STATE OF INDIANA

INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSION

REQUEST OF INDIANA GAS COMPANY, INC. D/B/A CENTERPOINT ENERGY INDIANA NORTH AND THE COMMISSION’S PIPELINE SAFETY DIVISION FOR APPROVAL OF A CONSENT AGREEMENT RESOLVING PIPELINE SAFETY VIOLATIONS AND NOTICE OF THE COMMISSION’S INTENT TO APPROVE THE CONSENT AGREEMENT.

))))))))

CAUSE NO. 45521

APPROVED:

ORDER OF THE COMMISSION

Presiding Officers: James F. Huston, Chairman Loraine L. Seyfried, Chief Administrative Law Judge

Based upon a letter received from the General Counsel Division of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“Commission”) and pursuant to Ind. Code ch. 8-1-22.5, the Commission commences this Cause to consider a February 24, 2021 Consent Agreement entered into between Indiana Gas Company, Inc. d/b/a CenterPoint Energy Indiana North (“CenterPoint”) and the Commission’s Pipeline Safety Division (“Division”) regarding alleged pipeline safety violations on May 10, 2019 and provides notice of the Commission’s intent to approve the Consent Agreement.

1. Commission Jurisdiction. Under Ind. Code § 8-1-22.5-7(b), the Commission,after notice and opportunity to be heard, may impose a civil penalty against a person that violates Ind. Code ch. 8-1-22.5 or any rules issued under that chapter. CenterPoint is a person as defined by Ind. Code § 8-1-22.5-1(e). Therefore, the Commission has jurisdiction over CenterPoint and the subject matter of this proceeding.

2. Background and Procedural History. On March 2, 2020, the Division issued aNotice of Probable Violation to CenterPoint alleging eight probable violations that occurred on May 10, 2019, including violations regarding tapping a pipeline under pressure and the qualification of pipeline personnel. Letter from Steve Davies, Assistant General Counsel, Commission, to Loraine Seyfried, Chief Administrative Law Judge, Commission (March 3, 2021) (attached).

The Notice of Probable Violation was issued to CenterPoint as a result of the Division’s investigation of an incident at 490 Cramertown Loop, Martinsville, Indiana on May 10, 2019. While CenterPoint’s contractor, Miller Pipeline, was tapping and stopping a 4” steel main, the pipeline ignited, resulting in injuries to a CenterPoint employee, a 175-customer outage, destroyed equipment, and damaged communication lines.

No Noi Commissioner Yes Parti.Clpa.ttng Huston Freeman Kre\•ifa Ober

-Z1egner

2

The Division and CenterPoint have entered into a Consent Agreement resolving the eight alleged violations for which CenterPoint has taken remedial action and agreed to pay a monetary civil penalty of $150,000, which will not be recoverable in the utility’s rates. CenterPoint also waives its right to a public hearing pursuant to Ind. Code §§ 8-1-22.5-7(b) and 8-1-22.5-10.

3. Notice of Intent to Approve Consent Agreement. Based upon the information

submitted by the Commission’s Assistant General Counsel, the Commission provides notice that it intends to approve the February 24, 2021 Consent Agreement unless it receives an objection or request for a hearing filed under this Cause within 20 days from the date of this Order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSION that:

1. After review of the Consent Agreement and based upon information from the

Commission’s General Counsel Division, the Commission provides notice of its intent to approve the February 24, 2021 Consent Agreement.

2. Any objection to the Commission’s proposed approval of the February 24, 2021 Consent Agreement shall be filed under this Cause within 20 days from the date of this Order.

3. This Order shall be effective on and after the date of its approval.

HUSTON, KREVDA, OBER, AND ZIEGNER CONCUR; FREEMAN ABSENT: APPROVED: I hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of the Order as approved. _____________________________________ Dana Kosco Secretary of the Commission

1

March 3, 2021

Loraine Seyfried

Chief Administrative Law Judge

Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission

101 W. Washington Street, Suite 1500 E

Indianapolis, IN 46204

Re: Submission of Consent Agreement between Indiana Gas Company, Inc. d/b/a

CenterPoint Energy Indiana North and the Pipeline Safety Division for

Commission Determination

Dear Judge Seyfried:

I hereby request that the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“Commission”) open a

proceeding to determine approval of the attached Consent Agreement between Indiana Gas

Company, Inc. d/b/a CenterPoint Energy Indiana North (“CEI North”) and the Commission’s

Pipeline Safety Division (“Division”). The Consent Agreement resolves a total of eight

violations of Ind. Code ch. 8-1-22.5 committed by CEI North in Martinsville, Indiana on May

10, 2019.

Specifically, the Division alleged eight probable violations in a Notice of Probable Violation

issued on March 2, 2020, including violations concerning tapping a pipeline under pressure and

the qualification of pipeline personnel. The facts surrounding the eight violations are given in

more detail in the attached Consent Agreement and in the Attachments to the Consent

Agreement. The Division alleged the same eight violations in a Notice of Proposed Penalty

issued on July 20, 2020. CEI North and the Division have agreed in the Consent Agreement to a

monetary penalty of $150,000.00 in addition to the compliance actions detailed therein.

This is the third Consent Agreement submitted by the Division in this manner for Commission

approval. In the previous consent agreements, you circulated this cover letter and the Consent

Agreement (with attachments) to the Commissioners.

If the Commission determines that it desires a public hearing, William Boyd and Mike Neal

should be designated as Testimonial Staff. If the Commission intends to approve the Consent

Agreements without a hearing, it may issue an initial order notifying the public of the

Commission’s intent to approve the Consent Agreements and allow a time period for any

objections or requests for hearing. I recommend a 20-day period for objections. If no other

party objects or requests a hearing within the specified time period, the Commission may then

STATE o/ INDIANA

INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSION 101 WEST WASHINGTON STREET, SUITE 1500 EAST

INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46204-3419

www.in.gov/iurc Office: (317) 232-2701

Facsimile: (317) 232-6758

2

issue an order approving the Consent Agreements. The Division does not anticipate any

objections or requests for a hearing from any other party.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Steve Davies

Assistant General Counsel

cc: Ryan Heater, Chief of Staff

Beth Heline, General Counsel

Bill Boyd, Director Pipeline Safety Division

STATE OF INI)JANA

INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSION

CONSENT AGREEMENT OF INDIANA GAS COMPANY, INC. D/B/A CENTERPOINTENERGY INDIANAN ORTH AND THEPIPELINE SAFETY DIVISION OF THE INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSIONF'QR. APPROVAL OF 'MONETARY CIVIL PENALTIES UNDER IND. CODEC::IL8-l-22;5FOR VIOLATlONS OF MINIMUM PIPELINESAFETY STANDARDS

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

CAUSENb.

STIPULATION, CONSENT AGREEMENT, ANDWAIVER OFEVIDENTIARYHEARING

Indiana Gas Company, In~., d/b/a CenterPoint EnergyJndianaNorth ("CEI North~')> formerly known as Ve.ctren, a CenterPoint Energy Company,andthePipeline SafetyDivisiort (''Division") of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Comrnissiori (''Commission") voluntarily enter into this Stipulation, ConsentAgreement,.and Waiver ofEvidentiary Hearing f'Agteement'') pertainirig to the violatitJris and penalties desc:dbed hetein.

A. Jurisdiction and Procedural Posture

L The Division is responsible foi- the administration and enforcement of compli:ance with federal safety perfol"mance applicabfo to ttanspo1tation and related pipeline facilities established under the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 .and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (49 U.S.C. 6nl0 J et seq.) (the "PHMSA Standards") under Indiana Code ch. 8-1-22.5. The Division is also responsible for the administration and enf9rcernent of compliance with the pipeljne safety standai-ds adopted by the Commission for the State of Indiana in 170 IAC 5-3, which specifically adopts ruidadds to the federal safety stat1dal'ds.

2. CEINorth is a "public utility"as that term is definedinlnd. Code§ 8--l-2-1,and is a "person who engages in transportation of who owns, 9perates, or leases pipelitte facilities~' within the rneaning ofT11d. Code§ 8-I~22c5-6and subject to the PHMSA Standards and the jurisdiction of the Commission;

3. Division staffperfotms inspections and other activities to verify compliance with the, PHMSAStandards and isstJes Notices of Pro.bableViohitioh ("NOPVs',) and Notices of Proposed Penalties C'NOPPs") to pipeline operators subject to the Commission1 s jurisdiction in instances whet'e non,-compliance with the PHMSA Standards is alleged.

1

Divisiortlnspection, Incident Report, NOPV,Response, NOPP

4, On or aboutMay 10, 2019, Division Director Boyd a11d Divisio11 Inspectors Fdend and Nea.l conducted an in-person fospectfort of CBI North's facilities at 490 Cramertown Loop; Martinsville, Indiana, 'i11response to a telephonic report ofa natmalgas pipeline incident

5; On or ahcn,1t May29, 2019, CEl North submitted a written Incident Report regal'ding the 'incident on May 10, 2019; whereinadditiona1 'information was provided to the, Division. A copy of the Incid<;rtt R¢pott is attached hereto as Attachment L

6. On or about August 9,2019, CBI North submitted a follow-tip to its Incident Report of May 29, 2019, pi-oviding additional information to the Divi1,io11 andJdentifying steps taken and to be taken ''fo tetraih field technicians in policies thatwould provide suppmt arid direction toreview procedures for possible safety issues." A copy of the follow-up to the Incident Repo1t ts attached hereto as Attachment 2.

7. TheDivision issued NOPVNo. l()939-2019S10 to CEiNorth on oraboutJ\/faroh 2, 2020. The NOPV alleged 8 probable vi<>lations.

1: Probable Violation 49 CFR.192.627-Tapping pipelines under pressure "Each fap. made o:n a pipeline under pressul'e mt1st be petformed by a cl'ew qua! ified to make hot taps.'; The operator employed a qualified contract crew to install a stopper fitting and machine to tap a:nd stop gas flow in a: steel main fota replace111ent project. Upon completion ofthe installation and stopping operation it became apparent thatthe gas flow had not been com.pletely<stopped. An employee ofthe operator entered the excavation to correct this.by tepositioningthe incorrectly·seated stopper cup. He maneuvered the, stopping machine handle to do so, buthis action actually resulted in inci·eased gas flow which was released and 1gnited. The employee was injuted, and it was revealed during a records review after the incident thatthe employee was not qualified to operateany partofthe stopping machine, of which the stopper cup handle isi:tpatt

2: Probable Violation 49 C:FR 192.805 - Qualification program - Qualification of Pipeline Personnel The ope1'ator's Operator Qualification program indicates the $pan of Control for 4'1

TDW stopping at one to one, meaning an imqualified individual may petfotn1 a task under observation. This is stdctly prohibited under 49 CFR 192.627. This task and similar tasks must be reviewed in the operators OQ Program: and modified to cotrectly represent the requirement in §192.627.

3: Probable Violation 49 CFR 192.805 - Qualification program ;.. Qualification of Pipeline Personnel The operatotconfirmed one person in the bell hole, a contract welder, was Operator Qualified irt 4h TDW stopping and was observing one person that was not qualified.

2

While this is allowed uridet the operatot1s ptocedures, it is ho tallowed under 49 CFR 192.627. In addition; it is understood bytheDivisio11thatthe weldet was welding on another section of the pipe andnot observing the opeiato1;'s employee;

4: Probable Violation 49 CFRl92;805- Qualification program .. Qmdificatfon of Pipeline Personnel Theconti'actctewalong with the operator's inspector failed to follow the written procedure of Operator Qualification Task nurnber 192.1426.05. The performance Evaluation clearly states, "After attempting to blow down the µipelim.\ evaluate the amount of leakage pasttl1e sealing cup prior to beginning the cutting operation. If the leakage.is .in excess,determine if the sealing cup can be tightened or if the bloWdown fittings Will be sufficient, ot ifait movers wHlneed to be installed, initiate notification to ICEI North l local management." [CEI North] managernentwas not notified ofexcess leakage through the stoppet fitting; management was only notified upon the ignition of gas and the injury to the employee.

5: Probable Violation 49 CFR 192.605-Proceduralmanual for operations,maintenance, alld. erttergencfos [CEI No 1th] Inspector on thejoh failed to follow procedures by 1) enteting an excavation alone to stoppet off a high pressure main and 2) entering an excavation with noJ;>PE.

6:Prohable Violation 49 CFR 192.605--" Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and efuergen~ies The contract crew nor the operator's inspector failedio follow the [CEI North] GCS 13. 7 procedufo by not installing a vent stack approximately 71 above grade.

7: :Probable Violation 49 CFR 1.99.105- D&A ... Drug tests required Post-accident drug testing of the ope1·atols inspectot should have been completed not Iatetthan 32 hours after the accident This did not occut

S: Probable Violation 49 CFR 199.225-D&A-'Akohol tests tequired Post-accldent(l) As sooi1 as pi'acticable followingan accident,·each operatot must test each surviving covered ernployee for alcohol if that employee1s performance of a covered function either contdbuted to the accide11tot cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. While there is reasontobelieve that the inspector'sactions may have contributed to the accident an alcohol test was not pe1f9rtned.

A copy of the N OPV is attached hereto as Attachment 3.

3

8. CBTNolthxespondedto tlieNOPVinwl'iting on or aboutl'yiafoh 20{2020. CEI North provided additional information to the Division and identified steps taken and to he taken to address the issues raised by the Division. A copy of the CBI N 01th, s Response to the N OPV is attached hel'eto as Attachment 4;

9. The Division issued NO:PP No. 10939-2020720 to CEJ North on July 20, 2020. The NQPP alleged 8 violations.

2 Viola dons: 49 C.F.R. § 192.605, Procedtttal manual for operations~ maintenance,. and emergencies One day each

1 Violation: 49 C.F.R. § 192.627?. Tapp'ingpipelinesunder pressure Orte day

3 Violations: 49 C.F.R .. § 192.805; Qualification of Pipeline Pe1·sonnel: Qualification Ptogram One day each

1 Violation: 49C.F.R. s 199.105, Drug Tests Required One day

1 Violation: 49 C.F.R. § 199.225, Alcohol tests required One day

A copy ofthe NOPP is attached hefoto as Attachment 5.

:B. Agreed Civil Penalty

l 0. The Commissfonmay impose penalties against CBI North fot violations ofthe PHMSA Standards ofup to $25,000.00 for each violation for each day that the violation persisted, uptoa111axiinum of $1,000,000.00 for awlated series of violations. In totalthe Division discoveted 8 violations ofthe PHMSA Standards. All are subject to the $25,000 fine for each violation, per day they persisted. The totaldolia1· amount 6f these violatfons calculating the numbet of days included was $200~000.00.

l L CELNorth admits (subject to qualification ih thisAgree·ment)to the vfofat1011s alleged in the NOPV and NOPP and agtees to payment of a total monetary civil penalty of $150,000.00 to the general fund oftheStateoflndianafor the foregoing identified violations. :Payment of this civil penalty will be made within 30 days of approval by the Commission, and the civil penalty shall nothe recoverable by CEI North through its Commission-authorized rates and charges. The .PSD acknowledges the steps taken by CEl Noi-th to comply with post-accident DOT alcohol and drug testing requil-ements and recognizes that ce1tain hospitals may not conduct such testing in their emergency facilities. As such, the PSD waives a pe-11alty assessment for CBI North's violations of 49 C.F:R. § 199225 and 49 C.F.R. § 199 .105. However, in ru1 eftort to ensure compliance with post::.accident drug and alcohol testing requirements wherever

4

possible, CEI No1th agrees to retrain all ofits employees presently ih the drug and alcohol testing pool and/or who are subject to 49 C.F.R. § 199.225 and 49 C.F.R. § 199. l 05 regarding post-accidenttesting obligations. Further, CEI Notth agrees that it will require all of its contractors who perform work for CEI North and who are subject to.the requirements of49 C.F.R; § 199,225 and 49 C.F.R. § 199.105 to retrain their employees regarding post-accident testing and provide documentation evideric:ing compliance with this requirement to CEI North. All aforementioned training programs shall be impleITiented by the end of FirstQua1ter 202 l.

C. Waiver of Public Hearing

12. Given its admission of the violations alleged in the NOPV and NOPP and its agreement to pay a statutory civil pehaltyfot those violations, and in the interest of administrative efficiency, CEI North waives its right to a public hearing pursuant to Ind. Code§§ 8-1-225-7(6) and 8-1-22.5-10 onthematterS alleged in theNOPVandNOPP andthe associated penalties. The Patties agree thatthe stipulated facts above together with the attachments hereto constitute an adequate evidentiary record upon which the.Commission may base an Order approving the agreed con·ective actions including paymehtofthe agreed monetary civil penalty.

D. Public Record

13. This agreement is a public record subject to diSclostit'e uponrequest under the Indiana. AcceSsto Public Records Act, Ind. Code ch. 5-14-3,

E. Stipulation

14.It is so stipulated and agreed this 24th day of f'ebruary202 l.

~:r;::;.!!!!. ..... ---VP Regional Opet'ations Indiana Gas Company, Inc., d/b/a CenterPoint Energy Indiana North

5

0

Director, Pipeline Safety Indiana Utility Regulator

May 29, 2019 Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission Mr. Bill Boyd Director, Pipeline Safety Division 101 West Washington St. Suite 1500 Indianapolis, IN 46204 Dear Mr. Boyd: We are writing to confirm information telephoned to you at 12:52 PM on 5/10/19, regarding the pipeline fire at 490 Cramertown Loop, Martinsville, IN. Incident data: 1. Reported by: Randa Powers 2. Date of Incident: 5/10/19

3. Location: App. 490 Cramertown Loop, Martinsville, IN

4. Injuries: 1

5. Fatalities: None

6. Property Damage: 6” Plastic Main; 2016 Ford F350 Pickup truck; Ingersol Rand 185 Air

Compressor; ShortStopp II Plugging Machine

7. Cause of Incident: Still Under Investigation As indicated in the telephonic notice, on 5/10/19 contractor Miller Pipeline was tapping a 4” steel main on Cramertown Loop in Martinsville, Indiana when the pipeline ignited at approximately 11:45 AM. A Vectren employee who was inspecting received second and third degree burns on both arms from the initial flash fire. Gregg Township Fire Department provided water protection for the overhead powerlines, as well as extinguished a welding truck and an air compressor that were on fire on the road. The truck and compressor fires were extinguished 12:20 PM. The pipeline fire was extinguished at 12:50 PM by closing valves 612 and 81, isolating the pipeline. Cramertown Loop was blocked to through traffic from 12:00 PM Friday, May 10 through 7:00 AM Saturday, May 11. Work being performed at the time of the incident was replacement of 4” steel pipeline running parallel to Cramertown Loop and approximately 2’ off the west edge of road with 6” HD plastic pipeline running parallel with Cramertown Loop and approximately 15’ off the west edge of the road in preparation of modifications to the roadway for I-69 Section 6 project. The 6” HD plastic had been gassed up and

connected into the 4” steel pipeline. The crew was abandoning the section of the 4” steel replaced by the 6” HD plastic. The crew, using a TD Williamson Shortstopp II plugging machine, was stopping the gas flow to separate the 4” steel pipe and weld an end cap. The 4” steel pipe was successfully cut by a 4-wheel circular steel cutter. The welder had made a successful 1” tack on the end cap when the pipeline ignited. Three homes were evacuated at the time of the incident. Those residents were able to return to their homes once the fire was extinguished at approximately 12:50 PM. The incident resulted in a 171 customer outage. Vectren completed meter shut offs by 4:25 PM. The pipeline was repaired and gassed up at 7:00 AM Saturday, May 11. At that time, Vectren began customer relights. Gas service to a majority of customers was restored by 8:00 PM Saturday, May 11. The remaining customers had gas restored by 6:00 PM Sunday, May 12. This incident is still under investigation. Vectren is working with local Vectren Operations and Training, Miller Pipeline, and StructurePoint (third party forensic investigation) to gather evidence for review. A root cause analysis is planned for Friday, May 31. Following that meeting, Vectren will provide the IURC with the findings as well as plans for any preventative measures and/or process changes resulting from the review. Sincerely, Adam Gilles Director of Regional Operations

August 9, 2019

Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission Mr. Bill Boyd Director, Pipeline Safety Division 101 West Washington St. Suite 1500 Indianapolis, IN 46204

Re: Martinsville incident, May 29, 2019

Dear Mr. Boyd:

As a follow-up to the Incident Report submitted on May 29, 2019, Indiana Gas Company, Inc., d/b/a Vectren Energy Delivery, a CenterPoint Energy Company, has conducted a root cause investigation and provides the following additional information related to the pipeline fire at 490 Cramertown Loop, Martinsville, IN that occurred May 10, 2019.

On Friday, May 10, 2019, an event occurred at 490 Cramertown Loop while tapping and stopping a 4” steel main as part of a retirement operation. This event resulted in an injured Vectren employee acting as an inspector for a Miller Pipeline Crew, a 175-customer outage, destroyed equipment, and damaged communication lines. A root cause analysis was initiated to investigate the event and based on findings corrective actions have been deployed.

Specifically, during the crew’s operation of the ShortStopp II Plugging Machine to stop off the flow of gas on the main, the rubber stopper failed to completely seal after several attempts, allowing gas to leak through. This equipment failure ultimately caused the leak and led to the fire. However, this situation could have been mitigated if procedures in dealing with a gaseous atmosphere had been properly followed. The Vectren employee inspecting the job determined that the gas leak could be addressed by applying slight pressure on the handle of the stopper machine. The Miller Pipeline welder completed a 1” tack with a small flame and determined that he felt comfortable with the small amount of gas leaking through to continue the weld. Unbeknownst to all parties, there was fire on the back side of the rubber stopper, which caused it to completely unseat, allowing an unexpected release of gas which further ignited. Had the inspector and crew followed manufacturer instructions and deployed relevant O&M and safety protocols, the ignition may have been prevented.

In reviewing actions by the crew and inspector that day, Vectren has embarked on a Lessons Learned Safety Stand Down to retrain field technicians in policies that would provide support and direction to review procedures for possible safety issues.

Job Briefing Policy (Corporate Safety Manual Section 4.22): Vectren’s job briefing will be retrained. Specifically, if needed, review an isolation plan and ensure that identified valves are operable.

Gaseous Atmosphere Policy (Corporate Safety Manual Section 6.2): The Gaseous Atmosphere policy will be retrained. Techs will be reminded that the policy drives us to monitor the conditions to determine if anything changes. This helps in our ability to take a step back and reevaluate the PPE and method we use in the work

Stop Work Authority: The crew has the power to stop the work if there are any questions or concerns. Vectren is adding Stop Work Authority as a standalone section to the Corporate Safety Manual.

All field technicians and inspectors who do tapping and stopping will be retrained on the following points to ensure proper protocol is followed:

Verify that the stopping equipment is properly maintained. Review proper cup size prior to use to ensure you have selected the proper size. Ensure that the proper cup shelf life is maintained as per manufacturer specifications. Ensure the isolation plan is reviewed and that all crew members are aware of what to do.

o Have you verified that you can access the valves (i.e. not under concrete)? Check that all personnel involved in the tap are properly OQ’d. Ensure you are using the proper number of purge points and that they are properly

located between the area of the stop and the work to be completed. Perform a pipe exam (both inside when possible and outside) before welding.

Vectren appreciates the IURC’s patience as we ensure that proper root cause analysis was completed for this incident.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

Adam Gilles Director of Regional Operations

cc: Richard Leger, VP of Regional Operations

2 March 2020

Indiana Gas Company Richard Leger One Vectren Square Evansville, IN 47708

RE: Notice of Probable Violation: 10939-2019510

The Pipeline Safety Division (“Division”) of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“Commission”) hereby provides you notice of the probable violation(s) listed below, pursuant to the Division’s authority under Indiana Code chapter 8-1-22.5, the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq.), and the Commission’s minimum pipeline safety rules and standards for transportation and related pipeline facilities, Title 170 Indiana Administrative Code Rule 5-3, incorporating 49 CFR Parts 40, 191, 193, 194, 195, 198, and 199.

Probable Violation(s)

On one or more days including 05/10/2019 , an Incident Investigation was conducted at 490 Cramertown Loop, in Martinsville. Probable violation(s) found during this inspection include:

1: Probable Violation 49 CFR 192.627 – Tapping pipelines under pressure “Each tap made on a pipeline under pressure must be performed by a crew qualified to make hot

taps.” The operator employed a qualified contract crew to install a stopper fitting and machine to tap

and stop gas flow in a steel main for a replacement project. Upon completion of the installation and stopping operation it became apparent that the gas flow had not been completely stopped. An employee of the operator entered the excavation to correct this by repositioning the incorrectly seated stopper cup. He maneuvered the stopping machine handle to do so, but his action actually resulted in increased gas flow which was released and ignited. The employee was injured, and it was revealed during a records review after the incident that the employee was not qualified to operate any part of the stopping machine, of which the stopper cup handle is a part.

2: Probable Violation 49 CFR 192.805 – Qualification program - Qualification of Pipeline Personnel The operator's Operator Qualification program indicates the Span of Control for 4" TDW

stopping at one to one, meaning an unqualified individual may perform a task under observation. This is strictly prohibited under 49 CFR 192.627. This task and similar tasks must be reviewed in the operators OQ Program and modified to correctly represent the requirement in §192.627.

STATE INDIANA

INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSION 101 W. WASHINGTON STREET, SUITE 1500E

INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46204-3407

http://www.in.gov/iurc Office: (317) 232-270 l Facsimile: (3 17) 232-6758

3: Probable Violation 49 CFR 192.805 – Qualification program - Qualification of Pipeline Personnel The operator confirmed one person in the bell hole, a contract welder, was Operator Qualified in

4" TDW stopping and was observing one person that was not qualified. While this is allowed under the operator's procedures it is not allowed under 49 CFR 192.627. In addition, it is understood by the division that the welder was welding on another section of the pipe and not observing the operator's employee.

4: Probable Violation 49 CFR 192.805 – Qualification program - Qualification of Pipeline Personnel The contract crew along with the operator's inspector failed to follow the written procedure of

Operator Qualification Task number 192.1426.05. The performance Evaluation clearly states, "After attempting to blow down the pipeline, evaluate the amount of leakage past the sealing cup prior to beginning the cutting operation. If the leakage is in excess, determine if the sealing cup can be tightened or if the blow down fittings will be sufficient, or if air movers will need to be installed, initiate notification to Vectren local management."

Vectren management was not notified of excess leakage through the stopper fitting; management was only notified upon the ignition of gas and the injury to the employee.

5: Probable Violation 49 CFR 192.605 – Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies Vectren Inspector on the job failed to follow procedures by 1) entering an excavation alone to

stopper off a high pressure main and 2) entering an excavation with no PPE.

6: Probable Violation 49 CFR 192.605 – Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies The contract crew nor the operator's inspector failed to follow the Vectren GCS 13.7 procedure

by not installing a vent stack approximately 7' above grade. 7: Probable Violation 49 CFR 199.105 – D&A - Drug tests required Post-accident drug testing of the operator's inspector should have been completed not later than

32 hours after the accident. This did not occur.

8: Probable Violation 49 CFR 199.225 – D&A - Alcohol tests required Post-accident. (1) As soon as practicable following an accident, each operator must test each

surviving covered employee for alcohol if that employee's performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. While there is reason to believe that the inspectors actions may have contributed to the accident an alcohol test was not performed.

You are required to review each listed probable violation and provide a written response to this office with the following information:

- A detailed description of steps that have been or will be completed to correct non-compliance with the above cited rules, including dates such steps were or are anticipated to be taken.

- Steps that you intend to take in order to prevent a recurrence of the above probable violation(s), including dates such steps were or are anticipated to be taken.

- Copies of any new or existing written procedures that support the steps taken to correct and further prevent a recurrence of these violations.

Your written response must be received no later than 3/15/2020 and sent to the Division as follows:

• Via email to pipelineinspections@urc.in.gov.

• Label the subject line: NOPV 10939-2019510 Response.

• You will receive an automated message that your response was received; if you do not receive an automated message, we did not receive your response.

If you must submit your response in hard copy, please send it to this address:

Attn: Pipeline Safety Division

Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission

101 West Washington Street, Suite 1500 E

Indianapolis, Indiana 46204

The Division will review your response and provide acknowledgement of receipt. After review of your response, the Division may:

(1) provide acknowledgement of a satisfactory response; (2) request additional information and/or documentation; (3) request to meet with you; (4) send you a Notice of Proposed Penalties; and/or (5) request the Commission initiate an investigation on the matter.

Failure to respond will result in a Notice of Proposed Penalty and/or a request for a Commission investigation. Thank you for the courtesy extended during our visit. Please contact the Division at pipelineinspections@urc.in.gov should you have any questions. Respectfully,

William Boyd, Director

Pipeline Safety Division

~~M

Vectren Corporation

P. O. Box 209

Evansville IN 47702-0209

1

March 20, 2020 Mr. Bill Boyd, Pipeline Safety Director Pipeline Safety Division Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission 101 West Washington St., Suite 1500 East Indianapolis, IN 46204 Subject – Vectren Response to IURC Notice of Probable Violation – 10939-2019510 Dear Mr. Boyd, Vectren, a CenterPoint Energy Company (Vectren), values its working relationship with the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC), particularly the Pipeline Safety Division Staff. Our commitment to the safety of the public, our workforce, and assets remains strong as our Safety Management System culture strengthens and our focus on continuous improvement expands across our workforce. Vectren welcomes this opportunity to provide additional information in response to the Notice of Probable Violation (NOPV) letter dated March 3, 2020 for the notice of probable violation 10939-2019510 related to the May 10, 2019 incident. Given the gravity of the incident, Vectren formed a cross functional team of subject matter experts to fully review and investigate the matter. The results of the investigation and lessons learned can be found in Exhibit 1 – Martinsville Ignition Lessons Learned. This document was made available to all employees via a link on the CNP Homepage, see Exhibit 2. Probable Violation(s) On one or more days including 05/10/2019, an Incident Investigation was conducted at 490 Cramertown Loop in Martinsville. Probable violation(s) found during this inspection include: Probable Violation 1: 49 CFR 192.627 – Tapping pipelines under pressure “Each tap made on a pipeline under pressure must be performed by a crew qualified to make hot taps.” The operator employed a qualified contract crew to install a stopper fitting and machine to tap and stop gas flow in a steel main for a replacement project. Upon completion of the installation and stopping operation it became apparent that the gas flow had not been completely stopped. An employee of the operator entered the excavation to correct this by repositioning the incorrectly seated stopper cup. He maneuvered the stopping machine handle to do so, but his action actually resulted in increased gas flow

Vectren Corporation

P. O. Box 209

Evansville IN 47702-0209

2

which was released and ignited. The employee was injured, and it was revealed that during a records review after the incident that the employee was not qualified to operate any part of the stopping machine, of which the stopper cup is a part.

Vectren Response: Vectren acknowledges the operator’s employee was not operator qualified to perform a tap.

The Lessons Learned document (previously referenced) stressed that only qualified personnel should be working on any specific task.

Probable Violation 2: 49 CFR 192.805 – Qualification program - Qualification of Pipeline Personnel The operator’s OQ Policy indicates the span of control for 4” TDW stopping at one to one, meaning an unqualified individual may perform a task under observation. This is strictly prohibited under 49 CFR 192.627. This task and similar tasks must be reviewed in the operator’s OQ Program and modified to correctly represent the requirement in §192.627

Vectren Response: Vectren interprets 49 CFR§192.627 more broadly than the Pipeline Safety Division.

As background, Vectren changed its OQ Program related to span of control for mechanized tapping and stopping to 1:1 in 2018 after identifying the need for individuals to obtain field experience and learn the nuances of tapping and stopping a pipeline under pressure in the field. In deciding whether to implement the change, Vectren determined that training under simulation, i.e., in a garage or other controlled environment utilizing air pressure, was not as effective and therefore did not support a best practice learning environment. Vectren believed the change would better prepare individuals for the entire tapping and stopping process – from planning for the tap/stop to understanding the actual obstacles inherent in the field.

In reviewing the Code of Federal Regulations, before modifying the span of control for mechanized tapping and stopping to 1:1, Vectren interpreted “crew” to include span of control. In reading 49 CFR §192.627 with 49 CFR §192.805, Vectren construed “crew qualified” more broadly – that is as consisting of both qualified and non-qualified individuals (i.e., crew members) such that a non-qualified individual could perform a covered task under the direction and observation of a qualified individual (or crew member). As part of its research before modifying the span of control, Vectren’s OQ Team polled industry peers, operators and associations; reviewed industry guidance and documentation on the interpretation of “crew qualified” and span of control; and found only one relevant, but commonly accepted, industry standard – ASME B31Q, which listed tapping and stopping tasks with a one-to-two (1:2) span of control. Having found no other relevant industry practices and no clear consensus among operators and/or industry associations, Vectren felt a more restrictive 1:1 span of control would allow the necessary knowledge and skills transfer to take place with personnel in training while ensuring safe practice.

Using the 1:0 span of control interpretation for tapping and stopping would create the potential for two individuals to train, qualify under simulation (i.e., air pressure in the garage and/or test facility), and comprise a “crew qualified” that makes a hot tap, never having performed a tapping and stopping

Vectren Corporation

P. O. Box 209

Evansville IN 47702-0209

3

operation under real-life conditions. Applying the 1:1 span of control helps ensure a “crew qualified” includes a crew member who has actual field experience making a tap on a pipeline under pressure.

The Lessons Learned document identified one of the root causes as a non-operator qualified person manipulating the stopper and notes, if working under span of control, the non-operator qualified individual must be actively observed by an operator qualified individual.

In sum, Vectren acknowledges that the Pipeline Safety Division has a different interpretation of the requirements. As such, Vectren respectfully requests further dialogue with the Pipeline Safety Division to reach agreement regarding the interpretation.

Probable Violation 3: 49 CFR 192.805 – Qualification Program – Qualification of Personnel The operator confirmed one person in the bell hole, a contracted welder, was Operator Qualified in 4” TDW stopping and was observing one person that was not qualified. While this is allowed under the operator’s procedures it is not allowed under 49 CFR §192.627. In addition, it is understood by the division that the welder was welding on another section of the pipe and not observing the operator’s employee

Vectren Response: Please refer to Vectren’s response to Probable Violation 2 (above) for an explanation regarding its interpretation of 49 CFR §192.627 and 49 CFR §192.805. Regarding the decision to change the span of control for hot tapping to 1:1, as elaborated in greater detail above, Vectren believes field experience is necessary for training and development. Individuals working on becoming operator qualified work alongside a qualified technician in the field, which allows the individuals in training to obtain hands-on experience; understand and feel the nuances of the equipment; and troubleshoot real-life obstacles in the field. Vectren believes training under simulation is not as effective, and therefore believes the need for field training is necessary for continued ability to tap and stop, as well as ensure safety in the field while tapping.

Vectren acknowledges the employee was not under the span of control of a qualified individual as outlined in Vectren’s OQ Program. The previously referenced Lessons Learned document emphasizes the requirement that, when working under span of control, a non-qualified technician must be actively observed by a qualified technician.

Probable Violation 4: 49 CFR 192.805 – Qualification program – Qualification of Pipeline Personnel The contract crew along with the operator’s inspector failed to follow written procedure of Operator Qualification Task number 192-1426.05. The Performance Evaluation clearly states, “After attempting to blow down the pipeline, evaluate the amount of leakage past the sealing cup prior to beginning the cutting operation. If the leakage is in excess, determine if the sealing cup can be tightened, or if the blow down fittings will be sufficient, or if air movers will need to be installed, initiate notification to Vectren local management.”

Vectren management was not notified of the excess leakage through the stopper fitting; management was only notified upon the ignition of gas and the injury to employee.

Vectren Corporation

P. O. Box 209

Evansville IN 47702-0209

4

Vectren Response: Vectren acknowledges that, while the company’s procedures are adequate, proper steps to monitor gas presence and respond to the gas bleeding through the pipeline were not taken. After determining that there was gas bleeding through the stopper fitting during the initial cutting pass, the contract crew failed to follow the protocol in that they failed to notify local management and to evaluate the amount of gas bleeding through the stopper using an approved gas detector. The root cause analysis of the incident revealed the contract crew and the employee discussed the gas bleeding through the stopper fitting, with the contract welder expressing a comfort level with the amount of gas passing through based on the size of flame from the first cutting pass. The discussion between the contract welder and employee led to the employee’s attempt to eliminate the gas bleeding through the stopper fitting by applying pressure to the stopper handle.

As soon as the issue of gas leaking through the stopper was identified, the contract crew should have stopped the job and contacted local management to discuss the leakage issue. In addition, the contract crew should have used an approved gas detector to evaluate the amount of gas passing through the stopper fitting so the information could be provided to local management and used in determining a plan of action. The employee was not the proper operator representative to decide on, or authorize, alternate action. The Lessons Learned document asserts Proper procedures must always be followed.

Probable Violation 5: CFR 192.605 – Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies Vectren inspector on the job failed to follow procedures by 1) entering an excavation alone to stopper off a high pressure main and 2) entering an excavation with no PPE.

Vectren Response: Please note a clarification, the main in question is an intermediate pressure main that operates at 52 psig.

Also, as a point of clarification, the employee entered the excavation to assert pressure on the stopper handle. At the time the employee entered the excavation, he was not alone. The contract welder was in the excavation with the employee with the contract laborer at the edge of the excavation manning the fire extinguisher.

Please refer to Vectren’s responses to Probable Violations 2 and 3 for additional details concerning span of control as outlined in Vectren’s OQ Program.

While the employee and contract crew had standard Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for entering an excavation including reflective vest, eye protection, hearing protection, hard hat, and steel toed boots, Vectren acknowledges the employee and contract crew failed to monitor the possible gaseous atmosphere in the excavation. They should have used an approved gas detector and followed the protocol set forth in Vectren’s Corporate Safety Manual at Figure 3.2-1 Determination of Potential Hazards in a Gaseous Atmosphere (“Gaseous Atmosphere”) (see Exhibit 3). Because they failed to monitor the possible gaseous atmosphere in the excavation, it is unknown whether the atmospheric readings would have reached the threshold for which the employee and contract crew would have needed flash gear. To ensure that all appropriate precautions are taken in the future, the afore-mentioned Lessons Learned directed the use of the Gaseous Atmosphere policy.

Vectren Corporation

P. O. Box 209

Evansville IN 47702-0209

5

Probable Violation 6: CFR 192.605 – Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies The contract crew along with the Vectren inspector failed to follow the Vectren GCS 13.7 procedure by not installing a vent stack approximately 7’ above grade.

Vectren Response: The contract crew did not install a vent stack between the stopper and the weld, per Gas Construction Standard (“GCS”) 13.7 – Venting During Repairs. The root cause analysis of the matter identified a gap between GCS 6.0 - Tapping and Stopping and GCS 13.7, in that GCS 6.0 does not specify the requirement to install a vent stack between the stopper and the work.

In response to this gap, Vectren Gas Engineering Standards group is adding language to GCS 6.0 to include a reference to GCS 13.7, stating that, when attempting a tap and stop, a crew should consider venting the gas, and in doing so should follow the standards set forth in GCS 13.7. Conversely, there will be language added to GCS 13.7 under general guidelines to include tapping and stopping as one of the tasks that might require venting. The new verbiage is currently in the Management of Change (MOC) process, with anticipation that the update will be viewable in the April 1, 2020 scheduled release by MOC. Concurrent to these changes moving through the MOC process, the aforementioned Lessons Learned document was sent to company and contract tapping crews on 8/22/2019 with specific reminders regarding tapping operations, including Ensure you are using the proper number of purge points and that they are properly located between the area of the stop and the work to be completed. All tap crews have been following that protocol in anticipation of the changes to the GCS.

Probable Violation 7: 49 CFR 199.105 – S&A – Drug tests required Post-accident drug testing of the operator’s inspector should have been completed no later than 32 hours after the accident. This did not occur.

Vectren Response: Vectren attempted to have the employee DOT drug screened, but the extent of employee’s injuries coupled with need for urgent treatment and subsequent hospitalization prevented Vectren from obtaining a post-accident drug test.

Upon arrival at IU Health Hospital in Martinsville, the employee was immediately triaged to stabilize him for transport to the burn unit at Eskenazi Hospital in Indianapolis. Both the employee’s supervisor and a Vectren safety consultant followed the transport. Upon arrival at Eskenazi, Corporate Safety requested that the hospital conduct a DOT drug and alcohol screen on the employee but was unsuccessful in this attempt. The employee was released from the hospital later that evening and returned to his home. Due to the risk of infection, the employee could not travel to a DOT drug and alcohol screening site. In addition, the fact the incident occurred on a Friday, Vectren could not find a DOT drug and alcohol screening collection vendor willing to travel to the employee’s home over a weekend.

Vectren completed a Post-Accident Alcohol Testing Variance Form (see Exhibit 4) regarding the inability to conduct drug and alcohol testing (see 49 CFR §199.105(b)(2) requiring a record stating the reasons for not administering the test).

Vectren Corporation

P. O. Box 209

Evansville IN 47702-0209

6

Probable Violation 8: 49 CFR 199.225 – D&A – Alcohol tests required Post-accident. (1) As soon as practicable following an accident, each operator must test each surviving covered employee for alcohol if that employee’s performance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. While there is a reason to believe that the inspector’s action may have contributed to the accident an alcohol test was not performed.

Vectren Response: Vectren acknowledges the employee did not receive a post-accident DOT alcohol screening. Please refer to Vectren’s response to Probable Violation 7 for an explanation concerning the failure to obtain a post-accident DOT alcohol screen.

Vectren completed a Post-Accident Alcohol Testing Variance Form regarding the inability to conduct drug and alcohol testing (see 49 CFR §199.225(a)(2)(i) requiring a record stating the reasons the test was not promptly administered).

We appreciate the opportunity to provide further clarification. Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 812-491-5848. Thank you. Respectfully submitted,

Adam Gilles Director, Regional Operations cc: Richard C. Leger, Vice President Regional Operations for CenterPoint Energy Indiana/Ohio

Vectren Corporation

P. O. Box 209

Evansville IN 47702-0209

7

EXHIBITS Exhibit 1 – Lessons Learned Document, page 1 of 3

Martinsville ignition lessons learned l.Jearnirng from exp.ellie I:e ·s a vftal pari: 11Jf GenterP1oirrt: Enerigy's Safety . nag.e , ent System. R'ob1Jst incident irnvesti~on and !lessons learned re inforoe the ,com · itment to ,cornt i · u:ous improve · em of o ., sai ety perfo:r ainoe and oult1uec Sharing lessons learned ,dlm-.is 1Js, to ide li'ftify ris~ and act to p:revent reocourrence of negative outco · es.

Facts of the incident Orn tlhe mo.ming of flriday, May 10, 20]91

, a ,m:ntrad: cre w 'was re pl'aoirng a sed:i o · ,of 4-iinch steel p'ip.eline in Martin&vil I e, Ind. A 6-inch h•gh density plastic Ii e hiit d already been ·nsralled.. The cont ract crew be,g,an stopping pmoeclur,es p:rio:r to, the Vediren ·n&1p.ector

arrivirng o rnsite.

Ornoe t he llil"ectren irnsperno:r ar rived, the T.D. 'M lliamwn Shortsiio;pp II stoppers were se1t at each end of t he sectiion to be retired. The pip.el1ne wa,s tlhen purged at a servke i1111 tlhe is:olat,ed sectiorn of mai As t ime IP I rging act· jt ies occ1Jn ed, tlhe crew no d a s:mall bleed through of natural gas, fro ,o, · e of t he stoppers,, too m 1J1dh to hll.egi ·

welding.

The crew attempted to res:et tlhe stoppers hll ut still e :iqperie ,1111ce cll t,oo mudh rnat1Jral g;a:s to wellcll. The st,o;pperswere then §fieased, and a third atte ,pt was, made to se tlhe sto,p;per:s. One ,of the stoppesrs was

believed 1b:o ca1Jse t he lble.ed, and a ded sjorn wa,s, macl1e to ,cl!cit mJt a sed:imm of pipe 1b:o dete rmine id 1 stopp.er was a llo ·mg · e nalJUral gas to leak through.

lhe 4-indh S'l:ee pipe was, s I ccessfully C1Jt, a 1111d · , was determined that e stoppe r on the s:outih e nd of t he sectiorn waS, allowjng gas to, pcltS'S

through. Alt t his point, the crnw con&1ide re cll irnstamng a te porary dea~ end dresser fitting to a1,11ojd welclJng w · · h the nalJUral gas

bleeding througlm" Time iMpector '\'las concerned '\ mh tlmis method being approved a'· di made tlhe ded sjorn to oontilillue ' Mlh the o:rigi al pl an of inst:a11ing Jthe welded encll cap.

W · en press re was app ied to th e stopper ha1i1dle, the bleed tihrirmgh oeased. Th i5, method was discUJiS.51ed by tihe §r,oup, 1111d th,ev fe,lt rnmfortable ' · · t he ,operat ion, deeming it safe. The inspe ctor entered t he excavaltion to apply presw re tG, t he handle on e rnntrol lbarto assi~t ilill iso.latirng tlhe ,gas.

SHDmST"IPP' Jlllll'mirav·ll.trluill,ar

CelltetPoiat~ ,EnlrfN

---. . ......._

"-

Ble11!1tr V.itfe

Vectren Corporation

P. O. Box 209

Evansville IN 47702-0209

8

Exhibit 1 – Lessons Learned Document, page 2 of 3

Cented'oilll~ 81BrW

i le the illiS:pectoirwas hilolding t hi!e handle,, the w eld'.er be,ga111 p~aratio:ns to weld the en d CQ\IJl Nait l!Jl1ral

gas star ted b eeding t l'llr,ou,ghil again, generati111g a fl a e. 9i111c,e as · all flare i5 mmmon d t1,e to i 111oor111plete

sh,l!ilbdown,, t hle w elder pn:rneed ed t o create a ,o:ne-iim:h tack ,on the ,end

cap. W hlen he mted t o t hle othe,r sid e~ an 1.m e·l!lpected rel~e of gas

occ1Jr red ,a111d iFi111i ted.

A crrew me ber ~uidkly used t h e f ire e·X:ltingJUisl'llerto s1Jppress the fire. · i le the ·~veifol1er exited the hole 1t. m:lhol!Jlt ser iou s i 111j u ry, tlhe i 111!S:pedor

suffered b llms. to his, arms, chest and face befo r;e he W1as ab1e bo

mr111p lete h is exit . A crew m e · b er called 9111._ The inspedo ir was ab1e bo

d rive h imselfbo,the ho:s:piltal.

The cont ract crew ,evac I aibed t hr ee n51r 1:Jrv homes as a pr ec,a1J1bion a mi be:gan w or king ,on idenrbifying a wav to, isolat e the fire. lit was 1d1:soovered

that one o f the val'!leS , ich irn1Jld be used t o isolate this sedJion of 4~

inch pipe was buried I mil:er a!S:ph.:1l t .

What Went Well

Up on arrival, addition ail Vie.ctir,en perso 111nel

\ileri ed li'learby sef\fiioes w ere saife wl'llile llrl,rjn,g

to locate Yalves bo is:o abe. Ultimately two Yalves

w ere iso ated, a!lmvi111g theg,as-fed fi r,e t o lbe

exti 111gu islhed am u nd an ho 1Jr ,after ign i'1tio:n.

The i li'loident resl!lllbed in a li'I inj 1Jre d ooUeagJUe, a

175-ousto er o I t a.:ge, a diam ~ed weld r1J1ok,

destroyed equipm ent, ,a111d dam ~ed

oo m 1111icat ion li 111 e:s,.

• P'er so · nel acting a5, the fire watr:lh 1qu ickly d is:chariged t heir fi re extinglllli5her bo s I p;piress, bhe fire.

,. 911 was cal I ed q I j ckJlv.

1• Neariby ho · es ·:.-.,.ere 1quioklv ewrnabecll.

1• Vect:ren person nel, contract uews an cll e erge111cy agencies worked together bo reso v;e tl, e

incident w · · hout any f I rtlher inj I ry.

Root Cause Ana lys is Lie~ cy '!J'ertren and cont radiu perscrnn el pa rtidpa ed i 111 a formal root ca1JcS1e a111alvsis event .

Primary Root Ca 1Jse

,. N0111,-0pera,'ltoir (bl,a ftified 1[0Q) personnel w ere man ip I ait i 111g the stopper afber bh e O (l crew

m ade t he tap and stop. On Iv !!!111Jalifi ed person nel ~ho I Id be workiin,g ,o:n anry· speciific ta!Sk. If the

incl i ·ctual is workif'lg .1 1i'1d1er span of rnli'lt m l,, t hey ml!l51i: be acti\il:ely observed l:irv a ~ualifiecll

incl ivid1Jal .. 1• T :e 100111,trol bar !handle ·was lil:O'lt iremwedl.

lh1s, pot entially allowed the sbopper o be moved inadverte111bly.

lapping proc:edlures call for this hand le 1bo, lbe re o\Ted.

1• A. purge point betweeilll tlhe sto;p, a111d the ·work beililg pmom ed was not i 111!Stallled.

Vectren Corporation

P. O. Box 209

Evansville IN 47702-0209

9

Exhibit 1 – Lessons Learned Document, page 3 of 3

Had tihis b!een inslta lled a md am evaauat:or such as a tomacl:o, used, ,gas ,ooulcll hav e b!een

pulled fmm t he pipe, even if tihe stqp;pe,r was o:mtinl!Jing to leak, a md !the weld saMv rnrn1d I cted_

,., Slt,o;piPfi ,cu.1is" ,or sea.1 irn1g e ~emerd:s, oontint!led to be reused] every lime the :stoppers; ·were ireset.

To prevent t he use of a damaged sto;pper, pa­anufact t.11ner insltrurnons, new Cl!JfP.5 are to be t.1sed at

every stop attemplt_

• S'.fili!p:peill" ,11:u,p, 10:11" sea1hi1g clemem11t1 1d1&eS mot ap:pealf to he the

pr~per siz.e fo.r tihe ·~'Vill ll lthiclmess,_

Rieiier to manl!J@dl!Jre r process. to cl:elter ime rnr rect slto,p;per c,11.1p sii~e­

n.e job site bri:efing was inad:equ:aite.. The job siite b!r iefimg did not Ex.ample.sof usedsmppeu.up:s stillfoond'i

indude discussion ,of tihe isol altion plan_ !here was no plan of at to cl:@ if 1th e sfio;p fail ed.

No gac-s deteotiom11 equ11pmern.t 11'8.'5 used to cl1e1ter1i111irn1e the amo 1 111 t of ,gas presenlt during !the st,opping and v.reldi g proced' 1 re:.

ir1111e1 to/!}' from other locooon:s. (Nore: they were re-moved from se.rvic,e}

1Ga9eol!Js, Atm o,sphere po icv dliililes l!.ls. to moli'litor t he conditions to de rmine if any1th1ng

,chamges_ This. helps in ,our abi'lny to tlke a step b!cid:: and reeva uat e tlhe PIPE a -d meltho cll we m e i tlhe ·wo rk_

• Lasltlv. pm;per sil:!L'!p ·wo:irk. authority was nolt usedl Anily!One on !the icriew has, tihe power lto st,o;p 1th e work if !there a re Q11J1est ions a b!mrt a job or t he safety of t hat work. Sta It ·~ mil t he plan a di 1the111

seek siupervfsor assii&tanoe w lme m11 the group, isn• d ear ,or i:s unrnmfortab! e ·wn:h expectations.

Tapping Eq ipment Reminders ,. , Ve rify that !the eQ,uip enlt i!S, properly mairnta i ed _

,., Fteii ew proper rup '.Sli z.e prior to uise 1to e 111su re yol!ll have seleobed t he pm;per size_

,., 6111su re t hat t he proper rup ~ eff lile is belng followed_

• 6nsure t he isola1tiom11 plan is revie\ved and tihat all crew members are a~wre ,of ·~malt lto ,do_

Have you ver ified tihat ¥ OU can access the 'I/ill ' . es r-e.. mot l.mcle r CO · crelte)?

• Checlk tlhat all J!)ersorn1nel immhred in t:he ta p, are pm;perly OQ.'d_ • 6ns ure J OLI are 11.1sing !the pm;per n Im bier of p l!ll rrge poin:l:s a li'ld 1th alt !they are pm per ly ocatecll

between !the a re<a oHhe S'to;p a111d tl, e wo rk t,o, he romp)elted_

• Perfom, a pipe exam (bot h inside ·1t, en possrble and om ide ) be' o re ·1t,.,.eMing_

Summary

Emlmue the Reject, llrind, Drive miml'<set to hel1p enhan11:e our safety perfo:rmanre and cult re.

• Pllro-per procedur,es must always he fol lowed. ,. , n.e job hr"efin,g i-s ~rilicat

ms,mss: 'U tlhis d®eSrr g,0 as p!arn m11ed~. , ~hat do I do lilow?'-' ,., Everyone has tlhe au:l:tiorm,· to, .stop tork

Vectren Corporation

P. O. Box 209

Evansville IN 47702-0209

10

Exhibit 2 – CNP Today companywide link to Lessons Learned document

CNP7t OAY Our Com any My Wo space Career a'ld Life Newa Ewnts CClfflllllllitylnwnremer-. C: Prafile I PDlii:y Cerar I Sef8t\r I lm111

Lessons leeimed from ignition incilfel"lt in Martinsvilfe

~D7,2D151

In M ~. a Ce.nterPooit Energy impl!'Clor w fl; woitcin,g alo.n,g•idt! , co:· c". m~w iri M - e, I wl><,11 a, m,;itlll'ill gas ig · :,:,n CIClilrttd. TIM iJiciijell'IL 111!!5!Ulii!!il in .illi'I il'ljweil colle !JU" z,oo] , 76-ous!O.fi>er i:rutag;,, ii, ,,...,II ,,,, a d!!ull'lageil wl!'ld l riud,., <!q p,,11,: nd o:iil'lrl'IUlli~i:«in ii,..;s..

CNP iiwe51i!J1!1ied ltle int:kl'entnndde'i<!IO-peil tl'leJe- le s lle med t'O il -emplO)'eo!s . o!il':ify risk!;

d t.i,ki, ;iies".io/'1 tG[llre\'l,:fif po'.emii.!11 rl!<:lcr.um!tico!"- Lea ·· 9 fm1il e•pe<i;, · o,, · a1 vil:l!II p · OfCNP'• S..fi!!l)' M gement S~llh. Robli~ iociil'elll investig~ioo ;iindl lli,-,,-.11!,;iimed r<!il'lfan:e OUJ:

ccullil11itrilett! tx:i o::intimmus [rt1p,....;;me . ;iis well ii, ou strfl!!lll' perkl1m11nce iioo cult<Jre.

•our ii!! m w.!ls d · •ied IXl Oilll oraiing 'M ihe pprupli.itot! 1ecarils lo evM!l ie bhe incident nil de'i<!IOj> a, .-.-i, fl!! ml!!li li<lalmen'.," said merui A!l&:X:am:leir, n'laliia¢r of Fieltl Oji<!r liocis Iii l lidi •Aidem GI eie. lndmii llllld Ohio r-eg· l\ll openitm • ditei:tiar • .t11d J 9'88JeBJ HI , Q /1.<!;sumnce li!'.ld ,p,;wli,t, limll!<ll"" • d.iy root c;iil.lSI!, .i111 • •si, . w 'di ;ii llow,;d us to do,t,ermirr.e·-,, t wemt w id'eiitify ..,..;;n ofiilnjlr,D\lell'l'l<!t'lt ;iinil ,iio!t:enilime, ll'le•i 1!.ioip,;; .•

To oiezlite ~n,e cl'lam,ge, eltlpb:;'ee-,;; !ilnt>u o:in,id!!rii'IIXl'll!ili,,:; solutio by usif>g11><, R<!j'ect, Find, Drive 1ilin.dse -wmch w· furtl><,r CNP's ctilliure Of fn11KM:11io . P~er p,rocedwres lliitlst be Jollbwed, in.cl!Jdin,g ciili,:;,a [P:,b brie · Iii•· Tal'!:e l i>e5'!! !irie g,i as <ippocronitie!i t:a di5a!S!!i p<it,;,nti ,co!rnnio,;. Give tl'loogliil to 'Wmit (;;!I Iii!! dMI!! • WO. doe,n~ 9" ;. pl,111ni,d_ Thiiilk .ii =d. d p,.,;p..,..; fol- w,<ialls ~ib!.JatiOO!I...

Da you1 lllervei a neW11 alillct& you woulc:I 1111e, · o allar& aa CNP Todlll}'? semi yo r au1uieie:1lone, fa ca nle:! oruL

_, ......... ~ ~

0-Ln'b - i ll fL- ~

Vectren Corporation

P. O. Box 209

Evansville IN 47702-0209

11

Exhibit 3 – Figure 3.2-1 Determination of Potential Hazards in a Gaseous Atmosphere

0

Category: Documen Nurnber.

=ili, VECTRE ?:~rl'l!'W -

Corrparnte Safety Mea:nuall

!Revision Number:: 20192

CORJPORATE SAFIETY MAf14 UAl. (CS !1

Effec ve Date: m 1r2m9

S.AFET'I' PROG1RAMS .AND INl[)'USTRl!AL HYGIENE - Bf14 BRGY l[)ELJViBRY' GAS-ON LY

FIGUIRJIE 16·.2-1 [)ElERlMINA TION OF POTENTIAL !HAZARDS IN A GASEOUS ATMOS PHIBRE

~ntial lllluu·ch ~Auro;a:, ~-~

llblrlnCGat-

\ \

\ \

\ \ \,

\

[:irr..,__,...,_ IJ.......,.U,.~IR ind , Watl

Page 526 of' 61 O

Vectren Corporation

P. O. Box 209

Evansville IN 47702-0209

12

Exhibit 4 – Appendix L – Post Accident Alcohol Testing Variance Form – R. Burchfield

~ VECTREN SAFETY IPROGRAJM

Drug and Alc,ohol l estirng IP I aim

Appendix L - P,ost Accid,en t Alcohol T~ting V:ar ianee Form

Po t .. Accid ntAic hol T fng Vanar ': e F ·

~ : Pie· r: enter the follo fng informatia 1 in the safety datahas.e .1· 199.2 5 Ak 101 re.sts requi1-ed tor any i nsranc ~he,reby the 2-no1.11r or 8-hom ak.o.ho.l testing window· ,1.ras exceeded.

Employee Na.rne:

Em.pl y

] dde t Date ;

Ct\

~ -\ f\ p

Date of. 1 ature :

·R' 1 c hc1 · d P>v rctf ,e\d

C-0.-cr dru :.) '\.(\ J. 1w· \4'1.1'1) r ·q · re · t-'1fY\&< ·~

fV\.gJf\-\- \ 'C\( \ "J

p h ;~p·Hu .) C1.0·

r\ · -€ ~-e ct M • \J l\ .Q_ )( ,

July 20, 2020 Vectren a CenterPoint Energy Company Richard Leger One Vectren Way Evansville, IN 47708 Re: Notice of Proposed Penalty: NOPP No. 10939-2020720

On January 28, 2020, the Pipeline Safety Division (the “Division”) of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (the “Commission”) sent Vectren (the “Operator”), a Notice of Probable Violations, No. NOPV 10939-2019510. The Division received the Operator’s response dated March 20, 2020, and considered the information provided. Because the nature of the violation(s) is such that penalties should be assessed, the Division is issuing this Notice of Proposed Penalty (“NOPP”). Under Ind. Code § 8-1-22.5-7, the Commission, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, may issue civil penalties not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) for each violation for each day that the violation persists and not to exceed one million dollars ($1,000,000) for any related series of violations. The Proposed Penalty is $200,000 for the following 8 violations that persisted as indicated: 2 Violations: 49 C.F.R. § 192.605, Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and

emergencies One day each 1 Violation: 49 C.F.R. § 192.627, Tapping pipelines under pressure One day 3 Violations: 49 C.F.R. § 192.805, Qualification of Pipeline Personnel: Qualification Program One day each 1 Violation: 49 C.F.R. § 199.105, Drug Tests Required One day 1 Violation: 49 C.F.R. § 199.225, Alcohol tests required

STATE INDIANA

INDIANA UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSION 101 W. WASHINGTON STREET, SUITE 1500E

INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46204-3407

http://www.in.gov/iurc Office: (317) 232-2701 Facsimile: (317) 232-6758

One day Please provide a written response to this NOPP no later than August 9, 2020, indicating whether you agree to the Proposed Penalty. If you disagree with the Proposed Penalty, you must provide justification for each violation, using the following factors from the federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s methodology under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225 for determining penalties:

a. The nature, circumstances and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment.

b. The degree of the operator’s culpability.

c. The operator’s history of prior offenses.

d. Good faith by the operator in attempting to achieve compliance.

e. The effect on the operator’s ability to continue in business.

f. The economic benefit gained from violation, if readily ascertainable, without any reduction because of subsequent damages.

g. Such other matters as justice may require. Failure to respond to this NOPP, or failure to come to an agreement on the amount of penalty, will result in a request for a Commission investigation.

Please contact me at (317) 232-2718 or WBoyd@urc.in.gov immediately with any questions.

Sincerely,

William Boyd

Director, Pipeline Safety Division

cc: Dan Novak, Program Manager

Howard Friend, Pipeline Safety Division Chief Engineer Michael Neal, Pipeline Safety Division Engineer