Science and Public Policy June 20090302-3427/09/050387-15 US$12.00 Beech Tree Publishing 2009387Science and Public Policy, 36(5), June 2009, pages 387401 DOI: 10.3152/030234209X442034; http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/beech/spp In search of relevance: the changing contract between science and society Laurens K Hessels, Harro van Lente and Ruud Smits Thispaperreflectsontherelevanceofacademicscience.Relevanceplaysacentralroleinwhatwe define as the contract between (academic) science and society. The manifestations of relevance in the dailypracticeofacademicresearchcanbestudiedusingthecredibilitycycle.Together,thesciencesocietycontractandthecredibilitycycleenableasystematicanalysisofrelevanceinscientific disciplines.ThisisillustratedwithacasestudyofacademicchemistryinTheNetherlands.We concludethatsciencessearchforrelevanceisnotnew,butthatitsmeaningchangestogetherwith changing ideas about the potential benefits of scientific research. HERELEVANCEOFACADEMICresearch isachallengeforpolicy-makersandscience studies.Invariousbodiesofliterature,itis claimedthattherelationshipbetweenacademicsci-ence and society is changing. Approaches like Post-AcademicScience(Ziman,2000),Mode2knowl-edge production (Gibbons et al, 1994) and the Triple Helixofuniversitygovernmentindustryrelations(LeydesdorffandMeyer,2006)allrefertoanin-creasing orientation towards the production of rele-vantknowledge(HesselsandvanLente,2008). Theyobserveanenhancedaspirationofacademic researchtocontributetothesolutionofsocietal problemsandtosupportinnovationsandeconomic growth.Thisdevelopmentexpressesaprofound change in the relationship between science, the state, the market and civil society. Some argue that the in-teractions between traditional institutions are intensi-fying (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000), to such an extentthattheboundarieshavebecomeblurred(Nowotny et al, 2001). Due to the limits on available resources, governments can no longer afford uncon-ditional support for basic science (Ziman, 1994) and demand value for money, urging university scientists todemonstratethattheyareeffectivelyfulfilling theirtasks.Inthemeanwhile,knowledgeisincreas-ingly seen as a valuable resource to ensure economic competitiveness,butglobalcompetitionhasforced industry to cut budgets on research with a long-term horizon (De Wit et al, 2007). They are now depend-entonstrategieslikeopeninnovation(Ches-brough,2003),inwhichuniversitiesareseenasa supplier of strategic knowledge.Itisamistaketoconsiderthestressonrelevance as a completely new phenomenon (Rip, 1997). Since the emergence of modern science, expected benefits haveplayedaroleinresearchfunding(Martin, 2003). In the course of the centuries, there have been severalperiodsinwhichknowledgeproductionwas strongly connected to contexts of application (Pestre, 2003). Intimate interactions between science, inven-tion and entrepreneurship were, for example, already importantintheBritishindustrialrevolution(Free-man, 1997). Science is not an autarkic system: it has always depended on the provision of resources from the government or from other wealthy individuals or organizationssoitmayalwayshavebeeninsearch ofrelevance.Nevertheless,thequestionremains whenandhowsciencecanberelevant.Isresearch relevantwhenityieldsknowledgeaboutanurgent T Laurens K Hessels (corresponding author), Harro van Lente and RuudSmitsareattheCopernicusInstituteforSustainableDe-velopmentandInnovation,UtrechtUniversity,POBox80115, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands; Email: l.hessels@geo.uu.nl; Tel: +31 30 253 7597; Fax: +31 30 253 2746. Allintervieweesaregratefullyacknowledgedfortheircoop-eration.Inparticular,theauthorswishtothankArieRip,Ernst Homburg,BarendvanderMeulenandJandeWitforsharing theirexpertiseandfortheirvaluablefeedbackonearlierver-sionsofthispaper.TheyalsowishtothankJohnGrin,Daan Schuurbiers,ArendZomerandtwoanonymousreviewersfor their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The sciencesociety contract Science and Public Policy June 2009388 problem such as global warming? Is it relevant when societalstakeholdersareinvolved?Isitrelevant whenindustrialcompaniesarewillingtopayforit? Orisitrelevantbydefinition,thankstothecultural valueofscientificactivities?Howisrelevancede-finedandmeasured?Whenandhowdoesthestress on relevance affect scientific practices? Any attempt to address these questions should take intoaccountthatthenotionofasingularscience, onemodelofdoingandorganizingscience,like Mode 1 knowledge production, is historically incor-rect (Pickstone, 2007). The way science is conducted at universities and the way it is influenced by outside forces and how it reacts to societal developments has changed over time. In a broad-brush narrative, Mode 1 may have shown an increase or even a lock-in (Rip, 2000) at the expense of research with Mode 2featuresafterWorldWarII.Thegeneralconvic-tionthatbasicresearchshouldbecherishedlikea diva and separated from applied research and tech-nologydevelopment,however,isspecificforthat timeratherthanauniversalstartingpointforfund-ingscienceandtechnology(ShapleyandRoy, 1985).Theissueofrelevanceclearlyisacompli-cated one. It seems that no straightforward answer is possible to the above questions, and there is not even a common definition of societal relevance. Theaimofthispaperistodevelopaheuristic frameworkthatcancontributetotheunderstanding of the various meanings relevance may have and the roletheseplayinacademicresearchpractices.1We willstartwiththebasicnotionthatrelevancerefers totheexpectedvaluescientificresearchwillhave forsociety.Whatdoesthisaddedvaluemeanmore precisely?Wewillinvestigatehowdefinitionsof whatrelevanceentailshaveshiftedandmaycon-tinue to shift. In the next section we will discuss the notionthatthesciencesocietyrelationshipcanbe conceivedasacontractwhichdefinesthetwopar-ties, their privileges and obligations. We build on the existing literature by using the idea of a contract as a heuristicdevice,andenrichitbysuggestingabasic composition of the contract between science and so-ciety.Next,weshowhowananalysisofthecredi-bility cycle (Latour and Woolgar, 1986) can help to explore the meaning and position of relevance in ac-tualresearchpractices.Together,ournotionsofthe contract and the credibility cycle constitute a heuris-ticframeworktostudyrelevanceinspecificdisci-plines.Inthelastsectionwewillillustrateand substantiatetheframeworkwithacasestudyof chemistryinTheNetherlands.Ourfirstintention with developing and presenting this framework is to enhancethetheoreticalunderstandingoftherele-vance of science. Secondly, we hope to contribute to theprocessofgatheringempiricalinsightsintothe changing relationship between academic science and society. A contract between science and society Academicscienceisnotanisolatedenterprise.To keep its position in society requires legitimacy. Prac-tices in science have changed over the course of cen-turies,butsciencehasalwaysdependedonsocietal supportintheformofresourcesandlegitimacy.In thedevelopmentofthechangingidentitiesofsci-ence,differentvisionsofscienceandconnectedle-gitimationscanbediscerned.Earlymodernscience couldbelegitimatizedbytheclaimthatitwasneu-tral, in the sense that it would not interfere with reli-giousmattersanditwouldnotdisturbthesocial order.Inthe18thand19thcenturies,sciencesle-gitimacy became dependent on the visions of science asamodelofrationalityand,later,asareservoir ofinnovations(Rip,1982;vandenDaele,1978). Thelarge-scaleinstitutionalizationofmodernsci-enceinthe20thcenturyhasmadetheselattertwo legitimationsevenmoreimportant.Thesubstantial investments that societies make in science today are only regarded as legitimate thanks to the great prom-isesofmodernscienceintermsofeconomiccom-petitiveness,culturalenrichmentorsocialprogress. Inotherwords,therelevanceofsciencehasbe-comecrucialforitspublicsupport.Relevancecan refertopracticalapplicationsofresearchoutcomes, butalsotootherwaysinwhichsciencemayserve society,likethesocio-culturalvalueofimproved understandingoftheworldortheprovisionofa breedinggroundforhighlyeducatedmembersofsociety. LaurensKHesselsispreparingaPhDthesisatUtrecht University on struggles for relevance in science. He holds a BSc in chemistry, a MSc in environmental chemistry and an MAinphilosophy(cumlaude),allfromtheUniversityof Amsterdam.Inhiscurrentwork,heisinvestigatingthe struggle for relevance of various scientific disciplines, study-ing how various actors give meaning to the concept of rele-vanceandwhatroleitplaysinthedailypracticeof academicresearchers.Hehasrecentlycontributedtoa literaturereviewonthenotionofMode2knowledgepro-ductionandtoasurveyregardinguniversityindustryrela-tionships, which both appeared in Research Policy (2008). HarrovanLenteisassociateprofessorofinnovationand program director of the MSc course in science and innova-tionmanagementattheUniversityofUtrecht,TheNether-lands.HestudiedphysicsandphilosophyattheUniversity ofTwente,TheNetherlandsandhasworkedattheKPMG Consultancy. He has published on the dynamics of expecta-tions in the development of science and technology. He has beeninvolvedinresearchandteachingintheareaofsci-ence,technology,innovationandsociety.Hiscurrent researchfocusesonthepromiseofhydrogenandnano-technologies and the role of needs in technical change. RuudSmitsisfullprofessoroftechnologyandinnovation andchairmanoftheDepartmentofInnovationStudiesat UtrechtUniversity.Thefocusofhisworkisontheman-agement of innovation processes, the development of more user-orientedtypesofinnovationpolicyandmanagement, technology assessment and the development of instruments that facilitate the participation of relevant actors in decision-makingprocessesoninnovationandonthedynamicsof innovationsystems(transitions,systemicinstruments,rela-tion between processes and systems). The sciencesociety contract Science and Public Policy June 2009389Numerouswritingsaboutchangingsciencesys-tems and their concomitant legitimations employ the ideaofa(tacit)contract.AsGustonandKenniston (1994:5)arguethecontractisausefulmetaphorbecause:it implies two distinct parties, each with different interests,whocometogethertoreachaformal agreement on some common goal;acontractisnegotiated,arrivedatthroughase-riesofexchangesinwhicheachpartytriestose-cure the most advantageous terms;a contract suggests the possibility of conflict or at least disparity of interests; andcontractscanberenegotiatedifconditions change for either party. Baldursson(1995),Elzinga(1997),Martin(2003), Jasanoff(2005)andRip(2007)usethenotionofa contractasaheuristicforstudyingthechangingre-lationship between science and society. Although the approach, scope and size of their studies differ, their diagnosesarebroadlysimilar.Theystartwiththe Endless frontier contract, which refers to Vannevar BushsreportScience,theendlessfrontier(Bush, 1945).Itholdsacleardistinctionbetweenbasicre-search, which is self-regulated and should not be dis-turbedbyoutsidesteeringandappliedresearch whichissubjecttoimmediatequestionsaboutrele-vanceandexternalsteering.Thisdivisionisinstitu-tionalizedbytwocategoriesoffundingagencies: basic research councils headed by scientists and sec-toralfundingagenciesmandatedbydifferentminis-tries.Forseveralreasons,theEndlessfrontier contract is currently under attack. One of the factors issciencesownsuccessinsectorslikehealthcare andagriculture,whichpromptsawishtoco-determineitsdirections(Baldursson,1995).Society demandsstrategicresearch(IrvineandMartin, 1984; Rip, 2004) or targeted research, new catego-ries of basic research that combine internal scientific qualitywithexternalsocietalrelevance(Elzinga, 1997).Scienceindustryrelationshipsintensify,sci-encepolicybecomesstrategicandfundingarrange-mentshaveanincreasingmissionorientation (Ziman,1994;Gibbonsetal,1994;Etzkowitzand Leydesdorff,2000).Anewcontractseemstobe emerginginwhichsciencesautonomyisincreas-ingly constrained.Otherauthorsusethecontractnotioninamore normativeway.Vavakova(1998),forinstance,ar-guesthattospeakofanewcontractisdangerous, becauseittendstoreducethesocietalusefulnessof science to purely economic value. In her reading, ar-gumentsforanewcontractconceiveresearchina too utilitarian way. A new contract in which science ismorecloselylinkedtotheprivatesectorwould threatentheavailabilityofknowledgeasapublic good.Incontrast,Gibbons(1999)arguesthatthe prevailingcontractwhichwassetuptosustainthe productionofreliableknowledge,isnolongeradequate.GiventhechangesGibbonsobservesin scienceandsociety(increasingsocietalcomplexity, convergenceofuniversityandindustrialresearch, riseofMode2),anewcontractisneededtoensure theproductionofsociallyrobustknowledgeof whichthevalidityisdeterminedbyanextended groupofexperts,includinglayexperts.This knowledge is less likely to be contested than knowl-edgewhichismerelyreliableinanexclusively scientificway.ForGibbons,enteringintothenew contractinvolvesembracingtheriseofMode2and contextualizedknowledgeproduction:(...)science mustleavetheivorytowerandentertheagora (Gibbons, 1999: C84).Inthispaper,wefollowthosescholarswhouse thecontractasaheuristicbutweenrichtheirap-proach by a more specific conception of the content of the contract. We continue the route taken by Gus-ton(2000:62)whodefinesthesocialcontractfor science as follows: The political community agrees to provide resources to the scientific community and toallowthescientificcommunitytoretainitsdeci-sion-makingmechanismsandinreturnexpects forthcomingbutunspecifiedtechnologicalbenefits. That is, science can take care of its own integrity (by self-regulation)andisabletoproducebenefitsfor society (productivity).2 Because the contract concerns the delegation of a particular task, principalagent theory (Braun, 2003; VanderMeulen,1998;Guston,2000)willbehelp-ful.Thisapproachassumesthatthepolicy-makers askscientiststodosomethingforthemthatthey cannotdothemselves,becausetheylackthecapa-bilitiesortheknowledgethescientistshave.Inthis viewofrelationshipsbetweenpolicy-makersand scientists,policy-makershavefourfundamental problems: gettingscientiststodowhatpoliticswant(prob-lem of responsiveness); beingsurethattheychoosethebestscientists (problem of adverse selection); being sure that scientists do their best to solve the problems and tasks delegated to them (moral haz-ard); and knowingwhattodo(decision-makingandprior-ity-setting problem) (Braun, 2003).Sciencepolicy,inallitsdifferent,oftencomplex, forms,canbeunderstoodasattemptstosolvethese four problems of delegation. Indeed, the evolution of sciencepolicyintherecentfewdecadescanbede-scribed as a sequence of different models of delega-tion:blinddelegation,delegationbyincentives, austerity,contractdelegation,anddelegationtonet-works (Braun, 2003; Pot and Reale, 2007). Principalagenttheorystartsitsanalysisatthe principals side and tends to overemphasize the gov-ernmentspowerinstructuringtherelationshipand to ignore the perspective of the agent (Morris, 2003). Yet,scientistsalsoshapetheinstitutionsgoverning The sciencesociety contract Science and Public Policy June 2009390 the task delegation. Another limitation is that princi-palagenttheoryhasdifficultieswithdealingwith multiple principals (Shove, 2003). The framework is usefultodescribetherelationshipbetweenscience andthegovernment,butitcannoteasilyaccommo-datetheinfluenceofotherprincipalssuchasindus-tryornongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs).In ordertoovercometheselimitations,wewillalso draw from other theories, in particular the credibility cycle (Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Rip, 1988) and re-sourcedependencytheory(PfefferandSalancik, 1978; Oliver, 1991). To conclude, the notion of a contract is a powerful metaphoranditcanserveasaheuristicinorderto enhanceourunderstandingofrelevanceandofthe changingsciencesocietyrelationship.Theexisting literatureoffersseveralusefulstartingpoints,but some further elaboration is necessary.A framework to examine the relationshipbetween academic science and society Acontractexpressesthepositionsandthemutualre-lationshipsoftheactorsinvolved.Inotherwords,it drawsonandexpressesamoraluniverse,asinthe caseoftherelationshipbetweenamotherandher child,wherenormsandvaluesinvolvedincareand protection are involved. Although the norms exist and exertforce,theyarenotfullyrecorded.So,explicit andimplicitnormstogethershapeamoraluniverse whichindicateshowmothersandchildrenrelateto each other. In the same vein, the contract between sci-enceandsocietyexpressesimplicitandexplicit agreements between science and societal parties.Thecontractbetweenacademicscienceandsoci-etydealswiththedelegationofaparticulartask. Multipleprincipalsaskscientificagentstodoajob they cannot do themselves. From the scientists per-spective, the contract can be regarded in terms of re-sourcedependence(PfefferandSalancik,1978; Oliver, 1991; Leiyt et al, 2008). Scientists are de-pendentontheirsocietalenvironmentfortheirsur-vival,sotheycannoteasilybreakthecontractwith society. If their environment develops new demands, scientistscanchoosebetweenseveralstrategies. They can shift their activities towards the new socie-talneeds,inaccordancewiththecompliancestrat-egy. Sometimes they manage, however, to pursue a symboliccompliancestrategy,bycreatinganim-agewhichcorrespondswellwithsocietaldemands, without changing anything in the actual work. Alter-natively,theycantrytonegotiatewiththeirenvi-ronment about the content of the contract, according to the manipulation strategy (Leiyt et al, 2008). In this paper we propose to use the notion of a con-tractasaheuristictostudythechangingrelationship betweenacademicscienceandsociety.Justlikethe moraluniverseoftheexampleabove,thiscontract cannot be found at a particular place. Nevertheless, its history can be told using various data sources like the writtenutterancesofdifferentactors,actualpolicy measures,fundingpatternsandinterviewswithkey actors.Assumingtheexistenceofacontractcanhelp toorganizethesedataintoacoherenthistoryofrele-vance.Tothisend,weassumethatthecontractcon-tainsthreemaincomponents.Inourconceptionit addressesthreebasicquestions:whatisthenatureof the delegated task, why is it delegated and how is it ar-ranged?Inotherwords,thecontractarrangeswhat science should do, why it should do this, and what are theappropriateconditionsforsciencetofulfillits delegatedtask(seeFigure1).Theanswerstothese questions, of course, are the result of negotiations be-tweenatleasttwoparties.Inthecaseofscienceand society there are more: neither science nor society can beseenasasingleactor.Moreover,scienceisasub-systemofsocietyratherthanexternaltoit.Thus,the contractisanagreementamongallactorsthathavea stake in academic research, including: the researchers doingtheactualwork,universitymanagers,policy-makersand research councils facilitating it, and com-panies,NGOs,authoritiesandanyotheractorswho areusingtheknowledgedevelopedbyscience.The assumptionofacontractdoesnotimplythatthereis noplacefordisagreements.Ofcourse,thepartiesin-volved have diverseinterests.However,ateachpoint intime,thereareanumberofratherfundamentalno-tionswhichtheactorsdonotcallintoquestion,in-stead, they refer to them as a shared vision.The identity of science Academicscienceisconcernedwithconductingresearchinordertoproducerelevantoutcomes. We use the notion of a contract as a heuristic to study the changing relationship between academic science and society 1. What? Identity of science 3. How? Conditions 2. Why? Rationales Sciencesociety contract Figure 1. General composition of contract between academic science and society The sciencesociety contract Science and Public Policy June 2009391Sciencestaskistoproduceknowledgeandtode-liver it in the form of communications (publications, presentations)orartefacts.Morespecifically,the contractcandescribewhichtypeofresearchshould becarriedout.Whatisthebalancebetweenbasic and applied research, or is science supposed to con-ductstrategicresearch(IrvineandMartin,1984),or toworkinPasteursquadrant(Stokes,1997)?This questionrelatestothekindofknowledgescienceis expectedtodeliver,orinotherwords,whatknowl-edgeisconsideredrelevant.Societalactorsmay want science to offer expertise that contributes to the solution of complex policy issues, to deliver insights intometaphysicalpuzzlesortoproducestrategic knowledgewhichenhancesitseconomiccompeti-tiveness.Thecontractcanhave(and,indeed,has had)variousconceptsofrelevanceandthesecan alsobespecifiedtovaryingdegrees.However,one can probably assume that relevance has always had a placeintheidentityofscience,associetywillde-mand some sort of return for its investments. Rationales for funding science Intheproposedconception,thecontractalsode-scribeswhyacademicsciencedeservessupport. Manydifferent(combinationsof)argumentsare possible,butmostrelatetoconceptsofthesocietal relevanceofscience.Theexpectedbenefitsofsci-encecantakevariousforms,suchasneworim-provedweapons,moreaccuratenauticalalmanacs (based on improved astronomical observations), bet-termedicalcareandagriculture,improvedengines, newchemicalsandmaterials,newenergysources, new electrical devices and so on (Martin, 2003: 19). Withoutclaimingcompleteness,wementionfour genericrationaleswhichareprominentinthesci-encestudiesliterature.Onepossibilityistoregard science as a cultural good, if one believes that it has an intrinsic value or axiomatic relevance (Spiegel-Rsing, 1980). Or academic research may be seen as inevitabletosustainasystemofhighereducation (Martin,2003).Third,onemayfearthatacademic research is needed because the market will invest in-sufficiently in basic research (Guston and Kenniston, 1994).Finally,academicscienceyieldsknowledge ofgeneralinterest(likeexpertisewhichcansupport governmentaldecision-makingorstrategicknowl-edgethatmayleadtomedicalinnovations)(Gib-bons, 1999; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Bhme et al, 1983).Conditions Thethirdelementofthecontractweproposecon-tainsagreementsabouttheconditionsunderwhich universityresearcherswork.Tocreatenewknowl-edge,specialprocedures,norms,rewardingmecha-nisms,andinstitutionalisationsareputintoplace characterising scientific activities and distinguishing themfromotherprofessionalactivitiesinsociety (Braun,2003:310).Societydelegatesresearchto sciencebyasetofspecificgrantsandcontracts, each with its own terms and conditions (Guston and Kenniston,1994:8).Forthegovernment,thechal-lengeishowtomakesurethatgoodanduseful knowledge is produced, as well as how to assure that the investments in science do not go with unproduc-tivepressuresfromthegovernmenttoproduceap-plicableknowledge(VanderMeulen,1998:398), and the same goes for other stakeholders of science. Sciencesorganizationisattunedtoitsidentity.A traditionalfeatureofthewayacademicscienceis currentlyorganizedisthenestedhierarchyofre-searchgroupsinfaculties.Thismaychange,how-ever,withtheriseofinter-universitycentresof excellenceandothernovelformsoforganization (Rip,2004).Anotheragreementconcernstheway moneyisdistributedtoscientificresearchers,in which intermediary organizations have a central role (Van der Meulen and Rip, 1998; Lepori et al, 2007). This is not the place for a complete description of all theagreementsconcerningsciencesorganization. Here,wesimplywanttoemphasizethat,inprinci-ple,thefeaturesoftheorganizationofscienceaim tofacilitatethefulfilmentofsciencestask.There can also be specific instruments (organizational de-vices)whichaimtoenhancethequalityand/or relevanceofresearch,likeearmarkedfunding(Pot andReale,2007;BennerandSandstrom,2000)and performance assessments (Van der Meulen and Rip, 2000; Geuna and Martin, 2003).3 Asthedescriptionsofthethreeelementsofthe contractindicate,theirprecisecontentscanchange andaresubjecttonegotiationamongallpartiesin-volved.Weassume,however,thatthegeneralcom-position of the contract is of all times, as these three central questions are always at stake.Credibility cycle The next step in our investigation is to consider how relevancemanifestsitselfinthedailypracticeof academicresearch.Giventhebasicingredientsof the sciencesociety contract (see Figure 2) it is now Data Money RecognitionArticles Staff andequipment ArgumentsFigure 2. The credibility cycle, adapted from Latour and Woolgar (1986) The sciencesociety contract Science and Public Policy June 2009392 pertinenttoaskhowthismayinterfereintheway scienceoperates.Thisundertakingcanbuildonthe sociology of science. A central finding in the sociol-ogyofscienceisthatscientistsarenotprimarily drivenbyfinancialincentivesandrewards,but ratherbyadesireforrecognitionandreputation.In science,theneedtoacquirepositivereputations fromotherscientistsisacrucialfactorcontrolling what tasks are carried out and how, and how they are evaluated(Whitley,2000:25).Reputationsplaya centralroleintheorganizationofscientificwork. Scientificactivitiesarecarriedouttoconvincefel-lowresearchersoftheimportanceandsignificance of the results and hence to enhance ones own repu-tation. A scientists reputation in his or her field is a keyfactorinacquiringjobsandresources.Thus, onespositionwithintheemploymentorganization (university) also depends on ones reputation. The concept of the credibility cycle (Latour and Woolgar, 1986) has been introduced to explain how strugglesforreputationsteerthebehaviourofindi-vidualscientistsorresearchgroups.Similarto Whitleysnotionofreputation,credibilityrefersto theabilityactuallytodoscience(Latourand Woolgar,1986:198).Thisnotionisbroaderthan onlyrecognitionorrewardforscientificachieve-ments.Itisofamoregenericnatureandcantake various forms such as money, data or articles. Thus, scientificbehaviourcanbedescribedasacycleof conversionsofdifferenttypesofcredibility.Scien-tistsinvesttimeandmoneytoacquiredatathatcan supportarguments.Thesearewrittendowninarti-cles,whichmayyieldrecognitionfromcolleagues. Basedonthis,scientistsmayreceivenewfunding, fromwhichtheybuynewequipment(orhirestaff) whichwillhelptogatherdataagainetc.Conceived in this way, the research process can be depicted as a cycleinwhichconversionstakeplacebetween money,staffandequipment,data,arguments,pa-pers,recognitionetc.(seeFigure2).Inthisquasi-economicmodel,researchersarelikeinvestorsof capitalwhospendcredibilitywiththeintentionof earning it back after a complete cycle, with interest.4

Itisimportantforourpurposestonotethatat each point in the cycle the scientific actor meets spe-cificinstitutionswhichfacilitateorconstrainthe conversionsthatarebeingmadeapointnotwell elaboratedintheoriginalversionbyLatourand Woolgar. The scientist cannot make the conversions independently.Ineachstepthereareformalorin-formal structures which influence the transformation ofoneformofcredibilityinanother.Forexample, peer review procedures govern the conversion of ar-gumentsintoarticles.Thecriteriausedbypeersto assessthequalityofmanuscriptsdeterminewhat typeofargumentscanbeconvertedintopublica-tions.Inthenextconversion,recognitionisonly awardedtoarticleswhichhavebeenacceptedin prestigiousjournals,orincreasinglywhichare cited by other scholars. In a similar fashion, all other conversionsinthecyclearealsogovernedbyinstitutionsofvariouskinds,suchasuniversityor-ganizations, funding bodies and quality assessments. Theinstitutionsdeterminetheexchangerate,soto speak,ofoneformofcredibilityintothenext.For theresearcher,theinstitutionalenvironmentisin-strumental in building credibility. Twoissuesdeserveattentionheretoclarifyhow weunderstandthecredibilitycycle.First,although scientificresearchersarethemainactorsinthis model,itdoesnotdealwithsciencealone.Knorr-Cetina(1982)haswarnedofthedangerofinternal-ismwhenusingquasi-economicmodelsofscience suchasthecredibilitycycle.Oneshouldnotcon-ceivescientistsasiftheywereisolatedinaself-contained, quasi-independent system (Knorr-Cetina, 1982:109).Scientistsactivitiesgobeyondthe boundariesoftheirspecialistcommunity.Recogni-tionisreceivedfrompeers,butalsofromscientific colleaguesinotherdisciplines.Asanextremeex-ample, Nobel prizes are usually awarded to research withanimpactextendingtowardsotherscientific disciplinesoreventowardsproductsorsolutionsin society. What is more, nonscientific actors play cru-cial roles in the acquisition of money. The availabil-ityoffundingforparticularscientificprojectsisa productofinteractionsbetweenscientists,societal actors(inindustry,government,orelsewhere),and oftenintermediarybodieslikefundingagencies. However,theseinteractionscanbedescribedin terms of the credibility cycle, if it is not applied in a narrowsense(Leiyt,2007;Wouters,1999; Elzinga, 1997; Rip, 1994). We follow Leiyt in as-suming that credibility is achieved not only within a researchersspecialistcommunity,butinseveral arenas that interact with each other, such as financial backers,thescientificcommunity,regulatoryau-thorities,andprofessionalandconsumermarketing (Leiyt, 2007: 48).Secondly, we assume that the precise composition of the credibility cycle can be subject to change. We consideritavaluablemodelforscientificpractice. Its precise composition, however, is a historical con-tingencyratherthananecessity.Whatconversions are part of the cycle, which ones are most important andwhataretheguidingnormsandvaluesmay changeovertime?AlthoughLatourandWoolgar (1986)haveintroducedthecycleasatimeless,ge-nericmodelforscientificactivities,severalscholars have already shown that it is useful starting point for describingchangesinthesciencesystem.Guston (2000), for instance, uses the credibility cycle to ex-plaintherelationshipbetweenscientistsandthe government in the USA during the period of the so-cialcontractforscience,whichhepositionsbe-tween1945and1980.PackerandWebster(1996) argue that the cycle needs to be extended in order to accommodatepatentingactivities,whichareofin-creasingimportanceforacademicscientists.Rip (1994;1988)showsthatthecredibilitycyclecan help to understand how the role of research councils hasdevelopedovertheyears.Hisanalysisindicates The sciencesociety contract Science and Public Policy June 2009393the rise of a pressure for relevance and related crite-ria in the assessment of research proposals. As a re-sult, scientists are now also involved in struggles for relevanceandforlegitimity,ontopofstrugglesfor facticityandforfundability(Rip,1988).Inthispa-perwefocusonthestruggleforrelevance.Weuse the credibility cycle in a more specific way than Rip, in a step-by-step analysis. Asamodelforscientificactivity,thecredibility cycle can be used for studying the changing relation-shipbetweenscienceandsociety.Thecentralques-tion,then,is:howisrelevancemanifestedineach conversionofcredibility?Aretheresignificant changes in the composition of the cycle? A combined model We have already explained how both the notion of a contractandthecredibilitycyclecanhelptounder-standwhatrelevanceisandhowitfiguresinaca-demic research practices. But how do these elements relate to each other?Thecredibilitycycledescribestheactivitiesof university researchers as individuals or as organized ingroupsorresearchinstitutes.Inthisway,itputs oneactorincentralfocus.Theconversionsofthe cycle may seem primarily to be processes that are in-ternaltoscience,conductedbythescientiststhem-selves.However,theinstitutionsgoverningeach stepareco-constructedbysociety(tovaryingde-grees).Forinstance,thepossibilitiesofconverting recognitionintomoneydependontheformalstruc-tures of university funding and research councils. In turn,thecriteriausedintheselectionofresearch projectstofundarestronglydeterminedbynotions of relevance as expressed in the sciencesociety con-tract.Similarly,theproductionofscientificpapers is, in the first place, ruled by peer review processes. But how scientists act is also strongly influenced by university policy and national quality evaluations. If the allocation of funding is increasingly based on the numberofpreviouspublicationsoftheapplicants, becausethisisconceivedasanindicatorofquality, thiswillstimulatescientiststodevelopstrategiesto increase their publication output (Weingart, 2005).In the terminology of Rip (1988), scientific activ-itytakesplaceatthelevelofscientificentrepre-neursmobilizingresources,buttheintermediary levelorganizedfieldofscientificinstitutionsalso giveshapetothecredibilitycycle.Someofthe credibilityconversionsareruledbyinstitutionsat theintermediarylevel,suchasresearchcouncilsor disciplinaryassociations.Theseinstitutionscon-straintheactionsandinteractionsofscientists,but also enable them by providing legitimacy and oppor-tunities. The sciencesociety contract can be located onthemacro-levelofthegeneralsocialcontext (Rip,1988)inthesensethatitisofageneralkind and all stakeholders of science take part in it.Thesciencesocietycontractconstitutesaplat-formforallactorsintheresearchsystemwhichprovides them with arguments, legitimacy and other resources.Theparticularspecificationofrelevance of science in the operative contract precipitates into theintermediary-levelorganizationsandtherefore shapesthecredibilitycycle.Theconditionswhich aregenerallybelievedtobeneededforscienceto optimallyfulfillitstaskaretranslatedintoinstitu-tionssuchasuniversityorganizationsandresearch evaluations.Fromthescientistsperspective,theconversions ofthecredibilitycyclemayappearasexchangesof differentcurrencies.Allformsofcredibilityconsti-tutepoolsofresourcesthatcanbetransformedinto one another. The exchange rate of these conversions, however, is determined by the contract. For instance, thecriteriarulingtheselectionofmanuscriptsfor publication, the selection of candidates for academic positions,ortheselectionofresearchproposalsfor fundingdependonthecontentofthecontractbe-tween science and society. The agreements about the conditionsprobablyhaveadirectinfluenceon credibility conversions, while the identity of science andtherationalesforpublicsupportwillcontribute indirectly to the institutions steering the conversions of credibility. Intheirturn,developmentsinscientificpractice alsocontributetoshiftsinthecontentofthesci-encesociety contract. As actors refer to concepts of relevance in their daily work, they reinforce the con-tract. In giving credit to particular research contribu-tionsorindecidinghowtospendmoney,scientists refer to shared views on what science is and what it shouldorshouldnotcontributetosociety.Forin-stance,technologicalexpectationsthatgotogether with research outcomes influence ideas about poten-tialbenefitsofaparticularfieldforsociety(Van Lente,1993;VanLenteandRip,1998).Scientific researchyieldsinsightsbothinproblemstobe solved(e.g.climatechange)andinpossiblesolu-tions(e.g.metalhydridesforhydrogenstorageon board vehicles) (Bakker et al, 2008). These promises cangiverisetodedicatedresearchprogrammes, schoolsorinstitutesonthemeso-levelthatsubse-quently influence the negotiations about the sciencesocietycontract.Expectationsabouthowparticular scienceandtechnologycansolvesocietalproblems shape concepts of the societal relevance of science in general,too.Particularexpectationsmaydealwith The sciencesociety contract constitutes a platform for all actors in the research system which provides them with arguments, legitimacy and other resources The sciencesociety contract Science and Public Policy June 2009394 specific domains, but in the end the overall view on the value of science will be affected by the expecta-tions in all fields together. Toconclude,thecontractenablesandconstrains scientistsandothersintheiractivities.Itexpresses theagreementsamongallactorsanddeterminesthe rulesandregulationsoftheinstitutionswhichgive shapetothecredibilitycycle.Inthisway,itmakes particularconversionsofcredibilitypossible,but complicatesothers.Thereisnounidirectionalcau-salitybetweenthecontractandthevariouscredibil-itycycles.Thecontractinfluencesacademic practice, and developments in practice, in their turn, influence the agreements in the contract. Because of theseinteractions,webelievethatastudyofthe relevanceofsciencerequiresanalyzingthecontract aswellasscientificpractice.Wewillnowillustrate this with an empirical case study.Struggles for relevance inacademic chemistry Wenowgoonestepfurther,andinvestigatehow concepts of relevance and the struggles around it are visible in a case study. As a unit of analysis, the sci-entificdisciplineseemsappropriate.Inthissection we narrow down the focus from science in general to acasestudyofacademicchemistryinTheNether-lands.5Obviously,theempiricaloutcomesofthis casestudydonotrepresentscienceingeneral.The meaningofrelevancecanbedifferentineachfield of research. An interesting aspect of chemistry is the intensitywhichtherelationshipsbetweenuniversi-tiesandindustrytraditionallyhave.Forthisreason, onecanexpecttherelevanceofchemistrytobe stronglyconnectedwithindustrialapplicationsand therelationshipbetweenscienceandsocietytobe relativelystable.Assuchitseemsahardcasefor studying changing notions of relevance and an inter-esting test for our framework. Given the heterogene-ityofscience,thiscasecanobviouslynotbetaken asrepresentativeofthewholesciencesystem.In some other fields, more radical transformations may occur,especiallyifconsiderationsofeconomicor commercialrelevancearetraditionallyabsent.Our analysisstartswiththepost-WorldWarIIsituation, previously referred to as the era of Science, the end-lessfrontier.Firstwewilldescribethechangesin theidentity,therationalesandtheconditionsthat haveregulatedacademicchemistryresearchinThe Netherlands.Thenwewilladdressthechanging credibility cycle. Identity Inthefirstpostwardecades,someprofessorshave strongtieswithchemicalcompanies,butthemain taskofacademicchemistryistoconductbasicre-searchnotdirectlyaimingatindustrialapplications. The relevance of academic research is often defined intermsofacontributiontochemicalindustry,but more in terms of skillful and knowledgable research and development (R&D) staff than in terms of useful knowledge.Knowledgetransfertoindustrytakes place through the people who move to industry after their(doctoral)graduation,byconsultancyservices and by industrially funded research assistants (Hom-burg,2003).Theusefulnessofacademicchemistry isnotcalledintoquestion,giventheimportanceof chemicalindustryfortheDutcheconomyandthe linear model-based belief that basic research will ul-timately lead to innovation and economic growth. In the1970s,whensciencepolicyisintroduced,the government demands academic research to more ef-fectivelyaddresssocietalneeds.6Theministerof sciencepolicyemphasizesthatchemistryshould produceknowledgewhichisusefulnotonlyin chemicalindustry,butalsoindomainslikeagricul-tureandhealthcare.Inthe1980s,wheninnovation emerges as a central topic for policy-making, chem-istrysrelevanceisbroadenedtoalsoincludedeliv-eringapplicableknowledge.Themainactivity remains basic research, but this is justified merely as anecessaryconditionfortheexistenceofgoodap-plicable research. During the 1990s the idea of stra-tegicresearchemergeswhichblurstheboundary betweenbasicandappliedresearch.Chemistrys taskthenbecomesproducingstrategicknowledge whichcombinesaspectsofbasicandappliedre-search.Strategicknowledgecanbedefinedasfun-damentalinsightsindomainsofhighrelevancefor theeconomyorsociety(IrvineandMartin,1984; Rip,2004).Thedomainofsustainability,which gainsimportancesinceitsintroductionin1987,be-comesamajorstrategicfieldforchemistry.7This notion combines the aspirations to contribute to eco-nomicalgrowthand,atthesame,tosolveenviron-mentalissues.Thestrategicidentityofacademic chemistryenduresinthenewmillenniumasitis compatiblewiththemostrecentinnovationcon-cepts, in which the university is seen as a supplier of basic knowledge which can be valorized by other ac-tors in the innovation system. Rationales Themostdominantrationalesforfundingacademic chemistry of the 1950s and 1960s seem to be its ne-cessityforthetrainingofnewR&D-workersand (less importantly) the cultural value of basic research (seeTable1).Thechemicalindustry,withwhich academicchemistryhasalwayshadstrongbonds (HomburgandPalm,2004),hasastronginterestin highlyeducatedresearchers.Althoughsomeuniver-sityresearchersalsoprovideindustrywithtechnical advice,inthepost-warperiod,industrytendstore-garduniversitiesprimarilyasaneducationalsystem to supply a steady stream of highly skilled research-ers(Homburg,2003).TheDutchResearchCouncil (SON),foundedin1956,providessupporttobasic chemicalresearchwiththetrainingofyoungThe sciencesociety contract Science and Public Policy June 2009395scientistsandthestimulationofcooperationasits primaryaims.Inthe1970s,whengovernmentalsci-encepolicyisborn,theneedforchemicalresearchis framed in more general terms, going beyond its value forchemicalindustry.Injustificationsforitspublic support the potential to contribute to problem-solving inothersectorsgainsvisibility.8Thisbroadeningisa response to the negative image of the chemical sector, duetotherisingawarenessofenvironmentalprob-lems. The budget cuts on basic research in industry in the1980sincreasetheimportanceoftherationalefor supportingacademicchemistryrelatingtoitspoten-tialcontributiontotechnologicalinnovations.9 Chemicalindustrynotonlydesirestobenefitfrom academic research in terms of educated staff, but also intermsofapplicationsoftheknowledgeproduced10 (DeWitetal,2007;VanHelvoort,2005).Inthe 1990s the notion of sustainable development becomes increasinglysignificantinrationalesforfunding (chemical)research.11Thisumbrellaconceptcon-nectsseveralpreviousrationalesbecauseitrefersto growthineconomicandenvironmentaldimensions12 (Rip, 1997; van Lente and van Til, 2008). Around the turn of the century, the funding of university research isincreasinglyframedassupportforthenationalin-novationsystem.Maintainingahealthyinnovation systembecomesacentralgoalofeconomicpolicy, which implies that universities deserve support thanks to their central position in this system. In this perspec-tive,however,supportforuniversityresearchersis accompaniedbytheexpectationthattheyactivelyin-teractwithotheractorsintheinnovationsystem,and contributetotheprocessofvalorization,bywriting patents or by founding spin-off companies.Conditions During the 1950s and 1960s chemical scientists have ahighdegreeofautonomy.Themostimportant types of funding (university funding and SON fund-ing) are distributed without any conditions attached, basedonconsiderationsofacademicquality.Indus-try also pays for research assistants and consultancy services,butonlytoaminorityofallprofessors (Homburg, 2003). In the 1970s scientists are increas-ingly held accountable for their work. Although they arenotyetaffectedbyformalpolicymeasures, chemical researchers are under pressure to put more effort into explaining their research priorities to pol-icy-makersandfundingagencies.From1980on-wards,however,asubstantialchangeoccursinthe funding of chemical science, due to two interrelated developments.First,facedwiththeneedtorestrict thegrowthofsciencefunding(Ziman,1994),the Ministry of Science, Culture and Education starts to supplypartofthefirstmoneystreamonacondi-tionalbase(BlumeandSpaapen,1988).Moreover, informedbyforesightstudies(Anon,1980;1982), anincreasingshareofthesecondmoneystreamis dedicated to application oriented research.13 Second, agrowingpartofallfundingstemsfromindustrial corporations14 and the ministry of Economic Affairs startstoimplementanumberofinnovationpro-grammesinspecificfieldslikecarbohydratesand catalysis.15Thesedevelopmentscontinueinthe 1990s.Thereorganizedresearchcouncil(NWO) continuestobroadenitsmissionbeyondbasicre-searchandincreasinglyworkswithprioritypro-grammesandfieldsofattentionthatarechosen partlythankstotheirsocietalrelevance.16Another significanteventinthe1990sistheinstitutionaliza-tionofperformanceevaluations.Governmentalpol-icy-makers,researchcouncilsanduniversity managerswhohavebecomemoreselectiveinsup-portingparticularactivities,developaneedfor transparencywithregardtoresearchoutcomes.In 1996thefirstnationwidequalityassessmentof chemicalscienceisconducted(VSNU,1996),the Table 1. Overview of the changing contract for academic chemistry. + signs indicate that these elements complement existing elements rather than replacing them Time periodSummary of identityMost dominant rationalesMost important conditions 1950s and 1960sBasic researchEducation Cultural value Autonomy Unconditional funding SON communities 1970s+Useful knowledge+Problem solving potential+Social accountability 1980sApplicable knowledgeTechnological innovation+Conditional funding +Application-oriented funding (STW, IOP, contract research) +Foresight +Scarcity of resourcesReorganization of NWO 1990sStrategic knowledge+ Sustainable developmentFurther prioritization +Performance assessments 2000+Strategic knowledge+ Innovation system+Consortia (ACTS, TTI, BSIK) +EFPs Notes: ACTSAdvanced Chemical Technologies for Sustainability Program of NWO BSIKBesluit Subsidies Investeringen Kennisinfrastructuur Programs IOPInnovation Oriented Program TTIsTechnological Top Institutes (funded by the Ministry of Economic Affairs) STWTechnology Foundation The sciencesociety contract Science and Public Policy June 2009396 second in 2002 (VSNU, 2002). Due to the lack of a strict protocol, the evaluators can choose themselves towhatextenttheytakeintoaccountconsiderations ofsocietalrelevanceasforinstancetheeconomic valueortechnologicalapplicationsoftheproduced knowledge(VanderMeulen,2008).Inpractice, theygenerallyignorethistypeofcriteriaandfocus strongly on traditional scientific norms.17 After 2000 chemistry faces a further diversification of policy in-struments.Thankstotheircontinuedgrowth,the EFPsbecomeasubstantialsourceofincomefor academic chemists. Moreover, there is a rise of con-sortia-basedfunding,largesumsofgovernmental money supplied to collaborative programs of univer-sityscientistswhicharemonitoredby(industrial) user committees and which explicitly aim at enhanc-ing the interactions with industry.18 To summarize, there havealways beenbonds be-tween academic chemistry and industry but the type ofinteractionhaschanged.Themeaningofrele-vancehaschangedinthecourseofyears.Initially education and cultural value ruled its definition; later servingsocietyandtheenvironment;inthe1980s innovation became dominant; since the 1990s speci-fied in terms of sustainability. Related, the emphasis intherationalesforfundingchemicalresearchhas shifted from its function to support higher education anditsculturalvaluetothenotionthatbasicre-search is needed to sustain the innovativeness of in-dustrysinceglobalmarketsfailtostimulateprivate sectorbasicresearch.Anadditionalrationalethat hasevolvedovertheyearsistheneedofchemical expertiseforgovernmentaldecision-makingabout the regulation of emissions. The conditions specified inthecontracthavebecomeincreasinglycomplex. Chemistsreceivelessunconditionalsupport.The MinistryofSciencestillprovidesacertainshareof fundingwithoutspecifyinghowitshouldbespent, butthedegreeoffreedominspendingthisbasic fundingisalsodecreasing.19Moreover,forafruit-ful career, scientists depend on the acquisition of ad-ditionalfunding,fromNWO,EFPsorfromprivate companies.Eachofthesesourceshasspecifiedtar-getsandrequiresfromresearcherstodefineexante thesocietalsignificanceoftheresearchtheypro-pose. Moreover, a couple of new devices are in place tostimulatetheproductionofgoodandrelevant knowledge:performanceassessmentsandforesight activities. Credibility cycle Changesintheidentity,rationaleandconditionsof academic chemistry will have an impact on scientific practice,whichcanbeanalysedintermsofthe credibilitycycle.Theinstitutionsaroundeachcon-version in the cycle are influenced by changes in the contract. Some conversions seem solely ruled by the scientificcommunity,butinothercasesexternal partiesdeliberatelyinterfere.Inourcasestudywe followedanumberoforganizationaldevicesthat havebeendesignedtoenhanceaparticularformof relevance of scientific research. In the case study, we identified five types of these devices: earmarked funding; foresightactivities(e.g.Verkenningscommissies, Sectorraden); internal(scientific)proceduresofqualitycontrol (peer review of scientific papers, selection of can-didates for academic positions, citation practices); universitymanagement,(e.g.focusandmass policy, promotion criteria); and performance assessments (visitations). In the following we will discuss how these organiza-tional devices interfere with particular credibility con-versions(seeFigure3)and,thus,howrelevance peerreview earmarked funding selection procedures foresight DataMoney Recognition Articles performance assessment (and/or citations) (and other outcomes) Staff andequipment 1 6 5 4 3 2 Figure 3. The credibility cycle, adapted from Latour and Woolgar (1986). Points at which organizational devices connect to the cycle are shown The sciencesociety contract Science and Public Policy June 2009397hasbeenexpressedinthepracticesofDutchaca-demic chemistry research.1. First,theriseofearmarkedfundinginterfereswith the conversion from recognition to money. The cri-teriaconnectedtoparticularfundsdeterminethe possibilitiesforscientiststoobtainmoney.Inthis waytheyco-shapetheprevailingnormsthatgov-ernthisspecificconversion.Theavailabilityofa numberofstrategicprogrammesforchemicalre-searchinTheNetherlandsimpliesthatscientists who are recognized experts in particular fields (like catalysis or nano-science) have an advantage in ac-quiring money. The ability to promise practical ap-plicationsisalsoincreasinglyvaluedinthis conversion.Moreover,earmarkedfundingisindi-rectlyinfluencedbyforesightactivities.Froma principalagentperspective,foresightstudiescan beseenasanattemptbyaprincipaltoovercome delegation problems, since the studies seek to make theworldoftheagentsmoretransparenttothe principal(VanderMeulen,1992).Theforesight studiesonchemistry(Anon.,1980;OVC,1995)in TheNetherlandshavehadasignificantinfluence on the available funding for particular sub-fields.20 2. Theproceduresforselectingcandidatesforaca-demicpositionsinfluencetheconversionof money into staff (and equipment). In these proce-duresacombinationofvariouscriteriaisusually takenintoaccount.Interviewswithscientistsin-dicatethatrecently,thepublicationandcitation recordshavegainedimportancehere.Themost recenttrendisthatacandidatesprovenabilities toaquirefundingarerewarded.Obviously,these developmentsco-determinehowmoneycanbe transformed into staff.3. Theconversionofstaffandequipmentintodata takes place relatively autonomously inside labora-toriesandotherresearchlocations.Governing norms seem to be primarily of a scientific nature. However,thechoiceofwhatdatatoproducecan stronglydependonagreementswithfunding sources and, less explicitly, on societal issues call-ingforparticularscientificknowledge.Thefre-quencyofinteractionwithpotentialusersduring theresearchprocessvariesacrossfunding sources, from about two to six times a year. How-ever,ininterviewsacademicresearchersspeak aboutattuningtheiractivitiestouserneedsasa boundary condition rather than a primary goal. 4. The conversion of data into arguments depends on normsaboutthecharacteristicsdatashouldpos-sessbeforetheycansupportarguments:reliabil-ity,validity.Traditionally,thereislittlesocietal interferencehere.Proponentsofpost-normalsci-ence (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993) claim that this ischanging,thatthepublicisbecomingincreas-ingly involved in quality assessments of scientific results in fields of social importance, but we have notobservedthisinourcasestudy.Someinter-viewees,however,indicatethatsponsoringorganizationssometimesattempttoinfluencethe formulationofargumentsbecausetheyhavea strong interest in particular outcomes, for example regarding the safety of chemicals. 5. Theconversionofargumentsintoarticlesis stronglyruledbypeerreview.Allscientificjour-nals employ this practice of quality control. Peers judgethequalityofpapersinacademicterms, withoutconsideringtheircontentssocietalrele-vance.Asignificantmodificationofthisconver-sionconcernstherisinginterestofresearch sponsors,particularlyinindustrialfieldslikeca-talysis,topatentresearchoutcomes.Forthisrea-son industrial funding often implies a delay of 13 months for publications, due to the scientists con-tractual obligation to give their industrial partners sometimetoexplorethepatentabilityoftheir findings. We also found that chemical researchers are actively involved in writing patents, especially in the field of catalysis.6. Obtaining recognition based on ones articles and patents traditionally depends on peer judgment of innovativenessandcontribution.However,inthe 1980s and 1990s the government and the union of universitieshaveinstalledperformanceassess-ments that formalize the attribution of recognition (VanderMeulen,2008).Bibliometricanalyses combinedwithqualitativejudgmentsfrompeers (andsometimesalsoofknowledge-users)yield scoresfortheperformanceofresearchgroups, programmesandindividuals.Interviewdatasug-gest that these scores increasingly contribute to an individualsscientificrecognition.Althoughthey donotyetplayadominantrole,theintendedin-volvementofusersandincludingthesocietal relevanceasasignificantcriterionintheseas-sessments (Spaapen et al, 2007) may considerably modify the conversion of articles into recognition. Note,however,theparadoxhere.Performanceas-sessments,includingbibliometricanalyses,havein-creasedthepublishorperishnorm(Weingart, 2005; Wouters, 1999). Although they were started to enhance the societal accountability of scientists (Van derMeulenandRip, 2000),theyhaveincreasedthe need for peer recognition rather than the need for so-cietaljustification.Thedevelopmentofbibliometric evaluationtoolshasaddedaquantitativedimension to the conversion from articles to recognition. Origi-nallyameansofcommunication,publicationhas become an end in itself. Thenewmosaicoffundingoptions,partlyinflu-enced by foresight activities, mean that only a happy fewmanagetoobtainmoneywithoutpromising some sort ofpracticalapplication. In the contract of the 1950s and 1960s, scientists had many options for acquiringresourcesbasedsolelyonconsiderations of originality or scientific relevance, but this has be-come a rarity nowadays. One effect of the increasing complexityoffundingoptionsisthatacquisitionactivitiestodayconsumeamajorshareofseniorThe sciencesociety contract Science and Public Policy June 2009398 scientiststime.Thisdevelopmenthasalsoinflu-encedtheproceduresforselectingcandidatesfor academicpositions.Scientificpublicationrecords stillseemtobethemajorcriterionhere,butincreas-inglythecandidatesestimatedfundraisingabilities21 arealsorewarded.Togetherthechangedconditions underwhichscientistsworkhavestrengthenedthe mutualcompetition.Thepressuretopublishandto be cited has intensified.22 Conclusion The framework we have developed in this paper en-richestheunderstandingofhowscientificpractice relates to external pressures and how internal devel-opmentsinfluencesciencesrelationshipwithsoci-ety.Today,relevanceisatthecoreofthe relationshipbetweenacademicscienceandsociety. Thelegitimacyofpublicsupportforuniversityre-searchdependsonitsperceivedpotentialbenefits, ranging from contributions to culture or education to specificinsightsorproductswitheconomicvalue. Theideaofacontractasanegotiatedsetofrights andobligationstounderstandthisrelationshipturns outtobehelpful.Aftermakingassumptionsabout thecompositionofthiscontractitcanserveasa heuristic.ContinuingontheroutetakenbyGuston (2000),inthispaperwehaveattainedthishigher degree of specificity, by conceptualizing the general contentofasciencesocietycontractintermsof identity,rationalesandconditions.Moreover, we have created a link with the credibility cycle (La-tourandWoolgar,1986),turningitintoatoolto study the role and position of relevance in academic practices. Therelationbetweenscienceandsocietyand scientificpracticearebothvagueconceptstryingto graspcomplexpiecesofreality.Thestrengthofour approach is that we have developed a model in which botharereducedtosomethingthatdoesjusticetore-ality and at the same time allows for systematic analy-sis.Ournotionofthecontractclearlyarticulatesthe relation between science and society in terms of a lim-ited number of variables. Similarly, the credibility cy-clemaynotgiveanexhaustiveoverviewofall activitiesinvolvedinscientificresearchbutitdoes describethegeneralpatterninwhichallactivities haveaposition.Assumingthatallscientistsactions aimtocontributetotheconversionofcredibility,the formofthiscyclebecomesacrucialfactordetermin-ing scientific practice. Our framework does not imply anyformofdeterminism.Thecycleisnotaresultof only the contract, but of social interactions within and outside science. In the same way, the credibility cycle isnotadictatingnormsystem,butratheraparticular patternofactivitiesthatarenecessaryforeachre-searcher to produce credible information. Norms, the socialisationprocess,deviance,andrewardarethe consequencesofsocialactivitiesratherthanits causes (Latour and Woolgar, 1986: 205). Weconsiderthatwehavedemonstratedtheuse-fulnessofourframeworkinacasestudyofaca-demic chemistry in The Netherlands. The framework helpedustoidentifythewaysinwhichconceptsof relevancechangeandhowtheyinfluencescientific practice. In particular, we have distinguished various organizationaldevices,whichaimtoenhancethe relevanceofscientificresearch,themostinfluential onesbeingearmarkedfundingandperformanceas-sessments. An important finding in our case study is that the effects of the changes in the credibility cycle arepartiallyincontradiction,creatingaparadox aroundrelevance.Thepressureforstrategicknowl-edge is most visible at the conversion from recogni-tion to money, but at most other conversions it is of littleimportance.Onthecontrary,intheothercon-versions, the importance of academic criteria of suc-cesshasincreasedfurtherduetotheriseof bibliometricqualitycriteria.Insomesub-fieldsof chemistrythiscreatesatensionbetweendifferent parts of the cycle. This tension is absent in catalysis, wheretheapplicabilityofbasicresearchiseasily demonstrable. But in other fields, like biochemistry, thereisadifferencebetweenresearchwhichisex-cellentaccordingtoscientificpeersandresearch whichisconsideredusefulbysocietalactors.This impliesthatthecriteriaguidingtheselectionofre-searchproposalscontradictthecriteriaguidingthe selectionofmanuscriptsforpublicationortheattri-butionofrecognition.Scientistsarethenrewarded formakingbeautifulpromisesaboutthe(possible) relevanceoftheirresearch,butnotforrealizing these promises.Possiblenextstepsaretoelaboratethiscaseand toextendtheapproachtodifferentscientificdisci-plinesandtoothernationalcontexts.Thewayour framework helped us to observe changes in the rela-tionshipbetweenacademicchemistryandsociety suggeststhatitwillalsoworkforothercases.Most otherdisciplinesdonottraditionallyhavesucha strong relationship with one industrial sector, so they may show even stronger developments.It is often assumed that the pressure for relevance has increased during the past few decades. However, it seems more fruitful to conclude that relevance can beexpressedandexpectedinvariousmeaningsand forms.Theseformscanalsobemutuallycontradic-tory,asourcasestudyhasshown.Themeaningof relevancechangestogetherwithchangingideas aboutthepotentialbenefitsofscientificresearch. Here we have introduced a framework that facilitates a systematic empirical study of changing concepts of relevance as products of the interaction between sci-ence and society.At least two implications for public policy follow from this paper. First, an enhanced understanding of the changing societal position of university research is crucial for making sound policy in the field of sci-enceandinnovation.Thisisoftenbasedonpopular andunarticulatednotionsofsocietalrelevance, withoutaclearunderstandingofwhattheseentail. The sciencesociety contract Science and Public Policy June 2009399Thispapershowsthatitisimportanttobecareful with the term relevance, as itsmeaning is variable intimeandplace.Sometimesthenotionisevenan emptyshell,whichtheactorsusetotheirownad-vantage.Second,ourbriefcasestudyofacademic chemistry indicates that the effect of public policy is limited when it only intervenes at one position in the credibilitycycle.Policyaimingtoenhancethecor-respondencebetweenacademicresearchagendas and societal needs would be more effective if a more systemic approach is taken which includes a combi-nation of instruments directed at various conversions of credibility. Notes 1.Thispaperdealsonlywithacademicscience,soresearch thatisconductedatuniversities,notatpublicresearchinsti-tutesorinindustriallaboratories.Forthesakeofreadability we will not consistently use the predicate academic through-out the paper. Everythingwe claim about science, scientists, research or researchers, however, is limited to university sci-ence and university scientists. 2.For the sake of clarity, let us indicate two differences between Gustons approach and ours. First, in our view science has a contract with society in the broader sense rather than with the government alone. Guston is mainly concerned with the gov-ernmentasastakeholderinscience.Inhisworkontheso-cialcontractforscienceheanalyzesthechangingwaysin whichtheUSgovernmentdealswithscientificresearch. However,weaspiretocapturethesocietalenvironmentina broader sense, taking into account all the actors that have an interest in academic research. Besides governmental authori-ties, these are all other organizations and individuals that give financialsupporttoacademicresearchandallthatcanbe expected to benefit from its outcomes. In fact, one may argue that all actors in society have a stake in science, but to vary-ing degrees.A second difference concerns the durability of the contract. In Gustons work, the social contract for science is a label for a specifichistoricalperiod,roughly19451980.Gustonuses the notion of the contract to describe and explain the particu-larrelationshipthatexistedbetweenscienceandthegov-ernment in the USA in those years, and to contrast it with the configurationsbeforeandafterwards.Inourapproach,how-ever,themeaningofthecontractisnotlimitedtoaspecific point in time. We argue that the idea of a contract can always beappliedtothesciencesocietyrelationship,regardlessof thehistoricalsetting.Ofcourse,thespecificcontentofthe contract can change, but its general structurewillremain the same. 3.Thesedevicesareoftenreferredtoaspracticesofquality control(HemlinandRasmussen,2006).Butinthepresent context,thisnotionisalittleconfusing,becausethesede-vices control not only quality, but also relevance. 4. This does not imply that thegoal of scientists is only gaining credibility and not gaining knowledge. Rather, in order to take partintheresearchprocess(togainknowledge)itisneces-sary to earn, retain and convert credibility. 5.This 10-month case study is based on document analysis and in-depthinterviewswithscientists,policy-makersandother societal stakeholders. Here we summarize our findings, which requires simplifying a complex history involving various actors withdifferentstakesandinterests.Amoreelaboratedanaly-sis of this case will be published separately. 6.Inthefirstpolicypaper(1974)bythefirstDutchMinisterof SciencePolicy,FHPTrip,theprimarymissionofscience policyisdefinedasenhancingtheagreementsofresearch agendas with societal demands. 7.Foresight studies by OCV (1995) and by KNCV (Professional OrganizationofChemists)andVNCI(Associationof ChemicalIndustry)(1994)bothpaysignificantlymoreatten-tion to environmental issues than their predecessors from the 1980s. 8.E.g. Nota Wetenschapsbeleid 1974. 9.The first foresight study (Anon., 1980) of chemistry, commis-sionedbytheministerofsciencepolicyconcludesthataca-demicchemistryshoulddefineitsresearchgoalsmore sharplyandthatthecontactswithindustrydeserveintensifi-cation. 10.The interest of chemical industry in academic research is also visible in an advisory report by VNCI and KNCV (1984) which argues for increasing industrial steering of academic research and suggests a set of six priority fields as a guideline in the conditional funding process. 11.Forallnewscientificandindustrialactivitiesonthefieldof chemistry thestrives for sustainability and the minimalisation ofenvironmentalpressurehavebecomeimportantboundary conditions.(originalemphasis)(OCV,1995:2).NWOs StrategyNoteonChemistryfor20022005iseventitled: Chemistry, Sustainable and Interwoven (NWO CW, 2001). 12.The1995foresightstudyonacademicchemistry,forexam-ple,writesaboutsustainability:Muchoftheresearchonre-sources (...) is not only motivated by economic considerations butservesatthesametimeimportantecologicalgoals (OVC, 1995: 3839). 13.SON,themainDutchChemicalResearchCouncil,startsa program for applied chemical research in 1980, together with theSTW.Moreover,SONsparentorganization,ZWO(Or-ganizationforPureScientificResearch),isreorganizedin 1988 into NWO (Dutch Organization for Scientific Research), inwhichthereismoreroomforfundingapplication-oriented research. 14.Duringthe1980s,thenumberoftemporarilypaidchemical researchersfundedbythethirdmoneystreamrisesfrom about 70 to 350 (ACC/KNAW, 1991). 15.TheIOPs,forexampleMembranes(1983),Carbohydrates (1985) and Catalysis (1989). 16.SON Jaarverslag, 1991, 1993, 1995. 17. This may change, as since then a protocol has become avail-able(VSNU/NOW/KNAW,2003)andthereareattemptsto develop more holistic methods that include societal relevance (Spaapen et al, 2007). 18.E.g.theACTS-programsofNWO,theTTIsfundedbythe Ministry of Economic Affairs and the BSIK-programs. 19.DuetouniversitymanagementlikethecurrentFocusen Massapolicy(UniversiteitUtrecht,2005)andduethere-quirementofmatchingexternallyfundedresearchprojects with block-grant support (AWT, 2004). 20.Forexample,SONsdecisiontostartfundingapplication-orientedresearchispartlybasedontheoutcomesofthe 1980 foresight study (SON Jaarverslag, 1980; Anon., 1980). 21.Important indicators for the assessment of a candidates fund-raisingabilityarehis/herpastfundingacquisitionsandnet-working skills (evidence from interviews with scientists). 22.This is confirmed in our interviews with chemical researchers: Without it I do not survive (full professor in biochemistry) and I think it is the only way to show what you have done. 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