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The Strategic Impasse in Low-

Intensity Conflicts: The Gap

Between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics

During the Al-Aqsa IntifadaSergio CatignaniaDepartment of War Studies, King's College, London

Available online: 24 Jan 2007

To cite this article:Sergio Catignani (2005): The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity

Conflicts: The Gap Between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics During the

Al-Aqsa Intifada , Journal of Strategic Studies, 28:1, 57-75

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The Strategic Impasse in

Low-Intensity Conflicts:The Gap Between Israeli

Counter-Insurgency Strategy andTactics During the Al-Aqsa

Intifada

SERGIO CATIGNANI

Department of War Studies, Kings College London

ABSTRACT Over the past 15 years Israel has been involved in a bitter counter-insurgency campaign against the Palestinians. Palestinian insurgency, particu-larly during the current Al-Aqsa Intifada, has posed serious challenges to theIsrael Defence Forces (IDF). Whilst being able to adapt successfully its tactics toPalestinian terror and urban guerrilla warfare in order to reduce the level ofPalestinian violence, the IDF has not been able to achieve a battlefield decision orvictory. This has been due to the nature of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, whichultimately necessitates the provision of a political solution by the Israeli politicalleadership, which has relied too often on the IDF as a panacea for its ownstrategic and political indecisiveness vis-a-vis the Palestinian national question.

KEYWORDS: Intifada, Israel, Counter-insurgency

Introduction

During the past 15 years Israel has strategically and tacticallyresponded to local Palestinian insurgency, which has evolved fromcivil disobedience to outright terrorism and guerrilla warfare,particularly following the now-defunct Oslo peace process. Indeed,over the past 15 years the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) has tried totransform its conventional army and adopt low-intensity urban warfare

strategies and tactics against violent rioters, guerrilla fighters and

Correspondence Address: Sergio Catignani, Department of War Studies, Kings CollegeLondon, 138-142 Strand, London, WC2R 1HH. E-mail: [email protected]

The Journal of Strategic StudiesVol. 28, No. 1, 57 75, February 2005

ISSN 0140-2390 Print/ISSN 1743-937X Online/05/010057-19 # 2005 Taylor & Francis Group LtdDOI: 10.1080/01402390500032054

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terrorists. This has been particularly the case during the current Al-Aqsa Intifada, which began in September 2000.1

Notwithstanding the extensive and successful innovations in tactics,weaponry and training adopted in response to Palestinian attacks, thepolitical nature of low-intensity insurgencies and, thus, the inherentstrategic restraint imposed by the Israeli political echelons decision toconduct low-intensity warfare ad nauseam without seriously providingan alternative political resolution to the current IsraeliPalestinianconflict, have prevented the IDF from imposing a clear battlefielddecision. Thus, the IDF has been unable to achieve strategic successduring the past four years of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict despite theIsraeli political leaderships belief that the IDF could achieve suchobjectives on its own.

Despite the enormous difficulties in fighting Palestinian terror andguerrilla elements within the villages and cities of the West Bank andGaza Strip, the IDF has managed to develop significant tactical andtechnological solutions to the Palestinian terrorist and insurgent threat,albeit occasionally at the cost of collateral damage and cases ofexcessive force vis-a-vis the Palestinian civilian population. Suchtactical success, moreover, cannot yield strategic dividends withoutgreater political and strategic direction from the Israeli politicalechelon. Whether or not such tactical successes will be used by the

political echelons to arrive at a strategic solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is to be seen, especially in light of the Israeliperception that there is no serious political negotiator on thePalestinian side.

Strategy

Strategy involves the employment of military forces to achieve aspecific political goal. Since war is an instrument of politics, limited

political aims result in the definition of limited war aims.2

However,the use of conventional strategy to low-intensity type conflicts hasalways been difficult. The intermingling with enemy forces, mixingwith the civilian population, and extreme dispersion have signifi-cantly challenged conventional armies particularly within the urbanarena of warfare.3

As shall be seen in the following sections, the IDF has struggled todeal with Palestinian insurgency since the end of the 1980s. Eventhough the IDF has adapted its tactics, particularly since the late 1990s,

to face Palestinian threats head-on within their towns, villages andrefugee camps, it has been unable to attain a battlefield decision in theIsraeliPalestinian conflict. In fact, such a goal is unattainable: astrategic doctrine that is geared towards linear conventional threats and

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that has clear parameters for what constitutes battlefield decision andvictory cannot be applied to insurgencies, which for the most part, mustbe resolved politically. Before elaborating such an argument, though,the article will first look briefly at Israels strategic doctrine.

Israeli Security Strategy

Since the early 1950s,4 the IDF has customarily differentiated betweentwo types of military operations: bitachon shotef (current security)and bitachon yisodi (fundamental security). The former whichhas abbreviated usually to the term batash includes responses toterrorist attacks, retaliatory raids and border skirmishes; the latter tobig wars [i.e., conventional], real or potential.5 The Israeli strategic

doctrine has traditionally focused on fundamental security aspects dueto the greater nature of the threat stemming from a conventional waragainst Israel.

Hence, the basic assumptions underlying the Israeli strategicdoctrine, which has focused primarily on the Arab conventional threat,were:

(1) That Israel was and will continue to live in a hostile environment,hence, the belief that it was confronted with wars of no choice

(ein briera).(2) That Israel was involved in a conflict in which it finds itself

strategically inferior vis-a-vis its Arab enemies both in terms ofmanpower and resources.

(3) That no matter how decisive results on the battlefield were, Israelwould never be able to achieve complete strategic victory.

Hence, Israels general strategic goal has always been that ofmaintaining the status quo by deterring major attacks against it. The

exception in applying such a strategic goal occurred unsuccessfully inthe 1982 Lebanon War when force was not used only to root out thePalestinian Liberation Organizations terror infrastructure in SouthLebanon, but also to establish a friendly Lebanese governmentcontrolled by the Christian Maronite minority.

In the case of the outbreak of a conflict, returning to the status quoante would be achieved through the attainment of a swift battlefielddecision, which as Avi Kober points out, is not synonymous withvictory. In fact,

battlefield decision can be defined in terms of negating the othersides combat capability, victory can be defined in terms of thecorrelation between what each adversary defines as its political

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and military war objectives . . . and what it actually succeeds inachieving during that war.6

That is, battlefield decision in the Israeli case can be equated todeterrence by denial: once war is imminent or has broken out, thedefending armed forces will try to disrupt as quickly as possible theaggressors military capability by attacking and disrupting the enemyscentre of gravity.

Indeed, the three pillars of Israeli strategic doctrine have beendeterrence, early warning, and the winning of a decisive [battlefield]victory.7 As stated above, the Israeli strategic doctrine has mostlyfocused on the conventional threat due to the fact that the Israelipolitical and military leadership have always seen it as an existential

threat. Nonetheless, the three pillars of the Israeli strategic doctrinewere called into question in light of the 1973 Yom Kippur War8 andhave proven difficult to put into operation since the Lebanon War whendealing already with low-intensity type operations, which haveincreased over the past 20 years. In fact, Israels deterrence policybased on reprisals vis-a-vis sub-conventional threats and guerrilla orterrorist forces has served as a means of redress, but has not, generallyprevented recurrence of the provocation.9

Despite the IDFs traditional focus on the conventional threat in

terms of strategy, order of battle, manpower policy and training, theIDF has been for the most part involved in current security operationsparticularly since the first Intifada (198793). Whereas at thebeginning of the first Intifada, IDF and other security forces such astheShabak(General Security Services, GSS) were involved in anti-riot,policing operations and arrests, towards the end of the first Intifadaand particularly during the Oslo peace process (19932000), the IDFwas used increasingly in counter-terror and counter-guerrilla opera-tions.

Moreover, with the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September2000, the IDF has been in constant operational use against terrorist andarmed guerrilla fighters many of which were trained, equipped andmobilized paradoxically under the auspices of the Oslo peace process inorder to to guarantee public order and internal security.10 Over thepast 20 years, the IDF has also been involved increasingly in routinepolicing and anti-riot measures some of which have had a preventativefunction, such as the widespread creation of checkpoints and theextensive use of military patrols. However, the IDF has also resorted to

measures that, although tactically effective, have had more of a punitivepurpose and negative strategic results, such as the imposition of wide-ranging closures of the Occupied Territories and the enforcement ofprotracted curfews within Palestinian cities, towns and villages

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considered to be either hotbeds of Palestinian militancy or outrightterror. The practice of demolishing the houses belonging to terrorists orto their closest relatives has also been considered successful by the IDFas a deterrent for other terrorist attacks in spite of the censure expressedby human rights organizations, by the European Union and other statesas well as by Israels closest ally, the US.

Nonetheless, many others have stated that such collective measureshave not had much of a deterrent effect, but have actually galvanizedthe Palestinian population. For example, Zuhair Kurdi, a journalistwith Hebrons Al Amal TV station, has stated somewhat rhetoricallythat, the legal father of the suicide bomber is the Israeli checkpoint,whilst his mother is the house demolition.11

In spite of the pervasive use of IDF personnel and materiel as well as

the growing threat and lethality of Palestinian terror and guerrillaoperations within Israel and the Occupied Territories, the IDF has notbeen able to address strategically the predominant and relatively newlow-intensity dynamic of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Some Israelimilitary (e.g., the former Chief of Staff [COS] and current DefenseMinister Shaul Mofaz and current COS Lieutenant-General MosheYaalon) and political leaders (e.g., Prime Minister Ariel Sharon) havecome to define as existential threats that which were regardedtraditionally as current security threats (i.e., terror, guerrilla and riot

violence).In June 2000, for example, then Coordinator of Operations in the

Territories, Major-General Amos Gilad, declared that the purpose ofthe IDFs campaign was to reduce the level of terror, which in the scopeand depth of its damage has become a strategic threat, with the firstsigns of threatening our existence in terms of our quality of life.12

There has not been, however, a major shift in the IDFs strategicapproach vis-a-vis low-intensity-type conflict scenarios and the beliefthat it could impose a battlefield decision or even obtain victory was

shared initially by top officers of the IDF General Staff. Thus, COSYaalon in the most widely-read daily newspaper, Yediot Ahronot,stated in August 2002 for example that, the only solution [to the Al-Aqsa Intifada] is to achieve an unequivocal victory over thePalestinians and that such a victory would not come at a low priceor immediately.13

In fact, Israels conventional strategic goal of maintaining the statusquo through deterrent retaliatory or pre-emptive measures has beenerroneously applied to the contemporary IsraeliPalestinian conflict.

Whereas in the past maintaining the status quo through deterrence wasgeared towards the conventional threat and, hence, towards theavoidance of a major conventional attack by Israels neighboringstates, which could have threatened its existence, today Israels

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ability in providing effective short-term tactical solutions to all forms ofPalestinian violence.

IDF Tactical and Technical InnovationsThe IDF, in fact, has been able to prepare and respond tactically to thevarious Palestinian threats used against Israeli civilians and soldiers,particularly since the mid- to late 1990s when the Oslo peace processwas quickly degenerating into tit-for-tat low-intensity skirmishes andwhich eventually erupted in September 2000 into a full-scale guerrillaand terror campaign. According to then COS Shaul Mofaz, this wasdue to the fact that we prepared the military for this confrontation. Wetrained and bought equipment for low-intensity conflict.17 Prepara-

tions, in fact, had started soon after the September 1996 riots. ColonelGal Hirsh stated that in early 1997 then COS Amnon Lipkin-Shahakhad told him: We must prepare for war and continue with the peaceprocess; go there and help General Itzhak Eitan, who was the Chief ofthe Central Command [i.e., the area responsible for security in the WestBank], help him to prepare units for war.18

Despite the rhetoric of such men, Israels actual preparedness for thereality of urban warfare involving a very hostile, well-armed group ofterrorist-guerrillas entrenched in an extremely complex built-up and

densely populated battleground was severely tested. For example,Operation Defensive Shield which was initiated in April 2002 inresponse to the late-March Passover Massacre suicide bomb attack,19

was the first major Israeli urban warfare operation to be carried outsince the siege of Beirut in 1982. Operation Defensive Shield wasinitiated in order to seize weapons, arrest terrorists and their supportnetwork, destroy weapons factories and suicide bomb workshops andkill suicide bombers. The IDF encountered significant resistance in mostPalestinian West Bank cities it entered (e.g., Qalqiliya, Nablus and Tul

Karem), but encountered especially stiff opposition in the Jenin refugeecamp where 15,000 poverty-stricken civilians packed into 600 squareyards.

Around 300 Palestinian guerrilla fighters affiliated to the variousPalestinian terrorist organizations (i.e., the PLO-affiliated Al-AqsaMartyrs Brigade, Force-17 and Fatah Tanzim, as well as PalestinianIslamicJihadand Hamas) were involved in the battle of Jenin. Snipers,mines and booby-traps were literally everywhere: inside cupboards,under sinks, inside sofas, in cars and dumpsters. On one street alone,

an Israeli [D-9] bulldozer detonated 124 explosive charges, someweighing as much as 250 pounds.20 Similar to other armies urbanwarfare doctrine, the Israeli army used in Jenin overwhelming numbers:there were approximately 100 soldiers for every Palestinian gunman.

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Intelligence

Not only did the Israeli army use overwhelming numbers, it also usedmost of its highly sophisticated weaponry and intelligence-gatheringcapabilities in order to maintain the initiative, something armiesentering urban theater of operations have always had trouble keeping,because of the high-tempo and level of confusion that urban battlefieldsusually create. Indeed, reiterating the importance of intelligence in theurban battlefield, IDF COS Yaalon stated at a recent internationalconference on low-intensity conflict warfare that, creating intelligencedominance is a critical factor for managing and dominating the low-intensity conflict. Qualitative intelligence provides the ability to realizemilitary power properly and precisely.21

Hence, the decision by the IDF General Staff to form in April 2000the Field Intelligence Corps, which includes combat intelligence-gathering units trained to gather tactical intelligence and to provide itin real-time to combat units during operations. This has enabledinformation, through the increasing digitization of its armed forces, togo faster to the troops and, in turn, has reduced the element of surprisefrom looming Palestinian attacks.22 Thus, despite the greater freedomthat IDF commanders and soldiers traditionally have had on thebattleground, the improvement in the command, control and commu-

nication systems has enhanced the IDFs ability to monitor groundoperations and provides real-time operational intelligence to groundtroops.

According to an AH-1S Cobra helicopter squadron commander,during the fighting the Israel Air Force kept four attack helicopters andtwo Searcher II reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)overhead at all times to ensure commanders knew where their troopson the ground were.23 Human intelligence was also provided byMistararavim (i.e., to become an Arab) units, who are trained to

blend in with the local population, gather operational intelligence andsometimes conduct targeted killings. More importantly and underliningformer GSS Chief Yaacov Peris conviction that there is no substitutefor a human source,24 the GSS had begun by the end of 2000 a largerecruitment drive for Palestinian collaborators given the fact that theiruse had diminished significantly since the start of the Oslo PeaceProcess.25 Such collaborators, in fact, have been put to good use,particularly in the targeted assassination of key terrorist leaders, such asHamas spiritual leader, Sheik Yassin and Hamas political leader

Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi in early 2004.Furthermore, attack helicopters very often were used to pinpoint andeliminate hostile forces either by using snipers or missile attacks. As oneSpecial Forces captain stated, for example, in Jenin I was in a

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helicopter above everything. I saw it happening. We were snipers; fromthe helicopter we were supposed to locate a certain area and eliminatehostile elements.26

Circumvention and Swarm Tactics

Such intelligence-gathering efforts, which were initiated weeks prior tothe IDFs entry into Jenin, were carried out in order to avoid mostarmies traditional urban infantry attrition approach tactics, wherebyoperations abide by the move, make contact, deploy, fire andmaneuver model (usually along a linear axis).27 The Israelis, on theother hand, were able to deploy out of contact with the enemy byselectively seizing small areas of the camp, drastically reducing

exposure to enemy fire and maintaining momentum by only clearingas necessary.28 This could be done only through the prior accumula-tion and analysis of field intelligence.

Various small-unit infantry, armor and air force task forcesswarmed around the Palestinian forces from all directions, thus,successfully integrating disparate units and proving their interoper-ability. Such swarm tactics especially managed to confuse Palestinianguerrilla fighters and terrorists. According to Colonel Gal Hirsh:

In one battle in the Nablus Kasbah in about 24 hours they lostmore than 80 of their gunmen and they never could identify wherewe were. We used the air force, combined forces and new fightinggroups. Even if they were inorganic forces, they became taskforces that knew how to fight together.29

The extensive use of tanks in major combat operations within urbanPalestinian areas since Operation Defensive Shield is due to the factthat the IDFs newest Merkava Mk.4 and upgraded versions of the

Merkava Mk.3 have been equipped with advanced communicationand battle management systems that enable individual tanks or verysmall groups of tank crews to operate autonomously for extendedperiods in conjunction with infantry units.30

When faced with dangerous alleyways full of booby-traps andsnipers, IDF forces used D-9 bulldozers to create alternative avenuesof approach within buildings, albeit at the cost of significant collateraldamage. Such circumvention and swarm tactics were particularlyused after 9 April when a suicide bomber detonated his explosive belt

in a courtyard where 13 IDF infantry soldiers were instantly killed.The need to avoid such targeted and lethal suicide bomb attacks aswell as heavy sniping against IDF personnel, led to such aninnovation.

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Since Operation Defensive Shield the IDF has also learnt that inorder to eliminate terror cells embedded in Palestinian towns andvillages, it does not have to show overwhelming force, due to the factthat such large-scale invasions into Palestinian areas createconsiderable international outcry and negative media exposure.31

The IDF has, in fact, learnt that low-signature operations often arenot only more effective, but also domestically and internationally lesscontroversial due to the stealth and rapidity with which they arecarried out.

Continuous Improvement of Training Capabilities

Despite the IDFs relative success, the number of both IDF and

Palestinian deaths was perceived as being too high.32 Thus, in order toobviate high casualty rates through better preparation and equipping,the IDF launched a multi-million dollar program in June 2002 toupgrade the IDFs Tzeelim National Training Center in the Negevdesert. The center provides Israeli soldiers with significantly betterurban warfare training facilities. The digital urban warfare center is, infact, modeled after Palestinian cities and provides various landscapes inorder to train the Israeli combat soldier for all types of contingencies. Itincludes a downtown area, rural village section, market area with

narrow alleys and urban outskirts. The center eventually will help trainaround 90,000 reservists as well as all conscript ground forces in urbanwarfare battle skills.33

The need to reduce cases of abuse by Israeli soldiers whilst carryingout security duties after Operation Defensive Shield, particularly atcheckpoints and roadblocks, has led to the development of an ethicaland operational code of behavior. Such a code, which is based on 11key rules of conduct, has been taught over the past two years to bothregular and reservist ground forces units. It provides extensive role-

playing exercises that deal with the dilemmas of how to operatesecurity checks on civilian and civilian property and, more im-portantly, with the dilemmas of what rules of engagement areacceptable within heavily populated civilian areas.34 This, however,has not eliminated all cases of misconduct given the fact that soldiersat checkpoints have occasionally abused Palestinians, albeit more as aresult of operational stress than malice.35 In any case, a specialCheckpoint Unit is being formed presently under the command of aLieutenant Colonel from the Military Police Corps This unit will be

trained in routine checks using advanced technological measures, inArabic and in civil rights issues in order to improve the conditions ofPalestinians trying to enter Israel and to reduce especially the timespent by Palestinians at checkpoints.36

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Avoiding Non-Combatant Casualties

Efforts at reducing the number of non-combatant deaths during thecurrentAl-Aqsa Intifada, while not sacrificing the protection of friendlyforces, have led to three major weapons development efforts. TheIsraeli Ministry of Defence has commissioned, for example, thedevelopment of a high-speed automatic anti-sniper gun, calledBeliever based on thermal imaging techonology37 as well as theCorner Shot non-line-of-sight weapon system, both of which aim toreduce the soldiers exposure to enemy fire.38 The IDF has,furthermore, purchased from Israel Military Industries a new infantryweapon system called Refaim, which enables the infantry soldier tolaunch grenades against targets beyond visual range. More importantly,

the rifle features a self-destruct mechanism to avoid post-battlecasualties.39

In order to avoid killing civilians when targeting Palestinian snipers,who often have used deliberately crowds of women and youthsupposedly demonstrating or rioting as their human shields, the IDFhas decided to equip not only trained snipers, but also regular infantrywith advanced optic sight scopes that have enhanced laser rangefindercapabilities.40

The IDF ground forces multi-year plan titled, Kela2008 [i.e., Shot

2008] is also under way. This plan will significantly expand the IDFsinfantry capability by adding five new light-infantry battalions, whichwill be based permanently in the Territories.41 Their permanentstationing in the Territories will increase their tactical knowledge ofthe urban terrain and of the civilian population. Such knowledge andthe greater number of infantry brigades will, in turn, reduce the stresssoldiers usually suffer in urban warfare operations due to the greaterturnover of rest periods that such soldiers will undergo. In fact, not onlyhas the reduction of stress reduced cases of IDF abuse vis-a-vis the

Palestinian population, but the ongoing connection with a singlespecific area . . . has greatly improved operational successes.42

Bitsuism

The reason for the IDFs successful provision of short-term tacticalinnovations and success can be ascribed to the organizational cultureand military tradition of the IDF, which has demonstrated at virtuallyevery level of war (except, perhaps, the highest: that of strategy) . . .

throughout its history a proclivity for the dashing, the unusual or thecreative solution to military problems.43 Indeed, within the IDF,preference for the pragmatic bitsuist(doer) over the reflective thinkerhas led to the IDFs tendency to focus its energies in current security

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problems often at the expense of long-term vision and innovation. Asone IDF organizational psychologist admitted recently in an interview:

When I got my education in the officers course, the most centralvalue that you are educated on is complete your task. Theresnothing more important than completing your task. Now, this isone of the ten principles of war: stick to your mission. But the fullcommandment is stick to your mission as long as it is directed tothe strategic goal. Remember the goal of the mission, the aim. ButIsrael tends to forget the second half.44

In fact, a typical aspect of the IDFs bitsuistorganizational culture isthe concentration of effort on pressing day-to-day problems whereby

commanders are not really troubled by the war to come, but findthemselves instead in a position where they want to be everywhere, todecide everything, to invest the maximum in whatever engages them.45

One battalion commander, for example, stated that in 2003 alone, heplanned and executed over 240 missions throughout the year.46

Such an operational tempo, clearly, reduces the chances ofcommanders to focus on the long-term strategic consequences thatany operation may have on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. This hasbeen particularly the case during the currentIntifadawhere, due to the

growing lethality of Palestinian terror and guerrilla groups and theincreasing budgetary constraints, the IDF has had to improvise andmake due with fewer resources, despite the growing number of militaryoperations.47

Another reason for thisbitsuisttactical and operational emphasis hasbeen the IDFs mantra of avoiding any political considerations andstatements when suggesting to the political-security leadership strategicsolutions to Palestinian violence. Although the supremacy of thepolitical echelon over the military regarding the decision and nature of

military force to be used is a paramount principle of democratic states including Israel taken to the extreme, military operations may provestrategically short-sighted if the military practitioners on the groundavoid making political-strategic assessments of their current securityoperations.

Thus, the IDF has often found itself conducting missions, whichalthough tactically and operationally effective, have had negativepolitical-strategic outcomes due to cases of excessive force andcollateral damage that are often repeatedly aired on major news

networks around the world. A slight break from such a tradition ofoverlooking the strategic consequences of day-to-day tactical opera-tions has been initiated by the current COS, Moshe Yaalon. In fact,he has criticized the Israeli political leaderships decision to use heavy-

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handed military operations against Palestinian terrorists because ofthe substantial collateral damage caused when conducting suchoperations and despite the fact that they may have negative strategicconsequences. Yaalon was quoted in Yediot Ahronotas saying that,in our tactical decisions, we are operating contrary to our strategicinterests.48

Collateral Damage

Despite attempts to use precision-guided missiles and highly-trainedsnipers to eliminate Palestinian guerrillas and terrorists while avoidingcasualties and major collateral damage, the extensive insertion ofarmored and infantry elements during Operation Defensive Shield

into such a compact battleground did bring about 53 Palestinian deaths most of whom were in any case combatants and structural damageto over 100 homes. The dilemmas and difficulties IDF soldiers wentthrough when trying to eliminate Palestinian fighters fighting frominhabited civilian homes were poignantly voiced by a reservist from theNahalInfantry Brigade, First Sergeant Sean Sachs:

One building that I saw in particular was a three-storey buildingwhere the bottom was still booby-trapped, the middle floor had a

family living in it and the top floor was used as a heavymachinegun post, a 50-calibre machinegun. They were firing atsoldiers coming down one of the alleyways. How do you explainto someone that the only way that you can take out a heavymachinegun which is armor-piercing is that you have to call ina helicopter and it has to be a pinpoint strike at that building? Soyou hit that top floor. Just the top floor is damaged and the peopleon the middle floor are fine. But a cameraman comes and showsthat building. And suddenly its a destroyed building and you are

accused of having killed people.49

Still, the IDF has on occasion conducted missile strikes with apparentdisregard for the possible collateral damage that they would entail. Ablatant example is when on 21 July 2004 the Israeli Air Force droppeda one-ton bomb over lateHamasleader Salah Shehades home situatedin a heavily-populated residential area of Gaza City. The operationwounded over 150 people, killed 14 civilians, including nine childrenand led to an official and embarrassing apology on the part of the

former IDF Chief of Operations, Major-General Dan Harel.

50

Thebombings repercussions are still being felt by former Chief of theIsraeli Air Force Major-General Dan Halutz who ordered the strike andwho had to justify the morality of his order in late November 2004

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before the Israeli High Court of Justice prior to being appointed as IDFDeputy Chief of Staff.

Thus, as a result of such collateral damage, the IDF has over the pasttwo years mapped out most Palestinian cities by developing a systemthat divides the urban battlefield into precise increments and gives eachbuilding in a city . . . an individual four-digit designation so both landand air forces know exactly which target they are trying to hit.51 Suchdetailed mapping and digital designation of Palestinian urban areashave helped reduce to some extent the cases of operational errors,which have led often in the past to extensive collateral damage.

Yet, despite efforts at reducing collateral damage Palestinian civilianshave suffered over the past four years; house demolitions have been acommon punitive measure used against families related to terrorists or

suspected of supporting terrorism. According to BTselem, an Israelihuman rights organization, almost half of the 628 housing unitsdemolished since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada belonged to peoplewho had no relation to terrorists. Such deliberate demolitions have ledto the unlawful creation of over 1,200 homeless civilians. Many more,furthermore, were destroyed during military operations to uneartharms smuggling tunnels.52 Operation Days of Penitence, which wascarried out during the first two weeks of October 2004 in order to rootout Hamas Qassam rocket attacks against Israeli towns bordering the

Gaza Strip, led to the destruction of over 90 homes and to the death ofover 100 Palestinians, most of whom were combatants, but whichincluded also 27 youths.53

Operation Defensive Shield, successive IDF counter-terror opera-tions, but especially the so-far partial construction of the security fence-wall have managed to reduce in any case by 30 percent the number ofterrorist attacks committed against Israeli objectives (from 5,301 to3,338) and by 50 percent the number of terror victims (from 451 to213) between 2002 and 2003.54 Moreover, according to a senior IDF

officer there was a further 75 percent reduction in attempted suicideattacks so far this year compared to the same period in 2003.55

The Strategic Impasse

And yet such tactical and operational successes have not achieved anymajor strategic dividends, despite the belief of the higher political andmilitary echelons for example, Moshe Yaalon, Ariel Sharon and ShaulMofaz to the contrary. Indeed, according to Brigadier-General (Ret.)

Shlomo Brom:On the tactical-operational level, the preparations were excellent,but the problem was, as usual, on the strategic level, because of

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the problem of how to prepare for it. Was it a preparation for amilitary conflict? Now in a military conflict you have very clearbenchmarks for success. You have to in blunt terms kill asmany of the other side and have as few own casualties aspossible. . . In this type of conflict there is a totally differentbenchmark, which should be built on the analysis of how it can bestopped, not on how it can be won. Thus, in this type of conflict,my aim should be to minimize as much as possible my casualtiesand to minimize as much as possible my opponents casualties,because killing breeds more killing.56

Such an observation is particularly poignant given the fact thataccording to IDF Major-General (Ret.) Yaacov Amidror, . . ..Palesti-

nians regard victory differently from Israelis or those in the West. Theymeasure success not by achieving positive results for their people, butrather by the amount of suffering inflicted on their enemies.57 Thus, nomatter how successful the IDF may be at the tactical and operationallevels, the Palestinians are willing to conduct terror and guerrillaoperations and inflict suffering on the Israeli and Jewish settlerpopulation until they achieve a political resolution leading to nationalindependence. This has been a constant problem for conventionalarmies that have conducted low-intensity campaigns with much larger

and better-equipped forces against weaker and poorly-equippedterrorist and guerrilla fighters.

Even when loss ratios have been considerably skewed in favor ofconventional forces, irregular forces have gained historically thestrategic upper hand on innumerable occasions. For example, inVietnam the loss ratios (including civilians) were 16 to 1 in the USsfavor; in Algeria the loss ratios were 24 to 1 in the French forces favor;in Afghanistan the loss ratios were at least dozens to 1 in favor of theSoviet forces; and in Mogadishu, Somalia, during an 18-hour battle on

3 October 1993 the loss ratio between US forces and Somali irregularsand civilians was 56 to 1 in the USs favor.58 Yet, despite their militarysuperiority, all such forces ended the conflict without achieving anybattlefield decision or victory as Israel did when it left the SouthLebanese Security Zone in April 2000.59

IDF approaches to low-intensity operations have continued tomaintain by default the traditional conventional goal and ethos ofmaintaining the status quo by trying to impose a battlefield decisionthrough military means. However, the nature of the current conflict

itself makes it very difficult for the IDF to achieve any major strategicdividends despite its extensive tactical and operational successes,because of the political nature of low-intensity conflicts, which areultimately resolved through political negotiation and diplomacy. The

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late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was able to reach finally such aconclusion after six long years of Palestinian violence and the IDFsunsuccessful counter-insurgency efforts. Current Prime Minister ArielSharon has possibly come to the same conclusion after avoiding anymajor political options by relying heavily on IDF over the past threeyears.

Thus, it is crucial that the Israeli political-security leadership provideproactively alternative political solutions to the current conflict,whether through unilateral disengagement in order to kickstart theRoad Map, which could provide a two-state solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, the creation of a newly-modified Oslo-typeagreement or any other political resolution that will end the currentconflict. Now seems a particularly auspicious moment given the fact

that the former Palestinian Authority and Palestinian LiberationOrganization leader, Yasser Arafat, has died.

The Israeli political leadership will have to understand finally thatwhen it is fixed on maintaining the status quo and the Palestinians areset on modifying it, recurring episodes of fighting between thembecome inevitable. It is imperative that the Israeli political echelon finda political solution to Palestinian insurgency given the fact that it is ableto negotiate from a position of strength Palestinian terror capabilities,although not motivation, have been dramatically reduced by the IDF

and Israeli intelligence organizations and given the fact thatultimately the occupation over and control of Palestinians will onlycontinue to wear out both societies and, in particular, the IDF.

When commenting on the need to continuously and creativelyaddress threats to Israeli security, David Ben-Gurion, Israels foundingprime minister and the father of its strategic doctrine stated that themost dangerous enemy to Israels security is the intellectual inertia ofthose who are responsible for security.60 The IDF has done its part intrying to provide solutions to Palestinian terror and guerrilla tactics,

now it is up to the politicians to heed Ben-Gurions warning againststrategic sclerosis.

Acknowledgement

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the American PoliticalScience Association Annual Meeting (2 September 2004) and at theInter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Canada Meeting

(3 October 2004). I am grateful to Professor John Mearsheimer,Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman and the journals anonymous refereesfor their many useful comments. However, any remaining errors are myown.

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Notes

1 The IDF and other Israeli security services have had a long tradition in fighting Palestinian

terrorism and insurgency both locally and internationally since the early 1950s. However, the

scope of this article will focus primarily on the period relating to the Al-Aqsa Intifada as, I

believe, it has proven to be the greatest challenge to Israeli counter-insurgency efforts since the

states establishment in 1948. For a brief historical overview of Palestinian insurgency and

Israeli counter-insurgency see: Sergio Catignani, The Security Imperative in Counterterror

Operations: The Israeli Fight Against Suicidal Terror, Terrorism and Political Violence Vol.

17/1, forthcoming.

2 Beatrice Heuser and Lawrence Freedman, Strategy in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), War

(Oxford: Oxford UP 1994) p.192.

3 Martin van Creveld,On Future War (London: Brasseys 1991) p.208.

4 See Zeev Drory,Israels Reprisal Policy, 19531956 (London: Frank Cass 2004).

5 Eliot A. Cohenet al., Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israels Security Revolution(Washington,DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1998) p.71.

6 Avi Kober, Israeli War Objectives into an Era of Negativism,Journal of Strategic Studies24/2

(June 2001) p.187.

7 Efraim Inbar, Israel National Security, 19731996,AAPSS555 (Jan. 1998) p.71.

8 See Chaim Herzog,The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War (London:

Greenhill Books 2003) pp.27091.

9 Uri Bar-Joseph, Variations on a Theme: The Conceptualization of Deterrence in Israeli

Strategic Thinking, Security Studies7/3 (Spring 1998) p.153.

10 Public Order and Security, 13 Sept. 1993, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-

Government Arrangements, Article VIII, available at 5http://www.jmcc.org/research/series/dop.html#declare4(accessed 1 July 2004).

11 Matthew Gutman, Destruction, Constructively Speaking,Jerusalem Post, 9 Jan. 2003.

12 Col. (Res.) Yehuda Wegman, Israels Security Doctrine and the Trap of Limited Conflict,

Jerusalem Viewpoints 514 (1 March 2004), available at 5http://www.jcpa.org/jl/

vp514.htm4(accessed 1 May 2004).

13 Rami Hazut, The Palestinians Are an Existential Threat: Iraq Is Not,Yedioth Ahronoth, 23

Aug. 2002, Israel Resource Review, available at 5htttp://israelvisit.co.il/cgi-bin/friendly.

pl?url = Aug-23-02!IDF4(accessed 14 March 2003).

14 For an account of the demise of national security consensus, see Dan Horowitz, The Israeli

Concept of National Security in Avner Yaniv (ed.),National Security and Democracy in Israel(London: Lynne Rienner 1993) pp.2731.

15 Moti Bassok and Eynav Ben Yehuda, Survey: 46 percent of households cannot meet monthly

outlays,Haaretz, 10 Aug. 2004.

16 Reuven Gal, The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF): A Conservative or an Adaptive Organization?,

in Daniel Maman et al. (eds.), Military, State and Society in Israel: Theoretical and

Comparative Perspectives (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers 2001) pp.3645.

17 Steve Rodan, Interview: Lt. Gen. Shaul Mofaz, Janes Defence Weekly (17 Oct. 2001),

available at 5http:jdw.janes.com4(accessed 23 June 2004).

18 Col. Gal Hirsh, Head of the IDF Officers Training School, interview with author, Tel Aviv,

Israel, 6 Aug. 2003.19 The attack killed 27 and wounded over 100 Israeli civilians celebrating the Jewish Passover at

a hotel reception in Netanya.

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20 Yagil Henkin, Urban Warfare and the Lessons of Jenin.Azure15 (Summer 2003), available

at at 5http://www.shalem.org.il/azure/15-henkin.htm4(accessed 23 May 2003).

21 Briefing by the IDF Chief of The General Staff, International Conference on Low-intensity

Conflict, 23 March 2004, available at 5http://www.idf.il/newsite/English/032304-4.stm4

(accessed 23 March 2004).22 See IDF Steps up Intelligence War against Palestinians,Janes Defence Weekly(5 Jan. 2001),

available at 5http:jdw.janes.com4(accessed 23 June 2004) and Israels Digital Army,

Foreign Report(22 May 2003), available at 5http://frp.janes.com4(accessed 23 June 2004).

23 David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, Israels Future Includes Armed, Long-Range UAVs,

Aviation Week and Space Technology (25 June 2002), available at http://www.aviationnow.

com/avnow/search/autosuggest.jsp?docid= 3864&url = http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aviationnow.

com%2Favnow%2Fnews%2Fchannel_military.jsp%3Fview%3Dstory%26id%3Dnews%2

Fmiuav0625.xml4(accessed 14 July 2002).

24 David Eshel, Israel Hones Intelligence Operations to Counter Intifada, Janes Intelligence

Review (1 Oct. 2002), available at 5http://jir.janes.com4(accessed 23 June 2004).25 According to various estimates the GSS and Military Intelligence ran about 7,000 informers

throughout the West Bank and Gaza during the first Intifada. See Israel Uses Intifada

Informers to Abet Assassination Campaign, Janes Intelligence Review (1 Dec. 2001),

available at 5http://jir.janes.com4(accessed 23 June 2004).

26 Capt. E., Sayeret Matkal (General Security Services E lite Commando Unit), interview with

author, Tel Aviv, Israel, 18 Aug. 2003. See also Barbara Opall-Rome, Israeli Gunships,

Troops Team for Pinpoint Strikes, Defence News, 21 April 2003, available at 5http://

www.defensenews.com/pgt.php?htd = i_story_1787859.html&tty = topnews4(accessed 20

May 2003).

27 Jeremy Gwinn, Jenin and the Fundamentals of Urban Operations,Infantry Online, 15 March2003, available at 5http://www.benning.army.mil/OLP/InfantryOnline/issue_21/art_125.ht-

m4(accessed 28 June 2003).

28 Ibid.

29 Col. Gal Hirsh, interview with the author, 6 Aug. 2003.

30 See Barbara Opall-Rome, Tanks Fill Wider Role in Israels Anti-Terror War,Defense News,

17 March 2003.

31 On the IDFs attempts at trying to grapple with media exposure during the Al-Aqsa Intifada,

see Baruch Nevo and Yael Shur, The IDF and the Press During Hostilities (Jerusalem: The

Israel Democracy Institute 2003).

32 Since the start of theAl-Aqsa Intifada, for example, 323 children under the age of 14 have beenkilled by IDF fire. See Gideon Levy, Suffer the Children, Haaretz, 2 Dec. 2004.

33 See Barbara Opall-Rome, Objective: Re-create the Fog of War,Defence News, 24 June 2002.

34 ForadetailedaccountoftheIDFCodeofConduct,seeAmosGuiora,BalancingIDFCheckpoints

and International Law: Teaching the IDF Code of Conduct,Jerusalem Issue Brief3/8 (19 Nov.

2003), available at5http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-8.htm4(accessed 11 Nov. 2004).

35 Soldiers often find themselves guarding checkpoints from around 8 to 12 hours a day and

dealing with up to 5,000 frustrated and hostile Palestinians. See Eitan Rabin, Army Cameras

Catch Soldiers Abuse, Maariv International, 11 July 2004.

36 See IDF Readjusts to the Needs of the Palestinian Population, IDF Spokespersons Unit, 8

July 2004, available at 5http://www.1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl = EN&id= 7&do-cid= 32567.EN4(accessed 11 July 2004).

37 Barbara Opall-Rome, Israel Tests Anti-Sniper System in Combat, Defense News, 15 July

2002.

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38 See Dror Marom, Corner Shot Invests $2m in Weapons Systems, Globes, 15 Dec. 2003,

available at 5http://www.globes.co.il/DocsEn/did = 751435.htm4(accessed 7 April 2004).

39 See Alon Ben-David, Israel UnveilsRefaimRifle Grenade System,Janes Defence Weekly40/

11 (17 Sept. 2003) p.15.

40 See Amir Buhbut, On Target,Maariv International, 19 March 2004.41 IDF infantry brigades usually rotate among the three Territorial Commands (North, South and

Central).

42 Amos Harel, Infantry Boosted in Leaner Army,Haaretz, 29 July 2003.

43 Cohen (note 5) p.50.

44 Major (Res.) Danny Gal,MAMDA(IDF Behavioural Sciences Unit), interview with author in

Herzliya, Israel, 12 Aug. 2004.

45 Yaakov Hasdai, Doers and Thinkers in the IDF,The Jerusalem Quarterly24 (Summer

1982) pp.1618.

46 Lt.-Col. A.,Sayeret EgozCommander, interview with author, Shrivenham, England, 23 June

2004.47 Due to the large budget cuts over the past four years imposed by the Ministry of Finance, the

IDFs new Shot 2008 five-year strategic review will envisage the reduction of its ground forces

by more than 25 percent, the withdrawal of older fighting platforms and the drastic cutback in

the use of combat reservists for routine security operations amongst other things. See Alon

Ben-David, Extensive Cuts to Hit Israeli Ground Forces the Most, Janes Defence Weekly40/

2 (16 July 2003) p.17.

48 Quoted in: Israel Needs Yaalon, Foreign Report (6 Nov. 2003), available at 5http://

frp.janes.com4(accessed 23 June 2004).

49 First Sergeant (Res.) Sean Sachs, Nahal Brigade, interview with author, Tel Aviv, Israel, 11

Aug. 2003.50 See Pierre Klochendler, Israeli General Apologises for Civilian Deaths, CNN, 23 July 2002,

available at 5http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/07/23/hamas.assassination4(ac-

cessed 10 Aug. 2003).

51 David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, Israel Refocuses on Urban Warfare,Aviation Week &

Space Technology156/19 (13 May 2002) p.25.

52 See Uri Glickman, Report: Over 4,100 Palestinian Homes Razed by IDF Since Start of

Intifada, Maariv International, 15 Nov. 2004.

53 See UNRWA Gaza Field Assessment of IDF Operation Days of Penitence, 20 Oct. 2004,

available at 5http://www.un.org/unrwa/news/incursion_oct04.pdf4(accessed 21 Dec. 2004).

54 See Margot Dudkevitch, 50% Fewer Terror Victims in 2003, The Jerusalem Post, 9 Jan.2004.

55 Arieh OSullivan, Mofaz Terror in Decline, Pressure to Continue,The Jerusalem Post, 22

June 2004.

56 Brig.-Gen. (Ret.) Shlomo Brom, former IDF Head of the Strategic Planning Division, interview

with author, Tel Aviv, 13 June 2003.

57 Maj.-Gen. (Ret.) Yaacov Amidror, Israels Strategy for Combating Palestinian Terror,Joint

Forces Quarterly32 (Autumn 2002) p.120.

58 Statistics quoted in Avi Kober, Has Battlefield Decision Become Obsolete? The Commitment

to the Achievement of Battlefield Decision Revisited, Contemporary Security Policy 22/2

(Aug. 2001) p.111.59 See: Gil Merom,How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2003).

60 Cohen (note 5) p.142.

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