ieta letter ets registry 16 may annex

2
 IETA-ClimateChallenges,MarketSolutions 100 King Street West, Suite 5700, Toronto, Ontario M5X 1C7, Canada Tel. +1 (416) 913 0135 Boite 27 Rue de la Loi 235 Brussels, 1040, Belgium Tel: +32 (0)22 30 11 60 Re . 088 9.0 72. 702 24, Rue Merle d’Aubigné Geneva, 1207, Switzerland Tel: +41 (22) 737 0500 1730 Rhode Island Ave., NW, Suite 802, Washington, DC 20036 USA Tel: +1 (202) 629-5980 Annex:ownershipandfinalityoftransfer Article37andArticle88(7) IETArecognisesandappreciatestheattemptbytheCommissiontoprovideclarityinrelationto thedeterminationofownershipandpreventionoftheunwindingoftransactionsenvisagedby these two provisions. However, IETA is concerned that , in pursuit of this object ive, the pro vis ions hav e the pot ent ial to cause a number of unintended consequences and yet not provideadefinitiveoutcometotheissuesfacingthemarketonallegedlystolenallowances. The re appears to be inconsistenc y wit h the intention expressed at recital (12) of the draft RegulationwherebyitisexpressedthattheRegulationshouldnot"preventanaccountholderor a thir d party from exercisingany right or claim resulti ng from theunderl ying transact ionthat they have inlawtorecoveryorrestitutionin respectofatransaction...".Thisimplies that a vic tim of a thef t of all owances may nonet heless seek remedies against someone who may currently betheholderof thealleged lystolenallowance sbutthatsuch remedydoesnote xtend tothereturn(i.e.restitution)oftheallegedlystolenallowances.Asweunderstandtheeffectof thesecond paragraph of theabove-mentioned prov isions, this means theinnocent holder of such allowances maynonetheless facea potential claim from thevictim for compe nsation or ot her equitabl e remedy avai lable in law. Addi tionally, paragraph (3) expressly recognises excep tions ag ainst the un wi n di n g of transac tions in c ir cum sta nc es where i ns olv en c y proc eedi ngshave been formally commenced. This exce ption fail s to recogni se that under the la ws of m an y jur isdicti ons, t ra ns actio ns can be unwou nd that were e nte red in to in circumstancesearlierthantheformalcommencementofinsolvencyproceedings(forexample wherethec ounterparty knewatthe timeofthe transactiont hattheent itywasunableto payits debt s). The carve-outs may therefore be unduly restrictive in thei r appl ication and have the effectofchangingtheinsolvencylawsofsomeMemberStates. Thereare otherissuesthatarise fromthe scopeand the language ofthe provisionsthatare worthfurtherconsideration.Forexample: (a)Thee ffectof paragraph(1) oftheprovis ions,thatcit esthatownersh ipofanallowance changesupontransf er,mayhavetheeff ectofprevent ingallowancesandKyotouni ts from being used as a means of raisi ng finance(for example, by prevent a security interestto betakenove rtheallowanc esinathirdpa rtyaccount). Wecannotsee why such a limitation of the commercial use of anallowance or Kyotounit shouldarise withoutmoredetailedconsultationwiththeMemberStatesandindustryfirst. (b)Similarl y,byparagraph(1)st atingthatowners hipisconclusiveupon transfer,thi smay havetheinadvertenteffe ctofpreve ntingcustody serviceprovide rsinallowancesand

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Page 1: IETA Letter ETS Registry 16 May Annex

8/6/2019 IETA Letter ETS Registry 16 May Annex

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/ieta-letter-ets-registry-16-may-annex 1/2

 

IETA-ClimateChallenges,MarketSolutions

100 King Street West, Suite5700, Toronto, Ontario

M5X 1C7, CanadaTel. +1 (416) 913 0135

Boite 27Rue de la Loi 235

Brussels, 1040, BelgiumTel: +32 (0)22 30 11 60Re . 0889.072.702

24, Rue Merle d’AubignéGeneva, 1207, Switzerland

Tel: +41 (22) 737 0500

1730 Rhode Island Ave., NW,Suite 802, Washington, DC

20036 USATel: +1 (202) 629-5980

Annex:ownershipandfinalityoftransfer

Article37andArticle88(7)

IETArecognisesandappreciatestheattemptbytheCommissiontoprovideclarityinrelationto

thedeterminationofownershipandpreventionoftheunwindingoftransactionsenvisagedby

these two provisions. However, IETA is concerned that, in pursuit of this objective, the

provisions have the potential to cause a number of unintended consequences and yet not

provideadefinitiveoutcometotheissuesfacingthemarketonallegedlystolenallowances.

There appears to be inconsistency with the intention expressed at recital (12) of the draft

RegulationwherebyitisexpressedthattheRegulationshouldnot"preventanaccountholderor

a thirdparty fromexercisingany rightorclaimresultingfromtheunderlying transactionthat

theyhaveinlawtorecoveryorrestitutioninrespectofatransaction...".Thisimpliesthata

victim of a theft of allowances may nonetheless seek remedies against someone who may

currentlybetheholderoftheallegedlystolenallowancesbutthatsuchremedydoesnotextend

tothereturn(i.e.restitution)oftheallegedlystolenallowances.Asweunderstandtheeffectof

thesecondparagraph of theabove-mentioned provisions, thismeans theinnocent holderof

suchallowancesmaynonethelessfacea potential claim from thevictimforcompensationor

other equitable remedy available in law. Additionally, paragraph (3) expressly recognises

exceptions against the unwinding of transactions in circumstances where insolvency

proceedingshavebeen formally commenced.This exception fails torecognisethatunder the

laws of many jurisdictions, transactions can be unwound that were entered into incircumstancesearlierthantheformalcommencementofinsolvencyproceedings(forexample

wherethecounterpartyknewatthetimeofthetransactionthattheentitywasunabletopayits

debts). Thecarve-outsmay therefore be unduly restrictive in their applicationandhave the

effectofchangingtheinsolvencylawsofsomeMemberStates.

Thereareotherissuesthatarisefromthescopeandthelanguageoftheprovisionsthatare

worthfurtherconsideration.Forexample:

(a)Theeffectofparagraph(1)oftheprovisions,thatcitesthatownershipofanallowance

changesupontransfer,mayhavetheeffectofpreventingallowancesandKyotounits

from beingused as ameans of raising finance(for example, bypreventa security

interesttobetakenovertheallowancesinathirdpartyaccount).Wecannotseewhy

suchalimitationofthecommercialuseofanallowanceorKyotounitshouldarise

withoutmoredetailedconsultationwiththeMemberStatesandindustryfirst.

(b)Similarly,byparagraph(1)statingthatownershipisconclusiveupontransfer,thismay

havetheinadvertenteffectofpreventingcustodyserviceprovidersinallowancesand

Page 2: IETA Letter ETS Registry 16 May Annex

8/6/2019 IETA Letter ETS Registry 16 May Annex

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/ieta-letter-ets-registry-16-may-annex 2/2

 Kyotounitsfrombeingabletoholdingsuchcreditsforthebeneficialinterestoftheir

customers. This tooappears tobeanunnecessarydevelopment further restricting

thescopeoftheEUETStogrowasamarket.

(c)Paragraph1oftheprovisionsonlyapplytotheholdingofallowancesorKyotounitsin

theUnionRegistry.AsweunderstandthescopeoftheRegistriesRegulation,AAUs

will continue to be held by Member States in KP Registries. As a result of the

limitationoftheprovisionstotheUnionRegistryonly,theresultwouldbeonesetof

lawswouldapplytotransfersofCERsandERUs(heldintheUnionRegistry)anda

differentsetoflawsapplyingtothetransferandholdingofAAUs(inaKPRegistry)in

aMember State. Is this desirable, even in circumstances where the only persons

transferringAAUsfromtheKPRegistriesaretobeMemberStatesthemselves?

Asyouwill appreciate theimpact(inadvertent orotherwise)oftheseprovisions isworthyof

further consideration. Given the short timeframe in which these comments have been

submitted,amorecompleteconsiderationhasnotbeenpossible.However,anumberofIETA's

legalmembersareoftheviewthatanalternativeprovisioncouldbecraftedthatwoulddeliver

theCommission'sobjectiveandhavetheeffectofreducinganyunintendedconsequences.IETA

would be happy to, if given sufficient time, to reachout to its legalmembers to assist the

Commissionwithsuchsuitableamendmentstotheprovisions.