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SIGTARP-17-001 January 11, 2017

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR

THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM SIGTARP OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL

INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET

RELIEF PROGRAM

Evaluation Report

Improving TARP’s Investment in American Workers


ThisPageIntentionallyLeftBlank

Office of the special inspector general

For the Troubled Asset Relief Program

1801 L Street, NW, 4th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20220


January 11, 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Jacob J. Lew – Secretary of the Treasury /Signed/ FROM: Honorable Christy Goldsmith Romero – Special Inspector General

for the Troubled Asset Relief Program SUBJECT: Improving TARP’s Investment in American Workers

(SIGTARP 17-001) We are providing this report for your information and use. It discusses homeowners who were denied TARP unemployment assistance. The Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program conducted this evaluation (engagement code 009) under the authority of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and Public Law 110-343, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. We considered comments from the Department of the Treasury when preparing the report. Treasury’s comments are addressed in the report, where applicable, and a copy of Treasury’s response is included in its entirety. We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. For additional information on this report, please contact Ms. Jenniffer F. Wilson, Deputy Special Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation ([email protected] /202-622-4633); or Mr. Chris Bosland, Assistant Deputy Special Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation ([email protected] /202-927-9321).

IMPROVING TARP’S INVESTMENT IN AMERICAN WORKERS

SIGTARP-17-001 i January 11, 2017

Summary

TARP’sHardestHitFundisaninvestmentinAmericanworkers,providingatemporarysafetynettohelpsavethehomesofunemployedandunderemployedworkingclassAmericansinRustBeltstates(suchasOhio,Michigan,IndianaandIllinois),Southernstates(suchasNorthCarolina,SouthCarolina,Alabama,Tennessee,andGeorgia),and10otherstates.

HHFhashelpedmorethanaquarterofamillionhomeowners,butevengoodprogramscanbebetter.Theprogramismeetingarealneed,onethatcontinues.Theneedforthisunemploymentbridge—andotherHardestHitFundprograms,likeblightdemolition—remainssocriticalthat,inDecember2015,MembersofCongressfromOhioandMichiganworkedacrosstheaisletoconvinceCongresstoadd$2billiontotheprogram.

HardestHitFunddollarshavebeenslowtoflowinmanystates,andmorethan160,000peopleweredeniedHHFassistance.SIGTARPanalyzeddataprovidedbystateagenciesoneachpersonwhowasturneddownforthisprogram.

What SIGTARP Found

SIGTARPfoundthatmostofthepeoplewhoweredeniedHardestHitfundsearnedlessthan$30,000,callingintoquestionwhethertheprogramiseffectiveinreachingthosehardesthit.StateagenciesthatdistributeHardestHitFundunemploymentassistanceturneddown84,965peoplewhoearnedlessthan$30,000,including64,979peoplewhomadelessthan$20,000.SIGTARPfoundthat,in12ofthe19states—mostlyintherustbeltandsouth—nearlythreeoutoffourpeopleturneddownfortheseFederalfundsearnedlessthan$30,000.

CongressrequiredthattheseTARPfundsbeusedtobailoutAmericanworkers,notjusttobailoutcompanieslikeGeneralMotors.

HardestHitfundscouldhelpautoworkerslaidoffwhenGeneralMotorsshutdowntheirplants,aswellasworkerscaughtintherippleeffectofashutdown,likeworkersatautopartssuppliersoratneighboringretailshops.

MichiganandOhioareamongthestatesthathavethemostTARPdollarssetaside,butalsohavesomeofthehighestpercentagesofpeopleturneddownfortheHardestHitFundwhoearnedlessthan$30,000.IncitieswhereGeneralMotors—whichreceived$50billioninTARPfunds—oritssuppliersclosedplantsorlaidoffworkers,denialratesareevenhigherforthosewhomadelessthan$30,000.

*IncludesDaytonandnearbycitiesofMoraineandVandalia.

Despitereturningtoprofitability,GMandotherautocompaniesclosedplantsandlaidoffworkers,eveninthelastyear.GMannouncedthat2,000additionalworkersinMichiganandOhiofacelayoffsearlyinthecomingyear.

Thefindingsuncoveredbythisevaluationindicatethattheremaybeeligibilitycriteriathataretoostringent.Theremaybevalidreasonswhythesepeoplewereturneddown,butitisimpossibletoknowbecauseSIGTARPfoundthatstateagencies’recordswerenon‐existent,missing,orincompleteregardingwhytheagenciesturneddownpeoplemakinglessthan$30,000.

Stateagenciesshouldunlockthefullpotentialoftheprogrambyeliminatingunnecessary


SIGTARP-17-001 ii January 11, 2017

criteriathatdonotexistinotherstatesorthatdonotreflecttherealityoftheworkingclassinthatstate.Forexample,somestatesrequirethatthepersonshowenoughincometopaytheirmortgageinthefuture,whichisnotrealisticforsomepeopleseekingtemporaryhelpwiththeirmortgageuntiltheycangetafulltimejob.

Thisprogramhasalotmorepotentialtoprovideasafetynetincertaincommunitiesuntiljobsreturntothesetowns,butthatpotentialneedstobeunlocked.

What SIGTARP Recommends

Treasuryandstateagenciesshould:(1)eliminateunnecessaryprogramcriteria;(2)openupeligibilitytoworkersfacinglayoffssothattheydonothavetofirstfallbehindontheirmortgage;and(3)stateagenciesshouldkeepdetailedrecordsonwhythestatedeniedeachperson.

Inresponsetoadraftofthisreport,Treasuryprovidedaletterandsometechnicalcomments,whichSIGTARPaddressedwhereapplicable.Initsresponse,TreasurydidnotaddressSIGTARP’sfindings,butsaidit“…appreciatesSIGTARP’sanalysisandiscloselyexamining[SIGTARP’s]recommendations.”


SIGTARP-17-001 iii January 11, 2017

Table of Contents

Summary .............................................................................................................................. i

Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. iii

Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1

Background ........................................................................................................................ 3

85,000 People Who Earned Less Than $30,000 Were Turned Down for Hardest Hit Funds ....................................................................................................................... 4

In 6 States (Including Ohio, North Carolina, and Indiana), 3 of 4 People Turned Down for Hardest Hit Funds Earned Less Than $30,000, and Nearly 3 of 4 People in 6 Other States (Including Michigan, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee) ............................................................................................................... 5

High Percentages of People Turned Down for the Hardest Hit Fund Who Live in Cities Where General Motors Closed a Plant Earned Less Than $30,000 ........... 8

SIGTARP Could Not Determine from State Records Why People Earning Less Than $30,000 Were Turned Away, Which Could Be Easily Fixed ........................... 12

To Level the Playing Field, States Can Remove Unnecessary Restrictions That: (1) Do Not Exist in Other States for These Dollars; and (2) Do Not Reflect the Reality of Working Class Americans .................................................................. 13

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 18

Recommendations ........................................................................................................... 21

Management Comments and SIGTARP’s Response ..................................................... 22

Appendix A – Objective, Scope, and Methodology ....................................................... 23

Appendix B – Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................. 26

Appendix C – Evaluation Team Members ...................................................................... 27

Appendix D – Management Comments .......................................................................... 28


SIGTARP-17-001 1 January 11, 2017

Introduction

TARP’sHardestHitFundisaninvestmentinAmericanworkers.TheGovernmentbailedoutcompaniessuchasGeneralMotors(“GM”),butCongressrequiredthatbailoutfundsalsogotoAmericans(likeautoworkers)tosavetheirhomes.TARP’sHardestHitFundprovidesatemporarysafetynettosavethehomesofunemployedorunderemployedworkingclassAmericansinRustBeltstates(suchasOhio,Michigan,IndianaandIllinois),Southernstates(suchasNorthCarolina,SouthCarolina,Alabama,Tennessee,andGeorgia),and10otherstates.TARPfundspaypartofthemortgageofAmericanworkerswholosttheirjobsthroughnofaultoftheirown(orsawtheirpaycheckscut),generallyforayearortwoatmost,whiletheylookforafull‐timejob.

Outof19states,withtheexceptionofthehighlypopulatedCaliforniaandFlorida,TreasurysetasidethemostdollarstoOhio($762million)andMichigan($761million).1InOhioandMichigan,TARPfundscouldhelpautoworkerslaidoffwhenGMshutdowntheirplant,orthosecaughtintherippleeffectofashutdown,likeworkersatautopartssuppliersoratneighboringretailshops.Near‐emptyplantsandabandonedhousesserveaseyesorestoneighborsdesperatetokeeptheirpropertyvaluesup.TheHardestHitFundalsocommitsmorethan$811milliontodemolishblightedabandonedhousesinOhio,Michigan,Indiana,Illinois,Alabama,SouthCarolina,Tennessee,andMississippi.

Dollarshavebeenslowtoflowinmanystates,buttheneedforthisunemploymentbridgeandblightdemolitionissocriticalthatinDecember2015,MembersofCongressfromOhioandMichiganworkedacrosstheaisletoconvinceCongresstoadd$2billiontotheprogram.2InOhioandMichigan,theprogramhasdoneabetterjobthanmanyotherstatesofdistributingthesefundstohomeowners,withOhiohomeownersexhaustingallofthefundsbeforetheadditionalmoneyfromCongress.

1Treasuryalsocommitted$715millionintheseTARPfundstoIllinois.NorthCarolinacanreceive$706million.Treasuryhasobligated$9.6billioninTARPfundsfortheHardestHitFund.

2UnemploymentisstillaboveaverageincitiessuchasDetroit,Michigan,andCleveland,Ohio,andunderemploymentremainsastruggleintheseandotherareas.



DespiteGMreturningtoprofitability,GMandothersclosedplantsandlaidoffworkers,eveninthelastyear.3TheadditionalTARPfunds,whichwereallocatedin2016,allowedOhiotoincreasefundingofblightdemolitionin18countiesandtoreopenitsunemploymentprogramforlaidoffworkersinSeptember2016.AutoworkersinOhioandMichiganwillsuffermorelayoffs.4GMannouncedthat,inJanuary2017,itwilllayoffmorethan2,000workersat2plantsinOhioandMichigan.5

Thisprogramhasalotmorepotentialtoprovideasafetynetincertaincommunitiesuntiljobsreturntothesetowns,butthatpotentialneedstobeunlocked.Ithashelped263,000peoplepaytheirmortgage—halfofthoseestimated.Morethan160,000peoplewereturneddown.Another170,000+peopleapplied,butwithdrewtheirapplication,perhapsbecausetheydidnotmeetthecriteria.Likelyevenmorepeopledidnotapplyatallknowingtheydidnotmeetthecriteria.AsanInspectorGeneral’sjobistorootoutfraud,waste,andabuse,andrecommendimprovementstoeffectivenessandefficiency,SIGTARPevaluated:

Whoappliedforthesefundsandweredenied,and

Whetherthereareunnecessaryrestrictionsthatcanbeliftedtounlocktheprogram’spotential.

SIGTARPconductedthisevaluationinaccordancewiththe“QualityStandardsforInspectionandEvaluation”establishedbytheCounciloftheInspectorsGeneralonIntegrityandEfficiency.Foradiscussionoftheevaluation’sscopeandmethodology,seeAppendixA.

3InOctober2015,GMannouncedthatitwouldlayoffabout500hourlyworkersatitsOrionAssemblyplantinMichiganthatmakesthecompactcarChevroletSonic.Fordlaidoff700workersinWayne,MichiganwheretheFordFocuswasmadeand,accordingtopressreports,announcedinSeptember2016thatitwouldmoveallofitsremainingsmallcarproductionintheUnitedStatestoMexico.InApril2016,FiatChryslerannounceditwouldlayoffabout1,400workersatitsSterlingHeightsAssemblyPlantinMichigan.

4InOctober2016,GMannouncedthatitwilldiscontinueitsironcastingdivisionatitsDefiancefoundry,whichwillresultinthelayoffof157employeesby2018.

5OnJanuary16,2017,about840workerswillbelaidoffatGM’splantinLansing,MichiganthatmakestheChevroletCamaroandCadillacATSandCTSluxurycars.Oneweeklater,GMwillcutproductionatitsLordstown,OhioplantthatmakestheChevroletCruze,whichwilllayoffapproximately1,250workers.Lordstownalreadysuffersfromaboveaverageunemployment.



Background

The19stateagenciesincontractwithTreasurytodistributethesefundshavelargelypaidthem(morethan72%)tounemployedandunderemployedhomeowners.TreasurydescribedthepurposeofHardestHitFundunemploymentassistanceasfollows:

Responsible families across the country have found themselves unable to pay their mortgages due to unemployment or underemployment. The economic downturn has led to a record number of workers suffering from long term unemployment, and millions more are working part-time because they cannot find full time or otherwise adequate work. This assistance is designed to help thousands of families keep making their payments and stay in their homes until they can find work.6

The19statesTreasurypickedin2010toreceivetheTARPfundshadhighsustainedunemploymentandhighnumbersofunderwaterhomeowners.ThesestatesareCalifornia,Florida,Michigan,Nevada,NorthCarolina,Ohio,Arizona,Oregon,RhodeIsland,SouthCarolina,Alabama,theDistrictofColumbia,Georgia,Illinois,Indiana,Kentucky,Mississippi,NewJersey,andTennessee.

TreasuryprovidestheseTARPfundstohomeownersthroughthestateagencies.Whenastatehousingfinanceagency(“stateagency”)approvesahomeowner,itrequeststhemortgageservicer’sagreement.AservicerparticipatinginHHFshouldagreebecauseitwillreceiveeithermonthlypaymentsoralumpsum.ThestatesdrawdownonTARPfundsfromTreasury.Already$6.8billion(70%)ofthetotal$9.6billionhasbeendrawndown.Someoftheremaining30%mayalreadybecommitted,aslongasthehomeownerstaysinthehome.

6Treasury,“GuidelinesforHFAProposalSubmissionforUnemploymentPrograms,”August11,2010.



85,000 People Who Earned Less Than $30,000 Were Turned Down for Hardest Hit Funds

StateagenciespaidbyTreasurytodistributethisunemploymentassistanceturneddown84,965peoplewhoearnedlessthan$30,000(asshowninFigure1),including64,979peoplewhomadelessthan$20,000.SIGTARPhasfoundthatmostofthepeoplewhoweredeniedHardestHitfunds(53%)earnedlessthan$30,000(seeFigure2).7

Figure 1: Hardest Hit Fund Homeowner Denials by State, as of June 30, 2016

State Agency Denied Homeowners Earning Less Than

$30,000

Florida 16,706

Michigan 12,653

California 10,032

Georgia 7,861

Arizona 6,801

North Carolina 6,559

South Carolina 5,350

Ohio 4,133

New Jersey 3,417

Illinois 2,787

Alabama 1,517

Oregon 1,478

Nevada* 1,293

Kentucky 1,241

Mississippi 1,158

Tennessee 952

Indiana 465

Rhode Island 456

DC 106 Total 84,965

* Data as of September 30, 2015 (the most recent data available).

Source: SIGTARP analysis of state agency Hardest Hit Fund data for homeowner programs. Table excludes 927 people for whom state agency records did not provide income information.

StateagenciesinFlorida,Michigan,California,andGeorgiaturneddownthelargestnumbersofpeoplewhomadelessthan$30,000.

7Stateagencies’recordsprovidedtoSIGTARPshowthat53%ofallhomeownersdeniedforHardestHitFunddollars(84,965outof160,015)earnedlessthan$30,000ayear.Thisassistanceislargelyunemploymentassistance.



In 6 States (Including Ohio, North Carolina, and Indiana), 3 of 4 People Turned Down for Hardest Hit Funds Earned Less Than $30,000, and Nearly 3 of 4 People in 6 Other States (Including Michigan, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee)

Althoughnationwide53%ofallofthehomeownersdeniedtheseFederaldollarsearnedlessthan$30,000,SIGTARPfoundthatin12ofthe19states,morethan70%ofpeopleturneddownfortheseFederalfundsearnedlessthan$30,000.

Figure 2: People Denied Hardest Hit Fund Dollars, as of June 30, 2016

Source: SIGTARP analysis of applicant data provided by the states.

In12states,70%ormoreofthepeopleturneddownearnedlessthan$30,000,asshowninFigure3.Peoplewhoearnlessthan$30,000arelikelytofallwithinthosestillstrugglingwithunemploymentandunderemployment,andhavedifficultieskeepingtheirhome.



Figure 3: Percentage of Denied Homeowners Who Earned Less Than $30,000, by State

Source: SIGTARP analysis of applicant data provided by the states.

OfthepeoplewhowereturneddowninOhio,NorthCarolina,Mississippi,Alabama,theDistrictofColumbia,andIndiana,76‐80%earnedlessthan$30,000.Atthesametime,thestateagenciesgaveHardestHitFunddollarstonearly20,000peoplewhomademorethan$70,000—includingalmost6,000peoplemakingmorethan$90,000.

WhiletheprogramhashelpedmanyinOhioandMichigan,thosearetwostateswherehighpercentagesofpeopleturneddownmadeunder$30,000—86%inOhioand71%inMichigan.

TheMichiganstateagencyturneddown12,653peoplewhoearnedlessthan$30,000,butgaveHardestHitFunddollarsto1,176peoplewhoearnedmorethan$90,000,and1,884peoplewhomadebetween$70,000and$89,999.

TheOhiostateagencyturneddown4,133peopleforHardestHitFunddollarswhoearnedlessthan$30,000,butgavethosedollarsto1,244peoplewhomademorethan$70,000(321ofthemmademorethan$90,000).



Whilestateagenciesmaywanttohelppeoplewiththesehigherincomes,highnumbersofpeopleturnedawaywhoearnedlessthan$30,000raisesquestionsaboutwhethertheseprogramsareaseffectiveandefficientastheycanbetoreachthosepeoplewhoarethehardesthit.



High Percentages of People Turned Down for the Hardest Hit Fund Who Live in Cities Where General Motors Closed a Plant Earned Less Than $30,000

StateagencyrecordsfromMichiganandOhioprovidedtoSIGTARPshowthathighpercentagesofthepeoplebeingturneddownforthisprogramincitieswhereGeneralMotors(“GM”)closedaplantorlaidoffworkersearnedlessthan$30,000.Theclosingofanautoplantcanhavearippleeffect,includinglayoffsatautopartssuppliers.AllofthestateagenciesreporttoTreasuryquarterlyonthenumberofpeoplelivingineverycityorcountywhoreceivethesefunds.Thisinformationispubliclyreleased,butnoonereleasesdetailsonthepeopleturneddown.

SIGTARPperformedazipcodesearchofthestaterecordsprovidedtoidentifywherepeopleearninglessthan$30,000livedandwereturneddownforthisHHFassistance.Thatsearchrevealedthat,inMichigan,manyofthosepeopleliveincitieswhereGMclosedplantsorlaidoffworkers,asseeninFigure4:

Figure 4: People Denied HHF in Michigan Cities Where GM Closed Plants or Laid off Workers: Homeowners Denied HHF Who Earned Less Than $30,000

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Michigan applicant data.



InMichigan,staterecordsprovidedtoSIGTARPshowthatincitieswhereGMclosedplantsorlaidoffworkers,theMichiganstateagencyreported:

Nearly5,000peoplelivingintheDetroitmetropolitanareawhoearnedlessthan$30,000wereturneddownforHHFdollars.Thatwas82%ofallpeopleintheDetroitareaturneddownforHHF.

Ofthealmost500peoplelivinginFlintandsurroundingareaswhowereturneddownforHHFdollars,407ofthem(84%)earnedlessthan$30,000.

About83%ofthepeoplelivingintheSaginawareawhowereturneddownforHHFdollarsearnedlessthan$30,000.Thiswasmorethan260people.

Twooutofeverythreepeople(66%)livinginGrandRapidsandsurroundingareaswhowereturneddownforHHFdollarsearnedlessthan$30,000.Thiswasnearly250people.

Morethan200peopleintheLansingarea(50mileswestofFlint)whoearnedlessthan$30,000wereturneddownforHHFdollars.Thatis63%ofthepeopleintheLansingareawhowereturneddown.

Morethan100peopleinYpsilantiandsurroundingareaswhoearnedlessthan$30,000wereturneddownforHHFdollars.Thatis62%ofallpeopleintheYpsilantiareathatwereturneddownforHHFdollars.

GMalsoclosedplantsinOhio,asdidautopartssuppliers,asshowninFigure5,below.However,onemajorplantinMoraine,Ohiowasclosedthreeyearsbeforethisprogramlaunched.



Figure 5: People Denied HHF in Ohio Cities Where GM or Suppliers Closed Plants or Laid Off Workers: Homeowners Denied HHF Who Earned Less Than $30,000

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Ohio applicant data.

OhiostateagencyrecordsprovidedtoSIGTARPshow:

GMdidnotcloseaplantinCleveland,but,accordingtomediareports,jobswerelostwhenautopartssuppliersinClevelandclosed,includingforexample,AccelPerformanceGroup,MetalworksWorldwide,andShilohIndustries.Morethan600peopleinClevelandandsurroundingareaswhoearnedlessthan$30,000wereturneddownforHHFdollars.Thatmeansthatnearly90%ofClevelandresidentsturneddownforHHFearnedlessthan$30,000.

Morethan200peopleinDaytonandsurroundingareas(includingMoraineandVandalia)whoearnedlessthan$30,000wereturneddownforHHFdollars.Thatmeansthatmorethan90%ofDayton‐arearesidentsturneddownforHHFearnedlessthan$30,000.DaytonalsosufferedfromalossofjobsatautopartssupplierslikeDelphi.

MostofthepeoplelivinginFindlay,Lordstown,Mansfield,andOntariowhowereturneddownforHHFdollarsearnedlessthan$30,000.



Figure6,below,showsthepercentagesofdeniedworkerswhoearnedlessthan$30,000inMichiganandOhiocitiesaffectedbyGMandsupplierplantclosures.

Figure 6: Percentage of Denied Workers Who Earned Less Than $30,000, by City

* Includes Dayton and nearby cities of Moraine and Vandalia, Ohio. Combined, these cities denied 238 homeowners who earned less than $30,000.

Source: SIGTARP analysis of applicant data provided by Michigan and Ohio.

Withsuchhighpercentagesofpeoplewhoearnedlessthan$30,000beingturneddownforthisprogramincitieswhereGMclosedaplant,itbecomesimperativetoknowwhythesepeoplewereturneddown,asthislevelofincomecanshowwhohasbeenhithardinthesecities.



SIGTARP Could Not Determine from State Records Why People Earning Less Than $30,000 Were Turned Away, Which Could Be Easily Fixed

Stateagencies’recordsprovidedtoSIGTARPwerenon‐existent,missingorincomplete,aboutwhythestateagenciesturneddownpeoplemakinglessthan$30,000.Insufficientrecordsmakeassessmentofthebasisforturningdownthesepeopledifficult.Insufficientrecordshinderimprovementstotheuseofthesefundsbythosemostinneed.Insufficientrecordshamperdeterminationsthatthemoneyisnotbeingwasted.

SomestateagencieswereunabletoprovideSIGTARPevenbasicaggregateinformationaboutthereasonswhytheydeniedpeopleseekingtheseFederalfunds.

AFloridaofficialtoldSIGTARPthatthestateagencycouldnotprovideSIGTARPalistingofthenumberofAmericansdeniedandthereasonswhytheyweredenied,despitethefactthatSIGTARPrecommendedthattheydosoinanOctober2015report.

SIGTARPfoundthatstateagencies’individual‐levelrecordsinNevada,SouthCarolina,andArizona,aremostlyblankinthefieldthatstoresthereasonwhyeachpersonwasdenied.

TheOhiostateagency’srecordslistnoreasonfordenying3,602(87%)ofthe4,133Americanworkerswhoearnedlessthan$30,000.

StateofficialsinOhio,IndianaandIllinoistoldSIGTARPthattodeterminethereasonswhyindividualsweredeniedwouldrequireamanualreviewofeachperson’sfile.

Whenstateagencyrecordslistedareasonwhyeachpersonearninglessthan$30,000wasdenied,oftenitwasavaguestatementthatthepersonwasineligible,raisingconcernsaboutwhethertheeligibilitycriteriaareallnecessary.Criteriaadoptedatthebeginningoftheprogram,whenitwasnotknownhowslowlythismoneywouldflowtohomeowners,maynotmakesensenownearlysevenyearslater—andwithanadditional$2billioninfunding.UnnecessaryrestrictionsthatserveasstumblingblocksorcloseddoorstoAmericanworkersshouldberemovedtoimproveeffectivenessandefficiency.



To Level the Playing Field, States Can Remove Unnecessary Restrictions That: (1) Do Not Exist in Other States for These Dollars; and (2) Do Not Reflect the Reality of Working Class Americans

Withtheadditional$2billioninfundingCongressapprovedin2015,alongwithunspentfundsinsomestates,thisprogramwillbemoreeffectiveandefficientifthereisafreshlookatthecriteriathatshouldapplytoday.Statesthathaveunderperformedindistributingthemoneyshouldopenupthefunnelandremoveanybottlenecksintheirprocess.

Evenstatesthathavebeendistributingthemoneycouldopenupthecriteriatoreachmoreworkerswhohavebeenlaidofforsawtheirpaycheckcut.UsingMichiganasanexample,12,653peopleearninglessthan$30,000inMichiganwereturneddown,mostlybecausetheywereineligible,asshowninFigure7.

Figure 7: Reasons Why 12,653* Michigan Workers Earning Less Than $30,000 Were Denied Hardest Hit Funds*

Michigan Workers Denied

8,757 Borrower Ineligible

1,371 Hardship Requirement

1,259 Mortgage Ineligible

840 Property Ineligible

436 Not Participating

(Investor/Servicer)

47 No Reason Given * Detailed figures do not add to 12,653 because some homeowners were denied for more than one reason.

Source: SIGTARP analysis of Michigan applicant data.

Thereareanother12,522peopleinMichiganwhoappliedbutlaterhadtheirapplicationwithdrawn(bytheagencyorthemselves),maybebecausetheycouldnotmeetoneormorecriteria.Othersmaynothaveeventriedtoapplybecausetheydidnotmeetthecriteria.

Unfortunately,thesevaguerecordsdonotlistwhichcriteriathepersondidnotmeet,makingitdifficultfromjusttheprogramdatatoseeifcertaincriteriahavebecomeastumblingblockorcloseddoorformanyhomeowners.TheMichiganstateagency,andanyagencythatlists“borrowerineligible”asareasonfordenyingsomeone,shouldprovidemoredetailintheirrecords.Oncethestateagencyrecordsthecriteriathepersondidnotmeet,theagencyandTreasuryshouldimplement



SIGTARP’sOctober2015recommendationtoanalyzetrendstoseeifcriteriaaretoorestrictive.

Evenwithpoorrecordsonwhypeopleearninglessthan$30,000havebeenturnedaway,trendanalysiscanshowsimplefixesthatstatescanmaketoincreasetheflowofthismoney.Thefirstfixistoleveltheplayingfieldbyeliminatingcriteriainthatstatethatdonotexistforhomeownersinotherstates.Thesecondfixistoeliminatecriteriainthatstatethatdonotreflecttherealityoftheworkingclassinthatstate.

Asanexample,HardestHitFundMichigancanremovesomecriteriathatdonotexistinotherstatesforthesesamefundsandthatdonotreflecttherealityofworkers.

HardestHitFundCaliforniahasprovidedtwotimesmoreHardestHitFundsdollarsthananyotherHHFstate.WhileMichiganhasbeenprovidingthesedollarstosome,96%oftheworkersturnedawaydidnotmeetoneormorecriteria.Thisraisesthequestionofwhetherallofthecriteriaarenecessarygoingforward.UnlikeOhio,MichiganhadnotgivenoutallofthefundsbeforeCongressapprovedtheadditionalmoney.

WhyshoulditmatterthataMichiganworkerreceivedunemploymentorsawtheirpaycheckcut“inthelast12months,”whenworkersinArizonadonothavetomeetthatsametimeframetoreceivethesesamedollars?

TheMichiganstateagencyprohibitsworkersfromreceivingHardestHitfundstohelppaytheirmortgageiftheyreceivedunemploymentbenefitsorsawtheirpaycheckcutmorethan12monthsago.MoststatesdonotputthistimingrestrictiononahomeownertogetHardestHitFunds.ItleadstoanunleveledplayingfieldifaworkerinArizonawhosawtheirpaycheckgetcut,orwhoreceivedunemploymentbenefitsmorethanayearago,canreceivethesefunds,whileaworkerinMichiganwouldbeprohibited.

TherealityforAmericanworkersisthatunemploymentlastsalongtime.AccordingtotheBureauofLaborStatistics,thenationalaveragelengthofunemploymentis27weeks.ButstateunemploymentbenefitsinMichiganonlylast14to20weeks.TheMichiganrequirementdoesnotrewardaresponsibleworkerwhosepaycheckwascutmorethanoneyearagoandhasexhaustedunemploymentbenefits,savings,familyhelp,orlow‐payingpart‐timeworktopaytheirmortgage.Witha27‐weekaverageunemployment,atsomepointeventhemostself‐sufficientrunoutofoptions.



WhyshouldworkersinMichiganhavetosuffera20%paycuttoreceivethesefunds,whileaworkerinFloridaandOregononlyhastosuffera10%paycutandaworkerinCalifornia,ArizonaandIndianadoesnothavetoshowanyspecificpercentage?

MichiganhascriteriatoreceiveHardestHitFundsthatanunderemployedworkermusthavesuffereda20%cutinincome,whichismorerestrictivethaninotherstates.Forexample,anunderemployedworkerinCalifornia,Arizona,andIndianadoesnothavetoshowanyspecificpercentagepaycut.UnderemployedworkersinsevenotherstatescanreceiveHardestHitFunddollarsshowinglessthana20%cutinincome.8Inotherwords,10otherstatesdeterminedthatitwasnotnecessaryforanunderemployedworkertoshowa20%ormorepaycuttoreceiveHardestHitfunds,raisingconcernsthatthiscriteriacreatesanunleveledplayingfieldforMichiganworkers.

TherealityisthattherearesomanyunderemployedAmericanworkers.Ofthe19statesintheHardestHitFund,13ofthem(includingMichigan)haveabove‐averageratesofunderemployment.TheBureauofLaborStatisticsdoesnotmeasureunderemploymentbythepercentageoflostwagesorsalary,butinsteadas“thoseworkinglessthan35hoursperweekwhowanttoworkfulltime,areavailabletodoso,andgaveaneconomicreason(theirhourshadbeencutbackortheywereunabletofindafull‐timejob)forworkingparttime,”callingthem“involuntarypart‐timeworkers.”9Thisfiguremaynotaccountforfulltimeworkerswhosawapaycut.

WhyshouldMichiganworkersbedisqualifiediftheirmortgagepaymentismorethan45%oftheirincome?

Thisrequirementmaybewellintentioned,butmaynotalwaysmatchtherealityoftheworkingclasswhoaresufferingfromunemploymentandmaybeusingmuchofwhateverincometheyhavetopaytheirmortgage.TheMichiganstateagency’sintentforthiscriteriaisthattheperson“haveincomenecessarytosustainfuturepayments,”definedasamortgagepaymentlessthanorequalto45%oftheperson’sgrossincome.Therealityformanyisthattheydonothaveenoughincometomakefuturepayments,andanyincometheyhavemay,inlargepart,goto

8FloridaandOregonrequirea10%paycut;Alabama,Nevada,NewJersey,MississippiandKentuckyrequirea15%paycut.

9TheBureauofLaborStatisticscalculatestheunderemploymentrate(the“U‐6”laborunderutilizationrate)asincludingunemployedworkers,part‐timeworkerswhowanttoworkfulltimebuttheirhourswerecutbackortheywereunabletofindafull‐timejob,marginallyattachedworkerswhowanttoworkbutarenotlookingforwork,anddiscouragedworkers,whobelievetherearenojobsavailabletothemandhavegivenuplookingasaresult.



paytheirmortgagepaymenttosavetheirhome.ButthatispreciselywhereastopgapmeasureprogramlikeHHFstepsin.Thewholepointistohelppayanunemployedworker’smortgagepaymentforashorttimeuntiltheycanhopefullyfindajobandgetbacktheirincome.

SustainabilityisnotTreasury’sstatedgoalfortheHardestHitFund,eventhoughitisastatedgoalfortheHomeAffordableModificationProgram(”HAMP”).ButHAMPisdesignedforsustainabilitybycontractingwithmortgageservicerstopermanentlyloweraperson’sinterestrateontheirmortgage,andmakeTARPpaymentsoversixyears.HHFisshortterm,sometimesaone‐timepayment,andtypicallynomorethantwoyearsofmonthlypayments.Itmostoftenleadstonopermanentchangetothemortgage.Treasury’sguidelinestostateagenciesforHHFhavenorequirementofsustainability.

HHFcomplementsstateunemploymentbenefitsthatdonothavesustainabilityrequirementssuchasthepersonhastoshowtheyhaveincometomakefuturepayments.Typically,astateagencyrequiresthat,inordertogetHHFusingunemploymentasthehardship,thepersonhastobeeligibleforstateunemploymentbenefits.TheHardestHitFundisaninvestmentintheseworkersandtheirneighborhoodsbyprovidingatemporarysafetynetthatpreventsforeclosuresuntiltheycanfindajob.

WhydoesaMichiganworkerfacinganupcominglayofforpaycuthavetowaituntiltheyarelaidoffandbecomedelinquenttoqualify?

TheCaliforniastateagencyallowsaworkertoqualifyforthesefundsiftheyaregoingtofaceanupcominghardshipthatcouldcausethemtodefaultontheirmortgage.OpeningupMichiganandOhiotoconsideranupcoming,involuntaryhardshipwouldallowtheworkersattheGMplantsinLansing,MichiganorLordstown,Ohio(whereGMannouncedlayoffsforJanuary2017),orworkersatpartssupplierswhomayalsobelaidoff,toworkthroughthemonths‐longapplicationprocessnowandreceivehelpbyFebruary,thefirstmonthafterthelayoffs.



WhyshouldaMichiganworkerhavetowaituntiltheyaredelinquentontheirmortgagetoqualifywhenworkerswhoarecurrentontheirmortgageinotherstateslikeIndiana,Oregon,andTennesseequalifyforthesefunds?

ToqualifyforHardestHitfunds,workersinMichiganmustbedelinquentontheirmortgages,propertytaxes,orcondominiumfees.10BeingcurrentonthemortgagewillnotdisqualifyaworkerinIndiana,OregonandTennesseeforthesedollars.Indiana,Oregon,andTennesseehavelownumbersofpeopleturnedawaywhoearnlessthan$30,000.Therealityisthatsomeresponsiblehomeownershavestretchedtheirdollartokeeptheirmortgagecurrentbutmayberunningoutofsavingsorothermeans.

Removingcriterianotpresentforhomeownersinotherstatesensuresthatthereisalevelplayingfieldforthesedollars.Italsocanopentheprogramuptopeopleearninglessthan$30,000.

10TheMichiganstateagencyemphasizesonitshomepageanditsHHF“FrequentlyAskedQuestions”pagethathomeownersmustbe“delinquent”toapplyforHHFassistance.Althoughanaddendum(onpageseven)totheagency’sFAQentitled“InformationforBankruptcyClients”subsequentlystatesthathomeownersneednotbedelinquentontheirmortgage,thatclarificationmayeasilybemissedbymanyhomeowners(andhousingcounselors),anddiscouragehomeownerswhoarenotdelinquentontheirmortgagesfromapplying.Becausetheagencywasunabletoprovidespecificreasonseachhomeownerwasdenied,SIGTARPcouldnotdeterminewhethertheMichiganstateagencydeniedHHFassistancetohomeownerswhowerecurrentontheirmortgages.



Conclusion

AsaninvestmentinAmericanworkers,TARP’sHardestHitFundprovidesatemporarysafetynettosavethehomesofnow‐unemployedorunderemployedworkersintherustbelt,south,andotherhard‐hitareasofthecountry.Theprogramhashelpedmorethanaquarterofamillionpeople,buttherehasbeennoreportingonthepeopledeniedentryintotheprogram.SIGTARPhasfoundthatmostofthehomeownerswhoweredeniedHardestHitfundsearnedlessthan$30,000,callingintoquestionwhethertheprogramiseffectiveinreachingthosehardesthit.Insixstates(includingOhio,NorthCarolina,andIndiana)threeoutoffourpeopledeniedentryintotheHardestHitFundmadelessthan$30,000.Nearlythreeoutofeveryfourpeopleinsixotherstates(includingMichigan,Georgia,Illinois,Kentucky,andTennessee)whoweredeniedentryintotheHardestHitFundmadelessthan$30,000.

TARPwasabailoutforcompanieslikeGeneralMotorsinareaslikeDetroit,Cleveland,andFlint,butCongressalsorequiredthatTARPfundsgotohomeowners,includingAmericanworkerswhocontinuetofeeltheeffectsofthefinancialcrisisandtherecessionthatfollowed.Inmanystates,themoneyhasbeenslowtoflow.TheneedfortheprogramissogreatthatabipartisaneffortbyCongressaddedanadditional$2billioninDecember2015.TreasuryextendedtheprogramthreeyearsuntilDecember2020.MorecanbedonetomakesurethoseAmericanworkerswhoarehardesthitgetthishelp.

SIGTARPfoundthat84,965outof160,015peopledeniedforHardestHitFunddollarsearnedlessthan$30,000ayear,including64,979peoplewhomadelessthan$20,000ayear.In12states,mostlyintherustbeltandsouth,70percentormoreofthepeopleturneddownfortheHardestHitFundmadelessthan$30,000.Atthesametime,nearly20,000peoplewhomademorethan$70,000,including6,000peoplemakingmorethan$90,000,receivedHardestHitFunddollars.

Outof19states,withtheexceptionofhighly‐populatedCaliforniaandFlorida,TreasurysetasidethemostdollarsforOhioandMichigan.WhiletheprogramhashelpedmanyinOhioandMichigan,thosearetwostateswherehighpercentagesofpeopleturneddownmadeunder$30,000—86percentinOhioand71percentinMichigan.

SIGTARPfoundhighpercentagesofpeopleturneddownfortheHardestHitFundwhoearnedlessthan$30,000incitieswhereGeneralMotors—whichreceived$50billioninTARPfunds—oritssuppliersclosedplantsorlaidoffworkers:



82%ofthepeopleintheDetroitareaturneddownmadelessthan$30,000—thatamountsto4,829people

89%ofthepeopleintheClevelandareaturneddownmadelessthan$30,000(619people)

84%ofthepeopleintheFlintareaturneddownmadelessthan$30,000(407people)

83%ofthepeopleintheSaginawareaturneddownmadelessthan$30,000(266people)

91%ofthepeopleintheDaytonareaturneddownmadelessthan$30,000(238people)

Theexpectationforaprogramthattargetsunemployedandunderemployedworkersshouldbethatmanystrugglingtosavetheirhomeswillhavelowerincomes.Thefactthatsomanyturneddownhadlowerincomesrequiresadeeperlookintowhytheywereturneddown.

Stateagencies’recordsprovidedtoSIGTARPwerenon‐existent,missingorincompleteaboutwhythestateagenciesturneddownthesepeoplemakinglessthan$30,000.Theremaybevalidreasonswhysomeofthesepeopleweredenied,butitisimpossibletoknowwhenstateagenciesmanagingthisprogramdonotkeeprecordsthatdetailspecificallywhyeachpersonwasdenied.Thatoversightisunjustifiableandshouldberemediedsoappropriateactioncanbetakentogetthismoneytotheworkingclassstillfeelingtheimpactofthecrisisandrecession.

Thisprogramhasalotmorepotentialtoprovideasafetynetincertaincommunitiesuntilfull‐timejobsreturn,butthatpotentialneedstobeunlockednow.DespiteGMreturningtoprofitability,GMandothershaveclosedplantsinthepastyear,andmorethan2,000GMworkerswillbelaidoffatplantsinMichiganandOhio.

Thebestwaytounlockthefullpotentialoftheprogramistoremovetoo‐stringentcriteriathat:(1)donotreflecttherealityoftheworkingclassinthatstate;or(2)donotapplytohomeownersinotherstatestogetthesefunds.Forexample,aMichiganworkershouldnotbeturneddownfortheHardestHitFundjustbecausetheyreceivedunemploymentbenefits(orsawtheirpaycheckcut)morethan12monthsago,whenaCaliforniahomeownerdoesnothavethatsamerestrictionforentryintotheHardestHitFund.Thereshouldbealevelplayingfieldforhomeownersseekinghelpthroughthisprogram.This12‐monthtimingrestrictionisalsoinconsistentwiththenewnormalofunemployment—thatitlastsalongtime—anditdoesnotrewardaresponsibleMichiganhomeowner



whomadeendsmeetformorethanayearafterreceivingunemploymentbenefits,buthasnowrunoutofoptions.

SIGTARPfoundothercriteriaincertainstatesforthisprogramthataremorerestrictivethanothers.Forexample,arequirementinMichiganandsomeotherstatestoshowa20%paycutinordertoqualifyas“underemployed”iseitherlowerornon‐existentinotherstatesforthissameprogram.SIGTARPalsofoundcriteriaincertainstatesforthisprogramthatdonotmatchtherealityofunemployedworkers.Forexample,arequirementthatthepersonmakesufficientincometoaffordtheirmortgageinthefuturemaynotberealisticnow.Therealityisthatthisistemporaryhelpwhilethepersonlooksforafull‐timejob,atwhichpointthehopeisthattheywillmakeenoughincometoaffordtheirmortgage.Programcriterialiketheseandothersmayhavebeenwell‐intentioned,designedtoensuretherewasenoughmoneytospreadaround.Nearlysevenyearslater,withbillionsofdollarsleft,andthemoneyslowtoflow,stateagenciesshoulddeterminewhethereachprogramcriteriaisreallynecessary.

Evengoodprogramscanbebetter.TheHardestHitFundcanbemoreeffectiveandefficientsothatthestateagenciescanhelpmoreofAmerica’sworkingclasssavetheirhome.Thatisagoalworthstrivingfor,butittakeschange,includingunlockingthefullpotentialofthisprogrambydeletingunnecessaryrestrictions.



Recommendations

1. ToimprovetheeffectivenessofdistributingHardestHitFunddollarstohelpunemployedandotherhomeownerssavetheirhomesandleveltheplayingfieldforhomeownersacrossstates,Treasuryandstateagenciesshouldeliminateunnecessaryprogrameligibilitycriteriathatpreventlow‐incomehomeownersfromgettingHardestHitFundassistance,includingthosecriteriathatdonotreflecttherealityofthestate’sworkingclassandthosethatdonotapplytohomeownersinotherstatesfortheseFederaldollars.

2. TohelpAmerica’sworkingclasssavetheirhomes,TreasuryandstateagenciesshouldopenupeligibilitytotheHardestHitFundtoworkerssubjecttoactualorannouncedlayoffs,plantclosings,orothersimilarreductions‐in‐forcesothattheydonothavetowaituntiltheyactuallyfallbehindontheirmortgagepaymentstobecomeeligibleforHardestHitFundassistance.

3. TreasuryshouldrequirestateagenciestokeepdetailedrecordsonwhytheydeniedeachpersonforHardestHitFundassistance,includingthespecificprogramcriterianotmet.



Management Comments and SIGTARP’s Response

Inresponsetoadraftofthisreport,Treasuryprovidedaletterandsometechnicalcomments,whichSIGTARPaddressedwhereapplicable.Initsresponse,TreasurydidnotaddressSIGTARP’sfindings,butsaidit“…appreciatesSIGTARP’sanalysisandiscloselyexamining[SIGTARP’s]recommendations.”



Appendix A – Objective, Scope, and Methodology

SIGTARPperformedthisevaluationunderauthorityofPublicLaw110‐343,asamended,whichalsoincorporatesthedutiesandresponsibilitiesofinspectorsgeneralundertheInspectorGeneralActof1978,asamended.SIGTARPinitiatedthisevaluationaspartofSIGTARP’scontinuingoversightofTreasury’sHardestHitFund(“HHF”)program.Theevaluation’sobjectivewastoassessthedenialofhomeownersapplyingforHardestHitFundassistance.ThescopeofthisevaluationcoveredHHFhomeownerassistanceprogramsforall19stateagencies.Giventhelimitationsoftherecordskeptbystateagencies,thescopeofthisevaluationlargelyfocusedonincomesofhomeownerswhoappliedandweredeniedHHFassistance.SIGTARPconductedthisevaluationfromFebruary2016throughDecember2016inWashington,D.C.

SIGTARPobtainedandanalyzeddatafromeachstateagencyaboutindividualhomeownerswhoweredeniedHHFunemploymentassistanceasofJune30,2016(theNevadastateagencyonlyprovidedhomeownerdenialdataasofSeptember30,2015).Becausestateagenciesdeniedmanyhomeownersbeforetheyverifiedthehomeowners’reportedincomes,whereavailable,SIGTARPusedtheearnedincomes(wages,self‐employmentincome,andrentalincome)reportedbyapplicantsandco‐applicantsintheirapplications.SIGTARPalsoobtainedandanalyzedstateagencydata,whereavailable,regardingthereasonswhyhomeownersweredeniedHHFassistance.SIGTARPalsoheldinterviewswithstateagenciestogainanunderstandingoftheirrecordkeepingformaintainingdataonhomeownersdeniedfortheprogram.

SIGTARPalsoanalyzedstateagencyquarterlyperformancedata,andperformedalimitedreviewofstateagencyagreementswithTreasuryandadditionaldetailedprogram‐leveleligibilitycriteria,policiesandprocedures.Inaddition,SIGTARPcollectedinformationregardingautomotiveindustryplantclosuresinMichiganandOhio.

SIGTARPconductedthisevaluationinaccordancewiththe“QualityStandardsforInspectionandEvaluation,”January2012edition,establishedbytheCounciloftheInspectorsGeneralonIntegrityandEfficiency.ThosestandardsrequirethatSIGTARPplanandperformtheevaluationtoobtainevidencesufficienttoprovideareasonablebasisforfindingsandconclusionsbasedontheevaluationobjectives.SIGTARPbelievesthattheevidenceobtainedprovidesareasonablebasisforthefindingsandconclusionsbasedontheevaluationobjectives.



Limitations on Data

SIGTARPreliedonstateagenciestoprovideapplicant‐leveldataanddataconcerningwhyapplicantsweredenied.Inmanycasestheapplicantdatathestateagenciesprovidedcontainedblankfields,asnotedinthereport.SIGTARPalsoreliedonTreasury’sQuarterlyPerformanceReports.ItispossiblethatthedocumentationprovidedbystateagenciestoSIGTARPdidnotreflectacomprehensiveresponsetoSIGTARP’sdatarequest,potentiallylimitingSIGTARP’sreview.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

SIGTARPreliedoncomputer‐processeddataforthisevaluation.Specifically,SIGTARPreliedonthestateagencies’dataprovidedtoSIGTARPtodeterminethenumbersandpercentagesofdeniedhomeownersandtheirincomes.SIGTARPreliedonTreasury’squarterlyperformancereportstodeterminethenumbersandpercentagesofapprovedhomeownersandtheirincomes.SIGTARPdidnotvalidatetheaccuracyoftheunderlyingdataprovidedbyTreasuryorthestateagencies.

Internal Controls

Toaddressthereportingobjectiveinthisevaluation,SIGTARPperformedalimitedreviewofinternalcontrolsbyinterviewingstateagencyofficialsandbyreviewingselectedstateagencyagreementswithTreasuryandstateagencyeligibilitycriteria,policiesandprocedures.

Prior Coverage

SIGTARPhascoveredtheHHFprograminfivepreviousreports.OnApril12,2012,SIGTARPreleasedanauditreporttitled,“FactorsAffectingImplementationoftheHardestHitFundProgram.”OnApril21,2015,SIGTARPreleasedanauditreporttitled,“TreasuryShouldDoMuchMoretoIncreasetheEffectivenessoftheTARPHardestHitFundBlightEliminationProgram.”OnOctober6,2015,SIGTARPreleasedanevaluationreporttitled,“FactorsImpactingtheEffectivenessofHardestHitFundFlorida.”OnJune16,2016,SIGTARPreleasedanauditreporttitled,“Treasury’sHHFBlightEliminationProgramLacksImportantFederalProtectionsAgainstFraud,Waste,andAbuse.”OnSeptember9,2016,SIGTARPreleasedanauditreporttitled,“WasteandAbuseintheHardestHitFundinNevada.”SIGTARPalsoissuedanalertletteron



December14,2015,thataddressedariskrelatedtodivertingTARPfundstodemolishlived‐inproperties,whichcouldunderminethesuccessofHHF’sBlightEliminationProgram.



Appendix B – Acronyms and Abbreviations

GM GeneralMotors

HAMP HomeAffordableModificationProgram

HHF HousingFinanceAgencyInnovationFundfortheHardestHitHousingMarkets(also“HardestHitFund”)

Stateagency Statehousingfinanceagency

TARP TroubledAssetReliefProgram

Treasury U.S.DepartmentoftheTreasury



Appendix C – Evaluation Team Members

ThisevaluationwasconductedandthereportwaspreparedunderthedirectionofJennifferF.Wilson,DeputySpecialInspectorGeneralforAuditandEvaluation,andChristopherBosland,AssistantDeputySpecialInspectorGeneralforAuditandEvaluation,OfficeoftheSpecialInspectorGeneralfortheTroubledAssetReliefProgram.

StaffmemberswhoconductedtheevaluationandcontributedtothereportincludeCraigMeklir,KamruzZaman,WilliamSaunders,andJeffBanks.



Appendix D – Management Comments


SIGTARP Hotline

If you are aware of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, or misrepresentations associated with the Troubled Asset Relief Program, please contact SIGTARP.

By UOnline Form: Uwww.SIGTARP.govU

By Phone: Call toll free: (877) SIG-2009

By Fax: (202) 622-4559

By Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program 1801 L Street., NW, 3rd Floor Washington, DC 20220

Press Inquiries If you have any inquiries, please contact our Press Office:

Robert Sholars Director of Communications [email protected] 202-927-8940

Legislative Affairs For Congressional inquiries, please contact our Legislative Affairs Office:

Joseph Cwiklinski Director of Legislative Affairs [email protected] 202-927-9159

Obtaining Copies of Testimony and Reports To obtain copies of testimony and reports, please log on to our website at Uwww.SIGTARP.govU.

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