imagining resilience: situating perceptions and emotions about climate change on kamchatka, russia
TRANSCRIPT
Imagining resilience: situating perceptions and emotionsabout climate change on Kamchatka, Russia
Jessica K. Graybill
Published online: 1 November 2012
� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012
Abstract Global environmental change shapes
places and people through ongoing transformation of
ecological, socioeconomic, political, and cultural
phenomena. One region construed as highly vulnera-
ble to global environmental change, particularly
anthropogenic climate change, is the North. Recent
research about human communities in Western arctic
and subarctic places revolve around vulnerability to
anthropogenic climate change, focusing on loss of the
ability to pursue traditional livelihoods, threats to
ecosystems sustaining human communities and the
need to adapt to new environmental regimes. Fewer
studies address Russia and the perceptions and emo-
tions related to climate change. To understand how
people of the Russian North engage with climate
change, I conducted ethnographic research in two rural
and remote communities in subarctic alpine Kam-
chatka, Russia in 2009–2010. Local narratives about
climate change largely reflect climate skepticism, and
anthropogenic climate change is rejected as explaining
environmental changes because: (1) climate is con-
sidered as naturally and cyclically changing, (2)
humans are not considered a large enough force to
alter natural climate cycles, (3) environmental prob-
lems are solvable with technology and (4) there is a
lack of knowledge about climate change science.
Thus, perceptions and emotions about transformation
focus on other realms—socioeconomic, political,
cultural—that are perceived as more critical to every-
day life in the present and near future. Here, I describe
these narratives and place the regional understanding
of climate change in greater context to explain
resistance to imagining environmental transforma-
tions due to climate change.
Keywords Anthropogenic climate change � Climate
skepticism � Emotional geographies �Risk perception �Kamchatka � Russia � Arctic studies
Introduction
Over the past two decades, an army of scholars has
turned their attention to climate transitions in the
North, documenting physical changes regionally and
longitudinally, understand the vulnerabilities and risks
experienced by human communities in this region of
rapid climate transition, and creating science-policy
frameworks to address human adaptation to changing
environmental conditions. Much research has been
undertaken in Western places, most notably in the
Canadian North (Berkes et al. 2001; ACIA 2004;
IPCC 2007; Ford 2009; Laidler et al. 2009).
This construction of impending risks, vulnerabili-
ties and transformations of coupled human and natural
systems in the North emphasizes vulnerability and risk
management approaches to the study of this region,
but largely excludes two additional concerns
J. K. Graybill (&)
Colgate University, Hamilton, NY, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
123
GeoJournal (2013) 78:817–832
DOI 10.1007/s10708-012-9468-4
regarding regional change in the arctic and subarctic:
colonialism and internal social resilience. Cameron
(2012) finds that current conceptualizations of indig-
enous people and communities in the north as ‘‘local’’
and ‘‘traditional’’ and current interest in improving the
lives of such people runs the risk of ‘‘perpetuating
colonial relations’’ by relegating peoples of the North
to being receptors, not agents, of current and future
change. Excluding colonial understandings from most
scholarship about the North guides engagement away
from deeper exploration of the implications of other
aspects of northern transformation, such as resource
and transportation development schemes (e.g., hydro-
carbon development and shipping routes), that will
affect physical environments and coupled human and
natural systems. While not writing about the North,
Cote and Nightingale 2011 express concern about the
lack of engagement with normative and epistemolog-
ical issues in the construction of the idea of social
resilience more generally. Social resilience is defined
as the ability of groups or communities to cope with
external stresses and disturbances as a result of social,
political, and environmental change (Adger 2000) and
resilience thinking ‘‘proposes a systems approach to
human-environment relations that fits well with
attempts to predict or model socio-ecological change’’
(Cote and Nightingale 2011). In other words, these
scholars would ask researchers to (1) examine criti-
cally for what and for whom are we defining ‘‘local,’’
‘‘traditional,’’ and social resilience, (2) emphasize
equally the roles of physical and political-economic
factors in conceptualizing vulnerability, and (3)
understand how ‘‘the production of knowledge about
colonized people and places is shaped by, and
implicated, in colonization itself’’ (Cameron 2012).
Interrogating knowledge production about human-
environment interactions shows the sociopolitical
construction of environmental knowledge (Castree
and Braun 2001) and, given geography’s general
interest in fairly representing others, acknowledging
social crystallizations of knowledge in ‘other’ places
is pertinent when studying ‘other’ environments.
Thus, geographers should be concerned with place-
based research and knowledge production that
engages other traditions and understandings of places
and transformations—environmental, socioeconomic,
political and cultural. Such a situated approach to
understanding knowledge construction of the North
recognizes that much scholarship about climate
transformations here originates from people outside
the North. Here, I refer to the North to include both
Arctic and sub-Arctic places. Because arctic physical
conditions can exist below the Arctic Circle (66� N)
and subarctic physical conditions occur 50–70� N,
these two regions can both be considered ‘‘the North’’
because they share similar biophysical conditions and
each provides important and early indicators of
climate change (Smith 2010).
Situated studies of northern climate change allow
research produced largely for Anglophone consump-
tion to incorporate extra-Anglophone conceptual fra-
mings. Without this, ‘‘the ‘other’, in postcolonial
terms, will remain an object of study and will not
become integral in ‘knowing’ other places’’ (Graybill
2007; see also Forbes and Stammler 2009). By seeking
to understand perceptions about climate change from
within a place and about a place, our knowledge of
climate change is increased and becomes polycentric,
moving beyond knowledge produced about regions
but inclusive of understandings developed by people
in regions.
Scholars have recognized that observations at the
local scale are largely absent from scientific studies of
climate change (Wilbanks and Kates 1999; Berkes and
Jolly 2001; van Aalst et al. 2008), but that local-scale
studies about topics such as local or traditional
environmental knowledges (Dinero 2011), shifts in
perceptions and uses of natural resource use (Graybill
2008) and understanding of the social networks that
may form to create community resilience (Bodin and
Crona 2009) provide multiple insights about local
responses to global environmental change. Addition-
ally, Moser (2007) recognizes the importance of
studying emotions in climate science, but few studies
anywhere in the North address perceptions and
emotions about climate change.
To move towards polycentric understandings about
climate change, I use a situated, constructionist per-
spective to ask how people on the Kamchatka Peninsula,
an understudied part of the Russian North, create
understandings of their own transforming lives, liveli-
hoods and places, ostensibly due to climate change. In
other words, do local people consider themselves to be at
risk due to current climate transformations? What are
the perceptions about climate changes in place? Is there
acceptance of climate change, or is climate skepticism
present? Is climate change discourse about vulnerabil-
ity, or is it about resilience and the ability to adapt to
818 GeoJournal (2013) 78:817–832
123
multiple transformations (environmental, socioeco-
nomic, political, and cultural) simultaneously? What
emotional responses are provoked in discussing climate
change?
On Kamchatka, investigating local discourses and
perceptions of climate and other environmental
change is important because it sheds light on how
people living in one part of the Russian North perceive
and feel about not only their environmental contexts,
but also their simultaneously experienced social,
economic and cultural contexts. Indeed, in studying
the Nenets in the Russian Arctic (Forbes and Stammler
2009) and the Nivkh and Evenk on Sakhalin Island in
the Russian Far East (Graybill 2008), scholars have
noted that concerns about socioeconomic and political
transformations related to oil and gas extraction may
be perceived as more critical than climate transfor-
mations by both indigenous peoples and ‘‘newcom-
ers’’ to these territories. Thus, to investigate local
perceptions and emotions about climate change on
Kamchatka, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in
two rural and remote communities, Esso and Anavgai,
on the Kamchatka Peninsula. I asked how local people
conceptualize climate change, especially against a
backdrop of other changes that are equally—if not
more—important in everyday life. I focused on
understanding emotional responses to climate change.
I frame my investigation of perceptions of climate
change in rural and remote Russia in two bodies of
literature: (1) emotional geographies and (2) climate
change science discourse in Russia. I describe my
research methods and results and discuss the results,
drawing out the significance of this study and impli-
cations for future research to be conducted on local
aspects of climate change in the North and in Russia.
Kamchatka
Scientific, socio-environmental and anecdotal knowl-
edges of resources and physical conditions indicate a
warming trend on Kamchatka over the past several
100 years. Glaciological (Dyurgerov and Meier 2005)
and dendrochronological (Solomina et al. 2007; Sano
et al. 2009) evidence indicate warming temperatures
for the last 400 and 1000 years, respectively. Local
anecdotal narrative of changes to reindeer pasture,
snow seasons, and reports of diseased or ‘‘untasty’’
salmon caught in waters thought to be too warm for
their health exist on Kamchatka (personal communi-
cations in the field).
Alongside this overall trend of scientifically
observed warming and anecdotal knowledge of eco-
system transformations, other changes on Kamchatka
today are happening in socioeconomic, political and
cultural realms. Located on the Far Eastern margin of
Russia and accessible only by air or boat travel or long
terrestrial voyage across northern Siberia, Kamchatka
has always been remote and culturally marginal to
Russia. The first urban settlement, Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatksy, was founded in 1740, but this outpost did
not become a large city until the Soviet era. Geopo-
litically, Kamchatka was important throughout the
Russian Empire and Soviet Union for its naval base
and general border region security (Stephan 1994).
While geopolitical importance has waned, visible in
the decay of naval bases, today the region remains
economically important for Sea of Okhotsk and
Pacific fisheries, especially for salmon and crab
(Newell 2004).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, local
economies were devastated, as subsidies that floated
many of Kamchatka’s towns and villages dried up.
Throughout the Soviet era, people and infrastructure in
this region were heavily subsidized by the Soviet
federal government as part of northern development
schemes (Hill and Gaddy 2003) and for the ‘‘civiliz-
ing’’ of indigenous populations through re-education
mandates that included living settled lifestyles in
‘‘places of compact living’’ (mesta kompaktnogo
prozhivaniya), boarding schools for indigenous chil-
dren, and the erasure of indigenous cultural and
language practices (Slezkine 1994, Bartels and Bartels
1995, Pika 1999). Subsidies and the Soviet living
model continued until 1991, at which time funding
from the federal center ceased flowing to this periph-
ery and people turned to subsistence and semi-
subsistence practices to survive the political and
ensuing socioeconomic upheaval of regime collapse.
Since 1991 and similar to other northern and
peripheral regions of the Russian Federation, the
Kamchatka Krai (the administrative unit in which the
Kamchatka Peninsula lies) has experienced multiple
socioeconomic, political and cultural transformations,
including but not limited to: outmigration, commercial
economic decline in all sectors, individual impover-
ishment, inflation for everyday goods and services,
physical (e.g., buildings, heating systems) and social
GeoJournal (2013) 78:817–832 819
123
(e.g., primary through tertiary education, health care)
infrastructural decay, and difficulty maintaining trans-
portation of goods, services and people to the rural and
remote villages scattered across the peninsula. Twenty
years into the post-Soviet era, Kamchatka’s economy
revolves around fisheries at large commercial, small
business (e.g., indigenous collectives) and family
subsistence levels. Fish and seafood products are sold
in legal and illegal markets and for those not involved
in the fish economy, everyday life is plagued by
multiple concerns: low salaries, high prices for goods
and services, ongoing decay of many commercial and
residential buildings and slow development of a
market-oriented economy. Ecotourism is perhaps
one exception, and there are great hopes that further
development of this sector will sustain, and perhaps
preserve, the mostly pristine places and the
local and indigenous populations on the peninsula
(van Zoelen 2002). While future oil and gas devel-
opment of the offshore Western Kamchatka Shelf
may prove to be lucrative as part of the larger
development of the shallow Sea of Okhotsk’s
hydrocarbon deposits (Shirkov et al. 2002) and
gasification of the island by Gazprom is in process
(Gazprom 2010), hydrocarbon development is
largely in a holding pattern. Currently, Kamchatka’s
fisheries comprise a large percent of national and
regional fisheries revenue and fishing remains more
vital to these economies than offshore hydrocarbon
development (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 Map of Kamchatka. Map from Newell (2004). Resource data and locations from World Wildlife Federation Russia
820 GeoJournal (2013) 78:817–832
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The physical and socioeconomic living conditions
on Kamchatka in the post-Soviet period give rise to
common phrases about Kamchatka that I heard across
the peninsula about living here: Kamchatka is my
home, but it is a ‘‘godforsaken paradise’’ that is
‘‘increasingly isolated’’ from Russia and the rest of the
world; that ‘‘we live on a fish edge (rybii krai) of the
world, dealing by ourselves with all of the changes,’’
meaning socioeconomic, political and environmental
changes. To indicate the slow pace of economic
change, I observed the grand opening of the first
indoor clothing store (instead of outdoor, open-air
market stalls) in one of my research locations in March
2010, 19 years after the collapse of the command
economy.
Literature review
Emotional geographies of climate change
Current engagement with emotions about environment
across multiple disciplines opens new spaces for
investigating human reactions to climate change
narrative and realities. Because part of the human
experience is lived through emotions and within
natural environments, emotions about environment
matter, because they are ‘‘an intractable and intangible
aspect of all of our everyday lives’’ (Davidson and
Bondi 2004, 373), informing how we feel, think and
act regarding our environments. Knowledge and
emotions about place are the ‘‘ingredients’’ of percep-
tion about places (Casey 2009). Applying literature
about sense of place and emotions regarding place to
investigations of climate change allows scholars to
become sensitive to the emotions expressed in and
about environmental transformations that people are
facing, particularly regarding critical resources. Plac-
ing emotions at the center of understanding people’s
motivations to think about nature and resources in
particular ways moves scholars closer to understand-
ing the reactions to ideas about climate change.
For people in Kamchatka, being in this place
provides the ability to know it or sense it. Being of this
place constitutes a local knowledge about culture and
environment. The lived experiences of people in place
provide embodied context for perceptions of change in
and of the environment. Indeed, phenomenological
geographers argue that we know the world through
perception and practical, lived experience and know-
ing places creates a sense of attachment to them that
constitutes places as ‘‘fields of care’’ for individuals or
communities (Relph 1976; Tuan 1990). Thus, to be
human is to be ‘in place’, and to be in place is to be
‘attached’ or ‘rooted’ (Cresswell 2004). Especially
when people use natural resources in critical ways,
such as for everyday survival, emotional attachment to
local environments is heightened (Sultana 2011;
Graybill, forthcoming).
For people dependent on local subsistence
resources for individual survival or market sale, the
idea of climate change threatens their existing knowl-
edge of how and where to rely on the natural
environment to obtain what they need for survival.
Complex emotional geographies, then, may develop
regarding availability of and access to critical
resources, especially when those resources are under-
going the multiple kinds of transformations occurring
in the post-Soviet era in addition to the rapid changes
expected to occur due to climate transformations.
While the entire North has not experienced rapid
climate change, overall arctic greening has occurred
since the 1980s and general biophysical changes
observed across the north include northward expan-
sion of the tree line and increased shrub abundance
(Danby and Hik 2007) and changing precipitation and
snow cover regimes (Serreze and Francis 2006).
Movement of emotions through the environment—
and reaction to those emotions—teaches us about how
people are attached to and use places or resources.
That is important to understand because ‘‘what moves
us, what makes us feel, is also that which holds us in
place, or gives us a dwelling place’’ (Ahmed 2004, 11).
Listening for emotions about the ecologies and
resources of Kamchatka assists in understanding the
kinds of environmental identities that people are
creating for themselves in this place and the emotions
they might attach to climate transformations of this
place.
Few social science studies have sought to address
emotional aspects of climate change. One exception is
a sociological study of Norway by Norgaard (2011),
who finds that local residents in this northern location
are living in ‘‘climate denial.’’ While they are aware of
the discourses and realities of climate change through
news reports and biophysical changes experienced in
their region (e.g., no/low snow winters), they continue
to enact a ‘‘nonresponse’’ to climate transformations
GeoJournal (2013) 78:817–832 821
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occurring around them. Other explanations for why
people are nonresponsive to ideas of climate change
include the idea of information deficit, the lack of
knowledge about climate change (Boykoff and
Boykoff 2004; Boykoff 2008), information confusion
about what climate change versus global warming,
global cooling and the role of sun spot activity might
be, given climate complexity (Sterman and Sweeney
2007; Dunlap and McCright 2010), and overall dislike
of the politicization of the issue by international
science policy panels such as the IPCC (Rowe 2009;
Berkhout 2010).
Norgaard explains lack of active engagement with
climate change in Norway through the emotions
attached to climate change by local residents. Specif-
ically, she notes the following emotions associated
with thoughts of climate change: fear of loss of
ontological security (threat to the confidence of
continuity of self-identity and surroundings; see
Giddens 1991), helplessness, guilt and threat to
individual and collective identity. Drawing on socio-
logical theory to understand that needs and desires
influence what is and not acceptable to think, emotions
can be understood to affect cognition (Lifton 1995).
Because individual and collective social processes
operate to organize the information people have in
their minds and, because controlling emotions is
difficult to do directly, ‘‘the main way of controlling
one’s emotions is to exert control over one’s thoughts’’
(Rosenburg 1991).
In attempting to control emotions, a condition
known as cognitive dissonance could arise if a person
has two incompatible thoughts. For example, envi-
ronmental cognitive dissonance occurs when a person
knows that water pollution is affecting their health
directly yet does nothing to purify their water source.
This is well documented in the environmental sociol-
ogy literature regarding non-responsiveness to envi-
ronmental degradation (Stoll-Kleeman et al. 2001;
Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002; Kellstedt et al. 2008).
When applied to climate change, cognitive dissonance
could mean different things to different types of
people in the North. For well-to-do northerners in
Western contexts, it might mean that people informed
about climate change show less instead of more
concern for dealing with that change, or stop paying
attention to it altogether when no easy solution is seen,
as Norgaard finds. For northerners experiencing
multiple transformations in the post-Soviet era, it
might mean that people confronted with knowledge
about climate change might not be able to reconcile
the potential magnitude of this change with the need
for subsistence and semi-subsistence living. Under-
standing emotions is increasingly an important part
of many disciplinary inquiries and investigating
environmental emotions should include emotions
of phenomena and emotions about places. After
all, environmental phenomena—such as climate
change—always occur in places, and knowledge
about situated emotions can provide deeper insight
into how environmental transformations affect peo-
ple’s emotions, thoughts and actions on the
landscape.
Climate science and Russia
Since the establishment of the Russian Academy of
Sciences (RAS) in St. Petersburg in 1724, the pursuit
of scientific endeavors in Russia has been considered a
noble and elite occupation (Graham 1993). During the
Soviet period, RAS became the USSR Academy of
Sciences, which worked to address issues of state
construction. In the post-Soviet period, the name has
reverted to RAS. In Soviet geography, understanding
human-environment interactions, including the rela-
tionship between climate and society, ‘‘was reduced to
economic geographic inquiry. Geoengineers, planners
and economic geographers choreographed widespread
and large-scale development projects to ‘modernize’
society. Prior works recognizing humans as changed
by their environments were squelched to conceptual-
ize progress as modernization’’ (Graybill 2007).
Because the physical environment, including under-
standings of climate, became the vehicle and tool for
building socialist reality (Wood and French 1989;
Mazurkiewicz 1992), Soviet climate science remained
firmly rooted in the physical sciences; nevertheless,
thinking regarding human-climate interactions was in
evidence during the early 1960s (personal communi-
cation, Jonathan Oldfield).
In the post-Soviet period, study of human-environ-
ment interactions is resurging and relies on pre-Soviet
and Soviet theories of human-environment interac-
tion. Graybill 2007 writes that ‘‘Making sense of their
present and future, post-Soviet geography has turned
to the past, lauding prior Russian achievements. The
very Russianness of post-Soviet Russian geography is
822 GeoJournal (2013) 78:817–832
123
noted by the (re)turn to pre-Soviet visions … instead
of looking to other nations’ or people’s experiences or
to international theories.’’ What this means for
Western scientists interested in field studies of climate
change in Russia is the necessity of engaging with
different conceptualizations of environmental change
on the ground. In other studies of climate change in the
Russian North, this is also noted by Forbes and
Stammler (2009) in their long-term engagement with
Nenets in the Yamal region in the post-Soviet North
and by Crate (2008) in research in Yakutia. They find
that Western concepts of climate change, wildlife
management or traditional ecological knowledge
(TEK) do not have local buy-in, leading to conceptual
mismatches on the ground unless Western scientists
alter their conceptual frameworks and remain open to
Russian scientific and local/indigenous management
ideas.
On Kamchatka, Western-style engagement with the
concept of climate change is nascent (Sharakhmatova
2011), especially among some indigenous people as
they receive funding from Western sources to conduct
research on this topic among indigenous peoples.
Generally, engagement with human dimensions of
climate has a long history on Kamchatka, especially
regarding the impacts of weather and climate on
humans. For example, a monograph by Russian
medical scholar Viktor Sharkun (2008) indicates
long-term research on the physiological impact of
Kamchatka’s extreme cold on humans and the
Department for the Study of Extreme Conditions
(Fakultet Ekstremalogiya) at the Kamchatka State
University (KSU) routinely studies climate impact on
humans, especially the impact of northern cold and
darkness on the psychology of naval officers and
seamen during active duty (personal communication,
Olga Shiryaeva, KSU).
Generally, however, the overall massive funding
decline for science and salaries for scientists in the
post-Soviet era has resulted in a deficit of ‘‘big’’
science produced by scientists in Russia (Graham and
Dezhina 2008) and created limited engagement with
climate change science. Decrease in funding and
scientific endeavors across RAS and has created an
atmosphere where science has not been considered a
lucrative career path (Tavokin 2012). Youth are
instead pursuing careers in business, management
and law (Mindeli and Pipiya 2002). Second, decline of
science occurred at the same moment in history when
climate change science took hold in the West as a
major concern and funding initiatives grew across
disciplines and internationally (Moser 2010). Only
very recently has funding for climate-related science
regained momentum in Russia. For example, in well-
publicized media stunts, Prime Minister Putin is
shown granting an award for ‘‘promotion of geo-
graphic culture and popularization of science’’ in
Moscow (Voice of Russia 2011) and in 2011, as
Chairman of the Russian Geographical Society’s
Board of Trustees, he distributed grants financing
research of concern to ‘‘national geography.’’ Exam-
ples of the kinds of grants given are funds for polar
expeditions and climate observations to be conducted
by the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and
Climate Monitoring (Russian Geographical Society
2011).
Due to national pride and distrust of Western
scientific concepts, climate skepticism is important to
address as part of the climate science landscape in
post-Soviet Russia (Table 1). The resistance to ‘‘out-
sider’’ models occurs by Russian scientists seeking to
reclaim prior glory of Russian science (Graybill 2007)
and by people of the North because these conceptual
models do not match existing local knowledge’s of
environments and other pressing concerns (Forbes and
Stammler 2009). Rowe (2009) also points out that
Western and international climate science is under-
stood by Russians as heavily influenced by policy and
therefore of potentially reduced value because of
policy involvement.
However, as noted in Table 1, climate change
skepticism and acceptance both exist in Russia.
Disagreement among and imprecise use of these terms
by scholars creates difficulty in explaining the term
climate skepticism. Among these terms commonly
used are climate ‘‘denial, skepticism, cynicism, uncer-
tainty, and ambivalence’’ (Poortinga et al. 2011), all
with different shades of meaning depending on the
scholar and context. For example, one scholar’s
climate denial is another’s climate skepticism, and
often ‘‘climate contrarians’’ are lumped into one
group, leaving climate skepticism misunderstood and
under-analyzed.
Rahmstorf (2004) provides a useful framework
for discussing nuanced meanings of the term climate
change skepticism. Rowe (2009) provides useful
terminology for discussing nuances in climate
change acceptance in Russia. First, for climate
GeoJournal (2013) 78:817–832 823
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change skepticism, Rahmstorf delineates three types
of climate skepticism: trend, attribution and impact.
Trend skepticism denotes uncertainty that climate
change is occurring; attribution skepticism means
the causes of climate change (e.g., natural climate
cycles or anthropogenic climate change) are uncer-
tain; and impact skepticism represents uncertainty of
the effects or impacts of climate change. Second, for
climate change acceptance, Rowe provides two
understandings specific to the case of Russia:
naturally cyclical climate (NCC) acceptance and
anthropogenic climate change (ACC) acceptance. To
this I add the notion of global environmental change
(GEC) acceptance. Acceptance of NCC means
recognition that climate is changing, but it is
attributed to natural climate cycles. Acceptance of
ACC denotes attribution of climate change to
natural and anthropogenic sources. Acceptance of
GEC is slightly different and indicates understand-
ing that environments and weather are changing, but
that environmental change derives from other fac-
tors before NCC or ACC. Combining Rahmstorf’s
and Rowe’s understandings, I create a nuanced
framework for understanding climate change skep-
ticism and acceptance in my study of Kamchatka
(see Table 2).
Methods
Interviews for this paper was conducted in two
locations in rural and remote Kamchatka. The villages
of Esso and Anavgai are located in the central
Kamchatka Peninsula (see Fig. 1), accessible by a
1-h helicopter ride (utilized by elite ecotourists) or an
8-h bus ride on gravel/snow roads (utilized by most
local people, thrifty ecotourists, NGO workers and
most research scientists). While living on Kamchatka
in 2009–2010, I conducted interviews for this research
in these two villages in March 2010. In obtaining
participants I was assisted by Bystrinsky Park office in
Esso and Liliya Bakanova, an Evenk cultural activist,
in Anavgai. Esso is a town of approximately 2600
people from across the former Soviet Union and some
of Kamchatka’s indigenous peoples (namely, Evenk
and Itel’men). Anavgai is a mesto kompaktnogo
prozhivaniya comprised of 800 people of multiple
ethnic groups, including Evenk, Itel’men and Kam-
chadal. These villages are located\20 km from each
other and are not close to other settlements. Partici-
pants from both of these remote and rural villages were
selected to include perceptions of climate change from
local and indigenous perspectives in different every-
day situations yet from largely the same geographical
Table 1 Framework for situating Russian national discourse about climate change since 2004. Major international and national
climate change events are noted. Shaded portions of the chart are after Rowe (2009)
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123
area for ease of comparison of the sense of climate
change in one region.
Investigating perceptions of ecology and resources
gets at the sources, or epistemological foundations, of
how individuals know and think about their environ-
mental surroundings. Semi-structured interviews
allowed me to learn how different individuals under-
stand changes to Kamchatka’s natural landscape and
what they identify as important about it, or what might
be a threat to it and living there, now or in the future.
I asked questions regarding perceptions and under-
standings of environmental transformation, weather
changes during the participant’s lifetimes, understand-
ings of climate change and global warming. I did not
state or discuss my personal position on climate
change, thereby avoiding labeling myself as a climate
skeptic or accepter in interviews or while living in
these communities. Most interviews lasted at least an
hour, and participants answered questions, expanding
on any topic they felt was important, including
historical land uses and weather conditions, other
transformative events in individual and collective
lives, and thoughts about their future existence. This
ethnographic and interview-based methodology
illuminated the emotions held about local environment
and climate change.
This analysis includes 20 participants (11 women, 9
men), 8 from Esso and 12 from Anavgai. Participants
self-identified as local or indigenous residents. Indig-
enous people interviewed include Evenk (11 partici-
pants) and Itel’men (1 participant). In one case, a
Russian woman identified herself as culturally Evenk,
because she lived with her husband and children in
Anavgai, rarely visiting Esso. The youngest partici-
pant was 24 years old and the oldest was 85. All
interviews were conducted in Russian. With one
elderly Evenk participant, an Evenk-Russian transla-
tor assisted with the interview. Research participants’
names are excluded to maintain privacy.
Results and discussion
It’s all changing, but it isn’t climate change…
The major results of this study indicate that participants
in my study are overwhelmingly skeptical about the idea
of anthropogenic climate change. Simultaneously,
Table 2 Types of climate change skepticism or climate change acceptance and associated thoughts of study participants
Explanation Esso (n = 8) Anavgai
(n = 12)
Quotes from respondents
Women Men Women Men
Trend
skepticism
No changes in temperature or weather
are occurring
X X ‘‘a topic of belief, not knowledge’’
Attribution
skepticism
Temperature and weather are
changing, but they are not due to
anthropogenic causes
X X ‘‘caused by natural climate cycles,
not human actions’’
Impact
skepticism
Temperature and weather are changing
due to anthropogenic causes, but the
related impacts are/will be negligible
X X ‘‘solvable with technological
innovation’’
Natural climate
cycles (NCC)
acceptance
Temperature and weather are naturally
cyclical and the related impacts may
or may not be significant in the long
run
X X X ‘‘caused by natural climate cycles,
not human actions’’
Anthropogenic
climate change
(ACC)
acceptance
Temperature and weather are changing
due to anthropogenic causes, and the
related impacts are/will be significant
‘‘solvable with technological
innovation’’
Global
environmental
change (GEC)
acceptance
Environments, weather and
temperature and changing, but
primary causes are historic or current
environmental degradation and
secondary causes are NCC or ACC
X X X Environment ‘‘has already been
changed by pollution and resource
overharvest. Why do we need
another explanation?’’
GeoJournal (2013) 78:817–832 825
123
however, participants find that environmental condi-
tions in this alpine and subarctic region of Kamchatka
are changing and they are emotional about these
changes, especially regarding resources used in a
subsistence manner. For example, notions of change in
the quantity, quality and spatial location of salmon;
decreased berry abundance in known locations and
increased abundance in ‘‘different’’ locations; and
difficulty in locating ferns (paparatniki) in forests were
commonly discussed. Changes in precipitation (e.g.,
timing of rain, amount of snow) were not discussed by
any participants, which could be due to the alpine
location of the study locations or to the fact that not all
arctic and subarctic regions are experiencing rapid or
even similar physical changes due to current climate
change (Solomon et al. 2007).
Analysis of interviews regarding natural resources
reveals a specific range of thinking about and
emotional engagement with this topic and shows
how participants perceived and felt about environ-
mental transformation. Participants in my study were
quite interested in talking about the transformation of
resource bases on Kamchatka, including the changing
quantity and quality of multiple kinds of fish in rivers
and in the Sea of Okhotsk, and about onshore mining
developments, including gold and platinum placer
mines. Participants were the most emotional when
discussing how they perceive that environmental
conditions have worsened and how they must travel
farther away into less hospitable resource places to
reap lower quality harvests of fish, other marine
resources, or hunted animals. In discussions about
resource quality and the distance to resource harvest
sites, participants’ faces often registered disappoint-
ment about quality and sorrow at the distances needed
to travel to now access traditional resources, such as
fish. Further distances traveled means more time away
from family, a source of distress for both men and
women in these communities.
These resource concerns are largely attributed to
environmental degradation, something participants
understand as having begun in the Soviet era and
continuing today. In their understanding, however,
these are solvable problems, either through personal
technological advancement (e.g., the use of snowmo-
biles to obtain resources farther away), by resource
replacement (e.g., fishing for smelt instead of crab) or
by stricter environmental enforcement. Upon raising
the question that these environmental problems may
be related to anthropogenic climate change, partici-
pants largely did not perceive this as a reason for the
noted environment changes. Reactions to this sugges-
tion were often emotional, which leads to the overall
conclusion that even mentioning anthropogenic cli-
mate change was a cause for distress or excitement
among all participants. In other words, even in the face
of a resource base experiencing transformation, the
reasons for change are perceived as environmental
degradation and not climate change. To this, local and
indigenous peoples largely express that ‘‘we will be
resilient and overcome these problems’’ either by
personal adaptations, technological improvement, or
hope that the Russian government will suddenly
promote proactive resource conservation.
To understand the full range of perceptions about
climate change, I have combined the ideas of Rahmstorf
(2004) about climate change skepticism and Rowe
(2009) about climate change acceptance to frame the
results of my study of Kamchatka (Table 2). At first
glance it might seem that some of these categories
overlap. For example, impact skepticism could be
understood as almost the same as ACC acceptance. To
obtain finer-scale appreciation of the nuances of climate
change skepticism and acceptance, I separated these
categories based on the overall sense of perception of
climate change and types of emotions participated
expressed in interviews. For example, a participant who
expressed more distrust in climate change science and
had more faith in technological fixes to the problem was
categorized as an impact skeptic, whereas a participant
who expresses a bit more understanding of climate
change science and was more concerned about the
ability of humans to solve climate change problems was
categorized as an ACC accepter.
Aggregated results of the analysis indicate varia-
tions between the two study locations and between
genders as to the specific kinds of climate change
skepticism or climate change acceptance expressed by
participants. In the larger, more Russian town of Esso,
there is more trend skepticism and acceptance of
climate change due to natural climate cycles than in
the more indigenous town of Anavgai, where there is
more attribution and impact skepticism and accep-
tance of global environmental change, but not natural
climate change. Men are overall more skeptical of
climate change and more likely to attribute environ-
mental change to natural causes than women. In all
locations and across gender, none of the participants
826 GeoJournal (2013) 78:817–832
123
explained environmental or climate changes in sub-
arctic alpine Kamchatka as occurring due to anthro-
pogenic climate change. This result is significant, in
that all participants felt that environmental problems
were ultimately resolvable by technological innova-
tion or policy implementation.
Temperature and weather are largely perceived as
changing, which many participants also conceded was
the reason for environmental and resource distribution
changes, but there was little consensus about the
magnitude or overall importance of these changes, or
their relationship to climate change, natural or human-
induced. Additionally, some participants remained
skeptical that climate change was occurring, while
others accepted that it was occurring, but doubted that
the impacts of climate and global environmental
change would be significant. Common phrases among
participants included that climate change ‘‘is a topic of
belief, not knowledge,’’ and that it is ‘‘caused by
natural climate cycles, not human actions.’’ In Esso,
participants identified belief as necessary for accept-
ing climate change, because they felt the knowledge
base for accepting large-scale climate change (either
natural or anthropogenic) did not exist. Among
participants from Anavgai, there was insistence that
while humans caused some environmental change
(e.g., pollution and ensuing degradation), nature was
the long-term cause of most changes they perceived to
be happening on Kamchatka.
Attempting to understand why there was an overall
acceptance of resource decline and only some accep-
tance of some explanations for climate change—but
definitely resistance to the idea of anthropogenic
climate change—requires situating people and place
in history and geographic context. Accepting changes
in resource bases is acceptable, because it is poten-
tially a solvable problem. According to Soviet science
ideology, humans are in control of nature and thus it
can be shaped or changed to meet our needs by
technological means and solutions (Mazurkiewicz
1992; Graybill 2007). Adherence to this understanding
of engineering-oriented science appears to be thriving
still in these locations on Kamchatka. Additionally,
resistance to accepting climate change as an explana-
tion for environmental changes occurring on Kam-
chatka may indicate distrust in international or
Western climate change science. Appreciating the
work of Forbes and Stammler (2009) and Rowe
(2009), both about Russia, misgivings about the
existence of anthropogenic climate change may be
related to the fact that much climate change science is
‘‘outsider’’ science, which participants seem to find
suspect for political reasons.
Geography matters in framing emotions
about climate change
In the process of making meaning in daily life in the
post-Soviet Russian North, socioeconomic, political,
cultural and environmental transformations all threa-
ten people’s sense of place, which affects a sense of
the continuity of life or the ability to (re)construct new
cultural, socioeconomic or political identities in the
post-Soviet era. Adding the need to construct new
environmental identities because of climate changes
that are beyond their ability to control may be simply
too much to add to the already chaotic mix of fluxes
that people already experience. With this contextual
understanding, it becomes understandable that people
in Kamchatka’s remote and rural communities that
subsist to survive resist accepting anthropogenic
climate change as an explanation of the environmental
changes occurring around them. Another way to think
about this is that international discourses and knowl-
edge of anthropogenic climate change, when applied
locally, present a temporal and spatial scalar mismatch
for local people. At the local level and on short human
time scales, the magnitude of change is hard to
imagine for remote and rural peoples on Kamchatka
who neither participate in Russia’s industrial produc-
tion nor barely afford its consumer products. Temporal
and spatial change in resource abundance and distri-
bution can rightfully be attributed to resource
mismanagement since the Soviet period of industrial-
ization (Pryde 1991) and this is perceived as a
solvable problem. As one participant noted, ‘‘our
environment has already been changed by pollution
and resource overharvest. Why do we need another
explanation?’’
To understand resistance to engaging with the idea
of anthropogenic climate change requires understand-
ing what other transformative experiences participants
have experienced and how they have adapted to other
changing conditions (socioeconomic, political, cul-
tural). In other works, applying a historical and
regional understanding of people and place is critical
in getting at the situated perceptions and emotions
about climate change on Kamchatka.
GeoJournal (2013) 78:817–832 827
123
To explain climate change denial in Norway,
Norgaard (2011) places emotions and emotion man-
agement centrally in individual’s processes of denial,
finding that emotional states ‘‘matter for climate
change’’ because ‘‘if the emotional states associated
with thinking about a topic are uncomfortable or
socially unacceptable, a person may not make the
associated cognitive link’’ to the actuality of anthro-
pogenic climate change. For example, one of Norg-
aard’s research participants placed ‘‘his hands in front
of his eyes as he spoke’’: ‘‘People want to protect
themselves a bit,’’ because simply thinking about
global warming increase feelings of helplessness, guilt
and fear for the future, some of which Norgaard
concluded threatened individual identities in Norway.
On Kamchatka, a range of emotions was expressed
when participants were asked to think about climate
change on Kamchatka: bravery, disbelief, victimiza-
tion, bitter humor, confusion, anger, fear and help-
lessness (Table 3). All participants expressed bravery,
bitter humor and confusion about climate change. In
both study locations, there was a sense that individuals
and the communities of Esso and Anavgai were
capable of adapting to any changes and that they could
be(come) socially resilient if necessary. Largely, study
participants felt they had been able to overcome
multiple perestroikas throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, individually and collectively, and they felt ready
to deal with whatever other changes might come their
way. In other words, the sense that ‘‘we will
overcome’’ all ‘‘transformations’’ existed among all
participants. This machismo did not exclude women
and was not age limited. However, all participants also
expressed bitter humor and confusion about what
climate change actually was. In terms of humor, most
participants thought that nature is a force too large to
be manipulated extensively by humans, and therefor
the idea of human-induced global climate changes was
preposterous. This idea itself was humorous to most
participants, and became bitterly funny when partic-
ipants expressed that this dialog was simply a
‘‘Western idea imposed on us’’. Of note is the idea
Table 3 Emotions related to climate change in Esso and Anavgai, Kamchatka
Emotion Expressions/quotes related to emotions from the interviews Esso (n = 8) Anavgai
(n = 12)
Distilled idea
Women Men Women Men
Bravery We will overcome/resist all transformations; we’ve dealt
with it before
‘‘We’ll just fish further away’’
‘‘This is a problem solvable with technology’’
X X X X Social resilience
Adaptation
Technological fix
Disbelief Humans are too insignificant a force to change nature
It’s an international political game and climate change is
‘‘all about money’’
‘‘A topic of belief, not knowledge’’
X X Nature rules humans
International politics
Scientifically
unfounded
Something indigenous people will ‘‘hang noodles on your
ears about’’ (tell tall tales about) because they don’t have
the ‘‘right’’ kind of knowledge about the environment
X Unfounded notions
of the aboriginal
population
Bitterly
humorous
‘‘It’s Western ideas imposed on us’’ X International politics
Humans are too insignificant a force to change nature X X X X Nature rules humans
Victimized ‘‘It’s not us who caused it’’ X X X Victimization
Confusion What/who should we believe? X X X X Climate confusion
Anger What/who should we believe? X Climate skepticism
I can’t handle any more transformation X Inability to cope
Fear I can’t imagine transformation of nature in addition to
other transformations
X X Inability to cope
Helplessness How will I deal with this in addition to other changes
going on (socio-economic)?
‘‘…and just when I thought the big changes were over…’’
X X Inability to cope
828 GeoJournal (2013) 78:817–832
123
that humans are in control of nature, and the distrust of
‘‘outsider’’ science. Reinserting Cameron (2012) into
the interpretation of the results, we might also ask
whether these emotions expressed relate to rejecting
the idea of climate change in the desire to not be
colonized again—this time regarding environmental
relations and possible policy futures—by ideas orig-
inating outside the North.
More men than women expressed emotions related to
the general ideas about human insignificance, interna-
tional politics, and unfounded bases for the acceptance
of climate change as really occurring. More women than
men expressed emotions related to the general ideas of
victimization, the inability to cope and climate confu-
sion and skepticism. Responses such as climate change
was ‘‘a topic of belief, not of knowledge,’’ ‘‘all about
money and international politics’’ indicate that climate
change was not a topic worthy of their consideration,
even if they might be confused as to what climate change
science actually is. All participants expressed some
confusion about the term and openly asked what and
whom they should believe about this topic. One
participant expressly noted that she would like to know
more about the topic, but didn’t know where to go for
information: ‘‘Local papers don’t write about this and I
don’t have internet access. The information I get is when
I go to the city (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky) and then I
get overwhelmed.’’
Similar to Norgaard’s experience with the person
who put his hands over his eyes, one Russian
participant from Esso was very open to exploring
what climate change might mean for her future and her
children’s future, and very much wanted to discuss it.
But, as she realized the potential magnitude of change
associated with warming temperatures and changing
weather patterns, she engaged less with the idea of
climate change and turned to a narrative of bravery
against any kind of change. This interview provides an
example of cognitive dissonance in one person’s
confronted with life-altering change: specific emo-
tions—confusion, fear, helplessness—expressed early
in the interview were are replaced by other emotions—
bravery, disbelief, victimization, bitter humor,
anger—after discussion was underway. This could
be understood as a step towards creating social
resilience as initial thoughts and emotions about the
inability to cope with climate change were replaced by
other thoughts and emotions that sought to shelter an
individual from their initial responses.
The emotions related to climate change on Kam-
chatka result from two things related to history and
regional context (in other words, place matters). First,
resistance is closely related to how local communities
currently manage to survive and even thrive in this era
of reduced support, which is related to their abilities to
respond to ongoing socioeconomic, political and
cultural transformations. Reliance on well-developed
local kinship-based and social networks supplies
everyone in the community with the material goods
they need to survive. Second, the remote and rural
nature of the two study locations serves to strengthen
community and territorial bonds. This raises the idea
of social resilience, which is noted in participant
narratives about their abilities to cope with socio-
ecological change. Existing narratives about surviving
multiple kinds of transformations, distrusting ‘‘out-
sider’’ information and believing in the insignificance
of human communities in creating environmental
problems serve local and indigenous peoples well,
bonding communities socially and territorially, espe-
cially after near-systemic collapse in 1991.
Implications and future research
Multidimensional aspects of the global environmental
changes that are occurring are often reduced to concern
about human vulnerability and adaptation to a rapidly
changing climate in the North. Other global environ-
mental changes of equal importance occurring across
northern places and deserving of more attention include
immigration and emigration related to resource booms
and bust cycles (Heleniak 1999); socio-economic and
political transformation, especially in the Russian North
(Young 2009); (re)imagining cultural identity by indig-
enous peoples who are largely gaining political freedom
(Pika 1999) or stature (Cameron 2012); and speculation
about legal ramifications regarding the opening up of
new offshore transportation due the future likelihood of
ice-free Arctic waterways (Smith 2010).
Long-term scientific research indicates that climate
change is transforming the ecologies and environ-
ments used for subsistence hunting, fishing and
gathering on Kamchatka, and anecdotal knowledge
of the environment confirms this. For example,
reindeer pasture conditions are more unpredictable
due to rapid weather changes (e.g., snow to ice)
(personal communication, reindeer Sovkhoz director,
GeoJournal (2013) 78:817–832 829
123
Esso), and salmon are more frequently seeking colder
waters further north and away from traditional fishing
locations for indigenous peoples (personal communi-
cation, fisherman, Anavgai). However, participants in
this study frame environmental change not as climate
change, which is ‘‘unthinkable,’’ but largely as envi-
ronmental degradation that can be resolved by human
actions such as individual and social resilience,
technological innovation or policy intervention.
Understanding local resistance to accepting anthro-
pogenic climate change must be understood in context.
Only by situating local knowledge about the environ-
ment can the perceptions and emotions about it be
understood. On Kamchatka since 1991, many people
continue to struggle through socioeconomic, political
and environmental transformation with minimal aid
from the federal center. Thus, people rely on natural
resources in subsistence and semi-subsistence ways to
cope with multiple and simultaneous transformations
of society, economy and place. Because other things
take precedence, participants do not conceptualize
climate change as an urgent problem to address.
Indeed, as Moser (2010) points out ‘‘(c)oncern, sense
of urgency and importance vary greatly across pop-
ulations, and understanding of the causes and the
stakes remains limited.’’ Causes of resisting the idea of
anthropogenic climate change are the fact that accep-
tance of this narrative is threatening to livelihoods,
individual and community, and existing notions of
social resilience. On Kamchatka, the stakes are simply
too high to accept this new narrative. Resistance to this
discourse stems from a place of self-protection. Local
conceptualizations of social resilience—‘‘we are
resilient, we have survived all of the changes thrown
at us by the twentieth century’’—does not have room
for the emotional baggage created by thinking about
climate change.
Further pursuit of locally situated historical anal-
ysis will help elucidate that change on Kamchatka, and
likely in other northern communities, is a constant and
nothing is stationary. This must be explored for this
locale and others to understand the human dimensions
of climate change. While the global science commu-
nity scrambles to understand biophysical change in
what many call the anthropocene, other changes and
histories are perhaps more vital to everyday life in
places also experiencing climate change. The grand
narrative of climate change obscures other lived
changes and realities. Largely a field dominated by
physical science understandings, social scientists must
work to ensure that humans are written into environ-
mental history, as both agents and receptors of climate
change. Without this, for whom are we ‘‘saving’’ the
environment? Additionally, the turn to historical
understandings must be done with local participation
because, as Norgaard (2011) writes ‘‘a community’s
sense of the past, present and future are not just
‘‘there’’ like a political imagination; they are collec-
tively constructed.’’
Finally, recognizing that resistance to the idea of
climate change can create localized or even regional-
ized climate skepticism is important to consider in
northern research agendas. Scholars must learn to
grapple with this powerful counter narrative to the
dominant discourse of climate change originating in
the North. If we, as a global community, hope to create
just policy decisions about climate change that are
based on studies about and for local people and places,
we must not only acknowledge, but engage with, local
narratives about all transformations that may be
occurring in order to understand the communities
about whom we are talking and who will be most
affected in the short and long term futures.
Acknowledgments I thank the American Council of Learned
Societies and Colgate University for financial support of this
research and Jonathan Oldfield for correspondence regarding
climate science in Russia. I am deeply indebted to numerous
people on Kamchatka, including Liliya Bakanova for her
assistance navigating Esso and Anavgai, and to Olga Shiryaeva,
Viktoria Zhezherova and Elena Andreeva at Kamchatka State
University who made this research possible in logistical and
scholarly ways.
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