incident investigation logic tree methods
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Incident Investigation Logic Tree Methods. Dennis C. Hendershot Rohm and Haas Company, retired SACHE Workshop September 2005 Bristol, PA. Purpose of Incident Investigations. System improvements Not choosing scapegoats You must set the tone!. Logic Tree. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Incident Investigation Incident Investigation Logic Tree MethodsLogic Tree Methods
Dennis C. HendershotDennis C. HendershotRohm and Haas Company, retiredRohm and Haas Company, retired
SACHE WorkshopSACHE WorkshopSeptember 2005September 2005
Bristol, PABristol, PA
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Purpose of Incident Purpose of Incident InvestigationsInvestigations
System improvementsSystem improvements Not choosing scapegoatsNot choosing scapegoats
You must set the tone!You must set the tone!
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Logic TreeLogic Tree
Start with the incident as the top eventStart with the incident as the top event It may be useful to start with a generic It may be useful to start with a generic
top treetop tree– Damaging agent in a locationDamaging agent in a location– Employee or equipment in locationEmployee or equipment in location– Employee or equipment in contact with Employee or equipment in contact with
damaging agent long enough to causedamaging agent long enough to cause InjuryInjury DamageDamage
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Generic Top Level Logic TreeGeneric Top Level Logic Treefor Incident Investigationsfor Incident Investigations
Injured (or damaged Injured (or damaged equipment) inequipment) in
contact withcontact withCausative agentCausative agent
AND
A
Injury or Equipment Damage
AND
Causative agentPresent (fire,
pressure,chemical)
AND
B
OR
Contact with causative agent
long enoughto cause injury
C
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Logic TreeLogic Tree
Choose one second level eventChoose one second level event– Determine causesDetermine causes– Draw causing events on logic treeDraw causing events on logic tree– Keep asking "Why?" andKeep asking "Why?" and– Draw causes on treeDraw causes on tree
Follow one branch to basic (root) system causeFollow one branch to basic (root) system cause– IncludesIncludes
TrainingTraining Management systemsManagement systems CultureCulture
Repeat for the other eventsRepeat for the other events
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"AND" Gate"AND" GateAll events entering this box must be All events entering this box must be true in order for this event to be truetrue in order for this event to be true
Event A Event B
AND
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Test the Logic at Each StepTest the Logic at Each StepAll events entering this box must be All events entering this box must be true in order for this event to be truetrue in order for this event to be true
Event A Event B
AND
• For each event, ask, “If this event does not happen, would the event above occur?”
• If no, the event stays as a cause. • If yes, the event is not a cause.
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"OR" Gate"OR" GateIf any event entering this box is If any event entering this box is
true, then this event is truetrue, then this event is true
Event A Event B
OR
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When to StopWhen to Stop
At System LevelAt System Level– Broader areas affected than this incidentBroader areas affected than this incident– Systems, rather than peopleSystems, rather than people
Typical: management systems, design systems, Typical: management systems, design systems, training systemstraining systems
When needed expertise is lackingWhen needed expertise is lacking– May need instrument expert (or vendor expert) to May need instrument expert (or vendor expert) to
explain why a control device failed a certain way.explain why a control device failed a certain way.– May need manufacturer when we can't figure out May need manufacturer when we can't figure out
why cooling tower fan blades are failing. why cooling tower fan blades are failing.
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Writing EventsWriting Events
Stick to the FactsStick to the Facts
Avoid drawing conclusionsAvoid drawing conclusions
Clearly label conclusionsClearly label conclusions
Indicate direct quotations of Indicate direct quotations of witnesseswitnesses
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Stick to FactsStick to Facts
Box SaysBox Says– ““Goggle area" sign too high to see easilyGoggle area" sign too high to see easily
Facts AreFacts Are– Sign is highSign is high
Conclusions DrawnConclusions Drawn– Signs cannot be easily seenSigns cannot be easily seen
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Determining CausesDetermining Causes
Generic logic treeGeneric logic tree Top level eventTop level event Second level eventsSecond level events Keep askingKeep asking "WHY?""WHY?" "AND" gates"AND" gates "OR" gates"OR" gates Common mode failuresCommon mode failures System level causesSystem level causes Test the logicTest the logic
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Test the LogicTest the Logic Test the logic against the sequence of Test the logic against the sequence of
events and the facts. events and the facts. Does the tree support the facts? Does the tree support the facts?
– does the tree explain all the facts? does the tree explain all the facts? Is the tree supported by the facts; Is the tree supported by the facts; are additional facts or assumptions needed are additional facts or assumptions needed
to support the tree?to support the tree? The events below each gate must be The events below each gate must be
necessary and sufficient to cause each necessary and sufficient to cause each eventevent
If there are gaps, modify the tree or get If there are gaps, modify the tree or get more facts.more facts.
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RecommendationsRecommendations Look at each bottom level event.Look at each bottom level event.
– Attempt to make a recommendation to prevent that Attempt to make a recommendation to prevent that event from occurring, or event from occurring, or
– To mitigate it, if it does occur.To mitigate it, if it does occur. Look at structure of tree.Look at structure of tree.
– Attempt to add "AND" gates to the tree.Attempt to add "AND" gates to the tree. Selection basis for recommendations:Selection basis for recommendations:
– Protection providedProtection provided– Frequency of challenge, Frequency of challenge, – Cost of recommendation.Cost of recommendation.
Management will address each recommendation Management will address each recommendation and document what was done.and document what was done.
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Peroxide Drum ExplosionPeroxide Drum Explosion1998 Loss Prevention Symposium Paper 6c1998 Loss Prevention Symposium Paper 6c
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MCSOII Logic Tree (1)Drum of DTBP
explodes
Decomposition ofDTBP
External heat orfire causes
pressure in drumdue to vaporpressure only
OR
OR
Fire inside drumcauses pressure
To "C"
Contamination External heatMaterial old (past
shelf life)Static Discharge
To "A" To "B"Does not directly
causedecomposition -can ignite a fire
DTBP willdecompose
before boiling -see decompostion
branch
Material was wellwithin
manufacturer'sstorage time
recommendations.
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MCSOII Logic Tree (2)
From valves andfittings attached to
DTBP drum
Contamination ofDTBP
DTBP arrivescontaminated from
supplier
"A"
OR
DTBPcontaminated in
storage area
Watercontamination
Dirt, etc., whenopening drum
Water wouldseparate as a
layer, does notimpact stability
Letter of analysisindicates drum
meetsspecifications
DTBP drum wassealed when
brought to building
"Normal"contamination withsmall amounts of
dirt has not been aproblem
Contaminationfrom steel drum or
liner
Supplier confirmsthat the drum was
appropriate forDTBP storage
Sabatoge -intentional
contamination orheating of DTBP
drums
Cannot be ruledout
Supplierrecommends
stainless steelfittings, but fittings
on drum werebronze
OR
Foreign materialadded to drum
while in mix room
Material spilledonto/into drumwhile in upright
position
Material pouredback into drum
(operating error)
Inventory othermaterial handled
in area
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MCSOII Logic Tree (3)"B"
OR
External Heat
Fire near DTBPdrum
Steam or otherexternal heat
source
Drum exposed toheat somewhere
in transit aftermanufacture
Electrical heatingfrom conduit,switch gear
No steam or hotoil/water in the
area. No spaceheaters in area.
No evidence ofbulging or
pressure in drumwhen opened or
used
OR
Fire in drip panunder drum spigot
Appears to havecaught fire after
the drumexploded.
Weigh up area,scale, absorbant
Pallet of bags ofcombustible solid
near the drum
Drums of othercombustible
liquids in area
This area washeavily burned.
The front corner ofthe table was
exposed to highheat. Only theunderside had
soot.
These drums arestill intact, no
evidence that theywere involved in
the fire
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MCSOII Logic Tree (4)
AND
"C"
OR
Fire inside drumcauses pressure
Fuel - DTBPAir - normallypresent in thedrum, which is
vented toatmosphere
Ignition Source
Static DischargeDTBP will selfignite if heated
sufficiently.
Electricalequipment spark
Other ignitionsources in mixroom (cutting,welding, etc.)
The drum wasgrounded duringmaterial transfers
When theexplosion
occurred therewas no material
being transferred -material had notbeen transferredfor several hours.
No ignitionsources at the
time of theincident could be
identified.
To ignite the DTBPinside the drum, an
external flammable vaporcloud would be required.There is no evidence that
there was an externalcloud before the drum
ruptured.
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Logic Tree AdvantagesLogic Tree Advantages More structureMore structure
Good display of factsGood display of facts
Encourages “Out of the Box” thinkingEncourages “Out of the Box” thinking
Displays cause and effectDisplays cause and effect
Shows simultaneous eventsShows simultaneous events
Captures common mode failuresCaptures common mode failures
Shows "AND" - "OR" relationshipsShows "AND" - "OR" relationships
If keep asking "Why?", can lead to deep system problemsIf keep asking "Why?", can lead to deep system problems
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Logic Tree DisadvantagesLogic Tree Disadvantages
Can get bogged down in discussions about Can get bogged down in discussions about the logic structurethe logic structure– Requires good facilitator to manage discussionsRequires good facilitator to manage discussions– If something appears to be important, get it If something appears to be important, get it
written down somewhere, worry about detailed written down somewhere, worry about detailed logic laterlogic later
Logic can become complex, if too rigorousLogic can become complex, if too rigorous Can miss deep cultural issuesCan miss deep cultural issues Some background items might not fit Some background items might not fit
easily in the tree (impact many branches)easily in the tree (impact many branches)
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Some Incident InvestigationSome Incident InvestigationResources and ArticlesResources and Articles
Book:Book:– Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) (2003). Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) (2003). Guidelines for Guidelines for
Investigating Chemical Process IncidentsInvestigating Chemical Process Incidents. 2. 2ndnd Edition. American Edition. American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York.Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York.
Papers and ArticlesPapers and Articles– Anderson, S. E., and R. W. Skloss (1992). “More Bang for the Buck: Anderson, S. E., and R. W. Skloss (1992). “More Bang for the Buck:
Getting the Most From Accident Investigations.” Getting the Most From Accident Investigations.” Plant/ Operations Plant/ Operations ProgressProgress 11, 3 (July), 151-156. 11, 3 (July), 151-156.
– Anderson, S. E., A. M. Dowell, and J. B. Mynaugh (1992). Anderson, S. E., A. M. Dowell, and J. B. Mynaugh (1992). “Flashback From Waste Gas Incinerator into Air Supply Piping.” “Flashback From Waste Gas Incinerator into Air Supply Piping.” Plant/Operations ProgressPlant/Operations Progress 1111, 2 (April), 85-88., 2 (April), 85-88.
– Antrim, R. F., M. T. Bender, M. B. Clark, L. Evers, D. C. Hendershot, Antrim, R. F., M. T. Bender, M. B. Clark, L. Evers, D. C. Hendershot, J. W. Magee, J. M. McGregor, P. C. Morton, J. G. Nelson, and C. Q. J. W. Magee, J. M. McGregor, P. C. Morton, J. G. Nelson, and C. Q. Zeszotarski (1998). “Peroxide Drum Explosion and Fire.” Zeszotarski (1998). “Peroxide Drum Explosion and Fire.” Process Process Safety ProgressSafety Progress 17, 17, 3 (Fall)), 225-231.3 (Fall)), 225-231.
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Incident Investigation Incident Investigation ExercisesExercises
Incident 1 – Emergency relief system Incident 1 – Emergency relief system catch tank rupturecatch tank rupture– Groups 1, 3, 5Groups 1, 3, 5
Incident 2 – Sodium hydroxide Incident 2 – Sodium hydroxide dilution tank eruptiondilution tank eruption– Groups 2, 4Groups 2, 4