implications of the information revolution for soviet ...its formation is articulated most clearly...
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FINAL REPORT T ONATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H
TITLE : IMPLICATIONS OF THE INFORMATIO NREVOLUTION FOR SOVIET SOCIETY :
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
AUTHOR : Richard W . Judy and Virginia L. Clough
CONTRACTOR :
Hudson Institute, Inc .
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR :
Hans Heymann, Jr .
COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER :
801-05
DATE :
May 198 9
The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided bythe National Council for Soviet and East European Research . Th eanalysis and interpretations contained in the report are those o fthe author .
IMPLICATIONS OF THE INFORMATION REVOLUTIONFOR SOVIET SOCIETY :
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
by
Richard W. Judy and Virginia L. Clough'
ExecutiveSummary :
There will be a Soviet information revolution . The questions are what kind will i t
be and what will be its implications for Soviet society . These are not easy questions. The
nature and implications of the information revolution are still dimly perceived in our ow n
society. It would be surprising indeed if we could see them with clarity in Soviet society .
The Soviet Union, with its legacies of Russian history and Stalinism, is a society ver y
different from our own. It is also a society in profound crisis, a crisis whose severity an d
whose perception are both partly consequent to the information revolution .
Who can doubt that the Gorbachev reformers are motivated in large part by thei r
widespread perception that the USSR is losing the technological race? They know full wel l
that one of their most spectacular and fateful losses is occurring in the development an d
application of computer and telecommunications technologies whose relevance to militar y
Richard W . Judy is a Senior Research Fellow and Virginia L. Clough is a Researc hAssociate of Hudson Institute, Indianapolis, Indiana . The research underlying this pape rwas supported in part by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research an dassisted by a travel grant from IREX, the International Research & Exchanges Board . Theauthors gratefully thank other participants in this project for their many contributions ,especially Robert W . Clough, Robert W . Campbell, and Hans Heymann, Jr . These an dothers who have contributed to our work are absolved from all responsibility for th econtents of this paper, a responsibility which the present authors bear in full measure .
i
power is increasingly obvious .
So, an information revolution of sorts is proceeding also in the Soviet Union . Bu t
it is a complex and contradictory phenomenon . In part, it proceeds in response to officia l
policy that seeks to define and to channel both the development of the technologies an d
the ways in which they are applied . In part, it is formed (many would say deformed) by the
unplanned but powerful interplay of bureaucratic interests and other institutional force s
that operate in the Soviet system. In part, it is driven by members of the Soviet
intelligentsia who increasingly see the close linkage between the information revolution and
their longing for freedom and democracy . In part, finally, it generates itself as informatio n
about the information revolution makes its way to rank and file Soviet citizens and whet s
their appetites to taste it themselves .
This paper is a preliminary exploration of the nature and meaning of the informatio n
revolution in the Soviet Union . It follows and builds upon an inquiry into the developmen t
and application of Soviet computer technology . Earlier phases of the study have focusse d
on the technologies themselves and some of their most important applications in the USSR .
This paper begins the third phase of our inquiry which is concerned with the meaning o f
the Soviet information revolution, i .e ., with the broader implications that transcend technica l
details .
The paper surveys Soviet views of the nature of the Soviet information revolution .
Until the mid-1980s, only the official Soviet vision of the computer and society could b e
discerned with relative clarity from the pages of Soviet publications . And even that officia l
vision had to be teased from oblique statements and inferred from observed behavior .
Soviet officialdom has behaved as if there were even when there may have been none .
ii
For many years, the notions of cybernetics and ideas associated with it were tabo o
with Soviet officialdom . After the taboo was lifted around 1960, explicit ideas of how th e
computer ought to fit into Soviet society began to appear .
Some grand vision of the future computerized Soviet society has gained popularity
in each of the last three decades, at least among certain members of the technica l
intelligentsia . In the 1960s, it was the "State System of Computer Centers" (GSVTs) whic h
was to be a pyramid of computers with those of the enterprises at the bottom and a gian t
central machine in Moscow at the top. The vision of the GSVTs was fatally flawed fro m
the start. There is no evidence that the top political or economic leaders ever took i t
seriously and, in any case, the vision never took a step toward reality . Although never
totally extinguished, this vision is dimming asymptotically toward invisibility .
The view of the computer's place in society in the minds of the Soviet technica l
intelligentsia and officialdom from the 1970s and into the mid-1980s held it to be a number
cruncher, a data processor, and the engine of automation . Indeed, nearly every compute r
application was construed as automation of some kind .
This view culminated in late 1983 when the State Committee on Science an d
Technology, Gosplan, and the Academy of Sciences developed a plan for the use o f
microprocessors in Soviet society. In this plan, the technology's main role would be as th e
controller of programmable machine tools, production processes, robots, and smar t
weapons . A second major role in which Soviet thinkers cast the computer was that o f
CAD/CAM (computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing) . Third place i n
importance went to the use of microcomputers in research, education, and other unspecifie d
information systems. "Personal computing" warranted no mention in this plan of 1983 .
Ideas began to change in the mid-1980s . A rapidly evolving perception of the nature
and significance of the information age is apparent in the writings of several prominen t
Soviet intellectuals . This new vision of the Soviet "information society" and the process o f
its formation is articulated most clearly and forcefully by Academician Andrei Ershov . He
portrays a strikingly coherent picture of the information future toward which he believe s
human societies, emphatically including the USSR, must head if they are to be considere d
advanced .
According to this new view, the entire world is moving rapidly toward th e
information society . If the Soviet Union chooses to stand aside, it will be at the cost of
becoming a global laggard . The social payoffs of this process are seen to be higher labo r
productivity, wider use of materials-conserving technologies, more rapid cycles of design an d
construction, and improvement in the quality of services, especially in trade and medicine .
Explicit mention of military enhancement is rarely made information is frequently to as a
"strategic resource .
Advocates of new view hold that certain domestic preconditions exist for the Sovie t
information revolution .
1.
The organization of mass production and implementation of computers an d
communications facilities .
2.
The creation of a software and knowledge base industry in the USSR .
3. A transformation of how people access and handle information in the Sovie t
Union. Bureaucratic intermediaries between the information and the people who use i t
must be greatly reduced or eliminated . The concept of individual initiative must b e
throroughly rehibilitated . Freedom of information for all citizens is deemed necessary fo r
iv
the information revolution to proceed .
The debate between the "automaters" and the advocates of the "information society "
has become a part of the larger debate about the future of Soviet society .
The paper examines the extent of personal computing in the USSR and the explores
the modialities by which a popular computer culture may be emerging in that country . The
conclsion is that Soviet consumers and professionals will take to computers with alacrit y
when and if more and better technology becomes available at workplaces, in the schools ,
and in retail stores. In short, the supply will create its own demand. The appetite will b e
further whetted when and if the flow of news about information technology in the Sovie t
media, whether it be reportage or advertising, becomes more interesting and more skillfull y
slanted toward a non-technical audience . As these things occur, the problem will b e
"merely" one of people mobilizing sufficient purchasing power to turn their desires int o
effective demand .
The paper examines some previously published Western conjectures about the natur e
of the Soviet information revolution and finds that they have not taken full account o f
recent developments . Another section explores a sample of Western opinions concernin g
problems and meaning of the computer revolution in the West .
The concluding section of this paper poses and adduces tentative answers to a serie s
of question about the economic, political, and social impacts of the information revolutio n
in Soviet society .
Concerning economic applications, it is argued that the contributions of the
informatics technologies to date have been quite modest . I lopes for major payoffs in th e
automation of goods production have not been dashed but neither have they been crowned
with anything approximating their anticipated successes. Looking ahead, perestroika and
computerized automation may be regarded as joint and highly complementary inputs int o
the future Soviet economy . Without successful perestroika, the returns to Soviet investments
in industrial computing will continue to be positive but disappointingly modest . With it, th e
potential could be enormous. The Soviet information revolution depends on perestroika
also because it needs the creativity and dynamism that only the nascent cooperative and
private sectors can provide . The state sector is a stultifying environment that discourage s
innovation and initiative. No reshuffling or reorganization, no redefinition of
responsibilities, and no creation of central coordinating commissions will breathe life int o
the Soviet industry .
The possibility of derailing the Soviet information revolution, or at least of shuntin g
it onto a sideline, remains quite real . Abject failure to meet announced targets for PC
production or for telecommunications modernization is all too conceivable . Conservative
forces may yet replace Gorbachev or Gorbachevism with more traditional Sovie t
totalitarianism and scuttle both glasnost' and perestroika. If any of these things were t o
happen and the Soviet information revolution were to be badly constrained, th e
consequences would be grave .
Soviet computer usage would still expand very substantially in military, CAD, CAM ,
transport, data processing, scientific research, and other institutional applications . The use
of personal computers would be restricted narrowly to official business, and communication s
patterns would remain vertical and run in their traditional bureaucratic channels . No
explosion of knowledge and creativity would occur and Soviet society would revert t o
intellectual insularity and isolation .
If these circumstances were to materialize, the maximum likelihood forecast woul d
be for a situation somewhat more dynamic economically and technologically than that o f
the dismal late Brezhnev period . Today's East Germany would be the paradigm, i .e., an
attempt to force feed high technology into a rigid and repressed society . But, with scientifi c
and technological progress proceeding at accelerating rates in the West, and with produc t
life cycles contracting, the prospect would be for an ever-widening Soviet lag behind th e
West. That lag would be manifest not only in informatics technologies, but across a broad
spectrum of technologies, military hardware, and the economy .
vii
IMPLICATIONS OF THE INFORMATION REVOLUTIO NFOR SOVIET SOCIETY :
A PRELIMINARY INQUIR Y
by
Richard W. Judy and Virginia L. Clough*
Introduction 3
Soviet Visions of the Soviet Information Society 9The Deleterious Impact of Marxist Ideology 1 0GSVTs: Vision of the 1960s 12Infatuation with Automation in the 1970s 12The Information Society: A New Vision for the 1980s 1 3"Automation" vs . "Informatization" - A Clash of Visions 25
The Supply of Personal Computers in the USSR 33
A Popular Information Culture in the USSR : Is One Emerging? 36How Are Soviet Citizens Exposed to Computers? 36
Workplace Exposure to Computers 36Educational Exposure to Computers in the USSR 38Computer Games and Computer Clubs in the USSR 40Computer Retailing in the USSR 4 1"Informatics Centers" as Surrogates for Computer Stores 45Personal Computers in the Soviet Press 47Computers in the Soviet Service Sector 52
Is There A Demand for PCs in the USSR? 53
Foreign Views on the Information Revolution in the USSR 5 6The "It Can't Happen There" View 5 6The Orwellian View 5 6The Computer Liberation View 57The Informatique a la Russe Views 5 8
Richard W. Judy is a Senior Research Fellow and Virginia L . Clough is a Researc hAssociate of the Hudson Institute, Indianapolis, Indiana . The research underlying this pape rwas supported in part by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research an dassisted by a travel grant from IREX, the International Research & Exchanges Board . Theauthors gratefully thank other participants in this project for their many contributions ,especially Robert W . Clough, Robert W . Campbell, and Hans Heymann, Jr . These an dothers who have contributed to our work are absolved from all responsibility for th econtents of this paper, a responsibility which the present authors bear in full measure .
Westerners View Some Implications of th eComputer Revolution in the West 60
Three Schools of Thought 6 1Effects on Personal Privacy 63Employment 65The Human Spirit 67A New Concept of Knowledge 70Does the Computer Diffuse or Centralize Power? 73In Lieu of a Conclusion 74
Implications of the Information Revolution for Soviet Society :Questions and Speculations 75
What Is or Is Likely to be the Economic Impact? 76Is A Cultural or Political Impact Visible? 79Will the Soviet Information Society Be More Unequal? 82Is Official Soviet Policy Hostile to Informatization? 84Will Informatization Help Big Brother? 87Is the CPSU Computer Literate? 88Can Samoinformatizatsiia Happen? 90What If There Were To Be No Soviet Computer Revolution? 92What Telltales Should We Watch? 94
ENDNOTES 96
BIBLIOGRAPHY 102
1 . Introductio n
The information revolution is real . Skeptics who think it is all media hype ar e
wrong. Rapid progress in computer and communications technologies are combining wit h
an explosion of knowledge to create an age unlike any mankind has know before .
We have long been accustomed to machines that can perform mechanical feats fa r
beyond man's puny abilities . Machines can carry heavier weights, travel faster, see farther ,
and operate in more hostile environments, to name but a few of the physical things tha t
machines can do better than men. Since about 1950, we have also become accustomed t o
machines whose ability to perform numeric calculations and process data far surpasse s
man's .
As significant as the first two decades of the computer era were, it is the integrate d
circuit (IC) that has laid the technological basis for the kind of historical discontinuity tha t
we have in mind when we use the term "revolution ." Man's rapidly increasing ability t o
place ever greater logical and memory capabilities upon smaller and cheaper media ar e
empowering him to create ever "smarter" machines . The class of functions that formerly
only humans could perform but machines are "learning" to do is growing at an astoundin g
rate.
Concomitant with the IC revolution in computing has been a revolution i n
telecommunications that vastly increases man's ability to move information inexpensively
from one place to another. Fibre optical and satellite transmission are transforming th e
volumes and speeds of information that we can move. Computerized switching i s
transforming our ability to direct information flows . Instantaneous and high volume globa l
communications capability has already transformed the broadcast media and will
increasingly do so for point-to-point communications .
A third technological basis for the information revolution comes in the area of mas s
information storage and retrieval . Laser-based devices make it increasingly possible and
economical to store incredible amounts of machine-readable information in small spaces .
For example, the NEXT computer will be shipped to customers bundled with Merriam-
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, its Collegiate Thesaurus, the Oxford Dictionary
of Quotations, and the Oxford Press' Complete Works of William Shakespeare -- all store d
on small magneto-optical disks that each hold 256 megabytes of data .
The combined result of these technological advances is a quantum leap in man's
ability to store, retrieve, transmit, and process information . Together, these thing s
represent colossal "intelligence multipliers," i .e., extenders of man's brainpower, of hi s
potential for intellectual activity . At the same time, they elevate the importance of thos e
human functions that machines cannot do, at least not yet, or which they do poorly . Man
will increasingly be able, indeed be forced, to discover and develop his human essence, i .e .,
those attributes that humans have and machines do not .
The implications of the information revolution are still dimly perceived . That i s
hardly surprising ; only the passage of time reveals the full implications of fundamenta l
technological change . The one thing that is already certain, however, is that individuals and
societies will find themselves compelled to accommodate and adapt to the ne w
technological realities in many unforseen ways . And we have begun none too soon in thi s
country to pose questions about those adaptations, and to study society's experience i n
adapting to previous technological leaps for the lessons there to be learned .
4
The development of computers and communications technology is a globa l
phenomenon and every nation is or will be affected by it . But differences in cultures, socio -
political structures, the existing technological base, and prevailing economic condition s
mean that the information revolution will proceed at different paces and, very likely, in
different directions in various nations of the world. It follows that the economic, social, an d
political impacts of that revolution will also be different in different places .
The Soviet Union, with its legacies of Russian history and Stalinism, is a society ver y
different from our own. It is also a society in profound crisis, a crisis whose severity and
whose perception are both partly consequent to the information revolution .
Neither Russia nor the Soviet Union are strangers to backwardness . Technologica l
and economic backwardness leading to relative military weakness has motivated most, if no t
all, of the great top-down attempts of past Russian rulers to modernize society . No
recitation of historical examples needs to be given here, but those acquainted with Russian
history cannot but hear the echo of familiar themes in the current Soviet time of troubles .
Who can doubt that the Gorbachev reformers are motivated in large part by thei r
widespread perception that the USSR is losing the technological race? They know full well
that one of their most spectacular and fateful losses is occurring in the development an d
application of computer and telecommunications technologies whose relevance to militar y
power is increasingly obvious .
So an information revolution of sorts is proceeding also in the Soviet Union . But
it is a complex and contradictory phenomenon . In part, it proceeds in response to officia l
policy that seeks to define and channel both the development of the technologies and th e
ways in which they are applied . In part, it is formed (many would say deformed) by th e
S
unplanned but powerful interplay of bureaucratic interests and other institutional forces tha t
operate in the Soviet system. In part, it is driven by members of the Soviet intelligentsi a
who increasingly see the close linkage between the information revolution and their longin g
for freedom and democracy. In part, finally, it generates itself as information about th e
information revolution makes its way to rank and file Soviet citizens and whets thei r
appetites to taste it themselves .
This paper is a preliminary exploration of the nature and meaning of the informatio n
revolution in the Soviet Union . It follows and builds upon an inquiry into the development
and application of Soviet computer technology that has spanned, with interruptions, more
than two decades. That inquiry intensified during the past three years in connection wit h
the Hudson Institute's research program on the "Implications of the Information Revolutio n
for Soviet Society." That program has been funded by, among others, the National Counci l
for Soviet and East European Research and assisted by a travel grant from IREX, th e
International Research & Exchanges Board . Without that support, this work could not
have gone forward .
Earlier phases of this study have focussed on the technologies themselves and som e
of their most important applications in the USSR . In this paper, we move into the thir d
phase of our inquiry which is concerned with the meaning of the Soviet informatio n
revolution, i .e., with the broader implications that transcend technical details . To speak
candidly, this is the aspect of the subject that interests us most, and that we suspec t
interests most others as well . Rightly or wrongly, however, we have felt that a soli d
grounding in the "nitty-gritty" facts of technology and its applications in the USSR ought t o
precede and inform our speculation about their significance .
A few words of explanation about what follows are in order. Section 2 of the paper
discusses visions of the Soviet information society as they have been seen through officia l
lenses at various times during recent decades . Considerable attention is devoted to a n
emergent vision that currently competes for official acceptance . We think that this new
vision, most clearly enunciated by Academician Andrei Ershov, merits the extende d
discussion we have given it because it is pregnant with social and political implications .
Section 3 takes a look at the situation of personal computing in the USSR an d
places it in the broader perspective of the information revolution . Section 4 explores som e
aspects of the development of a popular information culture in the Soviet Union and look s
in some detail at the ways in which ordinary citizens are exposed to computers in genera l
and personal computers in particular. Section 5 is a brief survey of western views of th e
nature and significance of the information revolution as it may or may not be manifeste d
in the USSR. Section 6 surveys some Western opinions and concerns abou t
computerization in the West with the hope of finding some universal themes . Finally,
Section 7 poses and adduces some answers to questions concerning various categories o f
conjectured implications of the information revolution for Soviet society . The authors '
division of labor has found Virginia Clough bearing the main burden for Section 6 with th e
balance falling mainly to Richard W. Judy .
That the present paper represents a beginning probe of the meaning of the Soviet
information revolution must be repeated. At this stage, we have many more questions than
answers . Furthermore, each answer seems only to open up more questions . But this is as
it should be. In this virgin territory, our ultimate objectives are still better served b y
exploring the terrain, even if that exploration is sometimes rather unstructured, than by
7
indulging the illusion that we know enough to make final judgments . Having said that,
however, we hope that this paper will interest and stimulate others who are interested i n
the topic and that our readers will share their reactions with us .
8
2. Soviet Visions of the Soviet Information Society
As we think about the possible implications of the information revolution for Sovie t
society, it is instructive to consider how the Soviets themselves see it . In what social role
do they cast the computer and communication technologies? Can we discern officia l
positions on this question? What aspects of these technologies and their spread may worry
the Soviet leadership? What divergent points of view can be identified among Sovie t
thinkers and policy makers? Has there been any visible shifting of official and unofficia l
opinion with the passage of time? Has or may the policy of glasnost' modify Soviet visions
of their future information society?
Until the mid-1980s, only the official Soviet vision of the computer and society coul d
be discerned with relative clarity from the pages of Soviet publications . And even that
official vision had to be teased from oblique statements and inferred from observe d
behavior. All of this causes one to wonder if any such vision, philosophy, or policy eve r
had been explicitly formulated at the highest political levels . What we think we know abou t
the cerebral prowess of Brezhnev and Chernenko evokes deep skepticism on this point . It
cannot be excluded, however, that more generously endowed ideologues such as Andropo v
or, especially, Suslov, did devote some serious thought to these matters and was (or were )
responsible for an explicitly formulated policy .
Whether or not an explicit vision was ever formulated by the top Soviet politica l
leadership is now a matter largely of academic interest . The point is that Sovie t
officialdom has behaved as if there were. Our purpose here is to lay bare that de fact o
vision, its putative origins, and its implications, without stretching the available evidenc e
beyond reasonable limits .
9
2.1 . The Deleterious Impact of Marxist Ideology
It should be noted at the outset that official Soviet Marxist ideology has exercise d
a continuing and harmful influence on the formation of the attitudes and institutions tha t
support the information culture . The history of negative official Soviet attitudes towards
cybernetics during the Stalin and Khrushchev periods has been well researched an d
described by Professor Loren Graham and needs no reiteration here. 1 Suffice it to say tha t
the virulent anti-cybernetics campaign of the 1950s cast a long pall over the subject and ,
paradoxically, that when Soviet cybernetics finally emerged from the shadows, it wa s
embraced uncritically and too fulsomely by those long deprived of it .
Furthermore, the very nature of information – non-material, seemingly ephemeral ,
infinitely replicable, and not consumed in its use – conflicts with crude philosophica l
materialism. Such a materialist philosophy has caused the Soviets consistently to distort th e
role and importance of information in society . Generally speaking, information has bee n
regarded as an instrument in the service of the state and Party. Intelligence information,
of course, has always been valued, but elsewhere the importance of informational accuracy
and truth has been insufficiently appreciated by Soviet officialdom . One can only marve l
at the poor quality of Soviet economic statistics, for example, in an ostensibly planne d
economy which could only work, even theoretically, when planners dispose o f
comprehensive and accurate information .
Another example of tangible damage done by Marxist materialist philosophy to th e
Soviet information culture is to be found in the arena of computer software . The problem
here lies in the fact that Soviet planners and managers have undervalued software' s
1 0
contribution to information systems. Programmers are paid paltry wages that compar e
unfavorably with the remuneration of semi-skilled manual workers . Software has not been
regarded as a commodity to be traded commercially. The authorship of Soviet softwar e
typically is not even recorded nor are the intellectual property rights of software engineer s
properly recognized or rewarded . Gorshkov put it as follows :
Even the term "software product" brings forth stormy protest from manyeconomists and planners . How is it possible, they say, to consider somethinga product which is written on paper and is impossible to measure by th ekilogram, kilometer, or liter . 2
A practical consequence of this prejudice against software products is that no rea l
Soviet software industry exists. Since no royalties or even honoraria are to be reaped from
creating good software for commercial distribution, it follows that it is in no individual's o r
organization's interest to create it . Can it be surprising, then, that virtually none is created?
The preceding does not mean that there is no Soviet software . Quite the contrary,
in fact, is the case . An army of three hundred thousand programmers toils away on miserl y
salaries creating vast numbers of programs for all sorts of Soviet institutions. There being
no commercial software, every institutional user is constrained to develop or commissio n
its own with the twin results that software wheels are re-invented over and over again, an d
that most of the re-inventions are of mediocre quality. The State Fund of Algorithms an d
Programs registers some 138 thousand program packages . Being of dubious quality and
unsupported by their anonymous authors, however, few of these programs are used b y
organizations other than the ones that paid for their creation . The situation is one o f
qualitative poverty amid quantitative abundance .
1 1
2.2. GSVTs: Vision of the 1960s
Some grand vision of the future computerized Soviet society has gained popularit y
in each of the last three decades, at least among certain members of the technica l
intelligentsia . In the 1960s, it was the "State System of Computer Centers" (GSVTs) which
was to be a pyramid of computers at whose base would be computers in practically al l
enterprises in the economy .3 These machines were to be connected to, and perhap s
controlled by, machines at the next stage of the hierarchy which would be at the oblast',
republican, or ministerial level . These intermediate levels of the system would be wired to
the top of the pyramid where would stand a powerful all-union computer system capabl e
of interacting and obtaining data from any subordinate computer .
The vision of the GSVTs was fatally flawed from the start . It was conjured in an er a
when Soviet economists could still dream of giant mathematical models that, if only enoug h
computing power were available, would permit optimal central planning on a national scale .
This scheme originated with academic dreamers who, to judge by their unbelievabl e
naivete, had never had anything to do with building a large computer-based informatio n
system . There is no evidence that the top political or economic leaders ever took i t
seriously and, in any case, it never took a step toward reality . Although never totall y
extinguished, this vision is dimming asymptotically toward invisibility.
23 . Infatuation with Automation in the 1970 s
The view of the computer's place in society in the minds of the Soviet technica l
intelligentsia and officialdom from the 1970s and into the mid-1980s held it to be a numbe r
cruncher, data processor, and the engine of automation . Indeed, nearly every compute r
1 2
application was construed as automation of some kind . This infatuation with automation
was linguistically manifest in the official names coined during that period for variou s
computer applications . The short list of those applications and their acronyms displaye d
in Table 1 shows just how dominant the notion of automation was.
This dream culminated in late 1983 when the State Committee on Science an d
Technology, Gosplan, and the Academy of Sciences developed a plan for the use of
microprocessors in Soviet society. In this plan, the technology's main role would be as the
controller of programmable machine tools, production processes, robots, and smar t
weapons. A second major role in which Soviet thinkers cast the computer was that o f
CAD/CAM (computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing) . Third place in
importance went to the use of microcomputers in research, education and other unspecifie d
information systems. "Personal computing" warranted no mention in this plan of 1983 . 4
2.4 . The Information Society: A New Vision for the 1980s
By the early 1980s, some more astute Soviet observers of Western development s
were already discerning that the computer and communications technologies were spawnin g
something more than just "automation ." They were beginning to see that the mos t
significant and fundamental outgrowth of these technologies was a transformation of man' s
ability to handle information and knowledge . Soviet views of information's role in societ y
underwent discernable evolution in the mid-1980s . A major contribution to this new
assessment came in the form of a book by Grigorii Rafailovich Gromov entitled "Nationa l
Information Resources : Problems of Industrial Exploitation." 5
1 3
TABLE 1 .SOVIET NAMES AND ACRONYMS FOR SELECTED COMPUTER APPLICATION S
WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS AND AMERICAN EQUIVALENT S
Soviet
Soviet Name for theAcronym
Application
ARM
Avtomatizirovannoe rabocho emesto
English Translation and AmericanEquivalent Term
"Automated work place," i .e . ,computerized work station .
AS
Avtomatizirovannaia sistema
ASNI
Avtomatizirovannaia sistem anauchnykh issledovanii
ASOI
Avtomatizirovannaia sistem aobrabotkii informatsii
ASTP Avtomatizirovannaia sistem atekhnologicheskoi podgotovkiproizvodstva
ASU
Avtomatizirovannaia sistem aupravleniia
ASUNS Avtomatizirovannaia sistem aupravleniia neproizvodstvenogosfera
ASUP Avtomatizirovannaia sistem aupravleniia predpriatiem
ASUZhT Avtomatizirovannaia sistem aupravleniia zheleznodorozhny mtransportom
"Automated system," i .e., virtuallyany computer application .
"Automated system of scientificresearch," i.e., any computerapplication in research .
"Automated system of informationprocessing," i.e., computer servicebureau or commercial computercenter .
"Automated system o ftechnological preparation," i .e. ,computer-assisted productio nplanning.
"Automated system of managementor control," i.e., managementinformation system ("MIS") .
"Automated system of managementin the non-productive sphere," i .e . ,a computer application in th eservice sector .
"Automated system of enterprisemanagement," i .e., MIS at the firmlevel .
"Automated system of control inrailroads,"i .e., MIS or DP in therailroads .
1 4
Gromov's book was the first monograph published by the newly formed Departmen t
of Informatics, Computers, and Automation of the Academy of Sciences. Clearly meant t o
make an impact, it carried dual introductions, one by the Academy's Vice President, Evgeni i
Velikhov and another by the late Boris Naumov, then Director of the Academy's Institut e
of Problems of Informatics . The Gromov book has been widely read in Soviet intellectua l
circles, is frequently cited, and has exercised an influence disproportionate to its print ru n
of only 4,700 copies.
What did Gromov say and what conclusions did he draw? Naumov's introductio n
put it well as follows:
G. R. Gromov's monograph is the first book published in Russian tha tattempts to give the reader a comprehensive picture of the dynamics of th egrowth of the world computer industry over 30 years of its development .Against this backdrop, it depicts the principal trends in the development ofcomputer technology that will be operating in the late 1980s and early 1990s .
The reader will find interesting material for thought and conclusion sin this book. In the author's opinion, the information processing industry (i .e . ,the computer and communication sectors) in the industrially develope dnations now plays the same role that heavy industry played in the period o findustrialization. A historically new sector of the national economy, theinformation processing industry, now produces the means of production fo rthe industrial exploitation of a nation's information resources and, thus ,constitutes the necessary technical precondition for the intensification o fpractically all basic sectors of the national economy. 6
Gromov was the first Soviet writer to present a documented case for the existence
and importance of the "information revolution" in advanced Western societies, particularl y
the United States . Not only that, he put the PC and individual computing at the ver y
center of this revolutionary process . After documenting the phenomenal growth of PCs i n
the West, he concluded that :
The potential impact of personal computing on the rate of scientific-technica lprogress is comparable only to that brought about by the invention of th eprinting press. Just as the book, the "fountain of knowledge," escaped fro m
1 5
monastic cells "into the light of day" after the invention of the printing press ,so the personal computer will bring the power of the computer and moderninformation processing out from behind the "moats" of large mainfram ecomputer centers . The computer thereby will be gradually transformed fro ma "mysterious monster" with which people interact only via programme rintermediaries into a simple and familiar personal tool, accessible fo reveryday use at home, work, and study.
A rapidly evolving perception of the nature and significance of the information age
is apparent in the writings of several prominent Soviet intellectuals, e .g., Velikhov,
Dorodnitsin, Naumov, and Marchuk. But none has elaborated so complete a vision of the
"information society" and the process of its formation as Academician Andrei Ershov . In
a pair of remarkable articles published in 1987 and 1988, one in the Party journal
Kommunist and the other in Informatika iobrazovanie, Ershov places himself squarely in th e
tradition of futurologists John Naisbitt and Alvin and Heidi Toffler . He portrays a
strikingly coherent picture of the information future toward which he believes huma n
societies, emphatically including the USSR, must head if they are to be considered
advanced. 8
Ershov coins the rather ungainly neologism "informatization" (informatizatsiia) to
mean a phenomenon that many Westerners might call "computerization" or the "informatio n
revolution." The major difference is that Ershov attempts to impart some specificity to hi s
word whereas its Western counterparts are highly impressionistic notions whose meaning
varies from user to user. To Ershov, "informatization" is the process by which the
"information society" is being built, in just the same way that "industrialization" was th e
process of creating the "industrial society ." He explains it further in the following words :
Informatization is a set of measures aimed at insuring the fulles tpossible use of accurate, complete, and current knowledge in all sociallysignificant aspects of human activity. Information, i .e., the knowledge o ffactual data and the interdependencies among them, is becoming a strategi cresource which determines, in large measure, an entire society's ability t o
1 6
develop successfully. The technical wherewithal for acquiring that resourceconsists mainly of computers and the communications media .
Informatization is a universal and inescapable phase in th edevelopment of human civilization, a time for constructing an informationa lcharacterization of our world, for understanding the unity of the law saccording to which information operates in both nature and society, fo rmastering the practical application of those laws, and for building an industr yto produce and process information. Modern systems for processing andcommunicating information are like a nervous system in the body of huma nsociety, a system giving that body unprecedented plasticity and developmentalpotential . 9
In its historical significance, Ershov places informatization on a par with earlie r
advances in information technology such as the development of written language, th e
invention of the printing press, the inauguration of periodical publications, and mor e
recently, the telegraph, telephone, photography, and xerography . He sees the process being
moved by two forces : First, it is pulled by recent advances in electronics technology ,
especially of integrated circuits and digital computers. Second, it is pushed by the rapid
growth in the numbers of white collar workers and the burgeoning mass of information
generated in modern societies .
In Ershov's view, informatization appeared initially in the United States during the
1940s when radio broadcasting first demonstrated the power of the mass communication s
media, when the country became, for all practical purposes, fully linked by the telephon e
network, and when a necessary technological base was laid in electronics and compute r
science . He believes that the process is sufficiently advanced in the USA to allow us to
comprehend its causes and preconditions, its nature, and the time span required for it s
fulfillment .
1 7
The development of very large scale integration (VLSI) in the 1970s together wit h
the development of microprocessors and personal computers furnish, Ershov believes, th e
clues necessary to visualize the end result of the informatization process . It is a situation
in which every computer " . . .and, by the same token, every workplace, [will have] practicall y
unlimited information and computational capabilities . The simultaneous development o f
an all-encompassing communications infrastructure using satellites and optical fibr e
networks will give information unprecedented mobility and potentially universa l
accessibility ." 1 0
Ershov sketches his vision of the mature information society in terms of a populatio n
numbering 200 to 300 million people, i .e, one roughly equivalent to the USSR, Western
Europe, or North America. Its technological infrastructure consists of the following:
* Various machines in man's direct employ, from digital watche sto airliners, that employ microprocessors rated at about onemillion operations per second (ops) . Assuming that thesenumber about ten per capita, their total comes to two or thre ebillion microprocessors .
* A universal communications network, like a telephone system,with about half a billion entry points, sufficient to permit perso nto person communications for everyone in a mobile society an dto link together all of the following computers .
* Some 300 to 400 million personal computers in homes and wor kplaces connected to the communications system. Each PCwould be rated at several million ops .
* Some 10 million "small" computers, rated at about 10 to 2 0million ops, distributed in offices, shops, and other workplaces .These also would be plugged into the communications network .
* Several hundred thousand generally accessible large regiona land other computer centers that support intra- and inter-regional information flows .
About a thousand supercomputers that, in the time framecontemplated, would each be capable of about ten billio noperations per second .
i
18
The combined computational capacity of this huge distributed processing
infrastructure, estimates Ershov, would be on the order of 10 to 20 million ops per capit a
of population . And on the basis of that he ventures a guess as to how long it would take
the USSR to develop it. Assume, he says, that the USSR had arrived at the threshold o f
the informatization process in the early 1970s . Assume, further, that that threshol d
corresponded to an average per capita computational capacity of 10 ops . If the combined
Soviet capacity were to increase by one order of magnitude every eight or nine years, the n
by Ershov's calculations the USSR will develop the technological infrastructure for a
mature information society sometime between 2030 and 2040 .
Ershov recognizes that this informational infrastructure, the central nervous system
of the information society, is merely so much apparatus and of little use until it is "loaded"
with information and "plugged into" society . Consequently, he sees a protracted process o f
transferring the accumulated knowledge of mankind into the data bases and knowledg e
bases of the system . More than that, it will involve " . . .a generational changing of the guard
in machines and technology, the development of new human skills and work habits, th e
redesign of millions of workplaces, and frequently also the restructuring of billions o f
economic and administrative activities ." He estimates the cost of doing all this over hal f
a century would be equivalent to the entire state budget for two or three years, somethin g
on the order of magnitude of the investment that the United States has made in it s
automotive highway network.
But is this all fantasy? Ershov, himself poses that question in the following words :
. . .[the reader] may be struck by the apparent absurdity of these (veryexpensive) aircastles given the obvious disorder of our social life, particularl yin its everyday manifestations . The mediocre living conditions produced byprimitive wage-leveling, the difficulties of providing food and shelter, the
1 9
overloading and alarming degradation of our energy and transportatio ninfrastructures, and the exorbitantly high share of low-skill and manual laborin our economy - all of these things are our "real life" and they deman durgent action as well as the immediate concentration of all availabl eresources. In such an emergency situation, is not all talk about a fifty-yea rprogram just another " . . .ization" of drearily familiar technocratic voluntarismand futuristic philosophizing? All these questions are too real and serious t obe ignored.11
Ershov, who viscerally favors policies that would make his informatization visio n
become a reality for the Soviet Union, betrays some intellectual ambiguity about th e
political advisability of such a course . Given the dire condition of the Soviet economy, suc h
policies would necessitate a major national effort and that could only be made after makin g
some very difficult political choices . To emphasize the portentousness of those choices ,
Ershov draws a melodramatic analogy from Soviet history :
There is a further consideration, that on the one hand evokes optimism, an don the other councils circumspection, namely, the discussion abou tinformatization has much in common with the stormy debates of the 1920 swhen the problems of electrification and industrialization had to be solvedand the bloody wounds of World War I and the Civil War had to be heale dsimultaneously with overcoming the legacies of oppression and socio -economic backwardness . 1 2
How are these words meant to be interpreted, appearing as they do in th e
Communist Party's leading journal of political theory, one circulated to more than a millio n
subscribers, and certain to be seen by the top leadership of the Party and state? Doe s
Ershov cast himself as a modern Preobrazhensky or Trotsky who, during the 1920s, urge d
the course of forced industrialization and collectivization, the course of centralization
eventually chosen by Stalin? Or does he see himself as a latter-day Bukharin counseling
an "organic" approach that would rely more on decentralized, democratic, and market -
oriented institutions? 13
20
Ershov does not leave his readers wondering . He says that the urgency, feasibility,
preconditions, and implications of informatizing Soviet society emerge not only fro m
futurological imagineering but from empirical observation . One has only to look, he says ,
at those nations, 'where structural economic changes are in harmony with the tempo o f
scientific and technological progress." 14 The process of informatization already has
proceeded to such point there that one can partly perceive the outlines of its completio n
and of the socio-economic implications of its rapid progress. Ershov then recites a set of
statistics showing how advanced the United States is along the way to full "informatization "
and he forecasts that the process will be essentially complete before 2020 . Furthermore,
"due to the activities of transnational corporations, competition, technological transfer, an d
other kinds of economic integration," the information revolution is spreading rapidly t o
Western Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia, and, in recent years, to a series of developing
nations of the Arab world, Southeast Asia, and South America.
The meaning is clear . The entire world is moving rapidly toward the informatio n
society, and if the Soviet Union chooses to stand aside, it will be at the cost of becomin g
a global laggard. Ershov sees the social payoffs to informatization in higher labor
productivity, wider use of materials-conserving technologies, more rapid cycles of design and
construction, and improvement in the quality of services, especially in trade and medicine .
He makes no explicit mention of military enhancement but his repeated reference t o
information as a "strategic resource" leaves little doubt that he is aware also of that payoff .
Finally, he nails down his point by saying ,
It is vital to point out that these benefits can be achieved in no other way .Knowledge and information are resources for which no substitutes exist . 1 5
2 1
Having established what he calls the "external imperative" for the Soviet informatio n
revolution, Ershov moves on to sketch the domestic preconditions for it to occur . He
enumerates three major challenges that must be met . The first two are technical in nature
while the third goes to the heart of the social implications of the Soviet informatio n
revolution.
The first requirement for the informatization of the USSR is trivially obvious to
everyone who is acquainted with the prevailing situation. It must organize the mass
production and implementation of computers and communications facilities . The existing
one-of-a-kind and small-scale production is totally inadequate to the demands of th e
information society . According to Ershov, the Soviet Union needs entirely ne w
manufacturing facilities, highly automated, and capable of producing very reliable hig h
technology equipment in great volume at low cost . He says that the costs of producing an d
operating such equipment in the USSR must be reduced by 30 to 100 times below current
levels!
The second requirement is to create a software and knowledge base industry in the
USSR, something that, by implication, Ershov acknowledges does not yet exist .
Significantly, he notes that building software as well as creating data bases and knowledg e
bases involves a unique combination of traditionally incompatible work styles, i .e., the
creative inspiration of the writer or artist ; the detached, deliberate, and abstract
contemplation of the mathematician ; and the discipline, pragmatism, and purposefulness o f
the engineer . The Soviet Union must, says Ershov, find ways of encouraging this uniqu e
type of effort. Furthermore, it must learn how to determine the real worth of th e
programmer's product, and must forge measures that would encourage the self-generated
(
7 2
growth of newly emerging sectors of the economy. This software and knowledge industr y
should have an annual output of 10 to 20 billion rubles by the beginning of the next centur y
and should double every five years thereafter, he estimates .
Having said the required and familiar things about solving various technical
problems of hardware and software production, Ershov moves on to spell out a number of
very fundamental social requirements and implications of the information revolution i f
there is to be such a thing in the Soviet Union .
In the final analysis, he asserts, it is the human element in the process of
informatization that is most critical . Turning first to the nature of white collar work ,
Ershov asserts that informatization both requires and makes possible its radica l
transformation. By obviating the necessity for bureaucrats and other paper pushin g
intermediaries that are now interposed between knowledge workers and the information
that they require, Ershov believes that the information revolution both requires an d
promises the liberation of society from bureaucratic suffocation . He woos dubious readers
of Kommunist in the following rhapsody:
The total informatization of society will bring all of society's knowledgewithin reach of every person. Only such universal potential accessibility willallow us to realize the requirement of the communist ideal, i .e., from eachperson according to his ability. But human ability cannot be planned . Itsmanifestation requires many conditions but it can occur only at the initiativ eof the individual himself. And ability is multiplied by knowledge . Therefore,the guarantee of man's fundamental right to knowledge, to full information ,becomes yet another cornerstone in the building of socialism . 1 6
Ershov lists several aspects of the existing Soviet socio-economic and administrativ e
structure that he believes are incompatible with the information revolution and which mus t
be profoundly altered .
23
First of all, he says, " . . .we must rehabilitate the concept of individual initiative . "1 7
And society must find ways of properly evaluating the contribution of individual initiative .
Finally, personal initiative has certain inherent characteristics such as its unpredictabilit y
and its propensity to flourish in circumstances when ability, knowledge, interest, and social
are serendipitously joined .
One of the barriers that blocks the liberation of individual initiative and the creatio n
of new knowledge in the Soviet Union, says Ershov, is the ".. .institutional assignment o f
responsibility for progress in one or another sector of economic life." Here he has in min d
the hoary Soviet principle of conferring the status of "lead organization" upon a particula r
institution with the concomitant responsibility, although rarely the authority, for leading th e
nation's efforts to develop a specific field of science or industry . This principle is a
carryover of the old Stalinist tendency to see important scientific or economic tasks as
military-like objectives to be attacked in campaigns led by commanders and executed by
echelons of scientific or economic "shock troops ." But the principle has no place in
Ershov's vision of the information society as the following words make clear :
The consistent implementation of this principle at all levels of themanagement hierarchy spawns monopoly, obsequity in industrial research, an dintolerance or inability to understand another's idea . Society must have amechanism for launching new ideas into orbit irrespective of where theyoriginate or who might be their carriers . 1 8
Next, Ershov assails another attribute of the existing Soviet system, " . . .the absurd
proliferation of `proprietary information' ." Bureaucratic usurpation of the citizen's right t o
information, he says,
. . .constantly violates the principle of social justice that consists in the equalright of access to socially significant information which, like other forms o fcommon property, ought to be universally accessible .
The lack or
(
24
underdevelopment of legal guarantees of the right to information leads to adegradation of bibliographical and archival work and informational sclerosis .Furthermore, it increases the probability of wrong decisions, substitutes myth sfor knowledge, and, most importantly, retards creative activity .
The democratization of society's informational structure is th eguarantee and precondition of its vitality and its capacity for development . 1 9
2.5 . "Automation" vs. "Informatization" - A Clash of Visions
The vision of the future Soviet information society, and the process of achieving it ,
that Ershov has elaborated is not yet accepted unanimously in Soviet political or intellectual
circles. Indeed, it may never be . The older vision of "automation" that was popular in th e
1970s is still alive and it rivals that of "informatization" for influence . How are the
attractions and flaws of the two visions perceived? And who perceives them so ?
The vision of automation appeals to the more conservative elements of the Sovie t
polity for the following reasons :
* It complements and extends what they dislike about glasnost'.
* It is devoid of all explicit preconditions and implications fo rfreedom of information, disestablishment of the bureaucracy,and fundamental social change.
* It is conceptually more familiar and concrete. Therefore, it iseasier to think about .
* It is less expensive in that it requires far less capital investmen tin the communications infrastructure and very little compute rtechnology for private individuals .
It is linked more obviously to the processes of physica lproduction which generations of Soviets instructed in Marxis tmaterialism hold in highest regard .
• It is more consistent with mental attitudes that value disciplin eand order, and that are suspicious of unbridled individualis m
2 5
which are perceived to breed excessive spontaneity(stikhinnost') .
* It places society's material investment in information technolog yin the hands of powerful and existing organizational entities ,i .e., ministries, institutes, enterprises, etc ., rather than disbursingit to private individuals .
* It promises to stabilize the existing economic and administrativ estructure .
These are powerful arguments that unquestionably have many adherents in Sovie t
industry, government bureaucracies, and conservative academia, as well as among guardian s
of ideological purity and members of the Party apparatus .
On the other side are those favoring the "informatization" vision propounded by
Ershov and his allies. These tend to fall into two overlapping groups . The first consists o f
computer theorists and top-flight practitioners, cybernetics specialists, and market-oriente d
economic reformers. They favor the Ershov vision because :
* It is consistent with theories of self-organizing and self -regulating systems that appeal to cyberneticists and others tha tthink along similar lines .
* It offers much greater scope for genuine creativity in compute rscience and technology as well as the opportunity t omeaningfully participate in the world information community ,both of which appeal to the more cerebral and ambitious Sovie tcomputer specialists .
* It is consistent with the great qualitative and quantitativ eimprovements in Soviet economic information, as well as thei rvastly broader dissemination, that are required if future Sovie tmarkets are to function properly .
A second, rather motley, group of people also leans in Ershov's direction when an d
if they stop to ponder the two visions . This group includes most "hard" scientists ,
26
democratically inclined political reformers, Westernizers, younger intellectuals, and certai n
others who wish the Soviet Union to remain a "great power ." They see the advantages o f
the Ershov version of the information society as follows :
It complements and extends what they like about glasnost'.
It makes a "scientific" case for greater intellectual freedom .
It furthers the ideal of an open, democratic, and civil society .
It disquiets Soviet conservatives and therefore appeals toiconoclasts and disestablishmentarians .
It offers greater prospects for westernizing Soviet society .
It emphasizes individual worth and freedom .
It offers greater hope that the Soviet Union will not slip intothird world status while the rest of the world bounds into th einformation age .
If Ershov's articles were the opening rounds in the great debate over the type o f
information society the Soviet Union is to have, it was immediately followed by salvos fro m
his allies. These took the form of a series of articles in various reformist and popula r
scientific publications that are extremely critical of the lagging pace of the informatio n
revolution and the pathetic state of personal computing in the USSR. Literaturnaia gazeta
(1988 :4) fired off a series of interviews and articles . NTR: Problemy i resheniia (1988 :1)
followed with a selection of letters and articles on the state of the computerization proces s
in the USSR. 20 Space precludes a complete treatment of these fascinating articles bu t
some extended discussion will impart their flavor and indicate how this debate is closel y
linked to the more general one about the direction and pace of change in Soviet society .
27
The editors of Literaturnaia gazeta asked a group of knowledgeable informatio n
systems authorities the following questions : "How do you evaluate the personal compute r
situation prevailing here? How do you see the prospects?"
The first answer comes from F . Shirokov, a computer design research manager and
author of the (so-far unpublished) book On theRoadto the Fifth Generation Computer ,
who says : It's a catastrophe. Neither more nor less . . . .our existing level of compute r
production varies between 1/100 and 1/1,000 of the American level. To begin a
competition from such a level is hopeless -- we need a great leap forward ." Having
established that point, he continues to urge a "Japanese strategy" of massive importation o f
foreign computers and the computer manufacturing technology .
Next comes A . Giglavyi, a senior researcher at the Institute of Electronic Contro l
Machinery. He says: "The situation is simply perilous . . . .the computers we produce are
freaks on which nothing serious can be done . They aren't compatible with internationa l
standards and there are no peripherals, which is to say that our computers lack hands, legs ,
eyes, or ears . Every hour our computer industry works throws us backwards a full day. "
From here, he advocates a policy of virtual reliance on imports with diversion of resource s
to a total reconstruction of the information infrastructure [i .e., the telecommunications
network.] rather than continued "wasting" of it on a hopeless computer industry .
M. Donskoi, a senior researcher in artificial intelligence at a prestigious Moscow
institute, says "The situation is tragic in all respects whether we look at scientific research,
cultural development, or education." He favors a dual track "Chinese strategy" of buyin g
computers abroad while investing in the domestic hardware and software industry, an d
training the new generation of users. A_ Rodionov, a programmer and developer o f
28
computer music, says : 'The situation is so bad that there seems to be no way out ." He also
favors the purchase of foreign computer technology and an emphasis on software
domestically. But he says, it is necessary to " ...radically change the existing style o f
thinking. Bureaucrats and the computer are incompatible: the technology is a clear threa t
to their well being; they understand that very well --- and they obstruct ." 2 1
In its first issue for 1988, NTR: Problemy i resheniia followed the lead o f
Literaturnaia gazeta by publishing a series of letters and articles. These missives, especially
that by Muscovite F. Shirokov, focused on the reasons for the Soviet lag behind othe r
countries in this field . A flood of readers' letters was provoked and the magazine returne d
to the topic repeatedly in subsequent issues. In his letter, Shirokov first documented the
poor quality and mutual incompatibility of Soviet "professional" PCs (i .e., the ES-1840 ,
ISKRA-1010, and NEIRON I9 .66), and then weighed in as follows:
The road which our "compatible" personal computers are taking todayleads nowhere. The computers which are being produced can only discredi tthe idea of computerization. In order to correct the situation, complet eglasnost' in everything involving personal computers, their present and thei rfuture, is necessary. We must publish and discuss the technical tasks for ne wpersonal computers and give the most detailed information about th emicroprocessors on which they will be implemented ; organize permanen t(intersectorial!) product selection offices in all large cities, accessible t oanyone "off the street ;" organize the competitive design of microprocessorsand made-to-order integrated circuits; and create an organization of users ,independent of producers, which evaluates the quality of said persona lcomputers .
If these or similar measures are not introduced, if the developers an dproducers "obscure" as before, and the ministries and departments continu eto guard the regimental honor, if society does not even know the last name sof those responsible for the state acceptance of new computers, then, in mas sproducing 100,000 such computers per year at a cost of 10,000 rubles apiece ,billions of rubles will be blown away on the wind . 2 2
29
Then there is the letter of M. Kuzmin, also a computer specialist, who writes i n
support of previous critical articles and letters as follows :
The ministries and departments are, undoubtedly, trying to soften th eevaluations which were expressed [in previous issues] . They relate thei rachievements and, as usual, promise to correct the situation in the shortestpossible time. Do not believe them! All of the evaluations are accurate : yes,it is truly a catastrophe, a truly tragic situation. All of the problemsmentioned in the articles are real and serious . This is the unanimous opinio nof the opposite side—the users of computer equipment . . . .I can bear witnessto the fact that over the last 2-3 years, in which the word "computerization"has appeared in our newspapers so frequently, the real situation in ourcountry has continued to worsen and our lag has noticeably increased. . . .Weare too far behind to make something of our own . Therefore, it is necessaryprecisely to copy, but to do it more quickly and more precisely, in critica lcases most likely using licenses from foreign companies which specialize i nthis field .
Meanwhile, the only thing that those comrades responsible fo rcomputers in our country have been successful in is creating artificial barrier sin the path to their import—not only for personal use, but also fo rorganizations. Yet, the most amazing thing is that insuperable obstacles als oblock the path to making purchases in the socialist countries . 23
Finally, A. I . Rakitov, a professor and doctor of philosophical sciences, writes a lette r
in which he echoes Ershov's vision, urges the creation of a developed information society ,
and mounts a slashing attack on matters as they now stand .
In a historical competition, that socioeconomic system will win whic hknows how to produce information of the best quality, in the greatest volumeand which uses it effectively. Today, the U .S. holds first place in this regard .It is followed by Japan, the West European countries, and only then by th eSoviet Union .
. . .when we started industrialization in 1927, we lagged behind the leadin gcapitalist countries by a factor of 6-8 . Today, starting informatization,according to basic indicators we are lagging by factors of hundreds, sometime sthousands .
In computer production, we lag not only quantitatively but als oqualitatively; our personal computers are the poorest in the world . In theUnited States, personal computers capable of several million operations pe rsecond are already being produced_ We make far less powerful equipment ,
30
"stolen" from Western 1980-1981 models, and are planning to produce model swhich are being taken out of production in other countries . It is impossibl eto reconcile oneself to such a situation.
. . .[The Party] should make the problem of informatization of society the firs tpriority in the system of socioeconomic preferences. It should not simply b econsidered one of the development trends, but a super-priority key trend,without which we will not overcome the lag, will not create a knowledg eeconomy, will not preserve our place as a great power, will not ensure adeserved place in solving global problems and will not overcome stagnatio nphenomena in the economy . Therefore, we must work out a breakthroug hstrategy, in several directions . Above all, we must begin to create generall yaccessible knowledge and data bases, to develop integrated communicationssystems and to set up mass production of modern computers, extensivel yinvolving (I would say, under any conditions) foreign firms .
All of this will be repaid a hundredfold . If we give our people reliablemodern computers, open access to all necessary information, and if we le tthem derive the benefit and profit from it, there will be no shortage of funds.True, we must overcome yet another great barrier in order to do this ; thephilosophy of secrecy, thanks to which we frequently hide technical, everyday ,transport, medical, economic and other information not so much from ou renemies, mystical spies and saboteurs, as from ourselves . Essentially, we arethrowing to the winds our most valuable property — information, the spiritua lachievements of our scientists and engineers who, again, are being deprive dof value. Instead of being useful to our people and to society, we onl yincrease the arbitrariness of our engineering and scientific bureaucrats, wh oare building their own well-being on the country's lag and on the inadequat elevel of information for the specialists, the higher echelons of power and th eentire population. It is impossible to carry out restructuring, withou trestructuring the information sphere, without creating a knowledge economy ,without converting into an information society . 2 4
From this discussion, it is obvious that many knowledgeable Soviet compute r
specialists have given up on the domestic industry and feel that the information revolutio n
will never happen in the USSR if they try any longer to rely on it . It is also clear that th e
debate between the proponents of the two competing visions of the Soviet informationa l
future is but a part of the larger debate about the future of Soviet society . The battle i s
joined but its outcome is far from certain . Outside observers can gage its progress not onl y
3 1
by the protagonists' words but by watching for certain behavioral telltales indicative of th e
direction and velocity of the official winds. Critical clues to watch for are discussed i n
Section 7 .
32
3. The Supply of Personal Computers in the USSR
We turn now to examine the state of personal computing in the Soviet Union . Some
Westerners may be surprised to learn that such a thing exists . It does, but it is in its
infancy. The Chairman of the State Committee on Computers and Informatics ("SCCI") ,
N. V. Gorshkov, said in late 1987 that the total Soviet inventory of PCs was about 100,00 0
and he compared that with an annual U.S. production of more than five million .2 5
According to the SCCI, only the five personal "home" computers displayed in Tabl e
2 were being sold at retail in the USSR in 1988. Except for the BK-0010, they are being
produced and sold in extraordinarily small numbers . In addition to these "home"
TABLE 2. FEATURES OF SOVIET "HOME" PERSONAL COMPUTER S
FeatureProcessorUS analogueByte size (bits)RAM size, Kbyte sRAM expandable?ROM size, Kbyte sROM expandable?External memoryMonitorCompatibilityYear introducedPrice (rubles )Number produced in :
19871988 (plan)
Name of Compute rMIKROSHA KRISTA L'VOVKR580
KR580
KR58018080
I8080
180808
8
832
32
64Yes
Yes
No2
2
16Yes
Yes
No
SURA
BK-0010KR580
K181 0I8080
PDP-1 18
1664
32Yes
No16
32Yes
Yes Audio cassette recorder TV set
KRISTA
MIKROSHA none
none
none1986
1987
1988
1988
1985500
510
750
995
65 0
3,400
200
300
390
20,0002,450
1,600
3,000
3,000
20,000
Source: Gorelov (1988).
33
computers, the USSR serially produces three more-or-less IBM-PC compatibles which are
called "professional" PCs in the Soviet lexicon : Minpribor's ISKRA 1030 priced at 10,000
rubles, Minradioprom's ES 1840 priced at 12,000 rubles, and Minpromsviazi's NEIRO N
I9.66 whose price is conjectured to be in the same range . In addition, Minelektronpro m
makes the ELEKTRONIKA-85 which is also billed as a professional PC . 2 6
Gorshkov stated that SCCI's "analytical calculations" indicate that the Soviet Unio n
only needs from 20 to 25 million PCs of which half would be in educational institutions and
the remainder "would be used professionally." The "professional" needs of economists an d
engineers are estimated at about eight million units while scientists and CAD-equippe d
designers are reckoned each to need more than two million high performance machines .
Gorshkov stated that the annual rate of PC production was currently "about a
hundred thousand" and that this would increase to "more than a million units" by th e
beginning of the next Five Year Plan, i .e ., 1991. These figures are roughly consistent with
the data from other Soviet sources that are displayed in Table 3 . Gorshkov also stated that
they plan to "satiate the nation's market" for PCs in the 14th Five Year Plan, i .e, by the
year 2001 .27 In assessing the realism of these plans, it is worth noting that computer outpu t
has consistently lagged behind plan targets, that the 1987 plan was substantially
underfulfilled, and that most available evidence indicates that the 12th Five Year Plan fo r
PC production also will not be met.
The official Soviet plans for PC production, as articulated by Gorshkov and quote d
above, slates the nation's entire output of these machines into educational and professiona l
uses. Indeed, the limited output of domestically produced PCs and the few foreign model s
being imported are presently distributed like all other scarce industrial machinery, i .e., by
34
TABLE 3. PRODUCTION OF PERSONAL COMPUTERS IN THE USS R
Year
1985-1990 (plan)(thousands)
Actual Planned1985 8.81986 27.61987 51 .2 64.81988 151 .81989 389.21990 560.3
Sources : Vestnik statistiki, 1988 :7, p. 62, and data displayed at the Computer Technologypavilion of the All Union Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy in July ,1988 .
Gosplan, the state planning committee. The machines end up in state organizations an d
extraordinarily few find their way into private hands . 28 Virtually no role seems to b e
anticipated for truly individual ownership of "personal" computers . That clearly indicates
that the Ershov vision of "informatization" has yet to have great impact on official policy .
But does it mean that a popular desire for personal computers is nonexistent ?
3 5
4. A Popular Information Culture in the USSR: Is One Emerging ?
We turn now to examine the nature of popular attitudes toward computers in the
Soviet Union. Is there a market for personal computers in the USSR? Is the kind o f
computer culture that is arising in the United States and elsewhere in the West arising in
the USSR? What exposures do ordinary Soviet citizens have to the "informatio n
revolution? "
4.1. How Are Soviet Citizens Exposed to Computers ?
The desire to own or operate personal computers is rarely self generating . A few
technologically inclined "hackers" aside, most people become sensitized to computers an d
their potentials by a sequence of exposures that gradually build their awareness an d
interest. Those exposures can occur at work, at school, at play (video and compute r
games), by observing and conversing with other people who already own or are using PCs ,
by visiting retail outlets where PCs are on sale, from advertisements and reportage in th e
media, by seeing PCs on exhibit, or by using services in which computers play a conspicuous
role. To what extent are Soviet citizens exposed in these various ways to compute r
technology, particular PCs ?
4.1.1. Workplace Exposure to Computers
Computer technology in general and PCs in particular are neither abundant nor
unknown in Soviet workplaces . Several tens of thousands of mainframes and
minicomputers operate in Soviet enterprises and computer centers . Nearly three hundred
thousand programmers in addition to other systems specialists attend all of this hardware . 2 9
36
But even if their numbers were many times greater, these "mainframers" would be unlikel y
propagators of awareness and enthusiasm for personal involvement with computers amon g
the broader population . On the contrary, American experience suggests that mainframe
professionals derive considerable satisfaction in perpetuating the myth of the computer a s
an Olympian techno-god whose anointed priests they, themselves, have become due t o
their superior and mystical talents. Mainframe specialists have been in the rearguard of the
PC movement in this country, sneering and sniping at the upstart's incursions into their hol y
domain, and resenting the diminution in their status caused by everyman's growing intimacy
with the technology . No evidence has come to light to suggest that things might be
different in the Soviet Union .
Industrial automation is far less advanced in the Soviet Union than in the West o r
Japan but, even so, computerized controlling devices have found their way into many Sovie t
aircraft, machine tools, and other types of equipment. Can these devices, ranging from
minicomputers to microprocessors, be the genesis of a popular computer culture? Th e
answer is almost certainly negative for the reason that these very technical applications d o
not resonate with the interests and concerns of most people. While some of the engineers
and other specialists that work with these devices may broaden their computer interests
from vocation to avocation and even become "home brew" computer tinkers, their interests
are likely to remain technical in nature . Many of them are more interested in cobbling a
computer together than in using it once made . Few ordinary mortals are potentia l
computer "home brew" addicts and a popular computer culture is unlikely to come from thi s
quarter. Indeed, a flourishing "home brew" community can be taken as contraindicative o f
a healthy and growing mass computer culture since it implies the scarcity or tota l
37
unavailability of "off the shelf' personal computers and the consequent necessity for
organizations and individuals to meet their computer needs by building their own machines .
The conclusion is that ordinary Soviet citizens, except for residents of Moscow an d
a few other major cities, have infrequent direct encounters with computers in the course o f
day to day work . This must be contrasted with the increasingly pervasive involvement that
Americans have with computers and related technologies in their daily experiences . It
would be incorrect, however, to conclude that the relatively limited contact that Sovie t
citizens have with computers has altogether precluded the arousal of interest and awakenin g
of some latent demand for PCs among the populace . Other influences also operate and ,
although each may still be limited in its impact, the effect is cumulative .
4.1.2. Educational Exposure to Computers in the USS R
Elsewhere we have described the massive campaign to expose Soviet students t o
computers that was begun in 1985 . 30 In that year, a new computer literacy course entitle d
'The Fundamentals of Informatics and Computer Technology" (FICT) was mandated fo r
all students in the last two years of secondary school . Four years have passed since th e
initiation of that course and we can form some early judgments about the amount an d
type of computer exposure that Soviet youngsters are receiving in the schools .
The most serious deficiency of the FICT is that the percentage of students receivin g
"hands-on" computer experience remains very low. During the 1987/88 school year, only
13 .7 per cent of secondary schools had computer laboratories. It merits mention, also, tha t
this percentage varies greatly among republics . For example, it is 21 .6 in the Ukrainia n
republic but only 0.6 in Kirgizia and Turkmenia . Rural schools, in general, rate very
38
poorly . In the USSR as a whole, there were only 61 .8 thousand computer workstations i n
the schools for more than 4 .6 million ninth and tenth grade students who are required t o
take the FICT, which works out to about 75 pupils per computer on the average .3 1
Even those students fortunate enough to have access to classroom computers fin d
that the design of the FICT course provides a narrow range of computer applications, ones
mainly limited to basic programming. The attractiveness of the educational computing
experience is diminished by the fact that the schools have received machines of very limite d
capabilities for which the software is even more limited . Finally, the frustrations of workin g
with unreliable computers using programming languages that employ English syntax must ,
to some extent, erode youthful enthusiasm.
Despite these and many other travails of Soviet educational computing, reports fro m
Soviet classrooms filtering through the press indicated that many Soviet students hav e
caught the computer "bug" and relish their opportunity to explore this new technology . It
can hardly be doubted that the new computer literacy course being offered to millions o f
Soviet secondary school children is the most significant mass exposure to this technolog y
so far to have occurred in the USSR .
The FICT is now sputtering ahead with uncertain momentum. That this momentum
should be accelerated is extraordinarily important to the formation of a Soviet computer
culture since educational computing offers the Soviet Union its single best hope fo r
developing a minimum level of familiarity with this technology in the years immediatel y
ahead. At the same time, it is the most promising means for stimulating interest in an d
demand for PCs that now exists in the USSR .
39
4.1.3. Computer Games and Computer Clubs in the USS R
Microprocessor-based video games play a significant role in awakening youn g
Americans to the enjoyment of interacting with "intelligent" machines . The transition from
video games to computer games with more sophisticated logic is a natural move for many
game enthusiasts. And the appetite for high resolution, multi-color computer monitor s
undoubtedly is whetted by customers' previous experiences with video games .
Video games also are popular in the USSR although the demand for them is fa r
from fully met and the technology is comparatively primitive . Simple games are available
in limited quantities at major children's department stores in major Soviet cities . Video
game parlors or arcades may be found in scattered locations in large cities . The small
memories and otherwise limited capabilities of Soviet personal and educational computer s
(e.g., Minelektronprom's BK-0010) make them suitable for little more than game playing .
Some Soviet youngsters who are fortunate enough to have access to these computers at
home or school delight in writing or copying games programs for playing on these machines .
Popular science magazines such as Kvant and Radio print a few listings of such games o n
their monthly pages . A small but active grey-market trade in illicitly copied Wester n
computer games flourishes among Moscow computer cognoscenti .
The first young persons' computer club in Moscow, "Nash Arbat" ("Our Arbat"), wa s
established in 1986 upon the initiative of Garri Kimovich Kasparov, the world ches s
champion. Kasparov, who had become a PC enthusiast in 1983, proposed to Academicia n
Evgenii P. Velikhov that a club be formed with computer chess as one of its main foci .
Velikhov, eager to popularize computers among Soviet youth, joined with Kasparov i n
formally opening the club . On that occasion Kasparov worried aloud about his country's
40
lag in computerization and admonished his young audience that, " . . .today it is critically
important to master the computer, especially for young people . Incidentally, this must be
done now, immediately — events are racing ahead and tomorrow already may be too late ."3 2
The computer clubs now sprouting in numerous Soviet cities function as bazaars for
selling and swapping games software . Visits to clubs in Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, and
Tallinn in the summer of 1988 typically found a clutch of young "hackers" and game s
enthusiasts milling about a motley collection of BK-0010, Commodore 64, and "home brew "
machines. These organizations are lively forums for showing and sharing tips, programs,
and recently acquired Western computer paraphernalia.
There seems to be little doubt that computer games and computer clubs are playing
a role in exposing some considerable number of Soviet youngsters to interactive computing.
That must be having the inevitable effect of raising their general level of consciousness o f
personal computing. How widespread this phenomenon may now be is very difficult t o
assess. But the limited number of computers and other interactive recreational devices tha t
are available in the USSR suggests that the impact may be correspondingly limited . To
date, the impact has been confined mostly to the larger cities with their large r
concentrations of computers to play on and computer clubs within which to swap, sell, an d
share experiences. But the future role of recreational computing and computer clubs i s
potentially significant across a much larger segment of the Soviet population.
4.1.4 . Computer Retailing in the USS R
The explosion of computer consciousness in the United States began in the late -
1970s with the appearance of retail stores specializing in personal computers and their
(
(
(
4 1
software. The opportunity to see, touch, and receive a sales pitch was and is a powerfu l
stimulus to the formation of America's popular computer culture.
Few such opportunities are available in the Soviet Union today. Retail exposure i s
minimal at present . It is not easy to discover where PCs are sold in the USSR .
Minelektronprom maintains a network of retail stores and some of these sell PCs, primarily
the BK-0010 . The "Radiotekhnika" stores in Moscow, Kazan and Saratov are said to sell
the MIKROSHA personal computer . Specialized computer retail stores have yet to com e
into existence and department stores have no computer sales departments although
computer kits are said sometimes to be available in certain stores such as "Detskii Mir" i n
Moscow .
A visit to Minelektronprom's Elektronika retail store at 78 Leninskii Prospekt in
Moscow during July, 1988 produced several interesting observations . The computers being
displayed included the BK-0010 personal computer, the KUVT-86 classroom networ k
(about 20,000 rubles depending on configuration), an ELEKTRONIKA 85, and several
other Minelektronprom microcomputers . During an hour long observation period one
weekday afternoon, very few people came to look at the machines . The computer display
usually was deserted although occasionally one or two people would stroll over to cas t
bemused or bewildered looks at the machines . None of the computers was turned on an d
no software was in evidence . No sales personnel were attendant although a searc h
disclosed two reasonably knowledgeable technicians conversing in an adjacent room . A
barrier separated onlookers from the machines and had to be surmounted in order to loo k
closely at the machines . Doing that occasioned no objection nor did switching on one o f
the machines, a DVK-2M . None of the Soviet onlookers approached the machines an d
42
none showed particular interest in what an obviously foreign visitor was doing .
A sign-up orderbook was positioned on a counter for each type of compute r
displayed at the Elektronika store and each contained numerous pages listing the name s
and addresses of those wishing to purchase the systems . An inspection of these books
revealed three interesting things about the names on the lists . First, the lists were lengthy,
ranging from about fifty to about two hundred entries for each model, even though th e
computers had been on display for only three days . Second, the geographical spread of the
signers was very broad, almost from border to border of the USSR . Third was the
predominance of cooperatives among the would-be buyers . Naturally, it was impossible t o
determine how the cooperatives planned to use the machines, but one could conjecture tha t
they hoped to build software and/or provide computer services . Schools were not among
the signers even though one of the systems displayed was a classroom network. Presumably
the schools receive their computers via official supply channels rather than purchase a t
retail .
One of the technicians at the Moscow Elektronika store stated that it was unique
in the Soviet Union . A few BK-0010 computers (194 in 1985, and a "few thousand" i n
following years) had been sold earlier at the Moscow store as well as in other main towns ,
he said, but the new store on Leninskii Prospekt was the only one in the country featurin g
a permanent display of larger computers offered for sale at retail . A five week auto tour
of the Ukraine, the RSFSR, Estonia, and Belorussia produced no evidence to contradict
him. Minelektronprom maintains retail (firmovye) stores in various cities and BK-001 0
home computers may be offered occasionally in some of them although none wer e
encountered .
43
Most of the stock in trade in the Elektronika and Radiotekhnika stores consists o f
radios, television sets, hand calculators, audio cassette recorders, etc. Nowhere are
computer supplies and important peripherals, e.g., floppy disks, disk drives, printers, sold
at retail in the USSR or, in some cases, even produced . Soviet industry does not
manufacture floppy disks and Soviet informants indicate that, if one is not in receipt o f
officially distributed supplies, the grey market is their only recourse33
At the Elektronika store in Moscow during the senior author's visit, the indifferenc e
shown by Soviet shoppers toward the computers contrasted sharply with the intense interes t
displayed by a clutch of would–be buyers collected at a VCR counter located at th e
opposite end of the store . People were standing in a long line to enter their names on a
waiting list to buy the devices. When asked how long customers had to wait before the y
could take delivery, a clerk answered, "four years." The demand for this type o f
information technology is alive and well in the Soviet Union .
Development of a network of retail computer stores would do much to expose the
Soviet public to PCs and further computer awareness . Minelektronprom plans to introduce
more stores like the one on Leninskii Prospekt in Moscow . But at what rate no one seems
prepared to say .
No discussion of computer retailing in the USSR would be complete withou t
mention of commission stores and the "grey" market . Commission stores are one of the few
legal ways in which individuals may trade personal items . They are, in effect, second-hand
stores that sell personal chattels on a commission basis . Their stock in trade is mainly
junk but goods-hungry Soviet buyers watch them for infrequent appearances of somethin g
worthwhile to buy. Occasionally, quite rarely, personal computers appear in the commissio n
44
stores. Typically, they are small machines, not bigger than a Commodore 64, that woul d
cost $200 at most in the West . Commission store prices for such PCs in the USSR rang e
upward from 2,500 rubles .
The Soviet grey market in PCs and Western software is the place to buy more
modern Western or Southeast Asian PCs . Prices for IBM-PC compatibles reportedly rang e
from 10,000 rubles to 40,000 depending on their configuration, and are on the rise . Some
buyers reportedly have paid up to five years' salary to own an IBM PC . Peripherals and
supplies, especially floppy disks which are in acute deficit because Soviet customs rules limi t
to ten the number of floppies that travelers may bring into the country, are extraordinaril y
valuable commodities on the grey market 34
4.1.5. "Informatics Centers" as Surrogates for Computer Store s
The absence of retail computer stores and computer advertising together with th e
shortage of informative computer publications leaves a huge information void . That such
a void exists is certified by the following excerpt from a Leningrader's letter to the editor s
of Radio:
Recently I found myself involuntarily caught up in the computer "boom." I'dlike to try out with my own hands what the radio and TV have been shoutin gabout. . . But information about how to start, which home computers areproduced in this country, how they are priced, what are their features (neve rmind where to buy one!) is nowhere to be found . And how to developcomputer skills? Alas, the magazines don't publish such information . Isuppose it is even more difficult to get such information for the citizens o frural areas and small cities! 35
45
The State Committee on Computers and Informatics (SCCI) is sponsoring th e
creation of "Informatics Centers" in various Soviet cities. The Informatics Center is a
peculiarly Soviet institution and is to the Soviet computerization campaign what th e
agitpunkt is (or was) to Soviet political propaganda . They are intended to perform th e
following functions :
* Provide consultation and advice on the choice and use ofcomputer hardware and software .
* Demonstrate software.
* Provide training and troubleshooting services in both hardwar eand software.
* Rent and lease computers and software for home use . Deliverequipment to residences, check it out, and provide instructio nto users .
* Perform accounting and other computer services for customers .
* Sell software to individuals, cooperatives, and otherorganizations .
* Market software and services provided by individuals andorganizations on a commission basis .
* Develop custom software for individuals and organizations .
Five such centers had been established in Moscow by the summer of 1988 . One of
them, at 4 Smolensk Bulevard, had a motley collection of PCs including the following : BK-
0010, MIKROSHA, AGAT, ROBOTRON 1715, ELEKTRONIKA-85, and ES-1840 . This
Informatics Center, like all others, operates on a self financing (khozraschet) basis and al l
services must be paid for. According to the SCCI, sixteen other Soviet cities hav e
Informatics Centers . 36
4 6
The Informatics Centers are, one supposes, better than nothing, but they will hardl y
substitute for a network of aggressive retail computer stores in awakening the latent Sovie t
demand for personal computers . They are a tepid and typically administrative response t o
an acute need for messianic organizations to spread information and create popula r
awareness and enthusiasm for computers . And they are hardly more than a gesture in th e
right direction .
4.1.6. Personal Computers in the Soviet Press
Until 1985, PCs were rarely mentioned in the Soviet media . "Automation" was the
key word until the middle of this decade and the computer was seen as its engine . Early
articles about PCs were highly superficial and written in a tone more resembling that o f
science fiction than of ordinary reportage .
In the early 1980s, isolated articles about PC developments in the West appeare d
in the specialized press but not elsewhere37 The failure of the popular Soviet press to take
notice of the Western PC "revolution" before 1985 does not yield to any obvious
explanation. Two alternative hypotheses may be considered . Perhaps it indicated official
suspicion or disapproval of the individualistic direction that PCs were taking compute r
development . Conjecturing further along this line, perhaps Soviet writers in the pre-
glasnost' era were reluctant to speak of PCs pending an explicit statement of approval fro m
on high. Alternatively, Soviet writers may have failed to write about PCs before 1985
because neither they nor the leading lights of Soviet science realized the significance of th e
PC revolution. Although the available evidence hardly allows us to reject either theory, th e
second seems more plausible to us .
4 7
Whatever the reason for the stillness surrounding PCs in the early 1980s, the silenc e
has been broken. The past four years have brought a burst of popular articles and book s
about computers and, especially, about PCs .
An early article about PCs by Evgenii Velikhov appeared in Vestnik Akademii Nauk
in 1984. In it, he gave a survey of Western developments and revealed, for the first time ,
tantalizing details of the Soviet plan to develop their own production of PCs. Velikhov' s
article was directed at a rather narrow, scholarly readership and did not achieve widespread
distribution outside academic circles .
Among the first popular journals to make an effort to popularize computing wa s
Kvant, a popular scientific monthly for young people with a circulation of about 200,000
published by the Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of th e
USSR. Together with the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences, Kvant
organized a correspondence programming course in 1979 . With its September, 1985 issue ,
Kvant began a series of articles on semiconductors and their role in computer technology .
Articles on 'The Art of Programming" constitute another regular feature of Kvant.
Two aspects of Kvant's effort to popularize computing deserve comment. First, the
magazine's computer coverage remains relatively paltry, usually occupying only two to fou r
of the 66 pages in a standard issue . The bulk of Kvant continues to be devoted t o
mathematics, physics, chess, and other traditional scientific topics . Second, the articles
consistently stress programming and other technical aspects of computer operations to the
total exclusion of the broader aspects of information processing, data base applications ,
networking, personal computing, etc . Furthermore, the presentation normally is dry an d
hardly likely to snare many young readers to the world of computers . However
48
commendable Kvant's effort may be as a start, it can only be called a drop in the bucke t
of what needs to be done to create a computer culture among Soviet youth .
Another popular Soviet magazine offering its readers regular features on computers
is Nauka i Zhizn ' whose monthly circulation in 1988 was an impressive 3.2 million copies
of 160 pages each . As with Kvant, however, Nauka i Zhizn' gives comparative little play to
computers . Only six or seven pages are devoted to computing and the coverage is almos t
exclusively limited to algorithms, programming, and other technical topics. Nothing about
the coverage is likely to attract the attention or interest of any but the most dedicated
hackers . In short, Nauka i Zhizn ' is doing practically nothing to popularize mass computin g
or to develop a market for PCs .
Radio, is another popular scientific magazine with a large circulation (1 .5 million) .
This 65-page monthly is published jointly by the Ministry of Communications (Minsviaz )
and DOSAAF.39 In keeping with its traditional amateur radio orientation, Radio caters
particularly to the "home brew" aficionados and computer kit assemblers among the Sovie t
population. During the past three years, the magazine has devoted five or six pages each
month to computer matters, largely to various technical aspects of assembling and operatin g
the "Radio-86PK" computer kit whose specifications were published in the first eight issue s
of Radio during 1986. 4 0
To Radio's credit, its journalists have recently begun what should be a series of
investigative reporting into the sorry state of the Soviet computer industry . In issue No . 7
of 1988, A. Grif parts a few veils of ministerial secrecy to show how the counterproductiv e
rivalry between Minelektronprom and Minradioprom has left Soviet schools mainly devoi d
of computers and especially of the KORVET educational computer . 4 1
49
Since 1984, the most informative techno-popular computer magazine published i n
the USSR has been Mikroprotsessornye sredstva i sistemy (Microprocessor devices and
systems) which now appears six times per year . Published by the SCCI, its chief editor i s
none other than Academician Andrei Ershov . In the five years of its existence, thi s
publication has increased its circulation from 5,000 per issue to more than 100,000 . In its
attention to computing in general and to personal computing in particular,
Mikroprotsessornye sredstva i sistemy stands alone with Informatika i obrazovanie.
Mikroprotsessornye sredstva i sistemy was begun when the official Soviet vision of the
microprocessor's role in society was limited mainly to that of device controller. The larger
Soviet vision at that time was one of the "automated economy" rather than the "informatio n
society." The stress was on the use of computing machines in production, transportation,
science, education, etc., rather than the use of information by humans. A very large
proportion of its pages has, from the beginning, been devoted to the nitty-gritty, technica l
details of chips, circuit boards, logical diagrams, and program code.
While retaining its original "techie" flavor, Mikroprotsessornye sredstva i sistemy
nevertheless has been its readers best source of information and news about the Soviet
microcomputer world. Having said that, one must also say that the quantity and quality o f
information about these machines and, especially, the software that runs on them i s
manifestly inadequate for the technically unsophisticated user of this technology . It does
little to cultivate the mass market.
Informatika i obrazovanie (Informatics and education) is published by the Stat e
Committee of the USSR for Public Education . Founded in 1986, it appears six times yearl y
and now has a circulation of over 95,000 per issue . It covers many aspects of computing
50
with special accent on educational applications and the problems of teaching compute r
literacy . For the most part, it is written in non-technical language that is relatively free of
computerspeak. As a result, it is probably the most accessible to a lay readership of al l
Soviet publications that regularly deal with computer topics .
Informafika i obrazovanie is targeted primarily at the nation's teachers of secondar y
school computer literacy and other educational applications . The growth in its circulatio n
suggests that it may become fairly successful in reaching this target audience, which is most
encouraging for the cause of Soviet informatics . On the other hand, it has virtually no
impact on the broader Soviet public .
The non-specialized popular print and television media have become strongly
supportive of personal computing since 1985 . Soviet television recently carried a series of
programs featuring Andrei Ershov and designed to support the computer literacy campaig n
in the secondary schools . TV interviews with prominent Soviet personalities frequently
occur in their comfortable studies or offices with PCs in the background . Rarely, when
such opportunity presents itself, is the cameraman able to resist the temptation to zoom to
the PC as if to say, "See, we have them too!" The irony is that the knowledgeable observer
quickly discerns the logo of IBM or another prominent foreign manufacturer on the fac e
of the machine . 4 2
It is no longer uncommon to read laudatory articles about both professional an d
personal uses of PCs . Indeed, some periodicals are inclined to exaggerate the extent an d
benefit of that use. The flagship publication of glasnost' and perestroika, the weekly
Moskovskie novosti, for example, regularly features a page-long section of opinion entitled
"On My Personal Computer ."43 The comments of three different commentators ar e
5 1
featured in each issue but it seems highly unlikely that many of these were prepared on a
PC. Perhaps it's the symbolism that counts when it comes to popularizing PCs in th e
USSR.
A particularly intriguing turn of the Soviet media's coverage of this subject has bee n
its handling of, indeed participation in, the "great debate" described above that is no w
raging over the future of Soviet information society, if there is to be one .
4.1.7. Computers in the Soviet Service Secto r
This section is short because computers have yet to find much use in the Sovie t
service sector. A few computers are employed in Soviet medicine but not at the level
where the general public would encounter them. The trade and service industries, which
make such widespread use of computers in Western nations, rely mainly on manua l
technologies in the Soviet Union . That is not to say that computers are nowhere in
evidence. Computerized seat reservation systems are used by Aeroflot and some divisions
of the Soviet railways. Computer terminals are to be seen behind the counters of some
Soviet hotels, presumably to support booking and billing systems . But a sample of fifteen
Intourist hotels in fourteen Soviet cities during the summer of 1988 failed to provide a
single instance of these terminals being turned on, much less being used to serve hote l
customers.44 Intourist headquarters in Moscow was able to produce a computer printout
of a visitor's itinerary but all of the very considerable recording and transcribing of trave l
details at every hotel along the route was done manually .
Soviet retail stores are practically devoid of point of sale electronics or any othe r
kind of digital technology ; the abacus retains its sway there . Digital scales are used at a
52
few retail counters but they have no computational capability so that calculation of th e
amount due must be done on the abacus or by other manual means . Automatic checkou t
counters are totally absent. The Soviet system of savings banks (sberegatel'nye kassy) i s
reported to employ a real-time distributed data processing system that networks some 3,000
terminals in about 800 bank offices.45 But, for the most part, banking and insurance
transactions are handled manually in most places ; the computerized branch banks i n
Moscow are a notable exception to this pattern. Automatic teller devices and mone y
machines are unknown. A considerable number of Soviet shops catering to the foreign
trade now accept Western credit cards, but they make no use of telecommunications to
verify card holders' credit worthiness . In any case, ownership of credit cards is limited to
a select set of the Soviet privileged class .' The masses have no personal acquaintance wit h
them or, for that matter, with bank checking accounts . Paper money remains the currency
of trade in the Soviet Union .
How much direct contact ordinary Soviet citizens have with these systems is difficul t
to estimate. It seems safe to say, however, that the demonstration effect of computer usag e
in the Soviet consumer service sector is still very modest .
4 .2. Is There A Demand for PCs in the USSR?
Although Soviet citizens have had little direct exposure to PCs, a nascent popular
desire for these products clearly does exist in the USSR. Evidence for this is
impressionistic and is based on attitudes expressed by individuals in private conversation s
as well on reflections of popular views seen in the mirror of the popular press .
S3
But the active interest in personal computing appears to be confined mainly t o
Moscow and other Soviet cities, and to the well educated classes of the population, i .e., the
intelligentsia . Even among these groups, interest appears to be fairly spotty . Most people
seem to consider ownership of a PC to be only a remote possibility for themselves .
Furthermore, other consumer electronics items, such as VCRs, camcorders, and stereo
systems are much higher on most people's wish lists .
Few Soviets appear to visualize much personal value that they might derive from a
computer. That is hardly surprising given the limited capabilities of Soviet personal
(whether "home" or "professional") computers . Small memories, limited or non-existen t
printing capabilities, well substantiated reports of poor machine reliability, a shortage o f
supplies (e.g., floppy disks), and a paucity of useful software (e .g., word processing
packages, spreadsheets, data base managers) combined with the total absence o f
information networks means that the utility of PCs is far from obvious to almost all Sovie t
citizens .
The Soviet citizens who do demonstrate an active interest in acquiring persona l
computers include a disproportionate number of those who have traveled or reside d
abroad. That group includes journalists and other writers, scientists, and students who have
participated in exchange programs with Western countries . Computer professionals in the
major academic and research institutions also display an unabashed craving for their ow n
computers. In general, those who are best informed about computer fashions abroad are
the ones who display the keenest interest in the technology and its use . That, of course, i s
not surprising . What is somewhat more so is the growing number of PCs that Sovie t
visitors are beginning to haul home with them from their foreign jaunts . That trend may
54
soon increase if the customs restrictions on single-unit imports by returning Soviet visitor s
are relaxed as recently was promised .
Another group of Soviet citizens that display active demand for personal computer s
are those engaged in the new cooperative and private sectors . Cooperatives were found t o
be prominent among those wishing to purchase computers at Moscow's Elektronika Store .
Private conversations and indications in the press point to a strong interest among lawyers,
musicians, engineers and economists aspiring to become consultants, and private venturer s
with accounting and marketing jobs to do .
Lacking systematic data on the incidence of Soviet citizens desires for PCs, it i s
perhaps best to conclude this section now . In final summary, however, it seems safe to
expect that Soviet consumers and professionals will take to computers with alacrity when
and if more and better technology becomes available at workplaces, in the schools, and i n
retail stores . In short, the supply will create its own demand . The appetite will be furthe r
whetted when and if the flow of news about information technology in the Soviet media ,
whether it be reportage or advertising, becomes more interesting and more skillfully slante d
toward a non-technical audience. As these things occur, the problem will be "merely" one
of people mobilizing sufficient purchasing power to turn their desires into effective demand.
55
5. Foreign Views on the Information Revolution in the USS R
The Soviet computer scene has exercised a fascination for Western observers fo r
many years. That interest intensified in the 1980s as advances in personal computing an d
telecommunications have accelerated the information revolution in Western societies . It
was natural to wonder what was happening on the other side of the Iron Curtain . Western
opinion about the likely course of a Soviet information revolution has tended to fall into
one or another of the four main categories surveyed below .
5.1. The "It Can't Happen There" View
Fundamentally, this is the view that "the Soviet information revolution" is an
oxymoron. The Communists' grip on power depends on their monopolization o f
information. The information revolution means a democratization of information .
Therefore, the Communists cannot permit the information revolution because they woul d
lose power if they did . QED.
5.2. The Orwellian View
This view is similar to that held by some western techno-pessimists of what migh t
happen here. The difference is that the Soviet KGB holds the world's record for violating
personal privacy. With its propensity and talent for surveillance, the KGB must combin e
formidably with the computer to pose a threat to freedom .
One veteran observer of the Soviet computer scene, writing in 1986, interpreted th e
Soviet long range plan for developing computer technology to the year 2000 as th e
"computerization of Soviet power.'47 He foresaw the selective allocation of personal
5
computers only to top nomenklatura officials, modernization but also greater regulation o f
the channels of data transmission, and the creation of a unified network of state computers .
In all of this, he said,
. . .the information technology is superimposed on the existing hierarchica lsystem of centralization : the boss is linked with the local computer syste mand also has access to the level above and to the central data bank ."
In Soviet conditions this could mean that the decision on who, whereand in what circumstances will have direct access to data banks will depen dnot on the needs of the ordinary user, but on the will of his superiors .
53 . The Computer Liberation View
Much Western commentary has taken the view that the computer and the Sovie t
political system are like fire and ice . This opinion is shared by members of the "It Can' t
Happen There" school and the Computer Liberationists. The difference is that the former
conclude that the regime will prohibit the computer revolution whereas the latter inclin e
toward the view that the regime either cannot succeed in or cannot afford to prohibit it .
The Computer Liberationists can list several prominent Americans in their ranks .
For example, Secretary of State George Shultz, speaking of the East-bloc regimes, has said :
So these regimes face an agonizing choice: they caneither open their societies to the freedoms necessary for th epursuit of technological advance, or they can risk falling eve nfarther behind the West . But, in reality, they may not have achoice That is why the promise of information technology i sso profound . Its development not only strengthens the economi cand political position of democracies : it provides a glimmer o fhope that the suppressed millions of the unfree world will fin dtheir leaders forced to expand their liberties . 49
5 7
5.4. The Informatique a laRusse Views
Some Western specialists who have closely examined the Soviet computer and
communications technologies and their applications incline toward a less categorical view
of the matter. They see a spectrum of possible "Soviet information societies" in which thes e
technologies would play roles officially assigned to them. Less apocalyptic than either the
"Big Brother" or "Computer Liberation" views, these analysts come nearer to the forme r
because they expect the Soviet regime to bend the computer to politically safe objectives .
Seymour Goodman describes a "Soviet-style information society" which is built t o
serve centrally formulated goals to :
* Improve industrial productivity and modernize the industrialbase ;
* Improve the economic planning and control mechanism ;
* Support both military and internal security needs;
* Present the image of a progressive society to the people of theUSSR and the outside world . 5 0
Richard W. Judy has viewed the future Soviet information society that would resul t
from implementing the Party's long-range plan to the year 2000. 51 He also sees a program
focussed mainly on production and military applications . Official priorities were arraye d
in the following descending order of importance :
* Military applications have top priority . Weapons systemsemploying sophisticated microprocessors as well as othe rcomputer and communications technologies are at the head o fthe list .
* Computer aided design (CAD) .
* Industrial applications such as computerized numerica lcontrolled machine tools (CNC), robotics, flexible manufacturin g
5 8
systems (FMS), computer integrated manufacturing (CIM) an dother kinds of computer aided manufacturing (CAM).
* Research and Development applications, particularly within theUSSR Academy of Sciences.
Top Level Decision Support Systems to meet the informatio nneeds of the central agencies of the Soviet state and the Party .Examples are the systems operating in Gosplan, Gosbank ,Gossnab, TsSU, and some ministries .
* Automatic data processing (ADP) and Management informatio nsystems (MIS).
* Personal computers as professional and educational workstations but not as private information processing devices .
In the works cited here as well as elsewhere, neither Goodman nor Judy has bee n
sanguine about the early liberalizing and democratizing impacts of computerization in th e
Soviet Union. Both have expressed a view that the Soviet regime and Soviet society ar e
evolving an information society quite different from that of the United States .
5 9
6. Westerners View Some Implications of th eComputer Revolution in the Wes t
A general consensus holds that the "information revolution" has proceeded farther
in the United States than in any other society in the world. For that reason, one migh t
hope a review of the literature that explains its "implications" here and in other Western
societies would provide clues to the general patterns and consequences that may b e
expected elsewhere. However useful this exercise might be, it is necessary to keep tw o
caveats in mind.
First, as the discussion of this section makes all too clear, the implications of th e
information revolution are not clearly understood even in the United States where the
process first began and where experience is the richest . Although popular speculatio n
about those implications and imagineering are plentiful, serious analysis is not. Evidence
that would shed light on the subject is scarce . Different "experts" look at the same dat a
and reach highly divergent conclusions. Great circumspection, therefore, should be ou r
counsel in evaluating their generalizations .
Second, the dangers of "mirror imaging" need to be kept in mind . Even when we
think we know something about one or another implication or consequence of th e
information in our own society, we must be very cautious in projecting the perceive d
patterns onto other societies . Soviet society is very different from Western societies i n
countless ways. Nothing works there just the way it does here and there is no reason to
expect the information revolution to be an exception . A survey of what experts think the y
know about the information revolution in the West and its social implications may b e
useful as a heuristic, but conclusions must not be mechanically transferred to our model o f
60
what is occurring or may occur in the Soviet Union.
6.1. Three Schools of Thought
At least three schools of thought are struggling to understand the impact of the
computer on Western society .
First, the technological optimists see the information age as a dream come true .
They perceive in "thinking machines" the ability to liberate man from the controls of nature
and from the limitations on the use of information in rational decision making . The
computer enables each individual to make the most of his or her special abilities an d
creative potentials while assisting in the understanding of social problems . The optimists
believe that the computer gives people the ability to make colossal decisions with greatl y
enhanced foresight as to the consequences .
Second are the technological pessimists who view the computer through Orwellian
lenses. Armed with the power of computers, the authorities have available the means to
gather information about all individuals in society and to produce a highly detailed portrai t
of a person's past and present activities . In this gloomy view, "computers offer th e
possibility for social control, jeopardizing the very foundation on which individual freedo m
has been built in Western democratic and constitutiona l states."52
Third is the vast majority of people who are still mastering the possibilities of th e
computer, to say nothing of contemplating its social implications . Public opinion survey s
taken in 1963 found that because few people had personal contact with computers, the y
held the machine in awe calling them "amazing" and "astounding", while feeling that onl y
very educated people could understand them . People considered the machines infallible,
s
6 1
as a sort of electronic brain, and weren't always aware that computers had to be
programmed and monitored by people . By 1983 interviews showed that people ha d
become much more knowledgeable about computers and comfortable using them . Forty
five percent acknowledged that they knew how to use a computer and eighty five percen t
felt that computers would improve the quality of their lives by freeing up time for mor e
creative work. However, sixty seven percent of those interviewed thought that informatio n
about them was being kept in secret files and forty five percent reported the feeling tha t
computers could turn them into human robots by controlling every minute of their day .5 3
The evolution in popular attitudes uncovered in these surveys is not unique t o
computers . It has been historically true that, as each new technological innovation develop s
and penetrates society, it gradually changes the lifestyles of those enjoying or employing it .
Habits and customs of usage change and popular attitudes evolve along with them. Early
owners of automobiles, for example, were required to have a person run along in front o f
the car signaling to those ahead that a "horseless carriage" was approaching .
It must be remembered also that the unintended, long-term effects of technologica l
innovations are often more influential than their direct and deliberate effects . Since the
computer revolution is still in its early stages, few of the long-term effects are yet visible .
Still, questions have been raised about the impact of computers in such areas as persona l
privacy, employment issues, the human spirit, the new concept of knowledge that computer s
provide, and finally, the diffusion or centralization of power that computers afford .
62
6.2. Effects on Personal Privacy
Our computerized information infrastructure records and remembers an astonishin g
amount of information on our everyday lives and actions . The following is but a partial list
of the records accumulated on each person over the course of a lifetime :
Vital statistics (birth, marriage, death) .Educational (school records) .Financial (bank records, loans) .Medical (health records, both physical and mental).Credit (credit cards, credit record, purchases) .City government (house taxes, improvements) .Employment (earnings, work record) .Internal revenue (taxation, deductions, earnings) .Customs and immigration (passports, visas, customs payments) .Police (arrests, convictions, warrants, bail, paroles, sentences) .Welfare (payments, history, dependents) .Stores (credit record, purchases).Organizations (membership, activities) .Military (service record, discharge status) .Motor vehicles (ownership, registration, accident record) . 54
The federal government as of 1982 maintained databanks containing an estimate d
3.5 billion individual records for an average of 15 files per American . 55 The top five credi t
rating companies have records on more than 150 million people.56
In addition to government and business files, subscriber services have now been se t
up. Doctors have at their fingertips databases of patients that have filed malpractic e
lawsuits, regardless of the outcomes of these suits, and now, in retaliation, patients ca n
subscribe to a service that records malpractice litigation against doctors . Landlords can
check out the past behavior of prospective tenants . And employers can find out the detail s
of employees' pasts .
(
(
63
The largest data base in the world is held by AT&T which contains information o n
nearly everyone ; the FBI comes in second with its files on people with arrest records . Once
they gather the information, different agencies and organizations can employ the policy o f
computer matching to cross-check separate databases . For instance, the Selective Servic e
references the lists of youths who recently received drivers' licenses to find young men who
have failed to register for the draft. Immigration and Naturalization Services can cross -
check ethnic names with telephone number listings to track down illegal aliens . The
Educational Testing Service is reported to have used computer equipment to determine
students who had similar Scholastic Aptitude Test answers at the same facility on the sam e
day. The students were promptly notified that they had two weeks to provide evidence tha t
they did not indeed cheat on the exam or their scores would be canceled and thei r
prospective colleges notified S7 And, as recent news reports attest, some governmen t
agencies may keep secret and illegal databanks such as the one held by the FBI containing
the names and activities of persons opposing US policy in Central America as well as th e
membership of other groups like the SCLC and NAACP. 5 8
Another invasion of personal privacy is a new information gathering device called
"computer profiling" wherein sophisticated software is combined with databases to creat e
profiles of people who are likely to exhibit certain characteristics . Privacy analysts report
that the Secret Service is presently developing a system to help identify people with th e
tendencies of assassins . 5 9
These and similar applications raise serious ethical, moral, and even constitutiona l
questions. Do such practices threaten citizens' constitutional rights especially thos e
concerning the presumption of innocence pending proof of guilt? Do they threaten thei r
64
ability to redress grievances in view of the fact that an individual may not know that he i s
being investigated? Whatever the answers to these questions, it is obvious that anyone wh o
has access to all or even part of this data can amass impressive amounts of information o n
people . And if knowledge is power, then power also is being accumulated . Computerized
databases have become of such importance for people's welfare that input errors, not t o
mention intentional tampering with databases, become causes for concern .
At the heart of American privacy law is protection against physical intrusion. New
methods of surveillance such as monitoring aural signals, facsimile transmissions, etc ., were
not anticipated in these statutes . Any information transmitted in digital forms such as
cellular mobile communications, all conversations on cordless telephones, more than hal f
of all long-distance telephone calls, and communications among computers are exempt fro m
the wiretap law.60 There is no doubt that computers now have the ability to keep track o f
individuals but it is also obvious that the laws have not kept pace with the technologica l
innovations .
63. Employment
Computer enthusiasts and technological optimists have always believed that
computers would be a boon for workers ; finally, employees would be removed from the
everyday tasks of retyping letters and filing paperwork . Workers would be freed for more
challenging activities while productivity and costs would be optimized . Technological
pessimists stress that computerization has made some jobs more tedious and monotonou s
as the machine controls the pace and regularity in which a task must be completed 6 1
Indeed, there is evidence that some workers are reporting new health concerns - visual ,
65
physical, psychological and radiation-related - stemming from their work with computers 6 2
Concern has been expressed that the new technology is actually lowering the skills o f
workers as they no longer have to think for themselves ; as the jobs are de-skilled, wag e
scales are downgraded accordingly leading to more job dissatisfaction.
Historically, the introduction of new technology has meant the displacement o f
certain workers and the creation of new ones. For the first time, however, a machine i s
competing for the jobs that earlier required a human brain . The techno-pessimists argue
that the computer age will destroy more jobs than it creates. Forecasts made for the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and for Business Week by Data Resources, Inc . predict that 2
million workers will lose their jobs and only 730,000 to 1 million new positions will open
up. 64
The techno-optimists reject the prophecies of widespread computer-induce d
unemployment . New jobs requiring new skills in the use of computers and the handling o f
information are arising faster than they can be filled . The companies that successfully
adopt the new technologies are increasing production and lowering costs and hence ,
improving their competitiveness. Those firms, and indeed those nations, unwilling to mak e
the initial capital investments to remain competitive will probably fail in the long run . The
problem comes not from wholesale displacement of workers by computers and relate d
technologies but, rather, from a mismatch between the low skills and inadequate educatio n
of many people, on the one hand, and the higher order skills and training required to play
the human role in man-machine systems, on the other . 65 The important implications here
point up the need to improve education and training for people of all ages . More
generally, the implication is that society needs to increase and improve its investment i n
66
human capital .
6.4. The Human Spiri t
The advent of computer technology has had interesting, if poorly understood, effects
on human relations. Once again, techno-optimists and techno-pessimists look at the same
evidence and arrive at opposite conclusions . Some studies of computer-aide d
communications indicate that communication loses its intonation, non-verbal nuances an d
social context when read off a video screen. Therefore, say the techno-pessimists, th e
increasing use of telecommunications and electronic mail will cause people to lose th e
personal touch and face-to-face communications that man as a social animal desires . The
result, they say glumly, will be widespread social alienation, ennui, and general de-
humanization. Techno-optimists maintain that removing the trappings of authority an d
personal intimidation from communications in organizations promotes freer expression an d
more democratic relationships .
Techno-pessimists worry that the use of computers for recording medical histories
will undermine the doctor/patient relationship as doctors use the computers more often t o
allow them to treat more patients more profitably .66 Techno-optimists stress the positive
by pointing out that there is nothing wrong with profit, per se, and that the application o f
expert systems are bringing the skills of the best diagnosticians to people who could never
afford their services . Furthermore, say the optimists, computerized health records ca n
reduce the dangers of toxic pharmaceutical interactions and, generally, can help coordinate
health information to the enormous benefit of the patient .
67
Pessimists fret that the identification of persons solely by their Social Security
number dehumanizes people by reducing them to mere ciphers. In addition, they worry
that people place excessive trust in machines and accord undeserved authority . They say
that men are becoming slaves to machines. At this, the optimists simply cry "Luddite" and
observe that fears like these are as old as tools themselves .
On a personal level computers are changing the way people think about themselves .
Here there is clearly great diversity. Some users gain self-confidence from mastering the
machine and the absence of face-to-face conversations allows them to be more forceful i n
communicating. Others withdraw into the workings of the computer and deny all socia l
interaction. Also, people are starting to refer to themselves as machines, feeling they ar e
"programmed" to act a certain way, while they give the computer human features such a s
a brain. Some attribute this personalization of a machine to be an extension of man' s
fascination with creating living things as evidenced by animated movies and tales o f
Frankenstein.6 7
Herman Kahn once wondered about the long term effect of the computer on th e
human psyche. In the following passage, he uncharacteristically found himself musing with
the techno-pessimists :
As far as I know, despite many popular and sometimes expert statements t othe contrary, nobody has demonstrated any intrinsic limits to what thecomputer can eventually do in simulating or surpassing human capabilities .There is a clear capability for mimicking the appearance and characteristic snot only of such human activities as analysis, calculation, and playing games ,but of activities which have a large aesthetic, emotional or seemingly intuitivecontent . . .It is my personal conjecture, and one which personally alwaysdepresses me as well, that by the end of the century, if not by 1980, theexperts will have concluded that the computer can transcend human being sin every practical aspect . I do not know what this means in terms o fphilosophy, religion . . . and even in the democratic way of life . 68
68
In the same vein, Weizenbaum is concerned that instead of passing on culture ,
through their computers people will only transmit knowledge and leave as a legacy a worl d
without values .69
On the brighter side, the techno-optimists see computerization as an opportunity t o
rekindle human spirituality. After completing a mammoth study of the effects of th e
computer on people of all ages and personality types, Sherry Turkle concludes that "we
cede to the computer the power of reason, but at the same time, in defense, our sense o f
identity becomes increasingly focused on the soul and spirit in the human machine ."70 As
is often the case, children seem to put this change in identity in the proper perspective . As
Turkle comments:
Children define what's special about people by contrasting them with theirnearest neighbors, which have always been animals . People are specialbecause they know how to think. Now children who work with computers seethe computer as their nearest neighbor, so they see that people are specia lbecause they feel. This may become much more central to the way peopl ethink about themselves . We may be moving toward a re-evaluation of whatmakes us human. 7 1
Defining this concept as "high tech/high touch", John Naisbitt agrees . He contends
that the self-help or personal growth movement is a result of the need to compensate fo r
the impersonal technology around us. And as computers take over the functions, if not th e
jobs, of the worker, the experts - medical, legal, etc. - lose their mystique . Consequently ,
there is a need to drop the Protestant Work Ethic in favor of a concept that values people
for who they are, not what they do.
In struggling to discern the implications of the computer revolution for the huma n
spirit, the techno-optimists and the techno-pessimists are at a standoff . Nobody has the
answers. You pay your money and follow your visceral inclinations .
69
6.5. A New Concept of Knowledge
As a tool for gathering and analyzing information, the computer has opened up a
new realms of scientific inquiry. Larger quantities of data, at higher levels of complexity,
can be examined to further permutations with the aid of a computer ; "a rapport with the
computer, which will make it possible for the creative person to think in terms of many ,
many variable, probabilistic, and dynamic relationships is bound to produce multi-variable ,
probabilistic, and dynamic models of the world that couldn't be invented or evaluate d
otherwise."72 Chess-playing computers can come up with new variations built on the prove n
strategies of human players and geometric theorems can be proven in new ways .
Computers can even aid in the creation of music, poetry and drama ; machines can analyze
exactly what it is that makes a Mozart a Mozart and try to replicate these patterns in ne w
pieces.
As computers begin to develop new information, questions arise over who i s
responsible for the reliability of the information systems applications that have come to pla y
such important roles in our lives . Who is liable when computers malperform? Conside r
the case of computer-assisted diagnosis . Who gets sued for malpractice if a doctor follow s
or, for the sake of argument, fails to follow a computer-prescribed course of action and the
patient dies when he could have been saved? If a plane follows a computerized flight path
and crashes, who is to blame? The navigator? The pilot? The software developer? Th e
programmer?
Who, for example, is responsible for the reliability and accuracy of the C3I and other
large military systems that are built by squadrons of analysts and programmers? Who ,
70
indeed, even understands them after their creators move on? Techno-pessimists worry that
the software for the Strategic Defense Initiative is its Achilles heel . There may be
satisfactory answers to these pessimistic concerns, but they are not obvious to mos t
professional programmers who are all too aware of how bugs, not to mention viruses, can
lie undetected in even simple programs, not to mention one of the length and complexit y
needed for SDI.
One could extend this series of questions about responsibility and reliability into a
discussion of policies to handle technology transfer, transborder data flows and the like .
Since it is doubtful that any kind of enforceable guidance will come from the industries an d
organizations that currently benefit from this technology, responsibility for information
systems ethics falls to the users themselves — or between stools .
Who is responsible for policing and ensuring the citizen's right to privacy? No stat e
or local government can cope and the federal government deserves poor marks for its wor k
in this regard. According to the Privacy Act of 1974, the government and commercial
agencies are expected to notify individuals that their files have been requested, but
expediency often takes priority over discretion . In seeming contradiction to the Act, the
Internal Revenue Service is bound by law to share information with some 38 differen t
offices inside government. 74 To help save citizens' tax money, but with little regard fo r
confidentiality, the Office of Management and Budget monitors the keeping of database s
to prevent redundancy and approximately 90 government agencies now share informatio n
in their files . 75
7 1
Groups such as the Association of Computing Machinery deserve congratulations fo r
their efforts to establish and maintain professionalism and ethics in their field . But for the
most part, these questions of reliability and responsibility are so tough and they pose s o
many uncomfortable issues that the temptation to ignore them dominates -- at least unti l
adverse consequences strike .
The advent of information technologies has opened up a new area of law to dea l
with the use and abuse of computers. Dertouzos details some of the questions now up fo r
debate :
(1) the extent to which information should be treated like or unlike rea lproperty; (2) the extent to which programs should be protected fromunauthorized duplication and misuse ; (3) the regulation of computer-to-computer interconnections; (4) the desirability for mandatory audit trailswhenever sensitive information is read or changed by anyone ; (5) thedesirability for mandatory destruction of machine-stored information afte ra certain time has elapsed or other conditions are met ; (6) the developmentof criteria for determining what kinds of information may not be stored inmachine-accessible form ; (7) the handling of authentication violations (whe nthe purported signatory of a computer message is an imposter) ; (8) theregulation of unauthorized expeditions (typically aided by other computers )over data bases ; and (9) the purposeful confusion of "mistakes" with planne dcomputer crimes in badly organized machine installations . 76
While experts and legislative bodies have busied themselves with trying to defin e
what constitutes computer crime, more or less harmless hackers as well as crafty criminal s
have been cracking codes and digging into databases . The misuse of computers to steal
money through computer transactions rivals the misuse of computers to plant viruses in
other people's machines for billing as top computer sensation in the media . Just as illega l
is the stealing of computer time, the unlawful access to files and the acquisition o f
privileged information . There are as many variations in methods as there are types o f
criminals but Donn Parker, a computer crime expert at SRI International, estimates that
losses from computer crime may total $5 billion a year . 77 And it should be noted that th e
majority of computer crimes probably go unreported, to say nothing of undetected ;
72
companies -such as financial institutions - do not want to reveal their lackadaisical securit y
and open themselves up to lawsuits from stockholders.
6.6. Does the Computer Diffuse or Centralize Power ?
Again, the answer is muddled . The truth is that computers can be used by different
groups as a tool for centralization of power or for diffusion of control or both. Those
wishing to centralize power can employ computers to keep specialized databases wit h
restricted access. Presently upper level office managers are no longer dependent on dat a
processing departments because they can send messages, schedule appointments, plan trips ,
cooperate on reports and generally direct the flow of information from their desk tops ;
consequently, techno-pessimists and some employees see computerization as another way
their bosses exert control. The knowledge gap translates into a power gap as those wh o
know computers can take advantage of new styles of communication and decision makin g
to get a leg up on their colleagues who remain computer illiterate .
That computerization and the information revolution carries important implication s
for national security and economic competitiveness is taken axiomatically by both techno-
optimists and techno-pessimists . In military matters, computer applications can be so secre t
and sophisticated that few pretend to understand them very well. The techno-pessimists
aver that this leads to technocratic decision making and little public participation. Put on
a global scale, the gap between the rich and the poor countries will, ceteris paribus, increase
because rich countries are likely to reap the benefits of the information revolution earlie r
and to a greater degree than poorer countries . Knowledge and access to knowledg e
increases wealth and, therefore, knowledge is wealth . '
73
Techno-optimists see the computer as a tool for decentralization of power . The
ability of people from all across the country to communicate by means of networkin g
contributes to a democratization of power . In answering the pessimists, Cleveland point s
out that if knowledge is power, then more widely spread knowledge is more diffuse power .
In order to take advantage of computer technology, individuals, corporations, an d
governments must create societies with millions of knowledgeable people and lessen th e
control from the center . And as a consequence of a largely educated clientele, leadershi p
must change from a command structure to a collegial rule characterized by a shared sens e
of direction .80
6.7. In Lieu of a Conclusio n
Computers are increasingly pervasive in Western society . The information
revolution is upon us . The phenomenon is so new, however, that we poorly perceive it s
fundamental implications . To understate the case, not all the uses for information system s
technologies have been discovered yet. And we have only a glimmering of their long-ter m
social implications . It is a commonplace that the computer is simply a tool that will follo w
the instructions of the humans who program it -- but it is, nevertheless, true . Because the
technologies involved are highly sophisticated, and in many cases poorly understood by the
users, the outcomes may be surprising. One thing is certain: The information revolution,
like every other technological revolution before it and every one yet to come, will bring
mankind both good and evil. What the mixture will be and who will bear the boons an d
banes remain to be discovered. In the final analysis, the answers to questions like these are
likely to depend less upon the technologies themselves than upon the quality of the peopl e
and the societies that use them .
74
7. Implications of the Information Revolution for Soviet Society :Questions and Speculation s
If the information revolution is too young to support a clear perception of it s
implications in the United States and elsewhere in the West, the task is even more daunting
with respect to the Soviet Union. But that difficulty should, in no way, stop our attempt s
to divine what this set of remarkable technologies may mean for that society both in the
short and longer runs . If the economic, cultural, or political impacts are now significant o r
are likely to become so, we need to take the proper soundings on an ongoing basis .
This section poses and adduces tentative answers to a number of questions that we
believe are important concerning the broader implications of developments, lack o f
developments, and potential developments in the Soviet Union's efforts to participate in th e
information revolution. For purposes of the present discussion, we take the "informatio n
revolution" to embrace the computer and communications technologies, their manifol d
applications in all social sectors, and the resulting transformation in man's ability to create ,
process and apply information and knowledge .
Once more, it should be stressed that few of the answers to the questions raised
here can be taken as definitive . But definitiveness is not the present objective. Rather, i t
is to raise as many of the right questions as we can, to generate some insight into th e
broader implications of the complex processes at work, and to propose . tentative or
alternative answers where we can do so without excessively violating evidence an d
plausibility .81
75
7.1. What Is or Is Likely to be the Economic Impact ?
Are there signs of economic change in the USSR as a consequence of th e
informatics technologies and their spread in the USSR or in societies with which the USS R
must compete?
Economic objectives have long been paramount among the goals of Soviet compute r
and informatics policies .82 The 1960s vision of "perfect computation" saw compute r
technology as the saviour of the system of centralized economic planning and
administration . The "infatuation with automation" of the 1970s and 1980s has gone through
two phases. In the first, lasting from about 1970 to 1978, the idea was to employ
mainframe computers to "automate" data processing in enterprises, agencies, and other
large state organizations; this was the period of the ASUP (Automated Systems o f
Management at the Enterprise level) .83 Dreams became less grandiose in the second phas e
as disillusionment with ASUP set in and priority turned to applying minicomputers and then
microprocessors to automated process control systems (ASUTP) .
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev clearly had economic objectives foremost in mind whe n
he made automation in general, and microprocessors in particular, the centerpieces of hi s
campaign to "accelerate and intensify" Soviet industry . He and those around him were
profoundly impressed, perhaps excessively, with the impact they perceived thes e
technologies to make in the United States and other "leading capitalist countries ." In his
report to the June, 1985 conference of the Central Committee, Gorbachev put the matte r
in the following words :
Machine building plays the dominant, key role in carrying out the scientifi cand technological revolution . . . . Microelectronics, computer technology,instrument making and the entire informatics industry are the catalysts o fprogress . They require accelerated development . 84
76
It was in 1985, also, that the Politburo "considered and basically approved a state -
wide program to establish and develop the production and effective utilization of computer
technology and automated systems up to the year 2000 ." Raising economic productivity an d
efficiency by accelerating scientific and technical progress, particularly in machine building
and electronics, is the global objective of this new program. The new informatics program,
which has not been disseminated abroad, calls for increased production, improved quality ,
and the introduction of new models of computer equipment. Applications of informatics
technology, especially computers and microprocessors, and automation are to lead to a
"comprehensive intensification of the national economy ."85
To what extent have these high hopes for economic payoff been realized? How ma y
they be in the future? What structural economic impact can be attributed to computer s
and automation ?
Although the evidence is far from complete, it is clear that the results o f
intensification of production and acceleration of economic growth have proven much more
illusive than the Soviet leadership originally anticipated . This is not to say that informatics
technology has not made significant contributions to performance and efficiency in man y
applications across a broad spectrum of the Soviet economy. Our own investigations hav e
turned up ample evidence of this . What is more difficult to estimate is the net economi c
contribution of this technology after correcting for the costs of creating, providing, installing ,
and maintaining the equipment, not to mention the wastage and misuse so much lamente d
in the Soviet press . Nor is it easy to estimate the indirect costs of disrupting production o r
the opportunity costs of devoting scarce resources to automation when so many alternativ e
needs cry for attention .
77
On the basis of the evidence available, however, we believe that the net results
shape up somewhat as follows :
* In CAD (Computer-Aided Design), the net payoffs have bee npositive and substantial . Had management structures an deconomic incentives been more favorable to innovation in Sovie tindustry, those payoffs would have been even more impressive .Other factors that also diminished payoffs from CAD includeSoviet technological backwardness in this area, inadequatetraining of Soviet designers and engineers, weak linkagesbetween designers and producers, and supply shortages tha timpeded implementation of new designs. Future CAD payoffsare likely to be very substantial because the aging Soviet capitalstock and prevalence of obsolete designs raises the potentia lcontribution of design improvements. The magnitude of thesefuture payoffs will depend, however, on how much and how soo nperestroika succeeds in improving the economic system' sefficiency and receptivity to innovation. The outcome alsodepends on levels of future Soviet capital investment because i tis difficult to embody improved designs in new products andprocesses if plant and equipment are not also renewed .
In CIM (Computer Integrated Manufacturing), FMS (FlexibleManufacturing Systems), robotics, and production automationgenerally, the picture is more clouded and complex. Successstories in this field are scattered and a spirit of disappointmentand disenchantment permeates the reports now reaching us . Ahost of factors has frustrated early Soviet optimism. First of all ,the expectations were certainly too high . Production automationwas viewed as a kind of "silver sword" that would slay some o fthe dragons that sap the vitality of Soviet industry. As late as1985, intelligent men like Mikhail Gorbachev could still believein the existence of a technological fix . They are now sadder bu twiser. But the Soviets had (and have) no monopoly on inflate dexpectations when it comes to CIM. Important preconditionsmust exist before the benefits of the more integrated andcomprehensive forms of production automation can be realize dand, indeed, before its substantial initial costs can be recouped .Alas, for those holding high hopes for CIM et al ., thosepreconditions are infrequently realized in Soviet industry .Important gains have been and will be had from more modest ,partial applications of computers to production automation, bu tmost of the big payoffs from FMS, CIM, etc., await the resultsof fundamental economic restructuring .
78
Without reviewing the balance sheet of computer applications in all areas of th e
Soviet economy, the main conclusion may be stated . It is that the contributions of the
informatics technologies to date are quite modest . Hopes for major payoffs in the
automation of goods production have not been dashed but neither have they been crowne d
with anything approximating their anticipated successes .
Looking ahead, perestroika and computerized automation may be regarded as join t
and highly complementary inputs into the future Soviet economy . Without successful
perestroika, the returns to Soviet investments in industrial computing will continue to b e
positive but disappointingly modest . With it, the potential is enormous .
7.2. Is A Cultural or Political Impact Visible?
What political consequences can be traced to the spread of the informatio n
technologies in the Soviet Union? To their spread in nations with which the Soviet Unio n
feels itself in competition? What discernable effect have the technologies had on Sovie t
cultural life? In particular, how do these technologies relate to glasnost' and perestroika?
What are their possible roles in decentralization and democratization? Will they hel p
citizens gain additional freedoms?
Four years into the Gorbachev era, it has become hard to find serious people wh o
seriously argue that glasnost', perestroika, and even novoe myshlenie ("new thinking" i n
foreign policy) do not represent significant shifts in Kremlin policy . Did and do the sprea d
of the information technologies have anything to do with those shifts? Clearly, the answe r
must be that they did and do. Without overstating the case, we can simply note that th e
Soviet leadership has shown every sign of being greatly alarmed by the economic and
military advantages of information technologies being realized not only in the Unite d
States, Western Europe, and Japan, but also in Korea, Taiwan, and, perhaps most of all ,
in China.
Whatever else may separate the contending factions within the Soviet polity, the y
share a nearly universal consensus that the nation's serious lag in these (among other )
technologies threatens its status as a great power. Recognizing that the lag will only wide n
unless profound structural changes are made, Gorbachev and his fellow reformers urg e
perestroika . Domestic political and international conditions dictate glasnost' and novoe
myshlenie if perestroika is to have the support at home and provide the respite abroad tha t
is required for it to take effect. The chain of effects from the Soviet's lengthening
informatics lag to policy change is thus laid bare .
Earlier we elaborated the views of the "computer liberation" school of Wester n
speculation about the impact of the information revolution on Soviet society . What
evidence is available that might substantiate those views? The answer to this question as
recently as two years ago would have had to be : "None" or "Nothing yet." In 1988, things
began to change. Controversies and conflicts formerly hidden beneath the surface began
to break through and become visible to outsiders .
As the discussion of sections 2.4 and 2 .5 in this paper illustrates, an explicit linkage
between informatizatsiia and glasnost' has appeared. Ershovian informatization i s
represented both as necessary for the USSR to remain a great power and as an inevitable
historical process that even the USSR must undergo. For that process to proceed properl y
and rapidly, the argument continues, it must be accompanied by universal freedom o f
access to all information and, moreover, by de-bureaucratization . Thus, complete glasnost '
80
is not just a sop to the intellectuals and Soviet democrats, it is an objective condition fo r
a historically necessary, if not inevitable, process . To the extent that this train of logic sell s
in the Soviet ideological marketplace, then the enemies of glasnost' become the enemies o f
the people, Party, and history .
However stilted and strained this ideological reasoning may sound to Western ears ,
it contains an important ingredient of truth . Fundamentally, Ershov & Co . are right. The
Soviet Union will not, in point of fact, be able to realize the enormous expansion of man' s
knowledge that is being and will be facilitated by the revolution in computer and
communications technologies unless information is allowed to flow freely in all directions ,
horizontally, vertically, and diagonally. In a society where information has been ratione d
in miserly dollops and communications have been confined to vertical channels, th e
liberating and democratizing implications of the Ershovian information revolution, to th e
extent that it proceeds, will be profound.
It was argued in the preceding section that perestroika was a precondition for the
Soviet economy to realize the benefits of the computer in CAD, CAM, etc. In fact, the
mutual interdependence between perestroika and the Soviet information revolution goes
much farther than that . Perestroika, to the extent that it means movement toward a market
economy, means that Soviet managers and economists need much more and much better
economic, business, and financial information than now exists in the USSR. Computerize d
information systems now play vital roles in the economies of all modern market-oriente d
nations, as well as in the world financial markets that increasingly link them . The Soviet
Union will need to emulate the advanced nations in building a modern economi c
information system if perestroika is to work.
8 1
The Soviet information revolution depends, in turn, on perestroika, because it needs
the creativity and dynamism that only the nascent cooperative and private sectors ca n
provide. The state sector is a stultifying environment that discourages innovation an d
initiative. No reshuffling or reorganization, no redefinition of responsibilities, and no
creation of central coordinating commissions will breathe life into the Soviet informatio n
revolution.
7.3. Will the Soviet Information Society Be More Unequal ?
How will the Soviet information revolution impinge on the distribution of income
and wealth in the USSR? How, in turn, will Russian and Soviet egalitarianism influence
the course of the information revolution ?
Begin, first, with the impact of the information revolution on the regiona l
distribution of income and wealth . Will wider use of the information technologie s
exacerbate centripetal forces that now promote economic agglomeration in Moscow an d
other leading Soviet cities? As usual, no definitive answer can be given . Industrial
automation probably is over-represented in the factories of Moscow, Kiev, and other majo r
cities, but it is not unknown in many other industrial centers as well . But it is clear tha t
Ershovian informatization, to the extent that it is now proceeding, is a highly concentrate d
phenomenon.
The use of, exposure to and, therefore, the awareness of PCs is largely confined t o
the big cities. The few data bases now existing and those likely to be brought on-line soon
are located in Moscow and a few other republican capitals . The existing restrictions o n
intra-city telephone communications severely limits information exchange . Even when, and
82
if, the telephone system is upgraded to handle data communications, the enhancements ar e
likely to appear first in Moscow and other capital cities .
The conjecture here is that the Soviet information revolution will, for at least th e
balance of this century, tend to concentrate the income and wealth deriving from use o f
these technologies in the large cities . The smaller cities and towns, not to mention th e
rural hinterland, will be relatively untouched and will tend to sink farther into comparativ e
backwardness.
How will the information revolution affect inter-personal distribution of income ?
That answer depends, of course, on many factors not the least important of which is ho w
successful may be that aspect of perestroika that seeks to overturn "primitive wage leveling "
in favor of a meritocracy which matches reward with results . To the extent that this occurs ,
however, some implications do emerge. Briefly, they relate to the fact that computer
technology does not work unaided but, rather, in partnership with human beings .
The machines and the people that know how to use them productively are highl y
complementary inputs to the social production function . By a well known economic law ,
an increasing abundance of powerful and inexpensive machines increases the value of th e
marginal output of those humans that complement them in production . A corollary of that
law says that humans whose sole employment is in competition with these new machine s
will find the value of their marginal output in decline . If society remunerates peopl e
proportionately to the value of their marginal product, then it follows that incom e
disparities between these two particular groups of people are bound to widen. In marke t
economies, precisely this differentiation is occurring . Whether it will happen in the USSR
depends, as was said earlier, on the course of perestroika .
83
Various social responses to this type of income differentiation are possible . The
most obvious response is to deny them by legal fiat or social pressure . Given the strong
streak of egalitarianism that persists among the Soviet, especially the Slavic, populations ,
it seems that the replacement of "primitive wage leveling" with meritocracy may be a lon g
time coming. To the extent that it does not, one would expect a continued under-suppl y
of the human services that complement the information technologies . Further, to the
extent that travel and emigration are possible, one would expect a considerable drain of th e
brain-power that combines productively with those technologies . People with the relevant
knowledge and skills will tend to move from the societies where their material rewards ar e
beneath the value of their marginal products to societies where those rewards more closel y
match the value contributed, i .e., to market societies .
Translated from economic jargon, this last point that means that we should watch
for increased pressure from talented computer and other information workers to leave th e
USSR for greener pastures abroad if perestroika fails to deliver more meritocracy.
7.4. Is Official Soviet Policy Hostile to Informatization?
The "It Can't Happen There" view elucidated in Section 5 .1 above holds that the
Soviet political leadership will not permit an American or Ershovian information revolution
to proceed because they recognize its threat to their monopoly of information and power .
What evidence can be mustered to test this view? What aspects of the informatio n
technologies and their spread concern the Soviet leadership ?
First, it must be said that nowhere have we found either an explicit or an Aesopia n
statement by a prominent Soviet political leader of this putative fear . The closest thing we
(
84
have comes from the opposite end of the political spectrum, e .g., from the Ershovians suc h
as M. Donskoi who was quoted previously to the effect that: "Bureaucrats and the
computer are incompatible : the technology is a clear threat to their well being; they
understand that very well --- and they obstruct ."86
But just because the top Party and Government leaders have not publicly voiced a
fear that computing and communications for the people would lead to dire politica l
consequences does not mean that they haven't such fears . Indeed, it excessively strains th e
credulity to believe that many Stalinists and even less rabid political conservatives do not
subscribe to that view. Those who hate glasnost' because it threatens their positions or who
align with Nina Andreeva because it violates their "principles,"87 cannot welcome th e
conditions of complete and equal opportunity to all information for all citizens, networke d
personal computers, and all the other ingredients of Ershovian informatization .
Indirect but irrefutable evidence of the conservatives' great reluctance to abando n
Party and state control over the production and dissemination of information is containe d
in a set of new restrictions issued at the beginning of January, 1989 . Without any
preliminary discussion or public debate, the Council of Ministers announced prohibition s
on private activities in the fields of publishing, film making, video salons, and schools .
Prohibited are producing and showing of "cinema and video productions," and th e
publishing of "works of science, literature, and art ."88
A Ministry of Justice official attempted to place a fig leaf over the action b y
claiming that these and other restrictions on private and cooperative businesses were i n
response to "hundreds of thousands" of citizens' complaints about the poor quality and hig h
prices of privately and cooperatively supplied goods and services . But Ivan P. Korovkin ,
85
deputy chairman of the State Publishing Committee, was more candid in his statement tha t
the restrictions on printing cooperatives had the aim of protecting the state's control over
book publishing. Score one for the forces opposing Ershovian informatization .
It is significant that the January, 1989 restrictions contain no reference to personal
computing or to private and cooperative ventures in this field . Obviously, the forces of
glasnost' and liberalization lacked the power to forestall the conservative backlash on
publishing or the making and showing of film and video products . But, does the exemption
of personal computing from this infringement on freedom of information reflect th e
conservatives' perception that PCs are no "clear and present danger" to the officia l
monopoly of information because there are so few of them and, in any case, they lack
printers and even floppy drives? Or does it indicate that the shield of "objectively
necessary" informatization deflected the conservative blow?
Can the historical Soviet lag in developing and applying computer and
communications technologies be attributed to the operation of an unvoiced policy o f
restraint induced by fear? While that possibility cannot be excluded and may even b e
likely, it must be admitted that no direct evidence to support it has come to light .
Moreover, there do exist several other explanations for which evidence is available tha t
would be sufficient to explain the Soviet lag . These alternative explanations have to do
with the appallingly inappropriate Soviet structure of R&D, design, and manufacturing i n
computer technology ; the disincentives to entrepreneurship and innovation endemic to th e
Soviet system; a policy of intellectual isolation from the outside world; and various othe r
systemic features of Soviet socialism . With all these things auguring ill for the information
technologies, policies explicitly discouraging them seem redundant .
S6
7.5. Will Informatization Help Big Brother?
One of the great concerns of Western techno-pessimists is that the computer i s
helping Big Brother to improve his watch over us . The Orwellian view holds that the
Soviet security forces will find their powers of surveillance and control greatly enhanced by
the same technologies . What can be said about this?
On the basis of open sources, very little can be said . At the same time, it is hard
to resist the pessimistic view that the KGB knows very well how to employ computers i n
its work. At the very least, the Orwellian potential exists and only the naive or knaves can
deny it. It is not very encouraging to note, however, that American citizens may now b e
more vulnerable to official and other invasions of their privacy than their Soviet
counterparts .
The reason for this apparent paradox is the obvious one that the average Sovie t
citizen moves about in a far less computerized society than does his or her America n
counterpart. Billions of computerized transactions in banking, payrolls, taxation, socia l
security, credit, membership, subscription, investments, enrollment, trade, transportation ,
and a myriad of activities add vast quantities of information to records on millions o f
American citizens. Many of these records can or could be cross-linked by a common
identifier, the Social Security Number. Because the Soviet society is computerized to suc h
a limited extent, very many fewer data are generated about Ivan Ivanovich than about Joh n
Smith.
87
7.6. Is the CPSU Computer Literate?
What use of computers is made within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ?
Are Party members computer literate? Would the spread of Ershovian informatization int o
the Party apparatus and among Party members undermine "democratic centralism" or othe r
hallowed Party maxims .
Only fragmentary evidence on Party computer usage has been accumulated . If
setting a good example for the comrades is important, then General Secretary Mikhai l
Gorbachev deserves commendation for reportedly making regular use of his own personal
computer. But the machine he uses is not a BK-0010. Rather, it is an Apple Macintosh
SE given to him by John Scully, president of Apple Computer Inc . Rather than
programming in assembly language, as many of his compatriots must do, Mr . Gorbachev
uses the Mac's user-friendly software . He even had Vice President of the Academy o f
Sciences Evgenii Velikhov scurrying about to find latest versions of Mac software durin g
a recent visit to the United States . Velikhov reported that Gorbachev was very intereste d
in his Mac. "He is really quite updated on it" said Velikhov in an interview. 89
On a more serious note, although possibly not a more significant one, evidenc e
indicates that Party applications are standard components of the city and regional dat a
processing systems that have been built during the past two decades . For example, the
design for a Kiev city and regional information system provided for terminals and direct
lines from the territorial computer center to the offices of Party secretaries even as low as
at the raikom level. System designs show terminals in the offices of the first and second
secretaries as well as for the heads of various Party departments responsible for industry
i
88
and transportation . Reports and applications are listed to support Party "leadership" i n
economic administration, Party personnel and organization, and ideological work . 90
It is very difficult to determine the nature and intensity of Party access to th e
governmental data processing and management information systems that have been buil t
in the republics and all major cities in the USSR . But it is thought that the Centra l
Committee apparatus is a major computer user . Evidence for this has been available at
least since 1972. In that year, Brezhnev sent Georgi S. Pavlov, then the head of th e
Central Committee's administrative section to the United States to study American dat a
processing techniques that might be used in top-level Party work . 91 Pavlov's department
was responsible for maintaining Party personnel records . During his visit to computer
installations in this country, Pavlov displayed particular interest in data base managemen t
and indicated that his department had the responsibility for quickly accessing data fro m
around the country . The conjecture here is that there is great variation in computer uses
by Party officials but that, in at least some locations including the Moscow Party
headquarters, that usage is very considerable .
On an even more speculative level, it seems unlikely that Party usage of mainframe s
in batch or even time sharing mode have any deleterious effect on Party discipline . Only
when people get their own printer-equipped personal computers or professiona l
workstations, connected via wide-area networks to far flung data bases and othe r
individuals, do they experience informational liberation and the temptations that it brings .
If and when that occurs, i .e., when Ershovian informatization moves into the Part y
apparatus, then will come also the potential danger of unauthorized usage an d
communications. But that day may be a long time coming . Meanwhile, other phenomena,
89
such as glasnost', Party elections, etc., may challenge the old structure of democrati c
centralism more than computers do .
7.7. Can Samoinformatizatsiia Happen?
Can informatization happen in spite of official attempts to prevent it or to channe l
it into politically safe avenues? Does or can the state control the spread and use of these
technologies? Is there evidence of or potential for a "technology underground" that escapes
official control? Soviet society produced samizdat ; can it also produce samoinformat-
izatsiia? 9 2
The answer here cannot be absolute . The state can and does inhibit the flowering
of informatization. It can stunt its growth and force it into freakish forms . But it canno t
stop it altogether . Furthermore, the stronger the state's repressive measures, the longer
will be its self-imposed sentence to informational and technological backwardness .
Fully flowering informatization of the Western or Ershovian variety requires a
modern and universally accessible telecommunications system capable of supporting voice ,
data, and video information . It requires, as Ershov put it, "full and free access for every
citizen to all socially important information ." 93 It requires convenient popular access t o
powerful and high quality PCs as well to the software, peripherals, and supplies that mak e
them productive . It requires that copy machines become accessible to ordinary citizens .
None of these things exists in the Soviet Union and, technically, it is within the state' s
power to see that they never do .
But if, as seems likely, the Party and state are going to allow substantial foreig n
travel by Soviet citizens, and also to permit returning travelers to bring PCs and supplie s
90
home, then the door is open a crack to samoinformatizatsiia of at least a minimal variety .
For instance, the regime lost control of videocassette recorders in Moscow and severa l
other large cities when the volume of private imports, legal and illegal, ballooned .
Moreover, if the 12th Five Year Plan target of producing 1 .1 million PCs is even
approached, the door opens wider. If the regime follows through on the plan announce d
by Gorshkov to "saturate" the Soviet market with some 25 million computers by the end o f
the century, the door will stand fully open.
The actions just listed, in ascending degree, open the way to popular usage of PC s
for word processing and, ultimately, for desk-top publishing. It will be increasingly
impossible for the regime to restrict people's access to PCs and printers in the way the y
have been kept from copy machines . If, as seems likely, this barrier to copying machine s
eventually becomes more permeable, the state's monopoly of publication and printing wil l
become increasingly more difficult to maintain.
The last important cards in the conservatives' hand are control ove r
telecommunications system and access to important Soviet data bases . These important
components of the information revolution lie totally within the state's power to develop o r
not to develop. But the 12th Five Year Plan calls for a 42 per cent increase in telephone s
installed of which three-quarters were to be residential. By the year 2000, 80 per cent of
all households are to have telephones . Substantial increases in transmission and switching
capacities also are planned .94 Robert W. Campbell writes ,
This is an interesting indicator of leadership attitudes about th einformation revolution. One of the uncertainties in Western assessments o fthe Soviet ability to exploit the information revolution is how the leaders wil lreact to the conflict between the desire to raise productivity by introducin gnew information technologies and the fear that these technologies ma yundermine control by enhancing information flow . The high priority thegovernment is giving to providing telephone service to households seems a n
9 1
important bit of evidence that they are willing to risk decentralizing some o fthe instruments for gaining access to information .95
At the present time, the Soviet Ministry of Communications (Minsviaz) proscribes
the use of its lines for private data transmission and places severe limitations even o n
official organizations. Technically, it would be possible to maintain those restrictions eve n
in an expanded and more fully automatically switched telecommunications network, but i t
would largely defeat the purpose of its creation . The conjecture here is that the restrictions
will be relaxed as the new capabilities become available .
Plans to put important Soviet data bases on line are still in the stages of formulatio n
and debate . But a substantial degree of pressure is building for this to happen. VINITI,
for example, already allows limited access to its bibliographical data bases and would like
to see that increased. The State Committee on Statistics, despite incompetence an d
conservatism in its ranks, also seems likely to put data bases on line for at least officia l
access.
In summary, the judgement here is that the process of informatization has acquire d
considerable momentum. That momentum is not so great that it could not be reversed b y
explicit policy or by failure to fulfill plans that have been announced. Nor is it as great as
Ershov & Co. would like it to be. But the process has already passed the threshold tha t
guarantees at least a freakish kind of samoinformatizatsiia . If Gorbachev's policies o f
glasnost' and perestroika remain on track, it will go a good bit farther .
7.8. What If There Were To Be No Soviet Computer Revolution ?
The attentive reader will have noted the frequent use of the conditional "if' in th e
section just preceding. The possibility of derailing the information revolution, or at least
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of shunting it onto a sideline, remains quite real. Abject failure to meet announced targets
for PC production or for telecommunications modernization is all too conceivable .
Conservative forces may yet replace Gorbachev or Gorbachevism with more traditiona l
Soviet totalitarianism and scuttle both glasnost' and perestroika. If any of these things were
to happen and the Soviet information revolution were to be badly constrained, what woul d
be the consequences? How would the nation suffer, and how badly ?
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the conservative reaction does occur.
Suppose, further, that the official enthusiasm for the "automation" vision of computerizatio n
remains intact. Then what? Such a scenario would still see Soviet computer usage expan d
very substantially in military, CAD, CAM, transport, data processing, scientific research, an d
other institutional applications. The use of personal computers would be restricte d
narrowly to official business and communications patterns would remain vertical and ru n
in their traditional bureaucratic channels. No explosion of knowledge and creativity would
occur and Soviet society would revert to intellectual insularity and isolation .
If these circumstances were to materialize, the maximum likelihood forecast woul d
be for a situation somewhat more dynamic economically and technologically than that of
the dismal late Brezhnev period. Today's East Germany would be the paradigm, i .e., an
attempt to force feed high technology into a rigid and repressed society . But, with scientifi c
and technological progress proceeding at accelerating rates in the West, and with produc t
life cycles contracting, the prospect would be for an ever widening Soviet lag behind th e
West. That lag would be manifest not only in informatics technologies, but across a broa d
spectrum of technologies, military hardware, and the economy.
93
It is precisely the specter of this failure of the Soviet Union to participate in th e
world-wide information revolution that stalks the Kremlin corridors . The reformers dread
that it may happen. The Stalinists deny it exists. The bulk of the people are too worrie d
about finding sugar or meat to worry about ghosts of tomorrow . The great debate today
is for the largely conservative middle ground of Party members and technical intelligentsia .
7.9. What Telltales Should We Watch?
What should we watch for as evidence, predictive signals, and litmus tests, to
indicate how the Soviet information revolution is proceeding and what its implications may
be?
Critical clues to watch for include the following :
* The manner in which the Soviet telephone network and, more broadly, theentire telecommunications system is developed and expanded . Consisten twith the Ershov vision would be: A steady and significant increase in thenumber of private subscribers and in the lines to serve them; A majorincrease in the system's transmission capacity through the use of fibre optics ,satellite transmission, and microwave relays; A major upgrading of thesystem's switching capacity that would facilitate a rapid increase in inter -personal as well as inter-organizational voice and data communications o na nation-wide basis; A diminution in Moscow's role as the nation's switchin ghub accompanied by a large augmentation of message switching capacity a tnumerous other points around the country ; Universal automatic switching;Early and rapid construction of an integrated digital network capable of highvolume transmission of voice, data, and video signals in digital form .
* The manner and rate at which individuals and organizations are supplied withpersonal computers. The Ershov vision requires that the output of high -quality PCs be increased rapidly and that these machines find their way toall kinds of organizations, particularly to schools, as well as to individuals .That implies high volume retail sales of computers to private individuals i nthe 1990s as well as close adherence to the plans for placing computers i nSoviet educational institutions . The "automation" vision requires an ampl esupply of CAD workstations in official organizations but not an abundanc eof truly "personal" computers .
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Official policies toward xerography and other information copyin gtechnologies . The Ershov vision requires free access to these technologie sfor everyone subject only to their willingness and ability to defray the cost sof material (paper, magnetic media) and equipment .
*Official policies toward the importation of personal computers, peripherals ,and supplies by private individuals as well as organizations . A permissiv epolicy is consistent with the Ershov vision.
Official policies and popular attitudes toward the cooperative and privat eefforts to develop and provide information services and products . Strongencouragement of those efforts will accelerate the Soviet informationrevolution. Restrictions will have the opposite effect. To the extent thatofficial policy seeks to restrict the design, production, and provision o finformation services and products to the public sector it will discourage an dretard the information revolution. Vigorous and well supported cooperativ eand private sector ventures must be the catalysts of Soviet progress i ninformatics . Perestroika and informatization are each other's handmaidens .
Glasnost' and informatization are also inextricably bound. What helps onehelps the other . The reverse is also true . It follows that by watching one wecan learn much about what is happening to the other .
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ENDNOTES
1. See Graham (1972).
2. Gorshkov interviewed in "Tirazhi komp'iutera" .
3. GSVTs stands for gosudarstvennaia set' vychislitel'nykh tsentrov, or State System o fComputer Centers. An early, pessimistic, and (as it turned out) accurate account of it sprospects was given in Judy (1967) .
4. See the statement of Arnold Konstantinovich Romanov, Vice President of the Stat eCommittee on Science and Technology, in Romanov (1988) .
5. See Gromov (1984) .
6. Ibid., 5-6 .
7. Ibid., 8 .
8. See Ershov (1987) ; and Ershov (1988) .
9. Ershov (1987), 82 .
10. Ershov (1988), 84 .
11. Ibid., 86-87.
12. Ibid ., 87.
13. Is it a mere coincidence that the editors of Kommunist chose to follow Ershov's articleimmediately in the journal with a reprint of "Lenin's Political Last Testament," a famousbut long-suppressed speech by Bukharin given in 1929 marking the fifth anniversary o fLenin's death? In that speech, Bukharin construed Lenin's last political statements t obuttress his (Bukharin's) warnings that socialism could only be built by enlisting the self -interest of the peasantry . In turn, that could only be done, argued Bukharin, by continuingthe market-oriented policies of the NEP, relying on voluntary measures, and abjuring force dcollectivization . Stalin, of course, chose the opposite course and purged both Bukharin an dits ideas .
14. Ershov (1988), 87 . (Emphasis added by the authors . )
15. Ibid ., 88.
96
16. Ibid ., 91.
17. Ibid ., 91.
18. Ibid., 92 .
19. Ibid ., 92.
20. /VTR stands for "nauchno-technicheskaia revolutsiia" or scientific-technical revolution .NTR. Problemy i resheniia is a popular fortnightly covering many aspects of science andtechnology.
21. Shirokov, Giglavyi, Donskoi, and Rodionov are interviewed in "Nauchnye sredy. "
22. Shirokov (1988) .
23. Kuzmin (1988) .
24. Rakitov (1988) .
25. "Tirazhi komp'iutera," (1987) .
26. For details on all of these machines, see Judy and Clough (1988). Prices are fromVeitsman (1988), 71 . As a point of reference, the misleading official exchange rate is$1 = 0.6 Rubles . The more realistic black market exchange rate is $1 = 5 .0 Rubles. Allmachines priced are configured with a text monitor, two floppy disk drives, 256 Kb RA Mand 128 Kb ROM. It is an interesting observation on the Soviet pricing system to note tha tthe imported East German PC (Robotron 1715) configured as above except with amonochromatic graphics monitor is priced at only 5,500 rubles . Furthermore, the Robotronmachine is almost certainly of higher quality than the domestic models .
27. "Tirazhi komp'iutera," (1987) .
28. Ushanov (1988) .
29. "Tirazhi komp'iutera," (1987) .
30. See Judy and Lommel (1986); and Judy and Lommel (1988) .
31. "Osnovnye Pokazateli Razvitiia Narodnogo Obrazovaniia v SSSR," (1988), p . 67 .
32. "Komp 'iuterny Klub" (1986) .
33. Personal interviews of the senior author and Ushanov (1988) .
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97
34. Personal observation and interviews of the senior author and Ushanov (1988) .
35. Gorelov (1988) .
36. For the reference of readers who might have an opportunity to visit an InformaticsCenter, the following addresses and telephone numbers are courtesy of the SCCI . Gorelov(1988) .
City
Street
TelephoneMoscow
Smolensk boulevard, 4
246-96-59Moscow
Lomonosovskii prospekt, 34
143-85-22Moscow
Frunzenskaia nab ., 50
242-78-33Moscow
ul . Ramenkin, 12
931-00-03Moscow
Dmitrovskoe shosse, 115
485-31-34Baku
ul. Fabritsiusa, 39Gorkii
per. Gogolia, 6A
34-19-9 8Georgievsk ul . Oktiabria, 140
2-20-12Erevan
Abovian Square, 1
35-05-5 1Kazan
ul. Korolenko, 28
53-99-4 1Kaunas
ul. Traku, 4
71-93-4 4Kuibyshev ul. Promyshlennaia 31 9Kiev
ul. Mel'nikova, 51
213-79-62Leningrad
B. Prospekt, 18
235-06-18Novosibirsk Krasnyi prospekt, 18
22-27-83Riga
ul . Pleskalas, 1
26-07-00Tallinn
ul. Gogolia, 39
53-63-6 3Tashkent
massiv Chilanzar, kv . 1, shk. 128 77-09-3 2Tbilisi
prospekt Druzhby, kv. 3, korp. 5 51-83-97Khar'kov
ul. Nezhinskaia, 9
43-71-4 3Chernigov ul. Karponosa, 12
7-41-1 0
37. See, for example, Kochetov (1983) .
38. Velikhov (1984).
39. DOSAAF derives from Dobrovol'noe Obshchestvo Sodeistviia Armii, Aviatsii i Flot y(Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy) . This quasi -military society sponsors a variety of sporting and technical activities thought to be relevan tto military and defense objectives .
40. See Gorshkov et al . (1988) .
41. See Judy and Clough (1988), 44-48 for an account of the KORVET fiasco .
42. Ushanov (1988) .
98
43. Moskovskie novosti appears in English as Moscow News . It is also published in French ,Spanish, German, and other foreign languages.
44. In the summer of 1988, the senior author undertook a 71-day research trip throug hEastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
45. Solomatin (1986) .
46. The Gorbachevs are such a privileged family. Mikhail has his Macintosh SE and Raisahas her American Express card .
47. Yasmann (1986).
48. Ibid., 36.
49. Shultz (1986) .
50. See Goodman (1987) .
51. See Judy (1987) .
52. Westin in Donnelly (1985), 136-137.
53. Rosenberg (1986), 13-16 .
54. Ibid., 209-210.
55. Ibid ., 205 .
56. Field (1987), 84.
57. Marx (1985), 45 .
58. See, for example, The New York Times, January 28, 1988, 1 ; January 31, 1988, 5 ;February 1, 1988, 26; February 2, 1988, 13 ; February 3, 1988, 1 .
59. Field (1987), 86.
60. Marx (1985), 45 .
61. Chapanis in Pagels (1984), 214 .
62. Rosenberg (1986), 253 .
99
63. Ibid., 256 .
64. Business Week in Forester (1985), 390.
65. For more information see Johnston and Packer (1987) .
66. Rosenberg (1986), 127 .
67. Ibid., 20 .
68. See van Tassel (1976), 204-5.
69. Mathews (1980), 35 .
70. Turkle (1984), 313 .
71. Turkle quoted in "Machine of the Year : A New World Dawns", 24 .
72. Michael quoted in Taviss (1970), 17 .
73. Taviss (1970), 201 .
74. Galloway (1984), 46 .
75. Rosenberg (1986), 162.
76. Dertouzos in Pagels (1984), 27 .
77. Ball in Forester (1985), 533 .
78. Rosenberg (1986), 329 .
79. Dertouzos in Pagels (1984), 27-8 .
80. Cleveland in Guile (1985), 61 .
81. Many people have aided us in formulating these questions and answers. Indeed, theyare too numerous to list . Nevertheless, the contributions of Robert W. Campbell, HansHeymann Jr ., Herbert S. Levine, Robert H . Randolph, and Vladimir I . Toumanoff areacknowledged with special thanks. Naturally, we take full responsibility for the opinionsand judgement reached here .
82. Many economic applications are examined in Judy and Clough (1989) .
100
83. This phase and its outcomes as they applied to Soviet industrial enterprises have bee nwell described in McHenry (1985) and McHenry and Goodman (1986) .
84. Pravda, June 12, 1985, p. 2.
85. Pravda, January 4, 1985 .
86. Ushanov (1988) .
87. Nina Andreeva is the outspoken chemistry professor in Leningrad who feels compelle dto promote her arch-conservative "principles" in vicious letters to various Soviet newspapers .
88. The New York Times, January 6, 1988, p. 6.
89. As reported by Newsday, November 29, 1988 .
90. See Glushkov et al . (1977); and Zgurskii et al . (1982) .
91. Gwertzman (1972) .
92. In Russian, "sumo" translates as "self'. "Samizdat" refers to "self-publication" and"samoinformatizatsiia" translates as "self-informatized . "
93. Ershov (1988), 91 .
94. Campbell (1988), 32-34 .
95. Ibid., 33.
1 0 1
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