INTIUT FO NATIO A

IN TAEI TDE

A popular Government,without popular information or the means of

acquiring it,is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or

perhaps both.Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;And a people who mean to be their own

Governors,must arm themselves with the power which

knowledge gives.

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRYAugust 4, 1822

PJ

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D I

SHOULD ARTICLE 43 OF THEUNITED NATIONS CHARTER

BE RAISED FROM THE DEAD?

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

McNair Paper Nineteen - ,July 1993

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITYWashington, D.C.

"9 30

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 0 President LieutenantGeneral P. G. Cerjan 01 Vice President: Ambassador H. K. WalkciINSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATE(;Jc STUDIES 0 Aci nngDirector: Stuart E, JohnsonPublications Directoratt 0 Fort Lesley J. McNair 0 Wka:hinocr. D).C,20319)-6000 0 Phone: (202)Z 475-1913 El Fax: 20)21 475-1012"0 Director. Frederick T. Kiley 0 Deputy Director: Lieutenant (olt~ncl [tamr \icQuoen"0 Marnaging Editor, JFQ: Robert A. Silano 0 Chief. Puhlicarsons B~ranch: (;~CMaerz 0 Editors. Calvin BI. Kelley. Kathleen A. Lyvnch .M 10inn !. Peter-.. ind lar, A.Sommerille 0 Setcretary: Laura hiall 0 Circulation Alanaiyer Msnui M,,rgan 0 Ettatriut Assis~anzt: Patincia Williams

0 1cMt diei~vn and editing Kathleen A. Lynch 0 Cover Desii'n Juan A. \ledracio

Eugene V. Rostow is Distinguished I'rofessor of Law and D~iplomacy, Na-tional D~efense University, Honorary Fellow of the Hebrew Universityv ofJerusalem, and Adjunct Fellow of the American Enterprise Institute.

From time to time. INSS publishes short papers to provoke thought and inlotiti

discussioon on issues of U.S. national secunty in the post-Cold War cia. Thesc:monographs present current topics related to nationial scni iirt iiiVv afnd'poicy'. defens;e iesiurce management, international allairs., civil-niiltatx relai-tions. military technology, and joint. combined, and coalition operations.

Opinion~s, ic inusio ns. taid re'ictmmenudatio ns. expressedc or imiplied, arc theauthor's. They do nit1 necessarily refleclthe/i views o]' thi' National iDefenseUniversit'.. the Departmeunt of D~efense. o'r any othier II.S (;cccsrni('r ay'erncv.

Readers are invited to submit (niinretumable) nianuscn-pts fur consideration fior

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PortionA of this publication niav heN quoted cur repriniced u% ithout furtherpermission, with credit to the Institute for Natiocnal Strategic Studies. Washing-toin. D.C. Copies ocf review~s andl tears/wets would be appre'ciatedl.

Should Article 43 of theUnited Nations Charter

Be Raised From the Dead?

Eugene V. Rostow

By reflex action, the collapse of the Soviet Union hasstimulated proposals to activate Article 43 of the UnitedNations Charter, the keystone of the Charter's plan forestablishing a standing U.N. military force to prevent andif necessary to defeat aggression. In the Charter suchactions are called "enforcement actions," as distinguishedfrom actions of "individual or collective self-defense" likethe various Arab-lsiaeli wars in the Middle East, the war inKorea some fort), years ago, or the recent war in thePersian Gulf. Under Article 43, enforcement actions wouldbe ordered and directed by the Security Council and itsMilitary Committee. With the possible exception of theCongo War during the 1960s, there have been no enforce-ment actions conducted by the Security Council. TheCharter rule against aggression has so far been en-forced-when it has been enforced at all-only by the useof force in self-defense.

This article has been adapted from Eugene V. Rostow. "Should UN Charter Article 43Be Raised from the Dead?" (Iloal Affairs (Winter 1993). pp. 109- 24.

3

4 SHOULD UN. ARTICLE 43 BE RAISED FROM THE DEAD?

If Article 43 is brought to life, the advocates of such acourse say, the world organization would be able for thefirst time to provide the nations and peoples of the world

truly global "collective security," the primary purpose forwhich the U.N. was founded in 1945. Some Americansupporters of the idea add--quite erroneously-that theformation of a strong United Nations force under thecontrol of the Security Council would relieve the UnitedStates of the burden of serving as the world's chief po-liceman. In other parts of the world the prospect of aserious United Nations military directed by the SecurityCouncil is considered attractive because it would, somethink, curb what is often called America's natural tendencytoward imperialism.

It is generally believed that only the policy of expan-sion pursued by the Soviet Union between 1944 and 1989prevented the implementation of Article 43, and that withthe dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence andrecognition of its successor states, the time has come tocarry out the original intention of the U.N.'s FoundingFathers. This is a major theme of Russian diplomacy.Senator David Boren of Oklahoma has written an influentialarticle endorsing the proposal. It is reported to have widesupport within the Clinton administration. And HelmutSchmidt, the former Chancellor of the German Republic,has issued a strong recommendation to the same effect asChairman of a High Level Group of the Interaction Council,an international body whose members are former heads ofgovernment. Chancellor Schmidt's colleagues in the studyon which his recommendation was based include formerprime ministers of Great Britain, Canada, Mexico, Zambia,Nigeria, and Portugal, as well as sixteen "high levelpersonalities," ranging from Henry Kissinger to Bronislaw

EUGENE V. ROSTOW 5

Geremek.The intensification of the Cold War during and after

World War II was not. however, the sole reason why theCharter plan for collective security under the control of theSecurity Council has not yet been implemented. While theexpansionist policy of the Soviet Union was surely a majorfactor in causing the delay, the experience of living with theCharter and the institutions of the United Nations for nearlyhalf a century has tempered the naive fervor with whichWestern public opinion embraced the dream of the UnitedNations in 1945. The people of the West and their govern-ments still support the United Nations as a moderatelyuseful part of the state system. But the Utopian hopeswhich had been aroused by the founding of the League ofNations and then of the United Nations have long sincebeen dissipated by the realities of international life. Faithin the idea of the United Nations is a hardy plant, however,and an important force in Western public opinion.

The nation state of the last three centuries has survivedand indeed prevailed over every attempt to replace it witha truly supranational entity. The break up of the SovietUnion into separate states; the constitutional conflict inCanada; the disintegration of Yugoslavia; and the wide-spread resistance in Europe to the Treaty of Maastricht andits implications are only the most recent straws in the wind.

Nationalism is a stronger and more determined politicalforce than supranationalism, and there is little or no chancethat this state of affairs will be substantially altered in theforeseeable future. Many practical problems of intema-tional life will continue to be managed by internationalbureaucracies established under treaties. But internationalcooperation in devising uniform bills of lading or trafficsigns, however successful, cannot lead to a truly inter-national military force capable of enforcing the Charter rule

6 SHOULD U.N. ARTICLE 43 BE RAISED FROM THE DEAD?

against aggression. The states of the world simply are notconfident enough in each other or in the future to give upor even to qualify in any way their inherent rights ofindividual or collective self-defense. Military actions inself-defense can be initiated by the aggrieved partieswithout the permission of the Security Council, and carriedon "until the Security Council has taken measures tomaintain international peace and security." Such militaryactions in self-defense can be terminated only by anaffirmative vote of the Security Council, finding that acontinuation of a campaign of self-defense had become abreach of the peace. Such a vote has never been taken. Ifit were proposed, it would be subject to veto by a perma-nent member. The right of self-defense is thus the ultimatebulwark of sovereignty. Article 51 of the Charter providesthat nothing in the Charter can impair it. And no state willwillingly give it up.

The five permanent members of the Security Councilare now Great Britain, France, Russia, the United States,and China. Even if Japan and India become permanentmembers, and Germany is added-or if the French andBritish seats become a single European Community Seat-itwill take a long period of favorable experience before otherstates are willing to entrust their national survival to theuncertain mercies of that body, however its membershipevolves. It proved difficult, expensive, and dubious toobtain unanimity in the Security Council even on so simplea proposition as the condemnation of Iraqi aggressionagainst Kuwait in 1991. After extraordinary efforts by theUnited States and other countries, a series of resolutionswere adopted approving the effort of the United States andits coalition partners to liberate Kuwait and to prevent Iraqfrom continuing its career of aggression against its neigh-bors In the Yugoslav crisis, China has indicated that it

EUC""E V ROSTOW 7

would abstain, at best, and Russia has supported humanitar-ian aid in Bosnia but indicated that it might veto sanctionsagainst Serbian aggression. Furthermore, there have beendisquieting reports that Russian troops are assisting Serh aswell as Armenian forces as "volunteers."

The war in Korea, which started in 1950 and has not vetbeen terminated, and the war in the Persian Gulf, whichbegan in 1990 and continues under the regime of anuncertain ceasefire, are not "enforcement actions" controlledby the Security Council, but exercises in collective self-defense approved by the Security Council, an entirelydifferent matter. In Korea. for example, all the SecurityCouncil did was to declare the North Korean attack onSouth Korea was illegal and ask the member states to helpSouth Korea and not help North Korea. In the Persian Gulfwar, thc Security Council went further, by authorizingeconomic sanctions and attempting to observe their effec-tiveness.

The policy of the United States should firmly insiNt onthe right of self-defense without the fig-leaf of a SecurityCouncil Resolution, and reject the model of Article 43.The real world of nation states is not yet ready for so bolda step toward world government. Article 43 embodies anoble idea and should be preserved as an aspiration. Butthe state system has not evolved enough to make it a matterof practical politics. In the rare cases of aggression wherethe Security Council is close to unanimity, at least amongits permanent members, the participants in a campaign ofcollective self-defense are tempted to invite the SecurityCouncil to bless their efforts, thus invoking the powerfulsymbolism of the Wilsonian idea. In Korea, the UnitedNations flag was flown, troops wore blue helmets andUnited Nations arm bands, and there was much talk of aUnited Nations "police action." From start to finish,

8 SHOULD U.N ARTICLE 43 BE RAISED FROM THE DEAD?

however, this was a political charade, designed to exploitthe hopes of the Western peoples for international peace,truly enforced by an international police force. II theKorean war, the Security Council vote was possible onlybecause the Soviet Union was boycotting the SecurityCouncil at that moment, as a protest against the fact thatTai-van was holding the Chinese seat. Blue helmets andUnited Nations flags were not displayed in the Persian GulfWar of 1991-92, although there were elements of confusionthere too between the authority of the Security Council andthat of the states exercising their rights of collective self-defense. President Bush found it convenient, for example,to get the Security Council to support the use of force IIthe Gulf before obtaining the reluctant and ambiguotls Noteof the Democrats in Congress favoring the same course.

In politics, however, deception has a way of becomings-if-deception. The Security Council finds it attractive topretend that it is indeed conducting an enforcement at tion,and my begin to trespass on authority it doe,.ii't pos-sess-for example, by attempting to stop a campaign ofcollective self-defense before the necessary measures ha,',been taken to restore and maintain "international peace andsecurity," the standard of Article 51. And the governmentsengaged in an action of colletive self-defense may feelobliged to obey Security Council Resolutions the C'uncilhas no right to pass.

However righteou" it makes us feel to pretend thatexercises in collective self-defense are really SecurityCouncil enforcement actions, governments should resist theimpulse. Such make-believe can do no good, but it can doa gieat deal of harm.

t_

EUGENE V ROSTOW 9

II.

The reasons compelling this conclus`ion are deeply mo te inthe nature of the state system which has evoilved sincc theend of the Thirty Years War in 164K and of the NapoleonicWars ii 1815. The state system which began to take itsmodern form after the Congress of Vienna was one (tindependent states, states deerned "soverein." Theyrejected as obsolete the claims of the Papacy o, of the holyRoman Empire to an, version of oser-all suzerainty. O)nthe other hand, after the terrifying experience of the FrenchRevolution and Napoleon. the statesmen of tht day wereimpelled to adopt a policy of consultation, cooperation. andmoderation in conformity with what they often called "thecommon law of Europe." As the 19th century approachedits end, the nightmare memory of Napoleon f:ided whileBismarck transformed Prussia into a large and uncomfort-ably ambitious German state, exceeding Austria and Francein every dimension of strength, and giving further impetusto the clamor for national independence which was sappingthe foundations of the Austro-Hungarian ant, FurkishEmpires. The United States became a major power in thatperiod, although it still clung fiercely to the belief that itwas not and should not be involved in world politics. AndJapan, too, acquired a modern economy and a modern state.and began to participate in world affairs.

The system for managing the state system during the19th century broke down in August 1914, and was reconsti-tuted as the League of Nations after World War I. In acondition of shock and paralysis, it stumbled through the

10 SHOULD U N ARTICLE 43 BE RAISED FRCOM, THE DEAD?•

interwar years. atnd was reconstituted as the ( nitedNatiops after World War 11.

Between 1815 and 1914, the leading powers of Europeconsciously sought to manage the state system as a systemof peace. Acting together as the Concert of Europe, theysucceeded better than those who came after them, althoughafter a hundred years their effort too failed. The provisionsof the League of Nations Cove rant and the Charter of theUnited Nations attempt to build on their experience, theCovenant of the League going beyond the mandate of theConcert of Europe, and the Charter of the United Nationsgoing beyond the Covenant of the League.

What makes thie Charte" of the United Nations soimportant as part of the legal code of the modem statesystem is that for the first tirne in history it purports tocondemn the aggressive use of force by and froi,. states asa violation of international law. The Covenant of theLeague of Nations did not venture a clearcut prohibition ofaggression. It called on the states to keep the peace, andcontemplated cooling , 'f periods which the Council of theLeague ,ould ask the parties to a conflict to respect.

The essential dilemma of the Charter system is broughtout by the relationship between two provisions of theUnited Nations Charter-Article 43, contemplating thecreation of large-scale armed forces under the control of theSecurity Council for the purpose of deterring oi defeatingaggression- and Article 51, safeguarding each state's rightto "individual" or "collective self-defense" if it is subjectedto or threatened by an "armed attack" (or any other breachof international law of a forceful character), The statesystem today is a hybiid-an uneasy combination of theclassic state system of the 18th and 19th centuries-asysteia of states deemed "sovereign," on the one hand, and.on the other, shifting groups of major powers who exercise

EUGENE V. ROSTOW 11

or fail to exercise their collective responsibilities as theSecurity Council of the United Nations, or, on economicquestions, as the Group of Seven.

The time has come to acknowledge that the UnitedNations Charter cannot be interpreted and developed toovercome the conflict between these two conceptions. Theidea behind the enforcement provisions of the Chartersimply do not correspond to the nature of the state system.As Professor Martin Wight of the University of Sussexonce commented, the flaw in the Charter as an instrumentfor keeping the peace is that it offers the world a choicebetween unanimity among the great powers and chaos. TheSecurity Council can issue legally binding "decisions" (asdistinguished from "recommendations") only if all itspermanent members agree. And it has never undertaken touse force effectively to carry out its "decisions." But afterfifty years or more of the Cold War, the uncertain prospectsfor world politics makes sustained unanimity among thepermanent members of the Security Council and othermajor powers inconceivable. Their interests, cultures, histo-ries, and attitudes are too different, even on the greatcentral issues of aggression and self-defense, for unanimityto be taken for granted. Since the United Nations could notexist for a moment without the veto of the permanentmembers of the Security Council, it follows that despite thehigh hopes invested by the world in the feasibility of U.N.enforcement actions carried out by the Security Council, thenations will have to continue indefinitely to rely for theirsecurity on actions of individual or collective self-defense,and not on the Security Council, or the Security Councilalone, as peacemaker and peacekeeper. Whether Article 43is implemented or not, the states will have to maintainsubstantial military forces as an insurance policy against the

12 SHOULD U.N ARTICLE 43 BE RAISED FROM THE DEAD9

all too probable paralysis of the Security Council by the

dissent of one or more permanent members.

Ill.The contrast between the procedures used in the Gulf Warand those of the futile effort to stop the cascade of violencein the territories of the former Yugoslavian state brings outthe force of this conclusion.

In the Gulf Crisis, the key operative language ofSecurity Council Resolution 661 of 2 August 199() con-demned the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait and"affirmed the inherent right of individual or colled, ve self-

defense, in response to the armed attack by Iraq againstKuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the UnitedNations Charter." In the same Resolution, the Council"decided" that "notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8above"-the paragraphs of the Resolution decreeingeconomic sanctions-that "nothing in the present Resolutionshall prohibit assistance to the legitimate government ofKuwait." Similarly, Security Council Resolution 678 of 29November 1990 "authorizes member states co-operatingwith the government of Kuwait to use all necessary meansto uphold [the Council's earlier Resolutionsi and to restoreinternational peace and security in the area." Despite theword "authorizes" in this sentence, it is clear from itscontext that it simply exhorts, approves, and recommendsthat the states cooperate with the United States and thecoalition it organized to defend Kuwait against the Iraqiaggression. The Security Council made no attempt to directmilitary operations. Indeed, it did not even meet between29 November 1990 and 16 February 1991, the most violentperiod of active hostilities. In short, the Security Councildid not at anytime treat the Gulf War as an "enforcementaction," under its control. It made no agreements with

EUGENE V ROSTOW 13

member states or groups of states about keeping troops "oncall" for duty in "enforcement actions" and it did not "call"for such troops, or establish a cemmand to direct theiractivities. In relation to the military effort of the American-led defense force, the Security Council behaved as it did inKorea, as an interested observer, but not in any sense as thecommand center of the operation.

In the beginning of the troubles in Yugoslavia in 1991.the United States and its chief Westcrn At"c.s, rFance,Great Britain, and Germany, decided not to intervene.Movements for secession in Croatia and Slovenia hadstirred anxiety in Serbia. If Yugoslavia was going to breakup, as the Soviet Union did, the militant President ofSerbia, a "former" Communist, Slobadan Milosovic. decidedto bring the large Serbian populations in Croatia, Bosnia,and other parts of Yugoslavia into a unitary Serbian state.After all, Serbia had been a strong independent kingdombefore 1914, and was the main component of the Yugoslavstate cobbled together at the Peace Conference of Versaillesin 1919.

In the beginning, the Allied leaders did not examine thequestion of intervening in Yugoslavia as a major issue ofpolicy. They consulted about it, and their first reaction wasnegative. As they did in 1914 and 1939. the British andAmericans found it hard to imagine that events in CentralEurope could seriously affect their security. They hopedvaguely that a little soothing European or United Nationsdiplomacy would put out the fire. And they averted theireyes from the possibility that their estimates were too Ioptimistic. The Germans had vivid memories of thedifficulties Hitler's armies had experienced in Yugoslaviaduring the final years of World War II, when the Allieswere waging war in Italy. The British thought a militaryoperation there would be worse than Ulster. The French

14 SHOULD U.N. ARTICLE 43 BE RAISED FROM THE DEAD?

were more apprehensive, but went along with the others.The reasoning behind President Bush's position was under-standable, but wrong. In the Gulf, Bush had courageouslyfollowed the path of collective security on which Trumanand Johnson had been ambushed and mugged, Relievedby his apparent success in terminating hostilities in the Gulfwithout a political catastrophe at home, Bush was in nomood to repeat the experiment in the forbidding terrain ofYugoslavia, despite the fact that every poll showed thatmore than 80 percent of the American people approvedwhat Bush trieu to do in the Gulf, but felt that he stoppedthe war too soon. As the tragedy in the territories of theformer state of Yugoslavia deepened, President Clintonfollowed the policy of Presidej,. -sh but made it evenworse.

At first, the Yugoslav tragedy wa• treated by theAmerican government as a civil war within the domesticjurisdiction of Yugoslavia. But Yugoslavia was not anindissoluble union of people like the United States in 1861.It was a loose federation of Turkish and Austrian provincesput together at the Versailles Conference of 1919. In anyevent, Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter recogniz-es that matters normally within the domestic jurisdiction ofstates can also be breaches of the peace or acts of aggres-sion of concern to the international community as a whole.It could hardly be otherwise for a document approved in1945 and ratified shortly thereafter, as the world began tolive in the presence of nuclear weapons and to learn aboutHitler's Holocaust and the gulags and other activities of

Stalin. Since the secession of Croatia and Slovenia, andtherefore the dissolution of Yugoslavia, have now beenwidely recognized, "civil war" in Yugoslavia is no longereven a plausible excuse for Western inaction. These states,

EUGENE V ROSTOW 15

and Bosnia as well, are independent members of the UnitedNations.

Second , President Bush said, the Yugoslav crisis shouldbe handled by the European Community or the UnitedNations, not by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO). This never was a serious suggestion- neither theEuropean Community nor the United Nations had thecapacity to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia. As events wereto demonstrate with brutal clarity, there was no chance tosettle the growing crisis in Yugoslavia unless diplomacywere backed by overwhelming force.

The European Community is an economic and political,not a military entity. And to expect the United Nations toresolve the Yugoslav conflict when the United States, GreatBritain, and France were reluctant to intervene, miscon-ceives the nature of the organization. Given the unstablecondition of world politics, with the major powers hesitantand undecided, and China and Russia prepared to vetoserious measures against Serbia, the Security Council wasparalyzed.

Lord Carrington was asked by the European Communityto mediate the quarrel, and soon discovered that without thecredible shadow of armed force behind him, his diplomaticefforts were treated with contempt. Cyrus Vance and LordDavid Owen made the same discovery acting as mediatorsin behalf of the Secretary General of the United Nations.And the United Nations Security Council has been hope-lessly mired in the affair, dealing mainly with humanitarianrelief to civilians caught up in the hostilities, and avoidingany serious attempt to stop the war.

The crisis in Yugoslavia has steadily gotten worse.Serbia's violent bid to dominate the territory of the former

.. ...

16 SHOULD U.N. ARTICLE 43 BE RAISED FROM THE DEAD)

Republic of Yugoslavia has become an aggression and athreat to the peace at least as dangerous as Iraq's conquestof Kuwait. Both President Bush and President Clinton haveremarked that American interests are not directly involved.True, there is no element in the Balkan crisis as directlythreatening to the United States as the specter of Iraqicontrol over 60 percent of the oil reserves of the region.But Iraqi control of the oil was not the only interest of theUnited States at risk in the Persian Gulf. The most fun-damental national interest of the United States in worldpolitics is not oil, but the effective functioning of the statesystem as a system of peace. During the Gulf War,President Bush explained over and over again that thereason we used force in that conflict was because we hadlearned during the 1930s that aggression is a threat to thepossibility of world public order, and cannot be allowed tostand-indeed, that if relatively minor acts of aggression gounpunished, they simply lead to more serious breaches ofthe peace later on. He proclaimed with great force that ourgoal and our national interest in the Gulf War was touphold the rule of law.

Legally, it is immaterial whether one calls the presentsituation in Yugoslavia an aggression by Serbia against theother provinces of the former Yugoslav state, or a grossviolation of human rigi,", justifying humanitarian interven-tion. It is both and therefore is a threat to the generalpeace.

What makes the turmoil in Yu,;oslavia a matter of furgent international concern is that there are so manyYugoslavias waiting to happen not only in the territories ofthe former Soviet Union and Empire, but in many otherparts of the world as well. Strong groups in Russia arealready saying that if the Serbs can do what they are doizigwith impunity, Russia can move to restore at least the

EUGENE V. ROSTOW 17

Empire of the Czars. Unless the Western Allies make afresh start to undo Serbia's aggression in Yugoslavia, allthat wa, achieved in the interest of consolidating the peaceby the Allied victory in the Gulf can be lost for anotherfifty years. Dictatorship and militarism are the usual endproducts of periods of anarchy.

Indeed, in Moldava, the Russians, encouraged by thedithering of Western policy in Yugoslavia and Iraq, havealready ventured to use their own armed forces, and Russiastill keeps troops in Germany, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and theBaltic States. They have even given up explaining togullible foreigners that their troops are deployed abroadbecause of a housing shortage at home, although of coursethey gladly accept foreign aid for the purpose of buildinghomes. The war in Yugoslavia could easily detonate manyothers, until the promise of the revolution Gorbachev startedin 1985 is swept away by chauvinism, xenophobia, andtyranny, and international life becomes a nightmare oncemore.

The impotence of the Security Council as a peace-keeping agency is being demonstrated not only in Yugo-slavia but in Somalia and Cambodia as well. Unless theUnited States returns to the precedent of its leadership rolein the Persian Gulf conflict, the risks to the possibility ofgeneral peace could easily rival those of the interwar years,the disastrous years between 1919 and 1939.

IV.

It has long been apparent as a practical matter that NATOis the only possible force which could deal with the menaceof fanatic and frenetic nationalism in "the entire Euro-Atlantic region." That phrase is the key statement of policymade by the Foreign Ministers of the NATO Allies at their

18 SHOULD UN ARTICLE i3 BE RAISED FROM THE DEAD?

meeting in Oslo on 4 June 1992. Following the lead of theHarmel Report of 1967, which the NATO Council reaf-firmed a decade ago, the Oslo meeting formally recognizedNATO's special responsibility for the peace of "the entireEuro-Atlantic region." This striking language could andshould represent a far-reaching adaptation of NATO policyto the changes in the structure and dynamics of the worldpolitics which have followed the collapse of the Soviet Un-ion. In October 1992, meeting at Gleneagles in Scotland,NATO went further and decided to start military planningto deal with situations like that in Yugoslavia.

If the rule against aggression is to be enforced againstSerbia, it will have to be done by the military and diplo-matic institutions of NATO, acting as the predicate for anactive alliance diplomacy. The NATO Allies could quicklyfield first class troops in sufficient numbers if the Serbiansallow folly to carry them over the brink. In any event, theNATO forces are there, the creation of forty-three years ofdevoted work in the task of peace-keeping. They should beused if the use of force proves to be necessary.

Dealing decisively with the crises of this order is not anew experience for NATO diplomacy. The NATO Alliesprevented war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus atleast twice in recent years. Such action in Yugoslavia istypical of the kinds of peacekeeping intervention that maywell be required of NATO in the years ahead as Europe andthe Middle East continue to react to the deep and farreaching reverberations of the end of the Soviet Union.Yeltsin and his regime will not be the final governmentalembodiment of Russian nationality. And beyond theproblem of wars between national, ethnic, or religiousgroups looms the question of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, amatter of compelling international concern. It too may wellrequire NATO assistance, preferably at the request of the

EUGENE V ROSTOW 19

Russian, Ukrainian, or Kazakh authorities. As AlexanderYakovlev, a senior Russian official, has said, internationalcooperation may be necessary in order to safeguard Sovietnuclear weapons, and to dismantle them.

Perhaps the most specious argument offered in favor ofthe policy of doing nothing in Yugoslavia is that the Serbforces are tough and gave Hitler a hard time during WorldWar II. The metaphor is absurd. In 1939, Yugoslaviamobilized several hundred thousand men. In 1991, theYugoslav Army had a roster of only 35,000. In any event,managing the peace sometimes requires hard wars, like thatin Korea. Armistice agreements in great wars, the break upof empires, and the end of long periods of tension like theCold War almost invariably produce years of conflict andinstability which have to be dealt with before peace can beachieved. That was true after IN15, 1919, and 1915, and itis true again, following the collapse and dissolution of theSoviet Union. Unless the forces favoring peace in suchsituations act in a determined way, the risk is that they willlose everything they fought for so hard during the waritself.

There is a reason even more fundamental than prag-matic necessity why NATO should be the Allied instru-mentality of choice for dealing with the crisis in theBalkans. A purely European solution for the problem, evenif it were available, would tend to divide Europe from theUnited States and Canada, a development which it is oursupreme national interest to prevent. The end of the SovietUnion is bringing about a vast shifting of the pieces on thechessboard of world politics. New combinations mayemerge, some favorable to the permanent security interestsof the United States, and others decidedly unfavorable.Every American understands instinctively that it could beextremely dangerous for our security if Russia is modern-

-T

20 SHOULD U.N ARTICLE 43 BE RAISED FROM THE DEAD9

ized in an exclusive partnership with Germany, and Chinais modernized in an exclusive partnership with Japan. AsThomas Jefferson remarked in 1814, it can never be inAmerica's interest to have all Europe unified under onemonarch. What Jefferson said about hegemony in Europein 1814 would apply even more emphatically if the possiblecombination of all Europe today were to include large partsof Asia as well. The wisest and most prudent course for theUnited States, therefore, is to remain an active participantin world affairs, acting closely with its allies to guide theday-to-day evolution of the state system in directionsfavorable to us, and seeking to prevent the emergence ofyet another aspirant for dominion. The course of aloofnessin so fluid a situation means waiting until it is too late todo anything but fight.

President Yeltsin has proposed Russian association withNATO "in the political sphere." Yeltsin's suggestionshould be considered carefully and sympathetically. Itcould be the starting point for a policy of concerted actionwhich could assure the entire Eurasian land-mass a longperiod of general peace, like that of the century of peacemanaged by the Concert of Europe between 1815 and 1914.On such a footing, the hopes for general peace generated bythe collapse of the Soviet Union could become less chimeri-cal.

In applying this policy to the crisis in Yugoslavia, thenations of the West should make it clear from the beginningthat their political goal is not simply the restoration of thestatus quo ante in Yugoslavia, but the fulfillment of theprinciples and purposes of the United Nations Charter bypeaceful means. The Charter does not freeze the statesystem into rigid and unworkable patterns forever. Itmerely forbids aggression. Yugoslavia, like several otherstates, was created in the name of an impossible dream: the

EUGENE V ROSTOW 21

thesis that all the "peoples" of the world have a right ofself-determination, and should, if they wish, have states oftheir own. Seventy years of appalling experience with thisidea should have convinced everyone that the way in whichthe peoples of the world are scattered over the earth-andthe vast and continuing tides of migration-make it impos-sible to devise ethnically or culturally homogeneous states,or states which will remain homogeneous indefinitely.There are in fact no such states in the modern world. EvenGreat Britain includes Scotland, Wales, and part of Irelandas well as England. Rather than yielding automatically toevery call for self-determination, however unwise, policyshould therefore concentrate on seeking the acceptance byall states of rules and practices which could assure thatthose who live within their borders share the equal protec-tion of the laws, and the right to participate as equals in theprocesses of responsible democratic governance. As SirIsaiah Berlin said recently, "We can't turn history back.Yet I do not want to abandon the belief that a world whichis a reasonably peaceful coat of many colors, each portionof which develops its own distinct cultural identity and istolerant of others, is not a utopian dream." To reconcile theforces of healthy and tolerant nationalism and its violentchauvinist cousins, Berlin says, requires not the imposeduniformity of political or cultural imperialism, but themanagement of the state system by the great powers as aloose and flexible system of peace. Without peace, nation-alism is bound once again to become a force for monstrousevil. I

Confronting these problems, Americans like to say, "Butwe are not the world's policeman." Indeed, President Bushrepeated this stale slogan, for years a standard feature ofSoviet and Chinese propaganda. Of course we are not theworld's only policeman. But we are one of the five

22 SHOULD U.N. ARTICLE 43 BE RAISED FROM THE DEAD?

permanent members of the Security Council of the UnitedNations, which is given "primary responsibility" for worldpeace.

The policy of Russia and China toward the enforcementof the Charter rule against aggression is still problematical.The Chinese vote in favor of the Gulf War was a close runthing, and China abstained in severai important SecurityCouncil votes on Yugoslavia. And ,Rissia has warned inthe Security Council that while it supports Ihumanitarianassistance in Bosnia it may veto serious resistance toSerbian aggression. For the moment, then, the UnitedStates is not the world's only policeman, but it is equallyobvious that no serious policy for managing the peace ispossible unless we are among the policemen. Great Britain,France and the United States, Allies in both world wars andin the Cold War, are and must remain the core of anypeacekeeping effort. Other nations will rally to their call,many of them. Even after fifty years, however, it may beimpolitic for German or Italian troops to return to theBalkans. But the principles of the U.N. Charter cannot beenforced at all unless Britain, Franc, and the United Statestke the lead, whether in the name of the Security Councilor the principle of collective self-defense. As GeneralPowell remarked during the Gulf crisis, "We are not theworld's only policeman, but guess where people look whenthey need a cop." 0

McNair Papers

The McNair Papers (ire fpublished at Fort Leslev J. McNair, hotet uit th',Institute for National Strateg~ic Studies and the National IDettvi.w(iniversitv. An ArmY pist since If794, thlefort was g *en its prelsenlt namnRhin 1948 in honor of Lieutenant Genera! Leslev Jamies Mt Al~ir. (''ncrjMcNair, known ais "Eduator of the Armv' and trainer of svom' threcmillion troops. i,,ws about to take command o1 Allied g.round frr c~In

Fut e under Eisenhower, when het iia(s killed in omibat in N01rI(nuil25 lu/4A 1944.

1. Joseph P. Lt 'rn/. 1-tzvi't and the Net, Arab (Coaltiojn. Fehruarv 1981).2. John E. Endicot., G rand Si rategv andi the Pua~i'i Re" 'ion. Mia ' v 9X10.3. Eugcene V. Ro sbow PI, esiden i. Prinie Mlin ister. or Co 01 A Itt0t ita A. onl (it

October 1989),

4. Howard G . DeWo[L .. iM and Aims Cuntrol. NovemberI X.

S. Marlin C. Libicki. ithat MaukeA IndustrieN,S Sat, Vi NvocjjjXr IL 9<9.

6. Melvin A. ('oodin.1r.. Gorbachev and Soviet Plu/t In lthe fluid' It, f(I

7.brJohn Van Oudenaren. "The Tridition of Change in Soviet Foreten Polik

and Franc is Conme. "Two Sc hool s 11 Soviet Di plomacyv'" if) t 'idef 'rl o inh itc ,tluretw' Pl'u(tt. April 1990).S. M~ax G. Manwaring and Court Prisk,. A Stiarcae,i twe of '1 In .i~i w i

Insit ,'v/tt1s fro I? I h .'I;alvado',. May 1 990.9. Steven R. Linke. Alanatinu,' Crises in lijCfnse lndidurrvl Ill( it and m

A ttt' Cases, June 1990).10). Christine M. Helms. Arabisot and Islamn Stati'les, Nattuft% dIItd Aattunhasý

Staites. Septembher 191-).11. Ralph A. Cossa., Iran. Soviet Interests, US ('piertitrs. July 1990).12. Ewan Jarnieson. Friend or A1liv? A Question fo'r Newu /ealand. Mayi 199 1.13. Richard J. Dunin Ill. Fromt (;e~ttxsbur~g to fthe Gulf anti Rtvond Coping Kiith

Revolutionarv Technological Change itt Land Warfaire. March 1992.14. Ted Greenw~xx. U.S. and NATO Forte .Structure and Alilitarv Operationsin the Mediterranean. June 19)93.IS. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr.. Bulgaria's Quest fo~r Securitv Af-ter the Cold It ar.February 19)93.

16. William C. Bodie, AMgscows "Near Abroad' SecuritY Pih/'v in I'ost-S-u t tEurope, June 1993.17. William H. Lewik (ed.), Military Implicati•ns of Uinted Nati.nsPeacekeeping Operatiot s, June 1993.IX. Carl R. Jones and S':rling D. Sessions. Inter(,pc'ahilttv A l)Ocstt StrmCase Study. July 1993.19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the United Nations Chartrt BtRaised From the Dead' July 1993.

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