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Independent Oversight Bodies in Security Sector Reform in Albania

Independent Oversight Bodies (IOB) form an essential part of the democratic governanceof the security sector. Generally, IOBs are defined as those institutions that are

established by the Parliament and are accountable to it. Along with the executive branch,

the legislative branch and the judiciary these institutions contribute in holding thesecurity sector accountable to elected civilian representatives and increased transparency.

Since there is not enough literature on this subject, a first research study was carried out

attempting to fill the gaps and suggest some direction for future study. Thus anassessment of the performance of the IOBs was made possible by looking at the scope of 

their mandate, the legal framework through which they were created and function, their 

available resources as well as their relations with the security institutions, the

government, the Parliament and the public.1

Legal framework and institutional capacities

The oversight by independent oversight bodies was originally introduced in Albania with

the adoption of the current Constitution in 1998 which established two main independent

 bodies the People’s Advocate2 and the Supreme State Audit Institution3. More recently

the Parliament has established four other IOBs: the High Inspectorate for Declaration of 

Audits and Assets in 20034, the Procurement Advocate in 20075, the Commissioner for 

the Protection of Personal Data in 20086, and the Commissioner for Protection from

Discrimination in 2010.7 These institutions control and oversee the implementation of the

legislation that guarantees the fundamental human rights and freedoms and oversee the

implementation of the legislation on the budget, procurements, and fight against

corruption. They can also review complaints and issue recommendations in case of illegal

actions or omissions by public institutions (mechanism).

In order for these institutions to effectively and efficiently perform their functions special

attention should be paid to the principle of independence. This includes the capacity to

1An assessment of the role of the Independent Oversight Bodies in Security Sector Reform in Albania,

Arjan Dyrmishi, Besjana Kuçi, Egest Gjokutaj, IDM Center for Security Studies, November 20112 Constitution of Albania, Article 134

3 Constitution of Albania, Article 162

4 Law No. 9049, date 10.4.2003, “On the Declaration and Audit of Assets, Financial Obligations of the

Elected and certain Public Officials.”

5 Law No. 9643, date 20.11.2006, “On Public Procurement.” 

6 Law No. 9887, date 10.03.2008, “On the Protection of Personal Data.” 

7 Law No.10221, date 4.2.2010, “On protection from discrimination.”

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operate free from interference in decision-making, develop a more proactive

approach, election of the heads of the IOB and tenure on merit-based and transparent

 procedures, sufficient funding and resources. Therefore, one of the main

challenges faced by the IOBs is the politicization of their activities and the trend to

weaken their independence.

Generally the legal framework that governs the functioning of IOBs is in line with

international standards and allows them to perform their tasks. However the level of 

independence of some IOBs and their mandate with regard to security sector institutions

seems to be weak. Further improvements are needed to allow for a more effective

implementation of the existing legislation. The security sector institutions are generally

supportive to the activities of the IOB and implement their recommendations. However,

there are still recommendations which are either dropped or dragged into bureaucratic

 procedures (reference to the annual reports).

The IOB are financed by the state budget and posses the necessary human and materialresources to allow their performance. Nevertheless, nearly all of the above mentioned

independent institutions maintain that their budgets have shrunk and that the human

resources they posses do not suffice for allowing them to perform effectively.

All the IOB report regularly to the Parliament and their reports are discussed in the

 permanent Parliamentary committees. The IOB report periodically to the Assembly of Albania’s Monitoring Department on Independent Institutions recently established with

the main purpose to strengthen the Parliament’s oversight capacity vis-à-vis independent

institutions.8 However, the Parliament can and shall do more to help the IOB to better fulfil their mandate.

Independent Oversight Bodies

Revise the legislation on the independent oversight bodies in order to

strengthen their independence

o  by improving election procedures which do not include the Executive

o  by providing for independent oversight bodies to propose own budget

to the Parliament

o   by providing for independent oversight bodies to issue their own

 bylaws

o  by facilitating their interaction with the security sector 

8 Assembly of Albania, Decision No. 29, date 09.7.2007, “On the establishment of the service for the

monitoring of the institutions that report and inform the Parliament.”