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IMPACT OF NEO-LIBERAL POLICIES ON URBAN MORPHOLOGY: THE INDIAN CASE

Amitabh Kundu

Abstract: The paper analyses the implications of the new system of urban management in the context of the recent demographic trends and programmes of urban development, taking India as a case study. It looks into inter state and size class variation in urbanisation and urban growth during nineties, the period of structural reform in the country and relates these with the new system of urban governance. It compares and contrasts the spatial pattern emerging in the nineties with that of the earlier decades, focussing on the new strategy of promoting the emergence of a limited number of global centres. It also overviews the policies and programmes of decentralised urban governance, the new system of management, resource mobilisation etc. and their impact on urban hierarchy and balanced urban development in the country.

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1. Introduction A major change in the perspective for urban development in the countries of the developing world since the late eighties has been in favour of a liberal system of governance and management of cities. This high profile shift has come at a time when a number of countries were having serious crisis in terms of balance of payment and debt servicing. Understandably, the problems of infrastructural deficiency in urban centres and the incapacity of the state and local governments to make adequate investments to alleviate these have been seen as a part the larger crisis, facing the countries. Consequently, the governments have sought to impose restrictions on public spending for maintenance and development of infrastructural services, in line with the macro economic solutions within neo liberal perspective, as prescribed by a number of international organisations. Restructuring the system of governance and reduction of public expenditure on infrastructure and civic amenities have often been perceived as the most crucial elements in a strategy for meeting the challenge of urban crisis. The need to free the market from regulative framework of the state, facilitate private and joint sector to invest in infrastructure and manage basic amenities and enable local governments to take development decisions has also been voiced in many of the less developed countries. Development of capital market for resource mobilisation and ensuring appropriate prices for infrastructure and urban amenities through elimination or reduction of subsidies have also emerged as important pillars of the strategy. Simplification of legislative system and flexibility to bring about appropriate land use changes and location of economic activities etc. have been advocated as a part of the remedial package (World Bank 1995, Harris and Fabricius 1996, World Bank 1998). Unfortunately, there are not many studies that have empirically examined the basic stipulations of this perspective, its impact on the availability of infrastructure, basic amenities and environment in different regions at different levels of development and urban centres in different size categories. Research studies that can support or question the tenets of a new paradigm or link up nature of governance with the social outcome or the impact on urban structure and its sustainability are hopelessly inadequate. Needless to point out that, as a consequence, the assertions, stipulations and prescriptions pertaining to urban governance and its impact on the poor are diverse and reflect the wide variety of circumstances even within the less developed countries that inform the issues. Given the above scenario, it would be important to analyse the experience of individual countries with their adoption of measures of economic reform and decentralised governance. The present paper attempts to do that taking India

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as a case study. Section 2 which follows the brief introductory section, presents a critical appraisal of the basic tenets of the neo liberal perspective taking into consideration the claims and counter claims made by researchers investigating the issues. The next section begins by looking at the trends of urbanisation and migration in India at the macro level and then proceeds to discuss size class and interstate variation in urban growth, focussing on the changes that have come up in the nineties, under the neo liberal policy regime. The innovations in management practices and functioning of local institutions have been analysed in the following section, highlighting their possible impact on the process of urban growth. The last section puts forward a critique of the neo liberal policy perspective based on the problems and distortions in urban structure, that have surfaced in different regions in the country in recent years. 2. Neo- Liberal Perspective of Urban Governance: An Appraisal Within the framework of neo liberal thinking, it is argued that a large number of developing countries, gaining political independence and freedom from colonial market relations, opted for the path of planned development. Urban structure, therefore, emerged within the perspective of centralised planning, subject to excessive administrative and legal controls. This perspective, scholars have pointed out, can not take up the responsibility of linking the cities to the “border-less” world (Ohmae 1991). It has hindered free functioning of the market within the urban economy and created barriers to the entry of private capital, both from within and outside the country, leading to deficiencies in infrastructure and basic services and urban crisis. The basic argument, thus, is that the existing city level and city related institutions have no capacity to deal with the demands and pressures that are being generated as a result of the present focus of globalization.” This perspective emerges also from the report of OECD (1994) which considers the cities to the product of complex forces over which individual cities have little control. There are limits to which the cities can accelerate or retard the rate of change1. The new perspective, thus, urges the local governments not simply to restrict themselves to provision of basic amenities but to launch aggressive measures to attract private capital. Further, decentralisation of governance is seen as a key element in the strategy for making these services available to all sections of population, including the poor.

1 Carrying forward this line of reasoning, Mathur (1999) writes that urban governance was “long considered to be an exclusive responsibility of the government and state-owned and state-led institutions, but is should now be viewed as a collaborative effort of all stakeholders in the cities’ future in which the industrial and business enterprises as well as communities themselves have their roles to assert”.

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The para statal agencies, created in the post-colonial period that had taken over many of the functions of local bodies, have come in for sharp criticism on grounds of inefficiency, lack of cost effectiveness and continued dependence on grants for sustenance. Some kind of "financial discipline" is now being imposed by the central banks, forcing these agencies as well as government departments to generate resources internally and borrow from development-cum-banking institutions at an interest rate fairly close to the market. In a few cases, they have been able to raise funds even from capital market. Solutions are being found also in terms of efficient and transparent management of urban projects2. In several countries, state has ushered in Constitutional Amendments and new legislations or ordinaces to transfer powers to municipalities and other regional or local bodies as a logical concomitant of economic liberalisation, making decentralisation, the keyword in governance3. The institutional vacuum created by the limited withdrawal of the state is sought to be filled up also through private sector partnerships and civil society organisations, following the example of the European cities. Many among the external banking cum assistance agencies (EBA) involved in urban programmes are responsible for building up or promoting this perspective through their development loans\assistance and associated research\monitoring activities. The EBAs entered the urban sector in a significant manner in the late seventies. They, in general, vigorously followed and advocated a technocratic approach to urban planning and environmental management that had been successful in transforming the European cities at the end of the last and beginning of the present century. A few studies, although limited in terms of database and coverage of issues, have questioned this neo liberal perspective and the associated package of solutions. Overviewing the technocratic and management solutions advocated within this framework, critics have pointed out that there appears to be a universal ignorance or a deliberate attempt to disregard the fact that “effective urban planning and management in European cities emerged from hard fought political battles”. Indeed, new techniques were developed here in the background of social movements. It, therefore, makes little sense to import techniques to the developing countries “unless there is a genuine local demand for them with a deep political commitment”. It can be demonstrated that city government, while assuming the “global responsibility”, may impose new conditions or structures that are 2 See the “Introduction” and various city level studies from different countries of the World in Harris and Fabricius (1996). 3 The central governments in many countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, operating under structural adjustment programme and suffering serious debt problems, are examining ways to decentralise some of the burdens of service provisions to the local level. Of the 75 developing countries with populations over five millions, all but 12 have initiated some form of transfer of power to the local governments (World Bank 1995).

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detrimental to the interests of urban poor (Kundu et. al. 1999). Furthermore, these governments are faced with increased competition and conflict in between two objectives namely (a) serving the needs of the city population, focussing on the poor who are deficient in basic services and (b) investing in infrastructure required by international business interests”. These business interests in many of the less developed countries have been able to capture the political process and influence the judicial system. This, in the absence of institutional backup, has often led to marginalisation of the interests of the urban poor. The studies, thus, give reasons to be skeptical with regard to the capacity of municipal governments to meet the needs and aspirations of the people of the city and the region\country, in an environment of globalisation and decentralisation. An overview of the studies in Latin America, Asia and Africa, suggests that worsening global debt patterns and nationally and internationally imposed austerity measures have dictated deep cuts in both new and recurrent spending on urban infrastructure. New public sector investments have effectively been ruled out and expenditures on maintenance of existing infrastructure have been postponed. As a consequence, the overall urban decline has become more and more endemic. This has accentuated the physical dualism of extreme poverty and extreme wealth in the "indebted globalised cities in the developing world. It may further be argued that decentralisation measures have the inherent risk of simply 'decentralising corruption’ rather than leading to any genuine community development or empowerment. These often pose a threat to redistributive policy in countries that have wide regional inequality in tax base. Further, the tendency to take a romantic view of civil society “movement” without considering the existing power equations might result in fragmentation of urban space. Indeed, when the local governments are weak (in providing basic services and a framework for future development) but civil society is active, fragmentation of urban space becomes inevitable. Often it is observed that affluent neighborhoods manage to receive water, sewerage and solid waste collection services from local or state government, while in low income neighbourhoods, community groups and NGOs are urged to organise physical and financial resources for the same. This often leads to resentment and popular protests. There is, thus, no unanimity of view that this new package would meet the widening deficiencies in infrastructure and basic amenities for all sections of population. Critics have also argued that it is no good supporting a sectoral or even a community development (or empowerment) project in a city, unless steps are taken, at the same time, to combat a macro context that consistently leads to further impoverishment of local communities. They have argued that “promotion of neo-liberal policies and programmes both in terms of macro-economic steering and, more specifically, structural adjustment programmes have had

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the effect of increasing poverty in a way “that cannot meaningfully be addressed by urban community programmes”. Indeed, given the present zeal for liberalisation, many of the formal development sectors are following their “own path to profits” regardless of the broader perspective of development or “what might make a more pleasant and workable city for the citizenry as a whole." Further, most of the national and international schemes have been concentrated to a few large urban areas for reasons of higher visibility as also the ease with which large sums of money can be spent through formal institutions with low overhead cost. This has further distorted the urban hierarchy. Finally, the basic assumption underlying the interventions by the EBAs is that governments are in control of the urban development process but that somehow the laws and regulatory mechanisms here not yet working very well. They, thus, insist that all countries be overseen by governments with uniform “legal structures and administrative organs” disregarding the ground reality that governments in different cultural contexts are different kinds of organisms. Further, the expectation of quick results and rapidity of implementation by the EBAs, sought to be achieved often by multiplying “the success stories” from different parts of the globe, have been responsible for not giving much attention towards creation of local structures of accountability. Most of their projects have, thus, been launched without due consideration of the different regional pattern of urban growth that are emerging in different part of the world. The strategies of urban development launched through the international agencies are, thus, insensitive to the ways in which wider political and ideological contexts determine priorities in different countries. The following section analyses how the pursuance of such a strategy has resulted in significant changes in the process and pattern of urbanisation and brought forth distortions in urban morphology, taking India as a case study 3. A Paradigm Shift in Urbanisation and Migration in India during the period

of globalisation

The Macro Scenario India has recorded a significant deceleration in urban growth during nineties, the decade in which programmes of globalisation have been launched formally. The annual growth rate (exponential) of urban population has gone down from 3.1 per cent during 1981-91 to 2.7 per cent during 1991-2001 (Table 1). This reinforces the declining trend of urbanisation in the country since the rate had decelerated even during eighties, when a number of measures to liberate the urban economy from legal and bureaucratic controls were initiated, although in a disjoint manner. The growth rate was much below the all time high growth of 3.8 per cent, recorded during seventies. The trend, however, goes against not only the popular theories of “urban

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explosion”, "over urbanisation" etc. but also questions the projections made by various Expert Groups, set up by various government and international agencies. The proponents of economic liberalisation and associated structural reform have argued that this new strategy would accelerate rural urban (RU) migration and give boost to the pace of urbanisation. Linking of India with global economy would lead to massive inflow of capital from outside the country as also rise in indigenous investment. This, in turn, would give impetus to the process of urbanisation since much of the investment and consequent increase in employment would be either within or around the existing urban centres. Even when the industrial units get located in rural settlements, in a few years, the latter would acquire urban status. Critics of liberalisation have, however, pointed out that employment generation in the formal urban economy might not be high due to capital intensive nature of industrialisation. A low rate of infrastructural investment in public sector - necessary for keeping budgetary deficits low - would slow down agricultural growth. This, coupled with open trade policy, would destabilise agrarian economy, causing high unemployment and exodus from rural areas. This would lead to rapid growth in urban population. Thus, the protagonists as also the critics of economic reform converged on the proposition that urban growth in the post liberalisation phase would be high. The recent data from the Population Census have thus proved them both wrong. Understandably, deceleration in the rate of urbanisation can partly be explained in terms of decline in fertility, resulting in slower natural growth rate. Notwithstanding that, RU migration can not be dismissed as an explanatory factor. The percentage of intercensal male migrants in urban areas came down from 18.5 to 16.9 and that of lifetime (male) migrants from 33.6 to 32.4 during 1971-81 (Table 2a), although the decade saw very high growth of urban population (Kundu and Gupta 2000). Correspondingly, the share of lifetime interstate migrants declined from 11.2 per cent to 10.0 per cent. The migration data from 1991 Population Census reveal further decline in the percentages. The percentage figures for intercensal, lifetime and interstate (lifetime) migrants being 11.7, 26.0 and 8.0 respectively. Inmigration of females into urban areas, too, declined but at a slower pace, as that is governed by socio-cultural factors that change slowly. In case this migration trend continues, the pace of urbanisation is likely to be slower in future years. The data from NSS for the past two decades confirms the declining trend of migration for males, both in urban areas although the fall is rather modest. The percentage of migrants in urban areas has gone down from 27.0 and 25.7 during the period from 1983 to 1999-2000. The fact that migration ratios have gone up marginally in urban areas during 1993-99 may not be taken as a reversal of the declined trend. The marginal increase can, at

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last partially be attributed to slightly more liberal definition of migrants adopted in the 55th round NSS4. An attempt has been made, here, using a simple identity, to decompose the incremental urban population in a decade, as reported by Population Census, into four components. These are: (a) natural increase, (b) new towns less declassified towns (outside the agglomerations), (c) merging of towns and jurisdictional changes in agglomerations and (d) RU migration. The first component, estimated by applying natural growth rate on base year population as well as intercensal migrants, can be noted to have gone up marginally from 35.4 million in eighties to 40.2 million in nineties (Table 2b). These account for 61.3 per cent and 59.4 per cent of the total increase in urban population in the two decades respectively. It may be mentioned that in estimating this component, the decline in natural growth rate of population during 1991-01, as per the SRS data, (which is much sharper than in rural areas) has been taken into consideration. The components where the changes in the share have been substantial are (b), new (less declassified) towns and (c), merging of towns and areas with agglomerations. The net increase in urban population due to addition\ deletion of towns in the terminal year, (N1 - D0), can be estimated through subtraction of the increment in population of common towns5 from the total increase in urban population over a decade. This may be expressed in the following equation: N1 - D0 = (U1-U0) - (C1 - C0) It is noted that the share of component (b) in the total increment to urban population has declined from 9.4 per cent in the eighties to 6.2 per cent in the nineties. This suggests that urbanisation process, away from the existing agglomerations and urbanised regions, has become sluggish over the decades. The third component is conceptually the addition to the population of common towns due to extension of municipal limits, merging of old towns or inclusion of new towns in the old UAs. This has been estimated as a residual category for the sixties, seventies and eighties. For nineties, this has been computed based on the assumption that concentrated urban growth in the decade would result in larger merging of towns with existing towns/UAs and areal expansion

4 The 32nd and 38th rounds of NSS defined migrants as those who are "normally resident members of a household but were enumerated at a place other than that of his\her usual place of residence (village\town). The 55th round, however, has dropped the critical phrase "normally resident", possibly implying a more liberal definition of migrants. Further, this round specified six months duration at a place other than that of enumeration as adequate for being considered a migrant. In earlier rounds, the period was not specified and possibly a longer duration of stay at another place was stipulated for designating the latter as the usual place of last residence for identifying migrants. 5 For details on common towns, see Census of India (1991).

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in the latter6. The share of this component going up from 7.6 per cent to 13.0 per cent reveals that there is considerable dynamism around the existing agglomerations. The fourth component, migration, has then been estimated from the following identity, as per the methodology discussed in the notes of Table 2b: Migration = Total increase - natural increase - New less declassified towns - merging and jurisdictional changes Using this, migration as a percentage of incremental urban population, has been obtained as 21 per cent in the nineties, the period during which programmes of liberalisation have been formally launched and implemented. This is marginally less than noted in the previous decade. Given such trends in migration, even the more modest projections of urban growth given by UN for the next two decades, seem somewhat optimistic. Size Class variation An analysis of the distribution of urban population across size categories reveals that the process of urbanisation in India has been large city oriented. This is manifested in a high percentage of urban population being concentrated in class I cities, which has gone up systematically over the decades in the last century. The massive increase in the percentage share of class I cities from in 26.0 in 1901 to 68.7 in 2001 has often been attributed to faster growth of large cities, without taking into consideration the increase in the number of these cities (Table 3a). Indeed, the basic reason for the increasing dominance of these cities is graduation of lower order towns into class I category. Importantly, Table 3b reports two growth rates for seventies and subsequent decades, for different categories of towns, one computed by considering the population in each category as reported in consecutive Censuses, the other considering the population of the common towns7 only. The differences between the two growth rates are due to towns moving in and out of a category over time. It may be observed that in 1901, there were only 24 class I cities that has gone up to 393 in 2001, which explains largely the increase in the share of population in this size category over the decades. However, in addition to the factor of increase in the number of large cities, the importance of a faster demographic growth in these, in making the urban structure top-heavy can not be minimised.

6 Unfortunately, the Census of 2001 does not report any increase in the number of urban agglomerations (UA) due to adoption of a stringent definition of UA. 7 This growth rate is computed by aggregating the base year and terminal year population of only those towns that belonged to the category in the base year. For details see Census of India (1991).

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Despite increasing concentration of urban population in larger cities over the years, several planners and researchers find no distortion and talk of stable morphology in Indian urban structure (Rakesh Mohan and Pant 1982). They hold that population growth is more or less uniform across size classes. It is evident from Table 3b that this is not the case. The class I cities, for example, show distinctly higher growth rates during seventies than compared to the lower order towns, except the class VI towns. Indeed, the class VI towns do not fall in line with the general pattern as they exhibit higher growth rate. One must hasten to add that these towns constitute a special category, as many of these are industrial townships, pilgrimage centres or have come into existence through establishment of a public sector unit. Their growth dynamics, therefore, are outside the purview of the regional economy. The pattern of growth has remained similar over the past three decades although there is a general deceleration in urban growth in all size categories. Nonetheless, one can note that the class I cities have an edge over class II, III, IV and class V towns in terms of the growth rate (of common towns). This gap seems to have widened a bit during 1991-01 (Table 3b). The annual exponential growth rate for class I (common) towns during seventies and eighties are 3.46 and 2.96 respectively. The recent Census has indicated a marginal decrease in the growth rate of class I towns to 2.76 percent during 1991-01, computed on the basis of 291 common class I cities. In comparison, the growth rate for class II towns has gone down by a larger margin, from 2.75 per cent in eighties to 2.38 per cent in nineties. The same is the case of class III towns, the corresponding percentage figures being 2.59 and 2.27. The smaller towns (IV, V and VI together), too, indicate a sharp decline in growth rate - from 2.57 percent during 1981-91 to 2.22 per cent during 1991-01. The decline in the growth rate of class I cities is, thus, less compared to all lower categories of towns. One would, therefore, stipulate that the urban structure is becoming more and more top heavy due to the higher demographic growth in larger cities, in addition to the other factors discussed above. An Interstate Analysis The regional variations in the distribution of urban population are significant. A large proportion is concentrated in the six most developed states, namely Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Punjab and West Bengal, accounting for about half of the country's urban population. By the 2001 Census, they report percentage of urban population much above the national average of 27.78, whereas the less developed states report significantly low figures. Indeed, the levels of urbanisation in the states with high per capita income are high, the opposite being the case of less urbanised states (Table 4).

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The pattern of urban growth across states is significantly different from that of the levels of urbanisation. Since Independence until 1991, the developed states such as Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Karnataka etc. (having high percentage of urbanisation) had shown medium or low growth of urban population. In contrast, high urban growth was registered in relatively backward states (Table 4), viz. Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, the states also having low percentages of urban population. This implies that the relationship between urban growth and economic development was generally negative. However, some of the developed states like Maharashtra and Haryana were exceptions, as they had recorded urban growth higher than that of the country. Urban scenario in the post Independence period was, thus, characterised by dualism. The developed states attracted population in urban areas due to industrialisation and infrastrctural investment. Interestingly, the backward states too – particularly their backward districts and small and medium towns – experienced rapid urban growth. This can party be attributed to government investment in the district and taluka headquarters, programmes of urban industrial dispersal, and transfer of funds from the states to local bodies through a need based or what is popularly known as "a gap filling" approach. A part of RU migration into smaller towns from their rural hinterland in backward states could, however, be explained in terms of push factors, owing to lack of diversification in agrarian economy. Nineties, however, makes a significant departure from the earlier decades, since many of the developed states like Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Haryana, Maharashtra and Gujarat have registered urban growth above the national average (Table 4). Karnataka has remained slightly below the national average and West Bengal is an exception whose growth rate is not particularly impressive. The backward states, on the other hand, have experienced growth either below that of the country or, at the most, equal to that. Making a comparison over the past two decades, the growth rates for developed states have either gone up or remained the same in the nineties8. The backward states, on the other hand, have recorded either a decline or stability in their urban growth. Urbanisation process has, thus, become concentrated in developed regions with

the exclusion of the backward areas. This is also reflected in the larger

cities recording relatively higher growth when compared to smaller towns, as

noted in the preceding section. This could, at least partly, be attributed to

the measures of decetralisation whereby the responsibilities of resource 8 Given a significant fall in overall urban growth rate at macro level, the marginal decline in case of Maharashtra and Karnataka may be treated as fluctuation around the rate of the previous decade. West Bengal is an exception but here the explanation

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mobilisation and launching infrastructural projects have been given to local

bodies, as noted above. Large municipal bodies that have a strong economic

base, particularly those located in developed states, have an advantage that

have clearly been manifested in their high economic and demographic growth.

4. Changes in Workforce Structure and Perspectives of Governance and their impact on Migration and Urbanisation It would be useful to build the explanatory framework for urbanisation and migration trend in the nineties by relating these to the changing employment structure in the country. Given the nature of industries, experiencing rapid growth after launching of the programmes of liberalisation, employment in the organised sector has shown negligible growth. Private industries within this sector, where growth in output has been significant in the nineties, have high capital intensity and a low potential for employment generation. The public units, on the other hand, have registered a negative growth in their workforce. Importantly, there has been a steady decline in the proportion of regular/salaried workers over the past decade and a half, as reported by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO 2001). This is because, a large part of the employment growth in the urban economy is taking place through a process of subcontracting, using casual and self-employed workers, that have a high incidence of poverty. Several of these workers are getting classified under tertiary sector, resulting in a decline in the share of manufacturing employment. Furthermore, the capacity of unorganised activities to absorb future migrants seems to be drying up over the years as reflected in the data from Fourth Economic Census and various Enterprise Surveys by NSS (Kundu et. al. 2001). It is the low growth of employment, which is behind the high growth in real wages in most of the unorganised activities. NSS confirms a substantial decline in the growth rate of total as well as non-agricultural employment in the nineties, both in rural and urban areas (Kundu et. al. 2003). In view of all these, the industrial growth in the late nineties and beyond, even if goes up to 7 or 8 per cent per annum, is unlikely to generate large employment. The growth process attracting a large number of migrants into cities and towns and giving a boost to the process of urbanisation, therefore, seems a remote possibility. Per capita income or average earning per worker in urban areas has possibly increased at a faster rate than rural areas. Importantly, however, the volume of migration would be determined not by the difference between rural and urban averages but that at the margin (Kundu 1993). There are indications that the gap between the real wages of casual workers in urban and rural lies in political economy of the state, giving greater emphasis to rural development.

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areas has gone down in the nineties. The decline in the growth of casual workers9 in rural areas, who contributed substantially to the migration stream in earlier decades, would also result in slowing down the rate of inmigration in urban areas. Furthermore, rural poverty was higher than urban poverty by at least five percentage points in the seventies and early eighties. Currently, the gap has gone down which is indicated both by the 55th (and more recently the 56th round) NSS data. This may be explained in terms of differential price rise in food-grains, which has pushed up the poverty line in urban areas much more than in rural areas. Also, the rate of unemployment in urban areas is higher than that in rural areas, both for males and females. Economic differentials between urban and rural poor, thus, seem to be narrowing down, and, as a consequence, there is no basis for the stipulation that urban growth will accelerate in future years. The sluggish growth in manufacturing employment in urban areas can also be attributed to location of large units outside the municipal limits, thanks to the emergence of environment lobby in big cities. This is facilitated by easy availability of land, access to unorganised labour market, besides lesser awareness and less stringent implementation of environmental regulations in the rural settlements in urban periphery. The poor are able to build shelter in these "degenerated peripheries" and find jobs in the industries located therein or commute to the central city for work (Kundu 1989 and Kundu et. al. 2002). The entrepreneurs, engineers, executives etc., associated with modern industries and business, however, reside within the central city and travel to the periphery through rapid transport corridors. This segmented structure of city growth, emerging in different variants in different regions, would bring in many of the migrants to the rural peripheries of large cities. More important factors in deceleration in urban growth are the changes introduced in the system of urban governance and planning. During fifties and sixties, physical planning controls on location of economic activities and urban land-use, imposed through Master Plans etc., had put some kind of ceiling on the absorptive capacity of large Indian cities. These had contributed to the slackening of RU migration. Presently, however, a strong lobby is emerging, particularly in large cities, pleading for disbanding all zoning restrictions, building laws and bye-laws and making the cities relatively independent of state and central level controls. It is stipulated that decisions regarding location of industries, change in landuse etc. should be taken expeditiously at the local level. The decentralisation of development planning responsibilities, sought to be ushered in through the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, is also expected to help this lobby through empowerment of local governments in large cities that have relatively high tax and non-tax revenue base. 9 The 56th round of NSS reports a significant decline in the percentage of casual workers.

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It may, however, be pointed out that planning controls, bye-laws etc. have had very limited impact in restricting urban growth in the past. The advantages of present relaxation in these controls currently are being taken by the large cities. These have relatively strong economic base, that are of help in attracting more investment. As a consequence, the urban structure has become more top heavy as only the large cities and their immediate hinterland have absorbed most of the migrants, as noted in the preceding section. Importantly, the Amendment Act would make it possible to provide differential levels of amenities in large cities, based on willingness of the users to pay, at the level of ward committees. This is likely to institutionalise disparity in the availability of civic amenities and strengthen the process of segmentation of the cities into rich and poor colonies. This process, operationalised through the market and backed up by governmental programmes, is likely to affect inflow of population into these cities adversely. Elitist preference for low density and clean micro environment would ensure no illegal encroachment and only selective new construction in core and high income colonies (Kundu et. al. 1999). Low level of basic amenities, unhygienic living conditions, deteriorating law and order situation, on the other hand, would be strong disincentive for further inmigration in low income colonies. A switch over from planning to free market, therefore, may not give any impetus to urban growth, even in case of the large cities attracting infrastructural investment. The impact of certain other aspects of the new system of urban governance on population growth in large cities needs to be assessed carefully. Local governments in many of these cities are currently facing two serious problems in attracting foreign and Indian business houses and industrialists. One is that of scarcity of land within the central city and other prime locations and the second is lack of capital. An ingenious method has been worked out in a number of cities, attracting national and multinational companies, to solve this twin problem. The agencies like World Bank, USAID etc. have recommended that the Floor Space Index (FSI) in the central areas of the city should be increased so that multi-storied structures can come up, providing space for business houses, commercial activities and high income residential units. The strategy of permitting vertical growth in areas with high land values has enabled the local bodies to find more space for these business houses and, at the same time, generate resources for infrastructural development by selling the extra FSI. There is an additional incentive for adopting this strategy, as sanctioning of loans by the international agencies has often been contingent on the acceptance of higher FSI in the central city by the local authorities (Kundu et. al. 1999). Attempts are, thus, being made in "select global centres of the future" to provide land at preferred sites to upcoming activities, through the market. This is being done by simplifying the legal and administrative procedures for

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changing landuse and by pushing out "low valued" activities from these sites. The low income and slum colonies are the obvious candidates for relocation in city peripheries. The shift is being carried out often directly through eviction of slum dwellers, hawkers, pavement dwellers etc. Sometimes, it is done indirectly and discreetly through slum improvement schemes, "rehabilitating" them out in the peripheries. This, in a way, has strengthened the process of degenerated peripheralisation, as noted above. Unfortunately, no alternate employment opportunities are generally provided to the poor, displaced from the central city. Such relocations have taken place in most of the metropolises, irrespective of whether the government in the state or city has a conservative or a radical perspective. Some of the government schemes do have a provision for giving the evicted slum dwellers plots or flats, in the building being constructed at the original site. It is, nonetheless, erroneous to believe that the allottees would be able to hold on to them for a long time, given their acute need for finance, growing land values and relaxation in legal and administrative environment. In the long run, such measures would undoubtedly push the poor out to the fringes or outside the municipal boundaries of the cities. The system of allowing extra FSI to be traded in the land market would also help the process of reorganisation of population and segmentation. Land in the central areas would, thereby, be available to the industrial offices and business houses and a select few who can afford the prices. Although the basic idea under the strategy is to promote greater efficiency in the use of land, this is unlikely to increase the density of population or give a boost to inmigration stream in any significant manner. Privatisation of land and civic services, in general, is likely to push up their prices, particularly in large cities. That would invariably slow down inmigration of the poor. It is observed that the migrants in class I cities, even in the early eighties, were economically and occupationally better-off than the non-migrants (Premi 1985). Inmigration of poor in large cities would have been even less in the nineties as access to basic amenities have become increasingly difficult for them, due to a reduction in public expenditure (particularly capital expenditure) on urban development and social sectors (Kundu et. al. 1999). This is reflected in a dramatic reduction in the percentage of poor in the eighties and nineties in case of the in the class I and metropolitan cities for which data could be available. Given the dynamics of urban industrial development, as discussed above, the small and medium towns located at a large distance from the "emerging global centres of growth", particularly those in backward regions, are unlikely to receive substantial private sector investment. Census of 1991 brings out that the towns having less than 50,000 population, not merely have a small proportion of workers engaged in manufacturing, but also fewer households

16

covered through basic services like drinking water, toilets, and electricity. With governmental investment in infrastructure and basic amenities becoming less and less over the years, the disparity across urban centres is likely to increase. It would be erroneous to expect the small and medium towns to finance capital expenditure through internal resources or borrowings from the capital market. The fiscal discipline, sought to be imposed by the government and credit rating agencies on urban local bodies, would make it impossible for them to undertake infrastructural expenditure of any kind. The deficiency in basic amenities has been a serious hurdle in attracting private investment from within or outside the country, which is reflected in their low demographic growth in the nineties. It is only a few large cities with strong economic base that have been able to secure high credit rating and raise resources through bonds and other instruments of credit. The rate of urbanisation could be high, if the process of RU transformation is expedited through sectoral diversification viz. increase in secondary and tertiary activities in large villages, helping the latter acquire urban status. There are about 3,000 villages having population above 10,000 in the country and their inclusion within the urban-fold would immediately increase the percentage of urban population by five percentage points. It may, nonetheless, be pointed out that, for acquiring urban status by Population Census, it is necessary for a settlement to have 75 per cent of the male workers outside agriculture, besides satisfying other demographic criteria like population size and density. Unfortunately, the share of non-agricultural employment in these 3,000 odd large villages works out as less than 40 per cent in 1991. The Census of 2001 has declassified as many as 445 towns by applying the non-agricultural conditionality (a bit more stringently than the previous Censuses) and it is unlikely that large majority of these villages would become urban places in the next couple of decades. This is specially so because the process of sectoral diversification viz. shift of workers from agriculture to non-agriculture, has slowed down in the nineties, as discussed above. It is argued, even by the proponents of liberalisation, that given the socio-economic reality in India, it is difficult for private sector to bring about the changes in urban land market, landuse, investment in infrastructure etc., without state becoming a partner. The changes in the system of governance and urban planning, as recommended by international agencies like the World Bank, USAID etc. and overwhelmingly endorsed by Indian planners, envisage state's role as an active facilitator. Indian state has indeed responded quite favourably to these recommendations, by ushering in the necessary changes, although the democratic structure and bureaucratic inertia have made the process somewhat slow. The message, however, comes loud and clear, even from the Ninth and, more recently, Tenth (Draft) Plan documents, that such changes are possible and are forthcoming.

17

If indeed the public agencies intervene as an "active facilitator" in the market - removing its deficiencies and saving the actors from market failures - the scenario of developed states and large cities receiving most of the migrants would emerge, possibly with a greater ease, with urbanisation exhibiting the same sluggish trend as in the past couple of decades. This would make realisation of the stipulated urban growth rate of even 2.8 per cent extremely difficult. Only a few large cities would emerge in the urban scene, experiencing modest to high demographic growth through RU migration, much of which will be concentrated in their degenerated peripheries.

The recent changes in the system of urban governance and planning may have

impacted significantly on urban growth. During fifties and sixties, physical-

planning controls on location of economic activities and urban land-use

imposed through Master Plans etc., had put restrictions on industrial growth

of large Indian cities. These restrictions were also expected to slow down

rural urban (RU) migration. The emerging neo liberal paradigm envisages,

particularly in the context of large cities, disbanding of all zoning

restrictions, building laws and bye-laws and making the cities relatively

independent of state and central level controls. It is argued that decisions

regarding location of industries, change in land-use etc. would be taken

expeditiously at the local level and thus give impetus to urban growth.

It may, however, be pointed out that planning controls, bye-laws etc. have

had little impact in restricting urban growth in the past. Further, the

advantages of the present atmosphere of relaxation in these controls and

decentralisation of development planning responsibilities, have been taken

only by large cities which have a relatively high tax and non-tax revenue

generating capacity. As a result, these cities are able to attract industrial

investment and much of the incremental urban population. As a consequence,

the urban structure in the country has become more top heavy as only these

large cities and their immediate hinterland have absorbed most of the

migrants.

18

Importantly, as part of decentralised urban management, it is possible to

provide differential levels of amenities, at ward or neighbourhood level, and

justify it in terms of different levels of affordability and willingness of

the people to pay user charges. This, in a way, would reinforce the disparity

in the availability of civic amenities and the process of dividing the cities

into rich and poor segments. This process, operationalised through the market

and backed up by governmental programmes, has affected inflow of population

into these cities, particularly the high income colonies adversely. Elitist

preference for low density and clean micro-environment here has led to strong

actions against illegal encroachments, evictions and only selective new

construction. Similarly, low level of basic amenities, unhygienic living

conditions, deteriorating law and order situation, have been strong

disincentive for further inmigration into low-income colonies, although they

have continued to grow at a rate much higher than the rich areas. A switch

over from planning to free market, therefore, has not provided an impetus to

urban growth, except in case of a handful of large cities attracting

investment.

The impact of certain other aspects of the new system of urban governance on

large cities needs to be assessed carefully. Local governments in many of

these cities are currently facing two serious problems in attracting foreign

and Indian business. One is that of scarcity of land within the central city

and other prime locations and the second is lack of capital. In a number of

cities, seeking to attract national and multinational companies, the Floor

Space Index (FSI) in the central areas of the city are increased so that

multi-storied structures can come up, providing space for business houses,

commercial activities and high income residential units. The strategy of

permitting vertical growth in areas with high land values would

simultaneously enable the local bodies to generate resources for

infrastructural development by selling the extra FSI. There is also a further

incentive of loans from national and international agencies, contingent on

the acceptance of higher FSI in the central city by the local authorities.

19

Attempts have, thus, been made in "select global centres of the future" to

provide land at preferred sites to upcoming activities through the market.

This has been done by simplifying legal and administrative procedures for

changing landuse and by pushing out "low valued" activities from these sites.

The low income and slum colonies are the obvious candidates for relocation in

city peripheries. The shift has been carried out often directly through

eviction of slum dwellers, hawkers, pavement dwellers etc. Sometimes, it has

been done indirectly and discreetly through slum improvement schemes,

"rehabilitating" them out in the peripheries. Unfortunately, no alternate

employment opportunities have generally been provided to the poor, displaced

from the central city. Such relocations have taken place in most of the

metropolises, irrespective of whether the government in the state or city has

a rightist or a radical perspective. Some of the government schemes do have a

provision for giving the evicted slum dwellers plots or flats, in the

building being constructed at the original site. It is, nonetheless,

erroneous to believe that such allottees would be able to hold on to them for

a long time, given their acute need for finance, growing land values and

relaxation in legal and administrative environment10.

Undoubtedly, such measures in the long run would push the poor out to the

fringes or outside the municipal boundaries of the cities. Privatisation of

land and civic services have already pushed up their prices and user charges,

particularly in large cities. That would invariably slow down inmigration of

the poor. It is observed that the migrants in class I cities in the early

eighties were economically and occupationally better-off than the non-

migrants (Premi 1985) which is not the case in the nineties. Inmigration of 10 A major concern in the scheme for Rehabilitation of Slum and Hutment Dwellers, currently being implement in Brihan Mumbai, for example, is to prevent future encroachment of land in the central areas. The Study Group (1995) set up for this purpose observes that "(e)encroachment of any land need to be firmly and quickly removed. For this purpose action needs to be taken as the first signs of unauthorised construction surface. Machinery needs to be established and strengthened wardwise with police force which should be well equipped."

20

poor in urban centres is likely to be even less in the future decades as

access to basic amenities would become even less, due to a reduction in

public expenditure (particularly capital expenditure) on urban development

and social sectors.

6. Conclusions

The macro scenario of urbanisation in India in the nineties is characterised

by deceleration in the rate of urbanisation, concentration of growth in

relatively developed states, and relatively faster demographic growth in and around a the large cities. High incidence of secondary and high valued

tertiary activities in large cities gives the people residing there a high

level of income. Those in small and medium towns, on the other hand, report

low earnings, due to the poor economic base and lack of employment

opportunities. These towns have a weak base of manufacturing sector and a

high percentage of workforce dependent on primary activities. Instability

in the economy of small and medium towns is reflected in high fluctuation

in their demographic growth over time.

The paper argues further that the large cities in the country, with strong

economic and infrastructural base, have been able to raise resources for

capital investment through bonds and other innovative credit instruments.

This has resulted in their registering reasonably high economic and

demographic growth. The fiscal discipline imposed by the government,

financial institutions, credit rating agencies and other intermediaries in

the post liberalisation era have, on the other hand, made launching

infrastructural investment by small towns extremely difficult. Most of these

towns are not in a position to generate funds internally or access private

or public resources to provide civic services to all sections of population

and stabilise their economic base. The deficiency in basic amenities in

21

these towns has also become a serious hurdle in their attracting private

investment from within or outside the country.

Disparity in the level of basic amenities across size categories of urban settlements is noted as high, the smaller towns reporting a figure which is one third that of class I cities. This is often explained in terms of earning differentials of the local bodies. The resource crunch is acute in case of the backward states where the per capita grant given by the state governments to local bodies is low. It may further be noted that the small and medium towns in these states have very low capacity to mobilse resources internally. As a result of all these, these towns have rarely been able to launch projects for the development of infrastructure and basic amenities through internal resources or borrowings from capital market. This has been reflected in their low economic and demographic growth in the nineties.

With governmental investment in infrastructure and basic amenities declining

over the years, only those public and joint sector projects have been taken

up in the nineties that have built in provisions for cost recovery. Even the

anti-poverty schemes have been redesigned incorporating the principles of

cost recovery and bankability. Understandably, only the large cities, and

here too, the better off localities would be able to attract all such

projects. This would invariably accentuate disparity across urban centres as

also within the cities in future years. The logical outcome of the policies

of economic reform and liberalisation, launched since the early nineties

would, therefore, be institutionalisation of inequality.

It is argued, even by the proponents of neo liberal policies, that given the socio-economic reality in the developing world, it is difficult for private sector to bring about the changes in urban land market, land-use, investment in infrastructure etc., without state becoming an active partner. An analysis of the changing legal and institutional structure governing the land use pattern in the large cities in India suggests that here, the state has responded quite favourably to the demands of the market. It has indeed ushered in the necessary institutional changes, although the democratic structure and bureaucratic inertia have made the process slow. The message, nonetheless, has come loud and clear from the Plan documents as also numerous administrative orders coming from concerned Ministries that such changes are possible and are forthcoming. As a consequence, the morphology of urban centres has undergone significant changes, reflecting a high degree of

22

economic and social segmentation. Access to basic amenities has increased marginally during nineties but has become extremely uneven across wards within the cities. Much of the demographic growth in case of the large cities has been diverted to their peripheries. Socioeconomic inequality within the cities or between city and its periphery has gone up significantly, reinforcing the process of city segmentation.

23

Table 1: Number of Towns, Percentage and Growth Rate of Urban Population in India since 1901 Census YearNo.of towns/

UA s % Urban to total population

Annual. Expn. gr. of urban pop.

1901 1827 10.84 - 1911 1815 10.29 0.03 1921 1949 11.18 0.79 1931 2072 11.99 1.75 1941 2250 13.86 2.77 1951 2843 17.29 3.47 1961 2365 17.97 2.34 1971 2590 19.91 3.21 1981 3378 23.34 3.83 1991 3768 25.72 3.09 2001 4368 27.78 2.73 Note: Estimated population has been taken for Assam and Jammu & Kashmir in 1981 and 1991 respectively Source: Paper-2, Rural-Urban Distribution, 1981, 1991 & 2001

24

Table 2a Pattern of Internal Migration for Males in Urban India, 1961-91

1961 1971 1981 1991 Urban Male Population

42.8 58.7 84.9 114.9

Urban Male Migrants a. Intercensal 10.2 10.8 14.1 13.3 (23.8) (18.5) (16.9) (11.7) a1.Intercensal interstate

3.4 3.3 3.7 3.7

(7.9) (5.6) (4.4) (3.3) b. Lifetime 16.1 19.7 27.1 29.6 (37.5) (33.6) (32.4) (26.0) b1.Lifetime interstate

5.3 6.6 8.4 9.1

(12.3) (11.2) (10.0) (8.0) Notes: (a) The figures are in millions while the percentages to total (urban male) population are shown within brackets.

a. (b) Population figures pertain to the whole country and include the estimated figures for Assam and Jammu & Kashmir for the years in which the Census could not be conducted in these states. The migration figures for 1981 and 1991, however, do not include Assam and Jammu and Kashmir respectively. The percentage figures (in brackets), however, are obtained by using the corresponding total population and not those given in the table.

b. (c) Lifetime migrants are those that were enumerated at places other than that of their birth. Intercensal migration figures are based on the concept of place of birth for the year 1961. For 1971, 1981 and 1991 the figures are based on the concept of place of last residence, implying that people residing anywhere other than the place of enumeration are considered migrants. (d) The data are obtained from D-III table for the year 1961 and from D-2 tables of the Population Census for the years 1971,1981and1991.

25

Table 2b Disaggregation of Total Incremental Urban Population into Components Percentage Distribution 1961-71 1971-81 1981-911991-01 Total increase 30.18 49.9 57.7 67.7 (a) Natural increase on base year pop and on inter censal migrants

64.6 51.3 61.3 59.4

(b) Population of new towns less declassified towns

13.8 14.8 9.4 6.2

(c) Net RU migration

18.7 19.6 21.7 21.0

(d) Increase due to expansion in U Area and merging of towns

2.9 14.2 7.6 13.0

Note: (a) The first component, natural increase, has been estimated by using

SRS data of birth rate and death rate for the urban population.

(b) The population in new towns less that of declassified towns, is obtained

by subtracting the increase in the population of common towns from the total

increase in urban population. Importantly, the new towns that emerge as parts

of urban agglomeration (existing in the base year), would be included in the

common towns. This second component would, thus, give the population of only

those new towns that are not part of the UA.

(c) The third component has been estimated as residuals in the first three

decades since it is very difficult to ascertain this directly. For nineties,

this has been obtained based on the assumption that there has been larger

number of merging of towns with urban agglomerations and areal expansion in

the latter. Since the number of towns merging with the existing towns in the

nineties is 221 compared to 103 in eighties, the third component has been

taken as twice that in the eighties, as a conservative estimate.

(d) The net of RU migration has been obtained from the Population Census in

the first three decades while in the fourth, it is a residual category.

26

Table 3a: Number of towns and percentage of urban population in different

size categories

Number of towns Percentage of urban populationCensus Year

ClassI

ClassII

ClassIII

ClassIV

ClassV

Class VIClassI

ClassII

ClassIII

Class IVClassV

ClassVI

1901 24 43 130 391 744 479 26.0011.2915.6420.8320.146.10 1911 23 40 135 364 707 485 27.4810.5116.4 19.7319.316.57 1921 29 45 145 370 734 571 29.7010.3915.9218.2918.677.03 1931 35 56 183 434 800 509 31.2011.6516.8 18.0017.145.21 1941 49 74 242 498 920 407 38.2311.4216.3515.7815.083.14 1951 76 91 327 608 1124 569 44.639.96 15.7213.6312.973.09 1961 102 129 437 719 711 172 51.4211.2316.9412.776.87 0.77 1971 148 173 558 827 623 147 57.2410.9216.0110.944.45 0.44 1981 218 270 743 1059 758 253 60.3711.6314.339.54 3.58 0.50 1991 300 345 947 1167 740 197 65.2010.9513.197.77 2.60 0.29 2001 393 401 1151 1344 888 191 68.679.67 12.236.84 2.36 0.23 The towns have been placed in six categories, following demographic criteria as given below: Class I towns - 1,00,000 or more Class II From 50,000 to 99,999 Class III From 20,000 to 49,999 Class IV From 10,000 to 19,999 Class V From 5,000 to 9,999, and Class IV Below 5,000

27

Table 3b: Annual Exponential growth rates of urban population in different size categories CensusYear

Class IClass IIClass IIIClass IVClass V Class VI

1901-110.54 -0.73 0.46 -0.55 -0.43 0.72 1911-211.57 0.68 0.50 0.03 0.46 1.47 1921-312.24 2.89 2.28 1.59 0.89 -1.25 1931-414.81 2.59 2.51 1.47 1.50 -2.26 1941-515.02 2.10 3.07 2.01 1.97 3.31 1951-613.72 3.50 3.05 1.65 -4.05 -11.62 1961-714.29 2.93 2.65 1.67 -1.14 -2.32 1971-814.34

(3.46) 4.43 (3.09)

2.69 (3.33)

2.43 (3.00)

1.64 (3.15)

5.05 (3.90)

1981-913.84 (2.96)

2.38 (2.75)

2.26 (2.59)

1.02 (2.50)

-0.13 (2.62)

-2.45 (3.64)

1991-013.42 (2.76)

1.76 (2.37)

2.15 (2.27)

1.64 (2.19)

1.93 (2.22)

0.80 (3.26)

Note: 1. Size class wise figures exclude Assam in 1981 and Jammu & Kashmir in 1991 2. All classes exclude six towns in 1941, four each in 1931 and 1921 and two

each in 1911 and 1901 of Goa, which could not be assigned to any size class as their population for these years is not available. Total number of towns therefore would not match with the figures of Table 1.

3. The growth rates for towns in a size category have been computed by taking the population in the category in the base and terminal year, without considering the change in the number of towns therein. The figures in brackets however computed by taking only the population of the towns that belonged to a category, both for base and terminal years.

Source: Paper-2, Rural-Urban Distribution, 1981,1991. For 2001, unpublished data from website.

28

Table 3c: Annual Exponential Growth Rates of Population in Different Categories of Urban Centres 1981-91 1991-2001 Class I cities 2.96 2.76 Metro cities 3.25 2.88 Capital cities 3.36 2.79 Common towns (excluding New and declassified towns)

2.83 2.56

Total urban growth 3.09 2.73 Note: The population growth rates in the first three rows have been computed using the base year population for classification of cities

Table 4: Pattern of Level of Urbanisation and Growth of Urban Population Across States/UTs Percentage urban populationAnnual exponential

growth rate Sl. N.States 1971 1981 1991 2001 1971-811981-911991-011 Andhra Prad. 19.31 23.25 26.84 27.08 3.94 3.55 1.37 2 Arunachal Prad.3.70 6.32 12.21 20.41 8.32 9.28 7.00 3 Assam 8.82 9.88 11.09 12.72 3.29 3.29 3.09 4 Bihar 10.00 12.46 13.17 10.47 4.34 2.65 2.57 5 Chattisgarh NA NA NA 20.08 NA NA 3.09 6 Delhi 89.70 92.84 89.93 93.01 4.56 3.79 4.14 7 Goa 26.44 32.46 41.02 49.77 4.37 3.96 3.32 8 Gujarat 28.08 31.08 34.40 37.35 3.42 2.90 2.8 9 Haryana 17.66 21.96 24.79 29.00 4.65 3.58 4.11 10 Himachal Prad.6.99 7.72 8.70 9.79 3.02 3.11 2.81 11 Jammu & Kas. 18.59 21.05 22.76 24.88 3.80 3.44 3.44 12 Jharkhand NA NA NA 22.25 NA NA 2.55 13 Karnataka 24.31 28.91 30.91 33.98 4.08 2.55 2.53 14 Kerala 16.24 18.78 26.44 25.97 3.19 4.76 0.74 15 Madhya Prad. 16.29 20.31 23.21 26.67 4.45 3.71 2.71 16 Maharashtra 31.17 35.03 38.73 42.4 3.35 3.27 2.95 17 Manipur 13.19 26.44 27.69 23.88 9.70 2.98 1.21 18 Meghalaya 14.55 18.03 18.69 19.63 4.87 3.10 3.16 19 Mizoram 11.36 25.17 46.2 49.5 11.79 9.57 3.27 20 Nagaland 9.95 15.54 17.28 17.74 8.49 5.58 5.27 21 Orissa 8.41 11.82 13.43 14.97 5.21 3.08 2.61 22 Punjab 23.73 27.72 29.72 33.95 3.62 2.55 3.19 23 Rajasthan 17.63 20.93 22.88 23.38 4.52 3.31 2.71 24 Sikkim 9.37 16.23 9.12 11.1 9.55 -3.23 4.83

29

25 Tamil Nadu 30.26 32.98 34.2 43.86 2.45 1.76 3.56 26 Tripura 10.43 10.98 15.26 17.02 3.26 6.19 2.53 27 Uttar Prad. 14.02 18.01 19.89 20.78 4.78 3.27 2.84 28 Uttaranchal NA NA NA 25.59 NA NA 2.84 29 West Bengal 24.75 26.49 27.39 28.03 2.75 2.54 1.84 Union

Teritorries

1 Andaman & Nico.22.77 26.36 26.8 32.67 6.38 4.10 4.40 2 Chandigarh 90.55 93.6 89.69 89.78 5.92 3.07 3.40 3 Dadra & Nagar H.0 6.67 8.47 22.89 -- 5.28 14.59 4 Daman & Diu -- -- 46.86 36.26 -- 4.93 1.87 5 Lakshadweep 0 46.31 56.29 44.47 -- 4.46 -0.77 6 Pondicherry 42.04 52.32 64.05 66.57 4.66 4.92 2.26 All India 20.22 23.73 25.72 27.78 3.79 3.09 2.73 Note: (a) The figures for the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh for the seventies and eighties pertain to the undivided states as existed during that time. The figures for the nineties are, however, for the new states and hence these figures are not temporally comparable. (b) In the absence of the Census data for total and urban population for the year 1981 in case of Assam, the urban and total population growth rates have been assumed to be constant during seventies and eighties. The same has been assumed for eighties and nineties for Jammu and Kashmir. The percentage of urban population have been arrived for Assam (1981) and Jammu and Kashmir (1991) based on these assumptions. (c) Goa in 1971 and 1981 (*) corresponds to Goa, Daman and Diu. Source: Population Census, Paper 2, 1981, 1991 and 2001.

30

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------, Lalitha, N. and Arora, S. (2001): "Growth Dynamics opf Informal Manufacturing Sector in Urban India: An Analysis of Interdependencies, in Kundu, A. and Sharma, A. N. (eds.), Informal Sector in India, Institute of Human Development, New Delhi

------ and Gupta, S. (2000): "Declining Population Mobility, Liberalisation and Growing Regional Imbalances - The Indian Case" in Kundu, A. (ed.), Inequality, Mobility and Urbanisation, Indian Council of Social Science research and Manak Publications, New Delhi

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