in focus - the sco

8/3/2019 In Focus - The Sco

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AS 212Regionalism and Community Building in Asia

Ambassador Rosario G. Manalo

IN FOCUS: THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

Danilo S. Cortez, Jr.

The principal intent of titling the article in the above way is to highlight

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a regional

organization in the international community of nation-states. Firstly, this

paper discusses the historical developments that led to the

establishment of the SCO. It also emphasizes the significant features of

intergovermentalism in the context of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization. Highlighting intergovernmentalism as the theoretical basis

of this academic study further characterizes the nature, goals, structure,

operations and other features of SCO. Moreover, this study examines

policies, activities and interstate affairs, both internal and external

spectrum of SCO vis--vis global politics and other perplexingcontemporary challenges and developments in the international arena.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

There is a clear trend in the 21st century for regional organizations to flourish, tobecome more multi-functional and to devote themselves in addressing the challenges ofglobalizing world, as well as other transnational issues of security and developments.Given this backdrop, this article focuses on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) being a regional organization geopolitically positioned in Eurasia. In general, it

seeks to study the relevance and effectiveness of the SCO as a model (icon) and/orinspiration for regional integration and international cooperation. It is interesting, though,to begin by narrating the historical development of the SCO. This will allow us to knowmore about this organization and to examine issues/concerns that triggered theformation of this regional organization.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a permanent intergovernmentalinternational organization. The creation of which was proclaimed on 15 June 2001 inShanghai (China) by the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Peoples Republic of China, theKyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic ofUzbekistan. Its prototype is the Shanghai Five Mechanism.1

For centuries, Central Asia has been the contested frontier of world empires.

Mongol, Chinese, Russian, and British empire-builders have all at various pointscontested to influence or establish outright political control over the region. In the 20thcentury, both Soviet and PRC regimes established firm control over their slices of theregion. These new empires drew political boundaries, stamped out much of localculture, and tried to integrate Central Asian people into the culture of these newempires. While Central Asia was the frontier of two of the biggest world powers of the

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20th century, strong-armed Communist rule on both sides assured that it was anythingbut contested.2

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 threatened to change that. New CentralAsian states emerged almost overnight from defunct Soviet Republics. The potential for

these newly independent states to destabilize the region immediately became of greatconcern to China. Thus, the Chinese acted quickly to negotiate a series of borderagreements with four of these new states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan)in November 1992.3

On 26 April 1996, the Shanghai Five grouping was originally formed when theheads of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and China at the summit talks inShanghai signed the Agreement on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions.This gathering was later named as the first summit meeting of Shanghai Five as thepredecessor of the SCO. On 24 April 1997, the heads of the Shanghai Five signed the

Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Regions in thesecond summit occurred in Moscow, Russia. Subsequently, the Shanghai group

conducted their annual summits held in Almaty (Kazakhstan) in 1998, in Bishkek(Kyrgyzstan) in 1999, and in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) in 2000.4

As the Shanghai Five continued to meet and reach formal agreements throughthe end of the 1990s, the Five decided to further institutionalize their interactions. On 15June 2001, the heads of state for the Shanghai Five again met in Shanghai to sign theDeclaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, theShanghai convention on fighting terrorism, separatism, and extremism. At this samemeeting, Uzbekistan, which had previously attended some Shanghai Five meetings asan observer, was admitted into the SCO as a full member.5 Praising the role played thusfar by the Shanghai Five mechanism and aiming to transform it to a higher level ofcooperation, hence, at this meeting the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization was formally declared.Later, in July 2001, Russia and the PRC, the organizations two leading nations,signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, bilaterally.6

The first meeting of heads of government of SCO member-states happened inAlma-Ate on 14 September 2001. They signed the Memorandum among theGovernments of SCO Member States on Main Objectives and Directions ofRegional Economic Cooperation and also announced the creation of a mechanism ofregular meetings of heads of governments within the framework of SCO. 7

On 7 June 2002, at the second meeting of heads of SCO member-states whichtook place in St. Peterburg, Russia. Parties signed the Charter of ShanghaiCooperation Organization, which expounded on the organizations purposes,

principles, structures and form of operation, and established it officially from the point ofview of international law. Additionally, they also initialed the Agreement on RegionalAntiterrorist Structure (RATS) and the Declaration of Heads of SCO member-states.The SCOs Charter came into force starting 19 September 2003.

In a meeting of heads of governments of SCO member-states on 23 September2003 in Beijing (China), they approved the Programme of Multilateral Trade andeconomic Cooperation among SCO member-states as well as adopted the




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organizations first budget for 2004. The Programme clearly determined the mainobjectives and task of economic cooperation with the SCO framework, and set adirection for the free movements of goods, capital, services and technology inside theregion during the next twenty-year period.8

Besides the Heads of State Council and the Heads of Government Council, theSCO also set up mechanisms for regular meetings on the level of speakers ofparliament, national security councils, ministries of foreign affairs (MFA Council),ministries of defense, law enforcement agencies, ministers of economy, transportation,emergency relief, culture, education and healthcare, heads of border agencies,prosecutor general, supreme courts and courts of arbitration, and national coordinators(CNC).9

The headquarters of the SCO Secretariat in Beijing (China) and the SCO RATSin Tashkent (Uzbekistan) opened in January 2004.10

Since the establishment of the SCO with its original six members (See Illustration1), no new member-states have been admitted to the organization. Provisions have,

however, been made for states to have observer status. Mongolia was made the firstofficial observer state in June 2004, and India, Iran, and Pakistan were all givenobserver status the following year, in the summit in Astana (Kazakhstan).11 Rathersignificantly, the United States application for SCO observer status was rejected in 2005.12

Illustration 1

Member-states of the SCO

Considering its recent security activities, there are studies which criticallyexamine if SCO is developing into a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] of theEast as it was regularly described after the anti-Western flavor of the 2005 AstanaSummit. In the last couple of years, the SCO indisputably made huge steps in




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intensified security cooperation, operational (military exercises), as well as political(policy concepts). A number of events and agreements in 2006 and 2007 indicate acautious development of the SCO towards a full-grown security organization.13

Currently, The SCO member-states occupy a territory of around 30,189,000

square kilometers (SCO countries [full members and observers] comprise a hefty 25%of Earth's land area), which makes up three fifths of the Eurasia continent (SeeIllustration 2), and have a combined population14of 1.526 billion (SCO member-statesonly), which makes up a quarter of the Planets population. Furthermore, The SCOcovers one of the largest geographical areas of any regional organization, fromKaliningrad to Vladivostok and from the White Sea to the South China Sea. If itsobserver states are added, it reaches to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East as well.Its members and observers collectively possess 17.5 per cent of the worlds proven oilreserves, 4750 per cent of known natural gas reserves and some 45 percent of theworlds population.15

Illustration 2

Map of member and observer states of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization

GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND VALUES




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Fundamentally, SCO members often refer to the underlying values of theorganization as the Shanghai Spirit. According to the Article 2 of the Charter of theSCO16, member-states of the SCO must adhere to the following principles:

Mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States andinviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs,non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking nounilateral military superiority in adjacent areas;

Equality of all member States, search of common positions on the basis ofmutual understanding and respect for opinions of each of them;

Gradual implementation of joint activities in the spheres of mutual interest;

Peaceful settlement of disputes between the member States;

SCO being not directed against other States and international organizations;

Prevention of any illegitimate acts directed against the SCO interests;

Implementation of obligations arising out of the present Charter and otherdocuments adopted within the framework of SCO, in good faith.

Above anything else, the concept of intergovernmentalism actively operates inthe state of affairs and process of regional integration of this organization. As to generalcharacteristic of this institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a permanentintergovernmental international organization. It is therefore apparent that the SCOadopts intergovernmentalism as an alternative method of decision-making in theregional organization, instead of supranationalism.

In its basic form, intergovernmentalism explains interstate cooperation andespecially regional integration as a function of the alignment of state interests andpreferences couple with power. That is, contrary to the expectations of

neofunctionalism, integration and cooperation are actually caused by rational self-interested states bargaining with one another.17 Additionally, any increase in power atsupranational level resulted from a direct decision by governments of member-states,thus, power in international/regional organizations is possessed by the member-satesand decisions are made by unanimity (agreements).

In the context of SCO, the organization firmly stands in support of nationalsovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. In line with itsguiding principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states, the SCO isstructured so that the organization can do nothing without the express permission of itsmember-states.

Structurally, the SCO was designed essentially as an intergovernmental network

led by annual summits and by regular meetings of the heads of government, foreignministers and other high officials of the member states. 18 The SCO Charter, adopted inJune 2002, lists several basic principles of international law as the foundations for theorganization, including the sovereign equality of states and the rejection of hegemonyand coercion in international affairs. It includes a statement that the SCO is not directedagainst other States and international organizations.19




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Liberal democratic principles such as human rights or self-determination, whichrest at the core of organizations like NATO, are completely absent from the SCO s charter. This makes the SCO attractive to its members, all of which have been criticizedby the international community for human rights violations. 20

While other regional organizations, such as ASEAN, have also stressednoninterference in a countrys internal affairs, some fear the SCO is becoming the chiefadvocate of what has been called Eurasian Neo-Authoritarianism. SCO membersinterpret noninterference as immunizing them against foreign criticism of human rightsabuses within their borders. SCO members have also singled out the Internet as asecurity threat and advocated its censorship.21 The elements present in the UnitedNations Charter that the SCO Charter most conspicuously omits are respect for humanrights and the self-determination of peoples. All these features can be explained first ofall as signals of reassurance being exchanged among the SCOs members: China andRussia grant the formal equality of the smaller ones and commit themselves, at least onpaper, not to intervene in their internal affairs without invitation. The omission of any

reference to rights of non-state actors completes the assurance of support forauthoritarian, centralizing regimes that was given already in 2001 by the organizationsdedication to countering the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism. 22

In addition, SCO proclaimed its main goals as follows: (1)Strengthening mutualconfidence and good-neighborly relations among member countries; (2)Promoting theireffective cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science and technology, culture aswell as education, energy, transportation, tourism, environmental protection and otherfields; and (3)Making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability inthe region, to move towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and rationalpolitical and economic international order.23

At this stage, the main conclusion to be drawn is that the SCO is not an

unprincipled organization in the strict sense, but one that has chosen to define itsmembers shared concepts of multilateral interaction in terms that consciously andsignificantly deviate from the principles of almost all other extant regional groups,notably on the point of disregard for human rights.24

STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS OF SCO

In line with its guiding principle of noninterference in the internal affairs ofmember states, the SCO is structured so that the organization can do nothing withoutthe express permission of its member-states. While individual states do invariably

exercise a great deal of influence over international organizations like the UN, supremepower over the SCO actually rests with the heads of state of the member states.Moreover, the three levels of command underneath the Council of Heads of State aremade up of officials representing the governments of member states: the Council ofHeads of Government, the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the Council of NationalCoordinators, respectively.25 (See Illustration 3)




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The Council of Heads of State is the top decision-making body in the SCO.This council meets at the SCO summits, which are held each year in one of the memberstates' capital cities. The current Council of Heads of State consists of:

Kurmanbek Bakiyev (Kyrgyzstan) Hu Jintao (People's Republic of China) Islom Karimov (Uzbekistan) Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan) Dmitry Medvedev (Russia) Emomalii Rahmon (Tajikistan)

The Council of Heads of Government is the second-highest council in theorganization. This council also holds annual summits, at which time members discussissues of multilateral cooperation. The council also approves the organization's budget.

The Council of Foreign Ministers also hold regular meetings, where they

discuss the current international situation and the SCO's interaction with otherinternational organizations.26

As the name suggests, the Council of National Coordinators coordinates themultilateral cooperation of member states within the framework of the SCO's charter.

Illustration 3


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurmanbek_Bakiyevhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hu_Jintaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islom_Karimovhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nursultan_Nazarbayevhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitry_Medvedevhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emomalii_Rahmonhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurmanbek_Bakiyevhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hu_Jintaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islom_Karimovhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nursultan_Nazarbayevhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitry_Medvedevhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emomalii_Rahmon


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The Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Source: The Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai CooperationOrganization, http://www.sectsco.org/html/00027.html

The Secretariat of the SCO is the primary executive body of the organization. Itserves to implement organizational decisions and decrees; drafts proposed documents(such as declarations and agendas); function as a document depository for theorganization; arranges specific activities within the SCO framework; and promotes anddisseminates information about the SCO. It is located in Beijing. The current SCOSecretary-General is Bolat Nurgaliyev of Kazakhstan.27

The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), headquartered in Tashkent,Uzbekistan, is a permanent organ of the SCO which serves to promote cooperation ofmember states against the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism. TheHead of RATS is elected to a three-year term. Each member state also sends apermanent representative to RATS.28

The official decision-making process laid out in Article 16 of the SCO Charteralso maximizes the rights of member-states to take whatever action they choose totake. Officially, decisions are taken purely on consensus without vote. If there is aproposal for a project of cooperation in which one or several member-states do notwant to take a part, states in favor of the proposal can enter into the project and cannotprevent other member-states from joining in at a later time.29

The two working bodies of the SCO that are not composed primarily ofgovernment officials of the member-states are the Secretariat and the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS). The SCO Secretariat is located in Beijing and is very similarto the Secretariat of any other international organization: It is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the organization and it is made up of a Secretary-General and staffwho are to act as international officials reporting only to the SCO and no individualcountry.30 Institutionally distinct from the Secretariat, RATS exists to help facilitatecooperation among SCO member-states in combating terrorism, separatism, andextremism.31

POLICIES, ACTIVITIES, AND INTERSTATE AFFAIRS

Proceeding from the Spirit of Shanghai, the SCO pursues its Internal Policybased on the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equal rights, consultations,respect for the diversity of cultures and aspiration towards common development. Onthe other hand, SCO conducts its External Policy in accordance with principles of non-alignment, non-targeting anyone and openness.32 Hitherto, because the SCO is sodirectly dependent on its member-states for direction, understanding the interest of the


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolat_Nurgaliyevhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tashkenthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_evilshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separatismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolat_Nurgaliyevhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tashkenthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_evilshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separatismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremism


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individual SCO members is especially essential to understanding the organization as awhole. This has brought vastly differing perspectives and expectations, as by-product ofdifferent national interests of member-states and observer states of the SCO.

China

China has consistently been a driving force behind the development of the SCO.The idea of the Shanghai Sprit and many of the other underlying ideas embodied inthe core documents of the SCO came from Chinese president Jiang Zemin. Since theSCOs founding, the Chinese have pushed for better institutionalization of the SCO andgiven substantial support for many SCO projects. Chinas active support of a multilateralorganization like the SCO contradicts the generally bilateral nature of Chinese foreignpolicy.33 While there has been much speculation about the interests China is pursuingthrough the SCO, three general Chinese objectives are put forward by most analysts:1.) Ensuring the security of sensitive multiethnic border regions; 2.) Building a regional

economic and military sphere of influence; and 3.) Countering U.S. and Westerninfluence in the Central Asian region and in the rest of the world. 34

Russia

While China is strengthening its influence around the world, Russia is strugglingto maintain its status as a major player in the current geopolitical framework. No longerable to challenge the U.S. in its own right, Russia would much prefer a multipolar worldto one in which the United States is the sole dominating force. 35 Russia also views theSCO as having a key role to play in its diplomatic relationships with its neighbors. Firstand foremost, the SCO helps Russia regulate the uneasy mix of cooperation,

competition, and power balance that has characterized its relations with China. TheSCO also functions as another link tying Russia with the former-Soviet Central Asiannations. Russia already plays a commanding role in institutions, such as the CollectiveSecurity Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community(EURASEC), of which the Central Asian states are members. The SCO simply adds toRussia s portfolio of forums it can use to exercise soft power leverage over these states and alleviate regional tensions.36

Central Asian States

The foreign policy of the Central Asian member-states of the SCO (Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) consists largely of playing Russia, China, andthe United States off of one-another. All of these states share the Soviet legacy withRussia, meaning that they have everything in common from Russian as a lingua francato the kleptocracy and authoritarian governments. Despite the close relationship that theCentral Asian states have with Russia, Central Asian states are sure to keep Russia atan arms length, particularly in light of its very aggressive dealings with its otherneighbors.37




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The SCO is very much a piece of this strategic balancing act, promoting peacefuland stable relations between Russia and China, providing a forum to discuss regionalissues, and giving Central Asian states an institutional connection to larger, wealthierallies.38

Observer States

Observer status confers the right to be represented at all higher-level meetings ofthe SCO. The current list of Observer States (Mongolia, India, Iran, Pakistan)represents a wide range of interests, but they are all interested in the opening up oftrade across Central Asia and joint approaches to trans-Asian energy delivery andinfrastructure. Currently, it does not appear that the full members will allow anyobservers to become full members in the immediate future (of all the observer states,Iran is pushing the most to obtain full membership), and it is likely that some observerstates would be nervous about getting too close to the SCO. 39 Nonetheless, the

potential benefits (economic and other) that could come from being in the SCO are suchthat observer states are monitoring the situation closely.

Security Cooperation

Although it does not have the conventional warfare capabilities of a collectivesecurity apparatus like NATO, the SCO has held increasingly large and ambitious jointmilitary exercises since the SCO s founding. This has been one of the most highly publicized aspects of the organization around the world and certainly indicates that SCOnations are become closer allies. It is not entirely clear, however, what this means about

the direction of the organization. On the one hand, China would almost certainly supportan expanded collective security apparatus under the SCO. Considering Russiasaforementioned control of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, though, it maynot see the need to create an SCO security apparatus in which it will have to share thecommanding role with China. Joint military exercises have taken place between theSCO and the CSTO, most recently the Peaceful Mission Rubezh-2007, which could bea model for a future larger security apparatus.40

Grigory Logninov claimed in April 2006 that the SCO has no plans to become amilitary bloc; nonetheless he argued that the increased threats of "terrorism, extremismand separatism" make necessary a full-scale involvement of armed forces. There havebeen a number of SCO joint military exercises. The first of these was held in 2003, with

the first phase taking place in Kazakhstan and the second in China.

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Economic and Socio-Cultural Cooperation

SCO members have also reached some agreements in areas not related tosecurity. In late 2005, member states agreed on mutual assistance to manage the

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consequences of natural disasters and other emergencies. The various nationalemergency management agencies of SCO members are now developing ways toenhance this cooperation.42 In addition, there have been some developments in theform of general agreements favoring free trade, mutual investment, and other economic

cooperation.A Framework Agreement to enhance economic cooperation was signed by the

SCO member states on 23 September 2003. At the same meeting the PRC's Premier,Wen Jiabao, proposed a long-term objective to establish a free trade area in the SCO,while other more immediate measures would be taken to improve the flow of goods inthe region. A follow up plan with 100 specific actions was signed one year later, onSeptember 23, 2004. On 26 October 2005, the Moscow Summit of the SCO, theSecretary General of the Organization said that the SCO will prioritize joint energyprojects; such will include the oil and gas sector, the exploration of new hydrocarbonreserves, and joint use of water resources. The creation of an Inter-bank SCO Councilwas also agreed upon at that summit in order to fund future joint projects. The first

meeting of the SCO Interbank Association was held in Beijing on 21-22 February 2006.On 30 November 2006, at The SCO: Results and Perspectives, an internationalconference held in Almaty, the representative of the Russian Foreign Ministryannounced that Russia is developing plans for an SCO "Energy Club". The need for this"club" was reiterated by Moscow at an SCO summit in November 2007. Other SCOmembers, however, have not committed themselves to the idea.43

Cultural cooperation also occurs in the SCO framework. Culture ministers of theSCO met for the first time in Beijing on 12 April 2002, signing a joint statement forcontinued cooperation. The third meeting of the Culture Ministers took place inTashkent, Uzbekistan, on 27-28 April 2006.44

External Policy Coordination

As shown by declaration and actual policy, the SCO further aspires to coordinateforeign policy and to become an actor on the international arena. According to theCharter the aim is to search for common positions on foreign policy issues of commoninterest, to maintain relations with other states and international organizations and tocooperate for the prevention of international conflicts.45

In line with the ambition to establish itself as an international actor, the SCO in2004-2005 establish contacts with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) andits EURASEC (Eurasian Economic Community) and the CSTO (Collective Security

Treaty Organization), with the ASEAN, the OSCE, and the EU. It also got observerstatus at the UN. The SCO evinced a special interest in the developments inAfghanistan, e.g. by creating a special contact group of Afghanistan, reportedly tosupports its anti-drug efforts and stabilize the socio-economic situation. In February2006 it held the first meeting with Afghan officials, and Afghan President Hamid Karzaimet the SCO secretary-general at the 2006 summit in Shanghai.46


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_of_the_People's_Republic_of_Chinahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wen_Jiabaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_trade_areahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscowhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almatyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_of_the_People's_Republic_of_Chinahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wen_Jiabaohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_trade_areahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscowhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almaty


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However, with regard to domestic policy there is an anti-Western and anti-USedge to this proclaimed foreign policy. The United States have been denied observerstatus in the organization.47 Already the Shanghai Five upheld the Russian positionconcerning the war in terrorism in Chechnya and Chinas right to reunification with

Taiwan.48

As just mentioned the 2005 summit asked for a deadline for the presence ofthe US-led coalition forces in Central Asia. The SCO contacts with Afghanistan can beseen as reflecting an ambition to show an alternative to Western policy there. Likewise,the military cooperation and antiterrorist exercises among the SCO states serve topreclude such cooperation with the West. Concerning the Central Asian nuclear-freezone mentioned above, it is noteworthy that the three Western nuclear powers did notpledge to respect it as they usually do in the United Nations, because the treaty text ofthe states collective security treaty with Russia. This was seen as a loophole allowingRussia to transport nuclear weapons across the countries.49

Further evidence of bias can be found in the SCO summit declaration of 2006,which praised the increasing multipolarization in the world and the establishment of a

new international order. It held the United Nations to be the most authoritativeinternational organization and called for a Security Council reform with a more equitabledistribution of seats. The declaration also advocated a new global security architectureof mutual trust and benefit, equality and respect base on international law, while doublestandards were disregarded. This sounded very much like official Russian andChinese criticism of Western, especially US policy.50

FINAL NOTES

There are still obstacles to the further development of the SCO. Despite the

SCOs uniting influence, questionable bilateral relations between a number of memberstates stand as a stumbling block for the future of the organization. For all theexcitement that surrounds Chinas growth and increasing power, even among SCOstates there is still a great deal of distrust felt towards China. Most significantly, perhapsis Chinas relationship with the two largest member-states of the SCO: Russia andIndia.51 Additionally, despite widespread speculation surrounding the SCO, the U.S.ultimately still has more comprehensive bilateral ties with Russia, China, India than anyof them have with each other.52 As to the opposing interests of participating states,although the SCO has succeeded in finding some key areas for cooperation between itsmember states, there is anything but uniformity of opinion on a wide spectrum ofeconomic and security-related issues. Among the two largest of these issues are the

U.S. Military Presence in Central Asia and Energy Cooperation.53

With regard tostructural problems, as an organization, the SCO lies somewhere between a looseforum and a structured alliance. Boasting itself as an ambitious organization that seeksto be actively engaged in political, security, economic, and social arenas, the progress ithas made has varied widely across different issues. Much of this problem can beattributed to fundamental issues in the structure of the SCO.54 Lacking a permanentinter-parliamentary body like NATOs North Atlantic Council, the SCO has difficulty in




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reconciling differences among members and enforcing the implementation ofagreements in a structured format. Although, there have been many discussions anddocuments produced by the SCO regarding economic cooperation, almost nothing hasbeen implemented and very few programs even require the SCO's existence to be

implemented.55

Yet, in the Asia-Pacific Security Survey 2008 Report56, SCO was recognizedas an effective regional institution, both for building sense of community andmechanism for practical cooperation (See Illustration 4), next to ASEAN and ASEAN-centered institution - ASEAN-Plus-Three. It emerged as the Top 3 clear winner asbuilder of a sense of community. SCO itself obtained the 3rd highest rating, followed bythe ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, United Nations, etc. On the dimension of PracticalCooperation, the analysts also gave effective ratings to SCO. Thus, it appears that thisorganization has moved up in the esteem of security analysts between the 2007 and2008 surveys, into the generally effective as a mechanism for practical cooperation.Indeed, this suggests that after short years of existence since its creation, SCO has

gained recognition from regional security analysts as an organization that can have apractical effect coordinating policies and actions by its members. Given this backdrop,the SCO as a regional organization is on the right track.

Illustration 4

Effectiveness of Regional Institutions

Source: Asia Pacific Security Survey 2008, Report by Richard W.

Baker and Galen W. Fox. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center,2008. p.28

As a final note, regionalism and community building in Eurasia through the SCOwhile applying its own strategic approach to regional integration and/or alliance maysteer the organization and its community in the right direction. Accordingly, the




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important concern is for the participating nation-states to live up to the agreements theymade and to advance the common aims and ambitions of the organization.

ENDNOTES




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1 Brief Introduction to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai CooperationOrganization, http://www.sectsco.org/html/00026.html (accessed November 19, 2008).

2 Security Council Simulation at Yale (scsyxxxi), Shanghai Cooperation Organization.3 Weitz, Richard The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: The Primakov Vision and Central

Asian Realities, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Journal 31, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 104.4 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Wikipedia.org,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organization (accessed November 20,2008)

5 Chronicle of Main Events of Shanghai Five and Shanghai Cooperation Organization,Shanghai Cooperation Organization, http://www.sectsco.org/html/00030.html (accessedNovember 19, 2008).

6 Ibid, wikipedia.org7 Ibid, Chronicles, sectco.org8 History of development of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai Cooperation

Organization, http://www.sectsco.org/html/00035.html (accessed November 19, 2008).9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Weitz, Richard, SCO Fails to Solve its Expansion Dilemma, Central Asia-Caucuses

Institute Analyst, September 19, 2007.12 Cohen, Ariel, What to do about the Shanghai Cooperation Organizations Rising

Influence, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092106.shtml13 de Haas, Marcel. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisations Momentum Towards a Mature

Security Alliance, Clingendael Security Paper, The Hague, Clingendael Institute,November, 2007.

14 www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook15 US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,World Proved Crude Oil

Reserves, 1 Jan. 19801 Jan. 2006 Estimates, URL, and World Crude Oiland Natural Gas Reserves, 1 Jan. 2005, URL; and for population data see

Turner, B. (ed.), The Statesmans Yearbook 2007 (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2006).16 Charter of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization,

http://www.sectsco.org/html/00096.html17 Moravcsik, Andrew. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal

Intergovernmentalist Approach, Journal of Common Market Studies, December, 1993.18 Regular meetings of secretaries of national security councils were suggested by

Uzbekistan and supported by the other member states in the Tashkent Declaration ofHeads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Tashkent, 17 June 2004,URL . The first meeting of heads of supremecourts took place on 2022 Sep. 2006; see URL.

19 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter was signed on 7 June 2002 at StPetersburg. An English translation of the charter is available at URL. The principles arelisted in Article 2.

20 Bailes, Alyson J. K., Pl Dunay, Pan Guang and Mikhail Troitskiy. The ShanghaiCooperation Organization, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 17 (Stockholm International PeaceResearch Insitutiute, May 2007), p6.

21 Weitz, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: The Primakov Vision and Central AsianRealities: pp109-110

22 Bailes, A. J. K., Baranovsky, V. and Dunay, P., Regional security cooperation in the formerSoviet area, SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmamentand International Security(Oxford University Press: Oxford, forthcoming 2007).

23 Ibid, Brief Introduction, SCO Website24 Ibid, Bailes, Regional security cooperation in the former Soviet area.25 Ibid, Security Council Simulation at Yale.


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26 Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers from Member States of the ShanghaiCooperation Organization, embassy of the Russian Federation in Malaysia.

27 SCO Secretariat in Brief, SCO Website28 Information on Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization,

SCO Website29 Charter of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization,

http://www.sectsco.org/html/00096.html30 For more information on what the SCO Secretariat does, see SCO Secretariat in Brief,

Shanghai Cooperation Organization, http://www.sectsco.org/html/00037.html31 Bailes, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 48-49.32 Ibid, Brief Introduction, SCO Website33 Bailes, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 48-49.34 Ibid, Security Council Simulation at Yale35 Ibid.36 Bailes, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 6. 33-3537 Ibid, Security Council Simulation at Yale38 Bailes, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 14.39 Bailes, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 18.40 Weitz, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: The Primakov Vision and Central Asian

Realities: 113.41 SCO to stage joint military drill to be transparent, Xinhua.net cited in wikipedia.org42 Weitz, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: The Primakov Vision and Central Asian

Realities: 106.43 Ibid, wikipedia.org44 Ibid.45 Oldberg, Ingmar. The Shanghai Coopearation Organization: Powerhouse or Paper Tiger?

Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defense Research Agency, , June 2007 p.1746 SCO Website, Interview of SCPO Secretary Genral Bolat Nurgaliev, 22 January 2007.47 Maksutov, Ruslan. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: a Central Asian Perspective,

SIPRI, Stockholm, August 2006, pp. 1-2948 Plater-Zyberk, Henry. Who is afraid of the SCO?, Conflict Studies Research Centre,

Sandhurst, March 2007, pp. 1-1149 Steen, Michael. Centr Asia declares nuclear free zone, 8 September 2006, Reuter,

www.news.scotman.com.50 Ibid, Oldberg, p1851 Ibid, Security Council Simulation at Yale52 Pant, Harsh V., Feasibility of the Russia-China-India Strategic Triangle: Assessment of

Theoretical and Empirical Issues,: 52.53 Ibid, Security Council Simulation at Yale54 Zhao, Huasheng, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization at 5: Achievements and

Challenges Ahead, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2006: 115.55 Lukin, Alexander, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: What next?, Russia in Global

Affairs 2007, no. 003, vol. 5: 144-145.56 Asia Pacific Security Survey 2008, Report by Richard W. Baker and Galen W. Fox. Honolulu,

Hawaii: East-West Center, 2008.

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