impacts of demographics on citizen’s access to information: an empirical study of district dera...

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Impacts of Demographics on Citizen’s Access

to Information: An Empirical Study of District

Dera Ismail Khan, North Western Frontier

Province, Pakistan

Najeebullah Khan, Bahadar Shah and Allah Nawaz

Department of Public Administration, Gomal University, Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP, Pakistan

The impact of demographic dimensions on local government behavior is well identified, analyzed

and documented at the global level. Likewise, several studies are available on developing countries,

but empirical evidence on the conditions of Pakistan is lacking. This study is an effort to unearth

empirical evidence on access to information in the local government system exemplifying data from

the district Dera Ismail Khan (DIK), North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). Most global

hypotheses for developing countries are accepted in this study but the statistics on local data are

far more different in terms of the value and weight of variables, relationships and impacts on the

research concepts. The most dominant concept in the impact of access to information on the local

government system is ‘‘education for all.’’ Mass education is a leading concept in making or break-

ing the role of people participation in the success or failure of local democracies. Data show that

illiteracy is causing many problems, including the mass population’s unawareness of their interests

and duties at the public level, thereby giving the ruling elite a free hand in exploiting public

resources for self-interest, at the cost of the public good.

Keywords access to information; demographics; impacts; local government; Pakistan

doi:10.1111/j.1753-1411.2008.00011.x

Introduction

It is widely recognized that access to information is an essential feature of a democratic

political system, as Noble, Mark, Rod, and Martin (2005) state, ‘‘the public release of

performance information is also seen internationally as an important lever to improve

service quality.’’ The disclosure of information is justified on the grounds that it promotes

an efficient market economy through informed consumer choice, ensures visible account-

ability of provider and purchaser organizations and encourages quality improvement. In

the absence of information, subordinate classes are less able to express their interests in

an autonomous way and, as D. Rueschmeyer argues, oligarchic interests may dominate

politics and oppose democratization or roll back democracy where it exists, no matter

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Professor Najeebullah Khan, Department of Public

Administration, Gomal University, Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP, Pakistan. Email: [email protected]

Asian Social Work and Policy Review 2 (2008) 81–90

� 2008 The Authors

Journal compilation � 2008 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 81

how densely organized civil society is (Rueschmeyer, 1998). The degree of equality in

access to information can have important equity and efficiency effects. If one demo-

graphic group, for example, is more politically active than another, parties and politicians

are likely to cater to this group’s interests more, and policies will deliver more benefits to

this group than to others. Biased access to information can also create economic distor-

tions if politicians divert resources to specific groups of more active citizens (Benabou,

2000; Rodriguez, 1998).

The main objective of this paper is to test the socio-economic biases in access to infor-

mation. Although there is well-developed literature on how institutions and political

practices may distort the transmission of citizens’ preferences into policy outcomes

(Panizza, 2001), there is little empirical evidence to determine how the expressed prefer-

ences themselves might be biased. The existing literature concentrates on the politics of

interest groups and on the various factors that affect the efficacy of collective action by

citizens (Becker, 1983), but little has been said about the demographics of access to infor-

mation. The core of this paper focuses on how access to information in Pakistan varies

with demographics.

Literature review

The Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing Government, held in Seoul on May 24–27,

2005, was organized by the government of the Republic of Korea with the support of the

United Nations. Transparency was one of the major themes of the forum. Transparency

means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be

affected by decisions and that enough information is provided in easily understandable

forms and media. This requires that decisions are made and enforced in a manner that

follows rules and regulations. The word ‘‘transparency’’ carries with it a powerful array

of moral and political associations, including honesty, guilelessness and openness (Kim,

John, Namshin, Cheol, & Angela, 2005).

Transparent governance implies an openness of the governance system through

clear processes and procedures and easy access to public information for citizens.

Access to information on the action and performance of government is critical for

the promotion of government accountability. Unless the public knows what goods

and services have been provided by the government, how well they are provided, who

the beneficiaries are, and how much they cost, they can not demand effective govern-

ment. Also the central government needs to be able to monitor the performance of

local governments.

To promote overall government accountability, government budgets and expenditure

programs need to be disclosed to the public to recognize their right to know how tax reve-

nues are spent. Many decentralizing countries have weak or inadequate citizens to moni-

tor the actions of local governments. In some cases the monitoring task is further

complicated by the broadly applied official secret act.

Another mechanism that potentially promotes transparency, and thereby account-

ability, is the periodic public sector audit. Despite the utility of this mechanism, however,

in the best-governed countries in most parts of the world, making the audit a useful tool

Najeebullah Khan et al. Impacts of Demographics on Access to Information


82 Journal compilation � 2008 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd

of good governance is a tall order. Common practices include an exclusively paper audit

(without spot-checks to verify audit information), the lack of any sanction for late sub-

mission of accounts and the prohibition of any release of audit information to the public.

As a result, audits have in several countries become yet another control point attracting

bribe and favors and audit findings are routinely buried. The existence in audit systems

of the physical audit (spot-check) requirement, sanctions for late submission and making

audit reports available to the public, or at least to an independent body capable of identi-

fying problems, is critical for restraining corruption.

Government contracting and procurement procedures play a major role in public

service provision, and also account for a significant share of resource leakage and cor-

ruption. The provision of goods, services and infrastructure to regions and communi-

ties at a distance from the capital poses special problems of information and

monitoring. These challenges include the potential for bid rigging and collusion,

manipulation of engineering specifications, over invoicing or undersupply of material

and output, the exploitation of planning overlaps and wholesale diversion of centrally

budgeted funds. Administrative oversight and audit can help to restrain corruption in

this area, but these are frequently weak and often compromised. The detailed release

of information to parliamentary committees and the general public is a necessary con-

dition for integrity here.

The media, both print and broadcast, can act as an external promoter of government

transparency and accountability by disseminating information about government action.

How effectively the media do this job depends upon the degree to which they are indepen-

dent. Laws and regulations, such as freedom of information laws, also influence the inde-

pendence of the media. These laws curb the ability of politicians to subjectively determine

what information to provide to the public. Citizens are given the legal right of access to

government documents without having to first prove special interest, and the burden of

justifying non-disclosure falls on the government.

Decentralization is considered as one method to promote transparency and reduce

corruption in the government (Nupia, 2006). As one author stressed, ‘‘decentralized

bodies in comparison to national governments, are more accessible, more sympathetic

and quicker to respond to local needs’’ (Faguet & Fabio, 2006).

The practical experiences of decentralized societies, however, show mixed results

regarding the level of transparency at local level. Manor (1996) based his work in India

and Africa and concludes that considerable increases in information flow between gov-

ernments and citizens, enhancing transparency and accountability (Faguet & Fabio,

2006). Similarly, Blair (2000) argues that the major promise of democratic decentraliza-

tion is that by building popular participation and accountability into local governance,

government at the local level will become more responsive to citizens desires and more

effective in service delivery.

In Colombia, to review their experience, the World Bank and the Colombian Govern-

ment conducted 16 case studies. It was found that accountability and transparency

showed a distinct improvement in local government performance (World Bank, 1995).

Whereas, other authors, such as Nygren (2005), Anderson (2004), McCarty (2004),




World Bank (2004) and the Commonwealth Foundation (1999) reported limited trans-

parency and accountability and are more cautious, arguing broadly that decentralization

is more complex, problematic phenomenon.

May and Baker (2001) found that in Uganda generally financial management, pro-

curement and audit systems were weak and decentralization had exacerbated this,

‘‘due to chronic shortage of qualified accountants at all levels of government’’ (May

and Baker, 2001). Of 45 districts the accounts of only one for 1999 ⁄2000 were in the

final stages of preparation, and none had been audited. They also reported that ‘‘inter-

nal audit sections were weak and tended to open the ways of corruption and creating

opportunities for the enrichment of elite.’’ Similarly Commonwealth Foundation

(1999) comments that citizens in both North and South Uganda express growing dis-

illusionment with their governments – citing a lack of responsiveness, transparency,

abuse of discretion, corruption, favoritism and weak accountability on the part of

public officials and bureaucrats.

Sometimes non-political factors like poverty and illiteracy were made responsible

for these failures. It is recognized, though in a limited manner, that a citizen’s access

to information varies significantly with the varying demographic characteristics of the

people (see for example, Luthans, 2002; Verba, Kay, & Henry, 1995). There are a

number of demographic characteristics contributing to such diversity. The most

widely recognized involve gender, class, education, income, location and ethnicity

(Luthans, 2002). The local level of government is frequently conquered by power

politics, as highlighted by Crook and Manor (1998) and Azfar, Satu, Anthony, and

Patrick (1999) who suggest that local governments are too susceptible to elite capture,

and too lacking in technical, human and financial resources to be able to produce

such a range of public services that are both reasonably efficient and responsive to

local demand.

Research methods

Subjects

The study made use of the survey method to collect the primary data. The survey was

conducted in the Dera Ismail Khan (DIK) district of North West Frontier Province

(NWFP), Pakistan. The target population of the study included the total number of regis-

tered voters of the Dera Ismail Khan district. The formula for finite population was used

to compute the sample size for each population category. The population was made up

of 420,002 voters and 456 councilors. In the social sciences, a 95% confidence level is

usable, which equals 1.96 z-values. Table 1 details the whole sampling procedural appli-

cations and results.

Of the respondents, 68.6% were male and 31.4% female; 60.7% were voters and

39.3% were councillors; 26.2% belong to an urban area, 19.9% belong to an urban-

cum-rural area and 53.9% belong to a deep rural area; 14.3% were rich people and

85.7% were poor people (monthly income of less than Rs 5000). The elite accounted

for 46.8%, and 53.2% were non-elite; 21.1% were highly educated, 36.1% were edu-

cated and 42.9% were uneducated people.




Measures

The survey for the general public and local representatives consisted of 27 questions each.

The survey was divided into two sections. The first section included six demographic

questions that established gender, qualification, income, profession, union council and

address. The second section included twenty-one statements, which determined the meet-

ing of the representatives and government officials, provision of necessary information,

detail of expenditure and displaying public information. Likert five-point scales were

used as responses with one indicating strong disagreement, two indicating disagreement,

three neutrality, four agreement and five strong agreement.

The database was then created. The database was analyzed using SPSS software

(SPSS Inc, Chicago, USA) to run the following programs: t-test and ANOVA analyses.

All differences are significant at P<0.05 levels unless indicated otherwise.

Results

The rich people reported greater access to information. The t-test comparing the

responses of rich people with the poor people (see Table 2) revealed that there is a signifi-

cant difference in the mean scores for the statement, ‘‘representatives regularly meet and

inform the people about policies and strategies.’’ The mean for the rich people was 3.46,

which was significantly higher than the mean of 2.72 for the poor people, indicating

greater access to information of wealthier citizens. The rich people also have a signifi-

cantly higher level of agreement (M=3.64) than the poor people (M=2.46) to the

statement, ‘‘representatives provide detail of developmental ⁄non-developmental expendi-

ture.’’ Furthermore, the rich have a significantly higher level of agreement (M=3.49)

than the poor people (M=2.59) to the statement, ‘‘representatives inform the people

about sanctioned schemes.’’ The responses to the statement, ‘‘district government dis-

plays public information’’ again yielded higher means (M=2.64) for the rich people than

the means (M=2.48) for the poor people.

There were also differences between the responses of men and women (see Table 3).

The mean responses of men and women indicated that women were significantly less sat-

isfied with meeting and informing the people about strategies and policies than the men.

Men have significantly higher level of agreement (M=3.26) than the women (M=2.84)

to the statement, ‘‘representatives provide detail of developmental ⁄non-developmental

expenditure.’’ The difference in means between genders to the statement, ‘‘representatives

Table 1 Sample sizes for three groups of population

PSn SD SE N Sampling procedure n

General public 45 0.65 0.097 420,002 [r2 ⁄ ((E2 ⁄Z2)+(r2 ⁄N))] 170

Representatives 35 0.80 0.137 656 110

Govt. servants 20 0.74 0.185 450 56

Total (n) of pilot study 100 Total (N)= 4,21,108 Total (n)= 336

N, number; n, sample size of study; Psn, pilot sample size; SD, standard deviation; SE, standard

error.




inform the people about sanctioned schemes’’ was also significant. Women (M=2.36)

expressed greater disagreement with the statement than did men (M=3.17). Further-

more, the mean responses of men and women to the statement ‘‘district government dis-

play public information’’ indicate that men (M=3.02) had a significantly higher degree

of agreement than females (M=2.25).

The results for the t-test comparing responses for those who were elite to those who

were not (see Table 4) revealed a significant difference in response to the statement, ‘‘rep-

resentatives provides detail of developmental ⁄non-developmental expenditure.’’ The elite

(M=3.12) agreed more strongly than those who were non-elite (M=2.49). Further t-test

results show a significant difference in explaining the representative’s attitude to inform-

ing the people about sanctioned schemes. The elite strongly supported this statement

(M=3.12) compared to the non-elite who showed their disagreement (M=2.58). The

elite agreed more strongly (M=3.15) than the non-elite (M=2.47) with the statement

that ‘‘district government displays public information,’’ and although both groups agreed

with the statement ‘‘representatives regularly meet and inform the people about policies

and strategies,’’ the elite again scored highly (M=3.02).

Table 3 t-Test comparing responses of male (Group 1) and female (Group 2)

Statements Group 1

mean

Group 2

mean

t-Score

Representatives regularly meet & inform the people

about policies & strategies

3.26 2.84 5.988*

Representatives provide detail of developmental ⁄nondevelopmental expenditure

3.01 2.22 6.450*

Representatives inform the people about sanctioned

schemes

3.17 2.36 6.505*

District government display public information 3.02 2.25 6.448*

*P<0.000. Scale: 1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree.

Table 2 t-Test comparing responses of rich people (Group 1) and poor people (Group 2)

Statements Group 1

mean

Group 2

mean

t-Score



3.46 2.72 3.309*

Representatives provide detail of developmental

& non developmental expenditure

3.64 2.46 10.572*


schemes

3.49 2.59 8.099*






Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to analyze the effect of education on

the participation level of the people. The education level was shown to affect the

responses. The ANOVA analysis, which compared the responses given by highly edu-

cated, educated and uneducated respondents, indicated that the highly educated and edu-

cated people gave more positive responses than the uneducated (see Table 5). Highly

educated and educated with respective means of 3.30 and 2.69, had significantly

(P < 0.034) higher scores in response to ‘‘representatives regularly meet and inform the

people about policies and strategies’’ than the uneducated, with mean of 2.49. This trend

towards highly educated and educated answering more positively than uneducated con-

tinued. Highly educated and educated people gave responses, which indicated signifi-

cantly higher level for meeting, information, detail of expenditure and displaying

information than their counterparts.

Discussion

Some research studies show that local governments have considerably increased their

level of transparency (Besley, Pande, & Rao, 2005; Blair, 2000; Foster & Rosenzweig,

2001; Manor, 1996), while many others (Commonwealth Foundation, 1999; World Bank,

2004) report limited transparency.

Table 4 t-Test comparison responses of elites (Group 1) and non-elites (Group 2)

Statements Group 1

mean

Group 2

mean

t-Score



3.02 2.84 0.891

Representatives provides detail of developmental

& non developmental expenditure

3.12 2.49 5.756*


schemes

3.12 2.58 4.994*



Table 5 Analysis of variance by qualification

Statements Mean of highly

educated

Mean of

educated

Mean of

uneducated

Overall

mean

Meeting 3.30** 2.69** 2.49** 2.93**

Information 3.35* 2.64* 2.53* 2.85*

Detail of expenditure 3.34* 2.62* 2.42* 2.80*

Displaying information 3.45* 2.59* 2.37* 2.81*

*P<0.000; **P<0.034.




The findings of this study also support limited transparency. The average for trans-

parency is 2.59 on the five-point scale (output not presented), with poor systems of checks

and balances, auditing, monitoring and lack of proper implementation suggested as the

main reasons for this limited transparency. The general public and government represen-

tatives are different with their perception of the prevalence of transparency of the local

government system in DIK. No doubt, the new system aimed to provide the well-

described mechanisms of transparency with systems of checks and balances and monitor-

ing, declaring the right of information and by binding the district government to display

public information, but the average of transparency (2.59) depicts a reality that has not

achieved this aim.

Furthermore, the findings of the study suggest that the poor (and less privileged) are

less satisfied with the degree and process of information access, which is proven by the

research (see Table 2) and by the following example. In this case, the researcher visited

the office of the District Officer (D.O.) of social welfare several times, to get the list of regis-

tered Citizen’s Community Boards (CCB), but failed. If an educated person faces problems

in such a petty matter, the question is raised of what would be the position of a layman?

It is well reported that the, the elites’ access to information (Dasgupta & Victoria,

2007) is very powerful. Similarly, educated members of the community are the better

users of public information than the less educated or illiterate.

Research also shows that female councillors have a passive attitude in respect to pay-

ing visits to local offices, resulting in limited access to information (Bari, 2000; Khan,

2004), which is proven by this research. The impacts of location, however, on access to

information have not been found in the study.

Conclusions

The impacts of demographic variables on different aspects of local government, and par-

ticularly ‘‘access to information,’’ is well documented, with mounting evidence on the

positive as well as negative implications of the statistical relationships between the con-

cept of access to information and the background variables of the respondents. It is, how-

ever, notable that given the extreme social, political, economic and educational

conditions of developing countries, the impacts on access to information in local govern-

ments are imbalanced due to demographic variations.

The history of local government systems in Pakistan reveals that the implementation

problems are more disturbing, and thus demanding, than the structural or resource related

issues. It is demographic changes which are required to bring modifications in the attitude of

the politicians, general public and the government officers. Access to information is what

guarantees many things in local government including accountability of the governing

authorities. But a major hurdle to this is the high level of illiteracy among the mass popula-

tion, which prevents them from taking adequate part in local government affairs.

Education creates both political awareness and the understanding of individual,

group and community interests. Access to information in activities which are perceived

to be necessary for efficient accountability emerge through widespread education of the




citizens. Pakistan is making unprecedented efforts, particularly visible during the last dec-

ade, by heavily funding educational institutions. Most of the attention, however, is on

higher education while access to information is more related to ‘‘education for all,’’ and

is irrespective of higher education and investments in information and communication

technologies.

No doubt, there is an acute need for peoples’ education and training in accessing and

using publicly available information for their individual and greater public good. How-

ever, parallel efforts are required to reconsider the government strategies for the purpose,

as well as the role of non-government organizations (NGO) in public awareness and the

availability of public facilities for people to access facts and figures about local govern-

ment performance. For example, NGOs like VEER and NEW KIRAN are working in

collaboration with the district government by arranging seminars wherein government

officers, NGO workforce and members of the general public sit together to discuss and

determine robust measures to increase public access to information by developing con-

sensus strategies.

It is therefore, suggested that the occurrence of this collaborative practice of tripartite

meetings be increased in frequency, with continuous reshuffling of the old strategies and

development of new work patterns for the purpose. Furthermore, the role of the media in

accessing the rural masses should be utilized by the government and other related agen-

cies to inform people, particularly through radio and public meetings, with a predefined

objective of providing information to the less privileged who cannot access public infor-

mation because of physical and behavioral inabilities.

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