implicit egotism

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Implicit EgotismBrett W. Pelham,

1Mauricio Carvallo,

1and John T. Jones

2

1

University at Buffalo, State University of New York, and2

U.S. Military Academy, West Point

ABSTRACTPeople gravitate toward people, places, and

things that resemble the self. We refer to this tendency as

implicit egotism, and we suggest that it reflects an un-

conscious process that is grounded in peoples favorable

self-associations. We review recent archival and experi-

mental research that supports this position, highlighting

evidence that rules out alternate explanations and dis-

tinguishes implicit egotism from closely related ideas such

as mere exposure. Taken together, the evidence suggeststhat implicit egotism is an implicit judgmental con-

sequence of peoples positive self-associations. We conclude

by identifying promising areas for future research.

KEYWORDSimplicit; egotism; self-esteem

Researchers have long known that how people view themselves

plays an important role in virtually every aspect of their daily

lives, including phenomena as diverse as personal achieve-

ment, interpersonal attraction, and even physical well-being. In

recent years, however, researchers have argued that peoplesconscious self-evaluations provide an incomplete view of the

self-concept. Specifically, researchers have argued that peoples

implicit (i.e., unconscious) self-evaluations also influence their

judgment and behavior (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hetts &

Pelham, 2001). Implicit self-evaluations are not beliefs that a

Freudian homunculus has banished to the unconscious. In-

stead, such beliefs are probably best conceptualized as part of

the cognitive or adaptive unconscious (Kihlstrom, 1987). Pre-

sumably, some implicit self-evaluations consist of beliefs that

were once conscious but have become highly automatized.

Other implicit self-evaluations might be unconscious because

they were formed prior to the individuals acquisition of lan-guage. Although few researchers have acknowledged the pos-

sibility, it may also be that implicit self-evaluations are a

product of defensive processes to which people have little or no

conscious access. Finally, implicit self-evaluations may be a

product of classical conditioning or implicit learning, that is,

associative learning that occurs in the absence of conscious

awareness. Thus, just as puppies do not know why they salivate,

people may not always know why they trust a stranger who

sounds vaguely like Garrison Keillor.

It is now well documented that people possess implicit self-

evaluationsthat is, unconscious associations about the self.

It is also well-documented that most implicit self-associations

are highly favorable. Two decades ago, Nuttin (1985) showedthat people like the letters that appear in their own names much

more than other people like these same lettersa phenomenon

Nuttin called the name-letter effect. Nuttin also showed that

people who preferred the letters in their own names were typi-

cally unaware of the basis of this preference. Similarly, Beggan

(1992) showed that once people are given an object people

evaluate the object more favorably than they would otherwise

a phenomenon called the mere-ownership effect. Give Ivan a

puppy, and he will overestimate the puppys worth, presumably

because the puppy has become an extension of the self.

It is now well established that people possess positive implicit

associations about themselves. Until very recently, however, itwas unclear whether peoples implicit self-associations ever

predict meaningful social behaviors (but see Dijksterhuis, 2004;

Shimizu & Pelham, 2004; Spalding & Hardin, 1999). To address

this question, we investigated the roleof implicit self-associations

in major life decisions. Our primary hypothesis was simple. If

Dennis adores the letterD, then it might not be too far-fetched to

expect Dennis to gravitate toward cities such as Denver, careers

such as dentistry, and romantic partners such as Denise. Pelham,

Mirenberg, and Jones (2002) referred to this unconscious ten-

dency to prefer things that resemble the self as implicit egotism.

In a series of articles (Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, & Mirenberg,

2004; Pelham, Mirenberg, & Jones, 2002; Pelham, Carvallo,DeHart, & Jones, 2003), we reported the results of numerous

archival studies (i.e., studies relying on public records such as

birth, marriage, or death records) and experiments suggesting

that implicit egotism influences major life decisions. As sug-

gested by the list in Table 1, which summarizes many of our re-

cent studies, implicit egotism appears to influence a wide variety

of important decisions. In the remainder of this report, we address

some of the strengths and limitations of our research on implicit

egotism and then offer some suggestions for future research.Address correspondence to Brett Pelham, Departmentof Psychology,

SUNY, Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260; e-mail: [email protected].

CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

106 Volume 14Number 2Copyrightr

2005 American Psychological Society


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STUDYING IMPLICIT EGOTISM

In our initial article (Pelham et al., 2002), we argued that im-

plicit egotism influences both where people choose to live and

what people choose to do for a living. For instance, in Study 1 of

this article, we identified four common female first names that

strongly resembled the name of a Southeastern state. The names

were Florence, Georgia, Louise, and Virginia, correspondingwith the states Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and Virginia. We

then consulted Social Security Death Index (SSDI) records

(kept since the advent of the Social Security system) to identify

women who had died while living in each of the four relevant

Southeastern states. This design yielded a 4 4 matrix of

namestate combinations, and a total sample size of more than

75,000 women. Women named Florence, Georgia, Louise, and

Virginia were all disproportionately likely (on average, 44%

above chance values) to have resided in the state that closely

resembled their first name.

Ruling Out ConfoundsThis study raised many concerns about possible confounds. One

concern was the possibility that these women disproportionately

resided in states whose names resembled their own first names

simply because they had been named after the states in which

they had been born (and had never moved). Although SSDI

records do not indicate where the deceased were born, these

records do indicate the state in which they resided when they

applied for social security cards (typically as adults). Using

these records, we were able to focus on people who got their

social security cards in one state and died while residing in

anotherthat is, people who had moved into the states in which

they died. An analysis of these interstate immigrants yielded

clear and consistent evidence for implicit egotism.

Another concern about this study is that the results might

reflect explicit rather than implicit egotism. It would be ex-

tremely surprising if Virginia failed to notice the resemblance

between her first name and the state name that appeared on herdrivers license. Archival research methods do not always lend

themselves well to documenting implicit effects. Nonetheless,

we have tried. In other studies summarized in the same article

(Pelham et al., 2002), we focused on names that, unlike Georgia

and Virginia, shared only their first few letters with the states or

cities to which people with those names gravitated. When Sa-

muel Winters moves to Winnipeg, for example, it seems un-

likely that he will conclude that the first few letters of his

surname are the reason for his move.

Watering down a manipulation in this fashion tends to water

down the size of the effect obtained. But to our surprise, implicit

egotism proved to be sufficiently robust that it survivedsystematic tests involving relatively subtle manipulations. We

were able to show, for example (Pelham et al., 2002; Study 6),

that people disproportionately inhabit cities whose names fea-

ture their birthday numbers. Just as people born on February 2

(02-02) disproportionately inhabit cities with names such as

Two Harbors, people born on May 5 (05-05) disproportionately

inhabit cities with names such as Five Points. This birthday-

number study also illustrated that implicit egotism is not limi-

ted to name-letter preferences. Presumably, any meaningful

TABLE 1

A Selective Summary of the Mos t Comprehensive Studies Providing Support for Implicit Egotism

Pelham, B.W., Mirenberg, M.C., & Jones, J.K. (2002):

1. Four most common female first names that resemble Southeastern state names

2. Four most common male first names that resemble Southeastern state names

3. Eight largest U.S. states and surnames resembling these state names

4. Eight largest Canadian cities and surnames resembling these city names

5. Four most common male and female names that resemble the occupations dentist and lawyer6. All U.S. cities that prominently feature number words in the names (matched with numbers corresponding to

peoples day and month of birth)

Pelham, B.W., Carvallo, M., DeHart, T., & Jones, J.T. (2003):

1. The 30 most common European American surnames and all U.S. cities that include the surname anywhere in

the city name (e.g., Johnson City, Johnsonville, Fort Johnson, etc.)

2. The three most common U.S. surname pairs (e.g., SmithJohnson) and street names that include these

surnames (each pair was replicated individually in each U.S. state)

3. Three sets of surnames chosen to avoid spurious namestreet matches (e.g., HillPark) and street names that

included these names or words (each pair also replicated individually in each U.S. state)

Jones, J.T., Pelham, B.W., Carvallo, M., & Mirenberg, M.C. (2004):

1. Matches for first letter of surname in two large counties, covering approximately 150 years

2. Single initial surname matches for parents of every birth occurring in Texas in 1926

3. Systematic surname match studies of four large Southeastern states over about 150 years

4. Nationwide joint telephone listing study of 12 systematically chosen male and female first names5. Laboratory experiments involving (a) birthday numbers, and (b) first three letters of surname

6. Subliminal conditioning study using participants full names as conditioning stimuli

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self-attribute can serve as a source of implicit egotism. Another

finding that seems likely to reflect implicit preferences comes

from studies of street addresses. Whereas people whose sur-

name is Street tend to have addresses that include the word

Street (e.g., Lincoln Street), people whose surname is Lane tend

to have addresses that include the word Lane (e.g., Lincoln

Lane; Pelham et al., 2003).

Moderators of Implicit Egotism

Can archival studies such as these shed any light on the psy-

chological mechanisms behind implicit egotism? We believe so.

To the degree that archival studies yield support for meaningful

moderators of implicit egotism, such studies can suggest, albeit

indirectly, that implicit egotism is based on self-evaluation. For

example, laboratory research has shown that women show

stronger first-name preferences than men do (perhaps because

many women realize that their first name is the only name they

will keep forever). In keeping with this established finding

in the laboratory research, behavioral first-name preferences

have also proven to be stronger for women than for men (Pelhamet al., 2002).

The distinctiveness of a persons name also appears to mod-

erate the strength of implicit egotism. Implicit egotism is more

pronounced for rare (i.e., more self-defining) than for common

names. The fact that rare names do a better job of distinguishing

their owners from other people than common names do suggests

that implicit egotism is grounded in identity. By definition,

people with rare names are also exposed to their own names

slightly less often than are people with common names (e.g.,

Zeke meets other people named Zeke less often than John meets

other people named John). The fact that implicit egotism is

stronger among those with statistically rare names also suggeststhat implicit egotism is not grounded exclusively in the mere

exposure effect, that is, the tendency for people to prefer stimuli

to which they have been exposed more often (see also Jones

et al., 2002, where this issue is addressed in other ways).

The Problem of Sampling

One of the limitations of archival research on implicit egotism is

that it is often impossible to sample people randomly in such

studies. The researcher is usually forced to sample names

systematically. In some studies, we tackled this problem by

sampling surnames and city or street names from all 50 U.S.

states (Pelham et al., 2003). For example, by systematicallysampling the same common surname pairs (e.g., Smith

Johnson, WilliamsJones) in all 50 U.S. states, we were able to

document robust namestreet matching in six different na-

tionwide samples. Thus, we were able to show, for instance, that

the surname pair SmithJohnson yielded supportive data for 45

out of 50 individual U.S. states.

Another way in which we have tackled the sampling problem

is by sampling names exhaustively within large geographical

units. In studies of interpersonal attraction, we were sometimes

able to sample entire states or counties. For example, using

exhaustive statewide birth records, Jones et al. (2004) were able

to show that people are disproportionately likely to marry others

who happen to share their first or last initial. (Moreover, in

samples in which it has been possible to determine peoples

ethnicity, we have also been able to control for ethnic matching

(the tendency for people to marry others of their own ethnic

group) by testing our hypothesis within specific ethnic groups

(e.g., among Latinos only). Although archival studies of inter-

personal attraction raise their own methodological problems, we

have gone to great lengths to rule out alternative explanations,

including not only ethnic matching but also age-group matching

and proximity. For instance, we ruled out the possibility that

people married those who were seated near them in high school

(based on surname) by showing that our findings remained robust

among couples whose ages differed by 5 years or more. Our

studies have consistently yielded evidence for implicit egotism.

Assessing Implicit Egotism in the Laboratory

Thomas Edison once said that genius is 1% inspiration and 99%perspiration. With a little inspiration and a great deal of per-

spiration, researchers who rely on archival research methods

can go a long way toward ruling out alternate explanations for a

particular effect. But as Edisons contemporary, the methodol-

ogist R.A. Fisher, might have put it, neither inspiration nor

perspiration is a match for randomization. The researcher who

wishes to rule out numerous alternate explanations for a phe-

nomenon, while gaining insights into its underlying mechan-

isms, must occasionally conduct experiments. In our research

on implicit egotism and interpersonal attraction (Jones et al.,

2004), we have done exactly that.

In one experiment, we introduced participants to a bogusinteraction partner whose arbitrarily assigned experimental

code number (e.g., 02-28) either did or did not happen to re-

semble their own birthday number. Participants were more at-

tracted to the stranger when his or her code number resembled

their own birthday number. This study suggests that implicit

egotism is not merely a corollary of the principle that people are

attracted to others who are similar to them. After all, partici-

pants did not think that their interaction partner actually shared

their birthday. In a second experiment, we found that implicit

egotism is most likely to emerge under conditions of self-con-

cept threat (i.e., when people have been forced to think about

their personal weaknesses). Men who had just experienced amild self-concept threat (by writing about their personal flaws as

a potential dating partner) were especially attracted to a woman

in a Yahoo personals ad when her screen name happened to

contain the first few letters of their surname (e.g., Eric Pelham

would prefer STACEY_PEL to STACEY_SMI). Together with

past research suggesting that self-concept threats temporarily

increase peoples positive associations to the self, this study

suggests that implicit egotism is grounded in self-evaluation

(Beggan, 1992; Jones et al., 2002).

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In a third experiment on interpersonal attraction (Jones et al.,

2004, Study 7), we found the most direct evidence yet for the

underpinnings of implicit egotism. Male and female partici-

pants evaluated an attractive young woman on the basis of her

photograph. The woman was depicted wearing a jersey that

prominently featured either the number 16 or the number 24

(see Fig. 1). Prior to evaluating the woman, participants took

part in 30 trials of a computerized decision-making task in

which they made simple judgments about strings of random

letters. At the beginning of each judgment trial, a row of Xs

appeared briefly in the center of the computer monitor, to focus

participants attention. This task was actually a subliminalconditioning task: The row ofXs was always followed (for 14 ms)

by either the number 16 or the number 24. One of these two

numbers (16 or 24) was always followed by the individual

participants own full name (for 14 ms), and the other number

was always followed by one of several gender-matched control

names. Participants liked the woman more, and evaluated her

more favorably, when her jersey number had been subliminally

paired with their own names. Implicit egotism appears to be

implicit.

FROM IMPLICIT EGOTISM TO IMPLICIT SELF-

EVALUATION

We believe that we have established beyond a reasonable doubt

that implicit egotism influences important decisions. Thus, we

believe that future research should attempt to identify mean-

ingful boundary conditions (i.e., predictable limitations) of

implicit egotism. Along these lines, some questions that seemripe for investigation involve close relationships, culture, and

implicit self-esteem.

Do name-letter preferences apply exclusively to the self, or do

the names of people to whom one is close also affect ones

preferences? Do such preferences grow stronger as relation-

ships grow closer? If Bill truly loves Virginia, will he be highly

interested in moving to Virginia, just as she might be? Given

recent developments in the psychology of culture, it might also

be profitable to assess cultural influences on implicit egotism.

One might expect that in collectivistic cultures (i.e., ones that

celebrate collective as opposed to individual identities), name-

letter preferences would be exaggerated for collective aspects ofthe self (e.g., surnames might have a greater effect than fore-

names). We are currently planning studies to test this idea. We

have also begun to address the implications of implicit egotism

for more mundane decisions. Specifically, we (Brendl, Chatto-

padhyay, Pelham, & Carvallo, in press) recently found that

people prefer products (e.g., teas, crackers, chocolate candies)

whose names share one or more letters with their own names.

If unconscious self-evaluations influence both mundane and

important daily decisions, it is important to understand the

origins and nature of these implicit self-evaluationsthat is, to

understand implicit self-esteem. Do negative social interactions

early in life cause some people to develop low implicit self-esteem? Apparently they do. In three separate studies, DeHart,

Pelham, and Tennen (in press) asked parents, their adult chil-

dren, or both to report on parentchild interactions in the family

when the children were growing up. Both the childrens and

their parents reports of how nurturing the parents had been

were associated with the adult childrens levels of implicit self-

esteem. This association still held true after controlling for

participants levels of explicit self-esteem. Studies such as

these raise the question of whether we have observed consistent

evidence for implicit egotism merely because most people are

fortunate enough to possess positive implicit associations to the

self. It is possible that our typical findings would be reversedamong people who possess truly negative self-associations (i.e.,

for those with very low levels of implicit self-esteem). Such

findings might have implications not only for theories of self-

regulation but also for clinical theories of the etiology of de-

pression and self-destructive behaviors. Of course, broad

speculations such as these await empirical scrutiny. However,

we hope that our research on implicit egotism will inspire re-

searchers to take a closer look at the nature of implicit self-

esteem. A complete understanding of the self-concept may

Fig. 1. Stimulus person from subliminal conditioning study (Jones, J.T.,

Pelham, B.W., Carvallo, M., & Mirenberg, M.C., 2004). Participants

evaluated this womanafter thenumberon herjersey (16or 24)had orhad

not been subliminally paired with their own names.

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Brett W. Pelham, Mauricio Carvallo, and John T. Jones


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hinge, in part, on a better understanding why Jack loves both

Jackie and Jacksonville.

Recommended Reading

Fazio, R.H., & Olson, M.A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cog-

nition research: Their meaning and uses. Annual Review of Psy-

chology, 54, 297327.Koole, S.L., & Pelham, B.W. (2003). On the nature of implicit self-

esteem: The case of the name letter effect. In S. Spencer, S. Fein,

& M. Zanna (Eds.), Motivated social perception: The Ontario

Symposium on Personality and Social Psychology (Vol. 9, pp. 93

116). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Wilson, T.D., & Dunn, E.W. (2004). Self-knowledge: Its limits, value

and potential for improvement. Annual Review of Psychology, 55,

493518.

AcknowledgmentsWe thank the many friends and col-

leagues who have encouraged us to pursue this research.

REFERENCES

Beggan, J.K. (1992). On the social nature of nonsocial perception: The

mere ownership effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-

chology, 62, 229237.

Brendl, C.M., Chattopadhyay, A., Pelham, B.W., & Carvallo, M. (in

press). Name letter branding: Valence transfers when product

specific needs are active. Journal of Consumer Research.

DeHart, T., Pelham, B.W., & Tennen, H. (in press). What lies beneath:

Early experiences with parents and implicit self-esteem. Journal

of Experimental Social Psychology.

Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). I like myself but I dont know why: Enhancing

implicit self-esteem by subliminal evaluative conditioning.

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Hetts, J.J., & Pelham, B.W. (2001). A case for the non-conscious self-

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Pelham, B.W., Mirenberg, M.C., & Jones, J.K. (2002). Why Susie sells

seashells by the seashore: Implicit egotism and major life deci-

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fortune: Implicit and explicit self-esteem, positive life events, and

health. Health Psychology, 23, 101105.

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