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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this

document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,

MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MIDDELBURG

(LOCAL SEAT)

CASE NO: 4708/2018

In the matter between:

ABSA BANK LIMITED PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT

and

TENANE CHARLES MAKOLA DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

___________________________________________________________________________

(1) REPORTABLE: NO

(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3) REVISED: YES

………………………………. ………………………..

SIGNATURE DATE

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JUDGMENT

___________________________________________________________________________

BRAUCKMANN AJ

INTRODUCTION

[1] This is an application for summary judgment launched prior to the

amendments of the rules of this court which came into operation on 1

July 2019. This summary judgment application was duly opposed and

an opposing affidavit was filed by the respondent. The application

was postponed, and case managed to the opposed roll, after which

the applicant launched a separate application as contemplated in

terms of Rule 46, read with Rule 46A, of the Uniform Rules of this court

(The Rules). The respondent is opposing both applications.

[2] The application for summary judgment was initially enrolled to be

heard in this court on 15 April 2019. The reason for the postponement

was that the court required heads of argument to be submitted by the

parties as to whether the court could entertain the application for

summary judgment without the necessary information required in terms

of Rule 46A being placed before the court. At the stage that the

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application for summary judgment was launched, and was to be

heard for the first time, this court was still functioning as a circuit court

of the Gauteng Division Pretoria. A full bench of the Gauteng Local

Division, Johannesburg, handed down the judgment in Absa Limited vs

Mokebe, case no 00612/2018 which held that the court could not

entertain applications for monetary judgment separate from the

declaration of fixed property executable.

[3] This triggered the applicant’s application in terms of Rule 46A.

[4] The applicant’s case, in terms of its particulars of claim, is that the

applicant and respondent agreed that the applicant would provide

the respondent with a private bank facility. In terms of the agreement

the following would apply:

4.1 The applicant made available to the defendant a facility

amount of R1 300 000.00;

4.2 The facility amount was provided in account number […],

together with which the respondent had to operate a separate

transactional account with the applicant;

4.3 The facility account will be utilised to ensure that the minimum

balance is maintained on the transactional account. This entails

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that the applicant will, insofar as necessary, sweep monies from

the facility account to the transactional account;

4.4 The facility agreement stipulated that minimum monthly

instalments of R10 473.00 was repayable in respect of the facility

account agreement.

4.5 As security for the indebtedness incurred in terms of the facility

agreement, and in terms of the provisions of the facility

agreement, the Respondent caused a mortgage bond to be

registered in favour of the Applicant over certain immovable

property. The mortgage bond agreement specifically contained

a clause stipulating that a certificate of indebtedness signed by

a manager will serve as prima facie proof of the indebtedness

amount due.

4.6 The Respondent defaulted with the terms of the facility

agreement, in that the Respondent failed to ensure that the

minimum monthly instalment amount is paid alternatively caused

the facility amount to become in excess of maximum available

amount.

4.7 Consequently, the Applicant commenced enforcement steps

with the dispatch of a notice as contemplated in terms of

Section 129 of the National Credit Act, 34 of 2005 (hereinafter

referred to as “the NCA”). There has been compliance with the

pre-enforcement provisions of the NCA. The Respondent does

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not take issue with the manner in which the said notice was

dispatched.

4.8 No response as contemplated in terms of the NCA was

forthcoming. Consequently, the main action was instituted. The

Respondent entered an appearance to defend, on 19

December 2018, in response to which the present application for

summary judgment was delivered on 14 January 2019 (14 court

days later). There has been compliance with the procedural

requirements of Rule 32.

INSTITUTION OF SEPARATE APPLICATION IN TERMS OF RULE 46 AND 46A OF THE

RULES

[5] Before the court heard arguments in this regard the applicant’s

counsel Adv. Markram-Jooste, and Adv. Cilliers on behalf of

respondent, agreed that the double-barrelled procedure adopted by

the applicant in this matter will not be objected to by the respondent. I

am of the opinion that the agreement is good in law having regard to

the unreported judgment of Van Eeden AJ in Absa Bank Limited v

Sawyer1 where the court stated:

‘13. Mr Scott’s submission correctly identified an uneasiness between

action procedure and a subsequent opposed application for summary

1 (2018/17056) [2018] ZAGPJHC 662 (14 December 2018) par 13-16.

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judgment on the one hand, and the provisions of rule 46A on the other.

A plaintiff is fully within its rights to pursue an application for the money

judgment and the order of executability in terms of rule 32, but rule 46A

requires an application on notice of motion for the order of

executability substantially in accordance with Form 2A of Schedule 1

(rule 46A(3)(a)). In addition, the Practice Manual (Gauteng

Johannesburg) requires the chapter 10.17 affidavit.

14. In my view the uneasiness is more apparent than real. A plaintiff

pleading its cause of action in a combined summons is compelled to

plead both circumstances entitling it to the money judgment and

circumstances entitling it to an order of executability. Although the

order of executability is ancillary to the money judgment, the latter

relief forms an integral part of the cause of action.[2] It follows that

when summary judgment is applied for and the cause of action is

verified, the deponent verifies both the money judgment and the order

of executability. The chapter 10.17 affidavit is a separate affidavit not

falling foul of rule 32, which supports the relief sought in respect of

executability. A court is eventually faced with a hybrid procedure

requiring adherence to rule 32, rule 46A and the Practice Manual.

15. I do not read rule 46A as excluding a plaintiff’s right to apply for

summary judgment, nor that the plaintiff must institute a further

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application under rule 46A in order to follow Form 2A. In my view the

summary judgement application and affidavit filed in compliance with

chapter 10.17 constitute substantial compliance by the plaintiff of its

obligations contained in rule 46A. Together they allow the court to

discharge its duties imposed by rule 46A and to strike a balance

between the competing interests of the plaintiff and defendant in a

matter where the executability of a primary residence is at stake. In this

matter the defendant also availed herself of the opportunity to place a

supplementary affidavit before court after receipt of the chapter 10.17

affidavit. In my view nothing would be achieved by insisting that the

plaintiff should follow the motion procedure prescribed by rule 46A. All

the information required by rule 46A is already before court.

16. In the premises I find that the plaintiff was fully entitled to apply for

both orders in summary judgment proceedings in terms of rule 32. The

summary judgment application, read with the affidavit filed in terms of

chapter 10.17, constitute substantial compliance with the provisions of

rule 46A. Rule 46A does not exclude action proceedings for an order

declaring a primary residential property executable, but the

requirements of rule 46A must still be complied with before the primary

residence of the defendant can be declared executable’.

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[6] This was supported in the decision of Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v

Rademeyer and Another2

“[18] The court in Sawyer found that the plaintiff in that matter was

fully entitled to apply for both orders in summary judgment

proceedings in terms of Rule 32. I am in agreement with this

judgment. The summary judgment application, read with the

affidavit filed in terms of chapter 10.17 constitute substantial

compliance with the provisions of Rule 46A. The rules exist for the

court, not the court for the rules. The further affidavit only deals

with execution and not with the money judgment.

[19] Courts should not be bound inflexibly by rules of procedure

unless the language clearly necessitates this. The rules are not

intended to be inflexible; where it is necessary to relax them in

order to do justice, it is competent for the court to do so;

otherwise the court would become the slave of rules designed

and intended to facilitate its task. The rules should not be

interpreted and applied in a formalistic manner that fails to take

these objects into account.

[20] In short, in a summary judgment application a court is not only

entitled but also obliged to consider the Rule 46A application

and accompanying affidavit to determine whether the order in

2 (1911/2019) [2019] ZAGPPHC 165 (31 May 2019) par 18 and 19.

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the summary judgment application should include an order to

declare the immovable property executable”.

[7] I accordingly find that the said judgment constitutes a good law and

that both applications can be heard simultaneously.

[8] The respondent raised various points in limine which, by the

respondent’s counsel own admission, does not constitutes points in

limine but actually defences that goes to the merits of the matter.

[9] Respondent’s counsel submitted that he will persist with the defence

that the respondent has a bona fide defence. It appeared that the

respondent conceded that the balance of the defences raised is not

good in law alternatively does not constitute points in limine, and was

accordingly abandoned.

GENERAL REMARKS REGARDING APPLICATIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[10] It is trite that a defendant/respondent in summary judgment

applications is required to fully disclose the nature and grounds of its

defence and the material facts it relies upon.

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[11] In Breytenbach v Fiat SA (Edms) Bpk3 it was decided that a defendant

cannot approach the court with bold, vade and sketchy defences.

[12] Summary judgment procedure is not intended to deprive a defendant

with a trialable issue or a sustainable defence of his/her day in court. In

Joob-Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture4

it was held that:

“[32] The rationale for summary judgment proceedings is impeccable.

The procedure is not intended to deprive a defendant with a

triable issue or a sustainable defence of her/his day in court.

After almost a century of successful application in our courts,

summary judgment proceedings can hardly continue to be

described as extraordinary. Our courts, both of first instance and

at appellate level, have during that time rightly been trusted to

ensure that a defendant with a triable issue is not shut out. In the

Maharaj case at 425G-426E, Corbett JA, was keen to ensure first,

an examination of whether there has been sufficient disclosure

by a defendant of the nature and grounds of his defence and

the facts upon which it is founded. The second consideration is

that the defence so disclosed must be both bona fide and good

in law. [Own emphasis]. A court which is satisfied that this

threshold has been crossed is then bound to refuse summary

3 1976(2) SA 226 (T) at 229 F-H. 4 2009(5) SA 1(SCA) par 31-33.

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judgment. Corbett JA also warned against requiring of a

defendant the precision apposite to pleadings. However, the

learned judge was equally astute to ensure that recalcitrant

debtors pay what is due to a creditor.

[33] Having regard to its purpose and its proper application,

summary judgment proceedings only hold terrors and are

‘drastic’ for a defendant who has no defence. Perhaps the time

has come to discard these labels and to concentrate rather on

the proper application of the rule, as set out with customary

clarity and elegance by Corbett JA in the Maharaj case at

425G-426E.” (Own emphasis).

[13] As dealt with in argument the only defence persisted with by the

respondent was that he had a bona fide defence. That is in respect of

the application for monetary judgment.

[14] The defendant/respondent stated that upon reading of the applicant’s

combined summons and application for summary judgment the

plaintiff/applicant neglected to set out comprehensively a statement

of account in support of his claim as contained in the notice of motion

and further that the plaintiff has failed to take the court into his

confidence.

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[15] The plaintiff refers to the facility letter attached to plaintiff’s particulars

of claim. He stated that the mere certificate of indebtedness could

not suffice for purposes of summary judgment. It was also, according

to the respondent, not agreed that such a certificate of balance

would provide prima facie proof of the respondent’s indebtedness,

losing sight of the content of the bond registered over the property.

[16] The respondent’s main complaint is that the applicant unilaterally

closed the accounts of the defendant which accounts were meant to

service the ABSA private 1 banking facility as was a requirement under

the agreement between the applicant and the respondent for that

purpose. The respondent, so goes the argument, as a result of the

closure of the account, was prejudiced as the plaintiff/applicant has

breached its own agreement with the defendant, and the defendant

is accordingly unable to verify the correct amount outstanding under

the agreement. According to the respondent, attempts to reopen the

aforesaid accounts were unsuccessful and no response was

forthcoming from the applicant.

[17] The respondent, in this regard, allege and stated that due to the

closure of the account by the applicant, the applicant made

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performance by the respondent impossible. Respondent states that

the respondent, after closure of the accounts could not pay his

instalments of at least R10 473.00 as agreed with the respondent. The

respondent’s only defence to the merits, which Mr Cilliers on behalf of

the respondent alleges is a good defence in law, is summed up in

paragraph 8.7 of the opposing affidavit to the summary judgment

application. In the paragraph the respondent states:

“The minimum monthly instalments of not less than R10 473.00 cannot

be debited due to the plaintiff’s conduct (closure of the accounts).

Further, the closing of the facility by the plaintiff is aimed at precluding

defendant from repaying the monthly instalments and for the plaintiff

to proceed to foreclose”. (Own emphasis).

During argument, and when I engaged with counsel for the

respondent, he could not deny that the plaintiff was entitled, upon a

breach of the agreement between applicant and respondent, to rely

on the breached clause contained in the summons. In terms of clause

13 of the facility agreement it was agreed that the respondent will be

in default under the agreement if he did not pay any amount payable

under this agreement on due date and further, in terms of clause 14 of

the agreement it was agreed that if the respondent were in default,

the applicant may refuse to advance any amount borrowed but not

paid out at the time of default.

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[18] If the respondent is in default notice may be given in terms of the

National Credit Act 34 of 2005(“The NCA”) (Section 1-9) thereof of the

respondents rights in terms of the said sections (1-9 and 130) of the NCA

and thereafter, if the respondent remains in default, start with

proceedings against the respondent to pay all amounts due under the

agreement and to exercise its rights under the covering mortgage

bond. The applicant will also be entitled to take steps to realise any

asset pledged or hypothecated under the bond registered over the

respondent’s fixed property.

[19] The respondent, dealing with the defence of a denial of the

indebtedness and the respondent’s bona fide defence, denies that

applicant set out properly what is required in law in respect of its cause

of action and indebtedness. This is incorrect.

[20] It is significant to note that the respondent, in its opposing affidavit,

blames the applicant for not providing him with statements. The

respondent does not deny the conclusion of the facility agreement nor

the registration, in terms of the facility agreement, of the mortgage

bond over his fixed property. The mortgage bond agreement contains

the so-called “certificate of balance clause” which provides that a

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certificate of balance will constitute prima facie proof of the

indebtedness of the amount which is claimed5.

[21] In as far as the breach of the agreement is concerned, the fact that

the agreement was breached by the respondent is stated in the

section 129 and 130 of the National Credit Act letter addressed to the

respondent, attached to the particulars of claim. In terms of the

particulars of claim it was also alleged that:

“The defendant did not comply with his obligations in terms of the

aforementioned agreement. The amount as mentioned above is due

and payable in terms of the agreement.” The applicant confirmed its

cause of action in its founding affidavit in the summary judgment

application.

Apart from a bald denial no specific facts are contained in the

respondent’s opposing affidavit denying the applicant’s entitlement to

accelerate payment in terms of the agreement.

[22] The amount due was also stated in the applicant’s particulars of claim

and more specifically paragraph 4.2 thereof which states that

R1 320012.46, together with interest at the rate of 9.25%, from 28

November 2018 to date of payment, was indebted to the applicant as

5see clause 9 of the bond agreement

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at 27 November 2017. Annexure B to applicant’s particulars of claim is

a certificate of balance in terms of clause 9 of the bond agreement,

confirming the amount due to applicant.

[23] The applicant certainly does not have to deconstruct the manner in

which a claim amount was constituted in the pleadings if the claim

amount is not placed in dispute. So to the interest rate. Only when a

claim is sufficiently placed in dispute will the applicant be required to

deconstruct and prove the manner in which the claim amount has

been constituted6. The respondent does not place the indebtedness in

dispute. Although the respondent complains about not receiving bank

statements (which he can access on the internet in any way) he does

not provide one piece of evidence that the certificate of balance is

incorrect. Nor does he indicate an error in the calculation or deny that

he stopped paying the instalments due to the applicants.

[24] In NPGS Protection and Security Services CC and Another vs First Rand

Bank Ltd7 it was held that:

“Rule 32(3) of the uniform rules requires an opposing affidavit to

disclose fully the nature and grounds of the defence and the material

facts relied upon therefor. To stave off summary judgment, a

6 F_I Advisers (Edms) Bp ken `n Ander vs Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk 1999(1) SA 515 (SCA). 7 (314/2018) [2019] ZASCA 94 (6 June 2019) at par 11 thereof. “

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defendant cannot content him or herself with bald denials, for

example, that it is not clear how the amount claimed was made up.

Something more is required. If a defendant disputes the amount

claimed, he or she should say so and set out a factual basis for such

denial. This could be done by giving examples of payments made by

them which have not been credited to their account”.

[25] I am also of the opinion that, in terms of Rule 35(12) the respondent

could have sought discovery and production of the bank statements

from the applicant. No explanation in its opposing affidavit to this

effect is given nor could his counsel provide an explanation in this

regard.

[26] I fail to understand how the applicant can lament about the closure of

his bank accounts if, as provided for in the agreement with the

respondent, he was in breach of the agreement, and the applicant

was entitled to close his accounts. It has also become trite law in South

Africa that a financial institution may close a client’s account if it so

wants8.

[27] The respondents defence as appears from paragraph 8.7 of his

opposing affidavit implies malice on the part of the applicant. No

8 Annex Distribution (Pty) Ltd and Others vs Bank of Baroda 2018 (1) SA 562 (GB) and Bredenkamp and Others vs Standard Bank of South Africa 2010(4) SA 468 (SCA).

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facts are provided to this court why the applicant would close the

respondent’s account to preclude him from paying his instalments, and

for the plaintiff to proceed with foreclosure. This implies that the

applicant wants to foreclose on the respondent for an ulterior purpose.

One would have expected the respondent to give factual

background as to why the applicant would act in such a mala fide

and irresponsible manner. The respondent’s defence with regards to

the indebtedness is, to say the least, not bona fide, and totally

untenable.

[28] I reject the respondent’s defence implying that the plaintiff was mala

fide in closure of its account.

[29] Having found that the respondent does not have a bona fide defence

and that the balance of the points in limine does not constitutes points

in limine I now turn to the Rule 46 application.

[30] In terms of Rule 46A of the Rules of this Court, certain requirements has

to be complied with by an applicant before this court can order a writ

of execution to be issued by the Registrar of the Court to attach the

respondent’s fixed property, if the fixed property is the respondent’s

primary residence. In opposition to the applicant’s Rule 46 application

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the respondent’s states that his objections to the declaration of

executability are the following:

“1. It is submitted further that the plaintiff would sell the property for

a far too low price in order to hold the defendant accountable

for the remainder of the outstanding balance ostensibly owned.

2. The defendant and all lawful occupiers occupying the property

with permission of the defendant would be left to the streets

whilst the plaintiff would have sold the immovable property for

far too less a price in order to keep the defendant indebted to it.”

[31] In its affidavit opposing summary judgment it also raises, as a “point in

limine” his constitutional right to adequate housing.

[32] He states in the opposing affidavit “for present purposes it is

appropriate to record that I am unable to secure alternative

accommodation for myself and my wife and children should the

immovable property be declared specially executable and

subsequently sold by the plaintiff, notwithstanding the immense upset

and trauma that it could cause to my wife and children”.

[33] He also alleges that he is currently over indebted without giving any

particulars of the over indebtedness or his income.

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[34] The respondent’s allegations regarding his right to adequate housing,

and the fact that the family will be left destitute and living on the

streets without adequate housing is rejected. The respondent did not

provide sufficient particulars in respect to his right to housing or the

reserve price to be set by this court. In respect of the involvement of a

debtor in the process of determining whether the court should declare

a property executable and set a reserve price the sentiment laid down

in First Rand Bank Limited vs Folscher and Another and Similar Matters9

was recently repeated by the majority ruling of the Supreme Court of

Appeal in the NPGS Protection and Security Services matter. The court

held (in adjudicating the factual matrix, similar to the present matter,

that is a summary judgment application where execution relief was

also sought, that10:

“[55] From this review of the relevant jurisprudence, it is clear that in a

case of an application for default judgment, a court, in its

discretion, needs to ensure that it is possessed with adequate

information to enable it to grant a remedy which complies with

these requirements. In the case of an application for summary

judgment, provided the creditor has complied with the

requirements of rule 46(A), there is an onus on the debtor, at the

very least, to provide the court with information concerning

9 2011(4) 314(GNP) and in Mokebe supra 10 NPGS- supra at paras 55, 63 and 67.

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whether the property is his or her personal residence, whether it is

a primary residence, whether there are other means available to

discharge the debt and whether there is a disproportionality

between the execution and other possible means to exact

payment of the judgment debt.

[63] In the present case this court is asked to find that but one

mention by counsel from the bar in the court below is sufficient to

avoid an order of execution. The summary judgment procedure

enables essential information to be placed before a court to

enable it to fulfil its function in adjudicating on defences raised.

In the present case, extensive facile defences, which were

dressed up as being technically proficient, were the only ones

presented resisting summary judgment. One would have thought

that a business person in the position of the second appellant,

when faced with the loss of his home, would, at the very least,

have expressed his anxiety about the consequences thereof. It is

the one thing that is conspicuously absent from the affidavit.

While it is true that the court below misdirected itself in relation to

whether or not an individual rather than a company was

affected, it is equally clear that the court was unimpressed with

the mere submission from the bar about the loss of a primary

residence without any further information being presented. It was

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clearly seen by the court below as a ruse to escape the

consequences of default. (Own emphasis).

[67] On the facts of this case, the complete failure by the second

appellant to avail himself of rights which were expressly drawn to

his attention in the summons issued by the respondent dictates to

the contrary. It bears repeating that there was a specific prayer

in the summons requesting an order of execution. In imposing an

obligation upon a court in this case when one vague and

unspecified mention of a personal residence without more

suffices as a defence or even a justification for remitting a case

back to the court a quo, would in my view, cause significant

uncertainty, and arguably serious damage to the efficient

provision of credit in the economy.”

[35] The respondent did not provide this court with any reasons why the

property should not be declared specifically executable. He does not

provide the court with his income, his sources of income, the income of

his spouse, his debts or any other reason why he would not be able to

afford alternative accommodation for his family and himself. The

respondent’s ipse dixit that he would be left on the streets is not

sufficient.

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[36] So to the respondent fails to provide this court with any information

regarding the declaration of executability and reserve price to be set

for the property.

[37] The respondent has an onus to prove that his right to adequate

housing as provided for in section 26 of the Constitution will be

disturbed.

[38] When a court exercise judicial oversight to declare the debtors home

executable, the court, where the property sought to be attached is the

primary residence of the judgment debtor must consider all facts as

stated in Rule 46A.

[39] The respondent put his residence up as security for a private banking

account which he utilised for six years. The purpose for which it was

used is not known to the applicant but the said bank accounts are

normally used by individuals who are business men for business

purposes.

[40] As Froneman J, in Gundwana vs Steko Development CC and Nedcor

Bank Limited11 stated:

11 2001(3) SA 608 (CC).

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“It must be accepted that execution in itself is not an odious thing. It is

part and parcel of normal economic life. It is only when there is

disproportionality between the means used in the execution process to

exact payment of the judgment debt, compared to other available

means to attain the same purpose, that alarm bells should start ringing.

If there are no other proportionate means to attain the same end,

execution may not be avoided”.

The respondent is in the best position to advance contentions to fully

inform the court of factors that should be taken into account when the

court considers the facts to declare the property executable in its

judicial oversight role. See Folscher supra at par 41. In this matter the

respondent, after 6 (six) years, owes applicant more than when the

agreement was entered into.

[41] The respondent’s counsel submitted that the court must first order

execution against movable property. That would prevent the

respondent from losing his residence. It can also, once execution

against movables are completed, reduce the indebtedness of the

respondent.

[42] The court would have considered same if the court was made aware

of movable assets belonging to the respondent. The court has no

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information in this regard and ordering execution against movables

might be a waste of time and money. The court cannot speculate as

to moveable assets that is owned by the respondent.

[43] Respondent simply failed to take this court into his confidence with the

facts surrounding his personal circumstances, that of his family, his

income and his assets.

[44] Therefor the court can only, in exercising its judicial oversight, in this

regard find in favour of the applicant.

[45] To execute against the movable property will in any way not happen

overnight. If the respondent pays the arrears and/or catches up with

his instalments, the agreement will be automatically reinstated and the

sale in execution cancelled. The respondent is therefore not left

remediless.

[46] In considering the reserved price, the court took note of the valuation

attached to the Rule 46 application. The market value of the property

is indicated to be R1 600 000.00. According to the applicant the

forced sale value is R1 066 666.66 which is less than the outstanding

indebtedness. The outstanding rates and taxes in respect of the

property is a mere R8 831.45.

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[47] I am of the opinion that an amount of R1 430 000.00 should be set as a

reserve price on the property.

[48] I accordingly make the following order:

1. Judgment in favour of the applicant is granted for:

1.1 Payment of the amount of R1 320 012.46;

2. Interest on the amount of R1 320 012.46 at the rate of 9.25% per

annum from 28 November 2018 to date of payment, the said

interest to be calculated and capitalized monthly;

3. That the immovable property knows as:

3.1 Erf […] Witbank Extension 10 Township, Registration Division J.S.,

Mpumalanga Province, measuring 1481 (ONE THOUSAND, FOUR

HUNDRED AND EIGHTY ONE) square meters in extent and is held

by the defendant in terms of Deed of Transfer Nr. T0003860/2013.

4. The Plaintiff/Registrar be authorized to issue a Writ of Execution

against the immovable property referred to in prayer 3 above, to

give effect to the order granted in terms of prayer 3 above.

5. That the immovable property referred to in prayer 3 above be

sold in execution with a reserve price of R1 430 000.00.

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6. That the defendant be ordered to pay the costs of the action

and application.

______________________________

HF BRAUCKMANN

ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE PLAINTIFF: ADV C.J MARKRAM-JOOSTE

INSTRUCTED BY: BIRMANS INCORPORATED

REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE DEFENDANT: ADV J.B CILLIERS

INSTRUCTED BY: MABHENA MADUBANY INC

DATE OF HEARING: 19 NOVEMBER 2019

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03 December 2019