implementing energy s ubsidy r eform maria vagliasindi lead economist, world bank

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Implementing Energy Subsidy Reform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist, World Bank Prepared for the 3 rd MEDREG-IMME Seminar Tunis, 12 September 2013

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Implementing Energy S ubsidy R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist, World Bank Prepared for the 3 rd MEDREG-IMME Seminar Tunis, 12 September 2013. Methodology ii. Key Policy Questions iii. Summary Results - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Implementing Energy Subsidy Reform

Maria VagliasindiLead Economist,

World Bank

Prepared for the 3rd MEDREG-IMME Seminar

Tunis, 12 September 2013

Page 2: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Outline

 i. Methodology

ii. Key Policy Questions

iii. Summary Results

(a)Have energy subsidy reforms succeeded in reducing the associated fiscal burden?

(b) Have energy subsidy reforms succeeded in restraining energy consumption?

(c) Have energy subsidy reforms managed to avoid adverse social impacts?

iv. Lessons learned

Page 3: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Methodology

Sample Selection for Case Studies Analysis

Net Energy Importer

Net Energy Exporter

Low and

Lower Middle Income

Group A Group C AFR Ghana NigeriaEAP Indonesia

ECA Armenia, Moldova Azerbaijan

MNA Morocco, Jordan Egypt, Iran, Yemen

SAR India, Pakistan

Upper-Middle

and High

Income

Group B Group DEAP Malaysia ECA Turkey

LAC Chile, Dominican Rep., Peru Argentina, Mexico

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

Page 4: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Key Policy Questions

(a)Have energy subsidy reforms succeeded in reducing the associated fiscal burden?

(b)Have energy subsidy reforms succeeded in restraining energy consumption?

(c) Have energy subsidy reforms managed to avoid adverse social impacts?

Page 5: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

(a) Have energy subsidy reforms succeeded in reducing the associated fiscal burden?

Explicit energy budgetary subsidies were reduced on average from 1.8% to 1.5% of GDP, with the most significant reduction for energy net importers (Groups A and B)

Explicit energy budgetary subsidies

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

Page 6: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

(a) Have energy subsidy reforms succeeded in reducing the associated fiscal burden? (ctd)

Developing countries still use implicit subsidies, which are more difficult to measure.

Hidden costs coming from inefficiency due to under-collection, and unaccounted losses in addition to underpricing are more challenging to eliminate. However, these have generally decreased over time, as a result of broader reforms and improved governance

Hidden costs over time (Ghana) Hidden costs over time (Nigeria)

Source: AICD Database (2010)

Page 7: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

(b) Have energy subsidy reforms succeeded in restraining energy consumption? (ctd)

In spite of considerable gasoline (and diesel) tariff increases across all group of countries (particularly for energy net importers) gasoline consumption in the road sector has generally increased over time (with the notable exception of Group B, representing lower income energy net importers) Gasoline retail tariff Road Gasoline Consumption

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

Page 8: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

(b) Have energy subsidy reforms succeeded in restraining energy consumption? (ctd)

In spite of considerable electricity tariff increases (particularly for energy net importers) power consumption has steadily increased, fueled by higher GDP per capita for all group of countries Electricity Tariff Power Consumption

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

Page 9: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

(c) Have energy subsidy reforms managed to avoid adverse social impacts?

To address such a question need to look at evidence from household survey

patterns of consumption of the different fuels, by quintiles or deciles

implications for the direct and indirect impact of the removal of subsidies by the average consumer by different quintiles or deciles

Page 10: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Patterns of consumption of the different fuels

Kerosene Expenditure (% income), between top and bottom quintile

Kerosene is used for lighting and heating, especially in low income countries where households do not have access to electricity.The share of income spent on kerosene accounts for the poorest quintile up to 6 times more than for the richest quintile.

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

Page 11: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Patterns of consumption of the different fuels (ctd)

Gasoline Expenditure (% income), between top and bottom quintile

Gasoline which is used in internal combustion engines is mainly spent by the richer quintile who consumes 10 to 20 times more than

the poorest quintile.

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

Page 12: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Patterns of consumption of the different fuels (ctd)

Electricity Expenditure (% income), by top and bottom quintile

Electricity is more important for the bottom quintile, with few notable exceptions.

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

Page 13: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Welfare Impact of Removing Fuel Subsidies

Welfare Impact of Removing Fuel Subsidies (% loss in real income)

Source: Del Granado et al (2010)

Page 14: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Welfare Impact of Removing Fuel Subsidies

Welfare Impact of fossil fuel subsidy removal in Malaysia, by quintiles

Source: Moradkani et al. (2010) based on Household Expenditure Survey (2005)

Source: Del Granado et al (2010)

Page 15: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

What alternative instruments can be used to reach the poor?

The most recent CGE literature consider the results of “recycling” at least some of the savings coming from reduction of subsidies through alternative policies.

In most of the cases, fossil fuel subsidy removal has adverse economic and social impacts. Incidence of poverty is significantly lower where the subsidy removal does not include kerosene, supporting the evidence that among fossil fuel subsidies they are the most “progressive”.

To mitigate and offset the negative impact on the economy, the re-allocation of given percentage of the subsidy to the poor through cash transfer have proven to be effective.

Page 16: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Unconditional cash transfer (Indonesia)

Welfare Impact of Removing Energy Subsidies (% increase in urban and rural poverty) in

Indonesia

Soure: Yusuf (2008)

Scenarios 1.A and 1.B. report the 2005 package of reforms without or with the increase in the price of kerosene; Scenarios 2. A represent the 2005 package of reform together with an untargeted cash transfer (UCT). Scenarios 2B and 2C introduce a targeted cash transfer, with different degree of effectiveness (100% and 75%). Scenarios 3. A and 3.B introduce subsidy to targeted household for spending on education and health (in the same amount of the UCT) with and without the 2005 package of reform

Page 17: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

The case of targeted cash transfer (Argentina)

Welfare Impact of Removing Energy Subsidies (% loss in real income) in Argentina (a) without cash transfers (b) with cash transfers

Source: Benitez and Chisari (2010)Note: P1-P5 refers to the 5 years period after the simulation of the tariff increase in 2006

Page 18: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Lessons learned

 1. Strengthening social safety nets and improving

the targeting mechanisms for subsidies:

a) lifeline tariffsb) geographical or socio-economic targeting

and subsidies to enhance access c) cash transfers

2. Informing the public and announcing one-off compensatory measures

3. Ensuring the Sustainability of Subsidy Policy through Broader Sectoral Reforms

Page 19: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

1. Strengthening social safety nets and improving the targeting mechanisms for subsidies: a) lifeline tariffs

Targeting mechanisms and methods for identifying those eligible for the subsidy program can vary, depending on the degree of coverage as well as the extent to which different programs are progressive, determining trade-offs between different solutions

Source: Komives et al. (2007)

In the case of lifeline tariffs while they offer the advantage of much higher coverage in middle income countries than other existing targeted programs, but they entail a relatively high cost of implementation

Source: World Bank’s Background Paper

Page 20: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

b) Geographical or socio-economic targeting

One approach to improve the targeting performance of electricity subsidies is to use of geographical or socio-economic targeting variables

An alternative approach is to replace consumption subsidies with connection subsidies. Simulations show that connection subsidies designed to reach a majority of un-served population living in areas connected to the grid are superior to consumption subsidies and in most of the cases are also progressive

Source: Komives et al. (2007)

Page 21: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

c) Cash Transfers

Cash transfers have been found in general to be progressive, vis-à-vis subsidies which are highly regressive. However, the implementation of targeted transfers can be challenging. Their effectiveness and efficiency depend on the targeting method and administrative capacity.

Oportunidades is Mexico’s main anti-poverty government program using cash transfers to households linked to regular school attendance and health clinic visits and in 2007 an energy component was added

Source: ENIGH (2008)

Page 22: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

2. Informing the public and announcing one-off compensatory measures

Governments need to ensure public trust in the reform agenda through broad communication, appropriate timing of subsidy removal, and implementation of compensatory social policies.

While developing social safety nets is important to ensure that consumers can cope with higher prices successfully in the long run, tariff and fuel price increases may need to be accompanied by immediate short-term measures to address any acute impacts of subsidy reform

Page 23: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Informing the public and announcing one-off compensatory measures

In Jordan, the minimum wage was increased, with low-paid government employees receiving higher wage increases than other employees as palliative measures, largely regarded as successful in dealing with price increases. An electricity lifeline tariff for those using less than 160 kWh per month was kept. A one off compensation for the non poor was also implemented. Along with subsidy reform, measures aimed at fuel substitution and energy efficiency were also implemented.

In the case of Ghana, budget savings from fuel subsidies were directed towards transparent and easily monitorable poverty mitigation. In addition, planned investment in the provision of mass urban transport expansion was expedited and the existing rural electrification system was expanded.

Page 24: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

3. Ensuring the Sustainability of Subsidy Policy through Broader Sectoral Reforms

Where the quality of electricity services is low, engaging in broader reforms to improve service ahead of reforming energy subsidies lends credibility and improves consumer willingness to pay the unsubsidized prices.

Steps such as improving metering, billing and payment collection, and enhancement of quality of service can make tariff increases more acceptable as subsidies are removed.

Improving energy efficiency will also help to reduce the potential social costs of removing subsidies to consumers.

More generally, rationalizing the fuel mix for electricity and transport and discouraging private transport in favor of public transport can help support reforms, as will the prioritization of structural expenses that benefit the poor (including sectoral road and rural electrification schemes, but also social expenditure, including health and education).

Page 25: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

INSECURITY

REMOVING FUEL SUBSIDIES

Entitled to low fuel costs

Reduced Income

Higher costs for food fuel and

transport

Government corrupt no transparency

No salary increase

Lower lifestyle

Who benefits

where will savings go

Anxiety & mental

problems

Less $ for school fees

Might have to move for

job

Feeling Trapped

Perception of Consumers

Perception of Government

Communicate: One Initiative - Two Perceptions

GREATER BUDGET SECURITY

REMOVING FUEL SUBSIDIES

Reduce corruption

Better macro economic situation

More for education and health

Better governanc

e

More money in budgetImproved

economy

Satisfy donors and

markets

Leaner government

Better living

standards

Better Life

Better environme

nt

Page 26: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Fill your reforms with communication

Page 27: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

References

Page 28: Implementing Energy  S ubsidy  R eform Maria Vagliasindi Lead Economist,  World  Bank

Thank you!

Let us know how we can best help you in your effort to implement subsidy

reforms