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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,

DHARWAD BENCH

DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF JUNE, 2014

BEFORE:

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K.N. PHANEENDRA

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2584/2008

BETWEEN:

Sri. P. Abubakker

S/o Mohammed,

Age: 66 years, Occ: Contractor,

R/o M.J. Nagar, Hospet,

Dist. Bellary, Represented by his

P.A. Holder Sri. M. Shaik Sab

S/o Sarvarsab, Age: 67 years,

R/o Near Sardaria Maszid,

Sardar Street, Ward No.29,

Hospet, Dist. Bellary. … Appellant

(By Sri. Hanumantha Reddy Sahukar, Adv.)

AND:

Sri. Mohan Wadiyar

S/o Someshekhar Wadiyar,

Age: Major, Occ: Merchant,

R/o Rajeshwari Nagar,

Bangalore. … Respondent

(By Sri. Arun L Neelopant, Adv.)

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THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER

SECTION 378 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,

PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED

31.07.2008 IN CRL. A. NO.144/2007 PASSED BY THE

LEARNED FAST TRACK COURT-III, HOSPET AND

RESTORE THE ORDER DATED 03.11.2007 IN C.C. NO.

822/2005 PASSED BY THE LEARNED PRL. CIVIL

JUDGE (JR. DVN.) AND J.M.F.C., HOSPET BY

ALLOWING THE ABOVE APPEAL.

THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINALHEARING, THIS DAY THE COURT DELIVERED THEFOLLOWING:

JUDGMENT

The appellant being the complainant before the

Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dvn.) and J.M.F.C., Hospet in

C.C. No.822/2005 lodged a complaint against the

respondent herein by name Mohan Wadiyar (hereinafter

referred to as the accused) under Section 200 of Cr.P.C.

for the offence punishable under Section 138 of

Negotiable Instruments Act on the allegations that, the

accused had issued a cheque on 20.02.1999 for

discharge of his legally recoverable debt for a sum of

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Rs.2,00,000/-. On presentation of the said cheque the

same was returned with an endorsement “insufficient

funds”. After issuance of legal notice under Registered

Post and Certificate of Posting and after providing 15

days grace time to comply the notice, within the

statutory time, a complaint came to be lodged by the

complainant.

2. The accused in fact, appeared voluntarily before

the trial Court, by getting the NBW issued against him

recalled and contested the proceedings on several

grounds. One of the grounds taken by the accused was

that, as per Section 138 (b) of the N.I. Act, it is

mandatory on the part of the complainant to serve the

legal notice on the accused calling upon him to make

the payment within 15 days from the date of the notice.

But in this particular case, no notice was served upon

him. Therefore, the complaint itself was not

maintainable. The accused has also taken up other

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contention but presently it is not necessary for me to

consider those contentions taken up by the accused.

On considering the entire case of the complainant and

the accused, the Trial Court on appreciating the oral

and documentary evidence on record convicted the

accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of

N.I. Act and sentenced him to undergo simple

imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.4.00

lakhs for the said offence and in default of payment of

fine the accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for

six months. The Trial Court also awarded a sum of

Rs.3,95,000/- towards compensation to be payable to

the complainant.

3. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction

and sentence passed by the Trial Court, the accused

has approached the Sessions Court by way of an appeal

in Crl. A. No. 144/2007. After appearance before the

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Sessions Court, the complainant contested the said

criminal appeal.

4. The appellate Court having come to the conclusion

that the Trial Court is right in drawing presumption

under Section 138 of N.I. Act and also holding that the

accused had given the cheque to the complainant

towards discharge of his liability. But the Appellate

Court differed from the opinion of the Trial Court with

regard to the service of notice on the accused. The

appellate Court mainly relied upon the evidence of

parties and as well as Ex.P11 as well as the notice and

acknowledgment marked at Ex.P5 to P7. The Appellate

Court came to the conclusion that the notice has not

been properly served on the accused and the Appellate

Court has observed that the complainant has actually

admitted that the accused has been residing at

Bangalore. In spite knowing that fact no fresh notice

was issued to him in order to comply Section 138 (b) of

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N.I. Act and ultimately held that the demand notice was

not served. Therefore, by allowing the appeal acquitted

the accused.

5. The complainant being not satisfied with the

pronouncement of the judgment of the Appellate Court

in the Criminal Appeal preferred this Criminal Appeal

against the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned

Fast Track Judge-III, Hospet in Crl. A. No. 144/2007.

6. The rival contentions of both the parties now

narrowed down with regard to the issuance of notice by

the complainant to the correct address and service of

notice on the accused and the question that arose

before this Court is that:

“Whether the appellant established before

this Court that the notice issued to the

accused deemed to have been served upon

him and further establishes before this Court

that even non-service of the notice is not fatal

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to the complainant’s case and even in spite of

that the Appellate Court ought to have

confirmed the orders of the Trial Court as the

Trial Court is right in coming to the conclusion

that notice has been served” ?

7. The learned Counsel for the appellant strenuously

contends that, even the notice is not served, but once it

is shown that the notice had been issued to the correct

address of the accused the law takes its own course

under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and also

under Section 114 of Indian Evidence Act which raises a

presumption that the said notice has reached the

destination, unless the contrary is proved by the

accused. He also contends that, on the basis of the

decision of the Apex Court and this Court that even if

the notice is not served and the accused failed to make

the payment even after service of summons issued in

the criminal case he is debarred from taking any such

defence that the notice has not been served upon him.

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Therefore, the order passed by the Appellate Court is

erroneous and the same is liable to be interfered by this

Court.

8. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the accused

equally and strenuously contends that Section 138(b) of

the N.I. is mandatory provision and in all the criminal

cases when the matter has to be proved in accordance

with the statutory principle, if that statute is violated

and the statutory requirement has not been complied

then the complaint itself is not maintainable. Therefore,

as rightly held by the First Appellate Court when the

notice is not served or deemed to has been served on

the accused the accused is entitled to be acquitted.

9. Before discussing the materials on record, it is to

be noted that the Trial Court and the First Appellate

Court are consistent in their view, with regard to the

issuance of the cheque for discharge of the liability,

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presentation of the cheque before the Bank, dishonour

of the cheque and also issuance of the notice, and filing

of the complaint in time. The service of notice on the

accused is only disputed by the accused. The

concurrent findings of the Trial Court with regard to the

above aspects have not been challenged before this

Court by the accused. Therefore, this Court has to

answer only the above said point formulated.

10. It is seen from the records that the accused and

the complainant have entered into an agreement as per

Ex.P11 according to the complainant. I don’t wish to

discuss the other contents of this agreement. As rightly

drawn my attention by the learned Counsel for the

complainant the address mentioned in the agreement

pertaining to the accused is as follows :

Sri. Mohan S/o Somashekar Wodeyar,

Age: 40 years, Profession: Business,Resident of Ilkal, Hunagund Taluk,Bagalkot District.

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According to the evidence of the parties so far as this

agreement is concerned, it appears there is no denial by

the accused. The issuance of the cheque is also not

denied by the accused. But according to him, the said

cheque was issued for some other purpose i.e. to say as

an advance amount not towards any debt or liability.

The evidence of the accused who was examined as DW-

1, in his affidavit evidence has stated at paragraph 3

that he approached the complainant in the year 1999

for supply of Lorries and Machineries. Towards the said

transaction he has given an advance security deposit by

way of a cheque for Rs.2.00 lakhs to the complainant as

per the precedent and practice in the business norms.

The cheque was given without mentioning the date but

as security as demanded by the complainant with

assurance that it will be returned back after the

purpose was over. There is no denial with regard to the

execution of Ex.P11 in his evidence though it is marked

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by the complainant in his evidence. In the course of

cross-examination of the complainant also, after

marking of this Ex.P11 it is suggested that Ex.P11 was

in the possession of the complainant and it came to the

possession of the complainant in the year 1998. It is

also suggested particulars of the vehicle has not been

mentioned in Ex.P11. But nowhere it is suggested that

the accused has not participated and entered into such

contract as per Ex.P11. Therefore, the Court has to rely

upon the contents of the said document which shows

the address of the accused. Ex.P6 is the registered post

notice issued in favour of the accused. The address

mentioned in Ex.P11 is reiterated on Ex.P6. The said

cover returned with a shara ‘insufficient address,

returned to the sender”. On the same day that was on

20.05.1999, one more cover was also despatched

containing the said notice by certificate of posting to the

same address. On looking to the above said documents

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tentatively, one can come to the conclusion that the

correct address given by the accused in the agreement

has been mentioned properly and meticulously in the

cover sent to the accused through registered post and

by certificate of posting. According to the accused he

has been residing in Bangalore and the same was well

within the knowledge of the complainant, in spite of

that, he has sent the notice to the wrong address. The

accused relied upon the evidence of the complainant

wherein the complainant, at paragraph 6 a suggestion is

made to the complainant that the accused is the

resident of Bangalore and it is admitted as true. In the

course of cross-examination at paragraph 7 it is also

suggested that the accused has not at all received any

legal notice, but the said suggestion was denied. The

above said answers of the complainant sought to be

considered as admission of the complainant.

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11. The learned Counsel also brought to my notice

that the cheque issued in this case is drawn on

Karnataka Bank, Bangalore. Therefore, if at all the

accused was residing at Ilkal there was no occasion for

him to issue the cheque drawn on the Karnataka Bank,

Kempegowda Road Branch, Bangalore. But the

contents of the evidence of accused discloses that he

never stated as to why he has given such an address to

the complainant in Ex.P11. He has not explained in

this evidence nor any suggestions made to the

complainant during the course of cross-examination as

to from what date he has been residing at Bangalore,

whether he was a permanent resident of Bangalore,

whether he subsequently shifted himself to Bangalore,

etc. The accused in his evidence has stated, he is a

resident of Rajarajeshwari Nagar, Bangalore. Even in

the affidavit he has not stated since what date he has

been residing in the said address. The deposition of the

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accused was recorded in the year 2005. He gives the

said address in the year 2005. But whether he was

residing at Bangalore in the year 1999, when the notice

was issued to him, has not been explained by the

accused. It is not even suggested since how long this

man is residing in the said address. The agreement –

Ex.P11 in fact, came into existence on 26.12.1998, it is

almost near to the date of issuance of the cheque,

within a short span of time the said notice was issued

i.e. in the month of May 1999. But the evidence of the

accused was recorded in the year 2005 there is a long

gap of 6 years. Therefore, unless it is explained by the

accused that why he has given the said address in

Ex.P11 that he is the resident of Ilkal Village and when

he actually changed the said address and where he has

been residing in Bangalore as on 1999 are not explained

by him reasonably. The stray and distorted admission

of complainant can’t be made basis to hold that notice

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was not issued to the correct address of the accused. In

the absence of elucidation of facts, it is not so believable

that the notice was sent to the wrong address, when

Ex.P11 is admitted and the address in the said

document is not disputed at the relevant point of time.

Therefore, the Appellate Court without appreciating all

these materials on record, wrongly come to a conclusion

to substitute its own opinion to that of the judgment of

the Trial Court.

12. The Appellate Court mainly relied upon the

admission of the complainant in the course of cross-

examination that the accused is residing at Bangalore.

Whether this one sentence can be taken as an

admission on the part of the complainant, it is a well

recognized principle of law that admissions must be

clear if they are to be used against a person making

them if they are true in accordance with law, the

admissions will become substantive evidence by

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themselves in view of Section 17 and 21 of the Evidence

Act, though they are not conclusive proof of matters

admitted. If the admission is voluntary with the

knowledge of the facts if a party unequivocally in an

unambiguous manner admits regarding any fact in

issue or a relevant fact before the Court then only such

admissions can be acted upon. It is also in number of

Rulings the Courts have observed that the stray

sentence in cross-examination does not amount to an

admission. Simply admitting by way of suggestions that

the accused is residing at Bangalore when other

materials are against to that statement of the

complainant, in my opinion, such sentence amounts to

stray sentence in the cross-examination, which cannot

be relied upon. Therefore, the value of admission

depends upon the circumstances in which it is made. It

is a question which needs to be considered as to what

weight is to be attached to an admission and for that

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purpose it is necessary for the Court to find out as to

whether it is clear, unfettered, unambiguous and a

relevant piece of evidence, and further, it is proved in

accordance with the provisions of the evidence Act. The

utmost important role with regard to admission is that

the whole statement containing the admission must be

taken together, for that some part of it may be available

to the party. The object is only to ascertain what he

was admitted against himself and what made him to do

so. Therefore, the whole cross-examination portion and

the other documents produced before the Court and/

examination in chief of the complainant have to be

considered in order to ascertain whether that one

sentence amounts to an admission that “the accused

has been residing at Bangalore” and it was very well

known to the complainant at the time of issuance of

notice to the accused under Section 138 of Negotiable

Instruments Act. As I have already discussed in this

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case the other factual aspects and even the other

portion of the cross-examination the documentary

evidence and the examination in chief of the

complainant and the cross-examination of the accused,

which shows that it is the consistent stand taken by the

complainant that the notice issued to the accused has

been served and the same was sent to the previously

known correct address of the accused. Therefore, the

Appellate Court has committed a serious error in

considering the said portion as an admission on the

part of the complainant.

13. Further added to that, it is the defence taken by

the accused, that he was not been served with the

notice and it is his burden to establish the case that he

was not served with the notice. On the other hand,

Section 27 of the General Clauses Act comes to the aid

of the complainant, which reads as follows :

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“27. Meaning of service by post.—Where

any Central Act or Regulation made after the

commencement of this Act authorises or

requires any document to be served by post,

whether the expression “serve” or either of

the expressions “give” or “send” or any other

expression is used, then, unless a different

intention appears, the service shall be

deemed to be effected by properly

addressing, pre-paying and posting by

registered post, a letter containing the

document, and, unless the contrary is proved,

to have been effected at the time which the

letter would be delivered in the ordinary

course of post”.

(Emphasis supplied)

This Section categorically raises a presumption that

unless a different intention appears, the service shall be

deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-

paying and posting by registered post, a letter

containing the documents, and, unless the contrary is

proved, it should be presumed that the letter would be

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delivered in the ordinary course of post. What is

required is that he has to prove the contrary that the

notice has not been sent to his correct address on the

basis of cogent and convincing material though not

beyond reasonable doubt. But the proof is not

produced before this Court except saying to the Court

that the said cover had been returned with shara

‘insufficient address’. But the said address whether it is

insufficient or sufficient might not have been known by

the complainant because of the simple reason, Ex.P11

discloses the some address which was furnished by the

accused. Therefore, when Section 27 comes to the help

of the complainant it becomes the onus on the accused

to prove that the said notice has not been served upon

him, because it was not correctly addressed.

14. In view of the above said circumstances, I am of

the opinion that in the absence of the accused

producing sufficient materials to show that as on 1999

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when the notice was issued by the complainant he was

residing at Bangalore, which was known to the

complainant unless i.e. established before the Court,

the Court has to raise the presumption of deemed

service of notice in view of the address given by the

accused in Ex.P11. Therefore, I am of the opinion, the

Appellate Court has committed a serious error in

holding that the notice has not been served upon the

accused and only on that ground reversing the

judgment of the Trial Court.

15. Now, coming to the other aspect though not

relevant, to the finding given above. It is pertinent to

note that whether the non-service of notice enure to the

benefit of the accused to take a defence that because of

the notice has not been served upon him, the complaint

is not maintainable and accused is absolved from his

criminal liability.

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16. The learned Counsel for the appellant drawn my

attention to the Judgment of the Apex Court reported in

D. Vinod Shivappa Vs. Nanda Belliappa [2006(6)

SCC 456] wherein the Apex Court has held that the

provisions of Section 138(b) mandates not only issuance

of notice of dishonour of the cheque but also service of

said notice on the accused. But the Court has observed

that :

“One can also conceive of cases where a well

intentioned drawer may have inadvertently

missed to make necessary arrangements for

reasons beyond his control, even though he

genuinely intended to honour the cheque

drawn by him. The law treats such lapses

induced by inadvertence or negligence to be

pardonable, provided the drawer after notice

makes amends and pays the amount within

the prescribed period. It is for this reason

that Clause (c) of proviso to Section 138

provides that the section shall not apply

unless the drawer of the cheque fails to make

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the payment within 15 days of the receipt of

the said notice. To repeat, the proviso is

meant to protect honest drawers whose

cheques may have been dishonoured for the

fault of others, or who may have genuinely

wanted to fulfil their promise but on account

of inadvertence or negligence failed to make

necessary arrangements for the payment of

the cheque. The proviso is not meant to

protect unscrupulous drawers who never

intended to honour the cheques issued by

them, it being a part of their modus operandi

to cheat unsuspecting persons. It is also to be

borne in mind that the requirement of giving

of notice is a clear departure from the rule of

Criminal Law, where there is no stipulation of

giving of a notice before filing a complaint.

Any drawer who claims that he did not

receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15

days of receipt of summons from the court in

respect of the complaint under Section 138 of

the Act, make payment of the cheque amount

and submit to the Court that he had made

payment within 15 days of receipt of

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summons (by receiving a copy of complaint

with the summons) and, therefore, the

complaint is liable to be rejected. A person

who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of

the summons from the Court along with the

copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the

Act, cannot obviously contend that there was

no proper service of notice as required under

Section 138, by ignoring statutory

presumption to the contrary under Section 27

of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the

Evidence Act. In our view, any other

interpretation of the proviso would defeat the

very object of the legislation. As observed in

Bhaskarans case (supra), if the giving of

notice in the context of Clause (b) of the

proviso was the same as the receipt of notice

a trickster cheque drawer would get the

premium to avoid receiving the notice by

adopting different strategies and escape from

legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act”.

In view of the above said Ruling it clears the doubt that

if the person has no intention to pay the amount at all,

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the non-service of notice would not come to his help.

This Ruling of the Apex Court relied upon by this Court

in LAWS (KAR)-2012-7-91 between Prakash Alias

Jnanaprakash Vs. T.S. Susheela. This Court also

held in the similar way that non-service of notice is not

fatal to the complainant’s case if the accused does not

make the payment within reasonable time after service

of summons in the criminal complaint.

17. The learned Counsel tried to convince that this

Ruling has been questioned before the Supreme Court

and the Supreme Court has reversed the said judgment,

but I have carefully perused the judgment of the

Supreme Court reported in C.C. Alavi Haji Vs.

Palapetty Muhammed and another reported in 2007

(5) Supreme 277. The Apex Court answering the

reference has not disturbed the observations made in

the above said Vinod Shivappa’s case. The reference to

the Apex Court was made in the following manner :

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“Reference pertaining to question of service of

notice in terms of 138(b) of N.I. Act to a larger

bench was made herein in the instant case on

plea that while rendering decision in D. Vinod

Shivappa Vs. Nanda Belliappa, Court failed to

take into consideration, presumption in

respect of an official act as provided u/s 114

of Evidence Act. Issue in consideration was

whether in absence of any averments in

complaint to effect that accused had a role to

play in matter of non receipt of legal notice, or

that accused deliberately avoided service of

notice, same could have been entertained

keeping in view said decision”.

(Emphasis supplied)

The Court held that, in view of the

presumption available under Section 27 it is

not necessary to aver in complaint under

Section 138 that service of notice was evaded

by accused so that accused had a role to play

in return of notice unserved. In so far as the

question of disclosure of necessary particulars

with regard to issue of notice in terms of

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Proviso (b) of Section 138 of N.I. Act in order to

enable the Court to draw presumption or

inference either under Section 27 of the

General Clauses Act or under Section 114 of

the Evidence Act is concerned, there is no

material difference between the two

provisions. Hence, held that when notice is

sent by registered post by correct address,

drawer of the cheque, mandatory requirement

of issue of notice in terms of Clause (b) to

Section 138 stands complied with.

18. The point for reference in the above said case was

not that, the observation made by the earlier decision in

Vinod Shivappa’s case that the accused is not entitled

to take the defence that he was not served with the

notice unless he makes the payment immediately after

service of summons before the Court. The observation

made in Vinod Shivapp’s case has not been disturbed

even in the subsequent decision referred to above. On

the other hand, it is seen from the judgment of the Apex

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Court in 2007 (5) Supreme 277 at paragraphs 16 and

17, the observations made in Vinod Shivappa’s case has

been reiterated and not disturbed.

19. Looking to the above said decision of the Apex

Court, it is very much clear that if the notice is issued to

the correct address of the accused then the non-service

of the notice has to be proved by the accused. Even

otherwise, if the notice is sent is not served on the

accused, the purpose of issuance of notice has to be

considered by the Court. The purpose of issuance of

notice is to provide an opportunity to the accused to

make the payment within 15 days from the date of

service of the above said notice. In this background, it

is also worth to note the provision under Section 138(b)

and (c) of the N.I. Act, which reads as follows :

“138 (b) – the payee or the holder in due

course of the cheque, as the case may be,

makes a demand for the payment of the said

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amount of money by giving a notice in writing,

to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty

days of the receipt of information by him from

the bank regarding the return of the cheque

as unpaid; and

138 (c) – the drawer of such cheque fails to

make the payment of the said amount of

money to the payee or, as the case may be, to

the holder in due course of the cheque, within

fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice”.

(emphasis supplied)

The words used in this provision clearly disclose that

Section 138(b) mandates the notice has to be issued

making demand for payment of the amount of money

informing him the return of the cheque as unpaid

issued by the accused. That clearly goes to show that

the intention of the Legislators in introducing this

provision under Section 138(b) must be that, the

complainant has to issue notice only to demand for

payment of money but not for providing any opportunity

to the accused to take any defence as he likes. Even the

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non-reply of notice by the accused will not debarr the

accused from taking any other defence. In this

background, Section 138(c) further clears out the doubt

that if the accused fails to make the payment of the said

amount of the money to the payee as the case may be to

the holder in due course within fifteen days from the

date of receipt of the said notice, then the complainant

can file the complaint. It is also a clear indication of the

intention of the legislators that if the payment is not

made, the cause of action arises for the purpose of filing

the complaint or proceeding against the accused.

Therefore, the concentration of the legislators in these

two provisions is only to the effect that the law would

like to provide an opportunity to the accused to make

the payment within fifteen days from the date of receipt

of the notice. If the non-payment is there for whatever

may be the reason, he cannot take the defence of non-

service of the notice. Atleast as soon he comes to know

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that the complainant has demanded for such payment

and filed a complaint it becomes the obligation and duty

on the part of the accused to make the payment soon

after service of summons by the criminal court. He

must show that he had really intended to comply with

the notice if it would have been served upon him.

Though the accused can take any number of defences in

the criminal complaint, but if he failed to make the

payment before the Court on service of the notice or

summons, or warrant as the case may be he is debarred

from taking the defence that the notice has not been

served upon him. Because, even if the notice would

have been served upon him, the conduct of the accused

establish before the Court that he had no intention to

make the payment.

20. Therefore, I am of the opinion, in view of the above

said Rulings and on facts the accused is not entitled to

take such defence, even assuming that, the notice has

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not been served upon him. Therefore, the complaint is

very well maintainable. Hence, I answer the point in

favour of the complainant and I am of the considered

opinion that the judgment of the Appellate Court is not

based on facts and also on law. Hence, the same is

liable to be set aside.

21. On perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court, the

Trial Court has sentenced the accused to undergo

simple imprisonment for one year and also to pay a fine

of Rs.4.00 lakhs with default clause. The imposition of

simple imprisonment for one year when the Trial Court

has imposed double the amount of the cheque, in my

opinion, was not warranted and becomes harsh.

Therefore, I am of the opinion, the sentence has to be

modified imposing sentence of fine of Rs.4.00 lakhs with

default clause in my opinion is appropriate and

adequate and meet the ends of justice.

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22. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following :

O R D E R

The Criminal Appeal is hereby allowed.

Consequently, the judgment passed by the Fast Track

Court-III Hospet in Criminal Appeal no.144/2007 dated

31st July 2008 is hereby set aside. The judgment

passed by the Trial Court in C.C. No. 822/2005 dated

3rd day of November 2007 convicting the accused for the

offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable

Instruments Act is restored. However, the sentence is

modified to the effect that the accused is sentenced to

pay a fine of Rs.4.00 lakhs for the offence punishable

under Section 138 of N.I. Act, in default of payment of

fine he shall undergo simple imprisonment for six

months. The awarding of the compensation by the Trial

Court is undisturbed.

Sd/- JUDGE

Rbv