[inc] round 4 compilation

8/11/2019 [INC] Round 4 Compilation

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PHILAMLIFE v. BREVAG.R. No. 147937 Nov 11, 2004 Callejo, Sr. J.petitioners Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company (P)

respondents Hon Augusto Breva (presiding Judge of RTC Davao, Branch 10) and Milagros P. Moralessummary Respondent Morales filed a complaint for damages and reimbursement against P. P filed a

MtoD since the summons was improperly served on the regional office and not on its mainoffice. After Morales amended the complaint, the RTC dismissed the MtoD and issued an aliassummons on Ps office. Ct. held that a case should not be dismissed just because the original

summons was wrongfully served. RTC should have issued an original summons on theamended complaint since the original summons on the 1 st complaint never reached P. Butsince the objective of notifying P that a case has been filed against it, the Ct held that the labelof the summons was of no importance.

facts of the case- Sept. 2 1999, priv respondent Morales, filed a complaint for damages and reimbursment of insurance premiums

against P. Complaint specifically stated that the petitioner could be served with summons and other court processesthrough its Manager at its branch office located at Rizal St., Davao City.

- Summons, together with the complaint was served upon the regl office of P.- December 8, 1999- P filed motion to dismiss, arguing that the summons was improperly served upon its employee

and said EE is not among those named in Section 11, Rule 14 of RoC.

-

December 9, 1999- Morales filed an amended complaint alleging that summons and other court processes could beserved at Ps principal office in UN Ave, Manila, through its President or any person authorized to receive summons- RTC denied motion to dismiss and directed the issuance of an alias summons to be served at Ps main office. Ruled

that the improper service of summons is not a ground for dismissal of the compliant since the case was still in itsinitial stage. According to the RTC, the remedy was to issue an alias summons to be served at the principal office.

- December 14, 1999 P received an Alias Summons together with copy of the complaint- CA affirmed the RTC. The CA held that the service of the alias summons on the amended complaint upon the

authorized officers of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila vested the RTC with jurisdiction over its person.

issueWhether weather yes or no question. YES OR NO PARA KITA AGAD.

ratio- The Ct. cited Lingner and Fisher GMBH v IAC: A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons

was wrongfully served.- In this case, the complaint was amended after the petitioner filed the motion to dismiss.- Rule 10 Section 8 of the RoC states that the amended complaint supersedes the complaint that it amends.- Does the summons issued on the original complaint become invalid? NO. Summons on the original complaint which

has already been served continues to have its legal effect. [ Application? Where the defendant has already been servedsummons on the amended complaint may be served upon him w/o need of another summons. When no summonshave been issued on the original complaint, new summons for the original complaint must be served on him.]

- Application to case: since at the time complaint was amended, no summons had been properly served on P and it hadnot yet appeared in Ct. ! Correct thing: New summons shouldve been issued on the amended complaint. The RTCshould not have sent alias summons, because alias summons are just continuations of the 1 st complaint (which wasalready amended).

-

Since theres a new complaint, original summons may be made- BUT, the rationale behind the service of summons- to make certain that P would promptly and properly receivenotice of the filing of an action against it- has been served.

- It is not pertinent whether summons is designated as original or as long as it has served its purpose. What is essentialis that the summons complies with the requirements under the RoC and it has been duly served on the defendant.

- (Requirements under the RoC: contains all the info required under the rules; it was served on the proper officerauthorized to receive it)


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Atiko Trans Inc., and Chen Lie Navigation Co. v. Prudential GuaranteeG.R. No. 167545 August 17, 2011 J. Del Castillopetitioners Atiko Trans Inc.

and Chen LieNavigation Co.

respondents Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.

summary Prudential Guarantee insured tinplates on board a ship owned by Cheng Lie Navigation Co.that were found damaged upon arrival and is seeking repayment. Atiko is Cheng Liesshipagent. Atiko filed a Notice of Appeal arguing that MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction overit because summons was served through its cashier. Cheng Lie filed its own Memorandum ofAppeal maintaining that the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over its person because whenthe defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in thePhilippines, service of summons may be made, among others, upon its resident agentbutthere is no proof that Atiko is the local agent of Cheng Lie. Jurisdiction was acquired overAtiko but not over Cheng Lie. Atiko voluntarily appeared. In Cheng Lies case, where serviceof summons upon the defendant principal is coursed thru its co-defendant agent, and thelatter happens to be a domestic corporation, the rules on service of summons upon a domesticprivate juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said tohave acquired jurisdiction over the person of both defendants. And insofar as the principal isconcerned, such jurisdictional flaw cannot be cured by the agents subsequent voluntaryappearance.

facts of the case40 coils of electrolytic tinplates were loaded on board M/S Katjana in Kaohsiung, Taiwan for shipment to

Manila. The shipment was covered by a Bill of Lading issued by petitioner Cheng Lie Navigation Co., Ltd. (Cheng Lie)with Oriental Tin Can & Metal Sheet Manufacturing Co., Inc. (Oriental) as the notify party. The cargoes were insuredagainst all risks by respondent Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. (Prudential). Upon discharge of the cargoes, itwas found that one of the tinplates was damaged. The sea van in which it was kept during the voyage was also damaged,presumably while still on board the vessel and during the course of the voyage. Oriental then filed its claim against thepolicy. Satisfied that Orientals claim was compensable, Prudential paid Oriental P205,220.97.Prudential filed with the MeTC of Makati City a Complaint for sum of money against Cheng Lie and Atiko Trans, Inc.

(Atiko), its duly authorized shipagent. Later, Prudential filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, alleging amongothers that a copy of the summons was served upon petitioners thru cashier Cristina Figueroa and that despite receiptthereof petitioners failed to file any responsive pleading. MeTC granted ! judgment in default ! Atiko filed a Notice ofAppeal arguing that MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it because summons was served through its cashier and thatunder Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, when the defendant is a domestic corporation like Atiko, summons maybe served only upon its president, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Cheng Lie filed itsown Memorandum of Appeal maintaining that the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over its person because when thedefendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service of summons maybe made, among others, upon its resident agentbut there is no proof that Atiko is the local agent of Cheng Lie. RTCaffirmed MeTC ! CA affirmed.

issue

Whether or not MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over Atiko. YESWhether or not MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over Cheng Lie. NO

ratio

MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Atiko. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can beacquired not only by proper service of summons but also by defendants voluntary appearance without expresslyobjecting to the courts jurisdiction, as embodied in Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 20. Voluntaryappearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusionin a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not bedeemed a voluntary appearance.


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When Atiko filed its Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal, Motion for Reconsiderationof the April 8, 2003Decision of the RTC, and Petition for Review, it never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person. The filingof these pleadings seeking affirmative relief amounted to voluntary appearance and, hence, rendered the alleged lack of jurisdiction moot. In Palma v. Galvez: the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, foradditional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion forreconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It was only in their Memorandumfiled with the SC where they claimed, for the first time, that Atiko was not properly served with summons. In La NavaDrug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must beseasonably raised.

MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie. Before it was amended by A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC, Section12 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court reads: SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. When the defendant is aforeign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agentdesignated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designatedby law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

When the defendant is a foreign juridical entity, service of summons may be made upon: 1.Its resident agentdesignated in accordance with law for that purpose; 2. The government official designated by law to receive summons ifthe corporation does not have a resident agent; or 3. Any of the corporations officers or agents within the Philippines.

No summons was served upon Cheng Lie in any manner prescribed above. It should be recalled that Atiko wasnot properly served with summons as the person who received it on behalf of Atiko, cashier Cristina Figueroa, is not oneof the corporate officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The MeTC acquired jurisdiction overthe person of Atiko not thru valid service of summons but by the latters voluntary appearance. Thus, there being noproper service of summons upon Atiko to speak of, it follows that the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over the personof Cheng Lie. To rule otherwise would create an absurd situation where service of summons is valid upon the purportedprincipal but not on the latters co-defendant cum putative agent despite the fact that service was coursed thru saidagent. Indeed, in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant foreign private juridical entityunder Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, there must be prior valid service of summons upon the agent of suchdefendant.

Also, the records of the case is bereft of any showing that cashier Cristina Figueroa is a government officialdesignated by law to receive summons on behalf of Cheng Lie or that she is an officer or agent of Cheng Lie within thePhilippines. Hence, her receipt of summons bears no significance insofar as Cheng Lie is concerned.

With regard to Cheng Lies filing of numerous pleadings, the same cannot be considered as voluntaryappearance. Unlike Atiko, Cheng Lie never sought affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the complaint on theground of lack of jurisdiction over its person. From the very beginning, it has consistently questioned the validity of theservice of summons and the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person.


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SAMARTINO v. RAONG.R. No. 131482 July 3, 2002 Ynares-Santiago, J.petitioner Regalado P. Samartino

respondent Leonor B. Raon, Agustin G. Crisostomo, et al.summary Private respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner. Summons was served to

petitioners brother since petitioner was in drug rehab at that time.The court declared him in default for failure to answer the complaint and allowed therespondents to present evidence ex parte. Thus, the court ruled in favor of the respondents.RTC affirmed MTC judgment. CA dismissed Petition for Certiorari and MR.Petitioner comes to court in a Petition for Review.SC found there was improper service of summons because the requirements for a validsubstituted service were not fulfilled. The sheriffs return contain no information regarding thecircumstances warranting a substituted service. Hence, jurisdiction was not acquired over thepetitioner and the judgment rendered by the lower court is null and void.

facts of the casePrivate respondents filed in MTC a complaint for ejectment against petitioner. Summons was served to petitioners

brother since petitioner was in drug rehab at that time.During trial, an NBI officer appeared before the court to certify that petitioner was in rehab and he is not able to

comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period. But the court still declared him indefault and allowed the respondents to present evidence ex parte. Thus, the court ruled in favor of the respondents andordered the petitioner to vacate the lot.

RTC affirmed MTC judgment. MTC issued writ of execution. Petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment,submitting an affidavit of merit alleging that the lot in question was already sold to him as evidenced by a Deed ofAbsolute Sale. RTC again dismissed the petition for relief.

Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. CA dismissed the petition and denied the MR.Hence, this Petition for Review with the SC.

issueWhether or not there was improper service of summons? YES, improper service of summons.

ratioThe Court found that the requirements for a valid substituted service were not fulfilled.The sheriffs return failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made.It failed to state that prompt and personal service on the defendant was rendered impossible.It was not shown that efforts were made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed; hence the resort

to substituted service.These requirements are indispensable because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of

such action is served not upon him but upon another whom law could only presume would notify him of the pendingproceedings.

Nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that petitioners brother, on whomsubstituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at petitionersresidence.

For this reason, failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renderssaid service ineffective.

There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person ofpetitioner.

The trial courts failure to give petitioner a reasonable opportunity to file his answer violated his right to dueprocess.

Perforce, the judgment rendered against petitioner is nugatory and without effect.


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ASIAVEST LIMITED v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 128803 25 September 1998 Davide, Jr., J .

petitioner Asiavest Limitedrespondents Court of Appeals and Antonio Heras

summary Asiavest Ltd, a Hong Kong company, filed a complaint against Heras (who left HKfor good and is now based in Quezon City) ordering him to pay to Asiavest the

amounts awarded by the HK Court. Heras claimed that the HK Court did not acquire jurisdiction over him, especially since summons were not properly and validly servedon him (Asiavest had to apply for leave and commissioned the Sycip SalazarHernandez & Gatmaitan law firm to serve the summons here in the Philippines). TheCourt ruled that since Heras was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action againsthim was in personam, summons should have been personally served on him in HongKong . The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did notconfer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. The Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect in the Philippines for having been renderedwithout jurisdiction.

facts of the caseAsiavest Ltd, a Hong Kong company, filed a complaint against Antonio Heras, based on his personal

guarantee of the obligations of Compania Hermanos de Navegacion S.A who had defaulted its payments.Based on the stipulation of facts, Heras had left Hong Kong for good and is now residing in New Manila,Quezon City. Asiavest prayed that Heras pay to Asiavest the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court.

Heras claimed that the Hong Kong Court did not acquire jurisdiction over him. No summons was everserved upon him in the Philippines and in Hong Kong, and neither did a copy of the judgment of the courtwas served on him. Asiavest, however, contends that he was given a service of summons when a messengerfrom the Sycip Salazar Law Firm served said summons by leaving a copy to his son-in-law. Furthermore, themere fact that the Hong Kong Court rendered judgment means that it can be presumed that there was serviceof summons.

issueWON the judgment of the HK Court has been repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction due to lack of noticeto the party. YES.

ratioFirst, the court determined whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. An action in personam is anaction against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itselfinstead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant andthe purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.

In this case, the action filed in Hong Kong against Heras was in personam, since it was based on his personalguarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly tryand decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear incourt can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules ofCourt. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may bemade in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the followingmodes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outsidethe country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner thecourt may deem sufficient.


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However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarilysubmit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to theacquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant isphysically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over hisperson and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.

In the stipulated facts, Heras "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines", which refers to hisresidence at the time jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. With this,

Asiavest cannot now claim that he was a resident of Hong Kong at the time.Accordingly, since Heras was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, indisputably,one in personam , summons should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorialservice in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdictionover his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in thePhilippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

Even assuming that Heras was formerly a Hong Kong resident, he was no longer so in November 1984 whenthe extraterritorial service of summons was attempted to be made on him. Heras left HK in October 1984 "forgood." His absence in HK must have been the reason why summons was not served on him therein; thus,Asiavest was constrained to apply for leave to effect service in the Philippines, and upon obtaining a favorable

action on the matter, it commissioned the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law firm to serve thesummons here in the Philippines.


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Manotoc v. CAG.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006 Velasco Jr., J.petitioners Ma. Imelda Manotoc a.k.a Imee Marcos

respondents Court of Appeals, Agapita Trajano on behalf of the estate of Archimedes Trajanosummary Trajano sought to enforce a foreign judgment before the RTC against Imee Marcos in a civil

case against the latter for the wrongful death of her husband Archimedes Trajano duringmartial law. The sheriff sought to serve the summons to Imee in her residential address inAlexandra Homes, Pasig City. However, following several failed attempts of personallyserving summons to Imee, the sheriff effected a substituted service of summons upon a certainDela Cruz who was allegedly Imees condo caretaker. The RTC and CA both held that thecourt has validly acquired jurisdiction over Imee. However, the SC held that the service ofsummons upon Imee was invalid and the court therefore did not acquire jurisdiction over her.According to the court, for a sevice to be valid, it must comply with the requisites laid down inthe Rules of Court. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over thedefendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it. Otherwise, the defendants right todue process will be violated.

facts of the caseImee Marcos is the respondent in a civil case filed before the US District Court by Agapita Trajano for the wrongful

death of her husband Archimedes Trajano by military intelligence under the command of the former during martial law.Upon obtaining a favorable decision, Trajano sought to enforce the foreign judgment through the RTC. The RTC thenissued summons addressed to Imees residence as indicated in the complaint as Alexandra Homes , E2 Room 104, at No.29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. Upon failing to personally serve the complaint and summons upon Imee, the sheriffresorted to substituted service by serving the summons upon one Macky Dela Cruz, who was allegedly the petitionerscaretaker. When Imee failed to file an answer, the RTC declared her in default. Imee, by way of special appearance,eventually filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction alleging that the service was invalid because (1) she was not aresidence of Alexandra Homes but of Singapore; and (2) Dela Cruz was not her representative, employee or a resident ofsaid condo unit. The RTC rejected her claim so Imee filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA to annulthe RTCs decision. The CA however, upheld the RTCs ruling. Imee then elevated the case to the SC.

issueWON the substituted service upon Imee Marcos was valid. NO, IT WAS NOT. COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF IMEE MARCOS.

ratioThe SC explained that Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or thedefendants voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction orwhen there is no valid service of summons, "any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of thedefendant is null and void." In an action strictly in personam (like the case at bar), personal service on the defendant is thepreferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, forexcusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can beresorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of theusual method of service." This is why one must strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstancesauthorized by the ROC.

For a substituted service to be valid, the requisites laid down by Section 8 Rule 14 of the Old Rules of Court are as follows:1. Impossibility of prompt personal service

! The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or thereis impossibility of prompt service.

! While Section 8 of Rule 14 does not define "reasonable time," the court explained that it means as "so much time as isnecessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contractor duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party."

! According to the court, the following periods could be used to determine the sheriff to effect a personal service inorder to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service:

To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of acomplaint is what a plaintiff wants.


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One month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to personalservice on the defendant. (based on practice in submitting sheriffs returns which is 15-30 days and practicein submitting clerk of courts monthly reports to the Office of the Court Administrator which is first 10 daysof the month).

! The court further explained that since defendants are expected to be evasive, there must be several attempts by thesheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period before substituted service becomes available.

! "Several attempts" means at least 3 tries, preferably on at least two different dates and the sheriff must cite why suchefforts were unsuccessful.

2. Specific details in the return! The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal

service: efforts made to find defendant and reasons for failure, dates/times of attempts, names of occupants ofdefendants residence, all acts done by the Sheriff, even if futile.

! SC Administrative Circular No. 5 (1989) requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by statingthe efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the proofof service.

3. Person of suitable age and discretion! If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable

age and discretion then residing therein."! A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is

considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons.! "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an

understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". -> to be of sufficient discretion, such personmust know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize theneed to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to takeappropriate action.

! The court said that the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter wouldreceive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. -> this must be ensured by the sheriff and described inthe return.

! 2 requisites: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house orresidence of defendant.

4. Competent person in charge! According to the court, if the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular place of business, then it

should be served on a competent person in charge of the place (ex. person managing the office or business ofdefendant) and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in thesummons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.

The court said that after a careful scrutiny of the sheriffs return, it will be revealed that there has been an invalid

substituted service in this case citing the following reasons:! There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why efforts of the Sherriff proved inadequate, to reach the

conclusion that personal service has become impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of"on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x personally," "at reasonable hoursduring the day," and "to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/orresidence or premises." -> no showing of extraordinary efforts to locate Imee.

! Requisites of person of suitable age and discretion have not been complied with.o Sheriffs return does not show age, residence, and discretion of Dela Cruz nor does it indicate that the

latter is a resident in the defendants alleged condo unit.

Thus, considering the findings of the court, it declared that the service of summons against Imee Marcos was void andillegal therefore the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person.


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Pascual v. PascualG.R. No. 171916 4 December 2009 J. Peraltapetitioners Constantino A. Pascual, substituted by his heirs, represented by Zenaida Pascual

respondents Dr. Lourdes S. Pascualsummary The process server failed to personally serve summons upon respondent, who was allegedly

not home at all the times the server came; instead, her maid received the summons. Whenrespondent was declared in default and an adverse judgment was rendered against her, sheassailed the validity of the service of summons. The CA agreed with her, declaring the serviceof summons upon the maid as not sufficient to have vested jurisdiction with the RTC. The SCupheld the CAs decision, listing the requisites of a valid substituted service ( see below) andruling that there had been no compliance with the requisites in this case. Thus, the RTC judgment against respondent, issued without having acquired jurisdiction over therespondent, is void.

facts of the casePetitioner Constantino filed against respondent Dr. Lourdes a Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer for

Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Damages. In the first Return of Service, the process server reportedthat he was unable to serve summons at Dr. Lourdes residence, because she was not home, and only a maid who refusedto receive the summons was there. The following day, the process server returned to Dr. Lourdes home, but she was still

not present. The Return of Service thus reported that the original summons and copy of the complaint was not served.The RTC where the case had been filed then issued an alias summons, and the server proceeded to Dr. Lourdesresidence, accompanied by barangay officials. He was again unable to serve the alias summons, because the respondentwas apparently still not home.

Dr. Lourdes was then declared in default, and after trial, the RTC ruled in Constantinos favor. When the RTC deniedher motions to set aside the order and to reconsider, she filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition with theCourt of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted Dr. Lourdes petition, ruling that there had been no valid service ofsummons. Petitioner thus bring this petition for review.

issueWhether there was proper and valid substituted service of summons on the respondents maid, through which the courtacquired jurisdiction over the respondent. NO.

ratioThis is an action in personam, and the defendant is in the Philippines. Thus, Secs. 6 and 7, Rule 14, govern . These

provide for service of summons on the defendant, in person; or, failing this, substituted service. Thus, personal service ofsummons is the first option, and only when that cannot be done within a reasonable time may the process server resort tosubstituted service.

The following are the requisites of a valid substituted service :1. Impossibility of prompt personal service It must be shown that the defendant cannot be served within a

reasonable time, i.e. one month , or there is impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts (three tries, on atleast two different dates) must have been made over the one-month period, and the sheriff must cite why suchefforts were unsuccessful .

2. Facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service The date and time of the attempts, theinquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants or the alleged residence of defendant, and all

other acts done, though futile, must be specified in the Return. 3. Person of suitable age and discretion must receive the summons This is a person who has attained the age of

full legal capacity (i.e. 18 years old) , and is considered to have discernment to understand the importance of asummons. Hence, such person must know how to read and understand English and fully realize the need todeliver the summons to the defendant at the earliest possible time, so the defendant may take action. Therefore,the person receiving the summons must have some relation of confidence to the defendant to ensure that thesummons would be received.

4. A competent person must be in charge If substituted service will be done at the defendants office/regular placeof business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge, such as the president or manager. Thisperson must have sufficient knowledge to understand the defendants obligation, the importance of thesummons, and the effect of inaction.


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In this case, the Returns of Service simply state that the defendant was not home, and the maid refused to receive thesummons. They show no actual exertion or positive steps taken by the officer/process server to personally serve thesummons on Dr. Lourdes.

The petitioners contend that the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions must operate in theprocess servers favor. But here, where there was no compliance whatsoever with the procedure for substitutedcompliance, such presumption does not apply.

Thus, jurisdiction over Dr. Lourdes was never vested with the RTC. The decision never attained finality. The remedyof Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 sought with the CA was thus proper.


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REPUBLIC v. DOMINGOG.R. No. 175299 Sept. 14, 2011 J. Leonardo De Castropetitioners Republic of the Phils, represented by the DPWH, through the Hon. Sec., Hermogenes Ebdane

respondents Alberto A. Domingosummary Domingo filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against DPWH Region III

for non-payment of equipment rentals. Summons was served to the address of DPWH RegionIII, and was received by a clerk. DPWH was declared in default for failure to file its answer.The OSG then filed a petition for annulment of judgment due to lack of jurisdiction, since thesummons should have been served with the OSG. Held: The DPWH Region III being attachedto the DPWH, is only an agent of the Republic. Sec. 13, Rule 14 RoC 1 specifically states thatwhen the Republic is the defendant, service may be effected on the SolGen. The decision isvoid for failure to include indispensable parties.

facts of the caseDomingo filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against the DPWH Region III. He averred that

from April-Sept. 1992, they entered into 7 contracts for the lease of Domingos construction equipment in order toimplement the emergency projects of the agency, which aimed to control the flow of lahar from Mt. Pinatubo in theadjacent towns in the provinces of Tarlac & Pampanga. DPWH failed to pay the rentals.

Summons was issued by the RTC. The proof of service of the Sheriff stated that he personally served the copy of thesummons together with the complaint upon DPWH Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga through a clerk in theoffice. For failure to file a responsive pleading, the RTC declared the agency in default, and decided in favor of Domingo.

The OSG filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writof Preliminary Injunction. They argued that the 7 contracts were entered into by the Regional Director, Asst. RegionalDirector and/or Project Mngr. of the DPWH Region III for and in behalf of the Republicthe real party to the contract.Moreover, under the law, the statutory representatives of the govt. for purposes of litigation are either the SolGen or theLegal Service Branch of the Executive Dept. concerned. Hence, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the Republic.

CA: Dismissed. The regional office is an extension of the dept. itself and service of summons upon the former isservice upon the latter. Nothing in the functions of the OSG remotely suggests that service of summons upon the Republicshould be made exclusively on the OSG.

issueWoN the summons were properly served with the regional office. NO

ratioSummons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the

means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquiredthrough coercive process, generally by the service of summons issued by the court, or through the defendant's voluntaryappearance or submission to the court.

Jurisprudence instructs that when a suit is directed against an unincorporated govt agency, which, because it is

unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit against the agencys principal, i.e., the State. TheDPWH and its regional office are merely the agents of the Republic, which is the real party in interest in the civil case.Thus as mandated by Sec. 13, Rule 14 RoC, the summons in this case should have been served on the OSG.

The Court holds that the Republic was not validly served with summons in the civil casethe RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the Republic. The decision is void.

1 SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations . When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on theSolicitor General ; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executivehead, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct.


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JEHAN SHIPPING CORP. v. NFAG.R. No. 159750 Dec.14,2005 J.Panganibanpetitioners Jehan Shipping Corporation

respondents National Food Authority (NFA)summary Jehan won in a suit against NFA in RTC. NFA filed an MR and Supplemental MR without

notice of hearing. Jehan claims that it is a violation of Sec.4 and 5 of Rule 15. SC disagreed:GR: a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect thereglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.E2R: as provided in this case when the purpose of a notice of hearing was served. The test isthe presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion andmeaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.

facts of the case

Jehan sued NFA for a sum of money and injunction. The complaint was due to NFAs fault and negligence in thesinking of one of the vessels of Jehan which NFA hired in transporting imported rice. Jehan won in the RTC.

NFA filed an MR and Supplemental MR without a notice of hearing directed to the parties as required by Sec.4 and 5 of Rule 15 . The MR was dismissed based on such lack of notice of hearing. NFA filed a notice of appeal but was

denied because the MR did not toll the period of appeal and the decision became final.

issue WON the lack of notice of hearing in the MR is fatal, such that the filing of the Motion did not toll theperiod to appeal and the RTC decision became final and executory? NO, there was substantialcompliance in this case.

ratio

Admittedly, NFA committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing in its MR, filed on thevery last day of its appeal period. Again, it committed the same lapse in its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary

period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. However, the purpose of the notice requirementprocedural due processwas satisfied in this case. As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-daynotice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose ofavoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet thearguments in the motion before a resolution by the court . Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a partyshould not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion andmeaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering the circumstances of the presentcase, we believe that the requirements of procedural due process were substantially complied with, and that thecompliance justified a departure from a literal application of the rule on notice of hearing.

AS APPLIED: The RTC gave Jehan 10 days within which to comment on NFAs MR. Jehan filed its Opposition tothe Motion. In its 14-page opposition, it not only pointed out that the Motion was defective for not containing a notice ofhearing and should then be dismissed; it also ventilated its substantial arguments against the merits of the Motion and ofthe Supplemental MR. In this case, the RTC set the MR and the Supplemental MR for hearing on during which Jehanscounsel appeared. In other cases, the Court has held that lack of notice is cured when, after learning that a motion has thatdefect, the trial court promptly resets a hearing with due notice to all the parties.


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Dumaguete v PPAG.R. No. 168973 Aug. 24, 2011 J. Leonardo De Castropetitioners CITY OF DUMAGUETE, herein Represented by City Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices

respondents PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITYsummary F: The City of Dumaguete filed for an Application for Original Registration of Title over a

parcel of land. Initially, the RTC dismissed such application based on the MTD of theRespondent alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction as the land being sought to be registeredis part of the public domain. But the RTC subsequently reversed itself based on the MR andSupplemental MR filed by Petitioner. Respondent now avers that MR and Supplement MRwere mere scraps of paper (thus no legal effect) for being procedurally flawed (Rule 13 and15).H: Ordinarily, non-compliance of procedural rules would render motions as mere scraps ofpaper and unable to toll the reglementary period for an appeal. However, this case hasexceptional circumstances to warrant the liberal application of the rules.For Section 11 of Rule 13, the considerable distance between the offices of these two counsels(QC and Dumaguete) made the personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon theother clearly impracticable and a written explanation as to why personal service was not donewould only be superfluous.For Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15, there was substantial compliance with such rules whenRespondent received copies of the MR and the Supplemental MR, even if they did not receiveany Notice of Hearing. Respondent cannot claim that it was deprived of the opportunity to beheard on its opposition to said Motions.

facts of the caseThe City of Dumaguete, through its Mayor, filed for an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of

land with improvements before the RTC. It alleges that the land has been continuously possessed and occupied by theCity Mayor for more than 30 years.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and the OGCC filed Oppositions, saying thatthey were not able to possess the land for more than 30 years and that it was part of the public domain.

During the pendency of the case, several postponements delayed the proceedings. After the testimony of the firstwitness of the petitioner, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction by the RTC,stating that the subject property is not alienable and disposable, since it is a foreshore land, as explicitly testified to bypetitioners own witness, Engr. Dorado.

RTC: Granted the Motion to Dismiss. Because of this, Petitioner filed an MR and Supplemental MR, asserting that thedismissal is premature.

Respondent: MR and Supplement MR had procedural and substantive defects. It violated Sections 4 (Hearing ofmotion), 5 (Notice of hearing), and 6 (Proof of service necessary), Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner also failed tocomply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court when it did not attach to the Motion for Reconsideration a writtenexplanation why it did not resort to personal service of the said Motion. They should then be treated as mere scraps ofpaper with no legal effect . Since it did not interrupt the reglementary period to appeal, the Order had already attainedfinality.

RTC: Initially, it agreed that the MR by the Petitioner violated the abovementioned Rules but it subsequently agreedwith the Supplemental MR, in the interest of justice, and decided to proceed with the case by having a full-blownproceeding to determine factual issues in the case.

Respondent: Filed a Rule 65 before the CA because it avers that the RTC acted with GAD when it modified a judgementthat has attained finality.

CA: Granted the Petition for Certiorari.

issuesWON Secs. 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 may be relaxed in this case. YES.WON Sec. 11 of Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case. YES.

ratio


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The Court held that it was an error for the CA to act on the Petition for Certiorari by the Respondent, as the RTCsdecision to reverse itself was well within its powers. Procedural rules may be relaxed in order to serve the demands ofsubstantial justice , especially if it cites meritorious grounds to justify the liberal application of the procedural rules.

Substantial Grounds to Justify Liberal ApplicationGenerally, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the

complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. As anecessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer orupon the motion to dismiss; for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant.

In this case, jurisdiction was vested in the RTC as Petitioner properly followed the prescribed form and content ofApplications for Original Registration of Lands. Respondent then sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, not because of the insufficiency of the allegations and prayer therein, but because the evidence presented bypetitioner itself during the trial supposedly showed that the subject property is a foreshore land, which is not alienableand disposable. When the RTC initially dismissed the Application, it indeed acted prematurely as factual issues such asthe nature of the land must be resolved in the normal course of trial.

Procedural Issues Admittedly, said motions filed by Petitioner did not comply with certain rules of procedure. Ordinarily, such non-

compliance would have rendered said motions as mere scraps of paper, considered as not having been filed at all, andunable to toll the reglementary period for an appeal. However, we find that the exceptional circumstances extant in thepresent case warrant the liberal application of the rules.

For Section 11 of Rule 13, the considerable distance between the offices of these two counsels (QC and Dumaguete)made the personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon the other clearly impracticable and a writtenexplanation as to why personal service was not done would only be superfluous.

For Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15, there was substantial compliance with such rules when Respondent received copiesof the MR and the Supplemental MR, even if they did not receive any Notice of Hearing. Respondent cannot claim that itwas deprived of the opportunity to be heard on its opposition to said Motions.


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De los Reyes v RamnaniG.R. No. 169135 June 18, 2010 DEL CASTILLO, J.petitioners JOSE DELOS REYES

respondents JOSEPHINE ANNE B. RAMNANIsummary Motion for issuance of final certificate of sale is non-litigious. Ramnani won a civil case and

bought the property on public auction. It was not redeemed. Now the petitioner cannot contestthe right of Ramnani asking for a final cert. of sale. Being a non-litigious motion, it does notneed a notice of hearing.

facts of the caseRamnani won in a civil case. A writ of execution was issued. Ramnani was the highest bidder in the auction sale.

Consequently, a certificate of sale was executed in her favor. A writ of possession was issued by the trial court. After 12years a certificate of sale was annotated at the back of the TCT. Taxes on the sale was paid a year after.

2004- Ramnani filed a motion (subject motion) for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the finalcertificate of sale in her favor. Petitioner opposed on the twin grounds that the subject motion was not accompanied by anotice of hearing and that the trial courts October 11, 1977 Decision can no longer be executed as it is barred byprescription.

The trial court ruled that the prescription for the issuance of a writ of execution is not applicable in this case. Lessthan a year from the October 11, 1977 Decision, respondent exercised her right to enforce the same through the levy and

sale of the subject property on June 6, 1978. Although the annotation was on 1990, petitioner still did not exercise right toredeem.CA:affirmed. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right because

petitioner failed to redeem the subject property.

issueWON notice of hearing is needed. NOWON respondent is barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. NO

ratioWhile, as a general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4, Rule 15, excepted from this rule

are nonlitigious motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverseparty. Ramnani is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless tooppose the same.

Petitioner argues that there is prescription because of respondents failure to secure the final certificate of sale within10 years from the entry of said judgment. However, the decision was already enforced when the property was levied andsold about 8 months after promulgation of decision.


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Koppel Inc v Makati Rotary ClubFoundationG.R. No. 198075 Sept 4 2013 J

petitioners Koppel Inc (FKI)respondents Makati Rotary Club Foundation (MRCF)

summary Due to a dispute regarding a lease contract which contained an arbitrationclause, MCRF sued to eject FKI. MeTC went through with the case, andruled in favor of FKI (~eject). When it reached SC, it ruled that, because ofthe arbitration clause, the proper thing for MeTC to have done is to havestayed the action and referred the parties to arbitration.

facts of the case! 1975. Koppel (FKI) donated a parcel of land to Makati Rotary Club Foundation (MRCF) with the condition that

the land will be leased to KFI for 25 years! The Contract of Lease had an Arbitration Clause that was enforceable if the parties had any disagreement as

regards the interpretation, application and execution of the lease.! The lease was renewed twice, on 2000 and on 2005, and the rent was fixed at P4.2m/yr. Moreover, FKI had to

make a yearly donation to MRCF.! 2009. FKI refused to pay any more rent, arguing that it was exorbitant and in violation of their original agreement

which, according to FKI, actually extended up to 2025.! MCRF sent two demand letters. KFI refused to pay and sued to rescind the donation at the RTC. MCRF instituted

this ejectment case in the MeTC.! Despite the arbitration clause, MeTC refused to dismiss the case. Still, it rendered judgment in favor of KFI (MeTC ruling:

insufficient demand because the 2 nd demand letter was not introduced in evidence.)! RTC reversed and ordered KFI to vacate. It ruled that, among other things, KFI cannot invoke the arbitration clause and

impugn the validity of the lease contract at the same time.! CA affirmed.

issuesWhether the instant case is arbitrable. YES.

What are the legal effects of applying the Arbitration Clause?(1) The Court must stay the action until arbitration has been had. (RA 876 Sec 7)(2) The Ct must refer the parties to arbitration . (RA 9285 Sec 24)

ratioMRCF argued that, pursuant to Gonzales v Climax Mining, the validity of a contract cannot be subject to arbitration

proceedings because this requires the application and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which are within judicialfunction.

SC clarified that Gonzales was decided on the fact that the law being applied necessitated that the case be a miningdispute, which Gonzales was not. It is therefore not applicable here. Moreover, it was previously held in CargillPhilippines v San Fernando Regal Trading that even the rescission of a contract is arbitrable.

As to the argument that FKI failed to file a formal request for arbitration, the SC said that it is sufficient to requestsuch not later than pretrial conference (RA 9285 Sec 24).

MeTC was in error when it went through with the proceedings. It should have instead stayed the action and referredthe parties to arbitration, in accordance with their contract.

The SC explained that, in the past, courts regarded arbitration with disdain, hostility and jealousy. Much haschanged, however, with the courts recognizing that alternative means of dispute resolution are effective partners in theadministration of justice, such that bona fide arbitration agreements are now recognized as valid.

The SC, therefore, set aside all proceedings and remanded the case back to MeTC, ordered the same to be suspendedat the point when FKI filed its counterclaim (this is the time when FKI requested for arbitration) and referred the partiesto arbitration.


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Strongworld v. PerelloG.R. No. 148026 July 27, 2006 J. Chico-Nazariopetitioners Strongworld Construction Corp., Leo Cleto Gamolo & Reynold Molo

respondents Hon. N. C. Perello, First Peoples Bank (formerly Rural Bank of San Teodoro), Bank ofCommerce, Orlando Francisco, and Editha Lizarda.

summary Strongworld & board directors filed a complaint for sum of money and damages vs banks &its EEs for depositing checks to personal accounts. RTC dismissed complaint for no cause of

action, petitioners not proper property in interest. CA dismissed appeal since wrong course ofcertiorari (Rule 41 v Rule 65). SC ruled that CA erred. Dismissal of the complaint beingwithout prejudice, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is Rule 65.

facts of the case Rizal Cement Co delivered to Strongworld four 4 checks amounting to P5,085,615.22 as payment for the construction

of housing units. However, the subject checks were not deposited to Strongworlds Bank of Commerce account, but were instead

diverted to the personal accounts of bank employees Francisco and Lizarda in First Peoples Bank, without theknowledge and consent of Gamolo and Molo, Strongworlds authorized signatories, and without authority fromStrongworlds Board of Directors. No action was made by respondent despite repeated demands, resulting in thedamage and prejudice of petitioners.

Petitioners filed a complaint for sum of money and damages w/ RTC Muntinlupa City. RTC (Jan.9, 1998): Dismissed complaint. Not prosecuted by the proper property in interest, no cause of action. Gamolo

& Molo, though officers of Strongworld, did not show any evidence proving authority to sue or defend in behalf of thecompany.

Petitioners MR (Mar.30): Granted. Case reinstated. Though board resolution authorizing Gamolo to prosecute the casein behalf of Strongworld was defective (not authenticated by the proper officer), intention to authorize was clear.

RTC (May 7): Recalled Mar.30 order. Case should remain dismissed. MR was not served on respondents. Also lacked anotice of hearing, which rendered MR a mere scrap of paper.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration and for Declaration of Default. Dismissed by RTC.Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari w/CA.

CA: Dismissed for utilizing the wrong recourse of certiorari. Remedy of a party aggrieved of a final order or judgmentis appeal under Sec.1, Rule 41, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (RRCP), and not a special civil actionof certiorari under Rule 65.

Petitioners MR denied. Hence, present petition for review on certiorari w/ SC.

issueWoN CA was in error when it dismissed petitioners petition for c ertiorari on the ground that appeal was the appropriateremedy under Rule 41, 1997 RRCP, and not a petition for c ertiorari under Rule 65 YES(To fit discussion: WoN RTCs May 7 order, reviving the Jan.9 order, which dismissed the complaint, an order dismissingan action without prejudice YES. Not appealable thus Rule 65 proper remedy )

ratioDismissal with prejudice - disallows and bars the refiling of the complaint; subject to the right of appealDismissal without prejudice allows refilling of complaint; not appealableDismissals that are based on the following grounds, based on Sec.1, Rule 16, 1997 RRCP: (1) that the cause of action is

barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations (letter f); (2) that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffspleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished (letter h); and (3) that the claim on which theaction is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds (letter i), bar the refiling of the same actionor claim, as provided by Sec.5 of the same rule. Logically, the nature of the dismissal founded on any of the precedinggrounds is with prejudice because the dismissal prevents the refiling of the same action or claim . Ergo, dismissalsbased on the rest of the other grounds enumerated in Sec.1 are without prejudice because they do not preclude therefiling of the same action.

In this case, the dismissal of petitioners complaint was not based on any of the grounds specified in Sec.5, Rule 16(letters h, i, j of Sec.1) , rather, it was grounded on what was encapsulated in Sec.1(g), that the complaint states no cause ofaction for not being prosecuted by the proper party in interest. For this reason, the dismissal of petitioners complaintcannot be said to be a dismissal with prejudice which bars the refiling of the same action.


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Sec.1(h), Rule 41, 1997 RRCP mandates that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action withoutprejudice. The same section provides that in such an instant where the final order is not appealable, the aggrieved partymay file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. In this case, CA erred when it ruled that petitioners petitionfor certiorari filed before it was not the proper remedy. The dismissal of the complaint being without prejudice, theremedy available to the aggrieved party is Rule 65.

Sec.1, Rule 41, 1997 RRCP

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completelydisposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable:

No appeal may be taken from:(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;(c) An interlocutory order;(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise

on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;(f) An order of execution;(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,

counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending,unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and

(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice;

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party mayfile an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.


SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleadingasserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;(c) That venue is improperly laid;(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or

otherwise extinguished; (i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of

frauds; and(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.


SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss basedon paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim.


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PINGA v HEIRS OF GERMAN SANTIAGOG.R. No. 170354 June 30, 2006 J. Tingapetitioners Eduardo Pinga

respondents Heirs of German Santiago represented by Fernando Santiagosummary A counterclaim can stand on its own. Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the original complaint due to the fault of plaintiff

does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim. Dismissal of thecomplaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute thecounterclaim.

facts of the casePinga was one of the two defendants in a complaint for injunction filed by the Heirs of Santiago, alleging

that he and co-defendant Saavedra had been entering Santiagos coco land, cutting wood and bamboos andharvesting fruits therein. Pinga filed a counterclaim, alleging that the lands were owned by his father.

The Heirs failed to attend the hearings, and the case was dismissed. Pinga elevated the matter to the SC viacertiorari under Rule 45, assailing the dismissal of his counterclaim.

issueWON the dismissal of the original complaint shall cause the dismissal of the counterclaim? NO

ratio (just see summary, no need to read all these)Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault ofplaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact,the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date ofthe presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable lengthof time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motionof defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his

counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication uponthe merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

The express qualification in the provision that the dismissal of the complaint due to the plaintiffs fault, asin the case for failure to prosecute, is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute hiscounterclaim in the same or separate action . This stands in marked contrast to the provisions under Rule 17 ofthe 1964 Rules of Court which were superseded by the 1997 amendments. In the 1964 Rules, dismissals due tofailure to prosecute were governed by Section 3, Rule 17, to wit:

SEC. 3. Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action foran unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may bedismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion. This dismissal shall have the effectof an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.

Evidently, the old rule was silent on the effect of such dismissal due to failure to prosecute on the pendingcounterclaims. As a result, there arose what one authority on remedial law characterized as "the naggingquestion of whether or not the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim."22 Jurisprudence construing the previous Rules was hardly silent on the matter.

The doctrine that the complaint may not be dismissed if the counterclaim cannot be independently adjudicatedis not available to, and was not intended for the benefit of, a plaintiff who prevents or delays the prosecutionof his own complaint. Otherwise, the trial of counterclaims would be made to depend upon the maneuvers of


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the plaintiff, and the rule would offer a premium to vexing or delaying tactics to the prejudice of thecounterclaimants. It is in the same spirit that we have ruled that a complaint may not be withdrawn over theopposition of the defendant where the counterclaim is one that arises from, or is necessarily connected with,the plaintiffs action and cannot remain pending for independent adjudication.

While the distinction is necessary as a means to facilitate order and clarity in the rules of procedure, it shouldbe remembered that the primordial purpose of procedural rules is to provide the means for the vindication ofrights. A party with a valid cause of action against another party cannot be denied the right to relief simply

because the opposing side had the good fortune of filing the case first.

Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of thecounterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and noton the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissingit under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised onthose defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protectsuch counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.


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VIRRA MALL TENANTS v. VIRRA MALLG.R. No. 182902 October 5, 2011 J. SerenoPetitioner Virra Mall Tenants Association, Inc.

Respondents Virra Mall Greenhills Association, Inc., Lolita Regalado, Annie Trias, Wilson Go, Pablo Ochoa, Jr., Bill Obag and George Winternitz

Summary Intervenor association, which is seeking to be reimbursed by the plaintiff in a civil case, has aright to intervene therein because (1) it has a cause of action against the defendant of that case,

which defendant allegedly refused to reimburse it for expenses it incurred for therehabilitation of a property; (2) it has a legal interest in that case in that it stands to bebenefitted or injured by its result; and (3) its intervention will avoid the multiplicity of suits.

facts of the caseOrtigas & Company (Ortigas), owner of the Greenhills Shopping Center (GSC), and Virra Realty entered into a 25-

year lease contract over a portion of the GSC. Pursuant thereto, Virra Realty constructed Virra Mall, and organizedrespondent Virra Mall Greenhills Association (VMGA), an association of all the tenants and leasehold right holdersmanaging and operating Virra Mall. VMGA assumed and was subrogated to all the rights, obligations and liabilities ofVirra Realty in the lease with Ortigas.

VMGA requested for Ortigas to renew the lease since it had already expired . Meanwhile, it also acquired new setsof insurance policies effective from January 10-December 31, 2001. On May 5, 2001, Virra Mall was gutted by fire ,

requiring substantial repair and restoration. Thus, VMGA claimed the insurance proceeds .On September 3, 2001, Ortigas entered into a new lease with VMGA, through its President, Uy. Then, Uy assignedand transferred all his rights and interests over the property to herein petitioner Virra Mall Tenants Association(VMTA).

Ortigas sued several defendants including herein respondents for Specific Performance with Damages and Prayerfor Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. It accused them of fraud, misappropriation and conversion ofsubstantial portions of the insurance proceeds for their own personal use unrelated to the repair and restoration of VirraMall. To secure the subject insurance proceeds, Ortigas also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachmentagainst herein respondents .

VMTA filed a Complaint-in-Intervention in the above case, claiming that as the assignee or transferee of therights and obligations of Uy in the Second Contract of Lease, and upon the order of Ortigas, it had engaged theservices of various contractors in the amount of P18,902,497.75. Thus, it sought the reimbursement of the expenses ithad incurred in relation thereto.

The RTC admitted VMTAs Complaint-in-Intervention and denied respondents subsequent motion for dismissalthereto. However, upon respondents Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the CA, the RTCs ruling was reversed uponthe grounds that: (a) VMTA failed to state a cause of action; (b) VMTA has no legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (c) theComplaint-in-Intervention would cause a delay in the trial of the action, make the issues more complicated, prejudice the adjudicatioof the rights of the parties, stretch the issues, and increase the breadth of the remedies and relief . The CA stressed that if VMTA hadany cause of action, it would be against Ortigas and not VMGA, because it was the former that ordered it to undertake therehabilitation. Also, it lacked legal interest in the case between Ortigas and VMGA since it was not privy to the firstcontract of lease between the two.

issueWON VMTAs Complaint-in-Intervention was proper YES.

ratioSection 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in thesuccess of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or otherdisposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the actiThe court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. Such interest must be of adirect and immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment.

Applying the foregoing points to the case at bar, VMTA may be allowed to intervene because of the followingreasons.


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First, VMTA has a cause of action , which is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another . The elementsof a cause of action consist of: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the defendant to respectthe plaintiffs right, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right.

In the case at bar, VMTA, in its Complaint-in-Intervention, explicitly laid down its cause of action, which is VMGAs failure to deliver the insurance proceeds to the real beneficiary, VMTA, and its alleged misappropriation thereof, inspiteof due notice and demand . VMTAs purported right as the real beneficiary of the insurance proceeds is rooted on theground that it had facilitated and spent for the repair and restoration of Virra Mall upon Ortigasorders. Corollarily,respondents have a duty to reimburse it for its expenses since the insurance proceeds had already been issued in favor ofrespondent VMGA, even if the latter was not rightfully entitled thereto. Finally, the imputed act or omission on the part

of respondents that supposedly violated the right of VMTA was respondent VMGAs refusal, despite demand, to releasethe insurance proceeds it received to reimburse the former for the expenses it had incurred in relation to the restorationand repair of Virra Mall.

Second, VMTA has a legal interest in the matter in litigation . It is seeking reimbursement from Ortigas for thesubstantial amount it had advanced for the repair and restoration of Virra Mall. Precisely because VMTA seeksreimbursement from Ortigas that the intervention is proper, since the main issue in the case between Ortigas and VGMAis whether the former has a contractual right to the insurance proceeds received by the latter . Thus, the recoupment byVMTA of the expenses it incurred in the repair of Virra Mall depends on the success of either party in the main case .VMTA therefore has an undeniable stake in the said civil case that would warrant its intervention therein.

Further, the issuance to Ortigas of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against VMGA puts VMTA in a situation inwhich it will be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of the property in the custody of the court,pursuant to the said writ. The prospect of any distribution or disposition of the attached property will likewise affectVMTAs claim for reimbursement.

Finally, VMTAs intervention will avoid a multiplicity of suits. Although the CA was correct in stating that VMTAcould always file a separate case against Ortigas, allowing VMTA to intervene will facilitate the orderly administration of justice and avoid a multiplicity of suits.


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Pinlac v. CAG.R. No. 91486 September 10, 2003 Ynares-Santiago, J.

petitioners Alberto Pinlac, et alrespondents CA

summary This is a case for quieting of title. The Republic filed a motion for intervention and a Petition-in-intervention concerning Lot No. 3 when the petitioners MR was already pending before theSC. SC granted Republics petition to protect public interest as well as government propertieslocated and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The rule on intervention, like all other rules ofprocedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice.

facts of the caseThe case stemmed from a Petition for quieting of title filed by petitioners over 3 vast parcels of land known as Lot

1, 2 & 3. TC rendered a partial decision in favour of petitioners declaring them to be the absolute owners of the 3 lots andthat the area of Lot 3 was in excess of its true and actual area. The private respondents filed a petition to annul TC partialdecision with CA. CA granted and this was affirmed by SC.

On MR before SC, petitioners contend that TC decision w/ respect to Lot 3 should not have been annulled by CAbecause the petition for annulment filed by private respondents concerned only Lot 2. SC issued a resolution reinstatingTC decision concerning Lot 3. Republic of the Philippines, represented by Land Registration Authority thru OSG filed

a motion for intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention praying that judgment be rendered declaring OCT of Lot 3 bedeclared valid and not in excess of its true and actual area.note: government buildings found in Lot 3 are HOR, CSC, DSWD, Sandiganbayan, COA, DPWH, PUP, TESDA, several publicelementary and high schools, health centers and barangay halls

issueWON Republics petition-in-intervention should be granted despite being filed pending resolution of MR by thepetitioners - YES

ratioThe rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully

and completely available for justice . It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding

technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. In exceptional cases, the Court has allowed interventionnotwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the TC. In one case, intervention was allowed even when the petition forreview of the assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.

The intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public interest as well as government propertieslocated and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of life,liberty, or property without due process of law can certainly be invoked by the Republic which is AN INDISPENSABLEPARTY to the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended as a protection of individuals against arbitrary action of the State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect its properties .

The TC decision regarding Lot 3 was flawed as it neither specify which portions are in excess of the area of Lot 3nor state the metes and bounds that would serve as basis for implementing the dispositive portion of the decision.


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Agustin v CAG.R. No. 162571 June 15, 2005 Corona, J.petitioners Arnel Agustin

respondents Hon. Court of Appealssummary The trial court ordered Agustin to submit to a DNA test to determine his alleged

paternity of Martin Angela, in a case for support filed by Martins mother Fe. CA

affirmed. Agustin filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65, claiming compelled DNAtesting violates his right against self-incrimination. The SC upheld the TCs order,ruling that DNA testing technology has merit as a dependable and authoritativeform of evidence gathering. Agustin was unable to prove that the CA acted withgrave abuse of discretion in upholding the trial courts order to compel DNAtesting. CA decision AFFIRMED.

facts of the caseFe Angela and her son Martin sued Martins alleged biological father, Agustin, for support and support pedente litebefore the QC RTC, claiming that Agustin impregnated Fe in Nov. 1999, resulting in her giving birth to Martin out ofwedlock in Aug. 2000. In support of these claims, she presented a babys birth certificate purportedly signed by Agustin,who had shouldered pre-natal and hospital expenses but refused further requests for support.

Jan 2001: incident wherein Agustin had sped off in a van, and hit Fes leg while she carried baby Martin. (incident wasreported to the police) July 2001: Fe was diagnosed with leukemia, has been undergoing chemotherapy ever since. March2002: Fe and Martin sue Agustin for support.

Agustin denied having sired Martin and claimed that he had ended his relationship with Fe in 1998, before Martinsconception (he terminated the affair to return to his wife and children); that he and his family migrated to the U.S. thenreturned in June 2000 to find Fe spreading rumors about him impregnating her; that the community tax certificateattributed to him in acknowledgement of Martins birth ceritifcate was falsified, and erroneously reflected his maritalstatus to be single when he was actually married.

July 23 2002: Martin and Fe move for issuance of the order that all parties submit to DNA paternity testing pursuant torule 28 of the ROC. Agustin opposed on grounds that DNA would violate his right against self-incrimination, and that Felacked cause of action considering his signature on the birth certificate was forgery, and that the law does not entitle anillegitimate child to support if not recognized by the putative father.

TC: denied Agustins motion to dismiss the complaint, and ordered submission to DNA paternity testings. The CAaffirmed.

issueWON the CA committed grave abuse in discretion in upholding the Trial Courts resolution ordering theparties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing. NO. Compelling Agustin to submit to DNA paternitytesting does NOT violate his constitutional right to privacy and self-incrimination. DNA testing technologyhas merit as a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. Agustin was unable to prove thatthe CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the trial courts order to compel DNA testing. CAdecision AFFIRMED.

ratio

1. First, the trial court properly denied Agustins motion to dismiss because Fe had a cause of action.Elements of cause of action 2 have been complied with, and in this case, the sexual relationship between Fe

2 ELEMENTS of CAUSE OF ACTION: 1. Plaintiffs primary right and defendants corresponding primary duty, 2. Delict or wrongful act oromission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated.


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and Agustin was undisputed. Whether this relationship produced Martin determines right for support;therefore there is a cause of action.

2. Agustins refusal to recognize Martin and the authenticity of the birth certificate and his claim that Martin,as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support without first establishing his filiation under Art.283 and Art. 265 of the Civil Code are WITHOUT MERIT. The assailed resolution allowed Fe and Martinto prove their cause of action against Agustins allegations of non-authenticity of the documentaryevidence of acknowledge. Accord. to relevant jurisprudence 3 , whether or not Martin is entitled to

support depends completely on the determination of filiation, which may be accomplished by theproceedings ordered by the trial court, i.e. submission to DNA paternity testing.

3. [MAIN] Agustins contention that DNA is not recognized as a conclusive means of proving paternity andthat such an order violates his right against self-incrimination has NO MERIT.

a. Relevant Philippine jurisprudence 4 show that DNA testing is recognized as relevant evidence fordetermining filiation. EVIDENCE IS RELEVANT when it relates directly to the fact in issue as toinduce believe in its existence or non-existence. DNA evidence is relevant and reliable, beingbased on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

b. Compulsory DNA testing and admissibility thereof is constitutional . The right against self-incrimination applies only against testimonial compulsion, not all compulsion. Where the evidencesought to be excluded is part of objective evidence, such as DNA samples, and not extractedfrom the lips of the accused as an admission of guilt, such is admissible. (other examples ofobjective evidence include: photographs, hairs, other bodily substances, pregnancy tests for womenaccused of adultery, etc.) If in a criminal case, an accused whose life is at stake can be compelledto submit to DNA testing, so much more for a civil case where the consequences are not as dire.

c. In U.S. jurisprudence 5 , DNA testing has become so commonly accepted that ordering itsprocedure has become a ministerial act, such as in Wilson v Lamb, where the SC of St. LawrenceCounty, New York, allowed a party who had already acknowledged paternity to subsequentlychallenge his prior knowledge, ordering the Family Court examiner to order DNA tests: Upon

receiving a partys challenge to an acknowledgement, the court shall order genetic marker tests orDNA tests for the determination of the childs paternity, if appropriate.

3 Tayag v CA: in this case, the Court allowed integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones inheritanceBiz v Biz: there is absolute necessity requiring the action to compel acknowledgement/filiation be instituted and prosecuted successfullyprior to the action in which the same plaintiff seekspartition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs.4 Tijing v CA, 2001: recognized that the University of the Philippines National Science Research INsititue DNA analysis Laboratory now has thecapability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat analysis; People v Vallejo reasoned that DNA is admissible and authorityiveevidence in a rape case where murder victims DNA sameples from bloodstained clothes were admitted in evidence; People v Yaaraffirmed conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, principle evidence including DNA test results, in which the decision discussedDNA, the process of DNA testing, and its admissibility in the context of rules of evidence (i.e. consider how the samples are collected,handled, possibility of contamination, procedure followd in analyinzg samples, whether proper standards an dprocedures were followed inconducting th ettests, and the qualification of the analysis)

5 i. DNA testing also appears in New York Family Court Act: that if the record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA testindicates at least 95% probability of apternaity, the admission of such record/report shall create a rebuttable presumption of paternity andestablish, if unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the support of a childii. Rafferty v Perkins : SC of Missispi ruled that DNA tests rusults howing paternity were sufficient to overthrow presumption of legitimacy ofchild born during the course of marriageiii.Kohn v Amundson : SC of South Dakota demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity can be vacated after the adjudicatedfather had, through DNA

[inc] round 4 compilation

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