the subject matter. If they begin at the grocery store. the discussion may well revolve around

diet, whiIe if in line at the bank. the subject might be usury. These can be rich theological

discussions. but the 'common ground' for the dialogue, insofar as there is one. is quite concrete.

The dialogue takes place on a different level than a theological dialogue. precisely because faith

is not shared. Furthermore. as Hauerwas notes, the Christian view on issues such as diet and

usury will have no power if the fact that such a view is Christian is hidden:

Their first task is not, as has been assumed by many working in Christian ethics and still under the spell of Christendom, to write as though Christian commitments make no ciifference in the sense that they only undenmite what everyone in p ~ c i p l e can dready know. but rather to show the dieerence those commitrnents make (Hauerwas f 985.44).

What m e r sees as an inevitable source of conflict is what Hauerwas sees as making the

conversation interesting in the fint place. And wfüle the importance of such conversations

39

should not be underplayed can it be extrapolated into Knitter's present view that it is necessq

to discuss my faith with those of other religions if 1 am to be tnily Christian? Such conversations

will occasionally happa in any event. but it seerns odd to daim that Christians musi seek them

out. Knitter's ciaim that Christianity is too 'narrow' to have a productive dialogue within its

own religious border is a common pluralist claim that is more often asserted than argued. With

the thousands of cultural expressions of the Christian faith that we have at our disposal. why

must we seek out those even more diffe~-ent?~'

Engaging other religions in ethical conversations and calling them theological marks a

drainatic shift fiom the apologists of old. This not only suggests a category error. but can render

the dialogue bloodless by robbing the interlocuton of that which motivates them. Frank

Clooney, in his review of Jesur and fhe Other Names, remarks that although Liner himself has

engaged in interreligious dialogue, %is book seems so clearly and cleanly Western and

Christian that it is not evident what Knitter has brought back with h i m (Clooney 1997. 179).

Deding effectively with a pluralist culture does not entai1 becoming pluralist about our own

religious identity. This prevents us not only from embracing the motivation from our behavior.

but also fiom hearing what 'religious Others' may have to offer. Christians must have a coherent

identity with which to engage pluralism, or they will have nothing to offer:

. . . if theologians are going to contribute to reflection on the moral li fe in our particular situation, they will do so exactly to the extent they can capture the significance of the church for determining the nature and content of Christian ethical reflection. (Hauenvas 1985,44).

" The notion that one who is maximally different will offer the most insight is a curious one. In personal decision-making situations one often looks for advisor who has 'distance' h m the situation, so that they can be 'objective'. This is always a limited possibility, because objective distance becomes a hindrance if the advisor is so 'distant' that there is no understanding of the issues involved. The tension between proximity and distance is one which anyone seeking advice must address in selecting an advisor.

40

Thteat of annihilation

The question of the possible annihilation of the world (which the soteriocentrists tend to use

as a whip to drive the discussion) is at least as compelling for Hauerwas as it is for Knitter. It is.

however, only tangentially related to the question of interreligious dialogue, because the issue is

more complicated than Knitter rnakes it out to be. If we are Christians, we live first for Christ.

and that is the first order of business. The survival of the world is not our primary problem.

although the well-king of the world will almost invariably be involved in living for Christ.

However, if a sound strategy were proposed that would ensure everyone's survival but entailed

sacrificing Christian identity, then we. as Christians. should reject the proposai because the

strategy negates why we were concerned about the problem in the first place. Hauerwas

condemns 'survivalist' appeais, noting, ' k e do not live because we are afraid to die. but because

we believe that our living is a gifi that offea us opportunity for service" (Hauerwas 1985, 13).

The contention that the plurdist mode1 is the only one that addresses the problems of global

injustice that confront us depends on the assessment that the socio-political structures that exist

need to be modified according to how they meet the critena of emerging 'global ethics'. This

assessment in tum rests on the assurnption that there is no radical alternative to these structures.

Hauerwas asserts that instead of addressing the structures of injustice in a way that proposes to

somehow repair them (implying that they are good but broken), Christians should be presenting a

radical alternative. Working out this alternative, and modeling it to the best of our abilities may

well be the best service we can offer to the suffering world:

... religious communities are likely to be practically relevant in the long nin to the degree that they do not first ask what is either practical or relevant. but instead concentrate on their own intratextual outlooks and forms of life (Lindbeck 1984, 128; in Hauenvas 1988, 5).

This is not advocating any kind of retreat h m society. Indeed, it is a forceful proclamation that

Chnstians have a unique gift to offer the entire worid: a place where one c m encounter Christ in

a community of His believers. Christians can offer a mode1 of what is good, rather than a

statement of what is right. This cannot be done, however, if we atternpt to distill our beliefs into

principles which will be universally paiatable, for:

. . .the justification of our moral principles and assertions cannot be done from the point of view of anyone. but rather requires a tradition of morai wisdom. Such a tradition is not a "deposit" of unchanging moral '%ruth", but is made up of the lives of men and women who are constantly testing and changing that tradition through their own struggle to live it (Hauerwas 1 985,42).

If there is no cornmunity of believers who are working out this tradition %tratextuallyW. then

Christians have nothing to offer the contemporary conversation. As we will see from a different

perspective in Habermas' critique. theologians may well "have something significant to say

about ethics, but they will not say it significantly if they try to disguise the fact that they think,

write and speak out of and to a distinctive cornrnunity" (ibid., 44).

Hauerwas, by demonstrating not only the inextricable link between Christian ethics and the

community which espouses them, shows that Knitter's proposal to universalize discourse based

on an 'ethical' impulse (global responsibility), is ineffective because the very motivation for

espousing them is removed. If, on the other hand, this same cal1 for global responsibility is both

espoused and modeled by Chnstians as a Christian alternative in light of a particularly Christian

notion of the grace of God and the sacrificial love of Christ, then there is indeed a powemil

approach that Christians cm take toward injustice. Applying this argument to war, Hauerwas

. . .we offer the world not simply moral advice designed to make war less destructive, but rather a witness to God's invitation to join a community that is so imaginative. so rich in its history that it gives us the means to resist the temptation to give o u . loydties to those that would use them for war (Hauerwas 1985, 198).

If the motive power behind Knitter's model is the suffering of the world, then a 'new' approach

to other religions is unnecessary. What is necessary is that Chnstians live as models of a polity

which exists as a live al ternative to our modern world.

From Outside: Secular Philosopher Jürgen Habermas

In 1988. The University of Chicago's Divinity School invited Jürgen Habermas to speak at a

conference regarding his impact on theology in the public realm. Arnong others. Tracy presented

a paper entitled "Theology. Critical Social Theory, and the Public Realm", which examined the

relationship between Habermas and public theology. This conference was unique in that it gave

Habermas an opportunity to respond to the manner in which his critical social theory has been

applied by theologians.

Habermas' connection to Knitter is an indirect one, passing through Tracy. Habermas'

approach to public discourse is appropriated by (among others) David Tracy to constnict a

method by which theology might fùnction in the -public realm'. Tracy's method is in turn

appropriated by Knitter to ground his model for interreligious discourse. Habermas addresses

Tracy's method, and raises several concems as to its appropriateness for theology. These

concerns cm also be addressed to Knitter, since his model is explicitly grounded in Tracy's

correlational theology. 1 will begin by outlining Habermas' model, and show how Tracy has

appropriated it. 1 will then r e m to Habermas and his challenges to any theological

appropriation of his model. These challenges will apply directly to bitter, whose primary

distinction fiom Tracy (his demand that statements be ethically rather than ratiorzully

redeemable) creates still another problem with respect to Habermas.

Discourse Ethics

In his book Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Habermas presents his model

for "discourse ethics", which sets out what he feels are the necessary parameters for discourse to

proceed in an ethical marner. In its simplest form, everyone who is part of the discussion must

have a chance to speak and be listened to. and everyone who is to be afTected by the outcome of

the discussion must be a part of the disc~ssion.'~ These are universal rules for any discourse.

guarding against the exclusion or silencing of those who might be negatively affected by

decisions reached.

This model divides possible topics of discussion into two categories: the 'world' and the

'lifeworld'. The -world' is the arena of public discussion where interlocutors can discuss issues

in an egalitarian fashion. according to Habemas' d e s of universal discourse. There are no

topics which are excluded a priori fiom such a discussion, but in practice many topics will not

survive the criteria for disco~rse.'~ In this arena, the style of interaction is argumentation. where

one must offer 'good reasons' for the statements one makes. These reasons must appeal to

publicly verifiable noms or scientific facts, not to traditional authorities recognized only by the

speaker. Communication in the 'lifeworld' is characterized by conversation. and this is the more

encompassing of the two styles." The lifeworld indeed gives rise to the topics that will be

discussed in the world of public discourse. Religion, art, culture, and iradition are dl elements of

36 Habermas presents these as the principles of universalization (U) and discourse (D): (LJ) Al1 affected cm accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can

be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone 's interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regdation).

(D) Only those noms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of al1 affected in their capacity as participonts in a practical discourse (see Habermas 1990, 65-66).

37 This presents a problem, since Habermas claims that the d e s are to be purely formal; without any ethical content. However, since styles and topics of discourse are excluded de facto, the d e s themselves act as a negative ethic.

the lifeworld. The formation of our opinions, the development of our tastes, the inculcation of

our moral values; al1 of this happens in the lifeworld.

The lifeworld has no authority in public discourse. which necessarily entaits involving

participants h m different lifeworlds. I carmot appeal to my aesthetic preferences. you cannot

appeal to your religious texts. and she cannot appeai to her farnil y values. This is how discussion

happens in the lifeworld of friends, churches and families. In argumentative discourse, on the

other hand, '%didity claims which previously remained implicit because they arose

perfonnatively are expressly thematized (Habermas 1992. 240). When one moves from the

lifeworld to the world of public discourse, the sources of one's daims must be identified and

excised leaving the opinion itself available for consideration. If good reasons cannot be offered

for the claim, then it too wil1 drop out of public discourse. This does not negate the claim. but

merely excludes it fiom the public reairn. The d e s of discourse are designed so that 1 ) no claim

(which might be unpopular but have good reasons) is prernaturely dismissed fiom the discussion:

and 2) no claim. or set of claims, is allowed to 'colonize' another by setting up parameters for

discussion without going through the process of argumentative justification. Thus for Habermas.

Christian commands such as 'thou shalt not steal' survive the process of public discussion,

because good reasons can be offered for such a command that can be accepted by dl. However.

any Christian doctrine that is challenged cannot appeal to its own authonties (scnpture. tradition)

in order to defend its vaiidity. Were Christianity to attempt to implement the authority of its

scripture as universal, it would fail (U), and even if it managed to circumvent this by ody

allowing Christians in the discussion, it would fail (D).

38 see Habermas 1992,240. 45

Correlational Theology

Tracy is fundamentally in accord with Habermas on the issue of public discourse and (with

modifications) the separation of the 'Iifeworld' and 'system'. He presents his own definition of

the term "public realm": "that shared rational space where al1 participants, whatever their other

particular differences, can meet to discuss any claim that is rationally redeemable" (Tracy 1992.

19). This clearly corresponds to Habermas' world of public discourse; not accidentally. since

Tracy models his contribution to theology on the work done in critical social theory by

Habermas (Tracy 1 976. 1 3, 246). Tracy acknowledges that the rational space whic h part ici pants

share is vitally threatened. and applauds Habermas' work in analyzing speech acts to form a

concept of 'communicative rationality'. This, Tracy believes. is a vaiuable tool in çaving the

public reaim from the death that has already been pronounced by Rorty, Lyotard and Hauerwas.j9

Tracy is less enthusiastic about the manner in which Habermas' mode1 resuits in a de facto

exclusion of religious claims. Granted, the "'pecuïiar logic of religious claims " creates awkward

issues for regulating argumentation, but this can be addressed:

... unless one assumes, rather than argues, that no religious or theological claims are argumentatively redeemable, a modem critical social theory should also account for and argue over just these claims.. .the discipline of [philosophy of religion and] modem theology are, at their best, hl ly modem critical disciplines (Tracy 1992,35-6).

This explicitly apologetic appeai *rms Habermas' notion that only good, publicly

accessible reasons should be allowed ùito the public discussion, but argues that theology is up to

the task of supplying them. It is crucial to note that Habermas' criteria are not being questioned

by Tracy; the only objection is to Habermas' assessrnent of theology as failing to meet them.

--- --

39 Tracy here gives one of the most clear and concise summaries of the postliberal position that I have seen. It is quite Fustrating that he then abandons the issue and never retums.

46

Habermas' critique

Before responding to the theologians, Habermas sketches a brief history of how religion and

reasun have interacted since the early modem period. He notes that philosophical appropriation

of religious content requires a 'neutrai' philosopher who does not bnng his own self-

understanding into the matter. Philosophy rnust content itself with a 'methodical atheism in the

manner of the philosophical reference to the contents of religious experience. Philosophy cannot

appropriate what is talked about in religious experience as religious experiences" (Habermas

1992, 133). Habermas recognizes that this "methodical atheism" presents a crucial obstacle for

philosophy. There is a point at which philosophy must simply admit that it can go no further.

and this is reached when there is no neutral laquage by which a daim fiom a specific tradition

can be redescribed.

Tuming to the theologians directly, he confronts Tracy on the issue of vaiidity claims and

investigates what theologians are committing to when they present theology as a "fully modem

critical discipline". The theologians are willing, even eager, to surrender theo1ogy.s right to

'privilege' so that theology, Iike every other discipline, will have to rneet the demands for

argumentative justification. For the correlational theologians. what is at &e is iheology's

status amongn the other disciplines of the academy. Answering such demands successfully

guarantees theology's position as a serious academic discipline, since it will be able to stand on

the same critical 'ground'. Habermas, however, sees it fiom a different angle:

If this is the cornrnon ground of theology, science, and philosophy. what then still constitutes the distinctiveness of theological discourse? What separates the internai perspective of theology fiom the extemal perspective of those who enter a dialogue with theology? ... the more theology opens itself in general to the discourses of the human sciences, the greater is the danger that its own statu will be lost in the network of alternathg takeover attempts (Habermas 1 992,230-1 ).

Habermas, Konically. echoes the concems of Hauerwas. by expressing concem for the

identity of theologians who want to dissolve the barriers between Christian and secular

discourse. Where Hauenvas expresses concems fiom within the Christian tradition, Habermas

expresses concern on behalf of the secular discourse, which will lose a valued lifeworld

perspective if theologians are willing to submit themselves without reservation to his criteria of

argumentation. While the public theologians are busy atternpting to demonstrate the likeness

between theology and other disciplines (argurnentative justification). Habermas points out that

they have abandoned their claim to distinctiveness. He seerns to see more inherent value in

theology than the theologians do.

He goes on to investigate the distinctiveness the theology on their behalf: If theology is not

to be subsumed by philosophy, what characterizes it? It is not distinctive simply by its reference

to religious experience. for the retrieval of religious elements into the arena of argumentative

discourse is a philosophical enterprise. The distinctiveness of theology is in the manner in which

it embraces religious experience. Theology is not under the sarne constraints, although it seems

to Habermas that the public theologians are voluntarily constraining themselves in this manner.

If they insist on doing so, then they sacrifice their identity as theologians, since "theology also

loses its identity if it only cites religious experiences, and under the descriptions of religious

discourse no longer acknowledges them as its own basis" (ibid., 233). In their eagemess to

achieve full status as an -01ogy'. they have sacrificed the 'theos', at least insofar as their method

is concerned.

How does this apply to Knitter? His correlational model, which is borrowed fiom Tracy.

obviously opens him to the same challenges from Habermas. The commitment to dialogue and

to unreservedly opening (Christian) theology up to criticism fkom outside brings the identity of

the Christian theologian into question. If theology is willing to submit itself to external cnteria

(universally available notions of soteria), declaring its "fùndamental loyalty" to this nom. it no

longer has any daims to distinctiveness (again, this echoes Hauerwas). By taking nothing for

grantecl except this 'universal'. it is methodical atheism. It simply cites religious experiences.

which are only relevant insofar as they can be translated into the 'neutral' language of soteriu.

and thus adds nothing that could not be discovered by a non-theologian.

However, the manner in which Knitter alters Tracy's model - making soteria the ground

rather than reason - results in far more compelling criticism from a Habermasian perspective.

Habermas did not arbitranly choose argumentative justification as the model for public

discourse. His selection was made in the wake of an arduous and thorough analysis of the

lingual nature of human understanding, and a corresponding 'rehabilitation' of the concept of

reason from the subjective hold that it has k e n (and still is) caught in since ~ant." Habermas

contends that reason is fundarnentally communicative, and the manner in which a truth daim

addresses its Iisteners gives us valuable insight into how language (and therefore reason)

functions in human life." As seen in Knitter's explanation for the 'correlational' part of his

model, Habermas' claim that reason is communicative is echoed in Knitter's notions that truth is

relational. Both c m be realized only in dialogue. However, Knitter's attempt to formally ground

" "The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus. Taken together, autonomy and responsibility constitute the only Ideai that we possess a priori in the sense of the philosophicai tradition" (Habermas 197 1. 3 14).

How successfid Habermas is in this is hotly disputed, as seen in the famed Gadamer-Habermas debate. The criticism does not ride on this, since Knitter (via Tracy) has already tacitly endorsed Habermas' mode1 by appropriating it for his model of dialogue. If Gadamer's side of the debate were to be preferred, Knitter wodd be in an even worse position, since he would then have to answer al1 of Gadamer's criticisms of Habermas.

49

dialogue in a 'cosmological faith' which has such strong ethicd content is precisely what

Habermas is attempting to moid in his 'discourse ethics'. Knitter's notion of eco-human well-

k i n g is a perfect example of a claim which rises out of the lifeworld and is brought to the

'public realm' (Tracy's term) for consideration under the d e s of argumentative justification.

That eco-human well-king cannot itself function as a critenon is painfully demonstrated when

Knitter attempts to rhetorically justif)- his certainty regarding cosmological faith: "How do I

know that? By faith. I just know it. 1 feel it" (ibid., 37). Knitter goes on to note the cultural

conditioning of his manner of stating the case, but expresses his optimism that its "roots * * are

universal. This pre-emptive move to make eco-human well-king the primary cntenon for al1

religious conversation is (in Habermas' language) a 'coionization'. Rather than engaging other

portions of the lifeworld cornmunicatively, it attempts to subsume them under its own

perspective. with no good reasons O ffered.

In summary, Habermas, in whose point of view Knitter is deeply rooted. has one explicit

and one implicit criticism for Knitter. The explicit criticism regards the appropriateness of

subrnitting theology to external cnteria This is a dangerous undertaking. which renden

theology vulnerable to "takeover attempts" because it surrenders its own distinctiveness. The

implicit (but much more powemil) criticism is the appropriateness of using Habermas (via

Tracy) to justify a positive ethical agenda The entire notion of a public system controlled by

'discoune ethics' is to prevent what Knitter is trying to do: take a daim that is firmly rooted in

the lifeworld. and use it to colonize other areas of the lifeworld by controlling the discourse.

From Alongside: Pluralist Theologian Mark Heim

Mark Heim has been a longtirne dialogue partner of Knitter's and there is significant respect

between the two. As was noted earlier, it was Heirn, in his response to Knitter's No Other

50

Name?, who noted the difficulties in assigrhg content to the theos in theocentrism. If there is

nothing particdar about 'God'. the word will merely function as a cipher. and usen will be fiee

to assign whatever content they prefer. In response to this article. Knitter announced his move to

a soteriocentric perspective. which he has since developed into his correlational. globally

responsibIe mode1 for dialogue. This overcomes the 'vagueness' problems of theocentrism. but

acquires a new set of problems. and Heim addresses these in Saivatiom (Heim. 1995). He

studies three prominent pluralists-Wilfred Cantwell Smith. John Hick and Knitter-and

challenges each of them individually. as well as pluralism as a concept. He makes it clear that he

finds Knitter's mode1 the most compelling of the three (ibid.. 87). but this does not save it frorn

devastating criticism regarding its coherence.

Heim is sympathetic toward much of the pluralist programCalvations itself presents an

new pluralist 'hypothesis' - especially its sensitivity to the darker parts of our Christian past. The

shocking brutality of Christians. both individually and as a Church. is sharneful and must be

addressed by Christians today. How did these memben of the body of Christ corne to do such

homble things, and what cm we do to prevent this from happening again? This is a real and

legitimate question. and the pluralists are facing it head on. For this. they should be applauded.

But the notion that our shamefid history was unavoidable due to the exclusivist nature of tmth

claims (which leads to intolerance for other 'tniths', and then to violence). is a dubious one at

best.

This is the crucial first element in the pluralistic syllogisrn: exclusivism leads to brutality.

bnrtality is counter to the gospel. ergo exclusivisrn is counter to the gospel. It is not a

particularly falsifiable claim, since it simply adumbrates a) the violence in Christian history. and

b) the religious exclusivisrn in Christian history, and asserts a causai relationship. Given that

they also maintain that there bas been no non-exclusivist phase in Christian history. it is difficult

to corne to any conclusion regadhg the validity of this assertion. And even if the syllogism is

accepted unresen.ed.iy. is this not a Christian problem? To artempt to apply this d i q o s i s of

Christianity u n i v d l y would seem to be an inclusivist or even an acluririst meet.. Wh!

should other religions be forced to adhere to the Christian method of resolving this issue.

assuming thai they b e a sirnilar problem?

Heim notes tbar for pluralists. exclusivisrn -bas the special character of heresy.- meriting

rejection as a m e f o m of religion but the exclusivïsm is only uith regard to religous docaines.

He fin& rhis move nrrprishg:

Given the apparent insistence on the validity of many sa-s. we might expect p l d i s t s to afFimi the full and equat value of religious paths that are inclusivist or exclusivist in c h t e r (ibid-. 1 02).

This rarely happas among pluralists- and cenainlp not with Kniner. The pnmacy of onhopraxis

over onhodoxy dictates that it is the -soteriolo@c.l miitsn by which the truly religious can be

identified (Kniner 1987. 193). The person u-ho bears these fhits is saved by virtue of this

exhibition of -justice'. regmcless of hou. they think the- came bu their salvarion: and those who

do not display these fniits are not participahg in sdvation. regardes of theu confessional

stance (bi t ter 19%. 35-6)." niis -some~-hat patrooizing attituden. uhich is m o n & -

inclusivist. proposes to erase (or at le- blur) the lines benreen the religions while drawing lines

" Heim points to the exclusivist yet gewrally non-violent hisrory of Buddhism as a clear cuunter-example. Why should the Buddhists shed their daims to universal tmth as the pluralists would have them do? The argument tbat it avoids intolerance and non-violence is \-en- weak since these are not themes in Buddhin hinory (Heim 1995.90). It is sometimes overlooked that the prescriptions aven by Knirter. whkh are c l d y tailored to address Chrinian -eMls'. are also to be applied to dl reiigions. " It is worth noting thai Kniner's strongest formulation of this harsh pronouncement cornes afier the pubfidon of Heimos critickm in Salvatiorrs ( 1995). Salvaiionr ifchially appears in the bibliography of Jesur and the Other .Vames (1 996). but there is no aîïempt to answer the points made in i t

52

within each of them. Each religion. insofar as it retains its identity with regard to other religions.

will be sharply divided intemally, with exclusivists/inclusivists battling pluralists across the

b'Rubicon'' the pluraiists have c r o s ~ e d . ~ Furthering this image leads to another crucial problem

with soteriocentric pluralism: the bloodiest wars are civil wars. Hei rn considers a hypothetical

situation where everyone was an adherent to the same religion. and notes that the empirical

evidence suggests that the likelihood of violent conflict may well be greater than in our present

situation. A Muslim living in Belfast is a most unlikely target for violence.

The claim that soteria is a vaiid universalizable criterion, while religious noms are not. is a

problematic one. Taking the United States as an example. the wars in which it has been involved

in this century-WWI, WWII. Korea Vietnam, Iraq (not to mention the cold war and numerous

covert wars) -- have not been fought in the name of religion. Rather. the motivation has (ai least

ostensibly) k e n some form of political or social justice. Yet these wars are the most homfic

conflicts on record. The threat of nuclear annihilation which moves Knitter so deeply is present

because of two nations who had rival concepts of a j~ social order. The two world wars were

fought over similar issues, and significant portions of both sides were adherents to the same

religion. This is not surprising, for notions of justice differ markedly not only across religions.

but within religions, and different conclusions that corne fkom like prernises are far more

m t i n g for those who are differing. A Christian pacifist will be far more mistrated by a

Christian libertarian than a Hindu libertarian, because the pacifist will have specific reasons why

the Christian should not be able to espouse such a system, while lacking an equivalent insight

"Crossing the theological Rubicon" is a favorite image for the pluralists (including Knitter), which critics of pluraiism find nchly ironic, given îhat the Rubicon was crossed by Caesar in order to assimilate another culture.

53

into the Hindu0s position. Nor c m one avoid the problem by somehow casting these conflicts

over justice in a religious light:

To stretch the definition of religion to include these phenornena [communism. fascism. nationaiism] is effectively oniy to admit that soteriocentrism is disguised religious exclusivism ...( ibid., 94).

There seems to be no escape fiom this. If justice and religion are two separate issues (a

contested point), it seems that rival notions of justice are both more proliferate and more

immediately threatening than rival notions of religion. If pluralism is indeed an appropriate

means by which to defuse these problems, then there should be a pluralistic theory of justices. If

they are not separate issues, sotenocentrism fails to its own criticism.

One possible avenue of escape is a pragmatic appeal to our capabilities: forming a consensus

on the notion of justice is eminently more achievable than achieving a workable notion of

religion. We may not know what is right for ou . lives, but we can certainly determine what is

darnaging, and attempt to alleviate these problems. The difficulty with this is that while the

sotenocentrists are correct in noting that there is a significant agreement across the religions in

condemning dishone*, violence and theft, the application of such principles invariably results

in exceptions being made. and these exceptions are ofien made in the name ofjustice. In this we

see that justice is inexüicably intertwined with living out religious convictions. Far fiom being

"something outside confronting them dl", justice exists within traditions, and mut be addressed

there. The conclusion for Heim is unavoidable:

The argument that particdaristic, religious claims lead inevitably to domination while clairns to know what justice requires lead to liberation is incoherent, no! least because the second daim is an instance of the first type. (Heim 1995,97).

Knitter's argument that his mode1 is but a heuristic device, which serves to anchor the

dialogue while itself remaining open to change, does not avoid this criticism. The choice for

certain social n o m as a 'center', no matter how tentative, is inextricably linked with religious 54

beliefs, which are the very things this choice is supposed to relativize. At any rate. Knitter's

claim that it is tentative is undermined by the force with which he presents it. Regarding the

cosmological faith upon which soleria is founded, Knitter states: "Perhaps there wili be other

experiences. insights, discoveries that will change my convictions and faith. At the moment- that

is unimaginable" (Knitter 1996. 168n.5). It is difficult to see how the word 'tentative' could

apply to such a conviction. Rather. it presents itself as a criterion by which to judge the

authenticity of religion. This necessary implication is what Ieads Heim to reject Knitter's

soteriocentric pluralist model in the strongest possible tems:

these theologies are in fact thoroughiy inclusivist and culturally particular in their character. These features would not be failings, were they not so contrary to the pluralists' own claïm. There is something wrong with principles which lead their adherents to so misread their own project (Heim 1995, 10 1 ).

Summary

Knitter's correlational, globally responsible model for dialogue has been challenged fiom

three directions. Hauerwas, fiom within the Christian tradition, challenges Knitter's attempt to

divorce his ethical principles from the tradition within which they hinction. He argues that these

principles can only rnotivate when anchored within a community of tradition that attempts to live

them out in al1 their particularity. The attempt to make them more broadly appealing is

misguided, which means that the style of dialogue for which they b c t i o n as raison d'éfre is

simply not necessary. Habermas challenges the correlationai theology which gromds the model

by investigating what is k i n g sacrificed in the process. The 'essential' ethical principles are

ones with which he heartily agrees, but they are nothing he did not already know. withouî

theology. He echoes Hauerwas' sentiment: the correlational theologians, in their eagemess to be

accepted by modernity, they have sacrificed theû identity. Heim, rather than addressing the

validity of the pluralist option, contents himself with challenging the soundness of the model. 55

Regardless of whether it is continuous with the tradition or f a i m 1 to the texts, it does not make

seme. It is guilty of precisely the faults that it proposes to combat, and its antidotes "may prove

to be much more culture and time bound than the theologies they condemn" (Heim 1995. 123).

Addressing the Criücs

In light of the challenges presented by Hauerwas. Habermas and Heim, Knitter's

correlational and globally responsible model for dialogue is in need of either clarification.

adjustment, or abandonment. Is it possible for the model to be suitably altered to deal with these

challenges? If so, what are the alterations which need to be made? If not, why not. and what are

the alternatives? 1 will begin by exarnining possible responses to the three challenges in their

own ternis: Hauerwas on necessity, Habermas on appropriateness and Heim on coherence. In

One Earth, Many Religions and Jesus and the Other Names. Knitter devotes a chapter to

'addressing' his critics. The problem is that d e r recounting the criticisms directed at his model.

he simply States that the remainder of the book will stand as a response. In some cases, Knitter

has a specific response that cm be directed toward a particular criticism. In the absence of this 1

will attempt to synthesize possible responses that are consistent with Knitter7s model.

Necessiy - Hauerwas argues that the suffering of the earth is something that Christians can

best address by modeling a radically different alternative. so the soteriocentric pluralist is

unnecessary. Knitter acknowledges this as criticism to be %ken senously" but he characterizes

it as "Danger Ahead" sign rather than a roadblock. Rather than respond directly to the substance

of the criticism, Knitter simply maintains that the postliberals fail to appreciate the urgency of

the situation:

For if the road to genuine dialogue between diRering cultures, nations, religions is d l y blocked so is hurnanity's firme (Knitter 1995,53).

Knitter can heartily endone the strategy of working within the faith to create and mode1

alternatives to our broken social stnictures, but wonders whether that is all we should be doing.

What about the interim time? Should we abandon the suffering to their lot, while we work

toward optimal solutions? As Knitter sees it. Hauerwas' insistence that theology must be done

within Christianity alone is dangerously passive:

... if such reservations become a reason to abandon or even diminish our efforts to bring about a cooperative, coordinated response from many nations and religions to the reaiity of human suffering and ecological peril, then there is something intrinsicaily wrong with al1 these objections (Knitter 1995,55).

Christians would seem to have no c l a h to f a i m stewardship if we sirnply proclaim that

contempomry structures violate Christian standards, and when this fails to have an impact (not

surprisingly), retreat to our own theological caves and work on our own intratextual outlooks.

Appropriateness - Habermas argues that revisionist theologians, such as Tracy. surrender

their distinctiveness when they appropriate his model. This is a dificult challenge for Knitter to

meet, for he does not acknowledge his debt to Habermas' critical social theory. Knitter could

allow that while Tracy's use of Habermas' model may not be appropriate. that is because it is

submitting to the consnaints of modem rationaiity. Knitter's model makes no such submission:

its grounding is in an affective response to the intolerable suffering in the world:

1 want to express this daim as cautiously as possible, but I do not want to equivocate. Sdferïng has a universality and irnmediacy that makes it the most suitable, and necessary, site for establishing cornmon ground for interreligious encounter (Knitter 1995,89).

Nor is his model a violation of Habermas' discourse ethics. The criterion of soteria is only

provisional, and is something that will be worked out through the dialogue. The model merely

argues that conversation leading to cooperative action is necessary, and that soteria presents a

criterion for the conversation that is much more easily addressed than doctrinal issues. It is aiso

less susceptible to ideological abuse, which Habermas himself is committed to preventing, 57

because the foundations of the mode1 stand against it. Human suffering "'stares us in the face and

questions us before we can fully understand or interpret it" (ibid., 127).

Coherence - While Heim has c learl y documented that 'justice0 and 'religion' are related.

Knitter still has some roorn to maneuver. Heim asserts that claims about justice are themselves

religious claims, which means that classifying religious claims as instruments of domination

while classi mg justice claims as instruments of liberation is incoherent . Knitter. however. has

the option of reversing the order of priority (while not denying the relation). asserting that

religious daims are ultimately claims about justice as expressed in his cosmological faith. Once

religious truth (orthodoxy ) is separated from concems about justice (ortho praxis), i t c m easi 1 y

become an instrument of oppression. He could also argue that he does have a pluraiistic theory

of justices. As with Habermas, he codd stress that soteria is a provisional heuristic. We donot

need a precise definition for soteria for it to ground dialogue; we can work through this problern

by engaghg in our particular venions of liberative praxis and bnng those into dialogue:

Precisely because human and ecological suffering is both universal and immedioie it c m serve al1 religious persons as a common context and criterion for assessing religious ûuth claims (ibid.).

The claim is that the suffering is universal and îmmediate, not the solution. How best io

alleviate this suffering and promote eco-human well-king is what will be discussed.

Sotenocentrism merely argues that this must be the primary topic of discussion; a "relative-

absolute criterion". This term stresses that any cornmitment to 'eco-human justice' must be

accompanied by an equally intense openness to other notions of what constitutes 'eco-human

justice' (Knitter 1995, 13 1-2).

These three responses are each fairly adequate to the task of blunting the thnist of the

cnticisms although there are problems with each. Regarding necessity, to say that Christianity

must cooperate with other religions in order to be effective workers for justice is more an 58

assertion than an argument, and depends on the reader's sympathy with Knitter's cosmological

faith for its power. With regard to appropriateness, any claim that soteria is provisional is

weakened by the force with it is presented. The response also fails to address the theologian's

loss of distinctive identity, which is inevitable because there is nothing that Kniîter proposes in

his mode1 that Habermas could not himself propose (and in many cases hm proposed).

Regarding coherence, there is a disagreement about the relative priority of religious tnith and

justice. This. I think. is fairly effective in avoiding Heim's criticism. although there is again the

problem regarding the force with which Knitter presents his case for soteriu.

While 1 do not wish to undervalue the problems with each response. the serious problems

arise when the responses are considered together. The more Knitter insists that religious buth is

a fonn of universally available cosmological faith, the more he opens himself to Habermas'

attack on the distinctiveness of theological discourse. If Knitter attempts to argue for the

distinctiveness of theological discourse. then Hauenvas will be there to ask: why is soteriocentric

pluralism necessary, if Christians are distinct? Should we not be working out our distinct

salvation, and modeling it for others? If Knitter atternpts to hold on to Christian distinctiveness

while relativizing al1 religions, Heim again raises the question of why soteria is not relativized in

the same way. To the extent Knitter can argue that soteria draws on our cornrnon cosmological

story and is thus prior to its expression in the religions, Habermas returns with challenge to the

theologian's distinctiveness. This proceeds in an endless circle, yet does not get to the heart of

the matter. Sotenocentric pluralism clearly does not work in the way that it claims to, but the

criticisms oniy hint as to why that is. To determine why the sotenocentric project Iacks

consistency, we must identiQ the issues that are implicit in the discussion.

Part III: ldentifying Issues lmplicit in the Discussion

In the discussion between Knitter and his critics. we have seen that the different components

of his model exist CO-exist in a destructive tension, where the force of one claim (e-g. universally

available soteria) necessari1 y weakens another daim (e-g. the distinctiveness of religious

discourse). It is not simply the particular claims of the model which are at fault. nor does it

necessarily indicate a lack of organization on Knitter's part. These tensions are al1 present in the

foundation of his model, his "cosmological faith", and cannot help but manifest thernselves in his

model. By examining Knitter's presentation of his cosmological faith in more detail. we will see

two ways in which this is evident: the tension between faith and ideology. and the tension

between truth and modernity.

Faith and ldeology

The theme of Knitter's biography was his encounters with the -Otherl. be they religious

Other or d e r i n g Other. We cm uncover the faith/ideology tension inbinsic to this theme by

asking: who, precisely. is a religious Other? Recalling the continuum that extends from

'monologicai' to 'dialogical'. we see that discourse which happens only among Christians is

considered to be firmly at the monological end; it is ecclesioceneic. Thus. for Knitter.

'Christian' functions as a crucial identifjhg feature, since Christians are not sufficiently

religiously 'Other' to be discourse partners in a correlative dialogue. Yet 'Christian' itself does

not get a precise dennition. Ultimately, it cannot have one, for to do so would be to shifi the

criterion for the othemess that is required for a dialogue to be correlative.

Knitter proposes to control the marner in which religious discourse happens (hence his

model). The participants m u t be religiously 'Other' (correlational), and the discourse must

concern eco-human well-king (globally responsible). Which is the most important? If

admission to the dialogue requires that 1 must be committed to eco-human well-king, yet it

matters not which 'faith' 1 adhere to (or indeed whether I adhere to any), then is it not clear that

my "cosmological fai th is my primary identiQing feature? If this is so. then it inevitably

follows that Christians who do not share this cornmitment to eco-human well-being are far more

'Other' than those who do share it, no matter what their religion. This exposes the fdse sense of

progression that Knitter presents in his attempt to 'center' dialogue. While theocentrism was

more 'open' than christocentrism, it was too nebulous to ground a dialogue. Soteriocentrism is

presented as move beyond (and thus more open than) theocentrism. but it is in fact a significant

move in the oiher direction. It is not nebulous in the least; rather, it places sharp restrictions on

the dialogue which are difficult to see because it does not do so on the basis of one's adherence

to a particular religion. What it does do however, is restrict access to the dialogue based on

one's conversion to 'cosmologicaI faitho:

. . .the ïHorldly'' conversion of devoting oneself unrestrictedly to the well-being of our suffering relatives and planet. If al1 participants in dialogue are genuinely converted to eco-human well-king, if this is the pre-religioui prioriîy in their lives, then I am quite sure that something like the globally responsible dialogue will work (Knitter 1995. 133. emphases mine).

Even Hauerwas would agree with this assessment; with the possible cuveut that Knitter is

proposing a neo-paganism. There is a narrative grounding in the cosmological story of our

common planet, and al1 members of the dialogue are "converted" to the "pre-religious" faith.

The dialogue is not correlative, nor even inclusivist (as Heim argues), but profoundly exclusivist.

I d e n m g exclusivist versions of faith as -ideological' plays a crucial role in Knitter's

theology, and ments closer examination. As his own "cosmological faith" presumably avoids

the 'ideology' label, it is worth investigating why this is so. Knitter defines ideology as:

the prevalent, really unavoidable. tendency that we al1 have to use our "tniW as a means to promote our own welfare (economic or societal) at the cost of othea. or to use our own advantage or prestige as the subconscious criterion for determining what tmth is (Knitter 1 996,33).

Knitter's definition ties ideology to selfishness in the strongest possible ternis: it is

necessarily an abuse. and fbndamentally dishonest. As with his mode1 for discourse. this has its

roots in Habermas:

Frorn everyday experience we know that ideas serve often enough to fumish our actions with justi@ng motives in place of the real ones. What is called rufionalizution at this level is called ideolog~ at the level of collective action (Habermas 1971.3 1 I ).

Habermas has a deep mistrust for received wisdom, believing that al1 knowledge is necessady

intenvoven with human interests, and thus susceptible to appropriation by those in power. He

proposes a critique of ideology which aims at identiSing interests and excluding them fiom

statements of knowledge. It appears that Knitter is atternpting to do the sarne thing:

... in multireligious cornmunities of action and reflection on each other's religious heritage, the participants mut first be suspicious of how their traditions may have been abused.. .there is no ideologically pure religion; al1 religious communities have simed (Knitter 1995, 146-7).

This is a curious move, for Knitter's use of "ideologically pure" does not cohere well with how

'ideology' is used in discourse. For Knitter, ideology is not a perspective. a body of beliefs or a

visionsuy theorizing, as might be commonly associated with ideology; " it is a tendency to allow

our 'religious tnith' (knowledge) to justiS the advance of our own welfare (human interest).

Thus, using Knitter's definition, asking whether his 'cosmological faith' is an ideology is to ask

whether it tends toward justifying selfishness and abuse of prestige.

If 'ideology' signifies a dishonest tendency to promote our own welfare, then what word

signifies a 'perspective', a 'body of beliefs' or a 'visionary theorizing' for Knitter? It seems that

--- - - - -- - - --

" Both 'body of beliefs' and 'visionary theorizing' appear in the Webster's definition of ideology.

62

Knitter uses 'faith' to refer to these concepts. His cosmological 'faith' is certaidy a perspective.

and while elucidating i t he asks whether Thomas Berry's notion that the "human cornmunity

becomes sacred through its participation in the larger planetary comrnunity" is not a -'vision

worthy of our trust and commitment" (Knitter 1995. 12 1). This is furiher supported by the

offhand way in which Knitter codates two very different words when describing his

cosmological faith. He begins his description: "This cosmoIogical awareness or fâith.. . - (ibid..

35, emphasis mine). To present ' faith' and 'awareness' as synonyms is extremely problematic.

This can be demonstrated by observhg the preposition that accompanies each word. One has an

awareness cfsomething, whereas one places faith in something. Awareness lacks the sense of

relationship that is inherent in faith. Something that one is aware of is something that is

immanent: it is possessed.l" Once 1 am aware of something, that awareness becomes information

that is at my disposal. Faith is quite the opposite. Once 1 place my faith in something (or

someone). 1 have now made myself vulnerable to the object of my fâith. Faith is not something

that 1 can have in the sense of ownership, it is something I must /ive. and ir must open toward

something that is beyond myself.J7

With this we corne to a crucial issue that soteriocenûic pluralism is simply unable to cope

with. In one sense. faith is the motive power behind the soteriocentrk enterprise, but it cannoi

be acknowledged as faith in anythmg particular, for it would then fail the test of universalit).. No

one is to be excluded from the dialogue, yet bringing 'faith7 h t o the dialogue will serve to do

-

46 If awareness is augmentai by 'recognition7 (ie. 1 am aware of you), then awareness could have a relational element, but even this would rest more on the recognition than the awareness. At any rate, Knitter's formulation does not incorporate this sense of inter-subjectivity. " Even 'awareness' seems to be an inappropriate tem, given that it is describing a "commitment to overcome".

63

just that. Recail Knitter3 definition of his cosmological faith which attempts to circumvent this

pro blem:

. . .our bdamental commitment. animateci by an ofien inexplicable hope. to overcome what threatens and to advance what promotes human and ecological well-king (Knitter 1996, 35).

He =fers to it as a "basic criterion" by which we will judge the authenticity of religion.

Each religion3 expression of its .faith' is but an instance of the attempt to render this

fundamental commitment concrete. Otherwise. there is no way for that cornmitment to f ict ion

as a criterion. AU faith is considered to be potential ideology. and must prove its cornmitment to

beco-human well-king' as Knitter defines it before it can shed the -ideology' label. This sets up

the odd situation where a secular humanist who has this cosmological awareness is suddenly

qualified to pass judgement on the authenticity of any given religion. This is a necessary. but not

surprising. consequence of soteriocentrism given its transparent grounding in Habermas'

modem social analysis. which the hurnanist has full access to.

The dependence on modem social analysis uncovers at least part of the pluraiist motivation.

The urge to unite the religions under one pluralist banner (which is actually quite inclusivist)

springs h m an implicit, yet very arnbitious, apologetic agenda. As was noted earlier. Tracy's

correlational approach is in part designed to render Christianity credible to the modem mind.

P l d i s t theology has a broader scope, but a simila. focal point. It is religion in general whose

credibility must be protected. The pmblem is ostensibly an intra-religious one (each religion

m u t recognize that it is not the only 'mie' religion ) but the manner of controlling the interaction

between religions is telling. That Knitter's criterion of soreria (eco-human well-being) has no

pst-mortem focus (a -~or ld ly" conversion), and coincides with the individualist ethic that is

espoused by modem social criticism is not an accident?' Were the efforts the pluralists to result

in inter-religious peace at the expense of all religions k i n g seen as irrelevant. or false. or simpl y

fünctional. this would be an utter failure. Fundamental to the entire project is the notion that it is

the ideological abuse of religion. not religion itself that is the problem. On the conb;uy. once we

shed our narrow exclusivist. and then our arrogant inclusivist views. religion will be the motive

force behind the solution to the problem.

Viewing the project in this apologetic light gives a possible explanation as to why pluralists

have a blind spot regarding their own inclusivist (and even exclusivist) tendencies. While

hoping to somehow unite the religions to stand against a secularism which threatens to

marginalize religion completely (and perhaps destmy the planet in the process). they are acutely

aware that Christianity is not able to captain the team. The consistent attack on the 'plausibility'

of Christianity by modem secular thinken has left many Christians with an insecurity regarding

the authenticity of their own religion. As Heim notes:

Plurdists may condemn the inclusivist's judgement as arrogant but it appears that they are at l em equally concerned that the inclusivist daim is apologetically ineffective. To p u n d other religions' validity in the biblical God is to do them no favors. seeing how pmblematic that God is (ibid.. 1 18).

The tension in this is palpable: a religion grounded in the biblical God cannot be deemed m e bp

modernity. This tension between religious and modem mith has led to a soteriocentric strate=

which proposes to uni@ the religions in a way that is ulso credible to modernity. It is a 'safety in

numbers' strategy which. by defusing the modem criticism that religion leads to intolerance and

contlict. while also gathering the religions under one pluralist banner. aims to solidify the status

of religion in an increasingly secular world. Furthemore. it is a 'faith' that is acceptable to

ûther prominent pluralists use different models which have the same characteristic. John Hick's use of modem epistemology and Wilned Cantwell Smith's use of modem cultural anthpology are both credible to modemity.

65

modemity precisely because it is a faith in modernity; at least insofar as modernity is embodied

in critical social theory. The irnplicit nature of this faith in modemity opens Knitter's

cosmological faith to his own attack regarding ideological tendencies. Cosmological faith. as

manifest4 in soteria, is ostensibly a criterion to mediate rival versions of religious truth: but it

also forwards the interest in making religion credible to modernity. It seems that. at least by

Habermas' definition. this qualifies as an ideology.

Tnrth and Modemity

Knitter's implicit embrace of rnodernity has consequences al1 through his theology. There is

an unmistakable theme of development or maturation in his theology, and this is refiected in his

account of truth. He refers to his notion of truth as "processive-relational" (which has a

postmodem flavor). but a more accurate tenn would be developmental-perspectival (which is

distinctly modem). It is developrnentul because his "cosmological faith" shares one characteristic

with a classical religious faith: It makes itself vulnerable by grounding itself in a particular

nanative, which Knitter designates as our b4common cosmological story":

The Earth itself, as it is seen by science, can become (1 am not saying must become) a source of new insights and feelings for the relation between the Transcendent and the finite ... the Earth is providing us not only with a context for experiencing the DivineITruth in a vast variety of ways.. .but also with a common story by which we can better understand our different religious experiences (Knitter 1995, 13 1, 1 1 8-9).

Although m e r will not Say that the scientific story of the universe "mut become" the unifying

meta-narrative which will gromd interreligious dialogue, he argues passionately that it should

become one. The primary difficulty with this strategy is its utter incompatibility with any notion

of a personal, living God. Modem science, when teiling its cosmological story, makes one of its

assumptions very explicit: naturalisrn. Naturalism assumes that the way the universe works

t&y is the way that the universe has always worked, and that there h a never been any extemal

interference. This is an extremely practicai assumption. for to reject this is to stop doing science.

The very notion of a 'controlled' experiment is dependent on the naturalist assumption. and the

attempt to reconstruct our 'naturalg history is impossible without it. Not d l scientists believe in

naturalisrn. Those who do believe it are called 'ontological' or -philosophical' naniralists.

Those who do not. however. must nevertheless proceed on the assumption of naturalism while

they are practicing science. Much like the -'methodical atheism" which prohibits philosophes

fiom bring their personal beliefs into their investigations. "methodo logical naturali smog prevents

scientists fiom positing external forces which intrude upon our u n i v e r ~ e . ~ ~ If Knitter wishes to

appeal to this cosmological story. he must take it with its assurnptions. This means that in

Knitteros story. God cannot act. It is aiso why bitter tends to refer to his notion of God with

capitalized impersonal names such as Transcendent. Divine. Mystery or Source? The

"methodical atheism" which characterizes Knitter's phenomenological approach to religion has

resulted in a Deism which can cohere with a naturai evolutionary story.

Knitter's notion of tnith is perspeciival in that rival truths are mediated by referring to an

outside criterion. Perspectival mith attempts to resolve the tensions between tmth claims which

are apparently incompatible by demonstrating that they are incomplete. It is often illustrated by

the old story in which several blind men stumble upon an elephant and attempt to determine what

it is. The man who feels the side thinks it is a wall, the man who feels the tnuik thinks that it is a

d e , and the man who feels the leg thinks that it is a tree. As it tums out, their apparently

incompatible views tum out to be complementary. because each has an incomplete expenence of

49 These classifications came under discussion at the "Naturalism, Theism, and the Scientific Enterprise" conference held in Febniary of 1997. The proceedings are as yet unpublished, but a copy of each paper presented can be found at: w w w . d l a . u t e x a s . e d u / d e p t s / p b i l o s o p h y / f a c ~

the elephant Once they share their views with each other they have a more complete

understanding of the phenornenon that they have encountered. So. say the peapectivalists. it is

for religious experience. Each have a version of the ultimate reality. and by sharing each

version. we will come to a more 'complete' version of the truth about this ultimate reality.

There are two problems with this analogy. First is that what is k i n g descnbed is actually a

realist version of tnnh. The entire metaphor is predicated on the notion that there is - ~ a l l y ' an

eiephant there, and that the men are having true but incomplete expenence of it. They are al1

interacting with the same 'thing'. which exists as what it is independent of their opinions. In

fact, when followed through to the end. we are dealing with the correspondence theory of t - t h

(see note 11). Each man's opinion corresponds correctly but only partially with the 'thing' in

question (the elephant). Once they cornmunicate with each other and integrate al1 of the

opinions, they ideally will come up with a complete version of the elephant. Obviously implied

is the notion that if the man who is of the opinion that they have encountered a tree is satisfied

with his explanation? and seeks no fùrther information. his encounter is somehow inferior to

those who have pooled their knowledge.

We can see in this parable that rival versions of truth do not 'relate' to one another directly.

They judge one another relative to their adequacy in describing the -thingo in question. The

more a 'truth' interacts with other 'tnith', the closer it gets to the Truth. Any religious mith

which declares itself adequate is thus inferior due to its lack of interaction with other religious

truth, much like the blind man who refuses to converse, and walks away believing that he has

just encountered a snake.

'O ". . .I understand such a conversion to the well-king of the world and othen to be a conversion to the Great Mystery" (Knitter 1995, 197n.7).

68

The second problem is the perspective h m which the story is told. The characters in the

story have to be deficient in some marner (in this case blind) for the story to work. If there were

no sighted nanator (whose perspective is implicitly given as superior. since he can see 'the

whole picture'), there would simply be no means of addressing the problem in the first place.

The only reason we can identiQ the 'wall'. 'snake'. and 'tree' versions as inadequate is because

there is someone who can k e g the entire elephant. The analogy between the elephant and

religious tmth is completely broken at this point, for there is no corresponding 'sighted' person.

Yet this is the role in which Knitter casts himself. Each religious 'tmth' can. rather than engaging

other 'truth' directly, judge the value of other truth by how well it matches up against the

critenon of eco-human well-king (which is a manifestation of Truth). This explains Knitter's

derisive attitude toward religious 'îruth'. Tmth, in this light, is a possession; a tool which has a

function. It can be used negatively or positively, and the criterion for judging this are somehow

above it.

Knitter's version of truth is perspectival as opposed to relational because it demands that

rival versions of tmth be evaluated in terms of a criterion which is not part of any venion. but to

which al1 versions refer. The fundamentai commitment to eco-human well-king is not part of

any religion, but is rather the manifestation of the Truth to which ail religions point. Truth

cannot be found by simply relating tniths to one another, there must be a reference to the 'thing'

(the Divine as manifested in soieria) in question. Knitter's version of truth is developmental as

opposed to simply processive partly because of its perspectival nature. but more because it is

grounded in an narrative whose themes are evolution and progress.

Habermas' mistrust of received wisdom is not without cause; in the post-classical e ra the

rules are fluid enough that ofien the best way to resolve a conflict in one's favor is to assume the

role of referee; a meta-position which judges the competing views. One can then adjust the rules

so that one's view becomes dominant. This is the great tension that exists between mth and

modernity : al1 tnith daims must pass through the identityhonsontradic tion fil tea befo re the y

can even be considered as tmth claims, and anyone who insists on holding to tnith clairns that

cannot pass through these filters is considered delusional and perhaps dangerous. Notice that

this is the light in which Knitter considee exclusivist religious truth. using terms such as

b'ungrounded hubris" and "downright nasty" (Knitter 1995. 5; 1996, 34). Whatever Habermas'

justification is for his skepticism regarding received wisdom (and it is problematic). he freely

adrnits that it excludes him from doing theology. Knitter's skepticism (or "suspicion") stands at

odds with his religious convictions, yet he is not willing to give up either. He thus attempts to

present a 'faithg that can pass muster at the bar of modern truth.

The two tensions we have discussed cannot be resolved easily, nor is their resolution

necessarily desirable. Not al1 tension is destructive. and it is often a mistake to look for complete

resolution. Some account, however. has to be given for how religious and modem versions of

tnith are to co-exist; without a simple synthesis, or the colonization of one by the other. I would

suggest that a new hermeneutic is required if the discussion is to go fonvard. The means by

which we interpret our world and out faith has a great impact not only on what we deem to be

true, but ais0 what is to count as truth.

Conclusion

The Hetmeneutic of Development

As I noted when first engaging Knitter, he f i d y believes that theology is rooted in

biography. While this can be taken to mean that any theologian will necessarily engage his

materid h m the perspective of his life experience, there is another more encompassing

implication of Knitter's belief. He not only uses events in his life experience to fuel his

theological inquiries, these inquines actually take on the structure of a biography; a structure

which charts the development of a penon. This hermeneutic of development controls how

Knitter engages his subject matter. He presents his own biography as a model through which to

interpret his theology. As he matwd as a person, his theology undenvent a similar

development: fiom ecclesiocentrism to christocentrisrn to theocentrism and finally

soteriocenaisrn; or, altematively, fiom exclusivism to inclusivism to pluralism. He presents his

"globally responsible. correlational model for dialogue" as the product of this developmental

process. This developmental hermeneutic, however, is not simply used to interpret his own life

and thought; al1 theology is now interpreted with respect to where it fits in to the various

dewlopmental classifications.

Each of Knitter's critics implicitly contest this shaping of theology. Hauerwas, in

questioning the necessity of soteriocentric pluralism, argues that the separation of ethics from the

faith community in which they are grounded results in a weakening of their daim on the lives of

those who hold to them. Far fiom k i n g a development, it is a regression. Habermas, in

challenging the appropriateness of the correlational theology in which bitter's mode1 is

grounded, demonstrates that by engaging religious experiences phenomenologically, one

sacrifices the ability to view them nom the inside, as it were. This is not a development of

theology, but rather a radical departuse from it. Heim. in challenging the coherence of bitter's

soteriocentrism. stresses that soteriocentrism is not piuralist at ail, but inclusivist. Those who are

cornmitted to fostering eco-human well-being are saved by this, regardless of how they think

they are saved. Sotenocentrism does not improve on theocentrism. but rather conhws the issue.

since it is not aware of its own inclusivist tendencies. He conciudes that this blindness is due to

the apologetic undercurent in the pluralist project; the quest to make Christianity credible to

modemity.

Engaging the quest for social justice under the rubric of seeking peace amongst the religions

points to the tension between faith and ideology. Faiths which do not wish to converse with

other faiths on the subject of sotena are, according to Knitter, plaidy ideoiogical and *'cannot be

fiom God" (Knitter 1996, 36). Yet the criterion of soteria is one that does not depend on any of

the religions, but on modem critical social theory. As Heim puts it:

The religions are important recniits, but they are recmits for a struggle regarding whose definition and strategy they are to have very Iittle substantive say (Heim 1995, 1 16).

This attempt to many religious motivation with action prescribed by modem analysis creates an

unbearable tension. The only 'authentic' behaviors of a religion are those which seek to address

oppression and suffering, the causative mechanisms of which are identified by critical social

theory. Simple acts of charity or compassion as may be prescribed by the religious traditions are

not what is k i n g discussed for they do not address the ' problem' . Such religious acts are fine in

their way, but are based on pre-modem social relationships and must be developed to address

modem problems. This is an assumption of a 'meta-position' fiom which Knitter can judge al1

other positions. It is the latest stage of the evolution of theology, another instance of the

hermeneutic of development. Ail religious 'truths' are but perspectives on how to achieve the

'thing ' itsel f: eco-human well- being .

Knitter's hermeneutic of developrnent leads him to conclude that his "cosmologicai fith" is

closer to the Truth than any other 'faith' because it has evolved further. Rather than naively

accepting religious trutk it is able to criticize the ideological tendencies of religious truth h m

the perspective of justice, using the Earth as our common story. The dificuity is that the

perspective nom which one is to criticize a 'faith' in its entirety must necessarily be outside that

faith. which means that the cnteria for adequacy will inevitably detennined 'outside' the faith.

This is what Knitter does, and one wonders where he is standing when he does it.

A Way Fornard

As we traced the lines of Knitter's thought back through the correlational theology of Tracy.

we discovered that Habermas, who has had a great influence on Tracy, had important insights

into what philosophy could not do when engaging religious experience. By tuming to another of

Tracy's major influences, Paul Ricoeur. we can perhaps find important insight into what can be

done when engaging a religion fiom the outside, as any interreligious dialogue proposes to do.

Ricoeur's treatrnent of concepts such as 'truth' and 'faith' may give a fiesh perspective which

can, if not rehabilitate Knitter's model, at least address the concerns which gave rise to it. 1 do

not propose to fûlly engage Ricoeur's thought here, but merely to demonstrate why f think this is

a promising avenue of exploration.

Ricoeur does have experience in addressing the inevitable tension that &ses when

modemity intenicts with tradition. His brilliant essay, "Hermeneutics and the Critique of

Ideology", engages both Habermas and Gadamer conceming what he calls I h e fundamental

gesture of philosophy" (Ricoeur 1981, 63), which is directed toward the initial value systems

73

which we receive h m out tradition. For Habermas the gesture is a gesture of defiance. while

for Gadamer it is one of respect. This is important because Knitter is an adherent of the

Christian religion, but is deeply suspicious of its clairns, especially regarding exclusivity. While

Knitter embraces Gadarner's notion of "effective history". he is also. Iike Habermas. pro foundl y

motivated by an "eschatology of non-violence"." in Ricoeur's terminology. Knitter's

hdamental gesture is one of confusion.

As he did with the Gadamer/Habermas debate, Ricoeur entea the discussion of religious

dialogue by way of linguistic andysis:

... whatever may be the nature of the so-called religious experience. it cornes to language, it is articulated in language. and the most appropriate place to interpret it on its own ternis is to inquire into its linguistic expression. (Ricoeur 1995.35).

Ricoeur is a highly skilled hermeneuticist. and has a great sensitivity to the dangers of

unconsciously imposing one's own hermeneutic on a foreign subject matter. especially when the

subject matter is religion. Notice that the aim is to engage religious experience "on its own

terms". He stresses that this is especially so with regard to a religion's claim that it is tme. This

opens us to challenges regarding our own notions of mith:

we do not yet recognize the mith value of this [religious] language if we do not put in question the criteria for tnith that are borrowed h m other spheres of discourse. mainly the scientific one. whether we invoke a criterion of verification or a criterion of falsification (ibid.).

As long as the interaction is unidirectional, religious discourse cannot be engaged on its own

terms. There must be a play between the world of the questioner and the world disclosed by the

religious language, else there is nothing to be gained by the venture. He criticizes modem

linguistic analysis for king blind to this point:

-- -

" For Knitter's appropriation of Gadamer, see Knitter 1995. 73-74. For an analysis of Habermas' eschatology of non-violence, see Ricoeur 198 1, esp. pp. 84-88. It would be

Linguistic analysis is so heavily detennined by the history of the principles of verification and falsification that it is very dificuit for this school of thought to conceive of a concept of truth that would not be taken for granted and defîned a priori as udequation. The idea that each mode of Mfillment develops its own criteria of truth and that truth may mean not adequation but manifstation seems to be alien to the main thesis of linguistic analysis (ibid., 36).

This illustrates why I consider Knitter's 'gesture' to be one of confusion. He does demonstrate

an understanding of the problems involved, but is indecisive in his treatment. He expresses a

desire to h d a path between a sterile modem essentialisrn and an inchoate postmodern

celebration of diversity (Knitter 1995, 74), and even cites Tracy (wbo is in turn citing Ricoeur)

on the possibility of considering tmth as manifstation (ibid., 125). Ultimately, however. he opts

for an ethical-political criteria on the grounds that it "less culturally conditioned" and promises

to be more effective in breaking through "the postmodem roadblock of 'incommensurability'**

(ibid.. 126). Like the linguistic analysts, he cannot embrace a concept of truth that does not

involve adequation. His selection does not break through the "postmodem roadblock". but

rather asserts that it is not there. He presents soteria as a means of cornmensuration; but as Heim

noted. Knitter's soteria may well prove to be the most culturally conditioned cnterion of ail.

There are many M e r reasons why Ricoeur rnight be a valuable resource in the continuing

conversation on interreligious dialogue (Schrifrlichkeit vs. Sprachlichkeit, narrative theology.

proclamation, etc.), but even this brief glimpse illuminates productive avenues of exploration.

The engagement of another religion's sacred texts, allowing those texts to speak on their own

terms and affecting the reader in a way that forces a reevaluation of one's own sacred texts can

be seen in Frank Clooney's engagement of Tamil devotiond poetry (Clooney 1990). The

structure that is inherent in textuality may focus the 'dialogue' in way that conversation cannot.

interesting to explore how closely the coexistence of history and eschatology in bi t ter% theology comects Knitter to Hegel.

75

This glimpse of Ricoeur also suggests some constraints on interreligious dialogue. The

religious lanpuaee that is king considerd mut be allowed to challenge in tum. without

reference to extemal criteria A consequence of this is that interreligious dialogue must be a

dialogue. not a mulfilogue. Lindbeck points this out when questioning the value of -centering'

interreligious discourse:

In the absence of any single unifyuig theme such as saivation. multi-lateral interreligious discourse is likely to wane in favor of bilateral varieties. In summary. the current major options in regard to uniqueness whether pluralist inclusivist. or exclusivist are irrelevant to the a d relations of religions except in situations where fear and guilt regarding Christian proselytisrn are salient (Lindbeck 1997.4254).

Reference to extemal criteria becornes necessary ody when there are more than two parties

involved in the discourse. If the scope of the interreligious project is m w e d h m accounting

for a l l other religions at once to engaging each other religion in tum. then both sides mi11 be able

to remaùi open to the manifestation of truth in the words of their interlocutor.

Knitter should be applauded for his efforts to forge a new mode1 for interreligious

interaction He displays an uncommon and admirable. dnerability by working out the

implications of his theolop in public. Were he not so forthright about his ~cosmological faith.

the tensions inherent in his mode1 would be much more difficult to apprehend. These tensions

are there. however. and must be addressecl. The =ope of such an inquiry estends far beyond the

reach of intemeligious dialogue and into the very identity of Christians who live their lives in the

modem Western world. As Hawnvas n o t d Christianity is in the uncomfortable position of

king neither M y established in nor Mly disestablished h m Western culture. One's identity

as a Christian dernaads that one have faith. which lends itself to a concept of tmth as

manijstution; one's identity as a citizen of the modem West demands that one reject faith.

dernanding that truth be adequate to reality . These two identities mut be brought into dialogue.

or the fkst one is in danger of king l o s altogether. 76

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Bmten. Carl. "Chnstocentric Trinitananism vs. Unitarian Theocenûism: A Response to Mark Heim." J o d of Ecumenical Studies 24(I) : 1 7-2 1

Browning, Don S., and Fiorenza, Francis Schussler, eds. 1992. Habermas, Modernify, and Public Theology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cobb, John B. Jr. 1987. Response to S. Mark Heirn." Journal of Ecumenical Studies 24(I): 22- 3.

D'Costa, Gavin. 1985. "Review of No Other Name?" Modern Theology 4: 53-4.

Fiorenza. Francis Schussler. 1992. "Introduction: a Critical Reception for Fractical Public Theology." In Browning and Fiorenza 1992, Habermas. Mudernity. and Public Theology.

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