Draft version

Moshe (Konstantin) Yanovskiy1 Sergey G. Shulgin2

Ilia Zatkovecky3

Incentives for opportunistic behavior under The War against Terrorism

Category: International Public Choice/ Political Economy JEL code: D74, D72, H56 Keywords : Officials’ incentives perverting, strategy choice, unproportional use of force. Abstract

Replacement of full-fledged moral with quasi - moral values of political correctness makes it impossible to choose the strategy that would be efficient for fight against terror. Rule of Force societies4 where live the majority of world population cannot be changed without use of force. Force is essential for an establishment of strong and respected regime interested in fundamental reforms. In societies controlled by dictators only the strongest and toughest challengers are seriously considered an. Other challengers hardly have any to be in power for a long time. To cooperate with such challenger is dangerous and, so, irrational, for the people in long-term perspective.

Strategy of appeasement of terrorists is inefficient for fight against terror. Equating of unproportional use of force with war crime and the threat of punishment

perverts stimulus of military command. Putting a veto on such punishment and an open recognition of the inequality of life values for two categories of citizens - a tax payer and a civil person, cooperating with terrorists, will allow to win war against terror. Thus, the situation for civilians living on the territory controlled by terrorists will not worsen in the short-term period and will drastically improve in the long-term period.

Content Introduction .....................................................................................................................................2 Problem............................................................................................................................................3 Model and Statistical analysis outcomes.........................................................................................8

Theoretical Model: «Martyrdom Contracts» against Israel.........................................................8 The Rules of the Game ..............................................................................................................12 Some new Data for the 2004 report’s model Verification: .......................................................20 Statistical analysis outcomes .....................................................................................................21

The scale of Human Lives Value .................................................................................................23 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................26 References .....................................................................................................................................27 Annex 1. Israel media coverage dynamics analysis ......................................................................29

1 yanovsky@procenter.net.ru; janovski@iet.ru 2 shulgin@openecon.ru 3 We would like to express our appreciation to Sergey Zhavoronkov, Dmitriy Cherny, Hanna Beckerova, Vadim Rotenberg for data collection and valuable comments. 4 Rule of Force society – see definition below

Introduction

The presented report is mainly based on the Israel case study – the joint project of

Institute for the economy in transition (Russia) and MAOF group (Israel). The first stage of the

research project was devoted to testing alternative theoretical approaches for the Terrorist

Activity Determinant. Classical “Crime and Punishment” approach was found to be the most

appropriate for the analysis of terrorist’s motives. Data on victims of acts of terrorism is used for

hypothesis verification. Concessions and policy of economic aid seem to be inefficient for

prevention of violence escalation.

We introduced some definitions, we would need in this paper too.

Rule of Force society - discretionary governed society where leader or dictator is

legitimated and supported by force and violence mainly.

“Type 2” terrorist groups5, attacking civilian for maximization of victim number have been

“forcing out” “Type 1”terrorist groups6, aimed at military victory and fight against military

personal only. A “Type 2” terrorist groups seem to win competition for the specific investments

due to better reporting effect: greater media-coverage return per one victim (Yanovskiy, 2004).

Political correctness in the given work refers to widely represented (especially since

1970s) in USA and Western Europe ideologically motivated approach to the analysis of facts,

media coverage of the events, presentation of information to the society and a choice of the

strategy based on a principle of moral relativism (proposed instead of the generally accepted

Jewish - Christian moral norms). Activists of such approach identify themselves as humanists

and liberals and apply for exclusive interpretation of liberalism and humanism at the present

stage. Their claims they try to support with interdictions on expression of the alternative points

of view (Rubin, 1995). Quasi-moral or good in accordance with political correctness ideology is

only things good for defended groups chosen by intellectual leaders. The same intellectual

leaders decides that exactly is good or bad for defended groups7 without any formal procedure of

revealing this very groups’ own will or preferences.

5 Type 2 terrorist groups refers to groups, aimed at maximization of civilian victims number as all-sufficient intermediate goal. The ultimate goal of these groups is civil society demoralization, and destruction of Rule of Law system and Democratic state. This group includes but not limited to Sendero Luminoso (Peruvian), HAMAS, Hizballa (Arabian). Terrorism of Type 2 is based on the “Spider-web theory”, describing Western Society as vulnerable (because of high value of an individual life and cowardice) spider-web which could be easily destroyed by terror – see Gen. M.Yalon’s interview to Ha’aretz August 30, 2002 (http://www.cdn-friends-icej.ca/isreport/aug02/yaalon.html). 6 Type 1 terrorist groups refers to groups aimed at power seizure by means of demoralization and destruction of armed forces and security services. They mainly attack military goals and politicians. The difference from militant groups lies in readiness to attack in spite of high probability of concurrent civilian victims. This group includes Kurdish Labor Party, initially – IRA, which evolved to Type 2 group (see CDISS Terrorism Programme web-site http://www.cdiss.org/terror.htm). 7 Compare it with the idea of Bolshevik party founder V.Lenin about “moral of the class”: everything is moral and good that good for working class. What is good or bad for workers decides “new type political party” leaders only,

Problem

Democratic leader, Free media journalists and editors rather often tries to avoid make

any harm to the Terrorists’ leaders. Middle East modern history proves propensity of the peoples

living in the Rule of Force, non-democratic countries chose terrorist cooperative strategy and

avoid cooperation with Rule of Law states.

Why democratic leaders, maximizing his electoral support could make the choice to

cooperate with terrorists? How the Mass media makes the same choice?

What the rational reasons, preventing the democratic state to grant new pay-offs matrix

to encourage Rule of Force, non-democratic countries population to change their choice?

Traditional approach is based on the assumption that terrorism is a dangerous type of

criminal activity. Therefore we can apply “Crime and Punishment” economic approach (Becker

1968) for the analysis. The issue is also discussed from the opposite viewpoint by various

politicians: W.Brandt (1980, 1983), M.Thatcher (2002). Brandt believes in the efficiency of

large-scale Aid programmes. Thatcher is convinced, that institutional and personal failures of

underdeveloped countries and their leaders cause backwardness. So this problem couldn’t be

solved by means of foreign aid. She also quoted Julius Nyerrere “president” of Tanzania

personally responsible for his country’s bankruptcy caused by his socialist exercises – who

expressed his credo in 1975 more clearly than W.Brandt and his European socialist colleagues:

«I declare, that it is unfair - to put overwhelming part of a world's population in position of the

beggars, deprived advantages. In the united world, as well as in the united state if I am rich

because you are poor, or I am poor because you are rich, redistribution of riches for the benefit

of poor should be carried out by the right, instead of from charity».

In reality, an investment climate in Rule of Force countries is such that long-term

economic growth of gross national product per capita is not possible. The only possible

variation of this parameter in such countries is fluctuation about stable and painfully low value –

see, for example, historical statistics Maddison (2003) or Melyancev (1996).

The number of publications of the Institute for the Economy in Transition devoted to

the import of institutions by countries with transitional economy (Mau, Yanovskiy, et al., 2003)

and to the political components of investment risks in Russian regions (Mau, Javoronkov,

Yanovskiy, etc., 2002). showed that in absence of appropriate guarantees of personal immunity

because workers themselves are uneducated, doesn’t knows Marxism and could generate only wrong ideas of trade-unionism – steady workers’ life improvement strategy instead of class struggle and revolution ideas and strategy. (see for ex. V.I.Lenin “Zadachi sojuzov molodeji” – “Youths Unions’ tasks”, 1920 speech for III-rd Congress of Communist Union of the Youths).

investment climate quality sharply deteriorates because of high risks of long-term investments

and transactions . The violence, which couldn’t be limited by Law destroys the chances for the

Rule-of-Force societies and countries to reach the path of sustainable growth ("modern economic

growth"). Unfortunately modern technologies can go with slavery of the worst type,8. Efficient

usage of modern technologies leads to "long-term rise in capacity to supply increasingly diverse

economic goods to its population" (see S.Kuznets, 1971) incompatible with slavery, violence and

absence of reliable guarantees of basic human rights for life, personal immunity, liberty and

property. As we demonstrated in the 2004 publications devoted to international terror problem

there is no dependence of terrorist activity and international assistance to underdeveloped

countries, including Arafat-leaded Arabian autonomy in the Israel. The fact, the terrorist

motivation not caused directly by poverty itself and by lack of hopes proved by Sageman (2004).

Any individuals and groups can become victims of such violence in case their success

challenges the leader, whose authority is based only on brute force. If this leader decides that

individuals or groups prospering abroad are insufficiently protected, "roving bandit" can become

more preferable option than "the stationary bandit» one.

B.Netanyahu’s conclusions is quite close to ours: “Terrorism hides in the nature of

dictatorial regimes and those organizations, which practise it. Propensity for violence including

terrorism is not an accidental feature of dictatorships, but their quintessence. It will persist

while dictatorship features are kept If this tendency is not repressed it will reappear once and

again. …

… natural propensity for terrorism remains permanent in countries committed to

terror, and their sponsors, therefore it is necessary to keep reminding them, that they will pay

dearly if continue to assault other states.” (B.Netanyahu, 2002, pp. 115-116).

Threat of terrorism is not purely modern phenomenon peculiar to developed countries

and countries in transition. In antiquity and Middle Ages economic underdevelopment did not

lead to fatal military implications, and it was possible to receive a tribute in result of a " fair

victory». So attacks and wars against rich, but feeble, unready to fight neighbours were among

the best business practices of the barbaric leaders.

During the last couple of centuries when economic underdevelopment has began to

cause almost inevitable military backwardness, such strategy of robbery ceased to be effective.

Probably, the fatal blow to this business was delivered in 1815 by the captain of US

navy fleet Stephen Decatur who destroyed the piracy fleet - a basis of power of the piracy states

of Northern Africa (Tunis, Tripoli, Algeria, etc.), and by French expeditionary corps that

occupied major seaports of pirates.

8 GULAG with aviation, rockets and atomic energy programs, for example.

An English historian Paul Johnson refers to the very same experience proving his well-

known thesis «The answer to terrorism? Colonialism» (Paul Johnson, 2001). He emphasizes, that

brilliant military victories of Americans are not comparable with occupation and colonization of

northern Africa by France in terms of durability of the achieved results. The truth is that the

historian makes no attempt to explain why his seemingly successful results were long-lasting

but temporary, and ended up with bloody process of "decolonization".

The next triumph of supporters of capitulation before barbarians fell on second half of

the last century when powerlessness of these barbarians became obvious, but there were no

interest to the direct colonial control over them among leaders and voters of developed countries

. By some coincidence during this period the advanced countries started to face the modern

form of "fight for tribute" – terrorist attacks. In terms of scope, technical capabilities and assault

potential of terrorist actions makes this threat especially significant in the latest decades.

Economic aspects and an estimation of more, than impressive losses from terror activities is

provided in the report of Nicole and Mark Crain (2004).

It is necessary to emphasize that direct losses from terror can become only insignificant

part of all losses (not including human) if Rule of Law states will follow political correctness or

ideology (definition of political correctness is provided below) and evade from execution of the

basic function - protection of their citizens. The failure of the state to provide basic public goods

could create strong negative incentives for taxpayers, left without any protection and obliged to

render tribute to terrorists (see. Yanovskiy et al., 2003).

E.L.Glaeser (E.L. Glaeser, 2002) and M.Ferrero (M.Ferrero, 2004) analyzed individual

incentives of politicians and their supporters, providing the basis for terrorist activity.

E.Glejzer in the «Political economy of hatred» considers "demand" and «supply» of

hatred as the resource necessary for mobilization of supporters by preparation of violent actions

(revolutions, etc.); The author believes that a two-party democratic competition provides too

weak incentives for the overwhelming majority of voters , and there is no need in such powerful

instruments as hatred.

He also makes assumptions that hatred is not connected to real insults in the past.

Therefore the author quite clearly referred to the fact that anti-German and anti-Japanese hysteria

in the countries –that won the second world war would be quite understandable, but never

appeared as a real problem. However, Hitler’s anti-Semitism had no any real basis. Propaganda

was based on the threat of distribution of the falsism and forgeries like «Zions’ wise men

protocols».

The offer of hatred in the Glaeser’s model directly proportional to the financial

resources available to the political leader who supplies the hatred and inversely proportional to

the intensity of dialogue of the population majority with the group, targeted by the politician as

an object of hatred. Demand for hatred is also associated with certain costs (participation in the

"process" is not always pleasant; alternative costs - the missed benefit from cooperation with

members of the minority).

In the result of the analysis of theoretical (mathematical) model the author comes to the

following conclusions. Hatred "is successfully sold" when its supply equals demand. Under

intensive market exchange with «target group» of potentially hated alternative costs of

consumption of hatred grows.

As it was already noted before in the summary of our research in 2001-2003 such

market exchange is more often registered exist in societies where exist « the equality of a

supply and demand of hatred ».

Italian researcher M.Ferrero proposed rational approach for suicide-bombers motivation

analysis. His model assumes that the potential suicide-terrorist concludes some kind of contract

with the terrorist organization. The very idea to challenge the monopoly of of the psychologists

and similar experts’ "irrational" explanations ( by means of emotional hatred, through "despair",

«absence of hope», etc.) looks positive since interpretations of this kind can not explain the

phenomenon reasons and to propose the policy advice how to fight terrorism.

In the games’ first period the potential "shahid" (suicide bomber) receives bonuses

from participation in the organization. In the second At the second stage (second period of te

game) he/she can be sent on suicide mission with probability P or not to be sent with probability

(1-P) and receive a new bonus. The contract becomes economically justified at the certain

combination of individual factor of personal discount rate, sizes of bonuses in the first and

second periods, sanctions for renegades, alternative value of the reasonable and legal application

of the personal resources and probability P.

Verification problem and policy advice looks not so impressive. Author refers to some

set of poorly compatible cases (early Christian communities and contemporary terrorist gangs;

the first usually not punished apostates, the latter could torture to death suspected renegade

without any proof of treachery). Based on this set of cases he advices to prevent terror by "to

make apostates instead of martyrs rewarding the treachery". As m-r Ferrero explains during

post-report discussion: "to provide for HAMAS ex-member nondiscriminatory access to job

places".

At the same time author refers cautiously, to the problem of rational forecasting and

adaptation which leads to enhancing of the incentives "to play terrorism a bit once". And later on

he writes: "However, the possibility that such a premium placed on reneging be strategically

anticipated may perversely simulate participation in terrorist activity – possibility that deserves

further studies".

So we tried, basing on the Israel experience, to modify and develop Ferrero’s approach

and model. We took in consideration, first and foremost, inability for democratic state to change

alternative opportunities value (U0) for all members of rule-of-force society (reasoning see above

and below). We also paid attention to some pictures (see them on the web-site:

http://gamla.org.il/english/feature/lynch2.htm) which shows what real signals Arabian terrorists

send to Arabian society about value of reneging.

The book «One for all. Logic of group conflicts» (R.Hardin, 1997) shows, besides

the other interesting findings, compatibility of the E. Glaeser’s and H. Becker's ideas and

approaches. Hardin clearly distinguishes between the power based on an exchange (actually,

on the contract) and the power based on coordination. He shows that well coordinated

coalition gains much higher power in comparison with not coordinated group or even worse

case of coordinated opponents (enemies). From this viewpoint investments into escalation of

hatred can be easily interpreted, as the construction of simple and consequently reliable

mechanism of mass coordination. And on the basis of this mechanism of coordination

through the hatred it is possible to create a rather powerful government, quite free and

independent from its citizens.

However, the state facing a challenge of oppositional (or, more precisely,

revolutionary) movement based on hatred, can use a political will as a cure for such hatred .

«Well organized state» can attack and destroy leaders of "revolutionaries" (terrorists),

changing their matrix of expected pay-offs and depriving them from potential gains of the

future revolution (terror). This idea perfectly corresponds with H. Becker's model - when

hatred, revolution and violence are offered with new expected utilities, new pay-offs of

leaders of revolution (terrorists) decrease.

This conclusion sounds nice to us, however, it should be verified.

Jack Hirshleifer9 proposed that poor countries could be interested to invest more in war

and fight more hardly, hoping on rich plunder after victory. He stressed that “There is another

way to get rich:” you can grab goods that someone else has produced. Appropriating, grabbing,

confiscating what you want – and , on the flip side, defending protecting sequestering what you

already have – that’s economic activity too. He found, the same ideas were some times

proposed in the past.

The Machiavelli’s version of the golden rule: He who gets the rule will get the gold.

9 “The Dark Side of the Force”

The efforts of men are utilized in two different ways: they are directed to the

production or transformation of economic goods, or else to the appropriation of goods produced

by others (V.Pareto). Hirsleifer cited A. Smith too: “An industrious, and upon the account a

wealthy nations, is of all nations the most likely be attacked…”

It looks what more likely the same (wealthy) nations as a rich people would prefer to

protect not to grab. J.Hirshleifer believes the wealth level influenced on the preferences and on

the strategy collective choice. But it was not too seldom, economically advanced nations

attacked backward and weak nations (last century examples of Italy aggression against Abyssinia

and Nazi Germany against Poland, Yugoslavia and Russia). So, it would be very useful find

more efficient criteria of strategy choice economic efficiency.

If the society has chosen the conservative strategy, as it is defined at the presented

report, Hirshleifers’ assumption on the greater intensity of conducting war by terrorists, on

stronger motivation "poor" in comparison with "rich" most likely will not work. As in a situation

when "rich" realizes inevitability of loss of all without a resolute victory a situation his

incentives varies also to keep advantage of the way of life will predetermine a high degree of

bitterness of war from his side. Thus Hirshleifers’ assumption of the greater share of charges of

available resources of a backward "poor" society on war can on former be carried out. It will not

rescue a backward society from defeat. Examples of two wars of Finland against Russia (1918,

1939-1940) show, that it is true even in a situation when rather poor country repeatedly by virtue

of the huge sizes surpasses rather rich.

Model and Statistical analysis outcomes Theoretical Model: «Martyrdom Contracts» against Israel10

In M.Ferrero's report of 2004 «Martyrdom Contracts» it was presented rather simple

and straightforward model which we take as a basis. However, we have developed and

modified this model to make it, in our opinion, more realistic. We believe that our modification

is more appropriate for formal description, at least, for the case of terrorists’ war against Israel.

In short, the original model is the set of five equitations:

rPBPCBEU

aaM

++−

+−=1

)0()1( 21 (1)

10 Here we have been developing the model of Mario Ferrero presented at Public Choice Society conference 2004 in his paper "Martyrdom Contracts".

rPSBCB

rSBPBPCBEU

aa

aaaR

+−

+−=+

−+−+−=

11)()1( 2

122

1 (2)

Where:

Eum is the utility of a suicide terrorist

Eur, the renegades’ utility

B1a, - 1-st period bonus

B2a -2-nd period bonus

P – probability.

r -Personal discount rate.

C - Entrance fee for joining terrorists’ gang.

To encourage a person to join terrorists his utility from the contract should exceed an

alternative utility of peaceful life:

Eur ≥U0 (3)

Eum ≥U0 (4)

Where U0 - alternative utility from peaceful life without cooperation with terrorists.

Sanctions of the rational terrorist organization should outweigh the bonuses of the

second period so that there is no temptation to defect:

B2a - S ≤ 0 (5)

Where S - sanctions against the renegade.

In our version of the model the following changes are made: 1. The entrance fee to the terrorist organization can be negative (the organization can entice

a new member). For the sake of simplicity we assume that it is equal to zero(C=0).

2. For renegade B2a =0,

because it is not quite clear, what kind of bonuses or benefits are acceptable for renegade apart

from the value of alternative utility of peaceful life (U0). Moreover the bonuses granted by

terrorists organization to loyal members becomes inaccessible for "traitor". Therefore in our

equation for the utility of the renegade this member is equal to 0.

3. We introduced several new variables, necessary to make the model more realistic and

appropriate to the situation.

Let's assume:

Vm - utility of death (Vm <<0)

It is equal to 0 in the original Ferrero’s equation. The problem is how to evaluate the difference

between victims of «shahid’s belts» explosion and deaths in "PA" torture chambers. It is

obvious that the level of the anti-goods are essentially different, as it is reflected in our version

for the sanction interpretation:

S= Ktorture * Vm

Where Ktorture - coefficient >>1 - factor of tortures.

V72v - expected utility of "the experienced in love virgins » in the second and the subsequent

periods for "shahid".

It should be stressed that probability of terrorists’ verdict for execution could be many time less

than 1. The probability depends on the strategy of Rule of law state in its war against terrorist

activity.

Ps=P(Rlawstr)

(i.e. Ps - probability of the sanction).

If the Rule of law state hunts and persecute terrorists every moment hardly and

furiously, they couldn’t afford to play in «peoples’ justice», so probability of punishment

(especially, connected with tortures practices) could be sharply reduced. However, if the state or

"international community" advocate the provision of a territory for "progressive" terrorists

(naming it, for example, «Palestinian autonomy» - "PA") or agree on truce with them, as

Americans in Iraq did (i.e. recognizes, de facto, the same "PA" only in a miniature), nothing will

prevent them to create an ornament of dead tortured bodies in the streets (see the picture at the

left) as it is done in the "PA" (and look for more illustrations on the site

http://gamla.org.il/english/index.htm).

For simplicity we reduced all variants of strategy of the democratic state to just two -

"progressive" and "conservative".

"Progressive" is named the strategy of rewarding for terror via regular concessions including

territorial and moral ones - a recognition of identity of values or even correctness of terrorists

views and actions, and legality of their motivation, provision of VIP-s status and diplomatic

immunity to the leaders of terrorists gangs as well as economic assistance to population of

developing countries ( actually to bandits).

"Conservative" is named the strategy of rewarding population of underdeveloped

(“developing”) countries for cooperation with democratic state army and intelligence and

punishing them for any assistance to terrorists. At the same time government persist in trying to

kill terrorists and their supporters, refusing to conduct any official negotiations. Certain

compensation is paid to those citizens of developing countries that to a greater or lesser extent

cooperate with democratic states.

If a suicide bomber does not receive an order to blow up himself, he/she enjoys both

bonuses from "brother - terrorists" and alternative utility of peaceful life:

Eum = B2a + U0.

U0 = U(r) - The latter equitation reflects the fact that the utility of peaceful life and legal income are higher

for persons with the lowest personal discount rate.

Therefore in modified version of the model there is a parameter actually verified by the

statistics on victims of specific punishments of terrorists at various strategies of the state (within

the framework of the present research project we can not make this test because of lack of time

and other resources therefore this analysis and appropriate data collection is left for further

studies).

The Ps=P(Rlawstr) parameter is quite "controllable".

We assume that the leader of terrorists (the Roving Bandit in the Olson’s terminology)

takes 100 % of the economic aid resources given by progressive democratic leaders (because

nobody dares to intervene) In a quantitative example we shall assume that the democratic state

gives assistance Aid = 10 units per capita.

Acost=1 - costs of murder per one victim. We set value (-100) for the anti – good named "death"

for the numerical example.

The price of cooperation with the Bandit (the leader of terrorists) at progressive strategy equals

to zero, and the collaborator can receive all the gains related to peaceful life (which are equal to

the gains received by a terrorist who was not ordered to blow up minus the B2a):

U0 = U(r)

More precisely, the expected utility is as the following:

Euс= U0pv(r). – present value of all-life citizens’ economic activity

If "conservative strategy" is chosen by a democratic government, cooperation with

terrorists generates a threat of punishment (a quantitative example =-50 that is approximately

equal to death with probability of 50 %):

Euс= (1-Pd)* U0pv(r) + Pd Vm. (6), where Pd - probability of being killed by democratic state’s

soldiers.

In case the leader of terrorists (Bandit) refuses to murder disloyal citizensit is

equivalent to death sentence to him . This is a clear signal of weakness both to other bandits and

to the population, a threat to his status of Bandit and even to his life since it creates an

incentive for mass disobedience and strengthens positions of competing bandits, «bandits -

challengers». Therefore in our example his pay-off from this strategy is equal to a pay-off from

death (-100).

If citizens refuses to cooperate with terrorists (roving bandits) then the democratic stateshould

choose the conservative strategy, and probability of punishment of "collaborators" - «neo-

colonialists’ servants» decreases.

Therefore pay-offs can be can be described by the following set of expressions:

Cooperation with the terrorist leader (roving bandit) - conservative strategy:

Euс= (1-Pd)* U0pv(r) + Pd Vm

Refusal from cooperation with the terrorist leader (roving bandit):

Eunc= 1/(1+r) [U0 (r) + Pb* Ps(Rlawstr)* Ktorture * Vm)] (7)

Cooperation with agents of the democratic state:

Euс= (1-Pb* Ps(Rlawstr))* U0pv(r) + Pb* Ps(Rlawstr)* Ktorture * Vm (8)

Where Pd, Pb - probabilities of punishment by soldiers of the democratic state and by terrorists

accordingly.

Similar to the case of the contract with a suicide-bomber who changed his mind (decided not to

be sent to paradise there is a probability of that democratic Rule-of-law state will allow the

punishment of its loyal partner - contactor.

If the progressive strategy is chosen by a democratic state, Ps(Rlawstr) ≈ 1, and expression (8) can

be rewritten as the following:

Euс= (1-Pb)* U0pv(r) + Pb* Ktorture * Vm (9)

The Rules of the Game

In this section a set of simplest prisoner dilemma type games with quantitative

examples of pay-offs are described to illustrate the aforementioned Democratic Leaders’

Strategy choice approach.

To cooperate or not to cooperate? This is a question. Population of an underdeveloped

country makes its choice, basing on the Democratic leader and the Bandits proposals and

strategies.

Democratic leader chooses between “Progressive” and “Conservative” strategies.

Progressive strategy is to prevent Bandits’ violence by means of permanent rewarding

both Bandits and Population.

Conservative strategy is to reward underdeveloped country population for cooperation

and punish them for assistance to Bandits. At the same time government persist in trying to kill

Bandits, avoiding any kind of official negotiations.

Assumption: Bandit could extract up to 100% extra rent out of economic aid provided

by a democratic country. Let’s assume that this extra rent equals to A, cost of civilians

assassination, Bandits’ revenue from cooperation with population = 10. Democratic state

provides economic assistance 10 per capita.

Example of progressive strategy Underdeveloped

country citizen Cooperate with the

bandit Not to cooperate

Terrorist leader (roving bandit)

kill Aid - Acost =9; Vm= -100

-1; Vm= -100

Not to kill 20; 0 -100; Aid =10 Even if Inhabitant believes He could be killed in spite of pro-cooperative choice with probability

50% his only rational strategy to cooperate with the Bandit (Expected Utility (-50) better choice

than expected utility (-100) Under the presented pay-offs matrix).

Underdeveloped

country citizen Cooperate with the

democratic country abstain

Democratic state (leader)

Assist - Aid =-10; Vm= -100 - Aid =-10; 0

abstain 0; Vm= -100 0;0

In the presented example the citizen cooperating with the democratic government killed by the terrorist leader (roving bandit).

Example of conservative strategy

Under this strategy pay-offs matrix varies significantly. The terrorist can kill a non

cooperating citizen, but with probability of 50 % only. In this example the citizen « aggravates

fault before the Motherland by cooperation with invaders ». Since a bandit can not kill twice, a

citizen, who prefers not to cooperate with the terrorist, can receive his pay-off from cooperation

with the democratic state which gives him the compensation of 10.

Underdeveloped

country citizen Cooperate with the

bandit Refuse to cooperate

Terrorist leader (roving bandit)

kill 0; Euс=-50 10; Eunc =-40

Not to kill -100; Euс=-50 0; Eunc =10

In this example conservative strategy leads to the situation when the choice to

cooperate with the Bandit becomes too risky for local people11, but the choice to abstain

becomes quite credible because the Bandit will be at risk to be killed by Democratic state

soldiers before he could punish somebody for the lack of loyalty.

If local citizens believe that the rules of Democratic Leader’s game might be "changed

without notice" their rational choice would be to switch to cooperation with the Bandit.

But if they believes that Democratic Leader will give a sanction to army invasion, and

going to leave his troops in their country for an indefinite period of time and suppress any kind

of hostile activity then their only rational choice is to cooperate.

In long run Bandit’s ability to kill would become an incredible threat. Therefore a

strategy to abstain will dominate in the first round of game and strategy to cooperate - in the

second round.

If probability of the terrorist repressions decreases significantly for a long period of

time (that certainly requires strictly conservative approach - without truce with terrorists,

without any concessions like in USA - Israel case with so-called "Road Map" plan of terrorist

state creation on the democratic state’s territory) "not cooperate with the terrorist" strategy could

be discussed as a real option or, even dominating strategy for the underdeveloped (or so called

“developing”) country citizens. Democratic leader’s incentives

Terrorist leader

(roving bandit) To sign Peace Treaty

and attack the Democratic country citizens

To sign the Treaty and follow it

Democratic country’s leader

Progressive strategy Liberal voters + vacillating voters ("centrists") (before the attack); R + Aid

Liberal voters + vacillating voters; Aid

Conservative strategy Conservatives’ voices + vacillating voters

Conservatives’ voices + vacillating

11 A citizen can be punished by Democratic State soldiers or other agents by means of violent actions or economic sanctions.

(after the attack); Vm= -100

voters; 0

Where R – the terrorists’ bonus of the winner and strong cruel leader reputation - (the

dead terrorist can not enjoy such a reputation).

The democratic leader tries to maximize the number of voices of voters. Here we do not

take into account an influence of press via the displaced estimation (constant displacement and

unexpected displacement) of the benefit of terrorists, and we assume approximately uniform

distribution of voters to fractions of "conservatives", "liberals" and " centrists".

If progressive strategy is the choice of the democratic country than long-term rational

choice of terrorists’ leader is - to attack (both in captain Decatur’s days and nowadays). In long-

term run he will be invited to peace talks anyway, win legitimacy and personal immunity, de-

facto recognition of his authority and his right on the seized assets (including, the foreign

assistance resources - Yasser Arafat's well-known example12). Thus, terrorists’ pay-offs in his

game against the democratic partner who conforms to the progressive strategy’s rules shows a

tendency to a «steady growth".

Under uncertain ("neo-Conservative") strategy as it showed the Spanish example of

2004 with vacillating voters shift to "liberals" after the dreadful act of terrorism, the given game

model does not work. It is easy to explain why . The conservative model could not show the

efficiency, because it was not offered to the voters by "conservative" Spanish prime minister.

Instead of precisely articulated idea of a crusade against terrorists Spanish "right-wingers"

unconvincingly suggested to strengthen struggle against Basque separatists ( who are something

in between militants and terrorists of the first type, and, perhaps, even closer to militants). In

result. voters hves decided to try an alternative model.

A tree game – for the « struggle for citizens of a developing country between the

terrorist leader (roving bandit) - and the leader of a democratic country» is shown below:

12 One couldn't enumerate all links and articles provided by internet searching machines by key-words "Yasser Arafat Corruption" or "PA corruption" – see very few examples in special section of the References.

Progressive Conservative

Cooperate with Bandits

Cooperate with Democratic State

Kill civilians

Not

Coop. Not Not

Not K N K N K N

Coop.

Cooperate Not

Coop. Not Not

K N K N K N K N

D

C

C

C C

C

C

B B B B B B B B

-10 -100 19

-10 0

-80

-10 -100

9

-10 0

-90

0 -100

9

0 -50 -90

0 -40 -1

0 10

-100

-10 -10019

-10 0 20

-10 -100

9

-10 0

-90

0 -100

9

0 -50 10

0 -100-1

0 0

-100

D: C: B:

Fig. 5. A tree of game: « struggle for citizens of a developing country between the

terrorist leader (roving bandit) and the leader of a democratic country »

1987-1991 so called “Intifada” (Uprising) of the Arabian against Israel started one year

after gen. E.Sneh initiated withdrawal of Israel Army outside the Arabian settlement on the West

Bank of Jordan. So, average distance for “apostate” to reach Israel army position for safety

increased in some times and terrorist organization activity increase could be forecasted in

accordance with our Ferrero-based model.

If everything is so obvious with Democratic state long term gains why Progressive

Strategy is still used even six and a half of decades after Munich and a few years after

September, 11, 2001?

1. Possibility to receive immediate gains (the increase of rating) and to hand over costs to

successor or to a Leader of another Democratic State ( i.e. Czechoslovakia in Munich).

The negative result of such policy becomes apparent not always so quickly and so

clearly. Even then, when the pay-off for each voter falls drastically as the result of such

policy, his next after change of pay-offs choice not necessary should be "conservative".

Aggregate preferences profile with very high negative evaluation of some costs makes

voter not interested in his Governments’ urge towards fighting. Since this actions leads

«blood, toil, tears, and sweat» for the voter - taxes, deterioration of conditions of a life,

conscription and other costs. The rational Frenchmen in 1940 made a choice opposite to a

choice of British people.

2. Personal preferences of Leaders such as personal discount rates can not be revealed with

reasonable cost. Rational ignorance could conceal this information from the voters even

if the cost of measurement is reasonable for the researcher. Strong opposition and

independent press could solve the problem, but not always in due time. Therefore under

certain circumstances unfair game of political leaders with their supporters is possible. In

short run an unscrupulous leader could even break the condition of Arrow’s theorem on

concurrence of a public choice to a choice of individual voters (examples of Edward

Heath, 1970 "U-turn", I.Rabin’s and then A.Sharon’s shift from declared Anti-Terrorist

approaches in the 1992 and the 2001, 2003 Campaigns respectively to quite opposite

actions).

3. According to Niskanen model a leader of a democratic state can be interested in

maximization of the resources under his control or in short-term positive change in

moods of voters for prolongation of his mandate at next elections. In such situations

Democratic Politician is interested in coming into agreement with terrorists and their

leaders on release of hostages – his country’s citizens - in exchange for political

concessions and/or the economic aid or purchase of a third party concession13).

4. The media coverage bias (appearance reasons – see Yanovskiy, 2004 comments to

example of biased coverage of Sabra& Shatila and Damur cases14) could encourage the

Leader and even part of rationally ignorant voters to shift their position. Sharp and

unpredictable shift in the coverage, a change of a viewpoint of certain mass media can

affect the rational voter who is inclined to save on information costs and consequently

rationally ignorant in the short-term period and close to «full rationality» in long-term

(therefore the conservative voter is hardly under influence of «New-York Times» or

«Washington Post», but can react on sharp change in a viewpoint of «Washington

Times», "Fox" TV channel or conservative radio channels). However, stable and

permanent shift in the media coverage creates problems for a politician. He could be

subject to pressure from even those editions, which his voters ignore, in a situation when

the politician’s communication with his target electorate blocked because of the shift.

Sometimes the politician can not inform his voters about his position avoiding the

13 For example, a program of assistance for "less developed countries" or realization of a foreign policy project to support a "peace process" - as B. Klinton's administration tried to follow “Aid for Peace” approach in Middle East policy - see Saul Singer http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp456.htm and chronicle of Barak-Clinton negotiations, 1999 http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/990720/1999072027.html 14 The analysis made by German researcher D.Cherny for this project proves (on the “New York Times” files for 1975-76 and 1982) the bias existence. The coverage of Moslems massacre by Christians militia some dozen times outnumbers coverage of the same scale massacre of Christians in Damur in 1975-76 by Moslems.

biased media. Such problem appears for Conservative Leader, for example, if «political

correctness supporting cartel» dominates on the media – market (see above).

It is clear that if Leaders’ personal discount rate is close to 1(or his r≈0) and the voters’

preferences tend to "conservative" values, probability of choosing "Conservative" strategy

increases. At the opposite situation – Leaders’ discount rate >> 1 (or his r>> 0) and voters’

preferences tend to "liberal" values, chances for choosing "Progressive" strategy grow.

Military commander’s choice Let's assume, there is a ratio (constant in the short-term period) of casualties in Rule of

Law State army and the number of killed terrorists (or soldiers of the state supporting terrorism)

= Kcas. Also we shall note that in each conflict there is some ratio of killed combatant and

civilian casualties (Kcivlos).

While planning military operations and their extensiveness (defense - offensive) a

general imposes the “manpower budget constraint” in the form of maximum number of

casualties in his own army and also tries to optimize the ratio of survived soldiers andkilled

enemies.

Let's assume, that the general also takes into account the number of negative remarks of

politicians’ and journalists on his actions . If Refneg =R(Kcas) it may not influence his choice

significantly since it is defined by the same coefficient. This situation is typical for countries

where conservative political strategy were chosen by voters or politicians.

However if a general faces the choice of the "progressive" strategy he should take

into consideration some additional parameters. First of all, death rate among the population

controlled by terrorists (dictator) or supporting terrorists (dictator). And as it was shown earlier,

it is more or less the same. At least, in absence of long-term occupation that looks like almost

permanent by the victorious Rule of Law country acting as a full-scale government.

Then dependence Refneg on the factor remains, but it changes a sign. The more

successful offensive leads to increase in number of enemy’s causalities, respectively it leads to

increase of number of civilian persons killed and, therefore to a greater number of negative

comments about the general in media and from influential politicians that may negatively

influence his career to say nothing about the risk of legal prosecution for non-proportional use

of military force or even war crime.

There is always of danger a court prosecution for fighters against the terrorism. In

particular if the judicial authority is independent in the Rule of Law state and acting under the

influence of ideas of "political correctness", and the society itself does not throw away such

ideas. There is also a probability of prosecution of the leader of the democratic country after his

retirement by terrorists and their allies with the help of the international court institutions. A

leader can be accused, for example, in «unproportional use of force » ( first steps in this

direction were made by judges of Israel) or simply in ignoring the interests of the population

supporting terrorists (see above the ruling of the Supreme court of Israel on safety wall

location).

In such situation the general faces the following dilemma: to solve a multi-criterial

optimization task or to forget about killing maximum number of terrorists and minimize

casualties among his own soldiers at any cost, at the same time minimizing casualties among

enemies and supporting population, reducing number of negative responses on his activity. If

progressive politicians and journalists manage to convince the majority of voters that mass

killing of enemies (terrorists) is not the best possible option the general will rationally forget

about this parameter in the decision making process the.

However, a talented and risk-taking general could make decisive actions, increase the

Kcas factor and become victorious. When he would leave military career to become polititian

supported by conservative electorate (young A.Sharon's example in 1973).

Left-wing extremists, “ political correctors” insists the unproportional use of force is

something dreadful and, at least – the terrorists’ human rights violation.

The simple logic reminds: one couldn’t win on the battlefield without unproportional

use of force. The “Military victory” could be defined as efficient unproportional use of force.

Unproportional use of force in due time and in due place (breakthrough of the specified sector of

front, key attack direction or target) leads to military victory.

Any application of advanced military strategy, tactics, techniques or technology,

communication and transportation leading to victory is clear examples of “unproportional use

of force” or could be easily interpreted as such.

Therefore, the restriction imposed by legislation or court precedent and enforcement

practices unfriendly to commander makes majority or even all victory targeted strategies

irrational for the commander of Rule of Law state Armed forces.

Terrorist (or, say politically correct “militant”, “fighter for “freedom”, “partisan”)

being well informed because of free society transparency, could convert his status very quickly

and without significant risks or costs. Don’t wear uniform, put your gun on the ground and avoid

death! Few years later he could be released because of politically motivated exchange or

amnesty.

Two examples:

Progressive strategy has been chosen Terrorist leader

(roving bandit) To attack To be quiet

Rule of Law State’s general

To fight terrorism Conservative voters’ support – court prosecution – Media; Strong man Reputation

Conservative voters’ support – court prosecution – Media and politicians’ pressure; Survival probability

To fight for “Peace” Liberal voters & Media support; Strong man Reputation + Survival guaranteed

Liberal voters, politician’s & Media support; Survival guaranteed

Conservative strategy has been chosen Terrorist leader

(roving bandit) To attack To be quiet Rule of Law State’s general

To fight terrorism Conservative voters’ support & politicians’; Death + Strong man Reputation probability

Conservative voters’ support; Arrest

To fight for “Peace” Liberal voters & Media support; Strong man Reputation + Survival probability15

Liberal voters & Media support; Survival guaranteed

The new phenomena – appearance of growing number of “liberal” generals in the US

and Europe who prefers fight for peace not fight enemy shows the hypothesis regarding new

commanders’ incentives couldn’t be rejected.

Some new Data for the 2004 report’s model Verification:

The last year report we tested H.Becker crime and punishment-type model:

Oj = uj/pjfj

Where Oj - number of acts of terrorism in one year; uj - utility of organizers and customers

(investors) from fulfillment of an act of terrorism; pj- probability of punishment of organizers

and customers; fj - an indication of rigidity of punishment.

For evaluation of Terror Determinants Significance a linear regression has been used last year.

Dependent Variable Number of Terror Victims – Civilian – time series (Israel, 194916-2003);

15 All pay-offs valid if the general wouldn’t be dismissed; so it could be multiplied on dismissal probability. 16 1948 was the year of war in the Israel; part of the country territory was temporarily occupied and by 5 Arabian armies, therefore this year is incomparable with others and was excluded from the time-series.

Independent variables: Type of Governmental Strategy – set of Logical Variables; Dummy on 10

years after IDF17 foreign full-scale operations (the IDF operation is considered here as the pj-

probability of punishment of organizers and customers and the fj - an indication of rigidity of

punishment increase).

Now we collected monthly civilian causalities statistics and set of historical data. We used the

following sources:

Court decision and legislation data base;

International electoral statistics (to evaluate Democratic leader incentives). Israel media

monitoring data. Terrorists biography data set (from the Israel).

CK – the dependent variable – number of civilian casualties.

PEACE and NONPEACE actions were marked by “1” and “0” (presence / absence).

We have data since 1948, but as first large scale peace initiatives could emerged only after large

scale military victory (as production – stimulating policy requires many years of responsible

financial policy of previous governments and other money authorities). So we started our test

since 1966 December.

Statistical analysis outcomes Significant correlation between some variables could means nothing but some spurious,

meaningless relations.

But dealing with time series one could use Granger (1969) approach to see how much of current

Y can be explained by previous values of Y and then to define whether additional lag of X could

improve the explanation of Y. It is said that X Granger-causes Y if X helps in prediction of Y.

To test Granger-causality we ran regressions

Y = c0+c1Yt-1+…+cnYt-n + k1Xt-1+…+knXt-n+et

F-statistics are the Wald statistics for the joint Hypothesis: k1 = k2 = … = kn = 0

Null hypothesis is that X does not Granger-cause Y

Pairwise Granger Causality Tests Sample: 1949:01 2005:01 Lags: 2 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability NONPEACE does not Granger Cause CK 671 3.43946 0.03265 CK does not Granger Cause NONPEACE 0.05011 0.95113 PEACE does not Granger Cause CK 671 1.05338 0.34934

17 Israel Defense Forces

CK does not Granger Cause PEACE 1.15345 0.31617 PEACE does not Granger Cause NONPEACE 671 0.22673 0.79719 NONPEACE does not Granger Cause PEACE 0.27640 0.75860 And we cannot reject the hypothesis (on 5% confidence level) that CK does not Granger-Cause

NONPEACE, and also we reject hypothesis that NONPEACE does not Granger-Cause CK. That is we

have one way Granger causality from NONPEACE to CK.

Running regression CK = C(1) + C(2)*NONPEACE(-1) + C(3)*NONPEACE(-2) + C(4)*CK(-1) + C(5)*CK(-2) Dependent Variable: CK Method: Least Squares Sample(adjusted): 1949:03 2005:01 Included observations: 671 after adjusting endpoints

Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. C 1.553006 0.242142 6.413629 0.0000

NONPEACE(-1) -2.428797 1.639148 -1.481744 0.1389NONPEACE(-2) -3.513581 1.634726 -2.149340 0.0320

CK(-1) 0.267703 0.038767 6.905458 0.0000CK(-2) 0.281142 0.038768 7.251884 0.0000

R-squared 0.194694 Mean dependent var 3.214605Adjusted R-squared 0.189857 S.D. dependent var 5.769076S.E. of regression 5.192625 Akaike info criterion 6.139779Sum squared resid 17957.59 Schwarz criterion 6.173377Log likelihood -2054.896 F-statistic 40.25375Durbin-Watson stat 2.139725 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 We could see that NONPEACE action in second period is significantly decrease number of civilian killed Pairwise Granger Causality Tests Sample: 1949:01 2005:01 Lags: 24 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability NONPEACE does not Granger Cause CK 649 0.55423 0.95913 CK does not Granger Cause NONPEACE 0.80054 0.73819 PEACE does not Granger Cause CK 649 3.01272 2.6E-06 CK does not Granger Cause PEACE 3.01059 2.6E-06 PEACE does not Granger Cause NONPEACE 649 1.11850 0.31677 NONPEACE does not Granger Cause PEACE 1.40401 0.09630 Running granger test on 24 months period. We see that Granger-causality for Peace actions and CK runs both ways CK = C(1) + C(2)*PEACE(-5) + C(3)*PEACE(-8) + C(4)*PEACE(-11) + C(5)*PEACE(-13) + C(6)*PEACE(-22) + C(7)*CK(-1) + C(8)*CK(-2) + C(9)*CK(-3) + C(10)*CK(-4) + C(11)*CK(-5) + C(12)*CK(-6) + C(13)*CK(-7) + C(14)*CK(-8) + C(15)*CK(-9) + C(16)*CK(-10) + C(17)*CK(-11) + C(18)*CK(-12) + C(19)*CK(-13) + C(20)*CK(-14) + C(21)*CK(-15) + C(22)*CK(-16) + C(23)*CK(-17) + C(24)*CK(-18) + C(25)*CK(-19) + C(26)*CK(-20) + C(27)*CK(-21) + C(28)*CK(-22) + C(29)*CK(-23) + C(30)*CK(-2 Dependent Variable: CK Method: Least Squares Date: 02/18/05 Time: 16:22 Sample(adjusted): 1951:01 2005:01

Included observations: 649 after adjusting endpoints Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.

C 0.630512 0.256801 2.455250 0.0144PEACE(-5) 2.653208 1.326371 2.000352 0.0459PEACE(-8) 3.113176 1.296273 2.401636 0.0166PEACE(-11) 4.048770 1.285097 3.150555 0.0017PEACE(-13) 2.805208 1.374609 2.040731 0.0417PEACE(-22) 7.264917 1.372200 5.294357 0.0000

CK(-1) 0.130278 0.038530 3.381183 0.0008CK(-2) 0.112528 0.039327 2.861314 0.0044CK(-3) 0.166245 0.039464 4.212535 0.0000CK(-4) 0.099122 0.039787 2.491305 0.0130CK(-5) 0.024340 0.039875 0.610412 0.5418CK(-6) 0.025358 0.040089 0.632537 0.5273CK(-7) 0.147949 0.039888 3.709135 0.0002CK(-8) -0.033859 0.040302 -0.840123 0.4012CK(-9) -0.015147 0.040184 -0.376935 0.7064

CK(-10) 0.064503 0.039932 1.615327 0.1067CK(-11) -0.080267 0.040475 -1.983147 0.0478CK(-12) 0.062630 0.040089 1.562275 0.1187CK(-13) 0.039659 0.040045 0.990369 0.3224CK(-14) -0.010631 0.040398 -0.263156 0.7925CK(-15) 0.046014 0.040212 1.144274 0.2530CK(-16) -0.041736 0.040836 -1.022055 0.3072CK(-17) 0.131902 0.040563 3.251798 0.0012CK(-18) -0.051311 0.040727 -1.259873 0.2082CK(-19) 0.029007 0.041602 0.697266 0.4859CK(-20) -0.070387 0.041005 -1.716521 0.0866CK(-21) -0.069051 0.041034 -1.682782 0.0929CK(-22) -0.061744 0.041199 -1.498691 0.1345CK(-23) -0.038072 0.040124 -0.948861 0.3431CK(-24) 0.055218 0.040580 1.360710 0.1741

R-squared 0.388382 Mean dependent var 3.191063Adjusted R-squared 0.359727 S.D. dependent var 5.827816S.E. of regression 4.663245 Akaike info criterion 5.962423Sum squared resid 13460.69 Schwarz criterion 6.169299Log likelihood -1904.806 F-statistic 13.55410Durbin-Watson stat 1.981151 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 And we see that PEACE actions correlated with higher number of civilian killed. So, as last year we got the same results: peace-making by any means doesn’t caused real peace (as the absence of war and terror). Military actions as reaction on the terrorist attacks deters terror escalation.

The scale of Human Lives Value

Certainly, in this small paragraph one can not attempt to solve so scrupulous and

technically sophisticated problem as creation of a universal scale of a human life values

(especially its cardinal version, for example, recalculated in US dollars of 1990,). However, as it

will be shown further, ordinal scales actually exist, though have been never legalized.

Until the last third XX century Rule of Law states at war relied on hidden but quite

straightforward lexicographic scale of values. was a Lives of the voters and tax payers were the

most valuable ones. To save their lives was a priority task. Then followed down the scale the

lives of allies . Then that of the rest of civil population (non combatants). The lowest value

were given to lives of enemies - combatants (who reasonably, were defined as "anti-good").

Sometimes this approach or separate assumptions didn’t work (Noel-Noiman

suspected to the end of WWII majority of Germans were faithful to theirs families only) but

generally it caused acceptable outcome.

It is obvious, that expression «unproportional use of force» concerning enemies could

be regarded only as condemnation of a wasteful way of conducting military actions while the

same number of enemies could be killed with less resources spent.

Outrage of terrorism, targeting civil population of the developed countries, has

coincided with the revision of this scale. The list of sources where Israel and lately USA and

Great Britain are accused on regular basis in «unproportional use force» is not quoted in this

report due to space limitations . Among accusers, you can find both the left-wing media, and

officials from France, the European Union, the United Nations, etc.

However Israel judges have gone much further in their criticism of the Jewish state

than the foreign accusers. So Aharon Barak wrote in the (case of Beit Sourik Village Council v.

the Government of Israel & Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank President A. Barak,

Vice-President E. Mazza, and Justice M. Cheshin):

“The military commander is not permitted to take the national, economic, or social interests of his own

country into account . . . even the needs of the army are the army’s military needs and not the national

security interest in the broad meaning of the term.

In Jam’iyat Ascan (earlier precedent – comm...author), we discussed whether the military commander is

authorized to expand a road passing through the area. In this context I wrote, at 795:

“The military administration is not permitted to plan and execute a system of roads in an area held in

belligerent occupation, if the objective is only to construct a ”service road” for his own country. The

planning and execution of a system of roads in an occupied territory can be done for military reasons . . .

the planning and execution of a system of roads can be done for reasons of the welfare of the local

population. This planning and execution cannot be done in order to serve the occupying country

… (At the same time nor Government, nor the Knesset of Israel never acknowledged

mentioned ed the territory as occupied) The route of the Fence, as determined by the military

commander, separates local inhabitants from their lands. The proposed licensing regime

cannot substantially solve the difficulties raised by this segment of the Fence. All this constitutes

a severe violation of the rights of the local inhabitants. The humanitarian provisions of the

Hague Regulations and of the Fourth Geneva Convention are not satisfied. The delicate balance

between the security of the area and the lives of the local inhabitants, for which the commander

of the area is responsible, is upset”. …

Judges concluded :

The result is that we reject the petition against order no. Tav/105/03. We accept the petition against

orders Tav/104/03, Tav/103/03, Tav/84/03 (western part), Tav/107/03, Tav/108/03, Tav/109/03, and

Tav/110/03 (to the extent that it applies to the lands of Beit Daku), meaning that these orders are

nullified, since their injury to the local inhabitants is disproportionate.».

This decision actually creates a new scale of human life value . It means that economic

interests of local population supporting terrorists freely or under coercion received higher

priority than security (i.e. life itself) of Israelis

The logic of such decision could be comprehended in the framework of the

aforementioned definition of political correctness only that gives the highest priority to the

interests of protected group. It is also obvious that any effective strategy of fight against terror

will not be compatible with a new scale of "politically correct" values.

This decision were followed by the recommendations of the Hague Court regarding the

same safety wall . The international judicial body must have taken into account the position of

their Israeli colleagues - so radical that in comparison with it any pro-terrorist decision would

not look too extremist.

While adhering to similar decisions the Rule of Law state can remain more or less legal

for a time. But it can hardly remain as a united state in the long-term period. The institute of the

state based on the obvious or implicit contract (what the Rule of Law state is) exists therefore

and only because, receiving taxes, it fulfils certain duties before taxpayers and delivers public

goods, including safety of its citizens and public order.

When the state refuses to recognize its prime task – to protect the lives of its citizens

and tax payers and cares of its international reputation, it means that the state refuses to deliver

the good “safety”.

If the Rule of Law State makes the decision of this sort as a court precedent18, it means

that the State denies to supply even such key public good as "justice" for tax-payers.

In this situation a rational citizen and a voter has strong stimulus not to carry out its

social duties (for example, to evade from taxes). He compares tax burden and the probability of

his falling victim of terrorist attack. The results of this comparison are obvious and proportional.

To preserve the ability of state to delivery at least « the pure public goods» in full scale

the clear system of values is needed. This system could be borrowed from the 20th century’s

experience when the most powerful totalitarian empires were destroyed, and democratic

institutions were implemented. As a result of successful implementation of this institutions by

means of long-term country occupation the basic incentives of the overwhelming majority of

citizens of these countries were changed so drastically that these countries no more represented 18 Israel legal system is relates to the Common Law family and as in the UK and USA precedents created by the judge, especially in the High Court are very important for the system development.

any threat for the neighbours. The priority of value of life of a lawful citizen for the Rule of Law

state should be restored, as a part aforementioned informal scale of human life values which

actually existed during the best part of 20th century.

Since even Belgian parliament made an attempt ( that failed due to lack of resources

in Belgium for enforcement of its decisions) to give a national court the right to prosecute

crimes committed in other countries, parliaments of the countries bearing on the main burden of

fight against terrorism could use the precedent to introduce the similar norms regulating

military operations abroad.

Prevention of bringing politically motivated claims against military men or political

leaders in «unproportional use of force». For protection of basic legal values in civilized

countries the norms regulating fight against terrorism should be introduced to provide severe

punishments for tortures non-authorized by court.

The high probability of bringing accusations in «unproportional use of force» reduces

stimulus for command of armed forces of democratic countries (including commanders-in-chief -

political leaders) to choose strategy of determined fight against terror.

One should emphasize, that for the population of Rule of Force countries clear and

transparent decision to «decrease the priority of life» in the course of counterterrorist operations

will not make situation worse even in the short-term period. In these countries the life of «a man

without gun» is not considered valuable in any case. However if armed forces and special

services of Rule of Law states will have sufficient means to crush terrorists in the framework of

minimal necessary legal restrictions it would be beneficial for population of emerging countries.

Leaders of Rule of Law states are not in position to provide their citizens with required

protection from terrorist attacks against civilians without introduction of aforementioned priority

scale as a norm of national legislation.

Leaders of terrorists quickly adopts new channels including mass-media, pseudo –

human right protection rhetoric and legal actions and so on for compensation of their inevitable

weaknesses in military and technical areas. Prevention of retaliation strikes and even minimal

defensive measures by means of internal legal mechanisms of Rule of Law societies seems to

be a quite rational and effective strategy (see the aforementioned fragments of the decision of

the Supreme Court of Israel).

Conclusions

• To break the Rule of Force incentives system, to provide personal immunity

guarantees (Mau, Yanovskiy) and blocking violence danger (maybe even by

external overwhelming violence credible threat) is vital condition for fighting

terrorism efficiently. Appeasing activity could be dangerous for Rule of Law

citizens in medium-run period. So restrictions imposed because of quasi-moral

reasons should be eliminated. Military commanders must fight enemy, fight terror,

not fight for peace. Judicial guarantees against politicized prosecution should be

elaborated as reliable generator of due incentives for politicians and military

commanders.

• Interdependence between mortality caused by terror and incentives to escape

taxation should be inspected accurately in coming researches.

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Annex 1. Israel media coverage dynamics analysis Basic Hypothesis The interdependence exists between the Media coverage and public choice made and, so, media coverage affects the strategy of fighting terror choice. Data Israeli newspapers “Yediot aharonot” and “Haarez” files 1968-2003 Basic variables

1. Articles number presented terrorists’ vision or opinions weighted on the general number of the articles devoted the terrorists’ attack coverage.

2. The number of the articles, devoted the details and successes of anti-terrorist military actions, operation of revenge, weighted on the general number of the articles devoted the terrorists’ attack coverage.

Politically correct, or “progressive” approach detected by means Indicator (1) increase. The conservative approach domination characterized by indicator 2 high level.

Additional variables 1. Articles number, focused on the emotional assessment the Terroristic attack and its

consequences; the indicator increase shows conservative approach weakening. 2. Terminology manipulation cases: use of the terms, reflecting one’s side or political

party’s approach as consensual, as generally accepted: "Peace process" the term - Is used concerning negotiations with PLO. Means, that both parties (sides) want to reach the peace, as to logical final of process. Alternative opinion – PLO use negotiations just as a way to weaken Israel, embodying thus the plan of stage-by-stage destruction. The term is characteristic for politically correct or “progressive” the approach. "Annihilation" or “kill” the term - Is used concerning deprivation of the terrorist of a life. Means, that the action is not murder, but the elimination of the danger menacing to lawful people. Alternative opinion - the terrorist is the human being too. The term is characteristic for the Conservative approach.

Short description of the main results

Main stages 1966-1989 – conservative approach in the terrorist attacks coverage dominates clearly, especially till the 1982. Since 1982 share of emotional assessments increase significantly. 1989-2003 – “progressive”, politically correct approach in the terrorist attacks coverage dominates clearly.

Main conclusion is: The coverage variables comparison with civil casualties dynamics proves the “progressive”

approach ability to promote the terror, as against the Conservative approach. The psychologist’s (V.Rotenberg, Israel) comments’ to this part of research main idea was: The emotional coverage domination with simultaneous decrease of the Army anti-terrorist

actions, operation of revenge coverage steadily makes impression for reader (or TV viewer) that the terror is something like Natural disaster (earthquake or tsunami) which impossible fight and win, so surrender (marked as so called “Peace process) is rational and inevitable choice.

Table 1. Basic variables dynamics

Terrorists position presentation/ all articles

Army reaction (revenge)/ all articles

1968 10% 45%1969 5% 45%1970 9% 12%1971 4% 35%1972 13% 7%1974 11% 16%1975 15% 12%1976 14% 16%1978 2% 7%1979 7% 30%1980 5% 16%1982 0% 81%1983 13% 5%1984 4% 6%1985 17% 22%1986 0% 7%1987 0% 33%1988 8% 25%1989 18% 9%1990 6% 5%1991 12% 3%1992 13% 18%1993 30% 0%1994 13% 1%1995 13% 4%1996 11% 2%1997 10% 0%1998 18% 0%1999 18% 6%2000 18% 8%2001 8% 18%2002 7% 18%2003 8% 18%

Table 2. Articles number, focused on the emotional assessment the Terroristic attack and its consequences dynamics

Period Emotional basis for the assessment in the articles 72-82 22% 83-89 32% 89-99 32% 2000 37%