1

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NO. 1952 CD 2016

PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,

Appellant,

v.

GREGORY STOVER,

Appellee.

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE OFFICE OF OPEN RECORDS

JOINED BY THE ACLU OF PENNSYLVANIA

Charles Rees Brown, Esq.

Chief Counsel

Supreme Court I.D. Number 70612

Jordan C. Davis, Esq.

Appeals Officer

Supreme Court I.D. Number 321970

Office of Open Records

Keystone Building, Plaza Level

400 North Street

Harrisburg, PA 17120-0225

T: (717) 346-9903; F: (717) 425-5343

For the Office of Open Records

DATE: February 21, 2017

Received 2/21/2017 5:13:47 PM Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Filed 2/21/2017 5:13:00 PM Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania1952 CD 2016

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .............................. 1

II. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF STANDARD AND SCOPE OF

REVIEW .................................................................................................. 4

III. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE QUESTION .................................. 5

IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................... 6

V. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... 8

A. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas’ decision follows this Court’s past decisions on the subject. ......................................................... 8

B. Disclosing the requested orders does not implicate the separation of

powers ........................................................................................................ 13

C. The standard applied by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas is efficient and furthers the purposes of the RTKL ....................................... 17

VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 20

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Allegheny County Dep’t of Admin Servs. v. A Second Chance, Inc.,

13 A.3d 1025 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) .............................................................. 3

Barkeyville Borough v. Stearns, 35 A.3d 91, 94-95 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) .... 17

Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County v. Pa. Office of Open

Records, 2 A.3d 810 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) ............................ 7, 8, 10, 11, 13

East Stroudsburg University Foundation v. Office of Open Records, 995

A.2d 496, 507 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) ............................................................. 2

Faulk v. Philadelphia Clerk of Courts, 116 A.3d 1183, 1186 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2015) ..................................................................................... 10, 11

Gates v. Dep’t of Corr., 2014 Pa. Cmwlth. Unpub LEXIS 416 (Pa.

Cmwlth. Ct. 2014) ..................................................................................... 12

Grine v. County of Centre, 138 A.3d 88 (Pa. Cmwlth.. 2016) ........... 9, 10, 14

Lawson v. Phila. Clerk of Courts, 2016 Pa. Cmwlth. Unpub. LEXIS 737

(Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 2016) .............................................................................. 12

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) .............................................. 15

Miller v. County of Center, 135 A.3d 233, 237 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) ........... 11

Office of Open Records v. Center Twp., 95 A.3d 354, 363-64 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2014) ............................................................................................. 1

Pa. Gaming Control Bd. v. Office of Open Records, 48 A.3d 503, 506

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) ..................................................................................... 2

Pa. Office of Attorney General v. The Phila. Inquirer, 127 A.3d 57, 61 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2015) ........................................................................................... 17

Piasecki v. Dep’t of Transp., 6 A.3d 1067, 1070 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) ........... 3

Stein v. Plymouth Twp., 994 A.2d 1179, 1181 (Pa. Cmwlth.. 2010) .............. 3

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Stover v. Phila. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 2016 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl.

LEXIS 507 ............................................................................................. 8, 16

Sturgis v. Dep’t of Corr., 96 A.3d 445 (Pa. Cmwlth.. 2014) ........................ 12

Whitaker v. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 Pa. Cmwlth. Unpub. LEXIS 181 (Pa.

Cmwlth. Ct. 2013) ..................................................................................... 12

Statutes

42 Pa.C.S. § 102 .............................................................................................. 1

65 P.S. § 67.101 .............................................................................................. 1

65 P.S. § 67.102 ............................................................................................ 17

65 P.S. § 67.506 ............................................................................................ 14

65 P.S. § 67.1101 ............................................................................................ 1

65 P.S. § 67.1310 ............................................................................................ 1

Constitutional Provisions

PA. CONST. ART. IV § 1 .................................................................................. 15

PA. CONST. ART. IV § 2 .................................................................................. 16

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I. STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The Office of Open Records (“OOR”), is an independent, quasi-

judicial agency primarily charged with implementation of the Pennsylvania

Right-to-Know Law (“RTKL”), 65 P.S. §§ 67.101 et seq., including issuing

final orders of appeals within its jurisdiction and conducting training on the

RTKL. See 65 P.S. § 67.1101; 65 P.S. § 67.1310(a) (describing the OOR’s

statutory mandates to issue final orders and conduct training); Office of Open

Records v. Center Twp., 95 A.3d 354, 363-64 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)

(describing the subject-matter jurisdiction of the OOR); see also 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 102 (defining “tribunal”).

Since its establishment in 2009, the OOR has adjudicated over 17,000

appeals, participated in or monitored over 1,000 cases in the Supreme Court,

Commonwealth Court and Courts of Common Pleas, conducted over 800

trainings, fielded tens of thousands of e-mail and telephone inquiries from

citizens, public officials and the media, and has conducted numerous

hearings and mediations.

As a neutral arbiter and adjudicatory body, the OOR does not have an

interest in the records at issue underlying an appeal of its decisions. Indeed,

this Honorable Court has held that when appeals of OOR Final

Determinations solely concern the merits of such Final Determinations,

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“[t]he OOR does not have standing to defend its decision because it is not

aggrieved by the release of another [] agency [’s] records.” East Stroudsburg

Univ. Foundation v. Office of Open Records, 995 A.2d 496, 507 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2010); see also Pa. Gaming Control Bd. v. Office of Open Records,

48 A.3d 503, 506 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (discussing the OOR’s lack of

standing in appeals from its own decisions) (rev’d on other grounds).

In the instant matter, the OOR respectfully submits this amici

curiaein support of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas’ analysis of

judicial records under the RTKL. Specifically, that analysis creates an easily

administrable standard for identifying records of a judicial agency that fits

the rationale expressed by this Honorable Court in recent cases on the topic.

American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania (“ACLU-PA”) is the

Pennsylvania state affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union

(“ACLU”), a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization founded in 1920 to protect

and advance civil liberties throughout the United States. The ACLU-PA has

over 27,000 members throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Since its founding in 1920, the ACLU has been dedicated to preserving and

defending the principles of individual liberty embodied in the U.S. and

Pennsylvania Constitutions. The ACLU strongly supports adherence to the

provisions of the Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Law. It has participated in

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numerous public records cases, as amicus curiae, as counsel to parties, and

as a party itself.

Pursuant to the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 531(b)(2), OOR hereby

advises the Court that no person or entity other than OOR paid in whole or

in part for the preparation of this amici curiae brief, and no person or entity

other than OOR and undersigned counsel for OOR authored in whole or in

part this amici curiae brief.

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II. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF STANDARD AND SCOPE OF

REVIEW

With respect to appeals from a lower court, the Commonwealth

Court’s review is limited to determining whether findings of fact are

supported by substantial evidence or whether the trial court committed an

error of law, or an abuse of discretion in reaching its action. Allegheny

County Dep’t of Admin Servs. v. A Second Chance, Inc., 13 A.3d 1025 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2011); (citing Piasecki v. Dep’t of Transp., 6 A.3d 1067, 1070 n.7

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)). “The scope of review for a question of law under the

[RTKL] is plenary.” Stein v. Plymouth Twp., 994 A.2d 1179, 1181 n.4 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2010).

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III. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE QUESTION

1. Whether a record generated by a judicial agency, but received by and

in the possession of a Commonwealth or local agency, is subject to

the RTKL when it documents a transaction or activity of that agency?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes.

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IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Court orders received by a local or Commonwealth agency from a

judicial agency are subject to disclosure under the RTKL. The RTKL

provides for separate standards and methods of access for records of

Commonwealth and local agencies and records of judicial agencies. This

separation exists for two (2) purposes: (1) to respect the judiciary’s right to

control its own records, preserving traditional separation of powers, and; (2)

to avoid interfering with the processes that govern the constitutional right of

access to judicial records.

Certain records are “of” both a judicial and a Commonwealth or local

agency, and determining whether they are treated as records of the judiciary

also determines whether they can be accessed through the RTKL. In many

cases, it is appropriate to treat a shared record as judicial, especially when it

primarily documents the activities of the judiciary and is only held by a

Commonwealth or local agency for ministerial purposes. In other cases, a

record generated by a judicial agency may primarily exist to direct the

actions of Commonwealth and local agencies.

The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas correctly found that this

latter type of record, even though generated by a court, primarily documents

a transaction or activity of a local agency, and is, therefore, subject to

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disclosure under the RTKL. Making these records subject to the RTKL

advances the purpose of the RTKL to prohibit secrets and clarify the

workings of the government without interfering with the independence of

the judiciary. Conversely, applying the standard advanced by the Appellant

Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office would place an unintuitive limitation

on executive agencies that has no precedent in Pennsylvania law, without

benefit to judicial independence.

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V. ARGUMENT

The Court orders issued by the Philadelphia County Court of

Common Pleas and transmitted to the Appellant are subject to disclosure

under the RTKL. The orders at issue are an “Order of Conviction” and an

“Order of Sentence” regarding the Appellee Gregory Stover’s criminal case.

The RTKL requires a local or Commonwealth agency to release court orders

when that agency is in possession of those orders and those orders document

a transaction or activity of that agency. Permitting agencies to release this

information reinforces the purpose of the RTKL without impinging the

independence of the issuing court. Such a standard promotes efficiency and

helps to eliminate redundant and misdirected requests. The lower court

correctly interpreted past precedent regarding the separation between

executive and judicial entities.

A. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas’ decision follows this

Court’s past decisions on the subject

In reaching its conclusion, the Appellant cites, but does not analyze,

three opinions by this Honorable Court. A careful reading of these opinions

shows that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas’ decision correctly

applies the rationale this court has relied upon.

The first opinion that the Appellant in this case focused on was Court

of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County v. Pa. Office of Open Records, 2

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A.3d 810 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). In Lackawanna County, the OOR ordered

the disclosure of e-mails from the account of the Director of the Lackawanna

County Office of Domestic Relations on the theory that the Director’s e-mail

account was controlled by the County, even if the Director was an employee

of the judiciary. Id. at 812. This Honorable Court reversed the OOR,

holding that the records of an employee of a judicial agency are records of a

judicial agency, whether or not an executive agency has access to them for

ministerial purposes. Id. at 813. The court further explained that this result

was required by the principle of constitutional separation of powers because

the judiciary must be free to supervise judicial personnel without

interference from the executive branch, including control over judicial

documents. Id. at 813-814.

Here, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas distinguished

Lackawanna County from the instant matter by noting that Lackawanna

County dealt with an officer of a judicial agency, but it did not distinguish

the two based on the character of the records sought. Stover v. Phila. Dist.

Attorney’s Office, 2016 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 507, *3. Specifically,

the records in Lackawanna County documented the daily work and internal

affairs of an employee of a judicial agency, and the County had access to

these records only for ministerial purposes. In contrast to the instant case,

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the Appellee is seeking a court order—a document written by the judiciary

but transmitted to a local agency in order to inform and compel the actions

of that agency.

In the second opinion cited by Appellant, Grine v. County of Centre,

138 A.3d 88 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), this Honorable Court held that Centre

County was prohibited from releasing telephone records related to the judges

of the Centre County Court of Common Pleas. Although the records were in

the possession of the County’s administrative offices and generated through

a contract paid for by the County, this Honorable Court explained that the

telephone records documented the actions and business of the Court of

Common Pleas. Id. at 96-97, 100. Both the text of the RTKL and the

principle of separation of powers mandated that such documents remained

records “of” the judiciary, and properly subject to the judiciary’s control,

because the primary purpose of the records was to document the activities of

judicial officers. Id. at 94, 97-98.

Here, the situation is nearly reversed, as the request underlying this

appeal seeks a document generated by a judicial agency, but transmitted for

the explicit purpose of directing and guiding the actions of a local agency.

In Grine, this Honorable Court explained that a record is “of” an agency

when it “documents a transaction or activity of the agency.” Id. at 94. The

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court orders sought in this case document the final ruling of a trial court, but

exist to inform and direct the actions of the local agencies that possess it.

Grine is the most comprehensive interpretation of records in the

possession of both judicial and Commonwealth/local agencies, and it

provides the most support for the proposition that when a record is “of” a

Commonwealth/local agency and judicial agency, the judiciary must control

it. Id. at 96-97, 100. The records in the Grine case, however, are

distinguishable from the record sought in this appeal. Id. The holding in

Grine reaffirms the basic premise of Lackawanna County: that a local

agency’s possession of records that primarily document the activities of

personnel of the uniform judicial system is no basis for that agency to

assume control of such records. Id. at 100, 95 (“The location of the record

or an agency’s possession does not guarantee that a record is accessible to

the public; rather, the character of the record controls.”). As discussed in

greater detail below, the judicial orders sought in this appeal do not raise the

same separation of powers concerns as the records in Grine. Id.

Finally, in the last case cited by the Appellant, Faulk v. Philadelphia

Clerk of Courts, 116 A.3d 1183, 1186 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), this Court

conducted a review of the RTKL as it pertains to judicial agencies. There a

requester sought records from a judicial agency, and appealed to the OOR.

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In Faulk this Honorable Court upheld the OOR’s dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction, and went on to explain that the requested order was not a public

record under the RTKL because it was sought from a judicial agency. Id. at

1186-88. The court further explained in Faulk that a “public” record may be

available from a judicial agency under Pennsylvania’s constitutional right to

access court records, but unavailable from a judicial agency under the

RTKL. Id. at 1188.

As in Lackawanna County, the Faulk case turned primarily upon the

nature of the agency responding to the RTKL request. Id. For example

many kinds of records that are routinely available from a District Attorney’s

office under the RTKL are available only under the constitutional right of

access when sought from a judicial entity. Here, it is uncontested that the

Appellee’s request was addressed to a local agency in possession of the

documents sought. See Miller v. County of Center, 135 A.3d 233, 237 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2016) (holding that district attorneys are local agencies under the

RTKL).

The Appellant incorrectly argues that these three cases illustrate that

the origin of the document is the sole, overriding factor in determining

whether a record is of a judicial agency. In contrast, none of these preceding

cases stand for this proposition. Instead, in each case, this Honorable Court

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found that a record of a judicial agency is a record that documents the

transactions or activities of a judicial agency. In this case, the records at

issue document the Appellant’s prosecution of the Appellee, and, therefore,

do not implicate the same separation-of-powers concerns that have shaped

past cases.1

B. Disclosing the requested orders does not implicate the separation

of powers

Releasing the orders does not violate the separation of powers. In past

cases, a major factor supporting the exclusion of records from the RTKL has

been the identity of the agencies to which requests are directed. Two

determinative factors in those cases, the constitutional separation of powers

and the constitutional right of access to records of a judicial agency, are not

issues here. The ability of a Commonwealth or local agency to provide,

upon request, access to judicial orders in its possession that document the

transactions or activities of that agency, neither threatens the independence

of the judiciary nor weakens the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s

1 It is also worth noting that this court has reviewed and affirmed many OOR Final

Determinations where the OOR has denied an appeal for sentencing orders on the basis

that the record did not exist, even though such a determination would have been

precluded by a lack of jurisdiction if they were universally records of a judicial agency.

See, e.g., Sturgis v. Dep’t of Corr., 96 A.3d 445 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014); Gates v. Dep’t of

Corr., 2014 Pa. Cmwlth. Unpub LEXIS 416 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 2014); Whitaker v. Dep’t of

Corr., 2013 Pa. Cmwlth. Unpub. LEXIS 181 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 2013); but see Lawson v.

Phila. Clerk of Courts, 2016 Pa. Cmwlth. Unpub. LEXIS 737 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 2016)

(stating in dicta that sentencing orders are not public records under the RTKL).

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constitutional prerogative to control the functioning of lower courts.

Instead, it provides a means of access to documents that are, by their very

nature, public records.

“The Pennsylvania Constitution establishes three separate, equal and

independent branches of government: the legislature, executive and

judiciary.” Lackawanna County, 2 A.3d at 814. It is uncontested that the

RTKL does not—and cannot—give a Commonwealth or local agency such

as the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office or the OOR control over

records documenting the business of a judicial agency. Id.

In the three (3) prior cases, this Honorable Court identified that the

independence of the judiciary and authority of the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania mandated the conclusion that both the OOR and

Commonwealth or local agencies lack authority over the disposition of the

records of judicial agencies. The rationale is obvious—in each case, a party

sought records documenting judicial activities. A judiciary that does not

control its own release of information could not be called “independent” in

any meaningful way.

Here, it is difficult to conceive of a scenario in which the release of

judicial orders, in the hands of a local agency and documenting the activities

of that local agency, could interfere with the judiciary’s power over its own

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records. As a substantive matter, providing the records requested cannot

endanger judicial independence. On the other hand, prohibiting an agency

from disseminating such records could lead to substantial confusion by

impairing that agency’s ability to fully satisfy RTKL requests.

The Appellant’s case relies primarily on a few sentences from these

prior cases, but rests its argument on the language in the Lackawanna

County decision that determined “no administrative agency may exercise

control over the records generated by personnel of a judicial agency.”

Lackawanna County, 2 A.3d at 813. In Appellant’s response to the Request,

the Appellant’s Agency Open Records Officer wrote: “[p]lease be advised

that the [District Attorney’s Office] is unable to provide responsive

documents for your request because the records you seek are non-financial

judicial records that are not subject to the RTKL.” (Emphasis added.) See

R.R. at 023. The Appellant’s theory limits agencies not only in what they

must do, but also what they are permitted to do.

An ordinary record of an agency may be provided upon an agency’s

discretion, even if it is not subject to the RTKL, 65 P.S. §67.506(c), but a

record barred by separation of powers is barred absolutely. See Lackawanna

County, 2 A.3d at 814 (agency permanently enjoined from releasing records

pertaining to judicial employees); Grine, 138 A.3d at 99 (an executive

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agency cannot use its own discretion to make records of a judicial agency

available under the RTKL). There is no limiting principle to this

construction. If every record created by a court employee is forever solely a

record of that judicial agency, then court orders, newsletters, and perhaps

even formal court opinions may only be disseminated by judicial entities. It

is apparent that the various agencies of Pennsylvania have never previously

considered themselves constrained from disseminating relevant judicial

orders, but that is precisely the stance endorsed by the Appellant.

Furthermore, the Appellant’s argument would lead to the absurd and

incongruous result of court orders not being subject to public disclosure

under the RTKL in the hands of a Commonwealth or local agency, but

otherwise subject to public disclosure in the hands of the judiciary pursuant

to the common-law right of access to court records.

Another problem arises in the context of the purpose of the RTKL—

to grant the people of Pennsylvania the ability to scrutinize their

government. It is well-established that “[i]t is emphatically the province and

duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also PA. CONST. ART. V § 1(“The

judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial

system…”). Once the judiciary speaks, however, it is the duty of the

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executive to carry out the law in accordance with those holdings. PA.

CONST. ART. IV § 2 (“The supreme executive power shall be vested in the

Governor, who shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed…”). It is

not unusual for agencies to disseminate final or injunctive orders, for

example, to alert the public to the new policy that governs them.2 An

agency that cannot share court orders relevant to its own function is an

agency that cannot explain itself to the people it serves.

C. The standard applied by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas

is efficient and furthers the purposes of the RTKL

In articulating its opinion, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas

endorses a simple standard—that the RTKL should apply to “requests for

records in the possession of local agencies that document a transaction or

activity of the agency, even when those records may also be in the

possession of, or generated by a judicial agency.” Stover v. Phila. Dist.

Attorney’s Office, 2016 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 507, *4. This standard

2 Examples of state agencies that regularly post relevant court orders and opinions

on their websites include the State Civil Service Commission,

http://www.scsc.pa.gov/hearings-and-

appeals/Pages/CommonwealthandSupremeCourtDecisions.aspx; the Department of State,

http://www.dos.pa.gov/VotingElections/CandidatesCommittees/CampaignFinance/Docu

ments/o5o_forms_online/Corrected%20Preliminary%20Injunction%20Order.pdf; the

Department of Community and Economic Development,

http://dced.pa.gov/download/commonwealth-court-order-to-confirm-harrisburg-strong-

plan-sept-2013/#.WJCpClUrJhF; and the Department of Corrections,

http://www.cor.pa.gov/General%20Information/Pages/Inmate-Strike-

Index.aspx#.WJCsJVUrJhE.

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parallels the ordinary test for whether a record requested is properly a record

“of” an agency, 65 P.S. § 67.102 (defining “record”), and it avoids

problematic requests as found in the Lackawanna County and Grine cases.

Such a standard is intuitive, because agencies already begin responses

to RTKL requests by asking whether the records sought are records of their

agencies. When an agency receives a request under the RTKL, its open-

records officer must first determine that the information “proves, supports or

evidences” “a transaction or activity of the agency” and that the information

is “created, received or retained” in connection with the activity of the

agency. Pa. Office of Attorney General v. The Phila. Inquirer, 127 A.3d 57,

61 (Cmwlth. 2015) (citing Barkeyville Borough v. Stearns, 35 A.3d 91, 94-

95 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)). The character of a record, properly considered,

immediately informs an official that a record is either of their agency, or of

the judiciary.

Finally, to the extent that there is uncertainty under this test, it is

minimal. Under this test, the origin of a record is informative—after all,

most documents produced by judicial employees and officers will document

only the transactions and activities of a court—but it does not need to be

determinative. This test allows agencies to distribute court orders and

similar documents that are relevant to the activities of the agencies, while

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ensuring that an agency that receives a request for records of the judiciary

can quickly recognize the issue. This standard also permits a requester

under the RTKL to gain access to all of the public documents necessary to

understand the business of government agencies, but it does not place at

issue any records that must be in the sole domain of the judiciary.

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VI. CONCLUSION

The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas properly found that records

produced by a judicial officer that documents the transaction of a local

agency, i.e., the criminal prosecution of the Appellee, are subject to the

RTKL when in the possession of that agency. The standard articulated by

the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas is intuitive, because it only applies

to records that do not threaten the independence of the judiciary in

Pennsylvania. Nothing in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas’ opinion

is contrary to the precedent articulated by this Honorable Court, and the

records at issue in this case are wholly unlike those found to be exclusively

records of the judiciary in the past.

For the reasons set forth above, amici curiae OOR joined by the

ACLU of Pennsylvania, respectfully asks this Honorable Court to enter an

order affirming the opinion of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.

Respectfully submitted,

By: C. Davis /s/ Jordan

__________________________________

Charles Rees Brown, Esq.

Chief Counsel

Supreme Court I.D. Number 70612

Jordan C. Davis, Esq.

Appeals Officer

Supreme Court I.D. Number 321970

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Office of Open Records

Keystone Building, Plaza Level

400 North St.

Harrisburg, PA 17120-0225

T: (717) 346-9903; F: (717) 425-5343

For the Office of Open Records

DATE: February 21, 2017