2004 – No. 22.1

NEA NewsNEA News

N U C L E A R • E N E R G Y • A G E N C Y

In this issue:Trends in waste arising fromnuclear power plants

The evolving role of governmentsin the nuclear energy field

Managing and regulatingorganisational change

Uranium production and demand:timely mining decisions needed

Direct indicators for nuclearregulatory efficiency andeffectiveness

Geological repositories: politicaland technical progress

The regulatory application ofauthorisation in radiologicalprotection

Legislative update: Switzerland

Cov-NEA News 221 5208 11/06/04 12:36 Page 1

NEA News 2004No. 22.1Contents

Facts and opinions

Trends in waste arising from nuclear power plants 4

The evolving role of governments in the nuclear energy field 9

Managing and regulating organisational change in nuclear installations 12

NEA updates

Uranium production and demand:timely mining decisions will be needed 16

Direct indicators for nuclear regulatoryefficiency and effectiveness 18

Geological repositories: political and technical progress 21

The regulatory application ofauthorisation in radiological protection 24

News briefs

New publications

Legislative update: Switzerland 28

29

NEA News is published twice yearly inEnglish and French by the OECD NuclearEnergy Agency. The opinions expressedherein are those of the contributorsalone and do not necessarily reflectthe views of the Organisation or ofits member countries. The material inNEA News may be freely used providedthe source is acknowledged.

All correspondence should beaddressed to:

The Editor, NEA NewsOECD Nuclear Energy Agency12, boulevard des Îles92130 Issy-les-MoulineauxFranceTel.: +33 (0) 1 45 24 10 10Fax: +33 (0)1 45 24 11 10

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency(NEA) was established in 1958 as theOEEC European Nuclear Energy Agencyand took its present designationin 1972 when its membership wasextended to non-European countries.Its purpose is to further internationalco-operation related to the safety,environmental, economic, legal andscientific aspects of nuclear energy.It currently consists of 28 membercountries: Australia, Austria, Belgium,Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark,Finland, France, Germany, Greece,Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands,Norway, Portugal, the Republic of Korea,the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdomand the United States. The EuropeanCommission takes part in the NEA’s workand a co-operation agreement is in forcewith the International Atomic EnergyAgency.

For more information about the NEA,see:

www.nea.fr

Editorial board:Gail H. Marcus

Karen DaifukuCynthia Picot

Production/photo research:Solange QuarmeauAnnette Meunier

Design/layout/graphics:Annette MeunierAndrée Pham Van

Cover page: Salamanca uranium mine (ForoNuclear, Spain); Dounreay laboratory(UKAEA); waste handling at Bohunice NPP(M. Durisova, Slovak Republic); decommis-sioning at Greifswald (Energiewerke NordGmbH, Germany); engineers (NEI, USA).

2

In recent times, the environment surrounding the electricity sector has considerablyevolved. In many OECD countries, there has been a complete restructuring. Newdevelopments include, in some countries, the liberalisation of the electricity market,mergers and acquisitions, an increased role of civil society, energy policy debates,restructuring and reorganisation of government institutions and bodies. The nuclearsector has also been affected by these changes, more so than in other sectors as in thebeginning, nuclear facilities were in government hands.

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and its member countries have over the last yeardevoted time and research as well as reflected on the role of government in the nuclearsector in order to assess, in this new environment, what level of involvement isappropriate. Major considerations include security of supply, safety, waste management,research, non-proliferation of radioactive materials and national securityconsiderations. Is there a consensus among countries that apply different economicpolicies and follow different nuclear strategies? Is there a consensus despite the contrastbetween market-oriented policies and more government-controlled systems?

On the occasion of the NEA’s Steering Committee meeting in April of this year,which coincided with the publication of our study Government and Nuclear Energy,we had the opportunity to discuss and debate the parameters for what is consideredessential to guarantee the continued safe operation of nuclear power plants underliberalised, competitive markets. Clearly, recent experience has shown that the market

Nuclear energy: the role of government

Editorial, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

3

alone cannot dictate policy. Governments have to juggle many interests, but energypolicy must be formulated at that level, taking into consideration a full range of factors.Last year, several NEA member countries experienced severe blackouts and electricityshortages. There has been increased debate on the role of the different productionmeans and distribution grids, evaluating the strength and vulnerabilities of each ofthem. There has also been considerable discussion in many member countries on howto ensure security of supply in the long-term future, whilst caring for the environmentand alleviating climate change when projections show continued growth in energydemand.

The debate is not over. However, it is clear to me that we have reached a commonunderstanding on most of the issues at hand. There are, however, different approachesdepending on the member country. The exchange of views has certainly helped manyin making progress in formulating sound choices.

Luis E. EchávarriNEA Director-General

Editorial, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

4 Facts and opinions, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

I n recognition of theirresponsibility to futuregenerations, governments and the industry havedeployed large resources to ensure a safe approach to the management and dis-posal of radioactive waste.NEA member country govern-ments have implementedcomprehensive legal andregulatory frameworks for thesafe management and disposalof radioactive waste. In addi-tion, governments are sup-porting R&D programmes inthe field of radioactive wastecharacterisation, treatment anddisposal. They are alsoinvolved in the design andimplementation of decision-

making processes for thesiting, licensing and operationof waste repositories adaptedto modern governance and thesocial needs of the twenty-firstcentury.

According to the polluterpays principle, the nuclearindustry assumes responsibilityfor managing the radioactivewaste arising from its activitiesand bears the associated costs.Economic competitiveness, as well as environmental andethical aspects, has led theoperators of nuclear facilitiesto develop and implementways and means to reduce the volumes and toxicity ofradioactive waste arising and the quantities requiring

disposal. Over time, techno-logical progress and improvedmanagement have contributedto reduce significantly theamount of waste arising andthe volumes to be disposed ofper unit of nuclear electricitygenerated.

The following articlefocuses on radioactive wastearising from the operation,maintenance and decommis-sioning of nuclear powerplants, which represent themajor part of waste from thenuclear industry. It reviewspast experience, highlightstrends and gives some insightsinto future prospects forfurther radioactive wastereduction through improvedmanagement and technolog-ical progress, including thedeployment of advancedevolutionary reactors andeventually of innovativenuclear energy systems ofthe fourth generation.

Radioactive waste in perspective

Radioactive waste arisingfrom the use of nuclear energyrepresents small volumes,typically far less than 1% of the overall toxic wastevolumes from non-nuclearactivities in countries with a nuclear industry.

In the context of policies aiming at sustainable development,minimising the quantity of waste generated is a key goal forany industry. The nuclear energy sector is not unique ingenerating unwanted material from which society must beprotected. Toxic wastes arising from many industries andeconomic activities represent much larger volumes thanradioactive waste from the nuclear energy sector. Indeed, thenuclear industry has been particularly attentive to monitoring,controlling and minimising its waste streams.

Trends in waste arisingfrom nuclear powerplants

P. Wilmer*

* At the time of writing, Dr. Peter Wilmer was Head of the NEA NuclearDevelopment Division.

5

In the European Union, forexample, around 5 000 m3

of radioactive waste areproduced each year whereas toxic industrial waste volume amounts tosome 10 000 000 m3. The small volumes of radioactivewaste are manageable and can be isolated from thebiosphere at affordable costsusing available technologies.The footprints of the requiredrepositories are very small in geographical terms.

The approach adopted inthe nuclear industry for themanagement of radioactivewaste is generally to treat andcondition waste materials toensure their confinement, safe storage and disposal inrepositories isolated from theaccessible environment. Someother industrial sectors havedifferent approaches to manag-ing their residues, for exampleby relying on release anddispersion in the environmentat concentration levels belowauthorised thresholds.

Following this conditioningand confinement approach,some types of radioactivewaste are already beingdisposed of in a number of repositories that exist inseveral OECD countries. The repositories already inoperation are designed for the more benign categories of waste. The disposal of other categories has beenstudied and analysed withpractical, tangible projectsbeing developed. Based uponthis research and experience at the laboratory level, expertsare confident that the man-agement and disposal of all types of radioactive waste can be accomplishedsatisfactorily (NEA, 1999).However, beyond scientificand engineering issuesinvolved in radioactive wastemanagement, regulatory

frameworks and decision-making processes are keyfactors for the social accep-tance of the options selected.

Generally, it is a goodtechnical practice to minimisewaste volumes for technical,safety and economic reasons.A well-compacted waste, ableto withstand geologicalpressures, provides stabilitywithin a repository andrequires less space. However,this logic does not apply toradioactive materials thatgenerate heat as their closeproximity may lead totemperatures higher than the maximum at which theintegrity of waste packages is sure to be maintained. These two aspects are takeninto account in the radioac-tive waste managementapproaches being developedand implemented in OECDcountries.

Specification of radioactivewaste

Radioactive waste isnormally classified into a small number of categories,based on the concentration of radioactive material itcontains and the time forwhich it will remainradioactive. Radiation isemitted by radionuclidescontained in the waste. Theradiation which they emitvaries in its fundamentalnature, in its energy and withtime. Furthermore, they arefrequently incorporated indifferent molecules whichbehave differently and towhich human life and theenvironment are vulnerable to various extents; radiotox-icity is a measure of thisvulnerability.

The establishment of asimple, comprehensive, uni-versal categorisation of radio-active waste is challenging and

the absence of internationallyagreed categories of radio-active waste makes compar-isons between countries andassessment of worldwidetrends somewhat difficult.However, most countries haveestablished well-definedcategories in the national legaland regulatory frameworkswhich are used for wastemanagement and disposalpurposes. In general, thecategorisation adopted can be summarised according tothree main types: low-level,intermediate-level and high-level waste.

Radioactive material,whether produced byirradiation or contamination in nuclear energy facilities, is invariably associated withnon-active materials, such assome form of structure. Thequantity of waste to bemanaged and disposed ofdepends on the extent towhich the radioactivity hasbeen separated from non-active material. The wastemanager needs to take accountof the benign material as wellas of the radioactivity. Also,additional material is oftenadded to raw radioactive waste as part of the process of preparing it for storage and disposal, increasing thevolumes to be disposed of but facilitating handling andenhancing safety barriers.

Radioactive waste fromplant operation

The operation of nuclearpower plants generatesradioactive waste, generally in the low-level or medium-level and low-heat wastecategories. Because of the cost of operational wastetransportation and disposal,and of the need to meetsustainable developmentpolicy objectives, operators of nuclear power plants have

Trends in waste arising from nuclear power plants, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

6 Facts and opinions, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

progressively reduced thevolume of this type of waste.

Operational waste vol-umes have been reduceddramatically throughimproved managementpractices and the imple-mentation of advanced tech-nologies for waste treatmentand packaging. In the UnitedStates, the volumes of low-level waste from nuclearfacility operation disposed of dropped significantlybetween 1980 and the early1990s in spite of the increas-ing number of nuclear powerplants in operation. In France,the same trend has beenobserved as shown in theFigure, illustrating the evolu-tion of operational wastevolumes in the last decade.

Decommissioning waste

The structural materialwhich comprises the nuclearreactor core and its immediatesurroundings generally con-stitutes radioactive waste,mostly low- and intermediate-level waste, when the plant isshut down at the end of itslifetime, decommissioned and

dismantled. The volumes arequite large as compared withthose arising annually duringplant operation; indicatively, it is estimated that futuredecommissioning waste willrepresent 80% of the totalwaste arising from nuclearelectricity generation whileoperational waste representssome 18%.

The mass and volume of the decommissioning wastewill remain broadly constantirrespective of the life of theplant. The quantity of radio-active material contained indecommissioning wasteincreases as plant life pro-ceeds but at a rate reducedrelative to time. Plant lifeextension, a growing practicetoday, reduces the mass andvolume of waste arising perunit of electricity generated.

The opportunity forreducing the quantities ofdecommissioning waste onceplant operation has started islimited in the absence oftechnological breakthroughs in the field of waste treatment.However, efficient plantoperation and management

lowers contamination andwaste arising to a certainextent.

In the long term, thegreatest opportunities forimprovement rest with plantdesigners, and the potentialsuppliers of new designs ofnuclear facilities are verycognisant of the fact.Advanced Generation III+reactors, such as the evo-lutionary EPR or the AP1000,are designed for lifetimes of 60 years and to reduce thevolume of decommissioningwaste to be managed. This willalso be the case for Genera-tion IV reactors, which will bebased on innovative concepts.

High-level waste andirradiated nuclear fuel

This waste categoryincludes spent fuel dischargedfrom reactors in countrieswhich have chosen the once-through fuel cycle option, andhigh-level waste from repro-cessing in countries whichhave opted for the closedcycle. Irradiated fuel and high-level waste, although

200

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Evolution of operational waste quantities and nuclearelectricity generation in France

representing only a few percent of the total radioactivewaste volume arising fromnuclear energy activities(around 2% for the closedcycle option), is the mainfocus of attention of theindustry, government policymakers and the public. Thecauses of this attention are thelarge amount of radioactivitycontained in high-level waste,the heat generated by this type of waste and, moreover,the long-term stewardshiprequired to ensure the safemanagement and disposal ofthe long-lived radionuclidescontained in this wastecategory.

Regarding spent fuel,technological progress inreactor operation has led to a continuous reduction ofvolumes per unit of electricitygeneration. While no signif-icant breakthrough has occur-red that would entail a dra-matic decrease of spent fuelvolumes, significant gainshave resulted from higherplant efficiency and enhancedfuel management schemes.The trend of operators world-wide has been to move to fuelelement designs and fuel man-agement schemes whichincrease the energy, andconsequently electricity,produced from a given fuelassembly, which itself islargely unchanged in its massor volume. The reasons forthis move have been to reducethe volumes of waste to betransported and stored, toimprove economics as well as to lower environmentalimpacts.

The trend of higher burn-upis illustrated for example bylight water reactors (LWRs),which constitute more than80% of the installed capacityin OECD countries: the aver-age burn-up of dischargedLWR fuels increased by some

50% between the early 1960sand the year 2000, reachingnow around 45 GWd/tHM or more. The spent fuel vol-ume reductions obtained byincreasing burn-ups, however,is accompanied by higher spe-cific radioactivity of the wastedestined for disposal.

The composition andradioactivity of irradiated fueldepends on fuel managementin the reactor core. As irra-diation of fuel increases, theproduction of those specificradionuclides of critical con-cern to geological repositorydesigners in the longer term,the so-called long-livedactinides, increases. Therehave been benefits of theimproved fuel utilisation inthis regard in terms of theactinides produced by thegeneration of a unit of elec-tricity but the effect is limitedto about 15%. This is illus-trated in the Table which pre-sents suppliers’ data for themost recent plants commis-sioned in France (N4) and forthe design now under con-struction in Finland (EPR).(The suppliers’ data does notpresume the final fuel man-agement schemes chosen byplant owners.)

Reprocessing nuclear fuel to retrieve fissile materials,

uranium and plutonium,greatly reduces the volume of heat-generating waste for disposal but gives rise to increased amounts ofintermediate-level waste. Therecycling of fissile materialsalso reduces the fresh uraniumrequirements thereby reducingthe waste from uraniummining. For example, with the current or evolutionarygeneration of light waterreactors, recycling uraniumand plutonium once in MOXfuel reduces uranium orerequirements by around 10%(NEA, 2002a). Reprocessingfollowed by recycling alsoreduces significantly theamounts of plutonium andneptunium sent to HLWrepositories (see Table).

Innovative reactors andfuel cycles

Innovative nuclear energysystems are designed forreducing the volumes andradioactivity of waste, inparticular through enhancedefficiency or more compre-hensive recycling of fissilematerials (GIF, 2002). The very high temperature reactor,for example, is aiming at anet thermal efficiency of 50%or more and could achieveaverage fuel burn-up

7Trends in waste arising from nuclear power plants, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

PWR – N4 type PWR – EPR type PWR – EPR typeUOx fuel UOx fuel 100% MOX fuel

45 GWd/tHM 60 GWd/tHM 60 GWd/tHM

Plutonium 31.1 26.1 -65.6Neptunium 1.87 2.02 0.263Americium 0.628 0.759 4.77Curium 0.00592 0.0674 3.64

Total actinides 33.8 29.2 -56.9

Actinides produced in nuclear fuel (kg/TWh)

8 Facts and opinions, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

exceeding 100 GWd/tHM,reducing by a factor of four at least the volume of spentfuel to be disposed of per unit of electricity generated.The sodium-cooled fast reactoris aiming at similar targets interms of efficiency and burn-up with the additionaladvantage of a closed fuelcycle eventually resulting in the recovery and recyclingof nearly 100% of minoractinides.

In the long term, closed fuel cycles including parti-tioning and transmutation(P&T) of minor actinides havethe potential to achieve ahundred-fold radiotoxicityreduction over a period ofmore than a century (NEA,2002b). The design of suchschemes, however, stillrequires large R&D pro-grammes and extensive peri-ods of research and testing to validate the concepts anddemonstrate their feasibilitybefore their implementationcould be considered. A robusteconomic assessment of P&Tis difficult to conduct at thisstage but the benefits of low-ering the stewardship burdenof future generations wouldhave to be factored into aneventual cost/benefit analysis.

Concluding remarks

The rate at which nuclearwaste is accumulated from thegeneration of electricity hasbeen progressively reducedthrough technological progressand good facility managementpractices. Waste volume reduc-tions achieved in the past havebeen significant regardingoperational waste, in particulardue to improved plant man-agement and the introductionof advanced conditioning andpackaging methods.

The evolutionary reactordesigns being built today will

continue this trend. Lightwater reactors achievinghigher efficiency and higherburn-up will contribute toreducing the volumes of wasteper unit of electricity gener-ated even further. Improvedcore design and fuel manage-ment strategies will also leadto significant gains in terms of minor actinide content ofdischarged irradiated fuel.Furthermore, the reproces-sing and recycling optionimplemented in some OECDcountries contributes toreducing the radiotoxicity of HLW sent to repositories as well as the requirements for fresh uranium.

In the long term, innovativereactors and fuel cycles underconsideration or developmentcould greatly reduce specificcomponents of the waste,notably the long-lived minoractinides. However, innovationtakes time and such nuclearenergy systems are notexpected to be ready fordeployment before a fewdecades. Furthermore, fuelcycles involving partitioningand transmutation will requirea century or more of operationto bring significant benefits in terms of waste toxicityreduction. In due course, acomprehensive cost/benefitanalysis will be required toassess fully the economic,environmental and socialdimensions of these innova-tive options.

Irrespective of potentialfuture improvements, thedesign and operation ofexisting and evolutionarynuclear energy systems isoriented towards the man-agement of radioactive wasteaccording to the principles of sustainable development.Evolutionary designs enhancethe trend towards minimisa-tion of radioactive wastevolumes and toxicity already

achieved with the presentgeneration of nuclear powerplants.

Radioactive waste should beconsidered in perspective, inthe context of waste and otherburdens arising from industrialactivities that support eco-nomic and social develop-ment. The volumes andtoxicity of radioactive wastearising from electricity gen-eration are not such that theycreate an insuperable techni-cal or economic challenge.Societal understanding andacceptance of the implemen-tation of technical solutionsthat experts find satisfactoryremains a challenge. Thelicensing and commissioningof repositories for all types ofwaste, in particular HLW, insome member countries willbe a major step forward in thisregard.

References

1. Generation IV InternationalForum (GIF), 2002, A TechnologyRoadmap for Generation IVSystems , USDOE, Washington,DC, USA.

2. NEA (2002a), Trends in the NuclearFuel Cycle, OECD, Paris.

3. NEA (2002b), Accelerator-drivenSystems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR)in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles: AComparative Study, OECD, Paris.

4. NEA (1999), Geological Disposal ofRadioactive Waste: Review ofDevelopments in the Last Decade,OECD, Paris.

Further reading

1. NEA (2003), Nuclear Energy Today,OECD, Paris.

2. NEA (2000), Nuclear Energy in aSustainable Development Perspective,OECD, Paris.

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9Facts and opinions, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

G overnment and NuclearEnergy 1 looks at the role of governments in the evolvingcontext of the three main goalsof energy policy in NEA mem-ber countries: adequate andsecure supply; competitivemarkets and prices; and sus-tainable development, includ-ing goals for climate changeand air quality. The reportexamines some of the forcesthat influence the degree ofgovernment intervention, whiletrying to avoid issues ofideology.

Governments have beendeeply involved in the devel-opment of nuclear energy.Some of them initiated and ledthe development of nuclearenergy since its military begin-nings in World War II, becauseof its strategic nature and thescope of its risks and benefits.Governments later supportedthe development of civiliannuclear energy, primarily for

the generation of electricity. In the post-war period, gov-ernments played an increasingoverall role in the economiesof the industrial countries.Science and technology wereessential instruments of gov-ernment action and nuclearenergy was a highly visiblesymbol of their successfulapplication.

In the 1980s and 1990s,problems with exclusive gov-ernment ownership and controlof production equipmentappeared. Governments cameunder pressure to cut expen-ditures and diminish theirdirect involvement in the econ-omy. Expanding internationaltrade forced all industries to bemore competitive. Marketswere championed as an alter-native to government directionand regulation. Simultaneously,environmental protection andthe concept of sustainabledevelopment increased in

importance in policy making,whilst the need to ensuresecurity of energy suppliespersisted or even increased.

In the current era of pri-vatisation and competitivemarkets, governments still have an essential role inenergy, electricity and nuclear energy. While in some countries they may not exercise as much direct control through ownership and economic regulation as in the past, they still have thebasic responsibility for creat-ing policy frameworks withinwhich market forces canfunction and public policygoals can be achieved. So, with fewer direct instruments,governments will need alter-native policy measures.

Why governmentsintervene and when

The reasons for governmentintervention in nuclear energyhave evolved as governmentsconfront their limits. Privatisa-tion and competition mean thatmany decisions are no longerdirectly made by governments.However, there will always bestrategic reasons for govern-ment intervention – nationalsecurity; emergencies, disastersand health crises; nationalprojects of such importance or

The evolving role ofgovernments in thenuclear energy field

The NEA Nuclear Development Committee (NDC) recentlycompleted a study that looks into the evolving role ofgovernments in nuclear energy matters. Many decisions ongovernment intervention in recent decades have been basedon the earlier experience of what works best. The reportsuggests some considerations that all governments couldtake into account when establishing their respective roles.

urgency that only governmentcan do the job. By and large,the current sentiment in mostOECD countries is that thegovernment should interveneonly when it is in the bestposition to carry out the taskand when the benefits ofintervention outweigh thecosts. In fact, the role ofgovernments in nuclear energyvaries considerably betweencountries, according to theirspecific history and situation.

The economic, social andenvironmental reasons forgovernment interventiongenerally fall into two cate-gories: market failure toallocate resources efficiently,and equity or distribution

concerns. Market failure mayrelate to several issues, some of which overlap: publicgoods, infrastructure, exter-nalities, information and competitive behaviour.However, even if there is a

case for government inter-vention, that intervention itselfshould be well designed andmanaged. Both markets andgovernment action can fail,thereby affecting the customersand societies that they serve.The government should havethe competence and resourcesto carry out its interventionseffectively.

Actual and recommendedinvolvement

The most important gov-ernment role is setting over-all policy for the economy,energy and the environment,with an adequate base inlegislation and institutional

competence. In particular,governments should haveclear strategies for achievingall three main goals of energypolicy over the comingdecades. They should showhow they will meet climate

change and air quality goals,given the current and prospec-tive market dominance of fossilfuels, as well as how to ensurelong-term security of supply in open market conditions. In this situation, governmentshave hard choices to makeabout whether, when and howto intervene in order to achievethe full range of policy goals.

In privatising and openingmarkets to competition, gov-ernments should make surethat they respect some basicprinciples. For markets, theyhave an ongoing responsibilityto ensure fairness, access,transparency and effectiveregulation and to provide the public goods that markets

may not otherwise deliver.Governments should ensuresecurity of supply, throughincentives or other meansguaranteeing that generatingand transmission capacity aswell as reserve margins are

10 Facts and opinions, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

Private, mixed, or public2 Market share of top 3 firms3

Belgium M 96Canada M high*Czech Republic PU* (high)Finland M 45France PU 92Germany PR 64Hungary (PU) (high)Japan PR (high)Korea (PU) (high)Mexico (PU) (high)Netherlands M 59Slovak Republic (PU) (high)Spain PR 83Sweden M 90Switzerland PR (high)United Kingdom PR 36United States PR (variable)

* NEA Secretariat estimate.

Electricity sector ownership and concentration

adequate, and that the grid iseffectively regulated to avoidsevere fluctuations, or evenworse, blackouts.

Governments have a role in looking at the long term to compensate for the highdiscount rate and short-termperspective of competitivemarkets, through appropriatetax incentives or othermechanisms. In particular, they should carry out longer-term and fundamental R&Dwith a sustainable develop-ment perspective in mind. They should also assess R&Don the basis of its contributionto achieving the three energypolicy goals.

Governments should try as much as possible to treatnuclear energy on a similarbasis to other energy sources,while keeping in mind itsunique properties. They shouldsponsor studies that comparethe full life-cycle costs andimpacts, including risks, acrossthe spectrum of energy sourcesand uses. They should alsointernalise the external costs of all energy activities on aneven basis. Regulation andliability for radioactive wasteshould be in line with those for other activities.

Regulation of nuclear safetyand security remains a corefunction of government. Itshould guarantee the existenceof an independent, competentregulator with adequateresources and authority. Theemphasis now is on the safetyculture of organisations, begin-ning at the most senior levels.This brings in the need toensure good governance.Nuclear regulation should be in line with modern regulatorypractice across the government,allowing nuclear energy tocompete fairly. Governmentslooking for a future contribu-tion from nuclear energyshould ensure that regulation

is prepared to deal with issuesof decommissioning, refurbish-ment, uprating, life extensionand new reactor designs.

Governments should lookbeyond regulation to othermeans of influencing thebehaviour of operators andinvestors. Economic instru-ments will be important in this regard. Governments will have a role in setting up public processes for thesiting and approval of nuclearinstallations, including wastemanagement facilities.

Governments have a role in ensuring that flexible, step-wise policies are in place forthe long-term management ofwastes and that funds andinstitutions are available tocarry out the plans. Theyshould oversee the imple-mentation of policy to ensureprogress toward waste man-agement goals.

Governments should ensurethat the public is adequatelyinformed about energy policyand that there is adequateopportunity for public partic-ipation in key energy deci-sions. Processes for decisionsshould incorporate the bestscientific information as well as a broad spectrum of publicviews. Governments shouldtake leadership on longer-termenergy policy issues and pro-vide clear justification forpreferred options. They shouldalso ensure that they and thepublic can continue to accessbasic information about energythat may not flow freely in aderegulated regime.

Governments clearly have a lead role in diversion resis-tance, non-proliferation andnational security. This includesresponsibility for the physicalsecurity of critical infrastruc-ture, including nuclear facil-ities. Governments shouldguard against the use of nuc-lear power materials as radio-

logical weapons. They shouldalso ensure that new fuel cycleand reactor designs have built-in resistance to proliferationfrom the start.

The internationaldimension

Intergovernmental co-operation will continue to be essential in the field ofnuclear energy. Concernsabout nuclear safety andenvironmental impacts can be effectively addressedthrough international co-operation and technicalassistance. The harmonisationof safety and radiation pro-tection standards is helpful in increasing public under-standing, especially in emer-gency situations. Joint projectson future reactor designs canmake efficient use of limitednational resources. In addition,international consensus andstate-of-the-art reports cancontribute to public discus-sions on nuclear energy.

Notes

1. This article is an extract of theExecutive Summary of Govern-ment and Nuclear Energy, ISBN92-64-01538-8.

2. International Energy Agency (1996),The Role of IEA Governments inEnergy, OECD, Paris.

3. Commission of the European Com-munities SEC(2002)1038, Commis-sion Staff Working Paper: SecondBenchmarking Report on theImplementation of the InternalElectricity and Gas Market ,Brussels, Belgium.

11The evolving role of governments in the nuclear energy field, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

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Nuclear energy companiesare, like any organisation,subject to change. They mustadapt to meet the differentdemands which are placed onthem as they move throughthe life cycle from constructionand commissioning, throughoperation, and finally todecommissioning. They arealso increasingly required toadapt to a more challengingcommercial environment aselectricity markets areliberalised.

One of the costs that isoften perceived as beingamenable to control is staffing,and hence there is significantexploration of new strategiesfor managing this cost – for

example, by reducing staffinglevels, changing organisationalstructures, adopting new shiftstrategies, introducing newtechnology or increasing theproportion of work carried outby external contractors.However, if changes to staffinglevels or organisationalstructures and systems areinadequately conceived orexecuted, they have thepotential to affect the way inwhich safety is managed.Moreover, it may be especiallydifficult for a utility torecognise and recover fromproblems arising from changesimplemented some time ago.These factors suggest thatnuclear regulators may wish

to have confidence thatutilities are planning andmanaging change in such away that it does not compro-mise nuclear safety.

Need for management ofchange and structuredreview processes

Both the utility (licensee)and the regulator should haveprocesses in place to ensurethat organisational change isproperly managed. Theregulator may wish to gain an early and accurateawareness of any proposedorganisational change whichhas the potential to impactnuclear safety. It is useful forthe licensee if the regulator’sposition is stated clearly andapplied consistently, thusreducing uncertainty whichimpairs the licensee’s capabil-ity to manage its own affairs.The regulator could thereforestate formally the process bywhich organisational changeswill be subject to regulatoryscrutiny and develop relevant,practical and transparentcriteria for assessing organ-isational change.

The regulator may not wish to examine all of thelicensee’s proposals forchange. This would be time-consuming and would impactadversely on the licensee’s

12 Facts and opinions, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

To the extent that organisational change in nuclear instal-lations can potentially impact nuclear safety, it is imperativeto ensure that such change is properly managed and regulated.A number of key elements can help achieve successfulmanagement of change.

Managing and regulatingorganisational change in nuclear installations

P. Pyy, C. Reiersen*

* Dr. Pekka Pyy (pekka.pyy@oecd.org) works in the NEA Nuclear SafetyDivision. Dr. Craig Reiersen (craig.reiersen@hse.gsi.gov.uk) works in theNuclear Installations Inspectorate of the UK Health & Safety Executive.

This article summarises the key findings of the 2001 NEA/CSNI Workshop onthe Regulatory Aspects of the Management of Change, which are alsocaptured in the recently published CSNI Technical Opinion Paper No. 5.

management processes.Instead, both regulator andlicensee could acknowledgethat organisational change canbe treated in much the sameway as modifications to plantand equipment. The regulatormay therefore require theutility to develop a process for managing change which is akin to the process formanaging plant modifications.That process could set out theway in which proposals forchange are derived, assessedand implemented.

A rigorous process ofchange would include anumber of key elements:● reference to an organ-

isational “baseline”;● a statement of proposed

change;● categorisation of safety

significance;● an assessment and review

of the change proposal inaccordance with categori-sation;

● an implementation pro-gramme and the use ofperformance indicators;

● a review of change post-implementation.

These elements comprisepart of a safety managementsystem or quality system fororganisational change man-agement, and as such theyshould each be subject toperiodic review and audit bylicensee and regulator. Each of these elements is discussedbelow.

Key elements ofsuccessful management of change

Firstly, the licensees may be encouraged to analyse and document their currentorganisational structures andresources. This documenta-tion, which can be regarded as a statement of how thecompany is able to ensure that nuclear safety is properlymanaged, can be described

as a “baseline assessment”. It provides the starting pointagainst which any proposedchange to organisational struc-tures and resources can bejudged. The change, onceimplemented, then becomesincorporated as part of thecompany’s updated baselineassessment.

Some regulators may alsoexpect the licensee’s baselineassessment to identify vulner-abilities to loss of specificresources, for example wherea single person is the princi-pal source of knowledge oncertain safety matters, and to identify contingencymeasures. Confidence that the licensee understands itsresource and competenceneeds, and maintains an effec-tive organisational structure,may be gained from evidencethat the licensee has devel-oped performance indicatorswhich monitor safety per-formance and confirm thatnuclear safety functions arebeing discharged effectively.Such indicators effectivelyserve to validate the assump-

tions which underpin thebaseline assessment and toidentify weaknesses.

The licensee’s changeprocess ideally starts with astatement of what the changeentails, why it is beingintroduced and what it isintended to achieve. Clarity of management responsibilityis important, and the processshould identify who isresponsible for proposing,managing and reviewing thechange. The programme forintroducing the change, andthe provisions for subjecting it to peer review, or self-assessment, should be defined. Also the timing of,and interaction with, theregulator should ideally beacknowledged.

Modifications to plant andequipment are categorised in accordance with theirnuclear safety significance.Modifications to organisa-tional structures and resourcesmay be treated analogously.The resulting categorisationcan then be used to define the scope and quality of

13Managing and regulating organisational change in nuclear installations, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

An example of managing change in the UK

In 1988, the UK government announced that it saw no short-term future for fast reactor technology, and that the UKAEADounreay Prototype Fast Reactor would close in 1994. Thisled to a major rundown in staffing of UKAEA. Between 1988and 1993, staff numbers fell from 13 600 to 8 300. In 1994,UKAEA split its activities into three business groups, inpreparation for the sale of two of these businesses to the pri-vate sector. This change of emphasis and the staff reductionssignificantly reduced UKAEA’s technical base, and left it need-ing to buy a number of services from contractors, includingthose to whom it had just sold parts of its business. The UKNuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) raised concernsabout this restructuring and advised UKAEA of its intentionto conduct an audit of the management of safety atDounreay. The audit was postponed to allow UKAEA’s newChief Executive to assess the situation, and for UKAEA toconduct its own review.

justification. Higher categorychanges may include arequirement for the changeproposal to be subject toregulatory agreement. Byadopting such an approach,the licensee and regulator canreach an agreement on thosechanges that warrant regula-tory scrutiny and those whereregulatory intervention is notneeded, e.g. because regu-latory intervention woulddelay changes that have apositive effect or that have no appreciable safety impact.

Ordinarily, organisationalchange proposals would bejustified by carrying out a levelof analysis which is propor-tionate to the potential impactof the change on nuclearsafety. The potential cumu-lative effects of a series ofsmall changes should also beconsidered when seeking toensure an appropriate level of analysis.

It is likely that most pro-posals for change will try todemonstrate that there remainsufficient competent persons

to deliver safety functions, thatmanagement responsibilitiesare clearly defined, and thattraining needs and proceduralmodifications have beenrecognised. However, if it is to offer insight, the analysisalso needs to consider thespecific risks associated withthe change. This will in turnhelp to identify specific factorswhich need to be addressed inthe justification of a proposalfor change.

A programme for imple-menting the change needs tobe developed. The programmeshould identify those elementsof the change which need to be completed in order toenable subsequent stages of the change to proceed (e.g. preparation of revisedprocedures, training, reloca-tion of staff, etc). A formalproject management plan mayneed to be drawn up to helpthe management of morecomplex or extensive changes.

The regulator will gainconfidence that the change is suitably controlled if the

licensee puts in place indica-tors to monitor the effects ofthe change. These indicatorsshould be designed so thatthey present early warningsignals of problems – forexample, increased workinghours, reduction in “right firsttime” maintenance, or amountof peer review comment onsafety cases.

Finally, the regulator mayexpect the licensee’s changeprocess to specify the conductof a formal review stage. Thiswill ordinarily be the finalstage of each change pro-gramme, although for morecomplex, extensive or signifi-cant changes, interim reviewsmight also be warranted.

What are the otherpotential pitfalls

Ideally, the utility changemanagement process is clearand visible to the regulator. For instance, it may formallyacknowledge the regulator’srole, and the timing of itsinteractions with the licensee.In turn, the regulator shouldexpress its own views clearly,and there must be an agreedend-point to the changeprogramme.

The importance of goodcommunication between theregulator and the utility cannotbe over-estimated. Dialoguehelps to ensure a commonperception of the importanceof specific issues. Where jobchanges and personnel redun-dancy are being planned,licensee staff will be anxiousabout their job security and the timing of the changes. Theregulator may therefore helpthe licensee ensure that thisuncertainty is minimised – for example, by giving thelicensee guidance on the typeof information that should beincluded in the change pro-posal, and by giving clear andearly feedback on licensee

14 Facts and opinions, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

Following up on change

On 7 May 1998, an incident occurred in which a mechanicaldigger damaged an 11kV electrical cable cutting power sup-plies to the fuel cycle area of the Dounreay site. Accordingto the NII audit of the management of safety, organisa-tional changes made within UKAEA had so weakened themanagement and technical base at Dounreay that it wasnot in a good position to tackle its principal mission, whichis the decommissioning of the site. The audit also foundthat UKAEA was over-dependent on contractors for thedelivery of many of the key functions that NII would expectto see under the clear control of UKAEA as the licensee forthe site. NII’s audit findings3 resulted in significantchanges to the organisation and staffing within UKAEA,with steps being taken to bring many of the key functionsback in-house and restore UKAEA’s ability to operate as anintelligent customer.

15

proposals. However, the reg-ulator must be aware of theimpact of its own actions onlicensee behaviour, and carefulnot to constrain unnecessarilythe licensee’s choice of actionor to impose inappropriatedemands.

Organisational changeswhich involve outsourcingroles previously performed bylicensee personnel can raiseissues which also warrant closeregulatory scrutiny. Regulatorsneed to be aware of and assessthe licensee approaches tocontractorisation. The licenseemust always retain its compe-tence and capability to assessthe quality of work, and toapply the same standards tocontractors as to its own staff,where applicable. The regu-lator may therefore consider itimportant that the licenseeprovides a rigorous demon-stration that it retains theability to act as an intelligentcustomer.

Furthermore, organisationalchange, particularly when thatchange is on a large scale, mayhave implications for thelicensee’s ability to maintain an adequate corporate memory– that is, to retain, understandand use intelligently informa-tion about the design, oper-ation and maintenance of theplant and, eventually, itsdecommissioning. The regula-tor may expect the licensee’schange proposals to include asuitable treatment of corporatememory issues. For example,the licensee could show howits succession managementarrangements ensure thatinformation and understandingare retained during and follow-ing a change. This may includecapturing and documentingspecific knowledge from expe-rienced personnel, and makingarrangements to secure thecontinued availability of keypersonnel.

Effective management offactors influencing staffmorale, attitudes and motiva-tion is central to the process of managing organisationalchange. It is reasonable for theregulator to seek confirmationthat the licensee is activelyconsidering these factors andtaking steps to sustain moraleand a positive safety culture.Open and regular communi-cation with staff is likely to bean important feature of thelicensee’s change managementprocess. Although the regula-tor may engage in discussionwith licensee staff, and maydescribe the regulatory processwhich the licensee mustfollow, it should be mindful of the need to maintain itsregulatory detachment and not to undermine licenseemanagement.

The principles set out in this article apply to organisa-tional changes planned by thelicensee. It should be recog-nised that change can also be unplanned – for example,when a person leaves thelicensee or when labour iswithdrawn because of indus-trial relations problems. Insuch circumstances, theregulator would expect thelicensee to have arrangementsin place for ensuring thedelivery of safety functions to cope without application of a formal change manage-ment process. If the unplannedevent subsequently leads to adecision to change thelicensee’s organisationalstructures or its resource orcompetence requirements,then it would be logical for the licensee’s management of change process to apply.

Concluding remarks

Organisational change, ifnot properly conceived andmanaged, can affect nuclearsafety. The Special Expert

Group on Human and Organi-sational Factors (SEGHOF) ofthe NEA Committee on theSafety of Nuclear Installations(CSNI) has sought to raise theawareness of licensees andregulators alike by organisingmeetings and workshops1 todiscuss the issues involvedand by producing a TechnicalOpinion Paper2. The SEGHOFcontinues to carry out work in this area, and the impor-tance of effective managementof change throughout thetransition from operation todecommissioning will bediscussed at the forthcominginternational workshop on“Safe, Efficient, and Cost-effective Decommissioning” to be held in Rome, Italy on 6-10 September 2004.

Notes

1. NEA/CSNI/R(2002)20, Workshop on the Regulatory Aspects of theManagement of Change – Chester,UK, 10-12 September 2001:Summary and Conclusions.OECD/NEA, Paris.

2. NEA (2004), CSNI TechnicalOpinion Paper No. 5: Managingand Regulating OrganisationalChange in Nuclear Installations.OECD/NEA, Paris.

3. UK Health & Safety Executive(1998), Safety Audit of Dounreay,HSE Books, London.

Further reading

1. INSAG-18 (2003), ManagingChange in the Nuclear Industry:The Effects on Safety. A Report byThe International Nuclear SafetyAdvisory Group, IAEA, Vienna.

2. IAEA TECDOC 1226 (2001),Managing Change in NuclearUtilities, IAEA, Vienna.

Managing and regulating organisational change in nuclear installations, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

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16 NEA updates, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

U ranium resources are abun-dant. At the beginning of2003, total known conven-tional resources (recoverable at

discover and develop newuranium production capability.The lead time for the discoveryand development of new ura-nium production facilities hasbeen of the order of one to twodecades (see Table). A varietyof factors have contributed tothese lag times, such as marketconditions, business decisions,environmental assessments andlicensing requirements or tech-nical difficulties. Nonetheless,such long lead times couldpotentially create uraniumsupply shortfalls, with signif-icant upward pressure onuranium prices as secondarysources are exhausted. Thelong lead times underscore theimportance of making timelydecisions to expand productioncapability well in advance ofany projected supply shortfall.

World electricity use isexpected to continue grow-ing to meet the needs of anincreasing population andeconomic growth. Nuclearelectricity generation is

expected to continue to playan important role in the energymix over the next few decades,at least. It may be called uponto grow considerably. Whileuranium resources are ade-quate to meet future projected

requirements, a concertedeffort will be required toensure that new resources aredeveloped within the timeframe required to meet futuredemand without shortfallsarising.

Key dates in the development of selected mines

Country Deposit/ Exploration Discovery Beginning mine begins of deposit of production

Australia Beverley (ISL) 1968 1970 2000Australia Honeymoon (ISL) 1968 1972 not yet announcedAustralia Jabiluka (UG) 1968 1971 not yet announcedAustralia Olympic Dam (UG) early 1970s 1976 1988Australia Ranger (OP) 1968 1969 1981Brazil Lagoa Real 1974 1976 2000Canada Cigar Lake 1969 1981 not before 2006Canada Key Lake 1968 Gaertner: 1975 Gaertner: 1983

Deilmann: 1976 Deilmann: 1989Canada McArthur River 1981 1988 1999Canada McClean Lake 1974 1979 1999Kazakhstan Inkay (ISL) 1976 1979 2001Kazakhstan Kanzhugan (ISL) 1972 1974 1982Kazakhstan Mynkuduk (ISL) 1973 1975 1987Kazakhstan Uvanas 1963 1969 1977Niger Akouta 1956 1972 1978Niger Arlit 1956 1965 1970

ISL: in situ leaching; OP: open pit; UG: underground.

1717Uranium production and demand: timely mining decisions will be needed, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

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Annual world uranium production capability through 2020 compared with projected

world reactor requirements

0

20 000

40 000

60 000

80 000

100 000

World reactor requirements

Planned and prospective production

Existing and committed production

2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019Year

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low

S ince 1998, the OECD/NEACommittee on NuclearRegulatory Activities (CNRA)has been investigating how toenhance and measure regula-tory effectiveness in relation to nuclear installations. In2002-2003, a pilot project wascarried out on 45 potentialindicators of regulatory effec-tiveness, including leading andlagging indicators, and cover-ing both quantitative and qual-itative aspects. The results ofthe pilot project were analysedby a task group and discussedat an international forum on“Measuring, Assessing andCommunicating RegulatoryEffectiveness” (MACRE 2003).

Regulatory effectivenessand efficiency

Regulatory effectiveness is generally understood asmeaning “to do the rightwork”, and regulatory effi-ciency as “to do the workright”. This implies that onehas to analyse effectivenessfirst, based on well-defined

mission objectives of theregulatory body. Having donethat, one can then work toimprove efficiency. Settinggoals that are possible tofollow-up is very important.

In its 2001 report onImproving Nuclear RegulatoryEffectiveness, the CNRA pro-vided a distinct definitionwhich stated:

Given the necessary author-ity and resources as prerequi-sites, the regulatory body iseffective when it:

● ensures that an acceptablelevel of safety is being main-tained by the regulatedoperating organisations;

● develops and maintains anadequate level of compe-tence;

● takes appropriate actions to prevent degradation ofsafety and to promote safetyimprovements;

● performs its regulatoryfunctions in a timely andcost-effective manner aswell as in a manner that

ensures the confidence ofthe operating organisations,the general public and thegovernment; and

● strives for continuousimprovements in itsperformance.

Indicators

Ensuring that nuclear instal-lations are operated and main-tained in such a way thatpublic health and safety areprotected has been and willcontinue to be the cornerstoneof nuclear regulation. Theorganisations, structures andprocesses of regulatory author-ities have evolved over thepast 50 years. Economic fac-tors, deregulation, technolo-gical advancements, govern-ment oversight and the generalrequirements for openness andaccountability are some of theelements that have led regu-latory bodies to look at theireffectiveness. Seeking toenhance the present level ofsafety by continuously improv-ing the effectiveness of regula-tory bodies is seen as one ofthe ways to strengthen publicconfidence in the regulatorysystems.

The fundamental value ofperformance indicators for anuclear regulatory body is to

18 NEA updates, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

Direct indicators for nuclearregulatory efficiency andeffectiveness

B. Kaufer, S. Chakraborty*

* Dr. Barry Kaufer (barry.kaufer@oecd.org) works in the NEA NuclearSafety Division. Dr. Sabyasachi Chakraborty (sabyasachi.chakraborty@hsk.psi.ch) is Head of Safety Research and International Affairs at the SwissFederal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate.

focus on its safety mission.Maximum benefit can bederived from the use of per-formance indicators if they arepart of an established qualitymanagement model. Perform-ance indicators may also beused to communicate withstakeholders, to monitor inter-nal processes and budgeting,and when necessary to assiststrategic development and tomanage change. Their useshould be part of a continuousimprovement process involv-ing all stakeholders, includingregulatory staff. Direct indica-tors are those which measurea regulator’s own perform-ance, as distinct from indirectindicators which infer a regu-lator’s effectiveness from itslicensee’s safety performance.

The direct indicators for thepilot project were developedto be able to:

● verify that regulatory workis performed in accordancewith the regulator’s mission,strategy and plans;

● verify that work is doneaccording to internal qualityprocedures and policy;

● measure work performance;

● determine the perception ofvarious stakeholders andstaff towards regulatoryprocesses;

● promote the use of detailedwork plans for regulatoryactivities.

Examples of indicators includewhether planned inspectionsor safety assessments hadbeen carried out, or whetherthe management of contractshad been carried out inaccordance with theagreed/published policy.

Results of the pilot project

The pilot project proved theusefulness of direct perform-ance indicators in helping to

assess and communicateregulatory efficiency andeffectiveness. It also identifiedpotential limits and cautionsrelated to the use of perform-ance indicators, namely thatthe information provided through the use of indicatorscompletes only part of theoverall picture of regulatoryeffectiveness. The inclusion of many other variables and types of information is required to accuratelymeasure, assess andcommunicate regulatoryeffectiveness.

Throughout the pilotproject, participants providedfeedback regarding their

experience in implementingthe direct performanceindicators, using a templatedesigned for that purpose. The project’s task grouprecognised that, during thecourse of one year, it wasimpossible to capture all of the positive and negativeaspects of the use ofperformance indicators.Nevertheless, some of themain observations andconclusions derived in thepilot project showed that theuse of direct performanceindicators:

● provided a better holisticpicture of the work sit-uation and allowed line

19Direct indicators for nuclear regulatory efficiency and effectiveness, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

Duke

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Direct and indirectperformance indicatorsform part of a qualitymanagement system.

20 NEA updates, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

management to get a betterpicture of the work situationof every individual;

● allowed the identification of poor performance andtriggered corrective actions;

● demonstrated the difficultyof defining indicators thatare not influenced by otherindicators;

● allowed more effectivecommunication with inter-nal and external stake-holders;

● promoted a better focus on regulatory outcomes;

● should be part of a long-term commitment to self-improvement;

● should be viewed in thecontext of a balanced qual-ity management system;

● needs to be supplementedwith qualitative aspects,indirect indicators and otherinformation in order to get a complete assessment ofregulatory performance;

● tends to focus on efficiencyrather than effectiveness.

Results from MACRE 2003

A main objective of theforum discussions was to seek verification and valida-tion of the selected measures.Through open panel sessionsand small breakout groupsessions, participants debatedthe appropriateness of theindicators chosen, whetherothers could be applied andwhat were the most essentialmeasures of a regulator’seffectiveness and efficiency. At its conclusion, the forumparticipants validated the work of the task group andprovided helpful insights.Some of the additional con-clusions reached at the forumshowed that:

● A good regulator brings“added value” to nuclear

power plant operators.While this “added value”cannot be measureddirectly, a comparison withgovernment-owned nuclearfacilities exempted fromregulation indicates majordifferences in safety per-formance.

● Performance indicators areuseful: “If you measure it, itwill get better.”

● Indicators do not measurethe actual quality of thework.

● Support was given to exter-nal qualitative assessmentsof a regulator’s perform-ance. It is generallyaccepted that regulatoryoversight improvesperformance of operators;similarly, it was shown that external assessmentimproves performance of regulators and is com-mendable.

● The need to improve theregulator’s competence was strongly emphasised.Besides technical compe-tence, other important skillsare decision making, man-agement and communi-cation.

● A strong consensus was also reached on the impor-tance of public confidencein ensuring regulatory effec-tiveness.

Future activities

The results of the pilotproject and the forum pro-vided clear stimulus for NEAmember countries to continuetheir work in this area. Thefollowing recommendationswere adopted by the CNRA:

● It is recommended thatmember countries utilisedirect performance indi-cators, including thosepresented in Direct Indica-

tors of Nuclear RegulatoryEfficiency and Effectiveness,to the extent possible toassess and improve theirregulatory efficiency andeffectiveness. Maximumbenefit can be derived fromthe use of performanceindicators if they are part of an established qualitymanagement system.

● It is recommended that theCNRA remain active in thisarea and conduct an annualstatus review to exchangelessons learnt. A task groupshould be convened in 2006to produce a progressreport by 2007, taking intoconsideration other inter-national activities in thisarea.

● The CNRA should examinemethods of integrating allthe various efforts and ini-tiatives in the general areaof regulatory efficiency andeffectiveness.

● It is recommended that theNEA communicate theresults of this pilot projectto other interested stake-holders (e.g. member andnon-member countries).

● It is recommended that the CNRA develop an inte-grated framework for reg-ulatory efficiency and effec-tiveness, paying particularattention to qualitativeaspects of regulatory per-formance and the valueadded by the regulatorybody to nuclear safety.

The results of the pilotproject were published inearly 2004 under the title:Direct Indicators of NuclearRegulatory Efficiency andEffectiveness: Pilot ProjectResults. The report is availablefree of charge from the NEAwebsite at www.nea.fr. ■

The NEA was one of the co-sponsors of the Stockholminternational conference on“Geological Repositories: Polit-ical and Technical Progress”that was held on 7-10 Decem-ber 2003. The conference wasa follow-up to the Denverinternational conference ongeological repositories held in1999 on an initiative from theUS Secretary of Energy. TheStockholm conference washosted by the Swedish NuclearFuel and Waste ManagementCompany (SKB) and held inco-operation with the Interna-tional Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA), the European Commis-sion (EC) and the InternationalAssociation for Environmen-tally Safe Disposal of Radio-active Materials (EDRAM).

The main objective of theStockholm conference was toreview global progress madesince the 1999 Denver confer-ence on activities to developgeological repositories. Theconference addressed bothpolicy issues and technicalissues and gave an overviewof current perspectives in a

number of countries. Theconference also provided aforum to discuss ongoingefforts and to strengthen inter-national co-operation on wastemanagement and disposalissues. The internationalconference aimed to bringtogether high-level decisionmakers and other interestedstakeholders from the national,

regional and local levels, aswell as regulatory bodies andimplementers.

The conference attractedabout 210 high-level decisionmakers from 26 countries. Thefirst day was devoted to policyissues. In the introductorysession the IAEA Director-General, Mohamed ElBaradei,and the NEA Director-General,Luis Echávarri, gave theirperspectives on geologicaldisposal of radioactive wasteand waste management poli-cies. The keynote address was

21NEA updates, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

Geological repositories:political and technicalprogress

T. Eng*

* Mr. Torsten Eng (torsten.eng@oecd.org) works in the NEA RadiationProtection and Radioactive Waste Management Division.

High-level decision makers at the conference noted that progress has been made inter alia on socio-political issues connected to

geological disposal.SK

B, S

wed

en.

given by Claes Ånstrand fromthe Swedish Ministry forIndustry and Trade.

During the two plenarysessions on policy issuespresentations were given bypeople directly involved in the political process throughwhich society deals with itstechnological challenges. Pre-senters included high-levelrepresentatives from China, the European Commission,Finland, France, Germany,Japan, Sweden and the UnitedStates.

The second, more technicalday of the conference focusedon a set of specific issues asso-ciated with repository develop-ment. One of the topics dis-cussed was the heightenedawareness and need for soci-etal involvement. Also high-lighted were the advancesmade in a number of countriesin research, development anddemonstration programmes, as well as the importance ofsafety and security. Further dis-cussions were held on the toolsand instruments in place orunder development to aid thewaste management process.

Key policy messages fromthe conference

During the policy part of theconference the following keymessages were broughtforward:

● In undertaking the review of progress in radioactivewaste disposal since the1999 Denver conference,participants confirmed theircommitment to the safetyand management principlesagreed to in such interna-tional documents as theIAEA Safety Fundamentalsand the Joint Convention onthe Safety of Spent FuelManagement and on the

Safety of Radioactive WasteManagement.

● There is internationalagreement that solutions arerequired that do not resultin undue burden on futuregenerations.

● The international commu-nity is adhering to theprinciple that those whogenerate the waste shouldprovide for the appropriatemanagement means.

● Disposal in engineeredfacilities, or repositories,located in suitable forma-tions deep underground, isbeing widely investigatedworldwide as a suitableoption.

● Progress is continuouslybeing made on the techno-logical aspects of geologicaldisposal. Although furtherprogress will surely bemade, no major break-through is expected in thisarea and many consider thetechnology to be mature.

● Engineered geologicaldisposal is seen as a radio-active waste managementend-point providing securityand safety in a sustainablemanner. It does not neces-sarily require long-termmonitoring, maintenanceand institutional control andis regarded as technicallyfeasible, acceptable from anethical and environmentalviewpoint, and acceptablefrom an international legalperspective.

● Progress has also beenmade regarding socio-political issues connected to geological disposal, par-ticularly in the sense thattechnologists accept thatthey need help from other,non-technical groups insociety.

● Co-operation under theaegis of internationalorganisations such as theIAEA and the NEA is key for developing a broadunderstanding of importantissues at hand and to ensurethat options are pursuedthat have internationalsupport.

● All national societies candraw technical help fromthe common internationalpool of knowledge, buteach one will have to weaveit into its national fabric, inits own specific way.

Specific technical andsocietal issues

During the session on long-term safety and security, it wasnoted that in 1999, the conceptof a long-term “safety case” fordisposal facilities had beenestablished in the NEA reporton Confidence in the Long-term Safety of Deep GeologicalRepositories. The concept wasaccepted internationally andfurther developed thereafter.Since then, a few major safetystudies have been finalisedand international peer reviewsof these studies have beenconducted. Since the reportwas issued in 1999, the aspectof guaranteeing long-termsecurity has also been broughtto the fore and is playing animportant role in decisionmaking for waste management,including disposal. Some par-ticipants stressed that securityis an important aspect of thesafety issue, rather than aseparate issue itself.

The two sessions onstakeholder involvementreflected the heightenedattention that stakeholderparticipation has beenreceiving over the past fewyears. Social concerns, public

22 NEA updates, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

participation and decision-making processes werereviewed by a number ofinstitutional and non-institutional stakeholders. A broad range of views werebrought forward. The first ses-sion gave the implementingorganisations’ perspectives onstakeholder issues, as well asan international, and thusmore general, perspective ofthose issues. Presentationswere largely based on workcarried out by the NEA Forumon Stakeholder Confidence.The work of the Forum isbased on lessons learnt byimplementers, regulators, localand regional stakeholders,NGOs, social scientists andothers.

The second session onstakeholder involvement high-lighted the role of stakeholdersresponsible for decision mak-ing at the municipal level. Thesession emphasized the experi-ence of siting a final repositoryfor nuclear waste as seen froma community or municipalpoint of view. The speakerspresented an overview of les-sons learnt and challenges met,and described what should

characterise a good decision-making process in siting anuclear waste managementfacility. For example, inaddition to providing basicpublic information on a regularand transparent basis, thewaste management authoritiesand implementers should alsobe prepared to receive andconsider critical researchresults that are different fromtheir own studies. Indeed, acomplete and exhaustiveinformation basis, coveringboth positive and negativeaspects of a project, is seen bystakeholders as a fundamentalelement in the decision-making process.

During the session oninternational instruments,presentations were made onthe role and implications ofvarious recently adoptedinternational instruments, suchas safety requirements andconventions, having a direct orindirect impact on geologicalrepositories and their devel-opment. Examples of suchinstruments are the JointConvention on the Safety ofSpent Fuel Management andon the Safety of Radioactive

Waste Management, and theRadiation Protection Recom-mendations as Applied to theDisposal of Long-lived SolidRadioactive Waste. Alsodiscussed was the need toadapt certain long-establishedinternational instruments torespond to new technicalapplications.

When discussing the con-tribution of research, devel-opment and demonstration(RD&D) programmes currentlybeing implemented, it wasnoted that the knowledge andunderstanding of processesand phenomena associatedwith the disposal of radioactivewaste in deep geologicalrepositories have made signif-icant progress, partly thanks to in situ observations andtesting performed in under-ground research laboratories.The importance of interna-tional co-operation in RD&Dand its contribution to devel-oping and consolidating thescientific and technical basisfor geological disposal wasalso discussed. Internationalco-operation is especiallyuseful on aspects of researchthat are not repository-specific,for example thermochemicaldata. These internationalefforts complement nationalefforts under way.

A follow-up conference inthis series will probably beheld in three to four years, as a joint effort between theIAEA, the NEA and a hostorganisation. The Stockholmconference proceedings aredue to be published by theNEA in the coming months.

23Geological repositories: political and technical progress, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

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The Belgian, British and Japanese implementing organisationsshared their practical experience of involving stakeholders in the

repository siting process.

SKB,

Swed

en

24 NEA updates, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

A uthorisation is the processused by governments and regulatory authorities to decide what regulatorycontrols or conditions, if any, should be applied toradioactive sources or radi-ation exposure situations inorder to protect the public,workers and the environmentappropriately. Over the years,governments and regulatoryauthorities have used variousapproaches to the authori-sation process under differingcircumstances. Now, with thenew draft recommendationsfrom the International Com-mission on RadiologicalProtection (ICRP), there is the prospect of being able to use a single, simple andself-coherent approach for the process of regulatoryauthorisation under allcircumstances.

Previously, the ICRPrecommended the use ofvarious approaches to man-age radiological protectionsituations. For what werecalled practices, exposureswere subject to limits, andoptimisation was requiredbelow these limits. What werecalled interventions weresubject to intervention levels,above which some actioncould be considered justified,and which should be opti-mised based on considerationof how much dose could beaverted by the countermeasureconsidered. Radon in homeswas subject to action levels,above which some sort ofcountermeasure could berecommended. Theseapproaches are all philo-sophically distinct and logi-cally constructed, but theirdifferences, particularly in the

types of numerical criteriaused (limits, interventionlevels, action levels, etc.)contributed to confusion andmisunderstanding.

A new approach to theregulatory process ofauthorisation

The process proposed bythe NEA Committee on Radi-ation Protection and PublicHealth (CRPPH) is based onthe new draft ICRP approachof using optimisation below adose constraint for all cases.As such, the process of regu-latory authorisation begins bytreating all radiation sourcesand exposure situationsequally. All sources (i.e. cos-mic, terrestrial, natural, artifi-cial) and exposure situations(i.e. planned, accidental, defacto) are then considered,characterised and screened.Situations covered include:

● what the ICRP previouslyreferred to as practices andinterventions;

● all exposures to naturalradioactivity, e.g. radon,

The regulatoryapplication ofauthorisation inradiological protection

T. Lazo, S. Frullani *

* Dr. Ted Lazo (lazo@nea.fr) works in the NEA Radiation Protection andRadioactive Waste Management Division. Dr. Salvatore Frullani(salavatore.frullani@iss.infn.it) works at the Istituto Superiore di Sanita inItaly. He is a member of the NEA Committee on Radiation Protection andPublic Health (CRPPH).

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naturally occurringradioactive materials(NORM), and cosmic rayexposure in air travel;

● public, worker andenvironmental exposures;

● prolonged exposures.

Based on this characteri-sation and screening, somesources and exposure situ-ations will clearly not beamenable to dose reductionthrough regulatory controlsand would thus not be subjectto any regulatory controls (i.e.cosmic rays at the earth’ssurface). Some sources andexposure situations will not be socially justified and willnot be allowed (i.e. thedeliberate use of radioactivematerial in toys). Most sourcesand exposure situations willrequire further analysis beforea regulatory decision regard-ing any necessary protectionactions can be made. Regula-tory analysis of these caseswill include the optimisationof protection using an indi-vidual dose constraint as theupper bound. Regulatorycontrols will be imposedbased on, among other con-siderations, the level ofresidual dose remaining afterprotection has been optimised.

In addition to this review of“new” sources and exposuresituations, previous govern-ment or regulatory decisionsmay, from time to time, berevisited, motivated bychanging technology and/orsocial norms. This could bethe case for sources andexposure situations that havepreviously been declaredunjustified, or for those forwhich protection measureshave previously been opti-mised and regulatory controlsimposed. This re-evaluationcould lead to a new view ofwhether the source or expo-

sure situation is or is notjustified, or could result in achange in regulatory controls.

Finally, for some sourcesand exposure situationsdeemed to be justified, theoptimum protection will benot to require regulatorycontrols. For these situations,the exposures will be allowedwithout regulatory control ofthe user, and the materials will be allowed to be freelyreleased. This will be the case,for example, for the use oftraces of natural radioactivematerial in consumer devices(i.e. tritium in emergency exitsigns or watches, thorium inwelding rods), for the dis-charge of liquids and gasescontaining small concen-trations of natural or artificialradionuclides (i.e. from nuclearpower plants, hospitals orresearch institutions), or forthe release of solid or liquidmaterials containing smallconcentrations of natural orartificial radionuclides (i.e.

tools from within contaminatedareas, or in some countries,rubble from decommissioningactivities). These materials willgenerally be regulated up totheir point of release, andregulators may require suchthings as environmental mea-surements and dose modelling.While governments and regu-latory authorities will not try to“regain control” over thesereleased materials, theirexistence may be consideredwhen making future regulatorydecisions regarding othersources and exposure situ-ations that may expose theaffected population to addi-tional doses.

Throughout this process,stakeholder involvement isessential. This does not meanthat a large, public consul-tation process needs to beinitiated for every govern-ment decision regardingradiological protection.However, the acceptability of a decision is a subjective,

The regulatory application of authorisation in radiological protection, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

Monitoring contamination levels as part of optimisation of public and worker protection.

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relative concept, and as suchthe relevant stakeholders forany particular situation willneed to be consulted so thatthe final decision will enjoythe acceptance of thoseaffected. In many cases, therelevant stakeholder group will simply be the regulatoryauthorities and the licensee,while in others, broaderconsultation of the public may be necessary.

Motivation for change:simplicity, coherence,transparency

The value and innovation of this new approach comesprimarily from two aspects.First, all sources and exposuresituations are treated in thesame fashion, using optimisa-tion below a predetermineddose constraint. This results ina system that is simple, consis-tent and coherent. It avoids the

need to explain and justify, aspreviously necessary, whysome regulatory “levels” werenot to be passed (limits), andothers required no actions until they were passed (actionlevels, intervention levels).This single approach can bemore easily and transparentlyapplied, and by addressing allsituations equally it portrays apositive, proactive image ofthe government and regulatoryauthorities.

Second, this approach hastried to avoid the use ofterminology that in the pasthas been confusing, such asexclusion, exemption andclearance. By concentratingonly on the procedural aspectsof radiological protection deci-sion making, this approachemphasizes the reasoningbehind decision pathwaysrather than specific and nar-rowly defined concepts. Thisagain simplifies the approach.

Steps in the authorisationprocess

Conceptually, the authori-sation process can be thoughtof as a series of analyticalassessments leading to deci-sion points. Decisions aremade based on various crite-ria, and result in the identifica-tion of any regulatory actionswarranted for the radioactivematerial, radiation exposure,or radiation exposure situationin the context being consid-ered. This process can beiterative, and can be asdetailed or as schematic asnecessary depending upon the risks being considered.

All radiation sources andexposure situations are subjectto analysis by the regulatoryauthorities. For those sourcesanalysed, the regulatoryauthority will perform a pre-liminary process to charac-terise and screen each source

The regulatory process of authorisation

Subject to regulatory

controls

Not subject to regulatory

controls

Full analysis(optimisation)

The world of radiation sourcesand exposures

Classifyand screen

Not justified

If concernarises

27The regulatory application of authorisation in radiological protection, NEA News 2004 – No. 22.1

or exposure situation. Thecharacterisation of the sourceor exposure situation is madein order to decide whetherfurther analysis is necessary,or whether a clear choice ispossible immediately. Thescreening of the source orexposure situation is to allowthe regulatory authority tomake a decision regardingregulatory control.

For some cases, the regu-latory authority will performfurther analysis or optimisa-tion. The focus of optimisationis on the protective actionsthat can be applied to reduceexposures. These actions canbe applied to the exposure(i.e. actions applied directly to the individual beingexposed, or actions appliedalong the pathway of expo-sure), or to the source of theexposure (i.e. shielding at thesource, reduction of emission,etc.). The desired result ofoptimisation is that theexposures remaining after the implementation of pro-tective actions are as low asreasonably achievable(ALARA). As a result of thisoptimisation process, there areseveral possible decisions thatcan be made regarding thesources or exposure situationsunder consideration. Thiscould include deciding that aparticular exposure situation isno longer justified, or on thecontrary that a previouslyunjustified situation can nowbe justified.

Following analysis, somesources and exposure situ-ations will be subject to reg-ulatory conditions. A gradedapproach will be taken. Forsmall sources or low-dosesituations with no significantchance for a high-exposureaccident, simple notificationfrom the “operator” to the

regulatory authority may besufficient. For sources or expo-sure situations with higherradiological risks, more strin-gent controls may be neces-sary, including formal reviewand licensing processes,requirements for environ-mental modelling and meas-urement, requirements for indi-vidual dosimetric assessmentand/or measurement.

As a result of this process,there will be some sourcesand exposure situations thatare not subject to regulatorycontrols. Examples of suchsituations may vary fromcountry to country, but mayinclude natural radioactivity infood and drinking water, solidmaterial that has been releasedfrom decommissioning pro-cesses, and smoke detectors or other devices with radioac-tivity. Once authorised, it willgenerally not be possible forregulatory controls to directlyaffect these sources and expo-sure situations. However, thisdoes not mean that the regula-tory authority will forget thatthese exposures exist. Inmaking future decisions, suchas those which may causeexposure to populationsalready affected by releasedmaterials, the regulatoryauthority may consider theexistence of those sources thathave already been releasedwith no regulatory conditions.

In the end, certain sourcesand exposure situations willnot be subject to regulatorycontrol and will not, in gen-eral, be re-evaluated. How-ever, should radionuclides that have been released insolid, liquid or gaseous formbe “rediscovered” and bedrawn to the attention of reg-ulatory authorities, there maybe a need to characterise andscreen such situations.

Conclusions

Since the development ofnew ICRP recommendationsbegan, it has been clear thatthe need to change is notdriven by new scientificknowledge about risks, butrather by the need to simplify,rationalise and consolidate theCommission’s recommenda-tions. To this end, the CRPPHis proposing the use of asingle regulatory process tointerpret and implement theICRP’s recommendations forall radiological protectionsituations. The CRPPH feelsthat this will not only simplifythe work of governments andregulatory authorities, but willresult in a system of radiolog-ical protection that is easier to implement and explain, and that will thus be moreaccepted and sustainable.

References

1. NEA (2003), A New Approach toAuthorisation in the Field of Radi-ological Protection: The Road TestReport, OECD/NEA, Paris.

2. NEA (2002), The Way Forward inRadiological Protection: An ExpertGroup Report, OECD/NEA, Paris.

3. NEA (2000), A Critical Review ofthe System of Radiation Protec-tion: First Reflections of the OECDNuclear Energy Agency’s Commit-tee on Radiation Protection andPublic Health, OECD/NEA, Paris.

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technology is used. Further-more, licences to operatenuclear power plants are notlimited in time.

● All new nuclear installations(nuclear power plants orunderground radioactivewaste repositories) require ageneral licence. The cantonin which the installation is tobe located, as well as thecantons and States in closeproximity to the plannedinstallation, will be involvedin preparing the generallicence, although the agree-ment of the canton in whichthe installation is to belocated is not necessary. The general licence will beissued by the Parliament,and will be subject to anoptional referendum.

● A moratorium will be intro-duced for the reprocessingof nuclear waste. The Actspecifies that spent nuclearfuel may not be exported for reprocessing for a periodof ten years, starting 1 July2006. During this period,spent nuclear fuel will haveto be disposed of as radio-active waste. The morato-rium may be extended for a further ten years by theFederal Assembly, whichrefused to impose an imme-diate ban on the reproces-sing of radioactive waste.Radioactive waste disposal ismoreover based on a newconcept formulated by aGroup of experts. Wastemust be placed in a deepgeological repository which

remains under surveillance,with a guarantee that thewaste can be easily recov-ered. Once sealed, therepository will become theresponsibility of the Confed-eration.

● Lastly, a decommissioningfund is to ensure thefinancing of the decom-missioning and dismantlingof nuclear installationswithdrawn from service,while a second fund willensure the financing of thedisposal of radioactivewaste. These funds aredesigned to guarantee thatafter 40 years of operation of a nuclear installation,monies are available tofinance decommissioningand radioactive wastedisposal.

The Act is due to enter intoforce in January 2005, follow-ing the completion of impor-tant legislative work thatremains. The entry into force of the Act is subject to theadoption