impact-calculus-final-camp

Michigan 2009 Impact CalcClassic Sophomores Polin/Alderete

Impact Calculus

Rescher Indict................................................................................................................................................................................2Terrorism.......................................................................................................................................................................................3Kashmir.........................................................................................................................................................................................5Iran................................................................................................................................................................................................9Great power wars........................................................................................................................................................................10Probability...................................................................................................................................................................................13Magnitude O/W Risk..................................................................................................................................................................14

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Rescher Indict

[ ] Rescher is poorly developed and obscure in his writing W. P. Birkettn University of Sydney Jul., 1970 [The Accounting Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jul., 1970), pp. 619-622 “review [NICHOLAS RESCHER, An Introduction to Value Theory]” American Accounting Association]

In quite a few instances, his argument uses (and even depends upon) unexplained distinctions, such as "authentic value," "proper value," "genu- ine benefits," "real interests." The term "rationality" is used in a variety of senses, often at key points in the argument (the necessity for an as- sumption of rationality in a theory of individual decision making is mentioned only once [p. 43] and is not developed-unless an individual is assumed to implement his highest valued alternative [rationality], there will be no necessary relation between order of valuation and the action imple- mented). In a few instances, his argument is ob- scured by a failure to distinguish clearly between "logical time" and "real time," and the different perspectives of an "actor" and an "observer."

[ ] Rescher consistently misinterprets other authors; making his claims completely unsubstantiated Zeno G. Swijtink; Proferssor at SUN Y at Buffalo; Sep., 1987 [“The Limits of Science by Nicholas Rescher” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 392-396; Jstor]

My point is not that to invoke Kant on the basis of one side-remark he has made, is a kind of name-dropping which this idea of Rescher's does not need. The point is that Rescher has completely misinterpreted this Kantian passage. Ironically, Kant's argument is the very same argument for the incompleteness of science which is dismissed by Rescher in his first chapter as "too facile-too quick and easy" (p. I7). It is the "something-is-always- left-out" route to charges of incompleteness. A little earlier in the same section Kant wrote Experience never satisfies reason fully but, in answering questions, refers us further and further back and leaves us dissatisfied with regard to their complete solution. Kant argues for the insuiciency of scientific explanations, especially of causal explanations of individual facts, because they lead to an infinite regress of causal questions which will not "satisfy reason". My second critical coment concerns a similar misinterpretation by Rescher. On page I 50 he quotes approvingly a formal argument which was first published by Fitch [I 962] and later put to philosophical use by Routley [I98I] to the effect that there are truths which are unknowable. Rescher writes that, although "this sort of argumentation for the incompleteness of knowledge is too abstract and "general principally" to carry much conviction in itself (. . .) it does provide some suggestive stagesetting for the more concrete rationale of the imperfectibility of science that has concerned us here", viz., that science will never be done with its job. But this is not what the argument seeks to establish. Indeed? the conclusion of the argument should be unwelcome to Rescher

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TerrorismThe worst of terrorism is yet to come – nuclear conflict, chemical terrorism, and biological terrorism are probable in the futureThe West Australian; 10/22/08; (Quals: edited daily newspaper published in Perth, Western Australia, and is owned by ASX-listed West Australian Newspapers Holdings Ltd); Grim report warns of a global war; Intelligence services warn Obama he could have less global power to face growing threats from rogue nuclear states”; LexisNexus

The use of nuclear weapons will grow increasingly likely by 2025, US intelligence warns in a bleak report on global trends that forecasts a tense, unstable world shadowed by war. The political, economic and military influence of the US will decline substantially and the advance of western democracy was far from guaranteed, the National Intelligence Council analysis, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, says. "The world of the near future will be subject to an increased likelihood of conflict over scarce resources, including food and water, and will be haunted by the persistence of rogue states and terrorist groups with greater access to nuclear weapons," it said. The report predicts that some African and south Asian states may wither and organised crime could take over at least one state in central Europe. Struggling to find a bright spot, researchers concluded that terrorism could decline if "economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced". However, "opportunities for mass-casualty terrorist attacks using chemical, biological or, less likely, nuclear weapons will increase as technology diffuses and nuclear power programs expand". Based on a survey of global trends by analysts from all US intelligence agencies, the report was more pessimistic about the status of the world's superpower than in the four previous outlooks that were made public. The report said the international system constructed after World War II would be almost unrecognisable by 2025 with new powers emerging in a globalising economy, the historic transfer of wealth from West to East and the growing influence of "non-state actors". "Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, its relative strength, even in the military realm, will decline and US leverage will become more strained," it said. The authors said they did not believe there would be a "complete breakdown of the international system" but warned "the next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught with risks". While the authors note nothing in their report is certain, they say it is an effort to stimulate thinking within the incoming US administration. "It is not a prediction," Thomas Fingar, the deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, said. "Nothing that we have identified in this report is determinative." Mr Fingar said these "trends, developments and drivers" were subject to intervention and manipulation. The report is a sobering reminder to US president-elect Barack Obama of the challenges he faces leading a country that might no longer "call the shots alone". The report has good news for some countries: ·\x{2002}A technology to replace oil may be under way or in place by 2025. ·\x{2002} Multiple financial centres will be "shock absorbers" for the world financial system. ·\x{2002}India, China and Brazil will rise, the Korean peninsula will be unified in some form and new powers are likely from the Muslim non-Arab world. The report highlighted the risk of a Middle East arms race with countries considering technologies useful for making nuclear weapons. The report said it was not certain the same deterrents in the Cold War would emerge in a nuclear armed Middle East. Instead, a nuclear arsenal might be seen as "making it safe" to engage in low-intensity conflicts, terrorism or even larger conventional attacks, the report said. "Those states most susceptible to conflict are in a great arc of instability stretching from Sub-Saharan Africa through North Africa into the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, South and Central Asia and parts of South East Asia," the report said. While the appeal of terrorist groups such as al-Qaida was likely to wane dramatically between now and 2025, violent extremists might become more lethal through access to biological weapons or even nuclear devices, according to the report, which is designed to give policymakers a "beyond-the-horizon" view

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Terrorism

Terror groups in the near future will likely have some of the most lethal technologies within reach and are probable to use themThe Atlantic Council; 10/20/08; (Quals: The Council embodies a non-partisan network of leaders and diplomats who aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas); ”Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”; http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world

Terrorism, proliferation, and conflict will remain key concerns even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Islamic terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its appeal could diminish if economic growth continues and youth unemployment is mitigated in the Middle East. Economic opportunities for youth and greater political pluralism probably would dissuade some from joining terrorists’ ranks, but others—motivated by a variety of factors, such as a desire for revenge or to become “martyrs”—will continue to turn to violence to pursue their objectives. In the absence of employment opportunities and legal means for political expression, conditions will be ripe for disaffection,

growing radicalism, and possible recruitment of youths into terrorist groups. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long-established groups—that inherit organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks—and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized. For those terrorist groups that are active in 2025, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. One of our greatest concerns continues to be that terrorist or other malevolent groups might acquire and employ biological agents, or less likely, a nuclear device, to create mass casualties.

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KashmirThe probability of nuclear weapons being used will be substantially very soon due to proliferation in AsiaThe Atlantic Council; 10/20/08; (Quals: The Council embodies a non-partisan network of leaders and diplomats who aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas); ”Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”; http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world

The risk of nuclear weapon use over the next 20 years, although remaining very low, is likely to be greater than it is today as a result of several converging trends. The spread of nuclear technologies and expertise is generating concerns about the potential emergence of new nuclear weapon states and the acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorist groups. Ongoing low-intensity clashes between India and Pakistan continue to raise the specter that such events could escalate to a broader conflict between those nuclear powers. The possibility of a future disruptive regime change or collapse occurring in a nuclear weapon state such as North Korea also continues to raise questions regarding the ability of weak states to control and secure their nuclear arsenals.

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Kashmir

Kashmir and surrounding South Asia tensions continue to rise, pointing to a probable warNick Bryant; 6/3/09; “Where Empires Go To Die”; The Australian; LexisNexis

In recent months, militant attacks have been ever more audacious and alarming . The already frail notion of jihadist

self-restraint has become firmly oxymoronic. As with the ambush on the Sri Lankan cricketers, new thresholds have been crossed, new security weaknesses exposed and new swaths of territory seized. In Pakistan, the Taliban captured Buner, a district 90km northwest of the capital, Islamabad. In Afghanistan, the Taliban has moved into two provinces, Logar and Maidan Wardak, on the fringes of Kabul, the first time it has been able to get so close to the capital since 2001, when the US-led coalition drove it from power. Since 2006, jihadists have attacked Mumbai, Delhi, Varanasi, Hyderabad and Bangalore, India's commercial, political, spiritual and hi-tech capitals respectively. For journalists who have covered the region, this worsening security climate has come as no great surprise. At times, it has also come dangerously close to home. The Marriot, Islamabad, that long-time journalistic haunt, was bombed. So was Mumbai's Taj Palace. Roads in what used to be the Tamil Tiger-controlled regions of Sri Lanka are patrolled by the national

army rather than Tamil Tiger traffic cops. Four years ago military commanders at Camp Salerno, the US's main forward operating base for the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, provided up-beat briefings that the number of Taliban fighters

coming over the border had slowed to a trickle. Last August, the Taliban tried to storm the camp. The dean of the South Asian press pack is Lahore-based journalist and scholar Ahmed Rashid, whose 2001 book, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia went from academic obscurity to the top of The New York Times bestseller list as the US launched into its post-9/11 quest for understanding. Charming, erudite and fun-loving, he can also be excoriating, as in his new book, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan,

Afghanistan and Central Asia. Few who have spent time in the region would dispute his analysis that ``Afghanistan is once again staring down the abyss of state collapse'' and Pakistan ``has undergone a slower but equally bloody meltdown'' . Since 9/11, South Asia has become a testing ground for a broad range of counter-terrorist and counterinsurgency strategies, some the product of intricate planning, others of rushed expediency. They have ranged from the promotion of democracy (Afghanistan) to its temporary suspension (Pakistan and Nepal); from the opening of peace talks (India and Pakistan) to their termination (Sri Lanka); from nation building (Afghanistan) to fiefdom destroying (Eelam, the Tamil enclave in the north and west of Sri Lanka); from fragile truce agreements (the Swat Valley) to shadowy diplomatic

back channels (India and Pakistan); from the scaling back of military operations (Indian-controlled Kashmir) to their escalation to the point of war (Sri Lanka). The shared aim of all of these strategies has been to improve internal security and promote regional stability. But few have yielded long-lasting improvements, while others have been extraordinarily counterproductive. Claims of success rarely hold up under close scrutiny. So while Sri Lanka's hardline President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his brother Gotahbaya, the Defence Secretary, may boast of their triumph over the Tamil Tigers, it has come at an awful cost: 4500 civilian lives alone, according to the latest UN estimate. Moreover, few observers think it will ultimately lead to the peaceful coexistence of the Tamil minority with the Sinalese majority. More likely it has re-radicalised a new generation of Tamils at

home and among the diaspora, prolonging the conflict. With the region in such turmoil and perpetual danger, it is no wonder Barack Obama's administration has reoriented the focus of US diplomacy from the Middle East to South Asia. The President has chosen as his envoy to the region Richard C. Holbrooke, a black belt in the art of regional problem solving. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said that the deteriorating situation in Pakistan poses a ``mortal threat to the security and safety of our country and the world'', echoing the apocalyptic language of her husband Bill, who once described Kashmir as ``the most dangerous place on earth ''. She has even raised the spectre of Islamabad's atomic arsenal falling into the hands of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida. These pointed public musings have been directed at Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari and his recent strategy of containment: a policy of ceding pockets of sovereign territory to the Taliban. Though it was Pervez Musharraf who first pursued truce agreements in the semi-autonomous tribal areas of North and South Waziristan, his democratically elected successor Zardari extended that policy in February to the Swat Valley. The area is just 150km from Islamabad and it is where 12,000 Pakistani troops failed in their year-long campaign to crush 3000 Taliban militants. In unusually stinging language, Clinton claimed it amounted to abdicating to the Taliban. Just as Afghan President Hamid Karzai became known as the ``mayor of Kabul'', since his writ did not extend far beyond the capital, the fear is that Zardari may become the ``mayor of Islamabad'', leader of a fast-shrinking state. Islamabad will not fall but it runs the risk of becoming irrelevant. Far from pacifying the militants, the creation of these Taliban sanctuaries appears to have emboldened them. In early

April, Kalashnikov-wielding fighters swept with startling speed into Buner, an advance that went unchecked by the military. Since the Pakistan army has long been viewed as the one institution capable of preventing the country from sliding into

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Kashmir

anarchy, its failure to contain the Taliban is of particular concern. With the creep of the Taliban now a headlong rush and with Washington signalling its discontent, the Pakistan army has launched a counter-offensive in the Swat Valley and the policy of truce agreements presumably has been jettisoned.The fashion for conciliation is over. Yet elsewhere on the Indian subcontinent conciliatory tactics have been more fruitful. In Indian-administered Kashmir, Delhi has sought to undercut support for Islamic separatists by lightening its [Continued, nothing removed]military footprint and offering the people of the country's only Muslim majority more people-to-people contact with relatives and friends over the long-disputed Line of Control, the de facto border. A bus runs twice a month between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, despite the threats of militants to turn it into a ``coffin on wheels''. Certainly, there has been a decline in armed militancy in the Kashmir Valley, which is also the result of American pressure on Islamabad to stop incursions from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Indian officials also point to the strong turn-out in state elections last year -- 60 per cent,

according to the Government -- despite a boycott call from separatists. Still, last year also saw the biggest street protests against Indian rule for more than a decade, which ended in bloodshed when Indian troops opened fire , and turn-out in

the recent federal election was a low 24 per cent. Although jihadist groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Army of the Pure, are not operating so freely in the Kashmir Valley, they have struck elsewhere in India: Bangalore, Hyderabad, and repeatedly in Mumbai and Delhi. In 2001, they even managed to penetrate the gates of the Parliament of India, an attack that sparked a nuclear showdown with Islamabad that came perilously close to war. The policy of conciliation, along with earlier peace overtures towards Pakistan in a now-stalled talks process, may have brought a measure of relative calm to India's most troubled state but offers little defence from attack to its vital centres of governmental, commercial and hi-tech

power. Hopes that democracy could be part of a cure-all have not always been borne out. The first Afghan presidential election in 2004 was a deeply flawed process, which by lunchtime on polling day had collapsed into chaos because of the delible qualities of the supposedly indelible ink. By early afternoon, all of Karzai's rivals had boycotted the election. A far more serious deficiency of that first direct poll was that it institutionalised the power of the regional warlords, thus creating a fractured cabinet with a feeble presidency at the apex of Afghan power. It did not help that by 2004 Karzai's sponsors in the Bush administration had made Iraq their

myopic focus. In August, Afghanistan will go to the polls again, with the security situation worse than it was five years ago. Nearly half the country is a danger zone and a map prepared by the interior ministry shows that 156 out of 364 electoral districts are high-risk. Ten are coloured black, signifying they are under Taliban control. In neighbouring Pakistan, elections have given Zardari the boast of moral legitimacy but have not marked a breakthrough in the campaign against violent Islam. Nor, after nine years of near dictatorial rule by Musharraf, have they brought about the emphatic resumption of civilian rule. Zardari has been unable to wrest control of the country's all-powerful intelligence agency, the ISI, from the army, renegade elements of which

have long been suspected by the US and India of sponsoring jihadist groups. For all the shortcomings of democracy, the autocratic alternative has failed. Its two main proponents, Musharraf and king Gyanendra of Nepal, have been deposed. Gyanendra's decision in February 2005 to declare a state of emergency and suspend democracy proved a miscalculation of immense scale. Nepal is now a republic, the king has been stripped of power and driven unceremoniously from the royal palace where his family had lived for more than a century. To compound the insult, his great nemesis, Prachanda, the enigmatic Maoist leader, came to head the new coalition Government, although he

stepped down last month in a row with the country's new President. Certainly, this is a region where effective and sustainable counterinsurgency strategies are exceptional. Disaggregating the threat, as Australian military strategist David Kilcullen argues in sections of The Accidental Guerilla (reviewed on Page 10), may offer some hope: the tactic of breaking big, nationwide insurgencies into small, localised rebellions and dealing with them accordingly. Before the fresh assault on the Taliban that started in 2006, as NATO launched new operations in the south, this approach had delivered a measure of progress in small villages close to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In what was then the most dangerous corner of Afghanistan, US forces tried to deal with tribal leaders in a localised rather than regionalised context, seeking their allegiance with a blend of soft and hard

power, such as the promise of new schools and roads and the threat of military action if villages became Taliban safe havens. But in this graveyard of empires, these techniques could not be applied universally for lack of troops, resources and strategic commitment from the US-led coalition. And commonly there were mission-related mistakes, such as attacks on the Taliban that resulted in civilian deaths, which generated a groundswell of disfavour. Because of that, localised successes often remained just that: localised. The history of that resonant phrase, the graveyard of empires, is part of the problem. For the Taliban and al-Qa'ida it fuses a belief in preordained victory with a refusal to countenance defeat. For jihadists, the struggle is centuries old and eternal. The region remains captive to that violent history and religious fervour, which speaks of another problem confronting South Asia: there is no reset button to press.

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Kashmir

India and Pakistan recognize Kashmir will never realistically go nuclear and are close to peaceSteve Coll; 3/2/09; (Quals: Pulitzer Prize-winning American journalist and writer. Coll is currently president and CEO of the New America Foundation.); “The Back Channel; India and Pakistan's secret Kashmir talks.”; The New Yorker; LexisNexis

The agenda included a search for an end to the long fight over Kashmir, a contest that is often described by Western military analysts as a potential trigger for atomic war. (India first tested a nuclear weapon in 1974, and Pakistan did so in 1998.) Since achieving independence, in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three wars and countless skirmishes across Kashmir's mountain passes. The largest part of the territory is occupied by India, and Pakistanis have long rallied around the cause of liberating it. The two principal envoys-for Pakistan, a college classmate of Musharraf's named Tariq Aziz, and, for India, a Russia specialist named Satinder Lambah-were developing what diplomats refer to as a "non-paper" on Kashmir, a text without names or signatures which can serve as a deniable but detailed basis for a deal. At the Rawalpindi meetings, Musharraf drew his generals into a debate about the fundamental definition of Pakistan's national security. "It was no longer fashionable to think in some of the old terms," Khurshid Kasuri, who was then Foreign Minister, and who attended the sessions, recalled. "Pakistan had become a nuclear power. War was no longer an option for either side." Kasuri said to the generals that only by diplomacy could they achieve their goals in Kashmir. He told them, he recalled, "Put your hand here-on your heart-and tell me that Kashmir will gain freedom" without such a negotiation with India. The generals at the table accepted this view, Kasuri said. They "trusted Musharraf," he continued. "Their raison d'être is not permanent enmity with India. Their raison d'être is Pakistan's permanent security. And what is security? Safety of our borders and our economic development." By early 2007, the back-channel talks on Kashmir had become "so advanced that we'd come to semicolons," Kasuri recalled. A senior Indian official who was involved agreed. "It was huge-I think it would have changed the basic nature of the problem," he told me. "You would have then had the freedom to remake Indo-Pakistani relations." Aziz and Lambah were negotiating the details for a visit to Pakistan by the Indian Prime Minister during which, they hoped, the principles underlying the Kashmir agreement would be announced and talks aimed at implementation would be inaugurated. One quarrel, over a waterway known as Sir Creek, would be formally settled

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IranIran’s pursuit of nuclear technologies in the middle east will drive surrounding neighbors to an arms race of nuclear weaponsThe Atlantic Council; 10/20/08; (Quals: The Council embodies a non-partisan network of leaders and diplomats who aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas); ”Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”; http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world

Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, other countries’ worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear-weapons capable Iran. Episodes of low- intensity conflict taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established.

If nuclear weapons are used in the next 15 years, the risk of them being used ever again is gone – global disarmament would followThe Atlantic Council; 10/20/08; (Quals: The Council embodies a non-partisan network of leaders and diplomats who aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas); ”Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”; http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world

If nuclear weapons are used in the next 15-20 years, the international system will be shocked as it experiences immediate humanitarian, economic, and political-military repercussions. A future use of nuclear weapons probably would bring about significant geopolitical changes as some states would seek to establish or reinforce security alliances with existing nuclear powers and others would push for global nuclear disarmament.

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Great power wars

Great power wars are no longer realistic – great powers don’t existForeign Affairs; August ’94; “Where are the great powers?”; https://www.msu.edu/course/iss/325/stein/read-325-1.htm

During the Cold War as before it, local and regional conflicts were often instigated or at least encouraged and materially supported by rival great powers. Now, by contrast, the absence of functioning great powers is the cause of the world's inability to cope with all manner of violent disorders. The result is that not only groups of secessionists and aggressive small powers, such as Serbia, but even mere armed bands can now impose their will or simply rampage, unchecked by any greater force from without. Today there is neither the danger of great power wars nor the relative tranquillity once imposed by each great power within its own sphere of influence. By the traditional definition, great powers were states strong enough to successfully wage war without calling on allies. But that distinction is now outdated, because the issue today is not whether war can be made with or without allies, but whether war can be made at all. Historically, there have been tacit preconditions to great power status: a readiness to use force whenever it was advantageous to do so and an acceptance of the resulting combat casualties with equanimity, as long as the number was not disproportionate. In the past, those preconditions were too blatantly obvious and too easily satisfied to deserve a mention by either practitioners or theoreticians. Great powers normally relied on intimidation rather than combat, but only because a willingness to use force was assumed. Moreover, they would use force undeterred by the prospect of the ensuing casualties, within limits of course.

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Great power wars

The international order is drastically changing – a multipolar world will violently break out by 2025 unless the U.S. takes steps to increase their dominance militarilyThe Atlantic Council; 10/20/08; (Quals: The Council embodies a non-partisan network of leaders and diplomats who aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas); ”Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”; http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world

The international system—as constructed following the Second World War—will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of nonstate actors. By 2025, the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries. Concurrent with the shift in power among nation-states, the relative power of various nonstate actors—including businesses, tribes, religious organizations, and criminal networks—is increasing. The players are changing , but so too are the scope and breadth of transnational issues important for continued global prosperity. Potentially slowing global economic growth; aging populations in the developed world; growing energy, food, and water constraints; and worries about climate change will limit and diminish what will still be an historically unprecedented age of prosperity. Historically, emerging multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones. Despite the recent financial volatility—which could end up accelerating many ongoing trends—we do not believe that we are headed towards a complete breakdown of the international system—as occurred in 1914-1918 when an earlier phase of globalization came to a halt. But, the next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught with risks. Strategic rivalries are most likely to revolve around trade, investments, and technological innovation and acquisition, but we cannot rule out a 19th century-like scenario of arms races, territorial expansion, and military rivalries. This is a story with no clear outcome, as illustrated by a series of vignettes we use to map out divergent futures. Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States’ relative strength—even in the military realm—will decline and US leverage will become more constrained. At the same time, the extent to which other actors—both state and nonstate—will be willing or able to shoulder increased burdens is unclear. Policymakers and publics will have to cope with a growing demand for multilateral cooperation when the international system will be stressed by the incomplete transition from the old to a still forming new order.

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Great power wars

Economic growth China and India will assert them as dominate poles of the world by 2025 unless the U.S. drastically increases growthThe Atlantic Council; 10/20/08; (Quals: The Council embodies a non-partisan network of leaders and diplomats who aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas); ”Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”; http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world

In terms of size, speed, and directional flow, the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under way—roughly from West to East—is without precedent in modern history. This shift derives from two sources. First, increases in oil and commodity prices have generated windfall profits for the Gulf States and Russia. Second, lower costs combined with government policies have shifted the locus of manufacturing and some service industries to Asia.Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by 2040-2050. China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country. If current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world’s second largest economy and will be a leading military power. It also could be the largest importer of natural resources and the biggest polluter. India probably will continue to enjoy relatively rapid economic growth and will strive for a multipolar world in which New Delhi is one of the poles. China and India must decide the extent to which they are willing and capable of playing increasing global roles and how each will relate to the other. Russia has the potential to be richer, more powerful, and more self-assured in 2025. If it invests in human capital, expands and diversifies its economy, and integrates with global markets, by 2025 Russia could boast a GDP approaching that of the UK and France. On the other hand, Russia could experience a significant decline if it fails to take these steps and oil and gas prices remain in the $50-70 per barrel range. No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia, and none is likely to match their individual global clout. We expect, however, to see the political and economic power of other countries—such as Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey—increase. For the most part, China, India, and Russia are not following the Western liberal model for self-development but instead are using a different model, “state capitalism.” State capitalism is a loose term used to describe a system of economic management that gives a prominent role to the state. Other rising powers—South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore—also used state capitalism to develop their economies. However, the impact of China following this path is potentially much greater owing to its size and approach to “democratization.” Nevertheless, we remain optimistic about the long-term prospects for greater democratization, even though advances are likely to be slow and globalization is subjecting many recently democratized countries to increasing social and economic pressures with the potential to undermine liberal institutions. Many other countries will fall further behind economically. Sub-Saharan Africa will remain the region most vulnerable to economic disruption, population stresses, civil conflict, and political instability. Despite increased global demand for commodities for which Sub-Saharan Africa will be a major supplier, local populations are unlikely to experience significant economic gain. Windfall profits arising from sustained increases in commodity prices might further entrench corrupt or otherwise ill-equipped governments in several regions, diminishing the prospects for democratic and market-based reforms. Although many of Latin America’s major countries will have become middle income powers by 2025, others, particularly those such as Venezuela and Bolivia which have embraced populist policies for a protracted period, will lag behind—and some, such as Haiti, will have become even poorer and less governable. Overall, Latin America will continue to lag behind Asia and other fast-growing areas in terms of

economic competitiveness. Asia, Africa, and Latin America will account for virtually all population growth over the next 20 years; less than 3 percent of the growth will occur in the West. Europe and Japan will continue to far outdistance the emerging powers of China and India in per capita wealth , but they will struggle to maintain robust growth rates because the size of their working-age populations will decrease. The US will be a partial exception to the aging of populations in the developed world because it will experience higher birth rates and more immigration. The number of migrants seeking to move from disadvantaged to relatively privileged countries is likely to increase.

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Probability [ ] Risk should be evaluated towards the overall welfareZeckhauser, Richard-, Harvard’s Kennedy School of Gov ’96[Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, “The economics of catastrophes”, vol 12, P. 127-128]

Let us consider a stylized version of the river-flood example. Individual landowners or cities can take actions, such as filling in marshes for real estate developments or building protective levees, that make the flood more likely. 32 Let us say that there are n decision makers with a binary choice, where a 1 promotes the flood probability, and a 0 does not. With m players choosing 1, we have p = P(m). Even ifp or P(m) were directly observable, we would have a severe incentives problem if the number of decision makers is large. Say there are ten equal-sized decision makers on the river. By choosing 1, they would reap any increase in expected benefits, but would bear only 1/10 of the extra costs. Too much risk would be taken, too many l's would be chosen. Figure 2 shows the average and marginal costs of being an m, judged from the standpoint of the individual taking the action. Here M -- 100. Say the benefit of choosing a 1 is constant at 1.33 Then we will have six players choosing a 1 in equilibrium. Note that there will be a race to choose, since the six who choose 1 get a higher payoff than the four who choose 0. What is efficient, however, is to have only one person choose 1. Beyond that, for a gain of 1, there is a greater than a .01 chance of loss of 100.Given such a situation, assuming rational choice, an absolute increase in the P(m) function may be desirable, because it may deter some risk-imposing behavior, lead to a lower level of risk, and improve overall welfare. For example, if there were a critical mass point, a point at which the probability of the catastrophe rose rapidly, this would curtail risk-imposing behavior beyond that point. Tilting a portion of the P(m) curve upwards could reduce the equilibrium probability of a catastrophe. Of course, some ways of raising the curves could make matters worse. The general point, however, is that, to cut off risk-imposing behavior in the uncoordinated equilibrium, we need to have the marginal cost sufficiently high at some point. Any increases in the P(m) curve offer a gain in deterrence but a loss in terms of increased risks created by the actions which we fail to deter.

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Magnitude O/W Risk[ ] The greater magnitude needs to be weighed over risk – even .0001 magnitude is enough to pull the trigger.RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER; Political economy professor at Harvard University; May, 1996; [W. KIP VISCUSI ABSTRACT “The Risk Management Dilemma” American Academy of Political and Social Science; Jstor]

When the magnitude of the risk is unclear, what should the government do? The current procedure is to focus on the worst-case scenario.15 Unfor- tunately, this leads to policies that pay the greatest attention to the risks about which least is known. If chemical Aposes a lifetime fatality risk that is known to be .00002, whereas equally widely used chemical B poses a risk that might be .00003 but probably is zero, current practice would first address the risks from chemical B, though we could save a greater expected number of lives if we fo- cused on A.

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