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I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L Summer 2004

The new triad of the

Bush administra tion

DAVID S. MCDONOUGH

Counterproliferation and escalation dominance inUS nuclear strategy

I N T R O D U C T I O N

he administration of George W. Bush has brought about significantchanges in the nuclear strategy of the United States. Traditionally, theUS calculus of deterrence was based on a nuclear triad of interconti-nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs),

and long-range bombers. This concept was expanded and modified inthe Bush administrations classified Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)Report, completed on January 2002.1 This document outlined a newtriad strategic concept, based on nuclear and non-nuclear weapons,ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems, and a revitalized defence infra-structure.

T

David S. McDonough is the Communications and Programmes Officer at the RoyalCanadian Military Institute, Toronto, Ontario. The author would like to thankBrian L. Job, Kevin Warrian, and Mike Schroeder for their stimulating discussionsand insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

1 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report(Was hing ton, DC: USDepartment of Defense, 8 January 2002) (hereinafter the Nuclear Posture Review).

This document was originally leaked to the Los Angele s Times. S ee Willia m Arkin,S ecret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable, Los Angeles Times (March 10, 2002),www.latimes.com. Portions of the NPRwere later posted on the Globalsecurity web-site, www.globalsecurity.org.


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614 I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L Summer 2004

Following from the recommendations of that report, the US hasplaced a renewed emphasis on nuclear and non-nuclear targeting ofrogue states armed with nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC)weapons. The development of smaller yield and more accurate nuclearweapons for hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs), alongside a sig-nificant ground- and sea-based ballistic missile defence capability, hasalso become a priority. While missile defence has typically been treat-ed as an issue distinct from US nuclear strategy, the increasing incorpo-ration of active defence systems in US nuclear policy indicates that sucha casual distinction is becoming less appropriate or analytically useful.

The new triad is the key strategic concept that guides the current

administrations nuclear strategy. It is also, however, a concept that isheavily indebted to the policies of previous administrations. Many ofits components were actually developed in the 1990s, as part of thegrowing postCold War American emphasis on rogue states and coun-terproliferation. Rather than a fundamentally new or revolutionaryconcept, the new triad should in fact be seen as the most recent andexplicitly nuclear manifestation ofUS counterproliferation efforts.

With its strong emphasis on offensive and defence capabilities, thenew triad is meant to achieve escalation dominance over rogue statesarmed with NBCweapons. This form of nuclear primacy will have adefinite impact on the nuclear deterrent capabilities of countries likeRussia and China. This does not mean that an incipient arms race will

take place. Nor does it mean the emergence of a Cold War era nuclearrelationship with either country. But it does mean that changes in USnuclear strategy will be an important factor in their calculations ofwhat is necessary for deterrence. In the short-term, a greater emphasison secure and survivable second-strike capabilities should be expected.While this in itself will not automatically lead to strategic instability,the Bush administrations current emphasis on grand strategic prima-cy does provide a very uncertain and potentially unstable context fora renewed US interest in escalation dominance. This grand strategymay make US relations with both countries more adversarial. It mayalso create a situation where the new triad becomes that much morethreatening.

T H E N E W T R I A D S T R AT E G I C C O N C E P T

The new triad is meant to be the new strategic concept for the uncer-tain postCold War security environment. A new mix of nuclear, non-


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I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L Summer 2004 615

nuclear and defensive capabilities is seen to be required for the unex-pected and diverse threats facing the United States. The NPRoutlines anew triad composed of offensive strike systems (nuclear and non-nuclear), defences (active and passive), and a revitalized defence infra-structure. These components are to be bound together by a sophisti-cated command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) sys-tem.

Offensive strike systemsOffensive strike systems are a key component of the new triad. In apostCold War era defined by American conventional dominance and

potential asymmetrical threats, offensive strike systems are meant toprovide a greater degree of flexibility in the design and conduct of mil-itary operations in the 21st century battlespace. One can discern threeseparate but interrelated aspects of this leg of the new triad: theplanned nuclear force reductions, the emphasis on conventional strikeoptions, and the potential development of new nuclear weapons.

The NPRcalls for a planned force structure of 1700-2200 deployedstrategic warheads by 2012, which will be based on 14 Trident ballisticmissile submarines (SSBNs), 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, 76 B-52Hbombers, and 21 B-2 bombers. This would deactivate the Reagan-eraMXPeacekeeper ICBM and remove four Trident SSBNs from strategic ser-vice. Initial movement to implement this planned force structure

began 2 October 2002, with the removal of an MX missile warhead atWyomings F. E. Warren Air Force Base. The D-5 SLBM, with its impres-sive hard-target kill capability, will take over many of the targets previ-ously covered by the MXmissile.

In its incorporation of non-nuclear capabilities, the new triadacknowledges the potentially strategic impact of conventionalweapons. The combat missions associated with these conventionalstrike options are based on two interrelated security developments.The first development is the growth ofHDBTs, which range from deeptunnels to hardened surface bunker complexes. It is estimated thatthere are currently over 10,000 HDBTs worldwide, many of which pro-tect important strategic assets (e.g. command and control facilities).

This number is likely to increase in the near future. The second devel-opment is the threat posed by chemical and biological (CB) weapons,and the need to destroy and neutralize agents and their associated facil-ities. While these facilities are often housed in HDBTs, the physical


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destruction ofHDBTs would be insufficient if CB weapons remainviable or are released in the environment. To neutralize both these tar-gets, the Pentagon has been developing and deploying variousadvanced conventional weapon systems.2

The further development ofUS nuclear weapons capabilities is alsofeatured prominently in the nuclear posture review. Problems exist inusing conventional weapons for the defeat of both HDBTs and CBagents. Current conventional weapons, while able to deny or dis-rupt the functioning ofHDBTs, are not seen to be effective for thelong-term destruction of deep and hardened underground facilities.For that reason, the NPR advocates the substantial modification of

existing nuclear warheads in order to develop an effective earth-pene-trating capability for HDBT destruction and CB agent neutralization.These earth-penetrating weapons (EPWs) could consist of either a low-yield warhead to minimize fallout, or large-yield, penetrating warheadsfor more protected facilities.3

While the NPR has yet to become official policy, advanced conceptteams have already been established at the three US nuclear weapons lab-oratories. The robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP), which is the Bushadministrations EPW project, is currently receivingUS$15.5 millionfunding under the National Defense Authorization Act ofFY2003. Anadditional US$15 is being requested for the FY2004 budget. A related

2 For more on HDBTs, see Department of Energy and Department of Defense, Report

to Congress on the Defea t of Hardened a nd Deeply Buried Target s(Was hing ton, DC:Department of Energy and Defense, July 2001). For a thorough treatment of possiblewea pon s ystems , s ee Michael A. Levi, Fire in the Hole: Nuclear a nd Non-Nuclear

Options for Counter-Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for Internationa l PeaceWorking P ap er, 31 (Novembe r 2002). Wea pon s yst ems for HDBTs include kinetic pen-etrators, smalldia meter bombs, active kinetic penetrators, hard target smart fuses,

precision-guided munitions, and microwave weapo ns. Weapo n systems for NBCneutralization include the development of chemical neutralization, high-tempera-ture incendiary weapons (i.e. fuel-air explosives and thermobaric weapons), and

low-blast high-fragmentation wea pons.

3 The technical feasibility of using nuclear ea rth-penetrating w eapons for thedestruction of HDBTs or CB agent neutralization has been q uestioned. The maximum

depth penetration of the EPWwould stillbe insufficient to contain the explosionsdeadly fallout. In addition, the high temperatures and radiation needed to destroy

CB agents would only be present near the centre of the explosion. Unless the exact

location ofs uch facilities are known, the more likely result of using these agentdefeat weapons would be the dispersal of CB ag ents. S ee Robert W. Nelson, Low-Yield Earth-Penet rat ing Nuclea r Wea pons , Science and Global Security10, no. 1

(2002). 1-20; a nd Robert W. Nelson, Nuclea r Bunker-Bust ers Would More LikelyDisperse than Destroy Buried Stockpiles of Chemical and Biological Agents,Science and Global Security(forthcoming).


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development has been the growing interest in the development of new,low-yield nuclear weapons. It does appear that George W. Bush is suc-cessfully pushing for the House of Representatives and the Senate torepeal the decade-long amendment prohibiting research and develop-ment of mini-nuke weapons of less than five kilotons. While the NPRdoes not explicitly mention the need for mini-nukes, the movementtowards modernizing the US nuclear infrastructure under the third-legof the new triad points to the potential development of these smaller,more useable nuclear weapons.

Active defences

The new triad differs sharply from the nuclear triad by incorporatingdefences as an integral component. According to Secretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld, this signifies a recognition that offensive capabili-ties alone may not deter aggression in the new security environment ofthe 21st century.4Active defences are the type of defence that is giventhe most weight in the new triad. Three ballistic missile defenceoptions are currently under consideration:

A single Airborne Laser for boost-phase intercepts against ballis-tic missiles of all ranges;A rudimentary ground-based midcourse system, consisting of asmall number of interceptors taken from the test program and anupgraded Cobra Dane radar in Alaska against longer-range

threats;A sea-based Aegis system to provide rudimentary midcourse capa-bility against short- to medium-range threats.

On 13 June 2002, the Bush administration effectively ended theambiguity surrounding national missile defence by withdrawing fromthe ABM treaty under the supreme interests clause under Article15(2). Other changes included merging the theatre missile defence(TMD) and national missile defence (NMD) systems into a single globalprogram and, to prevent the perception of a strategic decoupling fromEurope, increasing the role of allies in the creation of a global ballisticmissile defence system.5 Rather than a fixed or final missile defence

4 Nuclear Posture Review, 2.5 See James Fergusso n, The Coupling Parad ox: Nuclear Weapo ns, Ba llistic Missile

Defence, and the Future of the Transa tlantic Relations hip, in NATO and EuropeanSec urity: Allianc e Polit ics from t he End of the Cold War to the Age o f Terrorism ,Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, a nd Allen G. S ens, eds. , (Westpo rt, CT: Praegar

Publishers, 2003), 153-172.

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architecture, the Bush administration advocates fielding various BMDcapabilities as they become available. To do so, the FY2003 budget hasallocated US$7.8 billion for missile defence. With the FY2004 budgetrequest includingUS$9.1 billion on missile defence, this figure willlikely increase.

The initial set of capabilities planned for 2004-2005 includes: up to20 ground-based interceptors at Ft. Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg AirForce Base, California for midcourse interception under the ground-based midcourse defence (GMD) system; up to 20 sea-based intercep-tors for midcourse interception under the sea-based midcourse defence(SBM) system; the deployment of numerous PAC-3 tactical missile

defence systems; and various land, sea, and space-based sensors. Thisshould provide the foundation for a multi-layered hit-to-kill capabili-ty. Concepts, such as miniature kill vehicles on one interceptor or satel-lites armed with interceptors for boost-phase intercepts, with theobjective of deployment of three to five satellites for testing purposes in2008, are also being studied.6

While the development of missile defence has certainly advancedquite dramatically since the Sentinel and Safeguard programs andReagans Strategic Defense Initiative, the technical hurdles facing thisleg of the triad are significant. This assessment is based on the costs ofthe program, the lack of adequate testing, and the potential for farmore cost-effective countermeasures. For these reason, active defences

are the most uncertain leg of the new triad.

Revitalized defence infrastructureA revitalized defence infrastructure is a key component of the newtriad. In that regard, this strategic concept incorporates the long-stand-ingUS interest in maintaining overwhelming advantage in the revolu-tion in military affairs (RMA). The NPR does, however, pay particularattention to the infrastructure of its nuclear platforms. Numerousproblems with the current infrastructure are identified: solid rocketmotor design, development and testing; technology for current and

6 See Department of Defense, Missile Defense Operations Announcement,

Department of Defense News Releas e, No. 642-02 (December 17, 2002), availab le atwww.d efenselink.mil; Wade Bo ese, Missile Defense Post-ABMTreat y: No S yste m,

No Arms Race, Arms Contro l Tod a y(June 2003); a nd Wad e Boe se , US Aims toDeploy Spa ce-Bas ed Missile Interceptors in Five Years, Arms Contro l Tod ay(March2003). Another highly controversial idea being studied is the use of nuclear-tipped

interceptors instead of hit-to-kill vehicles.


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future strategic systems; improved surveillance and assessment capabil-ities; command and control platforms and systems; and design, devel-opment, and production of radiation-hardened parts.7

Perhaps most controversially, the NPR sees the need for the nuclearinfrastructure to have a revitalized capability to design, develop, andmanufacture new warheads, alongside an improved 18-month readi-ness to resume nuclear testing. This has important implications for thenew triads explicit emphasis on earth-penetrating warhead modifica-tions and the potential development of new miniature nuclearweapons.

While it is difficult to assess the changes underway in the US nuclear

infrastructure, the Bush administrationsFY

2003 budget request forthe stockpile stewardship program asks for US$5.9 billion, which istwice that of 1995 (US$2.9 billion), and nearly one and one-half timesthe US$4.1 billion spent on average during the Cold War. Plans areunderway to refurbish and modify the various components of theseweapons. Work on advanced nuclear weapons research and productionfacilities has already begun. On 22 April 2003, the Los Alamos nation-al laboratory announced the creation of the first plutonium pit since1989; this signifies the re-establishment ofUS capability to remake orproduce new plutonium cores for nuclear weapons, a capability thatwas lost in 1989. This is only one component of a larger, more ambi-tious plan to obtain a significant pit production capability. The Bush

administration, for example, plans to build the modern pit facility,which will be able to produce between 125 and 450 pits per year.8

While the NPR states that it supports the continued nuclear testingmoratorium, and only seeks to move the readiness time down to a yearor less, the reports emphasis on new nuclear capabilities indicates a

7 Nuclear Posture Review, 30.

8 This production range ca n be found in US Department of Energy, Draft

Supplemental Progra mmatic Environmental Impact St ate ment on StockpileStew ards hip and Manag ement for a Modern Pit Facility(Was hing ton, DC:Department of Energy, May 2003). Other facilities under development include the

Nationa l Ignition Facility (NIF), the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrotest Facility, a nd

pulsed power technology facilities. These d ata , a longside data from subcriticaltests, a re planned to b e integrated through the accelerated s trategic computing ini-

tiative (ASCI), a multi-billion dollar s upercomputing prog ram involving the USs lead-ing universities. S ee The S hape of Things to Come: The Nuclear Posture Review,Missile Defense, and the Dangers of a New Arms Race, Western St ate s Legal

Foundation Report(April 2002).


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strong potential for renewed nuclear testing. This view has been sup-ported by comments from Dr. Dale Klein, assistant to the secretary ofdefense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs. Thisemphasis on nuclear testing is reiterated in a two-page memorandumcirculated to members of the nuclear weapons council (NWC) by E. C.Aldridge Jr., undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, andlogistics. This memo recommends that US nuclear weapons laborato-ries assess the technical risks associated with maintaining the nucleararsenal without testing. The memo was followed by a 10 January meet-ing of significant nuclear weapons managers to plan for an NWC stock-pile stewardship conference. The notes of the meeting, which were

obtained by the Los Alamos study group, indicates a desire to study theneed to make testing modifications in order to build the new kinds ofnuclear weapons advocated in the NPR.9

T H E I N C O R P O R A T I O N O F C O U N T E R P R O L I F E R A T I O N

The new triad places a heavy emphasis on NBC-armed states. Offensivestrike systems, for example, have been justified by the need to neutralizeHDBTs and NBCweapons and facilities associated with rogue states. Onecan also see the same association with the new triads focus on mobile andrelocatable targets, something that was especially problematic againstIraqs mobile Scud missiles during the Gulf War. As the NPRstates,

North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries

that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected con-tingencies. All have longstanding hostility toward the United States

and its security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have

been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbour terrorists,

and all have active [weapons of mass destruction] WMD and missile

programs.10

While the NPR does focus on this threat, it would be a mistake toconsider this recent development in US nuclear policy a fundamentalchange. Throughout the 1990s, the United States has increasinglyemphasized the threat posed by the proliferation ofNBCweapons and

9 See Jace Rad ke, Defense Official: Nuke Tests at NTS Are Likely, Las Vega s Times(August 14, 2002), a vailable a t www.nukewatch.org; a nd Dan Stober a nd JonathanLanda y, US ponders resumption of nuclear weapons tests, The Mercury News(November 16, 2002), availa ble at www. ba yarea .com. The minutes of the meeting

can be found at www.lasg.org.

10 Nuclear Posture Review, 16.


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their delivery systems. Indeed, when the Pentagon studied variousthreat scenarios in the early 1990s, with scenarios ranging form peace-keeping to large-scale regional conflicts, only those involvingNBCweapons posed a direct threat to the US.11Washingtons response wasthe development of a counterproliferation doctrine. It is this doctrinethat provides the foundation for the new triad.

The US interest in counterproliferation stems in large part from theprocess of threat redefinition triggered by the end of the Cold War.This process can be clearly seen in the January 1988 report of the UScommission on integrated long-term strategy, entitled DiscriminateDeterrence. This report, while certainly emphasizing the Soviet threat,

also focused on the potential threat posed by emerging regional powersand their rapidly expanding conventional and non-conventional mili-tary capabilities. As the report goes on to note, The [expanding] arse-nals of the lesser powers will make it riskier and more difficult for thesuperpowers to intervene in regional wars. The US ability to support itsallies around the world will increasingly be called into question. 12

Highly visible statements by senior US officials quickly followed. InDecember 1988, William H. Webster, director of the CentralIntelligence Agency, spoke at length on the dangers posed by the pro-liferation of advanced weapons, particularly ballistic missiles and NBCweapons. This was soon followed by the comments of Pentagon offi-cials, who emphasized the threat of regional military powers and the

increased likelihood of expansionist tendencies in such states.Near the end of the 1980s, a series of Congressional committee

hearings on the dangers of horizontal proliferation took place.Initially, this threat redefinition stressed the proliferation of conven-tional military capabilities and did not take into account the politicalcharacter of the countries in question. An assortment of countries wereconsidered possible threats, including Egypt, Israel, India, SouthKorea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and China. However, borrowing from theReagan administrations growing concern for state-sponsored terror-ism, the threat redefinition began to emphasize the political character

11 See Gilles Andreani, The Disa rray of US Non-Proliferation Policy, Survival41(Wint er 1999-2000).

12 US Commission on Integra ted Long-Term Stra teg y, Discriminate Deterrence(Was hing ton, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988), 9. Quoted in Michae l Klare,Rogue S tate s a nd Nuclear Outlaws: Americas S earch for a New Foreign Policy(New

York: Hill a nd Wang, 1995), 19.


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of these regimes. The US began to characterize hostile (or seeminglyhostile) Third World States with large military forces and nascent WMDcapabilities as rogue states or nuclear outlaws bent on sabotaging theprevailing world order.13 This rogue states doctrine would go on toguide US international security policy for the postCold War era.

Following from this threat redefinition, the US counterproliferationdoctrine was unveiled in Secretary of Defense Les Aspins speech to theNational Academy of Sciences on 7 December 1993. He outlined aDefense Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI) as a supplement to thetraditional emphasis on non-proliferation. Counterproliferation wasthe Defense Departments new initiative to applyUS military capabili-

ties to address the threat posed byNBC

weapons and their delivery sys-tems. According to Barry R. Schneider, the CPI introduced a new mis-sion and new requirements, including improved active and passivedefences; the development of large area decontamination capabilities;improved deterrence against regional adversaries armed with small butgrowing NBC arsenals; and improved counterforce capabilities todestroyNBCweapons and delivery systems.14

Active defences like BMD are central to US counterproliferationefforts. Passive measures are meant to mitigate the impact of an NBC-contaminated environment on units, personnel and civilians. Activedefences play an integral and complementary role in the reduction ofmissiles, aircraft, and other NBC delivery systems from successfully

arriving at their targets; this lessens the degree of NBC-contaminationand, therefore, passive defence requirements. This would allow the USto more freely undertake counterproliferation missions against NBC-armed rogue states, while reducing the probability of successful NBCretaliation by those adversaries.

While the Cold War emphasized a multi-tiered BMD system in orderto limit the impact of a Soviet nuclear strike, the Clinton administra-tion placed particular emphasis on theatre missile defence programs. ATMD system would use a hit-to-kill interceptor to protect a small areafrom a small number of ballistic missiles. The impetus for TMD can beattributed to the threat that short- and medium-range missiles armedwith NBC weapons pose to US forward-deployed forces, bases, and

13 Kla re, Rogue Sta tes a nd Nuclear Outlaws, 26.

14 Barry R. Schneider Future war a nd counterproliferation: US military responses to

NBCproliferation threats(Wes tport , Conn., London: Pra ege r, 1999), 46.


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regional allies. To counter this growing proliferation threat, theatremissile defence programs proliferated in the 1990s.

The Clinton administration also oversaw the gradual if reluctantmovement towards NMD, which would be designed to protect the con-tinental United States from a small number of ballistic missiles.Possible scenarios include an accidental or inadvertent attack by Russiaor an intentional attack by a rogue state. Significant pressure for anational missile defence capability came in July of 1998, with therelease of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic MissileThreat to the United States, which stated that new ballistic missile-equipped nations like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would be able to

inflict major destruction on theUS

within about five years of a decisionto acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq).15 This direwarning, alongside the Iranian testing of a Shahab-3 missile and theNorth Korean testing of a Taepo Dong-1 missile, created the impetusfor the further developing of a NMD system. Not surprisingly, theClinton administration quickly signed the 1999 National MissileDefense Act.

Counterproliferation was originally conceived as a conventionaldoctrine. However, counterproliferation missions were increasingly(and often secretly) incorporated into the nuclear targeting policy ofthe United States. In March of 1990, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)published a military net assessment that cited the increasingly capable

Third World threats as a new justification for maintaining nuclearweapons. Three months later, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney pro-vided testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee. This wasthe first instance when a high-level official specifically used the dangersofNBC weapons proliferation as a rationale for maintaining the USnuclear deterrent.16

This planning received a significant impetus in the aftermath of the1990-1991 Gulf War. As Operation Desert Storm came to a close, theBush administration released a nuclear weapons employment policy

15 This report depa rted sharply from the traditional intelligence communitysass essment of the ba llistic missile threat. For instance, the November 1995 nationalintelligence estimate (NIE) predicted that a threat to the US would not take place for

at least 15 years. The executive summary of the report can be found atwww.house.gov.

16 Hans Kristensen a nd Joshua Hand ler, The USAand Counterproliferation: ANew

and Dubious Role for US Nuclea r Wea pons , Security Dialogue27, no. 4 (1996), 387-399.


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(NUWEP) which directed the military to plan for nuclear operationsagainst states developingNBCweapons. In March 1991, the joint mil-itary net assessment identified the utility of non-strategic weapons forthese postCold War roles, and recommended upgrades for the US C

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capabilities. Los Alamos analysts like Thomas Dowler and JosophHoward even argued for the development of tinynukes for counter-proliferation missions, with potential yields ranging from 10 tons toone kiloton.

These developments led General Lee Butler, the commander ofStrategic Command (STRATCOM), to establish a strategic deterrencestudy group, chaired by former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas

Reed and organized by the joint strategic targeting planning staff (theorganization that develops the SIOPs). The Reed panel, as it becameknown, began a process of new threat monitoring that led eventuallyto the conclusion that nuclear targeting was needed against every rea-sonable adversary, even non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs).

While certain officials were alarmed with this notion, since it wouldeffectively negate the critical negative security assurances given to theNNWSs, nuclear war planning for contingences in the third world con-tinued. This planning was codified on 1 June 1992 with SIOP-93, thefirst nuclear war plan to formally incorporate NBC targets in thirdworld states. While the Bush and Yeltsin unilateral disarmament ini-tiatives complicated this process, an updated NUWEP-82 and joint

strategic capabilities plan (JSCP), which directed the military objectivesof nuclear targeting, continued to emphasize these targeting options.

While the Clinton administration was publicly ambiguous on theutility of nuclear weapons serving as a deterrent against CB capabilities,military planners were under no such illusion. By April of 1993, theJCS published its first version ofJoint Nuclear Doctrine3-12. This doc-ument formally incorporated third world NBC targets into US nuclearplanning. This was quickly followed bySIOP-94, which reduced theabsolute number of targets but continued to emphasize the impor-tance of counterproliferation missions in US nuclear plans. A jointintelligence centre was established by General Butler for the assess-ment of the dangers ofNBC proliferation from STRATCOMs perspective.

It was also at this time that STRATCOM established the strategic plan-ning study group to develop a flexible, adaptive, and global strategicwar planning system (SWPS) to replace the archaic Cold War-era guid-ance planning system. The SWPS refers to the facilities used to analyze


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targets and assign and deliver nuclear weapons. In the process ofSWPSmodernization, the traditional distinction between strategic and tacti-cal nuclear planning would be erased. Even weapon systems would bemodernized, as shown by the development of the navySLBM retarget-ing system (SRS) and the air force rapid execution and combat target-ing (REACT) system. The eventual goal ofSWPS modernization was tocreate a revolutionary LivingSIOP, where the USwould be able togenerate SIOPs in less than 24 hours (rather than the standard 14-18months), retarget close to 1,000 targets per day, and be able to produceregional nuclear contingency plans involving only a few tacticalweapons.17

The Clinton administration did attempt a major nuclear policyreview in its 1994 nuclear posture review. Despite the best efforts ofAssistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, the 1994 NPR codifiedSTRATCOMs growing interest in using nuclear weapons for counterpro-liferation (to deter NBC acquisition or use, for example).18 In its silverbooks project, classified plans were developed for nuclear strikesagainst a range of suspected NBC facilities situated in rogue states.These plans contained specific targets, weapons assigned againstthem, timelines for attack (hours, days, weeks), rules of engagement,expected collateral damage, and associated risks.19 Buoyed by its suc-cess, STRATCOM even attempted to expand its mandate by obtainingthe responsibility for nuclear planning in regional theatres, which was

under the purview of the regional commands.

17 For more on many of these nuclear developments, see British American SecurityInformation Council (BASIC), Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mas s

Destruction and US Nuclear Strateg y, BASICResea rch Report (February 1998); HansM. Kristensen, US Nuclear S trateg y Reform in the 1990s, Working P ap er (Berkeley,

CA: The Nautilus Institute, March 2000); a nd Hans Kristensen, The Matrix of

Deterrence: US Stra tegic Command Force Structure Studies(Berkeley, CA: TheNautilus Institute, May 2001).

18 The 1994 NPRWorking Group #5 discuss ed the relationship b etween nuclear poli-cy and counterproliferation. This working group reached a close consensus onmany issues, including the need to maintain a full range of nuclear options aga inst

proliferant nations; the need to more forcefullys tate the nuclear contribution tocounterproliferation; the negligible impact of the nuclear posture on terrorism; thelimitations of deterring NBCacquisition; and the importance of forward-deployed

nuclea r forces. The role o f STRATCOM in this particular working group was also highly

significant. Further information o n the 1994 NPRcan be found at the NautilusInstitute website, available at www.nautilus.org.

19 William M. Arkin, Iran in the cros sha irs, The Bullet in of the Atomic S cientis ts51, (July/August 1995), 80. Silver books s tand s for silver or strateg ic installa tionlist of vulnerability effects and results.


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In the end, this controversial project was terminated in 1995, andSTRATCOMs ambition to centralize counterproliferation under its com-mand was stymied; it would be forced to share nuclear planningresponsibility in coordination with the regional commands. But fur-ther planning for third world nuclear contingencies soon followed.STRATCOMs strategic advisory group (SAG), for example, undertook areview of nuclear deterrence in regional conflicts, and even did studiesin which it tested its conclusions against adversaries like Iran. Regionalnuclear planning for counterproliferation was enshrined in the JCSs1996 Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations. The Clintonadministration accepted this new counterproliferation role for nuclear

weapons in Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDD

-60).

20

The administration of George W. Bush has placed counterprolifera-tion squarely at the forefront of US national security. In its 2002National Security Strategy of the United States, the administrationacknowledged the need for proactive counterproliferation measures tobe integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forcesand those of our allies.21 The emphasis is on a continued US ability toprevail in conflicts with NBC-armed adversaries in any future wars ofcounterproliferation. Counterproliferation was further elaborated inNational Security Presidential Directive 17 (NSPD-17, or the NationalStrategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction).22

The most significant aspect of the current administrations doctrine

has been the clarification of what has always been left unstated:whether these options were confined to wartime measuresorwhether they also included the pre-emptive use of force.23 The concept

20 Another notable as pect of PDD-60 was its strong emphasis on China. This too waslargelyd ue to STRATCOMs growing interest in targeting Chinese nuclear forces, evi-dent in the numerous China scenarios in its S un City Extended study. In 1998,

China was formally incorporated as a targetinto SIOP-99. Se e Kristensen, US NuclearStrat egy Reform in the 1990s; and Kristensen, The Ma trix of Deterrence : USStrat egic Command Force Structure Studies.

21The Nationa l Security Strateg y of the United Sta tes(Septemb er 2002), 14,www.whitehouse.gov.

22 NSPD-17 has also b een codified under Homeland Security Presidentia l Directive 4(HSPD-4). While the classified document has yet to be released, the public version

(Natio nal Stra tegy to Combat Weapo ns of Mass Destruction) can be found atwww. fas. org. Three interrelated components were identified: interdiction, deter-

rence, a nd defence and mitigation.

23 Thomas G. Mahnken, ACritical Appraisa l of the Defense Counterproliferation

Iniative, Nationa l Security Studies Quarterly(Summer 1999), 93.


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of pre-emption was codified in the 2002 national security strategydocument, and clearly demonstrated in the 2003 counterprolifera-tion war in Iraq. But pre-emption is based on notions of necessityand of an imminent danger of attack. By emphasizing the uniquecapabilities and objectives of its adversaries, the Bush administrationhas redefined what constitutes an imminent danger. The potentialattainment of dangerous capabilities may now necessitate the use ofmilitary force. This is much more closely associated with ideas of pre-ventive war, and harkens back to the 1940s and 1950s, when the UScontemplated preventive action to forestall the Soviet acquisition ofnuclear capabilities.

In the postCold War period, theUS

has emphasized unilaterallycounteringNBC proliferation through the research and development ofactive defences and offensive weapon systems (conventional andnuclear). The purpose of counterproliferation is to eliminate the per-ceived asymmetrical advantage enjoyed by rogue states. Many of thesophisticated weapons systems emphasized in the new triad are the lat-est manifestation of weaponry designed for counterproliferation mis-sions. Rather than a dramatic departure from existing policy, the Bushadministrations changes should be seen as the latest manifestation of apostCold War trend towards counterproliferation.

E S C A L A T I O N D O M I N A N C E A N D S T R A T E G I C S T A B I L I T Y

While the NPRhas yet to become an official government policy, manyof its key components are currently in the process of funding anddevelopment. In fact, much of the new triadincluding missiledefence and conventional and nuclear strike systemshas been underdevelopment for many years as part of ongoingUS efforts at counter-proliferation. Given the continuity that is evident in US nuclearweapons policy, it is highly likely that the new triad will remain animportant strategic concept for future administrations.

This concept is not, however, limited to matters of nuclear weapons,or even the counterproliferation of rogue states. The new triad is alsoan integral component of the emergingUS grand strategy of primacy.According to Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, this refers to a situation in

which US capabilities are sufficient, operating on their own, to cow allpotential challengers and to comfort all coalition partners.24With its

24 See Barry R. Pos en and Andrew L. Ross , Competing Visions for US GrandStrategy, International Security21, (Wint er 1996/1997), 32.


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emphasis on the development of even more versatile and effectivestrategic capabilities, the new triad is premised on the idea of nuclearprimacya nuclear corollary to current Pentagon efforts to achievefull spectrum dominance.

The US has consistently sought to achieve some form of nuclear pri-macy. During the Cold War, despite popular preconceptions, theUnited States only grudgingly accepted mutually assured destruction(MAD) with the Soviet Union, and spent much of the 1970s and 1980sattempting to escape from it. Counterforce and damage limitationcapabilities were the little-acknowledged foundation for US nucleardeterrence. The result was the Reagan administrations emphasis on

counterleadership decapitation strikes and its desire to achieve a mod-icum of superiority in the form of escalation dominancethe devel-opment of military capabilities that can contain or defeat the adversaryat all levels of violence with the possible exception of the highest.25

The search for escalation dominance over possible adversaries didnot dissipate with the collapse of the Soviet Union but its focus wastransferred to the postCold War threat ofNBC-armed rogue states.While still unable to fully threaten US territory directly, rogue stateswill increasingly be able to launch devastating, unconventional attackson US regional allies and basing areas. This could lead to the deterrenceof anyUS regional intervention or, at the very least, intra-war deter-rence in the midst of aUS intervention. In consequence, the US began

to accelerate its counterproliferation efforts as a means to mitigate thisasymmetrical advantage and to ensure continued US escalation domi-nance over these potential challengers.

As a strategic concept, the new triad embodies this long-standingneed for escalation dominance. In this most recent manifestation, theexplicit emphasis is on rogue states. But these capabilities are also aconcern for established nuclear powers. Escalation dominance overrogue states, at least as envisioned by the Bush administration, impliesescalation dominance over countries like Russia and China. Thisbrings out questions of strategic stability. What impact will this have

25 Robert Jervis, The Illogic o f America n Nuclea r Stra teg y(Ithaca : Cornell UniversityPres s, 1984), 131. For more on t he cons iste nt US desire to mainta in some form of nuclear primacy, see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear S tra teg y, 2nd

Edition (New York: St. Martins Press , 1989); a nd Scott D. Saga n, Moving Targ ets :Nuclear Strate gy a nd Natio nal Security(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1989).


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on US strategic relations with both countries? How will Russia andChina react to these developments? Will their reactions lead to thedestabilization of their respective relationships with the United States?Are we seeing the beginnings of a new arms race?

The established nuclear relationship between the US and Russiaremains a matter of great strategic importance. Both sides still main-tain thousands of deployed nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert,alongside further thousands of reserve weapons that are easily re-deployable. It is also clear that the capabilities envisioned in the newtriad will have an impact on the survivability of the Russian nucleararsenal. The current emphasis on smaller, more accurate and useable

nuclear weapons againstHDBT

s will give the United States an increasedcapability for counterforce targeting and decapitation strikes againstthe Russian deterrent. Advanced EPWs will, for example, be necessaryfor the destruction of key facilities in the Yamantau and Kosvinskymountains in central and southern Russia. The Yamantau facility is aleadership relocation facility that is expected to be operating soon. TheKosvinsky facility houses the Russian nuclear command system and isa critical link to Russias dead hand communications network forsemi-automatic retaliation in the event of a decapitating strike.26 Thedevelopment of long-range conventional strike options, and theirincorporation in US nuclear war planning, will only increase the coun-terforce capabilities of the United States.

The new triads emphasis on a multi-tiered BMD system is also apoint of concern. Of course, the eventual system will not provide ashield against Russian nuclear forces. Active defences designed for oneor even a handful of nuclear weapons will have a negligible impact onthe vast Russian arsenal. And unlike rogue states, Russia has substan-tial capabilities in and experience with countermeasures for such adefensive capability. But the interplay between counterforce weaponsand active defences is not an issue that should be dismissed lightly.Together, this will substantially increase US first-strike capabilities. TheUSwill have the capacity to shift the ratio of warheads to its own advan-tage following a cycle of counterforce nuclear exchanges. The endresult will be escalation dominance over Russian nuclear forces. As

26 See Bruce Blair, We keep buiding nukes for all the wrong reas ons, TheWas hington Pos t(May 25, 2003), ava ilable at www.cd i.org. For more on the Russia n

dead ha nd system, see Blair, Glob al Zero Alert fo r Nuclea r Forces.


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noted by Douglas A. Ross, a government possessing this capacity isthought better able to resort to nuclear threats in a crisis situation, aswell as to impose satisfactory war termination conditions on theadversary.27

This situation will likely trigger modifications of Russias nuclearpolicy as the Russians address the growing qualitative gap betweentheir respective nuclear arsenals and attempt to secure the survivabilityof the countrys second-strike capabilities. There are some signs of thisoccurring, as witnessed by Russias decision to withdraw from theSTART II Treaty; to maintain its remaining inventory ofMIRVed ICBMs;to deploy a newICBM (the SS-27); and to develop a fifth-generation

submarine, newSLBM

s, and a nuclear variant of a new cruise missile.But these developments should be placed in their proper context.Many of these weapon platforms have been under development formany years, often for reasons more to do with a desire for nationalprestige than with a desire for a secure and survivable nuclear deter-rent. It would be easy to overestimate the importance of the new triadas a causal factor. But as the United States increases its counterforceand missile defence capabilities, the need to maintain a survivablenuclear deterrent will become an even more salient issue. A growingemphasis on modernizing the Russian nuclear arsenalby hardeningmissile silos or by developing countermeasures or active defencesshould be expected. Russia may also emphasis on its hair-triggered

launch on warning nuclear posture in order to protect the deterrentfrom a hypothetical US first-strike.28

However, an arms race between Russia and the United States is noton the immediate horizon. The gradual modernization of Russias

27 Douglas A. Ross, Coping with Sta r Wars: Issues fo r Cana da a nd the Alliance,

Aurora Papers 2 (Ottawa : Canadia n Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament,1985), 20. Escalation dominance can also refer to conventional as well as nucleardominance. For a good recent example of this, see Robert S. Ross, Navigating the

Taiwa n Straits : Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and US-China Relations, International Security27, (Fa ll 2002), 48-85.

28 This posture has its roots in the Soviet Unions highlycentralized command and

control arrangement, which was particularlyvulnerable to US decapitation capa bili-

ties. To o ffset this vulnerability, the Soviet Union bega n emphasizing the earlyrelease of its nuclear command authority and the launching of its nuclear weapons

in the event that its early warning systems detect a US missile st rike. This launch onwarning posture survived the collapse of the Soviet Union. See Bruce Blair, TheLogic of Accide nta l Nuclea r War(Was hing ton, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993) and

Globa l Zero Alert fo r Nuclea r Forces.


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nuclear forces, partly as a response to the new triad, does not mean thatan incipient arms race is underway. The nuclear developments of bothcountries are only partly being driven by calculations of each otherscapabilities; other considerations, by and large, play much moreprominent roles. Of course, there is a possibility that small adjust-ments to their respective nuclear arsenal may lead to some possiblydangerous policy options. A case in point is the Russian reliance of alaunch on warning posture, where a mistaken warning may lead toan inadvertent nuclear strike. But the likelihood that this nuclear rela-tionship will be severely destabilized in the near-term is negligible. Itis simply too well established, and lacks the aggressive, adversarial char-

acteristics apparent during the Cold War.The nuclear relationship between China and the United States hasits own unique characteristics. It is, for instance, a much more asym-metrical relationship. The Chinese nuclear arsenal is premised on theidea of minimum deterrence, and will likely remain only a fraction ofthe US arsenals size. This makes the new triads emphasis on counter-force and damage limitation capabilities much more problematic thanin the Russian case. A splendid first-strike by the nuclear and conven-tional forces of the United States, alongside some missile defence capa-bility for further damage limitation, is a real possibility against Chinassmall number of liquid-fuelled ICBMs. In this case, escalation domi-nance is less demanding.

It is, however, difficult to gauge the impact of this situation on theemerging strategic relationship between the two countries. This stemslargely from Chinas ongoing work to modernize and secure its nucleardeterrent. For Chinese leaders, the definition of what constitutes min-imum deterrence is evolving: the need to have a limited second-strike capability has now become a priority.29A good example of thismodernization process can be seen in Chinas development of thethree-stage, land-mobile, solid-fuelled DF-31 ICBM, with a range of8,000 km, and the possible use ofMIRV technology. Other missiles indevelopment include the JL-2 (a submarine-launched version of theDF-31) and the still tentative DF-41.

This emphasis on nuclear modernization appears to support the

notion that China is reacting directly to developments in the United

29 For a good examination of Chinas changing nuclear deterrence posture, seeAlasta ir Iain Johnston, Chinas New Old Thinking: The Concept of Limited

Deterrence, International Security20, (Wint er 1995/96), 5-42.


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States. China has frequently voiced concern over the US fixation onactive defences. This was initially confined to the development ofTMD,which was seen as a possible shield for US and Japanese military forces.But it became more vocal with the signing of the 1996 joint declara-tion on the alliance for the 21st century and the 1997 new guidelinesfor US-Japan defence co-operation, and by the eventual US decision todevelop an NMD system. It is therefore tempting to assume that thenew triads very explicit emphasis on offensive strike capabilities, activedefences, and other tools for escalation dominance will lead to a strate-gically destabilizing Chinese reaction, and perhaps even an arms race.

The new triad will, to some degree, affect Chinas nuclear deterrent.

The perceived need for a survivable nuclear deterrentin the face ofgrowing American emphasis on counterforce and damage limitationcapabilitieswill become an even more important priority. Theunequal nature of their respective capabilities, and the more uncertainlong-term relationship between the two countries, does make strategicinstability a possibility.

But it is very easy to overestimate the new triads impact on thisstrategic relationship. First, like Russia, the security threat posed by theUnited States is only one factor, among many other considerations:Chinas concerns over prestige vis--vis established nuclear powers andits rivalry with India may be more significant. Second, the need tomake modifications on a nuclear deterrent, to make it more secure and

survivable, does not mean that a destabilizing arms race is in the midstof formation. While relations between the two countries may containsome latent tension, this does not constitute a significant adversarialrelationship by any means. Third, unlike Russia, China has had a longhistory of living under US nuclear superiority and first-strike capabili-ty; minimum deterrence has never been comparable, in any realisticway, to a survivable second-strike capability. This may have led Chinato undertake its current nuclear modernization program, but oneshould recall that it has been a gradual affair (much like Chinas mili-tary modernization in general) that does not foresee reaching any mea-sure of real parity with the United States.

In the end, the new triad will likely create an incentive for both

Russia and China to modernize their nuclear forces. Survivability ofthe nuclear deterrent has certainly become an issue. But these techni-cal and policy adjustments do not mean that strategic stability betweenthe US and either country is in immediate risk, nor that an arms race


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dynamic will take hold. While the new triad and US escalation domi-nance may look destabilizing from a simple numbers perspective,one should recall that strategic stability is founded on relationships,not numbers.30And US relations with both countries are much moreco-operative than adversarial.

There are, however, significant long-term dangers associated withthe current emphasis on nuclear primacy. Strategic stability may bebased on relationships, and this certainly mitigates the new triadsimmediate impact on Russian and Chinese threat perception. But oneshould recall that nuclear primacy is only one aspect of grand strategicprimacy, a goal that the administration of George W. Bush appears

intent on pursuing. Many have noted the limits of, and dangers associ-ated with, this grand strategy, particularly to US relations with peercompetitors like Russia and China.31 If these relationships becomemore adversarial, the new triad and nuclear primacy will have a muchgreater impact on the threat perception of these nuclear powers. Withthat in mind, the new triads impact on strategic stability between theserelatively established nuclear powers is ambiguous and, in the long-term, uncertain.

C O N C L U S I O N

The 2002 NPR proposed a new triad strategic conceptbased onoffensive strike systems, active defences, and a revitalized defence infra-

structureto guide US nuclear strategy. This concept is heavily indebt-ed to the changingUS threat perception in the postCold War period,namely its recognition of the threat posed by NBC weapons in thehands of irresponsible rogue states. The result has been the significantUS emphasis on the conventional and unconventional counterprolifer-ation capabilities that are integral components of the new triad.

The new triad is also founded on the long-standingUS desire tomaintain nuclear primacy over other nuclear powers. This may leavecountries like Russia and China little choice but to make modificationsto their own nuclear arsenals. This in itself will not lead to an arms

30 See Frank P. Harvey, The future of strat egic sta bility and nuclear deterrence,Internationa l Journal58 (Spring 2003), 321-346.

31 For a good exa mple, see Douglas A. Ross , Foreign policy challenges for PaulMartin: Canad as international security policy in an era of American hyperpower

and continental vulnerability, Internationa l Journal58 (Autumn 2003), 533-569.


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race. Modifications for a secure and survivable second-strike capabili-ty are necessary to ensure strategic stability.

But the Bush administrations emphasis on grand strategic prima-cy does not auger well for future strategic stability. One of the mostimportant conditions for a destabilizing arms race is the presence of anadversarial relationship. The current US relationships with both Russiaand China, while periodically tense, are based much more on cooper-ation than conflict. This may change, however, in the face of an overtattempt by the United States to prevent the rise of a peer competitor.Much depends on further US action, often in areas that are not direct-ly related to US nuclear strategy. For instance, the manner in which

Washington deals with continued proliferation problems in theMiddle East and northeast Asia will have important repercussions forthe threat perception of Moscow and Beijing. If the US focuses moreexplicitly on maintaining escalation dominance over peer competitors,rather than simply rogue states, further balancing by these countrieswill also take place. Grand strategic primacy may make the capabili-ties envisioned in the new triad appear much more threatening.

The new triad is a strategic concept that is heavily informed by thepast. The postCold War US emphasis on counterproliferation isembedded in the new triad. The rationale for this strategic concept isfounded in the long-standingUS desire to maintain nuclear primacyand escalation dominance. But it is important to remember that this

concept has its origins in the present day administration of George W.Bush. Nuclear primacy and escalation dominance must be placed inthe context of a grand strategy founded on continued and unrivalledUS predominance. In that context, the new triad does have destabiliz-ing but dormant characteristics, which may be triggered in the future.

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