indi d efence rev ie kaoboys of r&aw down memory lane b raman eisbn: 978-1-935501-48-0 indian...

0 25 50 75 100

3C

4C

50K

50C41M41Y

Job Number: BOEG_BDS_IND_2543M_AClient: Boeing

Date: 6/13/12

File Name: BOEG_BDS_IND_2543M_A

Output Printed at: 100%

Fonts: Helvetica Neue 65

Media: Indian Defense Review

Space/Color: Page — 4 Color — Bleed

Live: 195mm x 280mm

Trim: 210mm x 298mm

Bleed: 220mm x 308mm

Gutter:

Production Artist: D.Seymour

Retoucher:

GCD: P. Serchuk Creative Director: P. Serchuk Art Director: P. de Koninck Copy Writer: P. Serchuk Print Producer: Account Executive: D. McAuliffe Client: Boeing Proof Reader: Legal: Traffic Manager: Traci Brown Digital Artist: Art Buyer: Vendor: Color Inc.

Product: Boeing Defense Space & Security ApprovedDate/Initials

PUBLICATION NOTE: Guideline for general identification only. Do not use as insertion order.Material for this insertion is to be examined carefully upon receipt.

If it is deficient or does not comply with your requirements, please contact: Print Production at 310-601-1485.

Frontline Communications Partners 1880 Century Park East, Suite 1011, Los Angeles, CA 90067

195mm Live

210mm Trim

220mm Bleed

308m

m in

. Ble

ed

298m

m T

rim

280m

m L

ive

boeing.co.in

Boeing is proud of its longstanding partnership

with India. A partnership India can depend upon

to meet its developing requirements, from

surveillance, strike and mobility platforms to

C4ISR, unmanned systems and support services.

The most advanced systems and technologies

providing the greatest value for India. That’s a

partnership of endless possibilities.

ISSN 0970-2512 Jul-Sep 2013 Vol. 28 (3)

Ind

Ian

defen

ce R

evIew

Lan

ceR

DGI_independence-day_210-298_2013-07-17.indd 1 18/07/13 16:19

Threat from ChinaEditor: Bharat VermaeISBN: 978-1-935501-09-1

The Right to Information A Global PerspectiveKM ShrivastavaeISBN: 978-1-935501-65-7

The Psychology of Military HumourBrigadier J. NazaretheISBN: 978-1-935501-70-1

Chinese Are Coming... India-China Stand OffEditor: Bharat VermaeISBN: 978-1-935501-52-7

Dharamsala and Beijing Claude ArpieISBN: 978-1-935501-51-0

Indian Air Force in WarsAir Vice Marshal Ak TiwaryeISBN: 978-1-935501-42-8

Jehad: A NovelSubroto KundueISBN: 978-1-935501-46-6

Burma to Japan with Azad HindAir Cmdr Ramesh S BenegaleISBN: 978-1-935501-64-0

Mumbai 26/11 A day of InfamyB RamaneISBN: 978-1-935501-63-3

Hinduism and Its Military EthosAir Marshal RK NehraeISBN: 978-1-935501-47-3

Rise of China Editors: S Gopal, Nabeel A MancherieISBN: 978-1-935501-71-8

Terrorism: Yesterday, Today & TomorrowB RamaneISBN: 978-1-935501-62-6

Party System in India Emerging TrajectoriesEditor: Ajay K MehraeISBN: 978-1-935501-67-1

The Kaoboys of R&AW Down Memory LaneB RamaneISBN: 978-1-935501-48-0

Indian Army After IndependenceMajor K.C. PravaleISBN: 978-1-935501-61-9

India’s Wars Since Independence Maj Gen Sukhwant SingheISBN: 978-1-935501-60-2

TIBET: The Lost FrontierClaude ArpieISBN: 978-1-935501-49-7

Modernization of the Chinese PLA Lt Gen JS BajwaeISBN: 978-1-935501-45-9

1962 and the McMahon Line SagaClaude ArpieISBN: 978-1-935501-57-2

Kashmir: Its Aborigines and Their ExodusCol Tej K Tikoo, Ph.D.eISBN: 978-1-935501-58-9

Reign of the Red RebellionLt Gen Gautam Banerjee,eISBN: 978-1-935501-53-4

Creative Thinking in WarfareBrigadier J. NazaretheISBN: 978-1-935501-69-5

India Under FireEditor: Bharat VermaeISBN: 978-1-935501-50-3

In the Line of Duty A Soldier RemembersLt Gen Harbakhsh SingheISBN: 978-1-935501-24-4

eBook edition available on amazon.com, google play and applewww.lancerpublishers.us

Books available on www.lancerpublishers.com

EditorBharat Verma

AssociAtE EditorPriya tyagi

EditoriAl consultAnts claude Arpi Author and a senior Journalist

lt Gen Js Bajwa

lt Gen Gautam Banerjee

lt Gen Prakash Katoch

Gp capt Balakrishna Menon

Air Marshal narayan Menon

Prakash nanda senior Foreign Policy Analyst

Vice Admiral rajeshwer nath

Vice Adm Bs randhawa Former chief of Material and controller of Warship Production and Acquisition, indian navy

Amitabha roychowdhury Associate Editor, Press trust of india

lt Gen Vinay shankar

ramananda sengupta Foreign and strategic Affairs Analyst

VK shashikumar recipient of “ramnath Goenka Award for Excellence in Journalism”

Kanwal sibal Former Foreign secretary of india

lt Gen Harwant singh Former deputy chief of Army staff

Maj Gen Mrinal suman

isBn 81 7062 130 5issn 0970-2512Jul-sep 2013, Vol. 28 (3)

indian defence reviewForEMost sincE 1986

From the editor

• The Chinese Game Plan 3

indian deFence review comment

• Fdi in deFenCe: dispelling the myths maj Gen mrinal suman 6

Paris: The QuieT show?Thomas withington 14

aTTaCK heliCoPTers: should india have Them?Group Capt aG Bewoor 20

V-22 osPreY: options for indiaair marshal raghu rajan 27

airBorne wiThouT a PiloT The Future of unmanned Combat air VehiclesGp Capt Joseph noronha 32

miliTarY aPPliCaTion oF amPhiBious airCraFT in the indian environmentGp Capt B menon 40

sTealTh TeChnoloGYspecial Correspondent 47

aerosPaCe and deFenCe newsPriya Tyagi 53

The adVanCinG Borders oF The Chinese emPireClaude arpi 71

inTer serViCe riValrY and iTs imPaCT on naTional seCuriTYair Cmde KB menon 77

inTeGraTed TheaTre Commandslt Gen Prakash Katoch 82

disasTer manaGemenT why the army continues to take the leadlt Gen Vijay oberoi 87

weaPonisaTion oF sPaCeair marshal narayan menon 90

india’s enerGY seCuriTY role of offshore helicopter operationsGp Capt aK sachdev 94

The india — China Border Conundrumlt Gen Prakash Katoch 99

norTh-easT india: its place in the national security CalculusPm heblikar 107

deCodinG The draGon’s Game Planmaj Gen Pushpendra singh 111

The eConomiCs oF deFenCe: investment vs deterrencelt Gen Gautam Banerjee 118

contents

india’s largest online military newspaperwww.indiandefencereview.com

IndIan defence RevIewidr•

in print every january, april, july and october from new delhi

for more information, please email us at [email protected]@lancerpublishers.com

INDIAN DEFENCE REVIEW 28.3-Jul/Sep ‘132

dAily onlinE FroM nEW dElHi www.indiandefencereview.com

Contributors may please send their articles, not exceeding 3500 words, in a disk with a hard copy, with suitable illustrations to Editor, Indian Defence Review.

The views expressed are the contributors’ own and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

Publisher: Capt Bharat Verma, Indian Defence Review, Lancer Publishers & Distributors, New Delhi.

Advertising: For information and rates, please contact Anuradha Verma, Director Coordination or the Publisher.

How to reach us: Indian Defence Review, 2/42 (B) Sarvapriya Vihar, New Delhi-110016.+91 11 41759461, 26854691 Telefax +91 11 26960404 [email protected] www.indiandefencereview.comPrinted at Sona Printers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi.

Price: Rs 350

pictu

re

pad

picture pad

India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier InS vikrant

28.3-Jul/Sep ‘13 INDIAN DEFENCE REVIEW 3

The chinese Game Plan

from t

he

editor

With the opening of two fronts against New Delhi, Beijing will, in collusion with Islamabad, repeat ‘1962’ in the near future

on an enlarged scale.

As a tactical ploy for the past several years, Beijing and Islamabad have been dishing out sermons on friendship. China has used its lobby successfully in India to promote the concept that the two nations, instead of being at loggerheads with each other, should join hands to make the twenty-first century theirs.

The twin objective was to concentrate on the American forces; firstly, with the help of Pakistan to ensure the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and secondly, that India does not shake hands decisively with the US thereby tilting the balance of power in favour of democracy.

Similarly, Pakistan, more or less a colony of China, went out of its way to promote friendship with India, using the oft employed ploy of the ‘twenty-first century belonging to Asia’. The refrain was that instead of fighting with each other Pakistan, China and India should join hands to evict American imperialism from Asia. Pakistan deployed its journalists on Indian channels at times bending backwards to placate Indian sentiments. Simultaneously, they effectively activated Pakistan’s peace constituency in India that is much larger than the one that exists in Islamabad to gain major traction. The continuous ranting of Pakistan being a bigger victim of terrorism and putting a temporary leash on Hafiz Sayeed did help to pull the wool over a large number of Indian eyes.

The aim of the China and Pakistan combine was to first employ jihadi forces in Afghanistan under the guidance of the Pakistan Army to evict the Western forces. Therefore, it was imperative to offer a fig leaf in the guise of friendship that retains calm on the Indian front. It was merely a tactical withdrawal to concentrate all available resources against the Americans in Afghanistan. Meanwhile under China’s guidance, India’s Track II crowd was enticed to sign, seal and deliver Siachen to Pakistan as the glacier is of great strategic importance to the Chinese. In the so-called Track-II diplomacy, India walked straight into the trap!

At the same time, to gain credibility with thinking Indians, both Pakistan and China desisted from aggravating the situation on the borders. However, the so-called misguided elements that left Kashmir for PoK were sent back duly trained in jihad on the pretext of temporary surrender; the real game being to wait for an opportune moment to engineer a home-grown rebellion. All along, the pot was kept intelligently boiling but on slow fire. The ‘peace’ witnessed in Kashmir for many years was not due to any extraordinary Indian capabilities; it was because Pakistan was preoccupied with the ongoing war in Afghanistan pursuing its own strategic interests and that of China. Undoubtedly, these were high priority military objectives.

the ‘peace’ witnessed in Kashmir for many years was not due to any extraordinary

indian capabilities; it was because Pakistan was

preoccupied with the ongoing war in Afghanistan pursuing

its own strategic interests and that of china.

from the editor


from t

he

editor

As usual, on account of collective incompetence, the establishment at Delhi fell for this ruse. It was the conduct of ‘psychological warfare’ under Chinese supervision at its finest. Executed with finesse, the phase of temporary tactical withdrawal put New Delhi completely off guard. Pakistan believes it has defeated two super powers in Afghanistan - the Soviet Union with the help of the US and the latter, with the help of China. Defeating India with a little help from China should, therefore, be a cakewalk.

The gloves are finally off with America’s ‘cut and run’ from Afghanistan. With the exit of the West, China and Pakistan are now confident that large areas of Afghanistan will be under their thumb. In due course, Indian footprint in Afghanistan will be wiped out.

In the second phase currently underway, India’s borders have come alive with China and Pakistan mounting intense pressure simultaneously. The PLA intruded 19 km across the LAC into Indian territory and dismantled existing structures. To add insult to injury, on the arrival of the Defence Minister Antony at Shanghai, Beijing issued a demeaning statement against New Delhi. Incursions into Indian territories continue while Chinese innocently claim they are patrolling on their side of the LAC.

For all the insults the Chinese continue to heap on India, they were rewarded by New Delhi rolling out the red carpet for Li, withdrawing troops from own territory in Despang, and sending the NSA, Foreign Minister and the Defence Minster in succession to pay respects as though Beijing

were an ‘imperial Durbar’. In spite of being insulted on landing at Beijing, the Defence Minister announced the enhancement of military-to-military cooperation between the two nations! To be subservient appears to be a persistent trait of the Indian leadership. It is simply amazing that New Delhi should offer military-to-military cooperation to China - a country that is at loggerheads with it all the while laying claim to 90,000 sq.km. of Indian territory.

Pakistan has gone into overdrive, beheading Indian soldiers inside Indian territory. In a raid in the Poonch

sector, its Battle Action Team massacred five Indian soldiers. The timing and intelligence of the adversary appear to be flawless as this killing has taken place at a time when the Maratha battalion was taking over from the exiting Bihar Regiment - a time when the units are not on a high state of alert.

China excels in long-term strategic thinking; its shared ethnicity with the people of the North-East India enables its spies to blend in easily with the people in the North-East region. However, China is limited by language and facial features to mess with the Indian heartland and proxy Pakistan, with no such limitations intermingles with ease within India. Pakistan, in coordination with China, has now put pressure on the border. At the same time, it has helped instigate, with renewed vigour, ethnic cleansing of Hindus in Kishtwar and Doda. This move is similar to that of Kashmiri Pundits ultimately being dislodged from the Valley while New Delhi continued to indulge in despicable vote-bank politics.

As it was with China, the Pakistan Army claimed that it was not responsible for any incident on the borders. Meanwhile, the sloppy response from the Delhi Durbar has emboldened Pakistan High Commission to raise questions on internal matters concerning India. With the withdrawal of US forces from the region, the jihad factory will be idle. Pakistan can implode due to this situation of high unemployment. Therefore, to redirect the destructive energy of this force towards India to achieve foreign policy objectives and avoid implosion would be an imperative for Pakistan.

With the withdrawal of us forces from the region, the jihad factory will be idle. Pakistan can implode due to this situation of high unemployment.


from t

he

editor

B h a r at v e r m a

Pakistani journalists appearing on Indian electronic media in the second phase changed their tune from soothing ruffled feathers earlier to declaring ‘a fight to the finish’ for the independence of Kashmir and vacating Siachen. On monitoring comments in the social media, the chant from, “India and China should join hands to make the twenty-first century belong to South Asia” has shifted to “India, whether it likes it or not, has to live with China and Pakistan, now that the Americans are running away. It has no choice but to join us!”

The second phase by China and Pakistan will continue for some time to further weaken Indian borders and inject communal disharmony through covert operations till sufficient demoralization sets in, American withdrawal is complete and a large swathe of Afghanistan’s territory is controlled by the Pakistan Army with the help of its jihadi forces.

In the final phase, the Chinese game plan is to repeat a much larger version of “1962” by imposing a two-front war on India once the Western forces are out of Afghanistan. Many in the Indian military, the government and a few analysts erroneously believe that China will opt for a limited attack in Ladakh.

In the current globalised century, waging war attracts severe economic penalties on a nation with the long-term debilitating consequences. Therefore, the prize has to justify the cost-benefit-ratio. In what may be termed as a repeat of 1962, the China-Pakistan combine will impose war on India at a time of their choosing which may be sooner than one can imagine.

China will go for the jugular by landing its airborne divisions and choking the 200-km long Siliguri Corridor that is merely 28 km to 60 km wide. On one side, we have Nepal, which is now almost a colony of China. On the other side, Bhutan is under pressure from Beijing to toe its line. This implies that the entire North-East region may be cut off from the Indian mainland. Apart from this region adding to flank protection as far as Tibet is concerned, China will gain direct access to Bangladesh and easier access to Myanmar.

Simultaneously, Pakistan will attack the Western front to unhook Jammu and Kashmir from India after creating sufficient internal turmoil to soften the target. China has always supported and will readily accept Jammu and Kashmir to be part of Pakistan. In the event of Pakistani success, China can hive off large chunks of territory in Ladakh to suit its strategic interests. Besides, the key advantage to China will be securing the flanks of alternative supply route from Gwaddar to Xingjian Province. This two-front war will also guarantee China’s position as the undisputed leader in Asia substantially reducing the preeminence of the USA.

In order to deter the China-Pakistan combine from inflicting war, India will need to rapidly equip its Army and the Air Force with deep offensive capabilities and phenomenal maneuverability even as it builds up a blue-water navy. Indian intelligence agencies should gear up to support separatist forces inside Tibet and Pakistan. In addition, Indian foreign policy must decisively leverage the influence of democracies in Asia and the West, particularly the USA.

The coming years will witness the territorial integrity of the nation coming under severe stress due to threats posed by the Great Chinese Game.

in order to deter the china-Pakistan combine from

inflicting war, India will need to rapidly equip its Army and

the Air Force with deep offensive capabilities and

phenomenal maneuverability even as it builds up a blue-

water navy.


INDIA’S POLICy ON FOREIGN DEFENCE Investment (FDI) in defence industry is symptomatic of bureaucratic obduracy

and perverse intransigence. Unwillingness to learn from experience has been the bane of Indian governance. Persistence with failed policy initiatives can never yield results. In May 2001, the defence industry was thrown open to the private sector. The Government permitted 100 per cent equity with a maximum of 26 per cent FDI component, both subject to licensing. Unattractiveness of the policy became evident in a short span of time. By 2004, Defence Minister George Fernandes was forced to admit in the Lok Sabha that India had received no FDI proposal till then.

Observing the lack of enthusiasm amongst the prospective entrepreneurs at Aero India 2005, Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee considered it necessary to exhort interested foreign companies to invest in the Indian defence industry. As per the reports appearing in the press, India has received less than US$5 million of FDI inflow in defence manufacturing during the last decade. Most prospective foreign investors consider the Indian FDI policy in the defence industry to be dissuasive in intent and content.

In 2010, the Commerce Ministry circulated a note recommending the raising of FDI cap to 74 per cent to encourage ‘established players in the defence industry to set up manufacturing facilities and integration of systems in India’.

It was vehemently opposed by the interested parties, with Ministry of Defence (MoD) insisting that the 26 per cent FDI limit should be retained. In May 2013, modifying his earlier proposal, Commerce Minister Anand Sharma suggested that the upper cap be raised to 49 per cent as a first step. It has also been shot down by the MoD. However, in a deft move, the MoD has suggested that higher FDI may be considered for modern and state-of-the-art technology by the Cabinet Committee on Security on a case to case basis.

The World Bank defines FDI as ‘net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (ten per cent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor’. FDI comprises funds provided by the foreign direct investor to the FDI enterprise as equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. Attractiveness of a nation for foreign investments in any sector is judged by its ‘FDI Confidence Index’ which depends on various factors such as stable policy, favourable investment climate, structural adjustments, economic freedom and a fair market access. India fares rather poorly on this account.

As recounted earlier, it is an undisputed fact that the current Indian policy has been an abject failure. Whereas an intense debate is taking place to influence the decision makers, a number of articles are being planted in the media to sway the public opinion.

Fdi in dEFEncEdispelling the Myths

India should adopt a flexible FDI policy to import much needed technologies which cannot be mastered through indigenous efforts in the acceptable time frame. Unfortunately, every time the issue of increasing FDI limit comes up, the opponents resort to their time-tested subterfuge of raising the bogey of security concerns and threat to indigenous industry, thereby hiding their selfish reasons. In any case, India can incorporate necessary security clauses in the initial license to ensure that an unscrupulous entrepreneur does not play truant in crisis situations. India should reserve the right to take over a facility if required in an operational emergency.

maj Gen mrinal suman is india’s foremost expert in defence procurement procedures and offsets. he heads defence Technical assessment and advisory services Group of Cii.

indian defence review comment

iNdiaN d

efeN

ce

reV

ieW c

ommeN

t

Maj Gen Mrinal Suman

Sagem AFV SolutionsYour armored fighting vehicles deserve state-of-the-art combat capabilities, including day/night target detection and tracking, and high-rate, high-precision firing – even on the move. Sagem is an acknowledged expert in AFV equipment and modernization, with turnkey or modular solutions that considerably boost the capability of your vehicles, from IFVs to MBTs. We offer a full rangeof combat proven systems, including optronic sights, inertial navigation, gun and fire control systems, integration in digital networksand self-protection systems. When you choose Sagem’s specialized solutions, you maximize your fire power. www.sagem-ds.com

BOOST YOUR OPERATIONALFIREPOWER

sin

gu

lier

et a

sso

ciés

- Ph

oto

: Get

ty Im

ages

- St

one


Unfortunately, objectivity is conspicuous by its absence. Stakeholders have taken stands that suit their interests.

As the debate has been highly skewed, this article endeavours to remove some common misconceptions and put all issues in their proper perspective.

Misconception One: Indian policy is highly investor friendly and does not require any changes

The MoD continues to insist that the Indian policy is highly investor friendly and requires no changes. It attributes lack of response to ‘the individual entrepreneur’s decision depending on his commercial perception’.

However, a closer look at the policy reveals that virtually every provision is dissuasive in nature – management control of the company

must remain in Indian hands with majority representation in the board. The Chief Executive has to be a resident Indian; a licensee can produce only the licensed products and in the sanctioned quantity and he

can neither diversify nor enhance production without prior sanction. A foreign investor cannot transfer his equity before the expiry of the lock-in period of three-years. Even after that, such transfers have to be with the approval of the Government.

Although the Government can give no purchase guarantee, the proposed quantity for acquisition and overall requirements may be made known to the extent possible. The policy directive further stipulates that arms and ammunition will be primarily sold to the MoD. Their sale to other security organisations in the country and exports will be with the prior approval of the Government. Non-lethal items may be sold to non-Government agencies but with the concurrence of the MoD.

Oddly, India expects a prospective foreign investor to be excited by such an asymmetrical policy wherein he is expected to invest his resources in a venture where he has no significant control, faces strict capacity/product constraints, gets no purchase guarantee and

has no open access to other markets (including exports). It defies logic. Such a lop-sided policy can never attract FDI.

Misconception Two: Higher FDI limit is a threat to national security

When every other argument fails, the spectre of security concerns is raised by the interested elements in the MoD to stymie any proposal to raise FDI limit. Apprehensions are often expressed that during operational emergencies, foreign investors may shut down their factories and choke supplies to the armed forces. In his recent letter to the Commerce Minister, Defence Minister Antony has opposed the raising of FDI cap on grounds that the country could not afford to be dependent on foreign companies and be vulnerable to policies of their countries of origin in the field of defence on the long-term basis.

Presently, India is procuring all critical weapon systems produced/integrated abroad. It is not understood as to how India’s security would get threatened if the same weapon systems are produced/integrated in India. As a matter of fact, indigenous production will insulate India from unilateral imposition of embargos on contracted supplies by whimsical foreign governments. The degree of assurance and resulting comfort accruing from indigenous facilities will always be significantly more than dependence on imports. Additionally, indigenous manufacturing facilities will also ensure better life-time support including supply of spares.

As regards dependability during crisis situations, no foreign investor can risk loss of his total investment by shutting down his production facilities. Further, all major defence equipment producers follow ‘Global Factory’ concept, wherein various manufacturing functions are spread over a number of locations in different countries. When a major defence company invests in any country, it makes it an integral part of its overall production chain. In such a scenario, it is not easy for the company to shut down any facility and disrupt its worldwide production network.

Most importantly, adequate safeguards can be incorporated while issuing licenses.

unwillingness to learn from experience has been the bane of indian governance…

iNdiaN d

efeN

ce

reV

ieW c

ommeN

t


India can reserve the right to take over the licensed facility under certain extraordinary circumstances of national emergencies. Most nations include such an enabling provision. It is ridiculous that imports are considered more reliable than production in India. Needless to say, security concerns are overhyped to perpetuate status quo by entrenched interests by resorting to specious logic. Fears expressed are totally unfounded and highly exaggerated.

Misconception Three: Investment decisions are taken by foreign companies and India has no role to play

It is often claimed by the MoD that foreign investors are guided purely by economic considerations and that they are neither influenced by the FDI limit nor by other provisions. If they wish to invest in India, the upper cap of 26 per cent will never be an impediment.

The above argument reflects ignorance of the dynamics of FDI flow. It is often forgotten that FDI is a need-based concept. Whereas a host nation needs FDI for accelerated growth, prospective investors are guided purely by economic considerations. As investible funds are limited, all countries covet them. Foreign investors carry out an inter-se appraisal of all likely destinations to determine the one that appears most lucrative for optimum returns. Therefore, every host country has to strive to project itself as the ideal FDI destination vis-à-vis other competing suitors.

It is prudent to understand what motivates an investor to invest his resources in another country and undertake risks associated with it. As investment in defence production means a lasting and protracted relationship, he seeks a stable environment with long-term, well-defined economic policies which are fair and consistent. In addition, there are four factors which influence such decisions – availability of abundant raw material, skilled work force, low cost of production and lucrative market. It is the interplay of all these factors which influence an investment decision.

If India is serious about attracting FDI in defence, it has to position itself as the most

lucrative FDI destination with improved ‘FDI Confidence Index’. For that, it must make structural adjustment to provide functional freedom to joint ventures to respond to market dynamics.

As regards the FDI cap of 26 per cent, no foreign investor is going to part with his closely guarded technology unless he has adequate control over the enterprise and is assured of sufficient autonomy as regards capacity enhancement and access to markets to ensure commercial viability through economies of scales.

Misconception Four: FDI will stymie the growth of indigenous defence industry

Defence Minister Antony’s statement that building up India’s own indigenous capabilities for designing and developing weapon systems is vi tal cannot be disputed at all . However, his assertion that allowing foreign companies to set up manufacturing/assembly facilities in India would be a retrograde step and stymie the growth of indigenous capability is certainly misplaced. He expressed apprehensions that such a move would perpetuate India’s dependence on foreign countries for modern weapons.

Further, the Defence Minister has expressed confidence in India’s capability to build-up defence industry through indigenous efforts, especially with the help of the private sector. According to him, only immediate requirement of weapon systems is being imported till India develops its own weapon systems.

It will not be incorrect to term the above optimism as a case of self-delusion. One has been hearing such declarations since early 1990s when confident predictions were made that defence imports would be reduced from 70 per cent to 30 per cent within a period of ten years. On the contrary, after two decades, imports have now climbed to close to 75 per cent.

Fdi is a need-based concept; whereas a host nation needs

Fdi for accelerated growth, prospective investors are

guided purely by economic considerations…

iNdiaN d

efeN

ce

reV

ieW c

ommeN

t


A look at the dismal performance of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the public sector hardly inspires any confidence in their capability to deliver. Both are equally responsible for the current abysmal state of affairs. Although DRDO has 51 laboratories with 5,000 scientists and over 25,000 support personnel, it has not been able to develop a single system in the promised time-frame and conforming to the accepted parameters. Mediocrity thrives due to lack of accountability.

Even after spending crores of rupees, the only success it has to its credit relates to replication of some imported products (fancifully called ‘reverse engineering’ and ‘indigenisation’).

Even if the DRDO is able to make some progress in a few cases, it is always done with major compromises with respect to the stated qualitative requirements. In most cases, by the time equipment is developed and delivered, it becomes obsolete. Thus, the services are forced to live with outdated and useless equipment.

As the performance of DRDO over the last five decades has been highly unsatisfactory belying

all hopes of development of indigenous competence, it will be unrealistic to expect DRDO to change overnight and make India self-reliant. The defence public sector consists of nine defence public sector undertakings

and 39 Ordnance Factories. Despite getting preferential treatment from MoD, it has singularly failed to keep pace with technological developments. It thrives on periodic infusion of transferred technology and has developed no indigenous competence at all.

Purchase of technologies under ‘Buy and Make’ route has failed to ensure infusion of meaningful technologies. Even Antony has admitted that India had not benefitted much from the transferred technologies. Most unfortunately, the Indian military is a captive customer of the Indian public sector and is forced to buy what it produces. With assured orders in hand, the public sector carries on with its lethargic and inefficient manner, without

bothering about the quality parameters or the time frame.

India’s private sector has certainly come of age but needs hand-holding in the interim to be able to graduate to the production of complex weapon systems. This hand-holding can be done only by foreign technology majors. For that, establishment of joint ventures with equity participation is a prerequisite.

It was left to Anand Sharma to remind the policy makers that it was unrealistic to expect domestic manufacturing to make state-of-the-art equipment without sourcing high-end technologies. He advocated encouraging foreign defence manufacturers to help catalyse the growth of the indigenous industry.

Misconception Five: Foreign technology can be sourced through offsets

In a paradigm shift in India’s approach towards offsets, the Defence Offset Guidelines (DOG) issued by MoD in August 2012 allowed the Transfer of Technology (ToT) as a permissible avenue for discharging offset obligations.

DOG offers three recipient-centric options to foreign vendors to earn offset credits against ToT. One, the foreign vendor can make investment in Indian enterprises in ‘kind’ in terms of ToT through joint ventures or through the non-equity route for co-production, co-development and production or licensed production and/or maintenance of eligible products and provision of eligible services. Offset credit for ToT would be ten per cent of the value of buy-back by the OEM during the period of the offset contract, to the extent of value addition in India.

Two, ToT can be provided to government institutions and establishments engaged in the manufacture and/or maintenance of eligible products and provision of eligible services, including DRDO. It includes augmentation of capacity for research, design and development, training and education. However, there is no mandatory buy-back stipulation.

Three, DRDO can acquire technologies and test facilities in ‘areas of high technology’. A highly imprecise list with open-ended description of vast array of related technologies

Fdi pre-supposes a long term commitment and lasting relationship between the foreign and local enterprise…

iNdiaN d

efeN

ce

reV

ieW c

ommeN

t


india has to make up its mind whether it wants

Fdi in the defence industry or not…

that DRDO seeks has been made public. It is left to a foreign vendor to study the list and offer technology of his choice. Overlooking the basic fact that it is not the type of technology but its relevance that should dictate the selection, India has abrogated that right in favour of the vendors. Thus technologies that will flow to India will be availability-based and not need-based. Needless to say, every vendor will try to pass off low-end technologies that do not require export licenses and are cheap to implement.

Further, multipliers are normally used to assign additional weightage to different offset programmes to provide vendors with incentives to offer offsets in targeted areas. Unfortunately, India has trashed the concept of multipliers by making their assignment usage-based and not as per the degree and exclusivity of technology. Resultantly, vendors will have no incentive to offer high-end technologies.

As seen above, DOG demonstrates the muddled thinking of the policy makers. It is extremely doubtful if the new policy can lead the country towards the achievement of much touted aim of self-sufficiency in defence production, especially as the upper cap for FDI has been retained at 26 per cent for offset cases as well.

Misconception Six: India can do without foreign funds in defence

An influential segment of decision makers has been propagating the view that India does not need foreign funds and can afford to pay for what it wants. It cites India’s huge shopping list to buttress the argument.

For an aspiring power like India, FDI is not just a question of acquiring funds, but more importantly, it represents access to the latest technologies. Most defence products involve a relatively high level of technology and this technology gets transferred only if the foreign partner has a long term stake in the company. FDI pre-supposes a long term commitment and lasting relationship between the foreign and local enterprise. FDI sets in motion a chain reaction wherein FDI upgrades local technology which, in turn, attracts more FDI with higher

technology and the cycle goes on. This is of vital importance to the defence sector which is highly capital intensive and undergoes rapid obsolescence of technology.

India needs defence technology desperately. It is lagging behind by up to twenty years. It is foolhardy to waste time and resources in trying to reinvent the wheel. India needs to import latest technology through FDI to bridge the current gap. Thereafter, the imported technology should be used as a spring board for developing newer technologies indigenously.

The Way ForwardIndia has to make up its mind whether it

wants FDI in the defence industry or not. The present policy with its 26 per cent limit has failed to elicit any positive response. Thus it is a non-starter. If India feels that FDI is not required in defence, it can continue to stick to the current failed policy. However, if the government wants foreign companies to invest in India, it has to change tack and revisit the policy.

As infusion of technology is the primary objective of inviting FDI, India should have a technology-centric policy. Defence industry covers too vast a spectrum and it is patently incorrect to apply a single FDI cap to all cases. All joint venture proposals should be assessed by DRDO on the basis of nature, level and depth of technology involved.

Whereas proposals with commonplace low technologies can continue to be governed by 26 per cent cap, the limit for proposals with stabilised technologies that are available from multiple sources can be raised to 49 per cent wherein majority shareholding still remains in Indian hands. Similarly, proposals that involve latest high technologies or exclusive technologies can be allowed 51 and even 74 per cent FDI component.

In rare cases, when infusion of frontier and cutting-edge technologies is promised, even 100 per cent FDI may be permitted. Such a methodology will provide protection to the development of indigenous research and development as well. Higher FDI can be allowed

iNdiaN d

efeN

ce

reV

ieW c

ommeN

t


india must exploit its favourable geo-political location and aspire to be a regional hub for global outsourcing of defence equipment…

only in those technologies in which India does not make much headway. It will be an excellent safeguard to ensure that indigenous growth does not get ‘stymied’, as feared by the MoD.

Whereas developing nations prefer FDI in Greenfield projects, developed nations seek acquisitions/mergers. India can exercise both the options. Higher FDI limit can be considered for Greenfield projects that add new capacities to indigenous production.

India must exploit its favourable geo-political location and aspire to be a regional

hub for global outsourcing of defence equipment by partnering foreign defence manufactures as a part of multi-nation consortiums. Restrictions on capacity should be relaxed so as to enable economies of scale. It will also reduce

India’s procurement price. Exports should be encouraged to ensure economic viability of an enterprise as also to earn foreign exchange to offset the initial foreign exchange outflow and repatriation by foreign investors.

ConclusionIn a high level meeting of the Union Cabinet

held on July 16, 2013, it was decided to accept the recommendations of the MoD. The FDI limit was kept unchanged at 26 per cent. However, as a sop to the Commerce Minister, it was decided that higher FDI limits may be

considered by the Cabinet Committee on Security for cases involving state-of-the-art technologies. Interestingly, it is for the MoD to grade a technology as state-of-the-art and initiate proposal accordingly. The MoD has accepted the provision as a façade to appear reasonable, knowing well that the proposition is totally impracticable and meaningless.

As suggested above, India should adopt a flexible FDI policy to import much needed technologies which cannot be mastered through indigenous efforts in the acceptable time frame. Unfortunately, every time the issue of increasing FDI limit comes up, the opponents resort to their time-tested subterfuge of raising the bogey of security concerns and threat to indigenous industry, thereby hiding their selfish reasons. In any case, India can incorporate necessary security clauses in the initial license to ensure that an unscrupulous entrepreneur does not play truant in crisis situations. India should reserve the right to take over a facility if required in an operational emergency. Most countries do that.

Production of high-tech systems by a foreign company in India would be infinitely better and safer than India importing fully built-up systems from abroad. Indigenous manufacturing facilities will also ensure better life-time support for the equipment. FDI has immense potential to raise technological threshold and kick-start India’s quest for self reliance in defence production.

iNdiaN d

efeN

ce

reV

ieW c

ommeN

t

www.mbda-systems.com

Pho

to:

A.

Par

inga

ux

multiple choicesfor multirole missions

lock on to mbda solutions

AIR DOMINANCE

by MBDA

ASRAAM

MICA

METEOR

DUAL MODE BRIMSTONE

STORM SHADOW/SCALP

TAURUS

CAP.AIR_AeroIndia_210x298_IDR_uk.indd 1 17/01/13 12:14


PAr

is: t

HE

Qu

iEt

sH

oW

?

ONE PREDICTABLE ASPECT OF the bi-annual Paris Air Show is the unpredictability of the weather in the

French capital. This year’s exhibition was no exception with the skies offering the thousands of assembled visitors either blistering sunshine or downpours of tropical proportions.

As usual the increasingly large civilian aspect of the show was resplendent with confidence. The world’s airliner manufacturers made their announcements of bumper orders and showcased their wares on the apron. Inside and outside the exhibition halls, the sub-systems companies whose fortunes largely depend on the ebb and flow of the civilian aviation market proudly exhibited their latest products

Paris: the Quiet show?Thomas Withington

While the military mood of the Paris Air Show may have been arguably more ‘low key’ than in previous years, business was still being done and announcements were still being made. Certainly, budget restrictions are not helping the situation in Europe and North America. Nevertheless Asia and Latin America are fertile markets for defence equipment, and perhaps a more robust military presence will be seen at the exhibitions on the horizon in these parts of the world? For the time being in Europe at least, tight budgets make for quiet air shows.

as diverse as lightweight passenger seats and intricate hydraulic systems. Nevertheless while the civilian aspects of the Paris Air Show seemed to hint that the slump in commercial aviation is coming to an end, a pervasively ‘bearish’ atmosphere characterized the defence side of the Air Show.

American AbsenceThis was perhaps most evident with the

noticeable absence of any meaningful presence of the United States armed forces. Previous Paris Air Shows would nearly always feature a prominent US display of aircraft on the apron and in the skies. yet this year, with major budget cuts taking hold at the Department of Defense, the expense of sending fighter planes, bombers

Thomas withington is the editor of the asian military review and Chainhomehigh. he is a defence journalist and analyst with a particular expertise in the field of military radar and tactical communications, and the royal air Force during the second world war. he lives in France.”


PAr

is: t

HE

Qu

iEt

sH

oW

?

and freighters to display on Gallic soil was no doubt one cost which the bean-counters at the Pentagon understandably thought they could do without. Moreover, back home it may have been politically savvy to avoid such visible expenditure at a time when budgets are being slashed and jobs are in danger.

The F-35Despite the lack of major US military

presence at the show, several contractors did make a leap over the Atlantic pond to showcase their products. Lockheed Martin used the opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to its F-35A/B/C Lightning-II Joint Strike Fighter initiative. While the fortunes of the programme have bought occasional grumblings from its customers regarding schedules and rising costs, this fifth generation combat aircraft is really the ‘only game in town’ as regards such a platform which can be purchased by America’s allies; all the more so now that the company’s F-22A Raptor air superiority fighter production line has closed.

The US Navy is due to receive the ‘Charlie’ version of the aircraft which may commence carrier flight trials in 2014. The US Marine Corps, meanwhile, is receiving the ‘Bravo’, which has already performed sea trials. While the Paris

Air Show provided an excellent opportunity to get an update from the aircraft’s manufacturer regarding the fortunes of the F-35 programme, much work is still left to be done with the US Government and the aircraft’s customers abroad eagerly watching the programme over the next year. Despite disquiet in some circles regarding the aircraft, purchases are going ahead and it was announced during the show that Norway has formally purchased its first six aircraft with the country to receive the F-35A conventional take-off and landing version. Supplies of the F-35 to Norway are expected to occur from 2019 with a total of 48 examples eventually being delivered.

RafaleThe general squeeze in Western defence

spending being witnessed around Europe and North America did not stop the Dassault Rafale combat aircraft from performing its usual breathtaking flying display. Although it equips the French Air Force and French Navy, and has been selected as the preferred bidder for India’s Multi-Role Combat Aircraft programme, Dassault is using any opportunity that it can find to promote its flagship military product. Part of

Previous Paris Air shows would nearly

always feature a prominent us display

of aircraft on the apron and in the skies…

Lockheed martin provided paris air Show attendees with an overview of the current status of the f-35 Lightning-ii Joint Strike fighter programme. norway also announced that it would acquire six of the aircraft initially.


PAr

is: t

HE

Qu

iEt

sH

oW

?

this marketing effort involves highlighting the sophisticated technology which inhabits the jet. This includes the Rafale’s new Thales RBE-2 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar which is claimed to be the first operational such radar in Europe.

Although a Rafale equipped with the RBE-2 radar has already been handed over to

the French Air Force at Mont-de-Marsan airbase in southwest France for test and evaluation, deliveries of the aircraft equipped with the RBE-2 to frontline units have already commenced. A total of 60 forthcoming French Air Force and French

Navy Rafale will enter service with the RBE-2 radar, although there are no plans at present to retrofit the radar onto older Rafale airframes.

Beyond India, Dassault is looking at other markets for the Rafale. Although Brazil’s ‘on-again, off-again’ procurement of new multi-role combat aircraft has been put on hold for the foreseeable future, other acquisitions are ongoing elsewhere. Dassault revealed at the show that it had received a request for technical

information regarding the Rafale from Canada. The aircraft builder is hoping that Ottawa will hold an open competition to acquire a new combat aircraft. Should Canada pursue this route, it is almost inevitable that the Rafale will compete against the Lockheed Martin F-35A/B/C Lightning-II Joint Strike Fighter. It is strongly expected that during any competition, Dassault would offer the Rafale with the RBE-2 AESA radar in a very similar configuration to that used by the French Air Force albeit with the possibility that the Canadian Rafale could accommodate a wider portfolio of American weapons.

TyphoonOne of the Rafale’s major rivals is the

Eurofighter Typhoon. The Typhoon has competed, and continues to compete, with the Rafale head-to-head in a number of MRCA acquisition competitions around the world. Like its French counterpart, this pan-European fast jet continues to add capabilities as it goes through its service life which Eurofighter GmbH, the multinational consortium which manages the project, hopes will not only give additional punch to the aircraft but will also be attractive to potential customers.

a number of announcements for the eurofighter typhoon were made at the paris air Show, this included news regarding the integration of the meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, and the e-Scan active

electronically Scanned array radar.

lockheed Martin used the opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to its F-35A/B/c lightning-ii Joint strike Fighter initiative…


PAr

is: t

HE

Qu

iEt

sH

oW

?

Like the Rafale, the Typhoon is receiving an AESA radar in the form of the new E-Scan system. Designed and produced by the Euroradar consortium, the E-Scan is intended to equip Tranche-3A jets, and later examples of the aircraft. All production Tranche-3A examples are being manufactured with the necessary wiring and interfaces to accommodate the radar. This will allow these aircraft to accommodate it once development is complete. Trial installations of the E-Scan have already been performed and test flights of a Typhoon equipped with this radar are expected to commence by the end of the year.

Unlike the Rafale, which has now commenced service with an AESA radar, the go-ahead for the full production of the E-Scan, and its installation on the Eurofighter has yet to be signed. Both the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia are reported to be especially keen to install the E-Scan on their Typhoons. It is envisaged that a production contract regarding the installation could be signed in 2014.

During the exhibition, Eurofighter GmbH signed a contract with the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency, which oversees the aircraft’s acquisition and

modernization on behalf of the Eurofighter partner nations (Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom), for the integration of MBDA’s Meteor beyond-visual range air-to-air missile. Six countries are involved in the development of this weapon, chiefly, the Eurofighter partner nations plus Sweden and France, with the missile expected to enter service from 2015. Testing efforts have been ongoing with the Typhoon and Meteor which saw the first missile being fired by the aircraft in December last year.

The Meteor will also equip Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen-E multirole combat aircraft. The Gripen makes up the third part of the triumvirate of so-called ‘4.5 generation’ fighter aircraft offered by European suppliers alongside the Typhoon and Rafale. Saab announced at the Paris Air Show that it had commenced construction of the first examples of its Gripen-E jets which will be used for the aircraft’s flight test campaign. The Gripen-E represents the most advanced version of the JAS-39 Gripen family and, in addition to equipping Sweden, it will outfit Switzerland. Deliveries of the Gripen-E to the two countries will begin in 2018 with Sweden acquiring up to

airbus military showcased its a400m atlas strategic turboprop freighter at this year’s paris air Show. the first production example of the aircraft had been recently delivered to the french air force, its launch customer.

Beyond india, dassault is looking

at other markets for the rafale…


PAr

is: t

HE

Qu

iEt

sH

oW

?

60 with Switzerland purchasing 22. Beyond the Gripen-E configuration further development of the jet is possible in the future, with discussion of Saab perhaps developing an unmanned version several years hence.

Su-35One pleasant surprise at the show was the

epic daily flying display of Russia’s Sukhoi Su-35. Once again, Russian pilots demonstrated

t h e i m p r e s s i v e m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y o f their aircraft, throwing it around the sky with abandon in front of an audience in disbelief that

a flying machine would be capable of such feats. The United Aircraft Corporation, the conglomerate which builds the Su-30, foresees a market size of up to 200 machines split equally between domestic and international orders.

A400MAlthough traditionally the fast jets are the

show-stoppers at air shows all over the world, Airbus’s A400M Atlas product freshly painted in its French Air Force colours treated visitors to daily flying displays. The French Air Force is the launch customer for the firm’s strategic turboprop airlifter. The numerous development

problems of the aircraft now seem firmly in the past with the large plane demonstrating its neat agility. The force has already received one example of the airlifter and is expected to receive a second A400M by the end of the year. Meanwhile, at the aircraft’s assembly line in Seville, southern Spain, full-rate production is beginning to ramp up. Beyond France, the aircraft will be delivered to its other customers over the coming years notably Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom. This will see a total of 174 airframes being delivered to these customers. However, it was clear at this year’s air show that Airbus has set its horizons on additional sales of the aircraft to new customers.

While freighters traditionally carry cargo and combat aircraft traditionally carry on the fighting, fixed-wing gunships represent a curious hybrid of these two domains. For several years, the main platform in use for the provision of devastating air-to-ground fire has been Lockheed Martin’s AC-130H/U Spectre/Spooky-II employed by the United States Air Force. Nevertheless Italian aircraft builder Alenia Aermacchi, in conjunction with ATK of the United States, is developing a gunship version of the C-27J Spartan turboprop airlifter. On static display during the show, the aircraft

Saab provided an overview at the paris air Show regarding the latest, most advanced variant of its Gripen family of multirole combat aircraft, namely the Gripen-e. this aircraft will equip the air forces of Sweden and Switzerland.

one pleasant surprise at the show was the epic daily flying display of russia’s sukhoi su-35…


PAr

is: t

HE

Qu

iEt

sH

oW

?

was shown with its palletized mission system. This includes a ATK GAU-23 30mm cannon and accompanying fire control system. This enables the mission system to outfit the aircraft when in use as a gunship, but allows it to be easily reconfigured as a freighter, effectively giving customers two platforms in one aircraft. Ground and air tests were recently completed at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida which included the firing of the GAU-23 cannon. Additional development of the so-called ‘MC-27’ gunship concept is now expected over the next year.

Beyond the fast jets and freighters, training aircraft were on display in the form of BAE Systems’ Hawk-T2. The company is promoting the jet trainer as a possible successor to the French Air Force’s Dassault/Dornier Alpha Jet-E aircraft which are used extensively for instruction and to equip the country’s Patrouille de France aerobatic display team. The Hawk-T2 has sold well with 28 equipping the Royal Air Force, and 22 outfitting the Royal Saudi Air Force. Other sales have been concluded with Oman (eight aircraft), and Poland is potentially

in the market for the jets. While the Hawk-T2 could represent a suitable replacement for the Alpha Jet in French service, whether the traditionally good-natured Anglo-French rivalry will allow the Hawk-T2 to equip the Patrouille de France display team and overfly the Arc de Triomph on Bastille Day remains to be seen!

While the military mood of the Paris Air Show may have been arguably more ‘low key’ than in previous years, business was still being done and announcements were still being made. One has to wait and watch whether next year’s Farnborough Air Show in the United Kingdom is a similar, sober affair. Certainly, budget restrictions are not helping the situation in Europe and North America. Nevertheless Asia and Latin America are fertile markets for defence equipment, and perhaps a more robust military presence will be seen at the exhibitions on the horizon in these parts of the world? For the time being in Europe at least, tight budgets make for quiet air shows.

training aircraft were on display in the form

of BAE systems’ Hawk-t2…


AttA

cK

HE

lic

oP

tEr

s

AttAcK HElicoPtErsshould india Have them?

The Attack Helicopter has value for money in a relatively benign environment for short, swift Special Operations where the opposition has restricted ability to interdict the AH. Other countries have huge air arms for each Service, some of which are now closing down. There is no justification for India to mimic defunct, untried and indeed failed strategies developed for European and Middle East scenarios. This approach may mislead us into a weapons procurement minefield. Thereafter, wasteful expenditure will hamper us from getting what we really need for India’s safety and security.

Group Capt aG Bewoor

Group Capt AG Bewoor

IT IS WITH MUCH TREPIDATION THAT one reads about acquisition of Attack Helicopters (AH) for the Armed Forces.

Ground Force commanders have always demanded dedicated air borne offensive fire power placed directly under their command as they are convinced these are indispensible for victory. The commander equates airborne firepower with armour, artillery, combat engineers that are under command and integral to the Division or Corps. He believes, incorrectly, that under-command airborne fire, he will win the land battle. He ignores the inherent flexibility of airborne weapons which precludes limiting that firepower within restricted areas. Why squeeze that flexible and swiftly re-locatable capability?

The Indian Air Force (IAF), on the other hand, appears to be averse to let airborne weapons systems be with anyone except themselves. Their fear is that when one such weapon system goes outside their command and control, there will be an exodus of other similar airborne weapons. Precedents are awful to deal with.

Foreign Doctrines Over the last few decades as Indian Army

strategists were exposed to American doctrines of warfare in Europe, the desire to acquire ‘under-command’ air power became paramount. The Indian Army’s battle theories against Pakistan became copies of NATO hypotheses to thwart the ‘Soviet Steamroller’ overwhelming Western Europe. Strike formations with terrific mobility became the bedrock of fighting concepts in

India’s Western theatre. Many actually believed that such bold plans would succeed and they conducted exercises and rehearsals culminating in Operations such as Operation BRASSTACKS and Operation PARAKRAM.

Deducing that a mobile and fluid battlefield would emerge with mechanised and armoured forces covering great distances, concepts for airborne firepower to support these forces emerged in the form of the AH. Regrettably, the concept is intrinsically flawed and the question arises whether it will fructify in India.

Without bias and rancour, one can deduce the true utility of Attack Helicopters in India - these expensive flying machines have limited value and poor effectiveness and acquisition of the AH may be a seriously flawed concept.

Where Has the Attack Helicopter Been Decisive?

The appropriate answer would be - no where. AHs in support of huge mechanised attacking or defending armies have never been tested against any enemy. Exercises in Europe with Red & Blue forces could not give a correct picture of how the helicopters would perform. What attrition would they suffer? How would the mechanised formations changing directions, out-maneuvering each other keep their helicopters with them? How will the ground forces, who need to be within about 500 metres to recognise enemy tanks, identify own AHs from those of the enemy? More pertinently, how will the AH pilots differentiate friend from


AttA

cK

HE

lic

oP

tEr

s

foe? What happens with sudden reversals and retreats to re-group for counter-offensive? What is the impact on own forces when own AHs are destroyed among maneuvering tanks and infantry combat vehicles? The infamous fog of war becomes foggier with helicopters raising dust and howling jet engines. None of this can be ignored and wished away.

The Middle East and Afghanistan This is where Americans and Soviets utilised

their AHs - with no advantage, and that too, against a poorly endowed enemy with weak doctrine and training. Our adversary on the other hand, is well trained and has soldiers who have been known to fight courageously. With the latest technology at their command, American AHs caused many Blue-on-Blue engagements during both the First and Second Gulf Wars, but with negligible destruction of enemy forces. The Israelis found nothing great about AHs during the Lebanese and Gaza skirmishes. Even today Israelis use only fixed-wing aircraft, not AHs inside Gaza and Lebanon.

Lesson for India? Soviet AHs lost heavily in Afghanistan.

There are true stories of Afghans knocking out AHs using wire-guided anti-tank missiles. Recall the American helicopter destroyed in Mogadishu with humiliation to aircrew. Can we

ignore the fact that over 5,000 helicopters lost in Vietnam and against what type of weapons and enemy? That is how vulnerable an AH is. It is a slow moving target and extremely easy to destroy during hover. And the greatest aerodynamic capability of the helicopter is hovering, a critical disadvantage in close-quarter battles. And does the Army want such a weapon? Even the IAF needs to rethink on AHs and their utility to support forces on the ground.

The Mountains of India: In Ladakh and Arunachal

It is in the mountains that the AH will face its severest test and will, in all probability, fail. This is well known and has been evaluated often to squeeze some positive outcome but to no avail. Readers will be amazed to know that the first proposal for AH was for the defence of Bhutan. Observe the latest imbroglio about changing the QRs for VVIP helicopters with altitude being the defining factor.

The extremely inhospitable terrain with its lengthy border in the mountains precludes the use of AH or any other helicopters in the offensive role. Suffice it to say, AHs are bound

the indian Air Force appears to be averse

to let airborne weapons systems be with anyone

except themselves…

cheetah


AttA

cK

HE

lic

oP

tEr

s

to be under-utilised in the mountains, and since India has thousands of miles of mountainous borders to defend, the AH with the Army or the IAF is a zero force multiplier. Regrettably, there are many who refuse to accept this truth and insist that the AH is the panacea for some of the ills plaguing airborne warfare.

The Army’s insistence to acquire AHs is based on the most specious indefensible

reasoning. The IAF advises against their acquisition and indeed, even placing them, if acquired, under the Army. The bureaucrats in the MoD, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defence Production smirk at this rivalry that ultimately

leads to inordinate delay in the procurement of weapons. Desperately required routine acquisitions get sidelined and finally, when hostilities break out, the Chief is left with little choice but to declare, “…We will fight with whatever we have.”

Is this a display of jointmanship? Or is it plain cussedness and attendant degradation of India’s military acumen and strength, with our adversaries laughing at our discomfort and dissipated fighting capability? Do the proponents demanding AHs weigh these deleterious implications on morale? Frontline

fighting formations are aware of this injudicious infighting.

The Heights of the Himalayas All aero-engines degrade in power output

with increasing altitude and therefore, the thrust of turbojet engines decays at just 10,000 feet, the colour of the pilot’s uniform cannot recompense. At 17,000 feet, the thrust falls even further. At 20,000 feet, the height at which attack helicopters are expected to fly, there is less than 50 per cent oxygen to generate thrust. This is the inviolable verity of physics and has nothing to do with Sena Bhavan versus Vayu Sena Bhavan. Both Army and IAF pilots know this fact. Helicopter pilots operating in Siachen, Arunachal, Ladakh and Uttarakhand have experienced this phenomenon and know the perils of limited thrust. Many fatal accidents are attributed to pilots who have ignored this aeronautical truth. Since no AH can perform at peak levels in the mountains where the Army most needs them, why acquire them at all? There must be a reason that is non-military; or is it plain ego?

Advocating that the Army must have its own Aviation arm, many Army strategists have castigated the IAF for being cussed and obdurate about AHs for the Army. The IAF’s obstinacy may well have prevented ‘wasteful expenditure’ for a weapon that has little use anywhere in India. For the sake of hypothesis,

AHs in support of huge mechanised attacking or defending armies have never been tested against any enemy…

aw-101 merlin


AttA

cK

HE

lic

oP

tEr

s

let us imagine what the AHs would have done during the recent face-off with the Chinese. Fly around as a show of force? If that is all that is to be done, why buy AHs? Fly around in Mi-17s. Beyond doubt, we have established that AHs will be under-utilised, ineffective and become the proverbial ‘white elephant’ for the Services in the mountains.

Gaza and Golan Heights It is true that in the Golan Heights and the

Gaza strip, the Israeli Air Force deploys AHs that work in conjunction with UAVs and attack specific targets such as vehicles, buildings and hide-outs. Within Israel, there is no remaining opposition to the helicopters to fire their lethal missiles with precision guidance. It is pertinent that Israel does not use its AHs in close support of armoured formations for sweeping across the Negev, assaulting Golan, razing Gaza or entering Lebanon. The Israelis know it would be futile, waste of resources and attract heavy attrition to small arms. What about Indian AHs in Punjab and Rajasthan?

Into the Killing Grounds? Why then, does the Indian Army want to

procure the Attack Helicopter in support of our armoured and mechanised formations? The AH will have to move with tanks/APCs, manoeuver in the tactical battle area; it will fly low and slow in restricted visibility where the enemy cannot

be easily discerned and extensive small arms, to which it is extremely vulnerable, will be directed against the helicopter. No other Army on Earth adopts this doctrine and philosophy in actual practice. It has failed in Iraq, not once but twice. Helicopter casualties in Vietnam were horrendous as was Soviet helicopter attrition in Afghanistan.

The plains of Punjab and the deserts of Rajasthan will become the killing grounds for India’s AHs which will be floating around within small geographical boundaries u n d e r d i r e c t c o m m a n d of the Division or Corps Commanders. Being under command they have to remain within the Division or Corps battle zone but that will defeat the inherent flexibility and purpose of airborne weapon platforms. Is that not reason enough to avoid procuring them?

And what happens when the killing begins? The helicopters will have to withdraw just as the Mi-17s were forced to in the Kargil War? Will the Corps Commander fight without them or wait until AHs rejoin the battle? Are we planning on acquiring extremely expensive flying machines knowing full well their limited utility in the plains, zero capability in the mountains and

can we ignore the fact that over 5,000

helicopters lost in Vietnam, and against

what type of weapons and enemy?

mi-17


AttA

cK

HE

lic

oP

tEr

s

high vulnerability everywhere? Amazing! We know that tanks have to close up to 500 metres before they can identify and engage enemy armour and the AH will be right there, making itself extremely vulnerable to SAMs, MMGs, RPGs and small arms. Hardly tells of sound strategy or shrewd tactics.

The AH in the Kargil Conflict Whither Leadership and Vision?

Taking care of one’s turf, boosting promotion opportunities in one’s Service, adding flavor to units and formations are some of the

responsibilities of senior military commanders and are necessary for morale, and for glorifying military capabilities. But at what cost? How can any senior military leader willfully acquire weapon systems that do not significantly add to the offensive and

defensive strength of a Service? If the AH has no value except during ceremonial occasions and firepower displays, does it need to be acquired?

Here is a true story that emerged from the Kargil conflict. An AH was demanded by the Army to attack some intruders who had captured certain peaks in the Kargil sector

(as conveyed to the AOC J&K at Udhampur). Heavy with armour plating, the AH cannot climb and cross Zoji La into Ladakh. Hence, the AH could not be tasked for attacking intruders on Kargil slopes. It cannot fly across those heights into Ladakh due to an intrinsic design limitation. This was explained by the AOC. However, till date, the media repeatedly states that the IAF’s reluctance and unwillingness to help the Army was the reason for the IAF’s hesitation in using AHs in the Kargil Conflict. This canard is a sad commentary of how truths and facts are distorted for petty inter-service rivalry, immediately exploited by the politico-bureaucratic combine and the sensation-hungry media. Damage control is impossible; the truth is neither gripping enough for Prime Time TV nor Front Page news. The canard lives on; fiction becomes fact.

Even today, after 14 years, this misleading fabrication remains a thorny issue between the Army and the IAF. And, which is why the Army is strongly bidding for the AH to be placed under them so that the Army’s AH will support its troops, which the IAF is supposedly reluctant to do. How the Army’s AH, with its armour-plating will cross Zoji La, Rohtang, Khardung La, Baralachala and other high passes to get to the battle zones of Ladakh remains a mystery and needs closer examination. Will the Army

our extremely inhospitable terrain with its lengthy border in the mountains precludes the use of AH or any other helicopters in the offensive role…

chetak


AttA

cK

HE

lic

oP

tEr

s

AH use thrust augmentation devices to boost the thrust of the AH engines? How will they remove the heavy armour plating? yes, indeed that is exactly what the IAF did. They removed the armour plating of the AH which went on to cross the Zoji La carrying an insignificant amount of armament.

Thus, it begs the question - is the AH of the Army to battle in the mountains without armour plating and with limited armament? The AH with its poor offensive capacity in the mountains is as defenseless as the MI-17 was in Kargil 1999. Putting the AH under the command of the Indian Army cannot make it a better fighting machine than when under the command of the IAF. The harsh truth is that helicopters will be useless offensive firepower platforms in the mountains.

It makes no difference to the AH whether the senior commander is a General, an Air Marshal or an Admiral for that matter. The insatiable desire of Army formation commanders to have everything ‘under command’ is a flawed concept when talking about the AH or any airborne weapon system. Many senior Army commanders have even expressed opinions that fixed-wing dedicated ground attack aircraft for Close Air Support should justifiably be placed ‘under command’ of the Army Commander

if not the Corps Commander. Can there be a more absurd, farcical, ludicrous and laughable leadership vision?

Army Aviation Most certainly the Army needs its own

air mobility. It must have airborne artillery observation posts to direct gunfire. Senior Army officers cannot keep requisitioning the IAF for helicopters to swiftly move within their area of responsibility. However, in creating an Army Aviation wing, the issue of duplication and parallel assets has come up with separate logistics channels. All three Services use Cheetah/Chetak yet each have their own pool of spares and rotables, each Service supplied by a common agency, the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). All Army Aviation helicopters have been moved from Air Force Bases and duplicate heliports have been built at enormous cost. But that is a different tale.

Do We Need More Attack Helicopters?

Can anything be done with the AHs already in use with the IAF? Knowing their severe limitations, why were they procured? There is no justification for these machines being on our

aLh

it is in the mountains that the AH will face its severest test and will,

in all probability, fail.


AttA

cK

HE

lic

oP

tEr

s

inventory. Now that we have them, the AHs can, at best, be used for Special Operations where stealth, surprise, limited opposition and cover of darkness reduces their vulnerability. India has been threatening to attack and destroy terrorist training camps in POK. The AH may be utilised to target the ingress routes of terrorists and to intercept Naxals as they freely wander unseen by CRPF/BSF eyes. It may be used to sanitize an area from aerial or surface intervention on occasions such as Republic Day, the

Commonwealth Games and places such as stadiums, bridges, dams, buildings, ports, Vital Points and Oil Rigs. There can be umpteen occasions and options where the AH would make a positive impact. For the tasks mentioned and many more that will emerge from

SPG, NSG, PMO, MOD, MHA, Defence HQs et al, India needs not more than just one or two squadrons of AHs.

What about the Army and Navy? From the foregoing, it is evident that the AH

is incapable of supporting a land or sea battle where small arms, SAMs and other hand-held weapons used by the enemy pose a real threat to it. It is a fallacy to believe that heli-borne Special Naval Commandos can capture a ship on high seas. The AH squadron is best retained with the Air Force, readily available for all contingencies. Specialised training for aircrew will be centralised, combined with rehearsals, simulated operations, on-the-job continuation training with para-military and Special Forces.

Monitoring of the state of readiness can be strictly assessed with vital inputs from the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, BSF, CRPF, NSG and SPG. There will be no duplication of resources and no multiple locations with each State of the Union seeking their quota. The AH squadron has to be positioned where infrastructure to operate and maintain specialised airborne weapon systems exist. To create even more fixed assets solely for AH units is not a viable option. IAF Stations across India are intrinsically configured and

customised to maintain, support and launch special AH operations at short notice.

ConclusionThe phrase “I want” is natural for any senior

military commander, especially when state-of-the-art weapons are being procured. But senior military commanders also have a sacred duty towards truthfully procuring weapons which will genuinely enhance India’s offensive and defensive capability. Those weapons cannot have severe limitations and be susceptible to unacceptable attrition. Unfortunately, the AH is one such weapon. Given our terrain and the innumerable anti-helicopter weaponry available with our adversaries, India has little use for the AH.

The Attack Helicopter has value for money in a relatively benign environment for short, swift Special Operations where the opposition has restricted ability to interdict the AH. Other countries have huge air arms for each Service, some of which are now closing down. There is no justification for India to mimic defunct, untried and indeed failed strategies developed for European and Middle East scenarios. This approach may mislead us into a weapons procurement minefield. Thereafter, wasteful expenditure will hamper us from getting what we really need for India’s safety and security.

Most certainly, the Navy and Army must have their special air elements under their command and control. Inter-Service rivalry is rampant in all nations; the Indian Armed Forces cannot afford the luxury of creating duplicate parallel offensive air forces which cannot be force multipliers. Like the Hercules, the AH is ideally suited for very specialised tasks and naturally must be operated and maintained by the IAF which already has infrastructure and expertise to be the custodian and repository of Attack Helicopters. And finally, helicopters are very popular targets that attract immediate media attention leaving a deleterious impact on own forces and public at home. We may well be walking into a trap with fancy ideas of acquiring Attack Helicopters. And in the final analysis, it will turn out to be a lose – lose situation if we do.

in creating an Army Aviation wing, the issue of duplication and parallel assets has come up with separate logistics channels…


IN JUNE 2009, CV-22S OF THE 8TH SPECIAL Operations Squadron of the United States Air Force (USAF), delivered 20,000kg of

supplies by way of humanitarian assistance to remote villages in the Honduras that were inaccessible by road. In 2010, a US military helicopter was wrecked during a raid in Afghanistan. Dozens of combatants, who were thus stranded, came under enemy mortar fire. When other helicopters were turned back by dust storms and the high peaks of the Hindu Kush, two CV-22 Ospreys flew the rescue mission over 800 miles, climbing to 15,000 feet to clear the mountains. These two aircraft were able to rescue in under four hours the 32 US personnel in the two helicopters that were shot down. A year later, in a combat CASEVAC mission, an F-15 pilot, who had crashed in Libya, was rescued by an MV-22

V-22 osPrEyoptions for india

The Boeing V-22 Osprey is the only operational tilt-rotor aircraft that combines speed, payload capability and reach of a fixed-wing transport aircraft with hover-landing capability of a helicopter.

flying from an amphibious assault ship. The marines could return the pilot to the vessel 150 miles away in just about 30 minutes.

These missions clearly demonstrate the versatility of the Boeing V-22 Osprey, the only operational tilt-rotor aircraft that combines speed, payload capability and reach of a fixed-wing transport aircraft with the hover-landing capability of a helicopter. To examine the relevance of this platform to the Indian armed forces, it would be necessary to study its design features, safety aspects, its performance and the maintenance issues that impact its employment.

Design FeaturesAircraft designers had long dreamt of creating

an aircraft that can fly long distances at high speeds, carrying heavy loads and at the same

air marshal raghu rajan, former dy

Chief of air staff, has flown fighter and

transport aircraft as well as helicopters.

Air Marshal Raghu Rajan

V-22

os

Pr

Ey:

oP

tio

ns

Fo

r in

diA


time, take-off, hover and land like a helicopter. Designed, developed and manufactured jointly by American companies Bell Helicopter and Boeing Rotorcraft Systems under Boeing Defense, Space and Security, the V-22 Osprey is one such machine. The rotors of the aircraft are folded and wings rotated for storage on an aircraft carrier.

Bell developed the XV-15 tilt-rotor that was tested by NASA, in July 1979. The XV-15 became the first aircraft to tilt from helicopter to airplane and back. The success of the tests led to the

expansion of the program, which was subsequently renamed the V-22 Osprey. While the Osprey is operational with the US Marine Corps (USMC), the US Navy and the USAF, Bell is also exploring possible civilian uses of this unique and

versatile platform. The Osprey has two large, three-bladed lift-generating rotors turning in opposite directions eliminating the need for a tail rotor to provide directional stability as in a conventional helicopter.

The wings on which the rotors are mounted can pivot thus changing the plane of the rotors to either provide lift to the platform and hover like a helicopter or provide forward thrust to fly like a conventional fixed-wing aeroplane. In other words, the rotors tilt through 90 degrees thus effecting transition from vertical

flight to horizontal flight. The V-22 Osprey can transit smoothly from helicopter mode to airplane mode in just 12 seconds.

Propulsion Each rotor is driven by an Allison AE

1107C turbo-shaft engine that is capable of producing over 6,000 horse power. Each engine drives its own rotor and transfers some power to a mid-wing gearbox that drives the tilting mechanism. In the event of an engine failure, the Osprey is capable of running with power from the remaining engine being distributed to the two rotors through an inter-connecting drive shaft. Depending upon the configuration, the Osprey can hold up to 13,779 litres of fuel.

Cockpit Controls The Osprey has a three-man crew, a pilot,

a co-pilot and a flight engineer. The cockpit has multi-functional displays, similar to the glass cockpit of the space shuttle. The displays provide information about the engines including oil pressure and temperature. It also provides readings of hydraulic pressure and fuel state. Interaction by the pilot and the co-pilot with the flight computer and the control columns to manoeuvre the aircraft in flight is achieved through keypads.

Load Carrying Capacity The Osprey can carry 24 troops or 9,072 kg

of load that can be landed or be delivered

safety has not been much of a problem with the osprey...

Bell’s Xv-15 tilt-rotor

V-22

os

Pr

Ey:

oP

tio

ns

Fo

r in

diA


by parachute. In addition, the Osprey has an external hook-and-winch system that allows it to carry 6,803 kg of cargo in tow.

Defensive Weaponry In the Special Operations role, the Osprey

is equipped with rear-facing guns for defence. Ospreys that operated in Iraq were equipped with M240G medium machine guns mounted on the rear ramp to clear the Landing Zones of enemy opposition.

Safety Record The tragic crash in April 2012 of an MV-22

Osprey in Morocco that killed two marines, affected adversely the safety record of the Osprey. It earned a bad reputation during its development phase extending over 30 years. During this period, 30 marines are known to have perished in three accidents. In one of these accidents, which took place in Arizona in the year 2000, 19 marines were lost. Over the last ten years however, the accident rate on the V-22 has been about half the average for the entire marine aircraft fleet and it is currently the lowest of any rotorcraft in that fleet. These averages are adjusted to reflect time actually flown, so it really is a surprisingly safe aircraft, considering it only recently entered service.

Performance in Combat After the manufacturers fixed the problems

that led to mishaps during the development phase, the Osprey went into combat where its record is reported to be good. The US Marine Corps began crew training for the Osprey in 2000 and fielded it in 2007. Currently, it is supplementing and will eventually replace the fleet of CH-46 Sea Knights, the maritime version of the Chinook.

The other operator of the Osprey fleet, the USAF, fielded its version of the tilt-rotor in 2009. Since entering service with the USMC and the USAF, the Osprey has been deployed in both combat and rescue operations over Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. This unique platform has logged more than 100,000 flight hours in some of the most inhospitable conditions imaginable with a safety record that is actually considered the best among Marine Corps rotorcraft. Overall, the program was doing well as the fleet of 214 aircraft has logged nearly 200,000 of flying hours in combat deployment.

There has been only one fatal crash since the aircraft entered into service with the USAF. In

When speed is of the essence the

osprey will, without doubt, score over

the helicopter.

ch-46 Sea Knight helicopter

V-22

os

Pr

Ey:

oP

tio

ns

Fo

r in

diA


2010, a USAF CV-22 was destroyed in a landing accident in Afghanistan killing four. Until recently, that was the only fatal accident on the

aircraft in the past decade. In comparison, since 2001, six CH-46 Sea Knights have crashed killing 20. The detractors of this versatile machine need to view the Osprey’s performance more

objectively. What then are the controversies surrounding this versatile machine?

Can the Ospreys auto-rotate like a helicopter? When a helicopter’s engine fails, the rotors continue to turn driven by the column of air rushing upwards and past the rotor blades as the craft plummets towards the ground. By changing the blade angle of the wind milling rotor, the pilot can ensure that enough lift is generated by the rotor blades to make a controlled landing with a high degree of safety. Ospreys cannot perform such a manoeuvre which in technical parlance is known as auto-rotation. The V-22 has other ways to land in an emergency involving engine failure. This

aircraft can take advantage of the lift of the props and wings to set down safely. Marine Corps pilots state that the Osprey is not a helicopter as it can glide at a forward speed of as low as 40 nautical miles per hour.

Rotorcraft that descend too quickly at low speeds can lose lift if the rotor dips too far into its own downwash. This is called Vortex Ring State (VRS). An Osprey in VRS can lose lift on one side and flip. This apparently was the cause behind the accident during the development phase in which 19 marines had died. Since then, Ospreys have been modified to have audio and visual warning of the onset of VRS. Pilots can tilt the rotors forward to regain control if the aircraft has enough altitude to manoeuvre.

What if an Osprey loses an engine? The coupling of each engine to the other gearbox enables one engine to drive both the rotors. Thus, in the event of a single engine failure, the pilot has a good chance to fly the aircraft with one of the engines shut down to land at the nearest airfield.

Maintenance and Cost of Operations

Safety has not been much of a problem with the Osprey but maintenance certainly has been. A 2012 report by the Department of the Pentagon dealing with Operational Test and Evaluation states that from June 2007 to May 2010, the USMC’s Osprey mission-capable readiness was only 53 per cent. For an aircraft that costs more than $100 million (Rs 600 crore), it is a bit difficult to accept.

However, as maintenance crew gain experience availability on the flight line is expected to improve.

Pentagon records of operations in Afghanistan indicate that the V-22 engine service life is just over 200 hours. The military has expected that figure to be around 600 hours. The shortfall has more than doubled the cost per flying hour to over $10,000 (Rs 600,000) compared with $4.600 (Rs 276,000) for the Sea Knight, the Osprey was designed to replace.

But those figures fail to account for the Osprey’s speed and size. A USMC analysis states that with the capacity of the Osprey to carry 24

an mv-22 osprey assigned to marine medium tiltrotor Squadron (vmm) 165 prepares to land on the flight

deck of the aircraft carrier uSS nimitz

the V-22 would be well suited to operations along india's vast Himalayan frontier….

V-22

os

Pr

Ey:

oP

tio

ns

Fo

r in

diA


the osprey is available for search-

and-rescue, medium-range assault and

long-range special operations...

passengers as against 12 by the Sea Knight, the cost per-seat-per-mile of the former is $1.76 (Rs 106) as compared with $3.17 (Rs 190) of the latter. The US Armed Forces are of the view that while the Osprey may be expensive to maintain operationally, it is much too useful to abandon. In fact, it has been reported that the US Navy is moving ahead to conclude a five-year contract on behalf of the other services valued just under $6.5 billion (Rs 39,000 crore) to procure 99 new V-22 Ospreys. 92 of these are meant for the USMC and seven for the USAF. The Navy is also reported to be contemplating a third contract for 100 or more aircraft, which could include the 48 V-22s for the US Navy and the remaining for possible international sales. So, is the V-22 Osprey relevant to the Indian armed forces?

Options for IndiaThe V-22 would be well suited to operations

along India’s vast Himalayan frontier where high altitudes, inhospitable terrain, non-availability of airfields, lack of road connectivity and long borders, make it a better option than fixed-wing transport aircraft that are runway-dependent or heavy-lift helicopters that are slow and would require many more round trips to complete a given task. When speed is of the essence as in Combat Rescue or for Special

Bell Boeing v-22 osprey

Operations, the Osprey will, without doubt, score over the helicopter. The Indian armed forces need to consider the Osprey as a possible future platform for all the three Services. While the Indian Navy has shown preliminary interest in the Osprey as a potential c a r r i e r - b o r n e A i r b o r n e Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) platform, it is now understood that the Indian Air Force has evinced interest and asked for briefings on the aircraft for the Combat Search & Rescue (CSAR) role and operations by Special Forces. The versatility of the Osprey can be optimally exploited for Special Missions conveying troops and equipment over long distances at high speed and be able to land in confined spaces like a helicopter. The Osprey is available in three configurations namely, search-and-rescue, medium-range assault or long-range Special Operations. The aircraft can even be fitted with a radar array for use on aircraft carriers. The cost of this machine at $100 million (Rs 600 crore) apiece however, may be a detracting factor. In the ultimate analysis, it is its operational versatility and combat record that should tilt the balance in its favour for induction into the inventory of the Indian armed forces.

V-22

os

Pr

Ey:

oP

tio

ns

Fo

r in

diA


Air

Bo

rn

E W

itH

ou

t A

Pil

ot

THE STRANGE AIRCRAFT APPROACHES the target system stealthily, selects the most significant one, and then strikes

with unerring accuracy and devastating effect before speeding away. yet, should the machine be shot down, the pilot’s life is never at risk. In fact, the ‘pilot’ may not even be a trained aviator and may be located thousands of kilometres away. Is it any wonder that Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) are rapidly becoming the weapons of choice for military forces worldwide? Despite savage cuts in the defence budget of many countries, the UCAV market continues to grow at a healthy pace.

Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs), popularly known as drones, have already proved their worth in the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) role. Since Israel made

drones a household word as far back as the yom Kippur War of 1973, they have become a cherished asset of many nations. But there’s a crucial time lag while the attacking force goes through the operational cycle of unarmed UAV employment - gathering and transmitting actionable intelligence, relaying it to a command post, launching a manned air strike and ultimately, executing the attack. By the time the attacking aircraft reaches the reported location the target itself may have moved.

Such delays can be eliminated by UCAVs that are able to locate, track and kill a target in real time, from the same platform, all without a pilot onboard. UCAVs also offer greater range, manoeuvrability and payload capacity than manned strike aircraft because they can dispense with life-support systems, flight

AirBornE WitHout A Pilotthe Future of unmanned combat Air Vehicles

It seems likely that UCAVs will supplement manned aviation in a growing number of operational situations. The main reason is the capability UCAVs offer to mount a lethal attack without endangering the lives of service personnel. In an era of shrinking defence budgets, cost-conscious governments are more likely to approve the acquisition of three or four squadrons of armed drones instead of one squadron of manned combat aircraft. In some cases, weather restrictions and the physiological limitations of human pilots could also make UCAVs more viable than manned aircraft.

Group Capt Joseph noronha, former miG-21 pilot.

Gp Capt Joseph Noronha

General atomics mQ-1 predator


Air

Bo

rn

E W

itH

ou

t A

Pil

ot

controls, ejection seat, even the cockpit. On the flipside, the response time of a UCAV’s flying control surfaces is much longer than that of a manned aircraft due to the distance between the operator and the airborne machine. At present, UCAVs are remotely piloted by a person who is generally on the ground. Alternatively, the operator could be located on an airborne aircraft in the vicinity. In the near future, UCAVs will also be capable of fully autonomous missions with pre-programmed routes and target details, decision making ability, and adequate means of defence against air and ground opposition. Are the days of the combat pilot numbered?

America’s Leading LightsThe United States has been in the forefront

of the emerging UCAV revolution for over a decade. In 2005, the total fleet of UAVs deployed by the US constituted just one in twenty military aircraft, but the figure has now soared to one in three. It is still rising. The US Air Force (USAF) reportedly trains more pilots for advanced UAVs than for any other single weapons system. Given the pace at which UCAVs are surging ahead, some believe that the troubled and prohibitively expensive Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fifth generation fighter may be the last manned strike aircraft the West will build.

America regards UCAVs as vital to its operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan and many dreaded terrorists across the region owe their premature exits to lethal robotic attacks. According to a report by the New America Foundation, in 2012 alone, US forces killed between 222 and 349 ‘militants’ in the course of 48 UCAV attacks in Pakistan. It also states that since the US drone campaign in Pakistan began in 2004, 84-85 per cent of those killed were reported to be militants, just six to eight per cent civilians, and seven to nine per cent remained ‘unknown’. Observers on the ground dispute these figures, insisting that many more innocent bystanders than terrorists get killed. However, given the spectacular results of drone strikes, it is understandable that the US government consistently stonewalls Pakistan’s shrill demands to end them.

The General Atomics MQ-1 Predator, the best-known of all UCAVs, initially carried only cameras and other sensors for reconnaissance and observation roles. It was later upgraded with AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missiles and other munitions and has seen combat in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Serbia, Iraq, yemen, Libya and Somalia.

ucAVs offer greater range, manoeuvrability

and payload capacity than manned strike

aircraft...

General atomics mQ-9 reaper


Air

Bo

rn

E W

itH

ou

t A

Pil

ot

The General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper is a larger and more capable version of the Predator and can be controlled by the same ground systems and satellite data-link used for the MQ-1. It is a multi-mission, medium-altitude,

long-endurance UCAV, employed primarily in a hunter/killer role against dynamic targets. It has significant loiter time albeit less than the MQ-1, wide-range sensors and a multi-mode communications suite. It can carry precision

weapons such as the GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bombs, Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs (SDB) and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. The Reaper’s 950 hp (712 kW) turboprop engine is far more powerful than the Predator’s 115 hp (86 kW)

piston engine. This permits it to carry 15 times more ordnance and cruise at thrice the speed of the MQ-1. Although it is remotely controlled, it also has a unique ability to autonomously execute the kill chain (find, fix, track, target, execute and assess) against high-value, fleeting, and time-sensitive targets. It can also be used simply to collect intelligence. The MQ-9 Reaper is expected to play a critical part in future USAF operations, even though it is considerably more expensive than the MQ-1 Predator.

A number of other American UCAVs are under development including Boeing’s privately-funded X-45 Phantom Ray and the US Navy’s X-47. Both have the potential to replace manned fighters eventually. Northrop Grumman’s X-47B next-generation UCAV is a technology demonstrator that in May became the first autonomous, fixed-wing aircraft to achieve a catapult take off and touch-and-go landing on an aircraft carrier, the nuclear-powered USS George H.W Bush, without human control. The aircraft carrier has special computers that digitally transmit speed, cross-wind and other data to the X-47B as it approaches from miles away, and the drone relies on pinpoint GPS coordinates and its own advanced avionics to execute this technologically striking feat.

The X-47B has an unrefuelled range of 2,100 nautical miles and much more with autonomous aerial refuelling capability, that is due to be tested in 2014. It will be able to deliver laser-guided bombs and other Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). It will undergo several shore-based capture landings before attempting its first true carrier landing this year.

Raytheon and Northrop Grumman are also developing new systems and concepts for close air support using an unmanned version of the twin-engine A-10 Thunderbolt II. Such UCAVs are large, very capable and carry huge amounts of lethal weapons. Obviously, they need considerable operational infrastructure and don’t come cheap.

At the other end of the scale, AeroVironment’s RQ-11B Raven is small enough to be mistaken for an aero-modelling toy. Weighing just two kilograms, it can fit into a soldier’s backpack, and is launched by hand. At present, it is used

unmanned Air Vehicles (uAVs) have already proved their worth in the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (isr) role...

Boeing’s phantom ray

northrop Grumman’s X-47B


Air

Bo

rn

E W

itH

ou

t A

Pil

ot

only for reconnaissance but may be modified to deliver a grenade-sized weapon from the air. AeroVironment’s Switchblade has a guidance system that enables it to loiter, lock on to, and follow a rapidly-moving target, even if the target is trying to evade its unwelcome attentions. It can then crash into the target with an explosive warhead.

Europe Gets GoingEurope, a late starter, now seems determined

to catch up in the UCAV race. The Dassault nEUROn is Europe’s first stealthy combat drone and has completed over six years of design, development, and static testing. A tailless flying wing like the X-47B, it is being designed under an experimental programme involving France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Its Turbomeca/Rolls Royce Adour Mk 951 engine is a non-reheated turbofan. The nEUROn demonstrator completed its first flight

in December 2012 and its testing programme, extending over 100 sorties, is likely to last two years. Dassault plans to use data collected by the demonstrator to produce derived UCAVs that may feature payloads and ranges similar to those of manned combat planes, with autonomous air-to-ground attack capability. Sweden’s Saab Group, a partner in the nEUROn programme, may in the future also consider marketing an unmanned version of its JAS 39 Gripen E/F combat aircraft.

The British BAE Systems Taranis, which is approximately the same size as the Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer, is one of the world’s largest UCAVs. Taranis too is a technology demonstrator, intended to prove the viability of unmanned systems to attack ground targets. It

unmanned and robotic attacks, however, raise

a host of legal and ethical issues...

a fully armed a-10 thunderbolt ii rQ-11 raven

aerovironment Switchblade


Air

Bo

rn

E W

itH

ou

t A

Pil

ot

gain the ability practically to think for itself for a large part of the mission, thus making it one of the most advanced UCAVs available. If all goes well, by 2030, a third of the Royal Air Force (RAF) could be made up of UAVs and UCAVs. The French and UK governments have also signed a Memorandum of Understanding to promote collaboration on the development of a future UCAV that will combine the strengths of the nEUROn and the Taranis.

The Best of the RestIsrael is where the modern unmanned ISR

story began and the Israeli military can teach the rest of the world a thing or two about UAV operational employment. Big Israeli companies such as Elbit, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Aeronautics Defense are global leaders in the field of UAV technology. Although Israel prefers to hold its cards close to its chest, and is yet to unveil its own full-fledged multi-role UCAV, it is already suspected of sometimes

is a semi-autonomous stealthy device designed to fly intercontinental missions at supersonic speeds. Controllable via satellite link from anywhere on Earth, it can be used for both

long-range reconnaissance and to provide deep-strike capabil i ty in a hosti le environment. It is powered by an Adour Mk 951 engine and will carry a variety of weapons enabling it to attack a range of air and ground targets. It will also be able to defend itself against

manned and unmanned enemy aircraft, perhaps even engage in air combat.

Already a decade into development, its first flight and further trials are scheduled this year at the Woomera testing facility in Southern Australia. Further in the future, with the possible incorporation of “full autonomy” Taranis will

Saab JaS-39 Gripen neuron ucav

Bae Systems taranis

currently, ucAVs themselves lack adequate defensive capability and are sitting ducks in heavily-defended airspace...


Air

Bo

rn

E W

itH

ou

t A

Pil

ot

employing armed unmanned platforms. Indeed, it is only a question of time before it does so in a big way. The IAI Harop, for instance, is a hunter-killer ‘hara-kiri’ type of UCAV with a small 23-kg explosive charge. Designed for Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD), it can detect the strong pulses transmitted by targets such as missile radars, automatically home onto them, and then collide explosively with the source. Alternatively, an airborne operator can sift through a number of targets detected by the aircraft’s electro-optical sensor and designate one for the Harop to hit. Thus, even radars that are shut down or not emitting can be knocked out. The Harop is powered by a propeller engine and has an operational range of 1,000 km and endurance of up to six hours.

China is also aggressively pursuing development of a whole range of UAVs and UCAVs. Its latest design, the delta wing, low-observable Shenyang Li Jian (‘Dark Sword’ or ‘Sharp Sword’) UCAV, appears to be similar to the Northrop Grumman X-47B and the Dassault nEUROn. It is expected to complete its first flight shortly. In Russia, the Mikoyan/Sukhoi SKAT, a stealth UCAV, is meant to carry missiles like the Kh-31 for subsonic strike missions including SEAD. In May, RAC MiG signed a new R&D agreement to build a UCAV based on the SKAT design.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is in the process of inducting the Israeli Harop UCAV. But wouldn’t India like to develop its own capability as well? It certainly would. The Indian Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle (IUSAV), codenamed AURA, is currently in the project definition stage. The design work of this a u t o n o m o u s U C AV i s being carried out by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA). Described as a “self-defending high-speed reconnaissance UAV with weapon firing capability”, it is a flying-wing with stealth iai harop

cou

rtesy

: en.

wik

iped

ia.o

rg

characteristics and a turbofan engine. It is similar to other flying-wing UCAVs like the European nEUROn and US Phantom Ray. The AURA will cruise at medium altitude. It will be capable of internally carrying two or more guided strike weapons, including missiles and bombs, with on-board sensors for targeting and weapon guidance. A prototype could fly in 2015-2016, with first deliveries hoped for by the end of the decade.

Ethical IssuesCurrently, UCAVs themselves lack adequate

defensive capability and are sitting ducks in heavily-defended airspace. They have no situational awareness of the threats around them, apart from detecting the emissions of hostile r a d a r s . H e n c e t h e y are highly vulnerable to any attack that does not activate their radar warning receivers. For this reason, most modern UCAVs are designed for maximum stealth, with tailless subsonic blended wing bodies, shielded air intakes and attenuated exhausts. Here a fighter aircraft with a human pilot capable of a range of defensive and offensive measures still scores over a

there’s the fear that heavily armed, out-of-

control autonomous machines may someday

decide to wage war against humans...


Air

Bo

rn

E W

itH

ou

t A

Pil

ot

UCAV. Nevertheless, most military experts believe that UCAVs will play an increasing role in future operations, ultimately perhaps even being capable of air combat against a manned fighter aircraft.

Unmanned and robotic attacks, however, raise a host of legal and ethical issues. Ideally, any UCAV operator should at least be a military

person who understands and accepts what it means to be a combatant, because a civilian at the controls would also be a combatant under international law and subject to a distinct s et of responsibi l i t ies and consequences. The

situation gets more complicated as autonomy increases. Pretty soon airborne machines will be ‘smart’ and able to act more like humans. Semi-autonomous or even fully-autonomous systems will take aggressive operational decisions without human intervention. While humans may still programme the autonomous UCAV’s flight plan and possibly override its decisions,

many find the concept of a heavily-armed machine operating without direct human control troubling because of the difficulty in assigning accountability.

For instance, what if human drone operators are completely replaced by computer algorithms? What about ‘signature strikes’ where unknown targets are hit simply because they seem to meet certain specified criteria? Who will be legally and morally answerable at a war crimes trial if an autonomous UCAV hits a hospital instead of a terrorist safe haven? Will it be the UCAV designer, the manufacturer, the mission programmer, or the launch agency? Right now, the US is the main operator of lethal UCAVs and its actions go virtually unchallenged. But it is only a question of time before Russia and China develop their own UCAVs. That’s when such questions will have to be faced head on.

Further into the future there’s the fear (common to all forms of lethal robotics) that heavily armed, out-of-control autonomous machines may someday decide to wage

us employment of ucAVs in Afghanistan and Pakistan vividly illustrates their usefulness especially in asymmetric conflicts...

mikoyan SKat


Air

Bo

rn

E W

itH

ou

t A

Pil

ot

war against humans. The danger is plausible enough for some experts and even the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to call for a global ban on lethal autonomous technology.

Manned or Unmanned?

Notwithstanding such concerns, UCAVs continue to proliferate. Their ability to fly relatively silently and stealthily and remain undetected over vast distances, then launch precision strikes against time-critical targets, makes them objects of desire for any military. US employment of UCAVs in Afghanistan and Pakistan vividly illustrates their usefulness especially in the asymmetric conflicts that rage across the globe.

The next two or three decades may see current aircraft such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, the French Rafale and the Swedish JAS-39 Gripen, besides fifth-generation fighters such as the US F-35 Lightning II and the Russian Sukhoi T-50, dominating military aviation. Beyond that, the future of manned combat aircraft appears increasingly uncertain.

It seems likely that UCAVs will supplement manned aviation in a growing number of operational situations. The main reason is the capability UCAVs offer to mount a lethal attack without endangering the lives of service personnel. They can also be produced, stored and flown at a fraction of the cost of manned combat aircraft. In an era of shrinking defence budgets, cost-conscious governments are more likely to approve the acquisition of three or four squadrons of armed drones instead of one

squadron of manned combat aircraft. At the same time, the survivability and operational employability of manned fighters in many situations is becoming suspect due to dramatic improvements in long-range air defences, radars that see through stealth, and increase in beyond-visual-range combat. In some cases, weather restrictions and the physiological limitations of human pilots could also make UCAVs more viable than manned aircraft.

Does that mean that fighter pilots should get ready to fly into the sunset? Not quite yet. The obituary of the manned combat aircraft has recurrently been written but the prediction is yet to materialise. Over half a century ago, the UK Ministry of Defence White Paper of 1957 stated that manned bombers and fighters would quickly be replaced by automated missiles. But missiles famously did not live up to their early promise and combat aircraft remain indispensable to this day. This time, however, the unmanned threat to fighter pilots does seem a lot more credible.

the future of manned combat aircraft

appears increasingly uncertain...

indian unmanned Strike air vehicle aura


Mil

itA

ry

AP

Pli

cAt

ion

oF

AM

PH

iBio

us

Air

cr

AFt

History and Concept

IN JANUARy 1953, THE CIVIL AVIATION facilities at Kochi (Cochin) were taken over by the Indian Navy and commissioned as

INS Venduruthy. The first twin piston-engine Shorts Sealand amphibian aircraft was inducted and a Fleet Requirement Unit (FRU) was set up which grew to two aircraft and five pilots by May 1953. This was the nucleus of the Naval Air Station named Indian Naval Ship (INS) Garuda, Indian Naval Air Squadron (INAS) 550 as well as the start of both Indian naval aviation and

military use of amphibian aircraft by the Indian Armed Forces.

With the advent of helicopters, the focus shifted to them and to shore based maritime aircraft, a worldwide trend. The amphibian

aircraft of the Navy were phased out in the early 1960s. Some countries such as Japan, Canada, Russia and China have retained amphibians for civilian use like firefighting, transportation between maritime communities, Search And Rescue (SAR) as well as military tasks. Use of large amphibians is restricted to SAR and firefighting roles with smaller amphibians and non-amphibian float planes in widespread use for transportation, especially in areas such as Canada, Alaska, island territories worldwide and in coastal areas of island nations such as Japan.

Military roles including surveillance, interdiction of hostile ships, combat SAR, anti-shipping and anti-submarine warfare are

Military Application of Amphibious Aircraftin the indian Environment

Gp Capt B Menon

Amphibian aircraft offer some advantages over fixed-wing land or carrier-based aircraft and helicopters. At longer ranges and over open ocean areas, these advantages become more marked. In our context, operations over island territories far from the mainland and with limited infrastructure offer areas of opportunity for inducting larger amphibians. Smaller types can augment the capabilities of surface ships, helicopters and land or carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft. For long range SAR and Special Operations in a marine environment, the amphibian may be the only viable option in specific scenarios.

performed by larger amphibians but limited in scope with land-based aircraft plus land and ship-based helicopters having taken over most of these tasks. Some entities, most notably the Japanese Self Defense Forces, have still retained a significant capability especially in the SAR field with modern heavy platforms plus highly trained crews. Most of the expertise gained during World War II, especially in open water operations, has been lost.

Amphibians have the capability to operate both from water and land with suitable hulls and flotation devices for water operation and wheeled landing gear for land operation. However, some types have only restricted usage as far as the landing gear goes and these confine their land capabilities to being towed onto land for maintenance and parking. A true capability requires landing gear capable of supporting the aircraft for take-off and landing from runways up to maximum operating weights. Only those aircraft with such capabilities can exploit the full capabilities of amphibians.

OperationsThe operational profiles most suitable for

large amphibious aircraft generally involve take-off from a shore base with full load using a conventional runway or from a sheltered water body such as a harbor or lake/lagoon, a rapid transit over open ocean at height to the target area, surveillance or patrol at altitude or at low levels in a loiter mode, the option of alighting on the water for purposes of off-loading material

Amphibians have the capability to operate both from water and land…

Group Captain B menon, former fighter pilot, iaF


Mil

itA

ry

AP

Pli

cAt

ion

oF

AM

PH

iBio

us

Air

cr

AFt

or personnel, followed by take-off from water with load, transit to base or another destination and recovery either by landing on a runway or a water body.

Roles Search and Res cue. The peacetime

scenarios will be conventional SAR for picking up survivors of ditched aircraft, occupants of surface vessels in distress or evacuation of injured personnel from ships as well as places where runway facilities do not exist. Combat rescue and recovery will involve retrieval of aircrew who have ejected and survivors of damaged/sunk ships, recovery of Special Forces teams and captured equipment. Obviously the tactical situation will dictate the viability of launching such operations and chances of mission success in face of hostile forces. Land-based fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, land and ship-based, perform these roles. Both these types are essentially capable of operating only in the medium of air whereas the objects of interest are on the water. Helicopters have a plus point in hover capability but landing on even calm water is more of an emergency.

Surveillance of Shipping. Conventional fixed and rotary wing aircraft carry out these roles but are again limited to operation in the air only and not on the water surface. After identification from the air, they can pass on information to base. After that they can either destroy or threaten the target but not physically occupy it without deploying personnel by parachute or, from a helicopter by lowering them onto the target area. Recovery by fixed-wing platforms is not possible and even retrieval of personnel on to the helicopter demands a neutralised combat environment. Only surface ships or submarines can do the latter other than an amphibian aircraft; the former have constraints in terms of speed of response.

Interdiction. The obvious scenarios are anti-contraband, counter-terrorism, anti-infiltration and anti-piracy operations. Only surface vessels or submarines have the capability to perform these tasks and using the latter is a gross waste of scarce and at

times, strategic assets. Speed of response is a constraint and unless surface forces happen to be in the vicinity, they cannot provide swift response. Without physically capturing the people involved, the limited choices are to stand by helplessly or eliminate the target. Amphibians offer far more options.

Anti-Submarine Operations. Seaplanes and amphibians were very effective in this role in World War II. Although amphibians do not have the capability to hover like helicopters, an attribute that enables the latter to deploy sensors like dunking sonars, they can carry a wide variety of weapons and sensors. Their multi-role capabilities, faster sprint speeds and larger radii of action make them more versatile. A plus point is that amphibians are not runway-dependent like land-based aircraft.

Logistics Support and Communications. Many maritime communities and bases are solely dependent on ships for supply and connectivity because terrain or space constraints inhibit construction of airfields. The Lakshadweep chain with small coral islands, has limited scope for runway construction. This applies to portions of t h e Ni c o b a r Is l a n d s a n d terrain considerations create problems in the Andaman Islands group as well. The long North to South spread of these islands makes distances and resultant long transit time for helicopters a problem. Amphibians have an advantage here. Runway damage during natural disasters will also not affect amphibian operations.

ComparisonsIn the chart below, performance comparisons

of land-based fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters and amphibian aircraft illustrate how they match up against one another. Response time that is dependent on transit speed, operating range and payload capability are the main parameters. Payload delivery mode is another important aspect.

Although amphibians do not have the

capability to hover like helicopters, they

can carry a wide variety of weapons

and sensors…


Mil

itA

ry

AP

Pli

cAt

ion

oF

AM

PH

iBio

us

Air

cr

AFt

Parameters Ship Conventional Fixed Wing Helicopter Amphibian

Operational Range

Longest range of all platforms

Could be long depending on type

Maximum of around 850 Km for large

helicopters

4500 Km for large amphibians

Cruising Speed

40-50Kmph average

Variable – could go up to 700- 750 Kmph for fast jets

Approx 250Kmph

Up to 480Kmph for large

types

CruisingAltitude

Surface bound & affected by

surface weather & sea states throughout.

Higher altitudes for climbing over weather in

case of bigger aircraft

Med & low altitudes -Influenced more by

route weather

Higher altitudes of around 6 Km for

large amphibians.

Payload Very large capacities.Delivery & recovery by

direct transfer

Large capacities depending on type.

Delivery by parachute or low extraction.

Hardly any recovery option except snatch for small objects with

specialized equipment.

5 to 6 MT on an average.

Delivery from hover by winch hoist or

parachute/free drop. Recovery by winch

hoist.

Over 10 MT.Delivery by

parachute, low extraction, free

drop, parachute or direct transfer

after water landing. Recovery by direct

transfer.

Versatility Can operate inrougher sea states than

other platforms

Dependent on runways Generally cannot operate on sea

surface except to float (if modified) in an

emergency

Can operate on sea surface & off

runways with some limitations on sea

states

use of large amphibians is restricted to sAr and firefighting roles…

When compared to helicopters, amphibians have twice the speed and payload, much longer range and because of greater fuel capacity and higher cruise altitudes, possess greater endurance. Delivery and recovery options with amphibians are more than that with all other platforms. Recovery destination options include runways and harbour areas or calm water around land or even open water near surface ships.

Amphibians are affected by weather conditions such as surface winds and visibility

while landing or take-off on water in the same way as on land. In addition, an important factor is the state of the water surface. Wave heights (amplitude measured from crest to trough) and wave lengths (frequency measured from crest of one wave to the crest of the following/preceding

wave) are the major factors. Both are, in turn, influenced by surface winds and sea currents and in waters closer to shore, by the sea-bed also. Waves speed up as the water becomes

shallower and this reduces wave length while increasing wave heights. Open and deeper water is less influenced by the land and true open water conditions exist from 150 to 200 km from the coast. Modern amphibians can operate on high seas with wave heights of up to three metres provided wave lengths are above 80 metres. Such conditions generally exist in open waters except in adverse weather conditions. No other aerial platform has this capability.

Aircraft like the four- engine Shin Meiwa US2 amphibian have a Short Take-off and Landing (STOL) capability. Sophisticated boundary layer control uses bleed air fed from a dedicated fifth engine and directed internally and externally over the flaps, wings and tail surfaces and also to deflect propeller wake flow downwards. Design features are incorporated to deflect water spray downwards and away from propellers and engine air inlets to minimize ingress into the engine. These measures reduce landing and take-off speeds, considerably reduce take-off and landing distances as well as guard against water ingestion damage. Low speeds of down


Mil

itA

ry

AP

Pli

cAt

ion

oF

AM

PH

iBio

us

Air

cr

AFt

to 90 kmph are claimed along with the ability to operate in wave heights of up to three metres. This not only gives a significant open ocean operating capability but also STOL capabilities for operating in restricted areas over land and small water bodies.

The Indian ScenarioSince India does not have large inland seas

or lakes, amphibian aircraft operations will be along coastal areas and in island territories. At distances out to sea of over 150 km or so, the speed differential between fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters become significant when responding to emergencies. At these distances, the time on station of helicopters gets degraded because of fuel considerations. Payload limitations have already been highlighted. Even medium-size twin-engine amphibians have a clear advantage over helicopters at these distances, the disparities increasing further as distances increase. The ability to alight on water as part of routine operations is the clincher as far as amphibians are concerned. At longer ranges, use of helicopters is not possible except perhaps with aerial refueling.

The Andaman & Nicobar Islands are about 1,400 km from the mainland, stretching for nearly 800 km from North to South. The large spread and long distances are tailor-made for aircraft operations. The constraints are shortage of runways plus length restrictions of existing runways because of lack of land space and terrain considerations. These conditions invite the use of seaplanes and amphibians which have suitable sheltered water landing locations in plenty. Amphibians have multi-role

capabilities and can therefore be used even in other areas as well as operate from land in case of adverse sea conditions. Movement of personnel and equipment can be done in a timeframe of hours instead of days by ships.

The military importance and the vulnerability of these islands has finally dawned on us only recently despite the fact these were the only Indian territories occupied by the enemy for a length of time during World War II. Patrolling these islands and the waters around them can only be done effectively by locally based aircraft and ships since they are far from the mainland. Non availability of runways makes the existing ones vulnerable to enemy action in war and natural calamities such as earthquakes and tsunamis. Amphibian aircraft reduce these vulnerabilities with the added advantage of the ability to get them on land to escape adverse sea conditions which could damage them if they continue to be moored on the water. A mix of long and medium range amphibians operating from these islands could extend our surveillance ranges and periods considerably.

The Lakshadweep chain is closer to the mainland at 200 to 400 Km and much smaller in spread as well as in land area. Land for runways is very hard to come by and use of amphibians is an attractive option. Patrolling these areas by shore-based aircraft flying out from the mainland or using locally based helicopters is not as effective as using amphibians based locally or using the islands as a staging area. In the area of SAR, there is hardly any cover

Shin meiwa uS2

Modern amphibians can operate on high seas with

wave heights of up to three metres…


Mil

itA

ry

AP

Pli

cAt

ion

oF

AM

PH

iBio

us

Air

cr

AFt

in these islands other than that can be provided by ships and helicopters engaged in other tasks and happen to be in the vicinity. With their inherent safety features of ability to operate on the water, amphibians are a better alternative.

Military operations such as interdiction of suspect pirate, contraband or terrorist surface craft are increasing as these threats increase, both in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal areas. As highlighted earlier, use of amphibians gives added operational flexibility and could be the only available option in case supporting ships and their ship-based helicopter assets are far away.

As far as offensive operations go, we may have to flush out hostile forces that have infiltrated into these islands during peace as well as in wartime. Insertion of Special Forces can be done rapidly by landing amphibians on water. Extraction is also easier to accomplish using these aircraft rather than bigger ships or slower helicopters. The same holds true for own offensive actions into enemy held islands.

The Air Force used to confine over-the-sea flying to at the most 100 km from land in the

past. This changed with the induction of the Jaguars and dramatically with the procurement of the Mirage 2000 and the SU-30MKI with long range and precision guided stand-off munitions.

The Navy used to operate patrol aircraft long distances out to sea but now with the induction of long-range surveillance aircraft such as the P8I and fighters of the Air Force operating in the strike role along with the capabilities of the carrier-based MiG-29, use of offensive air power over the sea has entered a new phase. However, our combat SAR assets are woefully incapable of rescue at long ranges.

The Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force inducted long range amphibian aircraft in this role when it felt the need to provide SAR cover to its P3C patrol aircraft. Long range over-water operations by fighter and patrol aircraft have inherent operational risks. The only way to rescue aircrew from the sea over long distances is to use amphibians or risk valuable ships having hundreds of crew members, which may have to operate alone in hostile waters, to conduct rescue missions which will take much longer

mirage-2000

Su-30mKi


Mil

itA

ry

AP

Pli

cAt

ion

oF

AM

PH

iBio

us

Air

cr

AFt

and thereby reduce chances of locating any survivors alive. The multi-role capabilities of amphibians make them useful in other tasks and a better alternative.

The Air Force and the Navy have issued Requests For Proposals for amphibians in the last few years. The Japanese Government and Shin Meiwa have expressed interest in the sale of US-2 four-engine amphibians to India recently.

The rider is that because of their self-imposed constraints on export of weapons, both the aircraft are for SAR only.

Comparisons of available parameters of two types of modern amphibians - the Shin Meiwa US 2, a large size, four-engine, long-range aircraft and the Canadair/Bombardier CL-145, a medium-size twin-engine, medium-range aircraft, are given below. Both are in commercial production.

Bombardier cL-145

Parameters & Specs Shin Meiwa US 2 Bombardier CL-415

Max Take Off Weight 47,700 Kg 19,890 Kg

SpeedCruise/Stall

480 / 90 Kph 333 / 126 Kph

Range 4,700 Km 2,400 Km

Service Ceiling 7,190 M 4,500 M

Take off DistanceLand/ Water 490 / 280 M 840 / 815 M

Landing DistanceLand/Water

1500 / 330 M 675 / 665 M

Max Wave Height For Water Operations

3 M 1.8 M

Avionics & Controls Wide range of Navaids, glass cockpit, Fly-by-wire Wide range of Navaids, LCD displays

STOL Features Boundary layer control over wings & tail surfaces with air bleed from a dedicated 5th turbine engine plus fly-by-wire

L e s s s o p h i s t i c a t e d features but still has low stall speeds

all figures are approximate and from open source publications.


Mil

itA

ry

AP

Pli

cAt

ion

oF

AM

PH

iBio

us

Air

cr

AFt

Tilt rotor aircraft such as the V-22 Osprey are another option. However, they lack the payload, range and speed capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft. Wing-in-ground-effect machines have also been tested. However, viable aircraft are not in service yet. Both these types do not at present match the capabilities of amphibians.

ConclusionAmphibian aircraft offer some advantages

over fixed-wing land or carrier-based aircraft and helicopters. At longer ranges and over

open ocean areas, these advantages become more marked. In our context, operations over island territories far from the mainland and with limited infrastructure offer areas of opportunity for inducting larger amphibians. Smaller types can augment the capabilities of surface ships, helicopters and land or carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft. For long range SAR and Special Operations in a marine environment, the amphibian may be the only viable option in specific scenarios. The downside is that very few types are available in the world market.

v-22 osprey


stE

Alt

H t

Ec

Hn

olo

Gy

DURING THE COLD WAR ERA OF the 1950s, the Lockheed U-2 spy planes of the United States of America

(USA) were undertaking photo reconnaissance missions regularly with impunity in the airspace over the Soviet Union. Tasks assigned to these aircraft included monitoring the progress in the development of missile test sites, key infrastructure, nuclear installations, military establishments and communications facilities.

Even while flying at extremely high altitudes well in excess of 100,000 feet above sea level, the U-2 spy planes were visible to the ground-based air defence establishments in the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that these spies-in-the-sky aeroplanes were not flying at very high

In the never ending rivalry between offence and defence, there will be a continuing race in development between stealth technology and detection devices of air defence systems. In future, stealth technology will be extended to transport aircraft, rotary wing and unmanned serial platforms. While stealth technology will undoubtedly play an increasingly critical role in air operations in the future, radar systems of the future will also have far greater capability to defeat stealth. The future holds even greater challenges for human ingenuity and the capability to innovate.

stealth technologySpecial Correspondent

speeds, they were still relatively immune to

enemy action as they remained well outside

the operational envelope of Soviet interceptor

aircraft and the surface-to-air missile batteries.

However, the US was fairly certain that the

Soviet Union would soon catch up and develop

the capability to intercept and shoot down

the high flying American spy planes. Hence,

the foremost challenge before the American

defence scientific community was the urgent

need to develop a technology to reduce the

vulnerability of military aircraft first by reducing

the possibility of their detection by enemy radar

while operating in hostile airspace.

Thus, it was that in the late 1950s, defence

northrop Grumman B-2 Bomber


stE

Alt

H t

Ec

Hn

olo

Gy

scientists in the US embarked on the development of “stealth technology” as was relevant to airborne military platforms to obviate the possibility of detection of the aircraft by ground-based air defence radars. But the endeavour was somewhat late to take off and the pace of development of this new technology was initially very slow.

Consequently, disaster struck on May 01, 1960, when a Lockheed U-2C that had got airborne from a secret airbase near Peshawar in Pakistan for an espionage mission over the Soviet Union, was successfully intercepted and brought down by a salvo of first of the newly developed SA-2 Guideline (S-75 Dvina) surface-to-air missile system fired by the Soviet air defence establishment. Also shot down along with the

U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers, a pilot employed by the Central Intelligence Agency of the US, was a Soviet MiG-19 fighter aircraft that was sent up to track and pursue the U-2. Undoubtedly, downing of the U-2 was not only embarrassing but also traumatic for the US, a sentiment that provided further

impetus to the US effort at the development of stealth technology.

Fundamentals of Stealth Technology

To understand the fundamentals of stealth technology, it would be necessary to recapitulate the principle on which a radar system works. The mechanically rotating or fixed phased array antenna of the ground based radar transmits a beam of radio waves that are reflected by any object that comes in its path. The intensity of the reflected wave varies with the nature of the reflecting surface. A conventional all-metal aircraft with fuselage generally of rounded shape for better aerodynamic efficiency provides an excellent surface for the reflection of the transmitted radar waves.

Based on the time taken for the reflected wave to arrive back at the ground based radar antenna, the radar system pin-points the position of the aircraft and displays it as a “blip” on the radar screen. Thereafter, the radar tags and tracks further movement of the target aircraft so long as it remains within the range of the radar.

While ground-based radars enhance aviation safety under normal circumstances, in the case of overt or covert military operations, it makes an aircraft on a mission into hostile airspace highly vulnerable to enemy air defence weapon systems. It would be obvious from the above that in order to build in stealth characteristics in an aircraft, ways have to be found to prevent reflection of radar waves by absorbing the radar waves striking the aircraft through the use of appropriate material in the construction of the airframe or by painting the outer surface of the airframe with radar wave electromagnetic energy absorbing material which is generally believed to be silicon-based inorganic compound.

Reflection of radar waves can also be prevented by shaping the airframe in such a way that the radar waves are not reflected but in fact deflected and are not able to reach the ground based radar receiver. This is achieved by designing the airframe largely with flat surfaces and sharp edges that deflect the radar waves away from the ground-based radar antenna.

stealth technology really matured with the development of the fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the F-22 raptor...

Lockheed martin f-22 raptor


stE

Alt

H t

Ec

Hn

olo

Gy

Another design feature that can reduce radar cross section of the aircraft is carrying bombs and missile loads internally and not slung under the wings. As weapons carried externally reflect radar waves and as it is practically impossible to make weapons stealthy, it is far more expedient to carry weapon loads in internal bomb bays designed for the purpose and to be opened only at the time of release of weapons.

These methods would successfully ‘blind’ the radar. Thus, stealth technology is based on a combination of materials used in the construction of the airframe as also its unique design features that help minimise reflection of radar waves. However, as of today, even with the best of stealth technology developed so far, it has not been possible to totally eliminate the reflection of radar waves to make the aircraft invisible to the radar and prevent the ‘blip’ from appearing on the radar screen. A stealth aircraft like the F-117 Night Hawk Stealth Fighter that was employed extensively in the First Gulf War would have a radar signature of an aeroplane the size of a small bird. In any case, stealth technology cannot neutralise optical methods of detection.

Infrared Signature Apart from factors that make an aircraft

detectable by radar and the innovations that

make an aircraft stealthy, there are thermal imaging systems that can pick up an aircraft both by day and night by its Infrared (IR) signature primarily generated by the high temperature of the engine exhaust. However, compared to the radar signature of the aircraft, the IR signature is relatively smaller.

While ways have been found to reduce the radar signature of the airframe, reducing the IR signature of an aircraft engine has certainly been found to be a far more challenging task. This has involved not only innovations in engine design but also its location on the aircraft. While the leading manufacturers of aero engines are engaged in research to reduce IR signature of the new engines being developed specifically for stealth aircraft, notable success has been achieved in reducing the IR signature through relocation of the engine on the airframe.

Engines on stealth aircraft are located deep inside the fuselage as can be observed on stealth aircraft such as the Northrop Grumman B-2 Bomber, the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor the only fifth-generation combat aircraft

the russian aerospace industry came up with fourth-generation plus

semi-stealth aircraft - the su-47 ‘Berkut’

and the MiG-35 super Fulcrum/raptor Killer...

f-35 Joint Strike fighter Lightening


stE

Alt

H t

Ec

Hn

olo

Gy

currently operational and the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Lightening II. The exhaust gases exit the fuselage at a much lower temperature thereby reducing the size of the thermal image. The F-117 also has devices to deflect the exhaust gases.

Development of Stealth Aircraft

U S a e r o s p a c e m a j o r Lockheed Martin took the lead to launch a project at its Skunk Works facility to develop the F-117, the first true stealth aircraft to become operational anywhere in the world. The project was shrouded in utmost

secrecy and although the aircraft undertook its maiden flight as early as in 1981, it was revealed to the world just before it took part in the Gulf War. This was followed by the development of the nuclear stealth bomber B-2 Spirit by Northrop Grumman as

follow up to the 1970s vintage B-1 designed and developed by Rockwell International.

There were some programmes though that met with failure. The McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics A-12 Avenger II, a carrier-borne stealth aircraft programme for which contract was awarded in 1986, was abandoned in 1991 on account of apparently insurmountable

technological problems and massive cost overruns. Stealth technology really matured with the development of the fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the F-22 Raptor as a replacement for the F-15 Eagle. This was a product of joint effort by Boeing and Lockheed Martin.

In response, the Russian aerospace industry came up with its own versions of fourth-generation plus semi-stealth aircraft, the Su-47 ‘Berkut’ and the MiG-35 Super Fulcrum/Raptor Killer, an advanced derivative of the MiG-29. Unlike the American stealth technology that was focused on shape of the airframe, these two Russian combat aircraft employed sophisticated Plasma Stealth Technology also known as Active Stealth Technology originally developed by the Soviet Union for its space programme. This technology involves building in the capability

in the aircraft to generate a Plasma Field that covers the entire external surface. The Plasma Field absorbs the electromagnetic energy of the radar waves thus reducing the intensity of the reflected wave and minimising the radar cross-section of the target aircraft.

The next stealth aircraft which is yet to be ful ly operational in the US is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Lightening II by Lockheed

the advantages that stealth technology offers are not without attendant limitations...

Su-47 ‘Berkut’

miG-35 Super fulcrum raptor Killer


stE

Alt

H t

Ec

Hn

olo

Gy

a maritime version of the aircraft which, when deployed on the Liaoning as well as her indigenous carriers to be built in the future, will give her the capability to project air power all over the world with the help of the next generation stealth war planes. The US with its carrier version of the F-35 already under trials, is clearly ahead at this point in time but this situation may change in the future.

After the Chengdu J-20 and the Shenyang J-31, the Chinese are reported to be developing the third stealth aircraft, the J-18. Meant for the PLAAF, this is a 4.5 generation fighter aircraft designed once again by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and is nicknamed ‘Red Eagle’. As per reports in the

the major weakness in china’s stealth

technology regime has been lack of capability

to design and build an indigenous stealth

engine...

Sukhoi t-50

chengdu J-20

Martin as a replacement for the F-16. Being the first stealth aircraft capable of Vertical Take-Off and Landing, the single-engine F-35 is shaped to have a low radar cross-section, has an airframe made out of stealth oriented materials and incorporates infrared and visual signature reduction measures.

The equivalent Russian stealth platform is the fifth-generation Sukhoi T-50 Prospective Airborne Complex of Frontline Aviation or PAK-FA, currently under flight test phase. The aircraft has an uncanny resemblance to the F-35 in shape. Incidentally, the twin-seat version of the T-50 PAK FA for the Indian Air Force (IAF) designated as the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) is under development and is expected to enter service by the end of this decade. This will be the first stealth fighter the IAF will be privileged to own and operate. The second will possibly be the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft without vertical stabilisers being designed by the Indian aerospace industry, if and when it does become a reality.

While the US and Russia carry on a neck-on-neck race in the development of stealth technology, China appears to be emerging on the scene as a dark horse with equally competitive products. Its first stealth platform described as “a masterpiece of home-grown innovation” is the Chengdu J-20 fifth-generation, twin-engine stealth fighter aircraft designed and developed for the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group. Very similar to the American F-22 and the F-35 in airframe design, the J-20 undertook its maiden flight in January 2011.

China’s next stealth fighter aircraft that completed its successful maiden flight on October 31, 2012, is the Shenyang J-31 nicknamed Falcon Eagle. Smaller in size, lighter than the J-20 and currently under development, the J-31 Falcon Eagle is a twin-engine, mid-size fifth generation fighter jet which is also referred to as the F-60 or J-21. Once again, this new stealth fighter resembles the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 JSF leading to the suspicion that the design could have been acquired from the US in a clandestine manner.

China also plans to develop, in due course,

cou

rtesy

: en.

wik

iped

ia.o

rg


stE

Alt

H t

Ec

Hn

olo

Gy

Japanese media, the J-18, which will have the capability of Vertical Take-off and Landing, will come with super-stealth characteristics. The prototype has already completed its maiden test flight at a secret base in Inner Mongolia. China is also reported to be developing her first weaponised stealth Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

In view of China’s demonstrated capability to indigenously design and develop her own 4.5

generation stealth fighter aircraft, Russia has agreed to sell her Su-35 fighters equipped with advanced 117S engines. China’s meteoric rise in this field has also inspired the US Department of Defense to increase the number of F-22 and F-35 fighter jets based in Asia to counter the

threat from China’s new range of stealth platforms. However, the major weakness in China’s stealth technology regime has been lack of capability to design and build an indigenous stealth engine to power its stealth fighter jets. Currently, China is dependent on Russia for the supply of stealth power plants.

The Flip Side of Stealth TechnologyThe advantages that stealth technology

offers are not without attendant limitations. On account of the unique design features of the

The US is finding it difficult to sustain its fleet of the B-2 Bomber and the F-22 raptor...

airframe of stealth aircraft that do not exactly enhance aerodynamic excellence, as compared to a normal aircraft, the stealth aircraft invariably suffer significant performance penalties. When compared with normal conventional combat aircraft of equal weight and size, stealth aircraft have relatively lower top speed, lower payload capacity due to limitations of internal space for the carriage of weapons, are generally not as easily manoeuvrable and are prohibitively expensive to procure and maintain. Even the US is finding it difficult to sustain its fleet of the B-2 Bomber and the F-22 Raptor. These aircraft are certainly less affordable for developing countries.

The FutureIn the never ending rivalry between offence

and defence, there will be a continuing race in development between stealth technology and detection devices of air defence systems. In future, stealth technology will be extended to transport aircraft, rotary wing and unmanned serial platforms. While stealth technology will undoubtedly play an increasingly critical role in air operations in the future, radar systems of the future will also have far greater capability to defeat stealth. The future holds even greater challenges for human ingenuity and the capability to innovate.

Shenyang J-31


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

Aerospace and defence newsPriya Tyagi

M I L I T A R Y A V I A T I O NSecond Boeing Globemaster Delivered to India

THE SECOND OF THE TEN BOEING C-17 GLOBEMASTER III HEAVy AIRLIFTERS arrived a month after the delivery of the first C-17 on time and as per schedule. The C-17 has immediately begun supporting IAF operations. With the ability to operate in extreme

climates, transport large payloads across vast distances, land on short, austere runways, the Globemaster III is expected to support operations in extremely challenging terrain that spans from the Himalayas where there are bases at altitudes of 11,000-13,000 ft to the Indian Ocean Region. Due to its ability to operate from short landing strips the aircraft will also be a crucial enabler in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR).

Air Chief Marshal N.A.K Browne who took delivery of the second C-17 at Boeing’s manufacturing facility in Long Beach, California termed it as, “an important milestone in the Indo-US global strategic partnership.” Adding that the IAF had undertaken a major modernisation drive, the Globemaster was specifically chosen to address India’s capability enhancement needs and provide a tremendous boost to the IAF’s strategic airlift capability. Boeing was also complimented for honouring the delivery schedule and ensuring a fast-track induction plan. Boeing is on schedule to deliver three more C-17s this year and five in 2014, upon completion of which, India will be the largest C-17 operator outside the US. So far, 255 C-17s have been delivered. These include 222 to the US Air Force, 33 to Australia, Canada, India, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Britain and the 12-member Strategic Airlift Capability initiative of NATO and Partnership for Peace nations.

c-17 Globemaster iii (iaf’s Second c17 flying out of Long Beach california after the acceptance ceremony) Priya Tyagi


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

The C-17s will be supported through the Globemaster III Integrated Sustainment Programme (GISP) Performance-Based Logistics contract, an arrangement that ensures mission readiness by providing all C-17 customers access to an extensive support network for worldwide availability of spares and economies of scale.

Navy Completes First X-47B Arrested Landing The first arrested landing onto an aircraft carrier with Northrop Grumman’s X-47B Unmanned

Combat Air System (UCAS) has been conducted by the US Navy. The X-47B, with a 62-foot wingspan and capability of reaching 40,000 feet, is a demonstration aircraft, designed to simulate future sea-based missions for the Navy.

The X-47B, which took off from the Naval Air Station (NAS) at Patuxent River, Md., completed a 35-minute flight, reached 145 knots and landed on the deck of the USS George H.W. Bush off the coast of Virginia. Its flight was controlled almost entirely by computers through GPS coordinates and advanced avionics. The US Navy has been working on integrating unmanned aircraft into its carrier operations for over a decade now. The arrested landing was the final test flight of an eight-month program. The recently conducted test flights will help the Navy to develop parameters for a next-generation variant of the X-47B, as it looks to launch its Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance and Strike program (UCLASS), which it is currently seeking proposals for.

X-47B makes history, lands on deck of the uSS George h.w. Bush


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

Lockheed Martin delivers third F-35 for RAF The third F-35B Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing (STOVL) Lightning II for the United

Kingdom Ministry of Defence has been delivered by Lockheed Martin (LM). The aircraft, known as BK-3 (ZM137), was ferried on a 90-minute flight from LM’s F-35 production facility at Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base to Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., where it will be used for pilot and maintenance training.

The F-35 Lightning II, a fifth generation fighter, combines advanced stealth with fighter speed and agility, fused sensor information, network-enabled operations and advanced sustainment. The F-35 is being developed by LM with its principal industrial partners, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems. The program’s more than 500 British suppliers will build 15 per cent of each F-35 produced. Numerous F-35 components including the aft fuselage, fuel system and crew escape system will be manufactured in the UK. Key F-35 suppliers in the UK include BAE Systems, GE Aviation, Martin-Baker, SELEX, Cobham, Ultra Electronics, UTC Actuation Systems and Rolls-Royce.

US Navy’s First F-35C Delivered by Lockheed MartinLockheed Martin has also delivered the first CF-6, the Lockheed Martin F-35C Lightning II Navy

Carrier Variant (CV) aircraft at Strike Fighter Squadron 101 at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

The CF-6 joins a fleet of 12 F-35A Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) jets and 13 F-35B Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) jets already assigned to Eglin. Later this year, four additional CVs will join the fleet. The F-35 aircraft will be used Strike Fighter Squadron 101 to train pilots and maintainers.

f-35B Short takeoff vertical Landing (StovL) Lightning ii


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

According to Lockheed Martin Executive Vice-President and F-35 Program General Manager, “We are committed to the Navy’s vision for the F-35 that will revolutionize forward-based combat power in current and future threat environments. The F-35 represents the new standard in weapon systems integration, maintainability, combat radius and payload that brings true multi-mission capability to the Navy.”

The F-35C, the Carrier Variant for the US Navy and Marine Corps, has larger wings and more robust landing gear than the other F-35 variants. At 19,624 lbs, the CV has the greatest internal fuel capacity making it suitable for catapult launches and arrested landings aboard aircraft carriers. With folding wings, the C-variant uses probe-and-drogue refuelling like the F-35B. Three distinct variants of the F-35 will replace the A-10 and F-16 for the USAF, the F/A-18 for the US Navy, the F/A-18 and AV-8B Harrier for the US Marine Corps and a variety of fighters for at least ten other countries. The US Navy plans Initial Operational Clearance with the CV in 2019.

30 Mi-17s for US Army for Operations in AfghanistanIn a contract worth $572.2 million, the US Army plans to acquire 30 Russian-made medium-lift

military attack helicopters which perform particularly well in the hot weather and high altitudes of Afghanistan. As per US Army officials, the intended user of the Russian helicopters is the Afghan National Security Forces Special Mission Wing, an aviation unit that supports counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and Special Operations missions.

Meanwhile, a US government watchdog audit gave thumbs down for Afghanistan reconstruction to move forward with a $771.8 million purchase of 48 aircraft for the newly formed Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW). Singled out for criticism was the contract for acquisition of 30 Mi-17 helicopters, spare parts, test equipment and engineering support “despite our recommendations.” In a letter to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, Inspector General John F. Sopko stated, “We maintain that moving forward with the acquisition of these aircraft is imprudent.”

Built by the Kazan Helicopter Plant, in the Republic of Tatarstan, the Mi-17 is a modified Russian Mi-8M Hip medium twin-turbine transport helicopter that also can function as a helicopter gunship. The Mi-17 is employed by a wide variety of military, law-enforcement,

commercial aviation and public safety agencies throughout the world in applications ranging from passenger air transport, search-and-rescue, and cargo transport, to military special operations.

With a crew of three, the Mi-17 can carry as many as 30 passengers or troops, 12 stretchers or nearly 9,000 lbs of cargo. The aircraft is nearly 61 feet long and 16 feet tall with a 70-foot-diameter rotor. It has two Klimov TV3-117VM turbo-shaft engines and can fly to altitudes as high as 20,000 feet.

$4.9 billion Contract for 99 V-22 Ospreys Under terms of a $4.9 billion contract, the US Navy is ordering 99 V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft

from Bell-Boeing for the USAF and Marine Corps. The contract also gives the US Navy an option to order 23 additional V-22 aircraft.

The V-22 Osprey is a joint service, multi-role combat aircraft that uses tilt-rotor technology to

mi-17 helicopter


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

combine the speed and range of a fixed-wing airplane with the vertical performance of a helicopter. The V-22, with its nacelles and rotors in vertical position, can takeoff, land and hover like a helicopter. Once airborne, its nacelles rotate forward to transform the aircraft into a turbo-prop airplane capable of high-speed, high-altitude flight. Currently, more than 200 V-22 Ospreys are in operation all over the world and the fleet has amassed more than 185,000 flight hours.

Successor to the Blackhawk?Looking to purchase its next high-speed helicopter, the US Army has recently chosen the JMR

MPS design put forth by AVX Aircraft Company, for its Joint Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator (JMR-TD) program.

With veteran helicopter makers Bell and a joint Sikorsky/Boeing already in the fray, the AVX design is the third to join the Army’s program. And if all goes well, the new bird might just be a replacement not only for the Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk but also for the Boeing AH-64 Apache.

AVX’s helicopter features a sleek, low-drag profile, which incorporates a number of weapons bay doors that function to conceal payload until the appropriate moment making it difficult to discern if the helicopter is an assault aircraft or a similarly-designed cargo variant.

The JMR MPS also features a 30-mm gun with 360-degrees of coverage and two side guns. The utility version has options for troop transport, FAST rope provisions, additional fuel cells and a 13,000-lb external load capacity. Negotiations are on with the US Army to settle the contract by September.

First Rafale deliveries to India by 2016French Defence Minister Jean-yves Le Drian was quoted by the financial daily ‘Les Echos’ that

France expects to make its first deliveries of Rafale to India by 2016 or 2017. The paper stated that

v-22 underslung m777

rafale


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

France’s draft defence budget was based on the assumption that the first deliveries of the Dassault Aviation-built fighters would commence in 2016.

India and France are negotiating the purchase of 126 of the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft. In April this year, Indian sources told Reuters that the deal could be delayed as the two countries struggle to reach an agreement over the role of an Indian state-run subcontractor Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. The Rafale was selected for exclusive negotiations in January 2012 after a hotly contested bidding war with rival manufacturers. The yet-to-be finalised $15 billion deal would be one of the world’s largest defence import orders.

Researchers Unveil Thought-Controlled Drone Researchers at the University of Minnesota have revealed a drone that can be controlled merely

by thought. Published in the Journal of Neuro Engineering, the project has implications in everything from unmanned vehicles to paraplegic mobility.

The drone is a commercially available four-blade helicopter - the Parrot AR quadrotor -which is basically a drone hobbyist’s Model T. To control it, the ‘pilot’ wears a funny hat, the sensing end of an Electro-encephalogram (EEG). EEGs place an array of electrodes over a person’s head in a totally non-invasive way and pick up on electrical activity in the brain. Clusters of activity, like thinking about making a fist with a right hand, generate a spark in a specific area of the brain. That spark gets translated through a computer into a Quadrotor command (“Turn Right”). The command is then beamed to the Quadrotor via WiFi.

Researcher Bin He, a professor of bio-medical engineering at the University of Michigan says that previously, research showed that subjects could control a virtual helicopter with their thoughts. The latest demo using a real, live helicopter is just another step towards more practical applications.

MQ-8C, the Rotary Wing UAV of the Future?

Earlier this month, at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space exposition at National Harbor, Md., a full scale mock-up of Northrop Grumman’s MQ-8C, the unmanned platform that is to succeed the MQ-8B, was on show. Built around the Bell 407 helicopter, the MQ-8C is different from the MQ-8B which was originally modelled around the Schweizer 333 platform.

Director - Business Development, Tactical Unmanned Systems Michael Furqua said, “This is the rotary wing UAV of the future. It will have 14 hours endurance and triple the payload of the MQ-8B weighing 600 lbs.” The MQ-8B has an endurance of around eight hours with a 170-lb payload.

Currently, the US Navy operates 28 MQ-8Bs. Since May 2011, these Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have served in Afghanistan, Libya and in Africa with AFRICOM (US Africa Command) for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations with daily operations sometimes

mQ-8c


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

reaching up to 17 hours. Deployments have reportedly exceeded 500 flight hours and by the end of March 2013, the whole fleet had exceeded 8,000 flight hours.

Although there has been widespread international interest in the MQ-8B/C program, international export is restricted by the Missile Technology Control Agreement (MTCA), under which UAS are classified.

USAF to Launch $555 Million Unmanned Modernization Project Northrop Grumman has been awarded a $555.6 million contract to modernize the USAF’s fleet

of Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The Department of Defense (DoD) stated that the modernization efforts would include upgrade to the Global Hawk’s “configuration management, data management, retrofit requirements and integrated logistics support.”

The upgrades will be carried out at Northrop Grumman’s aerospace systems facility in San Diego and is expected to be completed by May 2015.

US Army - UAH to Collaborate on Developing Next-Gen UAS The US Army’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Project Management Office (PM UAS) has signed a

Memorandum of Understanding with the University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAH) to promote the development of the next generation of UAS.

Under the agreement, PM UAS and UAH will work together to develop more courses in the study of unmanned aircraft. UAH’s Rotorcraft Systems Engineering and Simulation Center (RSESC) currently carries out UAS research. According to Colonel Baxter, Project Manager, PM UAS, “This effort will allow the Army to further promote independent research and development at the university level and develop student interest in the Army’s UAS program.”

Third-Generation Tilt-rotor V-280 by BellAt the annual US Army Aviation symposium, Quad-A, Bell’s V-280 Valor third generation tilt-

rotor helicopter was unveiled by John Garrison, President and CEO, Bell Helicopter.

The V-280 is Bell’s offering for the Department of Defense’s Joint Multi-Role/Future Vertical Lift helicopter project. If chosen, it could result in the production of more than 4,000 aircraft for the selected design, which will replace the US Army’s Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawks and the Boeing AH-64 Apaches.

tilt-rotor v-280


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

Garrison stated that the V-280 is designed to meet the needs of the Department of Defense and the US Army’s requirements of speed, range, payload and reliability.

While the V-280 looks similar to the original Bell/Agusta BA609, there are major differences. The first of these is the fact that the rotor blades and gearbox tilt upward, not the whole engine nacelle during the transition from forward flight to helicopter mode. This, said Garrison, was to improve the experience for troops leaving and emplaning the aircraft when on operations by taking away the hot engine exhaust. He added that the designers believed that keeping the engine in this position would assist the engineers during maintenance, rather than having the engine standing vertically as it does when a V-22 is on the ground.

With a V-tail configuration that will help to improve the aircraft’s overall stability, the V-280 will have two pilots sitting side-by-side with two crew chiefs, carrying up to 11 combat troops. The first prototype of the aircraft is expected to fly in 2017.

The V-280 Valor stands for the following - V = vertical; 280 for the aircraft’s cruise speed and Valor as a tribute to the services.

Lockheed’s JASSM Completes Successful Flight Testing The flight testing of Lockheed Martin’s Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM) Extended

Range for the US Air Force Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) has been completed. The JASSM was successful on 20 of 21 total flights which were designed to validate the full operational capability of the B-1B/JASSM-ER weapon system. With the completion of the IOT&E, Lockheed plans to move forward with full-rate production of the B-1B/JASSM-ER system later this year. The aerospace giant is looking to integrate the air-to-ground missile on its F-35 Lighting II fighter aircraft.

Lockheed martin JaSSm’s stealthy airframe makes it extremely difficult to defeat

JaSSm is integrated on multiple aircraft including the B-1, B-2, B-52, f-16, and fa-18

JaSSm’s pinpoint accuracy allows only a single missile to be used to kill each target.


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

N A V A L S Y S T E M SP-8A Poseidon Ready for Induction into US Navy

According to a report issued by the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), the P-8A Poseidon, Boeing’s next-generation military derivative of the 737-800, is ready for induction into the US Navy. Following extensive testing of the aircraft that began in 2010, the report confirmed that the P-8A Poseidon was “operationally effective, suitable and ready for induction”.

The P-8A Poseidon will be the replacement for the Navy’s aging fleet of Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion four-engine turboprops. NAVAIR plans on using the Poseidons on anti-submarine missions along with the MQ-4C Triton, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).

Hav i n g p a s s e d t h e I n i t i a l Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) milestone, the aircraft is on track to enter service beginning winter. So far, Boeing has delivered nine P-8A Poseidons to NAVAIR, against contracts issued in 2011 and 2012 worth about $5.2 billion.

As per terms of the contract, upgrades to the aircraft will include an automatic identification system transponder and receiver, Multi-static Active Coherent wide-area acoustic search system and high-altitude ASW weapons capability. The Navy plans on purchasing a total of 117 P-8As which will be delivered between 2014 and 2016.

$435 Million Deal for Sikorsky CH-53K Demonstrators Sikorsky has been issued a contract valued at $435.3 million to build four new CH-53K test article

aircraft for the US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). The CH-53K is designed to carry up to 27,000 lbs over a range of 110 nautical miles under high-hot ambient conditions, nearly tripling the external load carrying capacity of the CH-53E Super Stallion. The ‘K’ variant is a fly-by-wire helicopter with three 7,500-shaft horsepower GE engines and will be the first of the CH-53 family to feature an all-composite airframe and composite rotor blades.

Sikorsky delivered the ch-53K Ground test vehicle (Gtv) to the uS marines

Boeing p-8a poseidon


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

This contract is a part of $3.5-billion Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract issued to Sikorsky in April 2006. Under the terms of the contract, 17 per cent of the work will take place in Stratford and another 17 at the manufacturer’s flight test facility in West Palm Beach, Fla., with 15 per cent of the work in Wichita, Kan., ten per cent in Salt Lake City, Utah and a number of other locations.

While the first flight for the CH-53K test aircraft is scheduled for the end of 2014 delivery of all four aircraft is expected by 2017 and its Initial Operational Clearance by 2019.

Boeing Delivers First Boeing P-8I to Indian NavyThe first of the eight Boeing P8I naval reconnaissance aircraft have been delivered to the Indian

Navy with two more to follow this year. The contract for the P8I, which will enhance the Indian Navy’s strategic reach capabilities, enabling it to cover the entire Indian Ocean Region, was signed in January 2009 for $2.1 billion.

The aircraft will be based at the Indian Navy’s INS Rajali Air Station at Arakkonam near Chennai in Tamil Nadu. The P8I is armed with anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons apart from surveillance suites and sensors to sharpen its long-range maritime surveillance and airborne anti-warship capabilities. The eight P8Is will be the replacement for the ageing Soviet-era Tupolev-142M fleet that is currently operating out of Arakkonam.

Equipped with the deadly Harpoon Block II missiles that can take on enemy warships and submarines, torpedoes and depth chargers, the P8Is possess surveillance gadgets, advanced avionics and weapon control suite. If required, the P8I can also serve as an airborne command post for the Indian Navy.

In place of the key original equipment, India has integrated its indigenous equipment from government-owned Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL), Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Avantel. The Indian Navy has the option to acquire four additional P-8Is.

p-8i


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

$8 Billion Chopper Tender for Indian NavyIn view of its expanding fleet size and expansion in its area of responsibility with the Government

stating that the country’s strategic interest ranges from the Gulf of Aden to the Malacca Strait, the Indian Navy is planning to issue a bid for procuring more than 120 multi-role choppers in what could be expected to be the world’s largest tender expected to be worth around $8 billion.

The IN, which has plans of acquiring more than 120 Naval Multi-role Helicopters (NMRH), recently issued a global Request for Information. A global Request for Proposal in this regard is likely to be issued in the near future. The new NMRH will be procured for anti-submarine warfare, Special Operations and anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. Companies expected to take part in the tender include all major players like Eurocopter, Agusta Westland, Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin.

The IN is already holding a competition to procure 16 multi-role helicopters in which European NH-90 and American Sikorsky S-70 Bravo are in the running. Upon completion of sea trials, the IN had submitted its report to the Defence Ministry in 2011. As per the tender, the winning bidder would be required to supply the first MRH within 46 months in three phases. The Navy will also have the option of placing orders for another 44 helicopters, on completion of the present contract. However, the tender, for multi-role helicopters has been delayed for six months. Without elaborating on the details of this decision, the MoD has asked the American Sikorsky and European NH Industries to extend the validity of their proposals for the tender worth over $1 billion for the purchase of 16 choppers.

At present, the IN relies on its fleet of Sea King helicopters which were inducted in two different phases in the 1980s.

Upgraded MH-60S for US Navy at NAS North IslandCAE USA announced that the United States Navy has declared an updated MH-60S ‘Sierra’

Operational Flight Trainer (OFT) as ready-for-training at Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island near San Diego, California. This MH-60S OFT, originally manufactured by Lockheed Martin, was completely upgraded by CAE to add new technologies and ensure concurrency with other MH-60S training devices as well as the operational MH-60S helicopters.

As per John Lenyo, President and General Manager, CAE USA, “CAE is very proud of the partnership we have established with the Navy on both the MH-60S and MH-60R training programs, and will continue to leverage our experience and world-class simulation technologies to help the Navy lower risk, reduce costs and most importantly, prepare helicopter aircrews for mission success.”

The technology refresh and updates to the fixed-based MH-60S OFT included the addition of motion seats, upgraded image generator visual system, and a new Barco CD2260 visual display system.

CAE also performed significant engineering updates to re-architect the hardware and software computing designs to bring this MH-60S OFT to a common architecture with the Navy’s suite of CAE-built MH-60S training devices. CAE is currently the prime contractor responsible for the design and manufacture of MH-60S OFTs and Weapons Tactics Trainers (WTTs) as well as MH-60R Tactical Operational Flight Trainers (TOFTs) for the US Navy.

Indian-Built INS Arihant ActivatedIndia’s blue water capability reached a significant milestone as it activated the reactor onboard

the INS Arihant nuclear submarine, the first to be indigenously designed and built in India. The submarine, which can now undergo sea trials, will add a third dimension to India’s defence capability. Upon successful completion of its sea trials, India’s new nuclear-powered submarine could be operational within the next two years.


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

With the capability to carry a crew of about 100 sailors onboard, the Arihant will mark a strategic milestone as well. India’s deployment of a nuclear triad - the capacity to launch nuclear weapons from land, sea and air - will influence the strategic calculations of Pakistan and China.

The nuclear powered submarine will have the ability to remain under water for long periods and thereby increase its chances of remaining undetected. Last year, India leased the Russian-built nuclear-powered submarine the INS Chakra for the next ten years at a cost of about $1 billion.

In 2012, India had joined the Big Five – the US, UK, France, Russia and China in possessing the capability to operate nuclear-powered submarines when it formally commissioned a Russian-built submarine into its Navy. With India and Russia being long-time allies, the latter supplies 70 per cent of the former’s military hardware. Russia is also expected to aid India in training the Arihant’s crew.

Sagem On The High SeasSagem (Safran) is a long-standing leader in navigation systems, and has forged a solid reputation

in defense applications. With the brand-new BlueNaute inertial navigation system, the company is now seeking to carve out a spot in the commercial maritime market.

BlueNaute is the name of the new inertial navigation system offered by Sagem for the commercial maritime market. Primarily intended for merchant marine fleets and off shore applications, BlueNaute gives ships very precise headings, even at extreme latitudes, and also allows dynamic positioning because it compensates for boat movements due to swells and marine currents. The BlueNaute system is based on a cutting-edge technology, the hemispherical resonator gyro (HRG).

“We are a long-standing leader in very-high-performance military applications with our Sigma family of inertial navigation systems,” notes Fabrice Delhaye, head of Sagem’s Commercial


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

Navigation department. “After making the Sigma 40 the best selling shipborne system in the world, we wanted to diversify into civil markets to provide new growth outlets.”

E xc e p t i o n a l P e r f o r m a n c e . Sagem’s diversification strategy is all the more relevant since it coincides with the needs of both shipowners and operators, who are looking for an ultra-reliable product that offers virtually fail-safe performance in service. Unlike traditional navigation systems based on mechanical or c fiber-optic gyros, BlueNaute is maintenance-free and provides extremely high reliability, which means that shipowners avoid costly downtime. “For the same price, BlueNaute offers performance and reliability largely superior to current systems,” says Fabrice Delhaye. “Our system can operate for over 100,000 hours between failures, which is equal to the operational life of a ship. There’s also the offshore market, which has very demanding requirements for positioning precision and data accuracy. We just chalked up our first sales in this sector, and that wasn’t just a stroke of luck!”

A Technological Challenge. BlueNaute is a premium navigation system that was developed in less than two years by highly motivated teams. According to Nicolas Burgaud, head of Marketing & Business Development in Sagem’s Avionics Division, “We faced a heady challenge, namely to design a high-tech product that was both ultra-reliable and cost-competitive. We took a chance on a few audacious solutions, technically speak-ing, but they paid off, especially our choice of sensor. The HRG, initially developed for very specific space applications, had its design optimized to reduce unit costs. We can be very proud, because we are the only company to have made this technology more accessible for other applications!”

The next step is to introduce products for land applications, such as steering mobile satellite antennas (on Satcom vehicles) or geodesy, as well as aeronautical applications, in which the intrinsic qualities of Sagem’s HRG perfectly meet the requirements of prime contractors and end-customers. The ultimate goal is to make Sagem’s HRG-based products the global best-sellers on land, at sea and in the air.

• BlueNaute can go more than 100,000 hours without incident.

• BlueNaute weighs just 5 kilos, and is four times smaller than Sagem’s Sigma laser gyro inertial systems development for military applications.

A high-tech production facility. Sagem recently constructed a new building dubbed Coriolis, dedicated to the production of high-tech inertial systems and associated sensors (HRGs and laser gyros). This world-class production facility features a modular, scalable architecture, enabling it to keep pace with growing demand for HRG systems. It covers 19,000 square meters of floorspace, including 6,000 square meters of clean rooms where the sophisticated gyros are assembled. Safran invested some 60 million euros in this facility.

Bluenaute: new generation attitude and heading reference System for marine applications


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

L A N D S Y S T E M SNew Strike Corps for Sino-Indian Border

A new Strike Corps for the Indian Army has been approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security. The Corps, to be stationed in the East, will possess the capability to launch attacks in mountainous terrain. To be formed over the next seven years at a cost of Rs 65,000 crore, it may have as many as four divisions.

The Indian Army currently has three strike corps and nine holding corps. Four of the corps has elements on the China border deployed in the defensive role. With Division and Brigade headquarters in Bihar and Assam, the new Corps will be headquartered at Panagarh in West Bengal.

The IAF too plans to deploy its force- multiplier assets such as the six upcoming mid-air refuellers and the next squadron of C-130J Super Hercules Special Operations aircraft at Panagarh for the new Corps.

India to Have Shield from Long-range MissilesAs part of the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) shield being developed by DRDO, India’s

missile defence system is set to get a big boost with the capability to intercept enemy missiles fired from a distance of up to 5,000 km. Phase-I of the system under which the BMD shield can tackle enemy missiles fired from ranges up to 2,000 km is ready for deployment. Phase-II will entail enhancing the capability of BMD to deal with threats from missiles of longer range of up to 5,000 km.

Under Phase II of the programme, all the components of such a missile shield including the radar and interceptor missiles would be new and will have extended ranges. The DRDO is planning to have a new missile testing range in the Andamans for carrying out the test-firing of systems such as the long-range BMD. However, this will need various clearances, especially from the Environment Ministry, which earlier had not approved the setting up of a radar on the Island territory to save a rare species of bird there.

the Soldiers of indian army


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

Robotic Soldiers to Replace Human SoldiersKeeping in mind futuristic warfare scenarios, India is working to develop robotic soldiers. The

project is being undertaken by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). Under this, robots would be developed with high levels of intelligence to enable them to differentiate between friend and foe.

Robotic soldiers can be deployed in difficult war zones to help avoid loss of human lives. Newly appointed DRDO Chief Avinash Chander listed the project for development of robotic soldiers as one of his “priority thrust areas” saying that, “unmanned warfare in land and air is the future of warfare. Initially, the robotic soldier may be assisting the man.” The robotic soldier would be capable of being deployed in areas such as the Line of Control in about a decade.

Soldier of the Future?War enhances health technology in ways that are beneficial. In World War II, the Allies made

significant medical advances in developing antibiotic drugs and performed life-saving blood transfusions. Now, militaries the world over are developing keen interest in the human body and brain and aim to create armies of mutant soldiers equipped with unstoppable physical and mental powers.

According to the UK MoD, within the next three decades, British soldiers will have the ability to lift huge weights, run extreme distances at high speeds, have infra-red night vision and be capable of transmitting thoughts by electronically-aided telepathy.

An MoD report entitled ‘Global Strategic Trends Out to 2040’ predicts that advanced drug and genetic technologies will enable armies to re-program the genes of soldiers in order to transform them into daunting fighters. High-tech brain implants could transform soldiers into super-intelligent man-machines. These brain implants, called ‘cognitive prostheses’, could give soldiers bionic vision and hearing as well as extraordinary IQ and the ability of total recall. Such ‘augmented’ soldiers could even have bodies that self-repair wounds through the use of ‘regenerative medicine, tissue engineering and artificial immune systems’.

Lockheed Martin is also developing an advanced robotic exoskeleton known as the Human Universal Load Carrier, which will enable men to carry massive loads with minimal effort. The skeleton will be highly mobile, ultra-light and attached to the outside of the body with its own titanium legs in order to transfer the weight of the load to the ground. Microcomputers sense the soldier’s body movements and enable it to do exactly what he does, whether it is running, lifting or crawling. Prototype versions are under combat trials in Afghanistan.

Experiments in the US have demonstrated that implant technology could also give soldiers extra senses such as night vision and the ability to perceive magnetic fields.

Other areas of interest are infra-red detection and creation of super blood. Dr Miguel Nicolelis, a neurobiologist at Duke University in North Carolina announced earlier this year that he had given rats the ability to detect infra-red light, normally invisible to them, by fitting them with an infra-red detector wired to microscopic electrodes in their brains.

Doctors have long hoped for the advent of artificial blood that can be stored for years. Chemists at the University of Sheffield have created ‘plastic blood’ that can be successfully donated to patients. With such cataclysmic changes in the offing, can the bionic soldier be far behind?


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

N U C L E A R A N D S P A C EIndia, US Fast-Track Civil Nuclear Cooperation

India and the US have placed issues related to civil nuclear cooperation on fast track with all signs that an agreement for building a nuclear power plant at Mithivirdi in Gujarat could be inked during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s September visit to Washington. India has allocated two sites – Chhaya Mithivirdi in Gujarat and Kovvada in Andhra Pradesh - to Westinghouse Electric and GE-Hitachi for developing nuclear parks. The two sides are expected to sign an early works agreement between Westinghouse Electric and Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited during Dr. Singh’s visit.

Rs. 9,600-Crore Nuclear Fuel Facility At KalpakkamIndia’s first Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF) involving an outlay of around Rs.9,600 crore

got Centre’s nod recently, for it to be set up in Kalpakkam, as per R.K Sinha, Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Work on the project is expected to commence later this year.

The facility will cater to the upcoming Rs.5,677 crore 500 MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam.

A fast-breeder reactor is one which breeds more material for a nuclear fission reaction than it consumes. It is the key to India’s three-stage nuclear power programme. A fuel cycle facility near the PFBR eliminates the transport risk of fuel bundles. For the fuel reprocessing facility to be functional, the PFBR should first go on stream which is expected to happen next year. The fuel reprocessing facility, with little augmentation, can also cater to the needs of two more fast breeder reactors of similar nature planned at Kalpakkam.

The PFBR uses plutonium-based fuel, which is an important resource for India, and cannot be wasted. It is a high-value project and has to be done on time so that PFBR is not constrained for fuel.

nuclear power plant


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

Officials said the fuel cycle facility may come under a separate board as many units of DAE like the Nuclear Fuel Complex and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) will be involved in the proposed project. Tasked with the mandate of developing fast-breeder reactors, IGCAR will be steering the project. The fuel cycle facility might employ around 1,500 people and may take four to five years to come into play. Till then, PFBR will be storing the fuel at its complex.

ISRO Gearing up for First Mars Mission The Indian Space Research Organisation is planning its first ever mission to the Red Planet. The

Mars Orbiter mission will enable it understand the technological challenges of such an exploration. While searching for signs of life on it, the mission will aim to determine why the Red Planet lacks an atmosphere like the Earth.

ISRO plans to use the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) to launch the Rs. 450-crore Mars Orbiter. The PSLV carrying the Mars Orbiter, will blast off from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre at Sriharikota within the launch window of October 21 to November 19, a period during which Mars will be closest to the Earth.

The Orbiter is expected to exit the Earth’s orbit in the last week of November and travel for at least ten months before reaching Mars in September 2014.

The Mars Orbiter will be carrying compact science experiments with a total mass of about 14.49 kg. It will carry a methane sensor to determine the presence of methane that would suggest whether life ever existed on Martian soil. The five payloads of the Orbiter mission include a Lyman Alpha Photometer for studying the escape processes of Mars upper atmosphere through deuterium/hydrogen, Methane Sensor for Mars to detect the presence of methane while Martian E x o s p h e r i c C o m p o s i t i o n Explorer would study the neutral composition of the Martian u p p e r at m o sp h e re. M A R S Colour Camera would undertake optical imaging and TIR Imaging Spectrometer, which is targeted at mapping surface composition and mineralogy.

The satellite will enter a 372 km by 80,000 km elliptical orbit around Mars. The spacecraft will orbit the Red Planet once in every three days studying its surface and minerals.

The PSLV-XL (PSLV-C25) will inject the spacecraft from the spaceport of Sriharikota in the 250 X 23,000 km orbit. After leaving the Earth orbit in November, the spacecraft will cruise in deep space for ten months using its own propulsion system and reach the Martian transfer trajectory in September 2014. pSLv


AE

ro

sPA

cE

An

d d

EFE

nc

E n

EW

s

India Launches Navigational SatelliteIn a landmark late night journey into a new era of space application, India successfully launched

its first dedicated navigation satellite using the PSLV which blasted off from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre in Sriharikota.

India’s workhorse PSLV C22 lifted off in a perfect text-book launch, carrying the IRNSS-1A satellite, painting a dense golden flame in the dark canvas of the sky. About 20 minutes after its launch, the rocket placed the IRNSS-1A into its orbit.

This is the first of the seven satellites of the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS). After injection into this preliminary orbit, solar panels of IRNSS-1A were automatically deployed. Following this, the Master Control Facility (MCF) at Hassan took control of the satellite. The IRNSS-1A with a mission life of about ten years was built at ISRO Satellite Centre, Bangalore.

US Phasing Out Nuclear PlantsThis year, the US has decided to retire four nuclear reactors, bringing the number remaining in

to 100. Three had expensive mechanical problems but one, Kewaunee in Wisconsin, was running well, and its owner, Dominion, had secured permission to run it an additional 20 years. But it was losing money, because of the low wholesale price of electricity.

The other three, San Onofre 2 and 3 near San Diego and Crystal River 3 in Florida faced expensive repair bills because of botched maintenance projects. This is a turnaround because until recently, the life expectancy of reactors was growing with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission routinely authorizing reactors to run 20 years beyond their initial 40-year licence.

Even if the economics do not result in retirements, they do mean setbacks. Exelon, the nation’s largest nuclear operator, set out a few years ago to invest $2.3 billion in its existing reactors and raise their generating capacity by 1,300 MegaWatts, a little more than one new reactor would generate. But after completing about a quarter of the plan, it dropped the rest because the economics were no longer favourable, consequently paying a penalty of $100 million for cancellation.

Oyster Creek, an Exelon reactor in Forked River, N.J., is the oldest in the country, having opened in 1969. It received a 20-year license extension in 2010, but Exelon promised to shut it by the end of 2019 in exchange for an exemption from some rules governing the discharge of hot water from the plant. It might not make it to 2019, though.

Such is the fate of all old power plants. As the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry’s main trade association, pointed out when San Onofre closed, of the power plant retirements since 2010, 41 per cent were coal and 33 per cent were natural gas. Ten per cent were nuclear. Old power plants lead conditional existences; they may not survive new environmental rules or other circumstances that require expensive retrofits.


tHE

Ad

VAn

cin

G B

or

dE

rs

oF

tHE

cH

inE

sE

EM

Pir

E

The incidents in the Depsang Plain, near the Karakoram Pass in April or more recently, in Chumar in South Ladakh, are the continuance of Nehru’s blind spot for China. There is today a huge difference of ‘perception’ on the location of the Line of Actual Control which over the years has been moving towards the South and the West. The 1959 LAC was indeed far more advantageous for India than the present LAC.

the Advancing Borders of the chinese EmpireClaude Arpi

Claude arpi writes regularly on Tibet,

China, india and indo–French relations. he

is the author of Tibet: The lost Frontier,

dharamshala–Beijing: The negotiations That never were, and 1962

and the mcmahon line saga

AT THE END OF AUGUST 1959, A serious border incident occurred in the Subansiri sector of the then

NEFA. According to a Note sent by the Indian government to its Chinese counterpart, “On August 25, 1959, a strong Chinese detachment crossed into Indian territory (in Lonju) south of Migyitun on the NEFA border and fired without notice on an Indian forward picket. They arrested the entire picket which was twelve strong but eight Indian personnel somehow managed to escape.”1

A few days later, the issue came to the Parliament. As the Migyitun/Longju skirmish was being discussed, Nehru’s Government was also asked about a road supposedly cutting through Aksai Chin in Ladakh. For the first time, Nehru conceded that China had built a road. However, he explained that although Indian maps showed the area within India’s territory, the boundary in Ladakh was not ‘defined’. He stated, “Nobody had marked it.” The Prime Minister added that Delhi was prepared to discuss specific areas ‘in dispute or as yet unsettled’, though not the ‘considerable regions’ claimed by Chinese maps.

The Aksai Chin was definitely Indian territory though the area was “Very remote and uninhabited”, said the Prime Minister who, on March 22 that year, had written to Premier Zhou En-lai on the subject. Nehru could not escape and remain vague as he had done in the past. He had to make a detailed statement; he even agreed to release a White Paper on the border issue. Nehru admitted that the boundary

in Ladakh was not sufficiently defined and that Aksai Chin was a “barren uninhabited region without a vestige of grass”. He further confessed the road was, “an important connection” for the Chinese though in any case, in comparison with the NEFA, the dispute over Aksai Chin was a “minor” thing. India was, however, prepared to discuss the issue on the basis of treaties, maps, usage and geography.

It was a real bombshell for India. The cat was out of the bag!

The New RoadsIt is necessary to go back eight years since

the border incident. Soon after the PLA entered Lhasa in September 1951, the Chinese decided to improve communications on The Roof of the World and built new roads on a war-footing.2 The only way to consolidate and ‘unify’ the Empire was to construct a large network of roads. The work began immediately after the arrival of the first Chinese soldiers in Lhasa. Priority was given to motorable roads - the Chamdo-Lhasa3, the Qinghai-Lhasa4 and the Tibet-Xinjiang Highway (later known as the Aksai Chin) linking Western Tibet to former Eastern Turkestan. For the latter, the first surveys were done in 1952 and construction commenced soon after5.

The official report of the 1962 China War prepared by the Indian Ministry of Defence6 gives a few examples showing that the construction of the road cutting across Indian soil on the Aksai Chin plateau of Ladakh was known to the Indian Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of External Affairs long before it was made public.


tHE

Ad

VAn

cin

G B

or

dE

rs

oF

tHE

cH

inE

sE

EM

Pir

E

nehru admitted that the boundary in ladakh was not sufficiently defined…

The Report quotes B.N Mullick, the then Director of the Intelligence Bureau, who claimed that he had been reporting about the road building activity of the Chinese in the area as early as November 1952. According to

Mullick, the Indian Trade Agent in Gartok also reported about it in July and September 1955 as well as in August 1957.7 The different incidents which occurred in the early 1950s should have awakened the Government of

India from its soporific ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’ illusion. Alas! It was not to be so.

Instead of alarming Nehru, these disturbing reports reinforced his determination to bolster friendship with China. The first of these incidents was the harassment of the Indian Trade Agent posted in Gartok in Western Tibet. Although Nehru wrote to Zhou Enlai about it8, no follow-up action was taken and no proper analysis of Chinese motivations was made. Nehru barely brought the matter to Zhou’s notice.9

The problem of the Indian Trade Agent in Gartok, Western Tibet was without doubt

linked to the work which had started on the Tibet-Xinjiang highway. Rudok, located midway between Lhasa and Kashgar, is the last small Tibetan town before entering the Aksai Chin. The presence of an Indian official nearby was embarrassing for the Chinese as they had started building a road on Indian soil. Did Nehru realize the implications of the incident over the Trade Agent or did he still believe in Chinese goodwill? It is difficult to say.

The Official report also mentions S.S Khera, the Cabinet Secretary who wrote “Information about activities of the Chinese on the Indo-Tibetan border particularly in the Aksai Chin area had

begun to come in by 1952 or earlier.”10 But that was not all.

Closure of the Consulate in Kashgar

If the Indian government had been willing to read beyond the Chinese rhetoric and Zhou’s assurance of friendship, it would have seen many ominous signs. One of them was the closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar.

Here again, as in several other cases, Nehru justified the Chinese actions without taking any retaliatory measures or even protesting. India’s interests were lost to the ‘revolutionary changes’ happening in China. He declared in the Parliament, “Some major changes have taken place there. Kashgar is important to us as a trade route. The trade went over the Karakoram, passed though Ladakh and Leh on to Kashmir. Various factors, including developments in Kashmir led to the stoppage of that trade... The result was, our Consul remained there for some time, till recently… but there is now no work to be done. So we advised him to come away and he did come away.”11

India had been trading with Central Asia and more particularly Kashgar and yarkand for

Map not to scale


tHE

Ad

VAn

cin

G B

or

dE

rs

oF

tHE

cH

inE

sE

EM

Pir

E

the different incidents occurring in the

early 1950s should have awakened the

Government of india from its soporific ‘Hindi-Chini

Bhai Bhai’ illusion…

millennia. Just because ‘revolutionary changes’ had occurred in Xinjiang, the Government of India accepted the closure of its trade with Central Asia as a fait accompli. The reference to Kashmir is totally irrelevant. Since the winter of 1948, India controlled the Zoji-la Pass12 as well as Ladakh. At that time, the Karakoram Pass was still open to the caravans.

More Reports Come inAnother indication came during the

negotiations for the Panchsheel Agreement. Instead of the planned three or four weeks, the talks went on for four months. One of the objections by the Chinese was the mention of Demchok as the border pass for traders between Ladakh and Western Tibet. Very cleverly, Chen, the main Chinese negotiator ‘privately’ told T.N. Kaul, his Indian counterpart, that he was objecting because they were not keen to mention the name ‘Kashmir’ as they did not wish to take sides between India and Pakistan. This argument is very odd and though Kaul could see through the game, the Indian side gave in once again.

The fact that the border post was not specified was indeed a great victory for Beijing while they were building the road in the Aksai Chin. It seems as though the Indian side was just not aware of the reality on the ground.

Several other authors have mentioned the building of the Aksai Chin road and the fact that it was known during the mid-fifties to the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs. In his book, The Saga of Ladakh,13 Maj. Gen. Jagjit Singh said that in 1956, the Indian Military Attaché in Beijing, Brigadier S.S Mallik received information that China had started building a highway through Indian territory in the Aksai Chin area. Mallik reported the matter to Army Headquarters in New Delhi and a similar report was sent by the Indian Embassy to the Foreign Ministry.

D.R Mankekar14 provided similar information. He said that Brig. Mallik made a first reference to the road-building activities of the Chinese in a routine report to the Government as early as November 1955. Five months later, in a special report to Delhi, the Military Attaché drew pointed attention to the construction of

the strategic highway through Indian territory in Aksai Chin. He also sent a copy of the report to the Army HQ.

The Official Report of the 1962 War states, “The Preliminary survey work on the planned Tibet-Sinkiang road having been completed by the mid-1950s, China started constructing a motorable road in the summer of 1955. The highway ran over 160 km across the Aksai Chin region of North-East Ladakh. It was completed in the second half of 1957. Arterial roads connecting the highway with Tibet were also laid.”

It was, therefore, known that China was building a road in the area but the government chose ‘not to upset’ Beijing.

Opening of the Aksai Chin RoadOnce it was opened, the Chinese did not try

to keep the new road a secret. On October 06, 1957, a Chinese newspaper Kuang-ming Jih-pao reported, “The Sinkiang-Tibet, the highest highway in the world, has been completed. During the past few days, a number of trucks running on the highway on a trial basis have arrived in Ko-ta-k’e in Tibet from yehch’eng in Sinkiang. The Sinkiang-Tibet Highway… is 1,179 km long, of which 915 km are more than 4,000 metres above sea level; 130 km of it over 5,000 metres above sea level, with the highest point being 5,500 metres.”

Giving more details, the Chinese publication continued: “Thirty (‘liberation’ model and Chissu 150) heavy-duty trucks, fully loaded with road builders, maintenance equipment and fuels, running on the highway on a trial basis, headed for Ko-ta-k’e from yehch’eng. In addition, two trucks fully loaded with Hami melons, apples and pomegranates, all native products of Sinkiang, headed in the same direction. These fruits were gifts brought specially by the road builders of Sinkiang for the people of various nationalities.”

The last straw is that it took a further two


tHE

Ad

VAn

cin

G B

or

dE

rs

oF

tHE

cH

inE

sE

EM

Pir

E

Nehru justified the chinese actions without taking any retaliatory measures or even protesting…

years for Nehru to make it public. The Prime Minster was aware of the facts but preferred to keep the information to himself and his close confidantes, hoping for the best. On February 03, 1958, five months after the road was opened, Subimal Dutt, the Indian Foreign Secretary wrote to Nehru, “There seemed little doubt that the newly constructed 1,200-kilometre road connecting Gartok in Western Tibet with yeh in Sinkiang passes through Aksai Chin.”15

Dutt informed the Prime Minister that he agreed with Joint Secretary B.K Acharya’s suggestion of sending a reconnoitering party in the coming spring to find out if the road passed through Aksai Chin. Dutt added, “However,

if the Chinese opposed, the party could come back and the matter could be taken up diplomatically.” Unfortunately, for the South Block babus, the reconnoitering party was captured and several Indian

jawans were killed. Dutt requested for a meeting to discuss the matter with Nehru, Acharya and K. Gopalachari, the Deputy Director of the Historical Division of the Ministry.

On February 04, 1958, Nehru replied, “I shall gladly discuss this matter with you, J.S (Joint Secretary) and Gopalachari. Meanwhile, my reaction is that we should send a reconnoitering party there in the spring with clear instructions that they should not come into conflict with the Chinese. I do not think it is desirable to have air reconnaissance. In fact, I do not see what good this can do us. Even a land reconnaissance will not perhaps be very helpful. However, it may bring some further facts to our notice.”16

The Prime Minister continued, “I do not see how we can possibly protest about the alignment of the road without being much surer than we are. What we might perhaps do is that in some communication with the Chinese Government in regard to the points of dispute which have to be decided, we should mention the Aksai Chin area.” Finally, he suggested that, “Our maps should be sent to the Chinese. But I think it would be better to do this rather

informally.” Even at this point, the Prime Minister preferred to remain informal!

But with the pressure mounting, on October 18, 1958, the Indian Foreign Secretary (Dutt) had to hand over an ‘Informal Note’ to the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi. In fact, the immediate reason for protesting to Beijing was that the team sent for ‘land reconnaissance’ had been captured by the Chinese in the Aksai Chin.

It is only at the end of the letter that the issue is mentioned. Dutt wrote, “In this connection, the Government of India would also like to draw the attention of the Chinese Government to another fact. An Indian party consisting of three Military Officers and four soldiers together with one guide, one porter, six pony–owners and thirty-four ponies, were out on a normal patrol in this area near Shinglung in Indian territory. This patrol had been given strict instructions not to cross the border into Chinese territory. Since the end of August, however, no news of their whereabouts has been received in spite of search by air. Since there are now Chinese personnel in this part of Indian territory, the Government of India would be grateful for any information that the Chinese Government may have about the party and for any assistance that they may find it possible to give to the party to return to their headquarters.” The Chinese must have had a jolly good laugh!

The Foreign Secretary’s letter had earlier noted, “The attention of the Government of India has recently been drawn to the fact that a motor road has been constructed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the state of Jammu & Kashmir, which is part of India. This road seems to form part of the Chinese road known as yehchang–Gartok or Sikiang Tibet highway, the completion of which was announced in September, 1957.” A description of the Indian alignment was given.

Dutt insisted that, “The India-China boundary in the Ladakh sector as in others, is traditionally well-known and follows well-marked geographical features.” His conclusion was “It is matter of surprise and regret that the Chinese Government should have constructed a road through what is indisputably Indian


tHE

Ad

VAn

cin

G B

or

dE

rs

oF

tHE

cH

inE

sE

EM

Pir

E

chinese workers who were building the road

did not have proper visas issued by delhi on

their travel documents!

territory without first obtaining the permission of the Government of India and without even informing the Government of India.” It was indeed a matter of ‘surprise and regret’ that a road was constructed on Indian territory without India’s permission and knowledge!

In the eyes of the Indian babus, what was irksome was the fact that the Chinese workers who were building the road did not have proper visas issued by Delhi on their travel documents! As Dutt pointed out according to diplomatic conventions, “Diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visas by the other party.”

But magnanimous India was ready to ‘settle these petty frontier disputes so that the friendly relations between the two countries may not suffer’. And to make matters worse, Prime Minister Nehru still did not tell the truth in the Parliament when the issue came up in April 1959.

A ‘Reply to Questions’ session was held in the Lok Sabha on April 22, 1959.17 The questions were, “Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state (a) whether the Government is aware of the fact that maps recently published in China and Russia show large chunks of our territory as part of their territories (b) if so, the action taken by the Government of India in the matter?”

Lakshmi Menon, the Deputy Minister of External Affairs answered, “yes Sir, instances of maps, published in China and Russia, depicting certain parts of Indian territory as parts of China, have come to our notice. The attention of these two Governments has already been drawn to the discrepancies.” The debate continued for some time on the maps and then, a Congress MP, D.C Sharma asked, “May I know if there is any dispute about any border territory or any kind of territory between China and India and, if not, why is it that some parts of India which are obviously in India have been shown as parts of China?”

The Prime Minister answered, “It is rather difficult for me to answer that question. We have discussed one or two minor frontier disputes which comprise tiny tracts of territory, maybe a

mile this way or that way, in the high mountains where nobody lives and those are pending. We have discussed them and for the present no settlement has been arrived at.”

Later, C.D Pande, the Congress MP from Nainital, UP (now Uttarakhand) brought up the subject again, “Apart from the maps, because after all, the question of the maps is academic, may I know whether there are certain portions of land between India and Tibet where they are encroaching on the basis of these maps — encroaching into our territory -particularly in Taklakot which is near the border of Almora? At Taklakot they have come six miles this way, according to their map. It is not a question of maps alone. They have actually encroached on our territory - six miles in one pass.”

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said, “I should like to give a precise answer to such questions. I would not like to venture to give an imprecise answer. Taklakot (tri-junction Nepal-Tibet-India in Pithoragarh district of today’s Uttarakhand) and another place – Hoti (Barahoti in Uttarakhand) - have been places under argument and sometimes, according to the reports we have received, some Chinese have advanced a mile or two, maybe in the high mountains. It is true. We have been enquiring into it. The difficulty is that in the winter months, most of these places are almost inaccessible, and more inaccessible from our side than from the other side.”

Later another MP, Braj Raj Singh queried, “May I know whether the Government’s attention has been drawn to the news item published in several papers alleging that the Chinese have claimed some 30,000 sq.km. of our territory and they have also disputed the McMahon line?” This was clearly related to the Aksai Chin as the MP said, “and also the McMahon line” (Eastern Sector).

Nehru’s answer was, “No Sir, I would suggest to Hon. Members not to pay much attention to news items emanating sometimes from Hong Kong and sometimes from other odd places. We have had no such claim directly or


tHE

Ad

VAn

cin

G B

or

dE

rs

oF

tHE

cH

inE

sE

EM

Pir

E

indirectly made on us.” Again, the Prime Minister deliberately omitted to mention the Aksai Chin.

Did Nehru sincerely believe that he would settle the issue in a friendly manner with Mao or Zhou Enlai? It is difficult to understand his reasoning. On September 07, 1959, a few weeks after the Parliament was informed about the road, the Ministry of External Affairs published its first White Paper in which the issue of the Aksai Chin figures prominently.

The same day, Nehru received a long letter from Zhou Enlai who by this time, had hardened his position, especially on the McMahon Line, and now claimed the entire NEFA. In these conditions and despite the visit of Zhou Enlai in April 1960 during which he offered a swap between NEFA and Aksai Chin and the

subsequent rounds of talks between officials from India and China, no solution could be found.

The incidents in the Depsang Plain, near the Karakoram Pass in April or more recently, in Chumar in South Ladakh, are the continuance of Nehru’s blind spot for China. There is today a huge difference of ‘perception’ on the location of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which over the years has been moving towards the South and the West. The 1959 LAC was indeed far more advantageous for India than the present LAC.

The question remains, “How does one retrieve the situation today when the battle was lost in the 1950s without a fight? That is a problem to which no one has as yet proposed a viable solution.

Notes1 Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and

Agreements signed between The Governments of India and China 1954 – 1959 (known as While Paper no 1), Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 1959;

see http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/White_Paper1_1959.pdf

2 One should not forget that in 1950 (when Eastern Tibet was invaded), a caravan took two months from the Chinese border to reach Lhasa, the Tibetan capital.

3 The Sikang-Tibet Highway of the Chinese.

4 Or Tsinghai-Tibet Highway.

5 It is interesting to note that the construction of one of the feeder roads leading to Nathu-la, the border pass between Sikkim and Tibet had strange consequences. India began feeding the Chinese road workers in Tibet, sending tons of rice through this route. John Lall, posted in Gangtok, witnessed long caravans of mules leaving for Tibet.

6 A document still marked ‘restricted’ today, but fortunately available on Internet. See, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/PDF/index.html

7 Mullik B.N., My Years with Nehru — The Chinese Betrayal (Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971), pp. 196-97.

8 On September 1, 1953, Nehru began his letter to

the Chinese Premier thus: “It has been a matter of deep satisfaction to me to note the growing cooperation between our great countries in international affairs. I am convinced that this cooperation and friendship will not only be to our mutual advantage, but will also be a strong pillar for peace in Asia and the world”.

9 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (SWJN), Series II (New Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, Vol. 23), Cable to Zhou Enlai, September 1, 1953, p. 485.

10 Khera, S.S. India’s Defence Problem, p. 157.

11 SWJN, op. cit., Vol. 24,. p. 579. Also the reply to a debate in the Council of States, 24 December 1953, Parliamentary Debates (Council of States), Official Report, Vol. V, Nos. 18-25, 16 to 24 December 1953, cols. 3590-3599.

12 Between Ladakh and the Kashmir Valley.

13 Jagjit Singh, Maj. Gen., The Saga of Ladakh, (New Delhi: Vanity Books, 1983), p. 37.

14 Mankekar, D.R., The Guilty Men of 1962 (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1968), p. 27

15 SWJN, Series II (New Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund), Vol. 41.

16 SWJN, Series II, Volume 41

17 Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol. XXX, cols 12715-12721. The topic was ‘Maps Published in China and Russia’.


intE

r s

Er

Vic

E r

iVA

lry

An

d it

s iM

PAc

t o

n n

Atio

nA

l s

Ec

ur

ity

Fighting Turf Battles

INTER-SERVICE RIVALRy IS AS OLD AS the services themselves. Competition amongst the services and within the

individual service is a good thing if it develops esprit-de-corps but at times, the rivalry can become dangerous as one service distorts the truth or actively works to undermine the efforts of a sister service. Such acts are generally common during periods of fiscal austerity, during extended periods of comparative peace or when the services come face to face with such financial stringency and have reservations about their ability to carry out wartime missions. Historically, during such periods, jointness is forgotten and the services become parochial rather than collaborative.

Rivalry flows from the highest levels when the services compete for the post of Chief of Defence Staff and vie for the allocation of funds or during the transfer of a role to another service. Inter-service rivalry is universal and there is a perpetual undercurrent both in peace and war. Most militaries in the world fight more turf battles than real wars.

Historical Perspective In Nazi Germany, Herman Goring created

a ground force under the command of the Luftwaffe to counter the influence of the German Army. The German Navy of that time and the Luftwaffe had serious differences over command and control of the air fleet which was

inter service rivalry and its impact on national securityAir Cmde KB Menon

Inter-service rivalry is as old as the services themselves. Competition amongst the services and within the individual service is a good thing if it develops esprit-de-corps but at times, the rivalry can become dangerous as one service distorts the truth or actively works to undermine the efforts of a sister service. Such acts are generally common during periods of fiscal austerity, during extended periods of comparative peace or when the services come face to face with such financial stringency and have reservations about their ability to carry out wartime missions. Historically, during such periods, jointness is forgotten and the services become parochial rather than collaborative.

to be stationed on aircraft carriers when they became operational. It is another story that the German carriers were never launched.

In the years before the Second World War (WW II), rivalry between the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was legendary and had serious geo-political consequences leading up to Japan’s entry into WW II. The Rikken Seiyukai political party was closely associated with the Mitsui group and had strong connections with the Japanese Army. Similarly, the Rikken Minseito party was connected with the Mitsubishi group and the IJN. The rivalry was so fanatical that each faction even resorted to murder of opponents to further their cause.

The IJA/IJN rivalry was manifest in the 1930s as the ‘Strike North’ and the ‘Strike South’ factions. The ‘Strike North’ faction led by the Imperial Army propounded the capture of China where the IJA would be the lead player. The ‘Strike South’ advocated the capture of Indonesia and in this scenario, the IJN would call the shots. The ‘Strike North” strategy was initially seen as the more prudent approach leading to the occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and full scale invasion of China in 1937. This strategy was reversed when a number of powerful Zaibatsus (business houses) realized that Japan’s aspirations would be better addressed by meeting the aspirations of the Navy and the Pacific campaign was launched.

air Commodore KB menon,

fighter pilot, served as a Flying instructor

in iraq and also as defence attache in

washington.


intE

r s

Er

Vic

E r

iVA

lry

An

d it

s iM

PAc

t o

n n

Atio

nA

l s

Ec

ur

ity

Zaibatsus were large family controlled vertical monopolies with financial and industrial subsidiaries and by 1940, the ‘Big Four’ Zaibatsus, i.e. Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and yasuda were wielding phenomenal influence and control on Japan’s industrial and commercial power.

Turmoil over Doctrine and Military Strategy

Inter-service rivalry is also driven by changes in military strategy and doctrine. A classic example was the “Revolt of the Admirals” in the late 1940s when several Admirals and high ranking civilian officials of the US Navy publically disagreed with the US President and the then Secretary of Defence on military strategy post-WW II.

Generals of the newly formed United States Air Force (USAF) were pushing for a new doctrine of strategic bombing particularly

with nuclear weapons as the sole decisive element to win any future war. However, for this the USAF would need a large fleet of home-based long-range bombers. This would also deter an enemy from attacking the US homeland. On the other hand, the

Admirals asked the US Congress to fund the construction of a large fleet of super carriers, each carrying 14 heavy bombers. The carriers would have enough fuel to launch eight raids by each bomber. The US Navy wanted funding for eight such carriers over a five-year period. The first Secretary of Defence, James Forrestal, who had a Navy background, authorised the construction of the first super carrier United States followed by five more. However, on March 28, 1948, due to a disagreement with President Truman on the budget, he was replaced by Louis Johnson who supported the President’s views and was in favour of strategic bombing by the USAF as the preferred strategy.

The new Secretary of Defence, Louis Johnson stated, “There is no reason for having a Navy or Marine Corps. General Omar Bradley tells me that amphibious operations are a thing of the past. That does away with the Marine Corps. The Air Force can do anything the Navy can do nowadays, so that does away with the Navy.”

On April 23, 1949, less than a month of taking office, Johnson unilaterally cancelled the super carrier order and a number of high ranking admirals resigned in protest. A few days later, he announced that the aviation assets of the US Marine Corps were to be transferred to the USAF, but this did not take place.

The “revolt” was the culmination of a contentious debate that had been simmering for several years on the efficacy of long-range land-based strategic bombers versus the unrestrained freedom of carrier-borne aviation to operate in international waters. Without carrier-based aviation and the expeditionary forces of the Marines, the US military would have been defanged in subsequent years. The “Revolt of the Admirals” drives home the point that during periods of severe financial constraints, inter-service rivalry can result in intense turf battles where national security can be compromised to meet narrow service interests.

The Royal Air Force (RAF) Under Threat

The RAF is perhaps the oldest Air Force in the world and its formation as an independent entity has been touted as the example for other Air Forces to follow. The RAF was formed by the amalgamation of the Royal Flying Corps of the Army and the Royal Naval Air Service. It was controlled by the Air Ministry which had the status of the War Office and the Admiralty.

Post-WW I, there was intense debate on the need for an independent air force and efforts were made to disband the RAF and revert control of military aircraft to the Army and the Navy. Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, retaliated by stating that air power would be more cost-effective than the Army in controlling large territories. Colonial policing of the British Empire in Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan and the North West Frontier Province of undivided India kept the RAF in the limelight.

Cuts in the defence budget during the 1920s and 1930s saw renewed demand for the disbandment of the RAF and transfer of responsibilities to the Army and the Navy. De-classified secret cabinet papers of the 1920s reflect the ferocity of the turf battle

Most militaries in the world fight more turf battles than real wars...


intE

r s

Er

Vic

E r

iVA

lry

An

d it

s iM

PAc

t o

n n

Atio

nA

l s

Ec

ur

ity

and the determination of the British Army to decimate the RAF. In response to a request by Lord Salisbury, Member House of Lords, the then Secretary of State for War, Earl of Derby wrote, “The experiment of an independent Air Staff and Air Force has been in operation in Great Britain for the past five years. It has proved a costly experiment and convincing proof of its success will be required to justify its continuance.”

The origins of the experiment are difficult to trace. The foundation of the separation was laid under cover of wartime so critical that the process passed almost unnoticed. At the end of the war, the fait accompli of the separation was disclosed tacitly and accepted by a war-weary Government and the public. In 1921-1922, the General Staff did protest on grounds of unsound principle. Since then, while conforming to the experiment in the spirit of the closest cooperation, their convictions remain unchanged. “We definitely do not see the necessity for an Air Force with an independent Ministry and organisation to support and an independent staff to control it,” was the general refrain.

In the same note the Secretary of State defined the only possible use of aircraft in war as under:

• The action of air units which form an integral part of military and naval formations.

• The action of air forces acting in close cooperation with military and naval forces in a theatre of war.

• The action of independent air forces in minor and possibly distant theatres of war in fulfillment of special air missions.

• The action of large air forces operating in a main theatre of war at a time when the air situation temporarily dominates the ground situation as a whole.

The Secretary of State recommended that the system of organisation and control of the RAF which would produce the greatest efficiency at the least cost was to be:

• Air units which are integral part of the fleet and air formations capable of cooperating

with the fleet on the high seas be under the Admiralty.

• The air units which are an integral part of any army formations and air formations required to cooperate with the Army to be under the War Office.

• Civil Aviation, research, experimental and supply to be under the Air Ministry, which relieved of all responsibility for the employment of air forces in peace and war to be much reduced.

The War Office was pitching for the disbandment of the Royal Air Force and the reduction of the existing Air Ministry to be a mere civilian organisation. If the British Government had fallen into the trap of inter-service rivalry, the outcome of the Battle of Britain might have been different.

Rivalry between Special Forces in the UK resulted in the formation of the United Kingdom Special Forces and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in the United States.

The root causes of the uneasy relationship between Army Aviation and the Indian Air Force (IAF)and goes back to pre-independence in 1947. It is a fallout of the cultural ethos that existed during the years before World War II between the RAF and the British Army. The RAF’s operational strategy was driven by the belief that strategic bombing would win wars of the future. The RAF was not in favour of the close air support concept expounded by the British Army during the period. The main role of ‘Army Cooperation’, as it was then known, was to be limited to reconnaissance and spotting of artillery fire, a task assigned to light unarmed aircraft flown by pilots from the Royal Artillery. Air Observation Post Flights (Air OP Flts) were to only direct artillery fire and provide rudimentary tactical recce, all other combat roles in support of the Army would be undertaken by the RAF. The aircraft were to fly generally over areas held by friendly forces and the pilot was to use his elevated vantage point and freedom of movement to observe areas not visible from the ground.

the iAF has consistently fought the

transfer of attack and medium lift helicopters

to the indian Army…


intE

r s

Er

Vic

E r

iVA

lry

An

d it

s iM

PAc

t o

n n

Atio

nA

l s

Ec

ur

ity

The concept was accepted by the British Government and the first Air OP Flt was formed in 1940 and in 1941, the British Government sanctioned the formation of an Air OP Squadron. To address the issues of ownership and inter-service command and control concerns a compromise solution was accepted. The Air OP Squadrons were to be RAF units commanded by an Artillery Officer with a RAF Adjutant. The RAF would provide the aircraft and maintenance crew, the Army

would provide vehicles, radios and soldiers. Pilots, however, would be officers from the Artillery trained by the RAF. The RAF would be responsible for all technical matters on flying but the Army would

have operational control in the field. Post-Independence, the arrangement continued in India. Air OP Squadrons saw action in Kashmir, Hyderabad, Goa and the 1965 and 1971 Wars with Pakistan.

In February 1963, General JN Chaudhuri, Chief of Army Staff proposed the need for an integral army aviation corps independent of oversight by the IAF. The case was submitted to the Government in February 1968 with the concept of introducing helicopters including attack helicopter, with large-scale mechanisation under an integrated Army command structure for obtaining cohesive combat power. General Chaudhuri discussed the expansion of the Army Air Arm with the “Select Body on Aviation” headed by JRD Tata which recommended the creation of the Army Aviation Corps but it took 23 years to bring it to fruition. The Joint Army-Air Force Memorandum of July 16, 1986, directed that all Air OP Flights be transferred to the Army by October 31, 1986, although attack, medium and heavy-lift assets were to remain with the IAF. The Army Aviation Corps as it exists today was formed on November 01, 1986.

The Indian Army has been demanding control over attack and medium-lift helicopters for many years but this has been resisted by the IAF. India has two attack helicopter units under the command and control of the Army but flown and maintained by the IAF. The IAF

will soon induct 22 Boeing Apache AH-64 D attack helicopters. The Indian Army is seeking a capability enhancement to absorb attack helicopters into its Aviation Wing and it is only a matter of time before it demands ownership of the Apache attack helicopters.

The IAF has consistently fought the transfer of attack and medium-lift helicopters to the Indian Army even though the primary task of these helicopters is to support army operations. The IAF’s contention is that the country can ill afford to have small “Air Forces”. Analysis of flying by the helicopter fleet of the IAF would show that a major portion of it is in support of the Army and other agencies, further strengthening the Army’s argument.

In December 2012, Defence Minister AK Anthony, informed the Lok Sabha that the Government had decided to allow the Indian Army to have its own heavy-duty attack helicopters and may have unwittingly stoked the fires of an ongoing turf battle. The Indian Army intends to set up Aviation Brigades for the Corps Head Quarters in 13 corps and the plan envisages that attack helicopters like the Apache will be provided to the three strike corps situated in Mathura, Ambala and Bhopal. The other ten corps will be equipped with the Rudra, the armed version of the Advanced Light Helicopter.

The Government, on its part, has stated that the attack helicopters acquired in ‘future’ will vest with the Army thus implying that the current acquisition of Apaches will be an Air Force asset and ensuring that attack helicopters remain a bureaucratic bone of contention for the foreseeable future.

There are many other questions at the operational level that have generated strong opposing views and never answered to the satisfaction of both protagonists, the IAF and the Indian Army. The salient issues are the relative importance and co-ordination of the air war and the ground battle at the commencement of hostilities, the use of air power in support of the army, command and control of attack and armed helicopters, the need for the army to have an independent helicopter airlift capability for intra-theatre mobility. Inter service rivalry and

A strong political direction is essential if inter-service rivalry is to be resolved…


intE

r s

Er

Vic

E r

iVA

lry

An

d it

s iM

PAc

t o

n n

Atio

nA

l s

Ec

ur

ity

the overwhelming need to protect one’s own turf - are the stumbling blocks.

The arguments put forth by the IAF and the Army in recent years to support their positions do not appear to be very different from the note submitted by the Earl of Derby in 1923.

The stalemate in the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is a manifestation of inter-service rivalry in India. The necessity of a CDS has been accepted by the Government but the Service Chiefs perceive that the appointment of a CDS will reduce their relevance as operational commanders and enhance the operational freedom of regional Commands. The IAF and the Navy are apprehensive that they will be swamped by the larger Army. The bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence fear the erosion of their authority and hence the need for all concerned to protect their own turf even at the cost of national security. A Chief of one of the Services summed it up when he said, “The idea of having a CDS is good and should be implemented but not in my time.”

Inter-service rivalry has been addressed by a number of countries including the United States, where on the basis of the Packard Commission Report commissioned by President Ronald Reagan, Senators Barry Goldwater and Senator Nichols moved a resolution which was passed by an overwhelming majority calling for the complete review of joint operations by US military forces.

India has also had a number of commissions including the HM Patel report in 1952, the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report on the debacle during the 1962 War with China, the Arun Singh report, K Subrahmanyam report and the Naresh Chandra Report. These reports are gathering dust and recently, the Ministry of Defence stated that it could not even trace the HM Patel report. A strong political direction is essential if inter-service rivalry is to be resolved.

K Subrahmanyam in his report after the Kargil operations stated, “The framework Lord Ismay formulated and Lord Mountbatten recommended was accepted by a national leadership unfamiliar with the intricacies of national security management. There has been

very little change over the past 52 years despite the 1962 debacle, the 1965 stalemate and the 1971 victory, the growing nuclear threat, end of the cold war, continuance of proxy war in Kashmir for over a decade and the revolution in military affairs. The political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo. National security management recedes into the background in time of peace and is considered too delicate to be tampered with in times of war and proxy war.”

The Naresh Chandra Task Force report recommended the appointment of CDS and integration of the Ministry of Defence and the Service Headquarters by allowing more cross postings. There is no progress on this report.

In some of the historical cases cited above, history as it unfolded showed that if the Governments in power had buckled under the parochial demands of the Services, there would have been irrevocable damage to national security. Political and professional debates on these issues kept them in the public glare and forced the Governments to take corrective measures.

Dr Ian Horwood, in his book, Inter Service Rivalry and the Air Way in Vietnam states, “Inter-service rivalry seems to be a fact of military life in peace time. Indeed, armed services may sometimes even measure their relative success in terms of the accumulation of resources and authority at the expense of their sister services, regardless of the extent to which this detracts from their peace-time preparations for the pursuit of national objectives in time of war. The achievement of those objectives becomes more significant - though not necessarily paramount - in wartime.”

Inter–service rivalry is a cancer that needs to be recognised and addressed aggressively by the political leadership before it results in catastrophe. At this juncture, are the powers that be in India competent, committed, capable or concerned about resolving inter-service rivalry in the interest of national security?

inter-service rivalry seems to be a constant

fact of military life in peace time…


intE

Gr

AtE

d t

HE

Atr

E c

oM

MA

nd

s

BO T H T H E K A R G I L R E V I E W Committee and the follow-up Group of Ministers (GoM) had recommended

the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), essential to synergise the Indian Armed Forces and provide single point military advice to the political authority of the country. The GoM report says, “The functioning of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) has, to date, revealed serious weaknesses in its ability to provide single point military advice to the government, and resolve substantive inter-Service doctrinal, planning, policy and operational issues adequately. This institution needs to be appropriately revamped to discharge its responsibilities efficiently and effectively including the facilitation of jointness and synergy among the three Services.”

As per news reports, the recommendation of the Naresh Chandra Committee for appointing a Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) itself is facing bureaucratic opposition from within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) albeit the Defence Minister has stated that the issue is yet to be discussed by the Cabinet Committee of Security (CCS). Incidentally, Pranab Mukherjee as Defence Minister had remarked during a presentation at Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in 2005 that the government had even decided who the CDS would be but then there was “no political consensus” adding in the same breath “but then there is no political consensus on so many things but they do come through”.

integrated theatre commandsLt Gen Prakash Katoch

Jointness and integration of the Military is an inevitable requirement for the modern day battlefield. The biggest challenge to jointness is to bring about an attitudinal shift by turning the sense of insecurity and mutual suspicion into a sense of belongingness amongst the Services as well as the politico-bureaucratic establishment. The change will need to be implemented top down for it to take root and be effective. While there is urgent need to appoint a CDS, we should get on with initiating the process of establishing ITCs and IFCs in the larger interest of achieving jointness and integration.

Lack of strategic forethought in the politico-bureaucratic dispensation in India and the higher defence set up sans participation by the Services in national defence decision-making has had direct bearing on integration and jointness of the military. Additionally, the latent political fear amongst the bureaucrats of military supremacy egged on by bureaucrats-turned-politicians, the police lobby, IPS turned politicians and the craving to maintain primacy by playing on Inter-Service rivalry and exercising overt control over financial expenditures, equipment acquisitions and appointments have not permitted institution of a CDS. But this is only half the story.

Equally to blame are the Service Chiefs who, to maintain their own turfs, have never been united in telling the government that the appointment of a CDS is necessary for the good of the military and the country. The Service Chiefs want to retain ‘operational’ control of their respective services despite their designation being Chief of Army/Navy/Air “Staff”. Then are instances where a Chief has even done a complete turnabout and made statements against the need of a CDS at the time of retirement for the sake of a Governorship, obviously playing along the politico-bureaucratic lobby that is against appointing a CDS. Equally painful has been the decision by the Service Chiefs in turning down the concept of Integrated Theatre Commands despite various joint studies highlighting the tremendous operational and administrative benefits that would accrue with

Prakash Katoch, former lt Gen, special Forces, indian army.


intE

Gr

AtE

d t

HE

Atr

E c

oM

MA

nd

s

such reorganisation – this again because of individual turfs.

Future BattlefieldThe battlefield of tomorrow will be non-

linear with multi-dimensional battle spaces characterised by nuclear ambiguity, increased lethality, a very high degree of mobility coupled with simultaneity of engagement and increased tempo of operations with compressed time and space coupled with a high degree of transparency. Given current dispensations in the sub-continent, the nuclear factor will further limit the depth and duration of conflict, which would be short and intense. This would necessitate swift and concerted response by the three Services coupled with quick decision making, the framework of which would already have to be in place with a joint command and control structure to direct the operations plus continued joint training and adequate rehearsals and exercises.

Jointness and IntegrationNo further justification for military jointness

and integration is warranted beyond Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s address to the Unified Commanders Conference in 2004, wherein he had said, “Reforms within the armed forces also involve recognition of the fact that our navy, air force and army can no longer function in compartments with exclusive chains of command and single Service operational plans.” History attests to the importance of being able to integrate the capabilities of different military forces. From ancient war-fighting techniques to Operation Desert Storm and beyond, success in war has been contingent on the common sense idea of jointness as seamless integration. In simple terms, jointness in non-traditional terms of military strategy and doctrine implies the response to the evolving nature of warfare.

Given the fact that the future Services have to operate jointly, even in smaller contingencies, jointness will enhance synergy of modern military forces. Complementary operations will be built around a key force rather than a key Service. It must be understood that no single weapon or force reaches its full potential unless employed with complementary capabilities of

the other Services. Integration is the corollary to jointness. Integration is a concept which refers to improved procedures for combining the unique, specialised capabilities of different Services to enhance combat effectiveness.

Today we are confronted with many complex threats and challenges to security. The sources and types of conflicts for which joint planning must be carried out are becoming more diverse and less predictable even as our adversaries/potential adversaries continues to grow. The global security agenda has expanded in functional terms.

yesterday’s peripheral challenges such as security of energy sources and the threat from mass migrations now compete with conventional threats. Such challenges in the security paradigm are changing the strategic terms in which military leaders must address long-term integrated joint planning so as to create defence capabilities that are relevant to emerging threats. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is rapidly transforming traditional war-fighting concepts. It is aimed at achieving full spectrum dominance through effective employment of joint forces and is increasingly relevant to the Indian context. Future requirements of dominant manoeuvre, information dominance, focused and integrated logistics, all call for jointness.

The battlefield of tomorrow requires Effect Based Operations (EBOs). EBOs can best be progressed through application of all the instruments of the nation state. What this implies is that EBO can only succeed if all components of national power are brought to bear, which in turn means that Defence Forces must possess the capability for full spectrum joint operations and an integrated approach. It is also important to understand that this synergistic application of power is to be applied at all levels of warfare, be it tactical, operational or strategic.

Again, the economy of a nation dictates the size and reach of the Defence Forces. Efficient defence management calls for

History attests to the importance of being able to integrate the

capabilities of different military forces…


intE

Gr

AtE

d t

HE

Atr

E c

oM

MA

nd

s

enhanced jointmanship that can contribute to optimum utilisation of the meagre resources by addressing in-built redundancies in the process of force organisation, equipping and establishing its support system. Besides, battlefield transparency is available today with technology increasingly enabling concerted employment of various weapon platforms of different Services to achieve a joint response for greater and more devastating effect.

Knowledge management needs to be addressed on a war footing, integrating our disparate intelligence gathering apparatus into a cohesive entity especially since EBOs require delineation of Centres of Gravity,

vulnerable points and strategic targets, which all depends upon a great deal on intelligence. National security cannot be achieved w i t h o u t i n f o r m a t i o n superiority. This requires institutionalising joint

mechanisms, free from wrangling of jurisdiction and turf protection. The bottom line is that in our approach to achieve jointness, our Defence Forces must be suitably integrated into the higher defence organisation of the country and they must be integrated within themselves so as to achieve the desired level of jointness. This requires political awareness towards future security requirements, national will and necessary drive from the very top.

Integrated CommandsThe vast expanse of India requires

identification of geographical theatres that are of military security concern. Conceptually, a theatre should include within its geographical boundary the entire geographically contiguous territory of a competing entity or an adversary including geographically contiguous territories of those entities or states which, in the event of hostilities, may collaborate either with the adversary or with own country. It must also include adjoining seas and space above that may be essential for manoeuvre of own forces to address the threatening entity/adversary and its geographically contiguous collaborator(s). This is an exercise which must be undertaken by the Indian strategists and military planners

in order to arrive at a common politico-military-economic strategy for managing geo-strategic concerns of the country and designate a single multi-disciplinary and multi-service agency to formulate and implement a common “theatre strategy”.

The three Services presently have 17 single Service Commands. In addition, there are two Tri-Service Commands in Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and Strategic Forces Command (SFC). The 19 Commands have considerable duplication and need streamlining. The geographical zones of responsibilities of various Commands of the three Services have little commonality. In most cases, the command of one Service overlaps or is linked with two or more Commands of sister Services. None of the Commands are collocated leading to lack of coordination in intelligence sharing, planning and execution.

The truth is that single Service Commands are antiquated structures which violate the basic principle of operational art which stipulates single-point command of military resources to attain the desired objectives. Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs) need to be established encompassing the entire operational spectrum with two to three Integrated Functional Commands (IFCs) that may be Bi-Service or Tri-Service under each ITC. The existing 17 single service Commands need to be reorganised accordingly. Fear of dilution of command authority and loss of promotional avenues due to right sizing, are unwarranted since none of these 17 Commands need be disbanded though re-alignment of operational geographical boundaries will obviously need to be undertaken.

The need of the hour is that all single Service Commands gradually evolve into either ITCs (akin to ANC) or IFCs (akin to SFC). Command and staffing of all ITCs and IFCs should be tri-Service taking into account existing rank structures so that promotional avenues of any Service are not affected. The CDS should exercise full operational control on the Commands. Reorganisation of the 17 single service Commands can be on the lines of four to five ITCs based on defined geographical

the geographical zones of responsibilities of various commands of the three services have little commonality…


intE

Gr

AtE

d t

HE

Atr

E c

oM

MA

nd

s

theatres in addition to the ANC. These should be the IFCs consisting of an Integrated Aero-Space Command, Integrated Cyber Defence Command, Integrated Air Defence Command, Integrated Special Forces Command, one or two Integrated Training Command(s) and one or two Integrated Logistics & Maintenance Commands, in addition to the SFC.

There has been speculation in the past to the requirement of separate Integrated Commands for Internal Security and for Disaster Relief but these would be redundant without separate resources being allocated, which is unlikely in the foreseeable future. ITCs and IFCs cannot be established in isolation from implementation of a strategy for fostering jointness and integration in the Services. Steps would need to be taken in phased manner. Gradual changes would need to be brought in both vertically and horizontally without reducing operational capabilities at any stage. In fact, reorganisation of Commands should be orchestrated in a manner that each step boosts combat capability.

RequirementThe best option is the top down approach by

appointing a CDS followed by reorganisation of the existing Commands into ITCs and IFCs. However, this implies wait for strategic wisdom to dawn on the politico-bureaucratic hierarchy. In the UK, the CDS was simply thrust upon the military by the government after 18 years of bickering and dissensions amongst the Services. Other countries adopted government resolutions for such acts, enforcing jointness and integration and for ushering in RMA.

Many a time strategists and military thinkers in India have opined that only an Act of Parliament (like the Goldwater-Nichols Act of the US) can bring about such changes in the Indian defence forces but the million dollar question is how this can happen. While there are no easy answers, it may be prudent for the Military (actually HQ IDS in this case) to work on a Draft Act of Parliament, for which adequate interaction with think tanks and strategic thinkers should be done. If the COSC goes to the Government with such a draft, there are bright chances of it seeing the light of the day sometime in the future.

Concurrently, the COSC needs to take a call on the formation of the ITCs and IFCs through reorganisation of single Service Commands (framework for which is already with HQ IDS) and seek government approval through a comprehensive proposal including time-plan of its implementation. Needless to mention, this requires sincere resolve on part of the Service Chiefs and a strong Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee to see it through. Past experience shows that whenever the three Services have come to an agreement at a sufficiently high level before going to the MoD, the bureaucrats find it difficult to reject it.

The Government must seriously look at the resources required for the twenty-first century I n d i a n M i l i t a r y commensurate with the desired global stature of India. There is always a debate as to how much the nation should spend on security and how much on boosting its economy but the fact is that with inadequate security, the economy can suffer major setbacks given the stance of our adversaries.

Permanent allocation of forces is required to ensure security of military theatres. The ANC set up is one example where the operations are still looked after by the Eastern Naval Command (ENC) due to lack of resource allocation by the Navy. Additionally, jointness in operations flows from sound joint training. Permanent allocation of forces is required to train together for fighting jointly.

Meagre resources available with each Service have precluded any meaningful level of joint training, thereby affecting implementation of any joint concept. There are few organisational structures in place, which could meaningfully formulate or impart the desired level of joint training. The essential ingredients of a joint training system (joint training philosophy, joint training infrastructure and joint training processes) need to be implemented. Additionally, technology is one of the principal factors that drive the change in the method of

the truth is that single service commands are

antiquated structures which violate a basic principle of

operational art…


intE

Gr

AtE

d t

HE

Atr

E c

oM

MA

nd

s

war-fighting. It has been the main impediment in achieving any level of jointness in the Indian context. Key technologies enabling joint war-fighting are a pre-requisite to fighting and training jointly.

The Government must also seriously address the issue of true integration of HQ IDS and

the Services with the MoD. Changes in nomenclature of the Services HQ to Integrated HQ of MoD have not gone beyond an exercise in semantics. Integration of Service HQ with MoD should transcend nomenclatures, cut out duplication, decentralise

decision making and devolve financial powers. Joint staffing throughout MoD by Service and civilian officers should be the norm. Financial advisers must work under Service HQ and act as advisers not controllers. Cross posting of Service officers to MEA, MHA, NSC should be reciprocated by posting of civilian officers to

HQ IDS/Services HQ, ITCs and IFCs, all aimed at political hierarchy getting direct advice from military professionals.

ConclusionJointness and integration of the Military is

an inevitable requirement for the modern day battlefield. The biggest challenge to jointness is to bring about an attitudinal shift by turning the sense of insecurity and mutual suspicion into a sense of belongingness amongst the Services as well as the politico-bureaucratic establishment. The change will need to be implemented top down for it to take root and be effective. While there is urgent need to appoint a CDS, we should get on with initiating the process of establishing ITCs and IFCs in the larger interest of achieving jointness and integration. Consensus and determination of the Military would ensure overcoming diplomatic hurdles. If we are to be determined to emerge winners in future conflict situations, we need to begin now.

consensus and determination of the Military would ensure overcoming diplomatic hurdles…


dis

As

tEr

MA

nA

GE

ME

nt

THE DEVASTATING FLOODS, CLOUD bursts and major land slides in Uttrakhand and Himachal Pradesh (HP)

have once again drawn attention to the inability of both the Central and State governments in coping with disasters effectively. Disasters may be natural or man-made or a combination of the two but governments are sadly lacking in the means to deal with them.

The loss of life and property has been phenomenal, especially in Uttrakhand. Despite the setting up of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and allocating sizeable funds to the states, nothing has changed. The civil authorities are as clueless and ineffective as they were before the formation of the NDMA and the local authorities seem to have done nothing to earmark and train their personnel or have prepared plans to cope with different types of contingencies.

The army (here, the term is used generically for all three services) was once again the lead force in bringing succour to the affected people. No doubt, some units of the NDMA and other forces like ITBP, CRPF, SSB, and others were also deployed, but it was the army that produced near-miracles. The moot question is - how long will the nation react to disasters in this manner, totally dependent on the army while the civil authorities remain stunned and paralysed into inaction? This situation becomes baffling when one considers that funds and resources have been lavishly provided to state governments and many civil agencies for this very purpose.

disaster ManagementWhy the Army continues to take the lead

Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi

Conceptually, the armed forces ought to be called to aid the civil authorities only when the situation is beyond the capability of the civil administration. In practice, however, the armed forces form the core of the government response capacity and are the crucial immediate responders in all high intensity disaster situations. If the army is to do everything, then why is the nation spending huge amounts on the various civil instruments available down to even below district level?

Little ProgressA national level seminar on disaster

management in India had been organised around 25 years ago. At that time, the Ministry of Agriculture was the nodal agency for disaster management, possibly because only famines were considered as disasters! During the seminar the Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture had been requested to brief the participants about plans for tackling disasters. Without hesitation, he replied that their plan was very simple and could be expressed in only three words, which were “Call the Army”!

In the last quarter century, much water has flowed down the Alaknanda and the Bhagirathi rivers but it seems that the plans for disaster management both at the level of the centre and the states continue to be to “Call the Army.”

There were serious deliberations in the government at the centre after the major earthquake in Kutch on January 26, 2001, following which the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), headed by a Minister of State was set up. It has now expanded considerably comprising a hierarchy mostly of bureaucrats and loyalists with no experience in handling disasters. Consequently, the dependence on the army continues, whether it is to rescue a child from an abandoned bore-well or a Tsunami or the tremendous destruction and grave human tragedy handled in Uttrakhand on a major scale and in the Kinnaur District of Himachal Pradesh on a lesser scale.

lt Gen Vijay oberoi is a former Vice Chief

of army staff (VCoas) and a former Founder director of the Centre

for land warfare studies (Claws).


dis

As

tEr

MA

nA

GE

ME

nt

Managing DisastersIt needs to be remembered that there are

three stages of actions to be taken in the case of disasters. The first is ‘risk reduction’ which has to be carried out before the disaster. The second is ‘mitigation’ which is to reduce the impact of the disaster and assist those affected. The third is ‘relief’ which is a long term exercise for the rehabilitation of affected segments of the population. The first and the third fall squarely in the ambit of the civil authorities, while the second is for all those who can come to the succour of the affected populace.

It is a truism that lives are saved in all types of disasters by the ‘first responders’, i.e. those

who are readily available at the site(s) of the disaster. While we have a number of well equipped and well trained units of NDMA, called National Defence Response Force (NDRF), they have to be moved from their permanent centres, which are usually far

away from the scene of disaster. Consequently, they can rarely be ‘first responders’ With their specialised (and fairly heavy) equipment, they can at best build-up on the ‘first responders’ and using their equipment dig out buried persons, make ad-hoc crossing expedients, build improvised by-passes and so on.

States Must Plan It is the civil authorities, especially at the

district level and below, that can and should have readily available teams, which can be deployed/employed immediately and thus are ‘first responders’, but it has been our experience, which is again reinforced by the recent tragedy that they have no interest in such dispensations. They do have sufficient manpower in terms of police, home guards, fire services, red cross workers, conservancy staff and other government servants who can be organised, trained, mobilised and used as ‘first responders’ for providing immediate assistance and succour. In every city, town and bigger villages, there are also Non Government Organisations (NGOs) willing to assist. However, it is seen that the civil authorities give no thought to it, despite funds, resources and instructions from the central

government and the NDMA. Consequently, they are content with following the age-old policy of the Ministry of Agriculture – “Call the Army”.

Role of the ArmyThe well-known and well-articulated policy

of calling in the army must be a last resort after all civil resources have been employed. However, since civil resources are neither trained nor equipped, the civil authorities find it expedient to invariably requisition the army as a ‘first resort’ option. It is not that the army should not be requisitioned or that the army does not want to assist. In actuality, the army responds on its own when it sees that assistance is needed to save lives, bring succour and to save property. This happened in both Uttrakhand and HP in those locations where the army was already stationed and the local commanders acted without waiting for orders.

On account of the hierarchical structure of the army, its secure and speedy communication lines and discipline and training, assistance by the army is spontaneous and units, sub-units and individuals carry out the tasks with alacrity and efficiency. It is on account of their dedication and sincerity that the public has great faith in the army. This was again articulated by the people rescued as well as the media in the case of the Uttrakhand tragedy. In the case of major disasters, such as the current one, senior officers of the army also plan ahead and cater for all types of contingencies. This is again evident in the current case where even the Army Commander of Central Command was personally present at all critical areas to give decisions and lead by example. Many more lives were thus saved.

Command and ControlIn disasters of the Uttarakhand type, where

many forces and agencies are involved, command and control is extremely important. Otherwise, considerable time and effort is wasted, an accurate picture is not available and optimum results are delayed. In the first stage, where the concern is saving lives, bringing succour and ensuring that property is not vandalised, it is perhaps better to appoint a senior officer of the lead force as the overall commander. Once the mitigation phase is over, the civil authorities may take over.

since civil resources are neither trained nor equipped, civil authorities find it expedient to invariably requisition the army.


dis

As

tEr

MA

nA

GE

ME

nt

Learning LessonsAfter every major disaster considerable

time is spent in reviewing the lessons learnt, committees being set up and comments requested from many. Unfortunately, little effective action is taken to eradicate the weaknesses. There are many reasons for this, including the State bureaucratic approach at the level of the State government in treating it as insignificant; utilising funds received from the Central Government for other requirements; little value for lives and sufferings of the public; non-accountability; thinking that they would handle it when the problem surfaces and the ‘dole syndrome’ whereby political leaders and bureaucrats believe that ‘doling out’ compensation for deaths, injuries and destroyed property is adequate!

Conceptually, the armed forces ought to be called to aid the civil authorities only when the situation is beyond the capability of the civil administration. In practice, however, the armed forces form the core of the government response capacity and are the crucial immediate responders in all high intensity disaster situations. Disasters also result in vociferous demands for the army to be tasked for disaster management. The army has resisted it with good reason. The tasks it is already performing have stretched it to the maximum and all assistance provided is at the cost of operational readiness. There is also the question of deterioration of equipment meant for operations. Above all, if the army is to do everything, then why is the

nation spending huge amounts on the various civil instruments available down to even below district level?

Dependence on the armed forces in assisting the civil administration and coming to the succour of the populace is likely to continue unless the State Governments assert themselves. The army is undoubtedly efficient but that should not be a reason for the over-dependence on the army as we see today.

An AlternativeDespite the lacunae mentioned above, if the

nation cannot do without the army, then one suggestion is that each state raises one or more Territorial Army (TA) battalion(s), specially structured as TA Battalions (Disaster Management). T h e s e s p e c i a l i s e d TA units should be located at pre-identified sensitive locations, so that they not only are the first response force, but are also suitably equipped for the task. The manpower for these should be recruited from the locals, reinforcing the concept of ‘home and hearth’ and should largely consist of ex-servicemen. They would thus not only have full local knowledge but they would be known to the populace and have their confidence. These TA units would also be able to train the other personnel available in the districts and take them under command when a disaster occurs.

one suggestion is that each state raises one

or more territorial Army (tA) battalion specially structured for disaster

Management…


WE

AP

on

isAt

ion

oF

sPA

cE

The Epics

TH E R A M A y A N A A N D T H E Mahabharata are the two great ancient Epics of India. These Epics, especially

the Mahabharata, pick up the thread of the tale of devastation and destruction. Atlantis rather displeased at the humiliating defeat, decided that they were no longer interested in subjugating the Rama Empire (an Indian empire) and decided instead to annihilate the major cities using weapons of mass destruction. Sanskrit scholars could not comprehend what was being described in the Epics until the dropping by the United States of America of the first atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. There are authentic verses from the Indian Epics as under:

“Gurkha, flying a swift and powerful Vimana (fast aircraft) hurled a single projectile (rocket) charged with the power of the universe (nuclear device). An incandescent column of smoke and flame, as bright as ten thousand suns, rose with all its splendour. It was an unknown weapon, an iron thunderbolt, a gigantic messenger of death, which reduced to ashes the entire race of the Vrishnis and the Andhakas. The corpses were burned beyond recognition. Hair and nails fell out, pottery shattered without apparent cause and the birds turned white. After a few hours all foodstuff was infected. To escape from this fire, the soldiers threw themselves into streams of water to wash themselves and their equipment.”

WEAPonisAtion oF sPAcE

There are descriptions of other weapons. The ‘Brahmadanda’, the most powerful weapon in the universe, belonged to Brahma. The ‘Pashupatastra’ was the weapon of Mahakali, the consort of Mahadeva. This was granted to Arjuna by Shiva and was among the most destructive and foreboding weapons. The ‘Brahmastra’, which contained the mystical force of Brahma, released millions of missiles creating great fires and it had the destructive potential of extinguishing all creation. ‘Vajra’ was the thunderbolt weapon of Indra.

All these weapons raining death and destruction have been described in great detail in the Epics written thousands and thousands of years ago. The fertile imagination of great Indian minds had envisaged the exploitation of space and energy as weapons of war a long time ago. The story is somewhat different today.

Definition of SpaceThere is no firm boundary where outer space

begins but is generally accepted as being 100 km above sea level. This imaginary line called the ‘Karman Line’ is conventionally used as the delineation of outer space for international treaties involving space. In his poem ‘Four Quartets’, T.S Eliot calls it ‘the vast interstellar spaces, the vacant into the vacant’.

Outer Space TreatyRecognizing the threat from uncontrolled

military expansion into space, the UN General Assembly adopted the ‘Declaration of Legal

Weaponisation of space would include space control and space-based systems that could destroy targets on the earth’s surface. Space control involves protecting own systems in orbit, attacking enemy assets in space and denying the enemy access to space. The means of achieving these objectives would be to prevent the enemy from launching satellites and destroying or degrading enemy satellites in space. It is akin to control over the air or the sea which would involve denying access to the air or to the sea to the enemy while ensuring access to own or friendly forces. Attacking terrestrial targets from satellites in space would limit reaction time available to the enemy and increase the element of surprise while reducing own losses.

air marshalnarayan menon

Air Marshal Narayan Menon


WE

AP

on

isAt

ion

oF

sPA

cE

Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space’ in 1962. This resolution became the basis of negotiations for a multilateral mechanism regulating the use of space, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) which came into force in October 1967. It established the principle that outer space is a global commons and not open to national appropriation and codified the phrase, “peaceful use of outer space” thus banning the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit and the establishment of military bases in space. The Outer Space Treaty provides the basic framework on international space law, including the following principles:

• The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind.

• Outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States.

• Outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation or by any other means.

• States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner.

• The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

• Astronauts shall be regarded as the envoys of mankind.

• States shall be responsible for national space activities whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental entities.

• States shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects.

• States shall avoid harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies.

PAROSIn 1981, a UN General Assembly resolution

on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) tasked the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with negotiating a treaty to

ban all space weapons. The proposed PAROS treaty would complement and reaffirm the importance of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which aims to preserve space for peaceful uses by prohibiting the use of space weapons, the development of space-weapon technology and technology related to “missile defence.”

The treaty would prevent any nation from gaining a military advantage in outer space. The CD made some progress on a draft treaty until disagreement between China and the US in 1995 prevented consensus on the creation of the ad hoc committee to continue negotiations. China insisted that it would only support final negotiations on a Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) if PAROS was considered at the same time.

Arguing that there is no space race, the US has consistently opposed PAROS. Due to China’s insistence on linking the two items, US opposition to PAROS and blocked approval of a work program, the CD has remained effectively paralyzed since 1995. The US and China, along with Russia are the frontrunners in weaponisation of space, though no weapons are known to have actually been deployed in space till now. India’s attempts, if any, to enter this exclusive club have been completely thwarted. India has signed and ratified the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.

Weaponisation vis-a-vis Militarisation of Space

A clear distinction has to be made between weaponisation and militarisation of space. Since the launch of the earliest satellite for communication purposes, space has de facto been militarised. Today, satellites of many countries, including India, orbit in space and are used for multifarious military purposes. On July 01, 2013, INRSS-1A, the first of the seven satellites planned under the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (INRSS) programme, was successfully launched from Sriharikota. The INRSS with seven satellites will cover a specified regional area around India.

The Global Positioning System (GPS) of the

since the launch of the earliest satellite for communication

purposes, space has de facto been

militarised...


WE

AP

on

isAt

ion

oF

sPA

cE

US has 24 satellites in orbit and there are plans to enhance numbers to 31 and later to 36. The GLONASS of Russia currently has 24 satellites and is planning to have 30 though one satellite crashed at launch recently. The Galileo system of Europe is to have 27 active satellites plus three in orbit as stand by for replacement. China’s Beidou system will have a constellation of 35 satellites. The Beidou system will be available to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and interestingly, also to the Pakistan military. The INRSS is expected to be operational by 2015 and will, to an extent, reduce the Indian military’s

total dependence on the GPS. India also has one Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system ready for deployment and others are under production. The BMD is an expensive system which does not and cannot guarantee security against incoming Surface-to-

Surface Missiles (SSMs). The resources invested in this system could have been better utilised to strengthen the nation’s second strike capability.

The USA, Russia and China have developed and successfully tested Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT). Indian scientists claim to have “all the building blocks necessary for ASAT” but till date, no tests have been carried out. All these developments could be clubbed under militarisation of space as no clause of the Outer Space Treaty has been violated by any of these systems.

Weaponisation of space would include space control and space-based systems that could destroy targets on the earth’s surface. Space control involves protecting own systems in orbit, attacking enemy assets in space and denying the enemy access to space. The means of achieving these objectives would be to prevent the enemy from launching satellites and destroying or degrading enemy satellites in space. It is akin to control over the air or the sea which would involve denying access to the air or to the sea to the enemy while ensuring access to own or friendly forces. Attacking terrestrial targets from satellites in space would limit reaction time available to the enemy and increase the element of surprise while reducing own losses.

There is no consensus on what constitutes a space weapon because most of the strategic weapons - be they space-to-space, space-to-earth, earth-to-space or earth-to-earth, transit through the medium of space. Different technologies could be employed to destroy, degrade or damage the intended targets. Some of the technologies that could be exploited are elaborated on in the succeeding paragraphs.

The ability to destroy satellites in orbit around the earth has been demonstrated by China who employed an anti-satellite device to ‘kill’ one of their own life-expired weather satellites. The USA and Russia have this capability and India claims to possess this technology. The flipside is that the vast amount of space debris generated would threaten other satellites, space vehicles and manned space missions.

The USA’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is working on a technology wherein a device uses electromagnets to shoot a stream of molten metal at very high velocity at intended targets. Directed energy weapons use lasers, microwaves and particle beams. The USA is developing a Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) which can be fired at enemy targets from the earth or from an orbiting satellite.

Cosmic satellites are created by employing nano-satellite or microsatellite technologies. These could swarm over an intended target or attach themselves to target in a ‘suicide’ mission. High altitude weapon using electro-magnetic energy may destroy or disrupt electrical and electronic devices aboard a satellite rendering it useless.

During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union, in a strategic attempt to evade the North American Air Defence (NORAD) system had developed a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) that would employ a low polar orbit to attack US targets from the South which is opposite to the direction the NORAD system was oriented. The SALT 2 agreement of 1979 prohibited the deployment of FOBS.

India and International TreatiesIt can be taken for granted that despite

the OST, countries like the USA, China and

china will have no compunctions about sharing military technology with Pakistan...


WE

AP

on

isAt

ion

oF

sPA

cE

Russia would continue to develop space weapon capabilities. India’s stand on space weaponisation is not available in the public domain. But considering India’s behaviour regarding international treaties, it is unlikely that India would develop such capabilities. Before going nuclear India had, for a long time, refused to sign either the NPT or the CTBT because of their discriminatory nature. As such, legally, India did not violate any treaty while going nuclear. However, India has abided by all its other international or bilateral treaties. The water-sharing treaty that India signed with Pakistan has been honoured despite the many occasions when relations between the two countries have deteriorated, sometimes resulting in conflict. So India will not transgress the OST stipulations even if its rivals like China do so. And China, as demonstrated on earlier occasions, will have no compunctions about sharing military technology with Pakistan.

Indigenous Aerospace IndustryThe Indian Space Research Organisation

(ISRO) has successfully achieved many of its goals. India today has harnessed space technology for broadcasting, education, monitoring weather, remote sensing, disaster warning and recently for navigation for both civil and military users. In 2008, ISRO sent a lunar probe Chandrayaan-1 to collect data from the moon’s surface. The next major objective is to launch a manned space mission to the moon. Preparations for this mission are underway.

While ISRO has done commendable work in India’s quest for space technology, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) can only claim limited success in its areas of interest. Except for the Dhruv

helicopters, the DRDO has not made any significant contribution to India’s military aviation capability. Its projects such as the Light Combat Aircraft Tejas, the INSAS rifle and the Arjun Main Battle Tank have been beset with problems. The Indian Navy, which has managed to wrest control over indigenous warship manufacturing, is doing relatively better than the other two services. The fiasco over the basic flying trainer aircraft and the intermediate jet trainer has left the Indian Air Force in the lurch. The DRDO and defence production establishments have been unable to satisfy the Indian Army’s requirements of a variety of small arms, light and heavy artillery.

Can India Do It?The armed forces, DRDO and ISRO work

in near impervious compartments and to develop space weapons, all three have to work in close collaboration. That is unlikely scenario in the foreseeable future even if there is the political will to vigorously pursue national security objectives and interests. That too is unlikely given the current state of paralysis in policy formulation at the level of the central government. India demonstrates timidity and lack of confidence while dealing with other powers, especially the potential adversaries. The Indian establishment tends to wallow in its own weaknesses. India’s pursuit of national security interests is half-hearted and weak-kneed. Unless the national leadership can get its act together on Mother Earth, an Indian vision, if there is one, of creating a space weaponisation capability will be an unrealisable objective remaining but a mirage.

india’s pursuit of national security interests is half-

hearted and weak-kneed.


ind

iA’s

En

Er

Gy

sE

cu

rit

y

THE WORLD ENERGy OU TLO OK 2012, published by International Energy Agency at the end of last year,

prophesizes that global energy demand is likely to grow by more than a third of its present level by 2035 and that, China, India and the Middle East would account for 60 per cent of that increase. Although known energy reserves are in no danger of immediate exhaustion or extinction, the competition for their use is natural and fierce due to their predictably finite quantum.

A World Energy Assessment Report (UNDP 1999) has defined energy security as, “the continuous availability of energy in varied forms in sufficient quantities at reasonable prices”. The challenge lies not just in the “sufficient quantities” signifying the need for newer and ever more extensive sources of energy to meet growing energy needs, but also to make the energy available at “reasonable prices”. This scenario, wherein many users are contending for limited and indeed depleting energy sources, justifies the nomenclature of energy security.

India accounts for 4.6 per cent of the world’s annual energy consumption and is the world’s fourth largest consumer of primary energy, with only China, USA and Russia consuming more than it. Moreover, in the last five years, India has grown at an average rate of eight per cent and the demand for energy has risen commensurately. Crude oil imports have been

indiA’s EnErGy sEcurityrole of offshore Helicopter operations

The helicopter is the workhorse for the off-shore oil and gas exploration and production industry. The ever-increasing demand for energy, ever escalating prices of crude oil and the discovered existence of oil and gas in off-shore areas ensure that there is a hectic increase in off-shore oil exploration in recent times. More and more hitherto untouched off-shore areas are being explored and developed through large public and private sector investments. Helicopters form an essential and critical part of off-shore operations as they connect these facilities to the mainland.

gradually rising in India and account for three fourths of the nation’s total requirements now.

Similarly, natural gas imports account for more than a fifth of the nation’s requirements. Even more alarmingly, by the end of the Twelfth Plan (2012-2017), import dependence on crude oil is expected to increase to around 80 per cent and import dependence on natural gas is expected to increase to 35 per cent. High import dependence is analogous to high vulnerability and lowered energy security of the nation. This is so, not just because high import dependence leads to the GDP growth rate becoming dependent on external factors namely oil prices, but also because it holds the potential for increased fiscal deficit and depleting foreign exchange reserves.

A seminal policy document called the Integrated Energy Policy produced by an expert committee of the Planning Commission felt it necessary to redefine energy security in the specific Indian context in the following words, “We are energy secure when we can supply lifeline energy to all our citizens irrespective of their ability to pay for it as well as meet their effective demand for safe and convenient energy to satisfy their various needs at competitive prices, at all times and with a prescribed confidence level considering shocks and disruptions that can be reasonably expected.” It is to eliminate or at least minimise ‘the shocks and disruptions’ so that uninterrupted supply

Gp Capt AK Sachdev

Gp Capt aK sachdev director - operations, eih ltd.


ind

iA’s

En

Er

Gy

sE

cu

rit

y

of oil and gas from our off-shore exploration and production facilities becomes an energy security imperative.

Indian Off-Shore Oil FacilitiesAlthough oil exploration began in India in

1867, when oil was struck at Makum in Assam, exploration and production was formalised only in 1899, after the Assam Oil Company was formed. At the time of Independence, India’s annual domestic oil production was just 250,000 tonnes. Added impetus was provided by the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1954, wherein the Government announced that petroleum would be considered as a core sector in the country. The Geological Survey of India executed extensive surveys to locate structures suitable for exploration of oil and gas.

The setting up of Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), in 1955 was a momentous point in petroleum exploration in India. The discovery of the vast off shore Bombay High field in 1974, off the West coast was perhaps the most significant event in India’s petroleum sector. The Government further liberalised the petroleum exploitation and exploration policy in 1991, and invited private companies, both foreign and Indian, to participate in the exploration of oil and gas. Since then many more players have entered the exploration and production fray, both in on-shore and off-shore areas.

According to the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, India has an estimated sedimentary area of 3.14 million sq. km. comprising 26 sedimentary basins out of which 1.35 million sq. km. area is in deep water and 1.79 million sq. km. area includes land or shallow off-shore basins. At present, 1.06 million sq. km. is under active petroleum Exploration Licenses in 18 basins by national oil companies and private/joint venture companies. A total of 35,601 sq. km. is under mining lease.

Operations are being carried out by national and private oil companies in 597 concessions, of which 259 are under Petroleum Exploration License (PEL) and 338 are under Mining Lease (ML). Off-shore basins lie in its Exclusive Economic Zone West and East of India as also in the Andaman and Nicobar area. The most important off-shore oilfield is at Bombay High

(now Mumbai High). It is located in the Arabian Sea around 160 km West off the Mumbai coast. Discovered in 1974, the field has been operated by Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC). Production at the field started in 1976. The oil field consists of two blocks named Mumbai High North (MHN) and Mumbai High South (MHS) and currently has 1,659 million metric tons (MMT) capacity and is producing around 12MMT a year. In a long term programme, Phase II development is going on to enhance the production capacity of the oilfield complex.

Significant exploration and production is also on in the Krishna-Godavari (KG) basin. It is reasonable to presume that off shore operations will increase in extent and value with more discoveries away from land. These operations are predicated to high value offshore assets requiring enormous investment.

Off-Shore Helicopter OperationsAll these off-shore assets are strategic in nature

and the loss of any such asset can have distressing consequences as in the case of the fire incident in Bombay High North platform in 2005 which affected a quarter of the nation’s total production output until repairs and replacements could be put into place. At the time of the fire, there were 384 personnel onboard, of which 362 were rescued. Off-shore facilities are located away from land and have Spartan living spaces for the personnel working there.

As the personnel have to stay away from families and under difficult conditions with a small but nonetheless extant risk to life and limb, they need to be kept on station for short periods and rostered on rotation bases. Typically, a person may stay and work on a facility for about two weeks. A person from a land base would be flown by helicopter to a living-in base. On a daily basis, personnel are moved from living-in bases to bases which are normally unmanned to which they would go in the morning and return at the end of a working day. There is also a need to support these facilities logistically on a daily basis. Helicopters

Pawan Hans Helicopters limited (PHHl) is

the largest helicopter operator engaged in off-

shore operations…


ind

iA’s

En

Er

Gy

sE

cu

rit

y

render constructive and irreplaceable service to sustain off-shore operations, firstly on a routine basis, and secondly, to deal with casualty evacuation in case of a medical emergency or accident at the facility.

Off-shore helicopter flying is a strenuous task and often conducted in abnormal operating conditions for both flight crew and their aircraft. Flights are in poor visibility conditions, very frequently with no horizon reference, and require high levels of skill, especially for the take-off and landing phases from small table-top heli-decks above the surface of the sea. The airframes and engines have to endure highly corrosive, salt-laden environment.

Flying to offshore platforms and floating decks has its own peculiarities. The small size of the heli-decks surrounded by obstacles, hot gases,

capricious wind velocities and rapidly changing meteorological conditions can be challenging for pilots. In addition, the pitching, rolling and heaving experienced while landing on floating decks require a very high degree of skill and accuracy in flying. According

to Captain Sanjay Mittal, Training Manager, Global Vectra Helicopters Limited (GVHL), “An off-shore helicopter mission off the coast of peninsular India can be the simplest task on a bright sunny winter day but the very same flight undertaken on a dark moonless night to a destination over 160 km into the sea for medical evacuation or a routine day crew change flight during the peak of South West monsoon can be extremely challenging even for the very best of professional helicopter pilots.”

The office of the Director General Civil Aviation (DGCA) considers off-shore helicopter flying a specialised operation and mandates that pilots engaged in this role be given specific role oriented training. Needless to say, execution of safe and efficient operations requires highly professional flight and maintenance crew as also good operational managers so that air safety is not compromised.

Pawan Hans Helicopters Limited (PHHL) is the largest helicopter operator engaged in off-shore operations. For its Mumbai operations,

the land base is Juhu airport from where around ten helicopters carry out two to three flights each in support of off-shore facilities. These flights are normally sunrise-to-sunset affairs while at night one helicopter stays on one of the facilities for emergencies and night ambulance duties. PHHL also carries out flying on the East coast. The next largest off-shore operator is GVHL which flies off Mumbai in the West as well as off Rajahmundry in the East and has seven Bell 412s and two AW 139s on long-term contracts to ONGC and British Gas.

Other operators include Heligo, UHPL, Deccan Charters and Reliance, which is the only Oil and Gas company to own helicopters (two Bell 412s) which are tendered out on an Operations and Maintenance contract, typically for two years at a time, to a helicopter operating company. Presently, the contract is with GVHL for the operations and maintenance of these two helicopters. Cairn and Transocean, two other off-shore companies, do not have their own helicopters and have contracted helicopter operating companies such as PHHL, GVHL, Heligo, United Helicharters Private Limited UHPL and Deccan Charters to meet their requirements.

In addition to the oil and gas production that is underway on the West and East coast, as already described, exploration and production companies that have been awarded contracts under the NELP policy of the Ministry of Petroleum undertake regular seismic survey operations in respective off-shore blocks. These operations are conducted in non-monsoon months that is from October to May and employ helicopters for air logistic support. During the year 2012-2013, such operations were conducted off the North West coast of Andaman and Nicobar Islands with two support helicopters based at Port Blair. On completion of survey work, exploratory wells are drilled in areas identified as having resources of oil and gas to further establish economic viability of progressing with commercial drilling operations. Presently, such exploratory wells are being drilled off the Orissa and Andhra coast supported by helicopters based at Bhubaneswar, Rajahmundry and Vishakhapatnam.

Helicopters render constructive and irreplaceable service to sustain off-shore operations…


ind

iA’s

En

Er

Gy

sE

cu

rit

y

Vulnerability of Off Shore Operations

The remote location of off-shore facilities, far away from land and inhabitation renders them very vulnerable assets. A RAND Corporation study on the subject of “Potential Threats to Offshore Platforms” lays out an array of threats from guerrillas and terrorism, extortionists, sabotage and hostile take-over of facilities by internal labour activists, environmental extremists and thieves targeting equipment and material. However, as far as surreptitious assaults go, the very location of these facilities renders them difficult to approach except by the very determined and the very well resourced. The probability of risk to their safety and security is low, but the consequences of a consummated risk (resulting in a threat turning into an actual attack, would be extremely high.

Apart from these possible risks, there is always the menacing peril of hostile wartime action like the shelling of Iranian off-shore platforms by US warships in 1987 in retaliation to Iranian attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf. In the Indian context, the threat from Pakistani action by the sea or submarine route is a possibility that can neither be undermined nor neglected or ruled out. A successful Pakistani attack on a facility, such as in the Mumbai High complex, would not only mean a blow to the oil and gas production but would also signify a body-blow to national pride.

The helicopter is the workhorse for the off-shore oil and gas exploration and production industry. The ever-increasing demand for energy, ever escalating prices of crude oil and the discovered existence of oil and gas in off-shore areas ensure that there is a hectic increase in off-shore oil exploration in recent times. More and more hitherto untouched off-shore areas are being explored and developed through large public and private sector investments. Helicopters form an essential and critical part of off-shore operations as they connect these facilities to the mainland.

Currently, about 40 helicopters are employed in the off-shore sector both on the Western and Eastern coasts. Flying carried out by them represents more than three-fourth of

the total civil helicopter flying in India. As oil exploration moves further offshore, the demand for modern helicopters with better range and advanced safety features is bound to witness a marked increase. The operational safety of the helicopters themselves is a vulnerability that comes from the very nature and harsh environment of their operations. Sporadic hull loss accidents in the offshore domain keep underscoring the need for special emphasis on operational, maintenance and procedural issues to reduce the risk of flying accidents to the helicopters involved.

ConclusionAs is the case with all areas of Indian

strategy, energy security strategy is also unclear and its determinants rather tenuous and questionable. There does not seem to be any consistent strand running through policy iterations to indicate any particular choice of energy strategy. Superimposed on this weakness is the fact that oi l and coal c o m p a n i e s a re s t a t e -owned and prices of all hydrocarbon and power sectors are regulated by the government with the exception of petrol which is partially deregulated since June 2010. As a result, private sector finds the energy sector largely devoid of allure. Had these policies been inspired by pragmatic energy security imperatives, they would have been laudable.

However, the state regulatory mechanism does not sub-serve energy security or national security demands. Instead it panders to vote bank politics. Ostensibly, the subsidies have the objective of protecting consumers from international price volatility and providing energy access for the common man, especially those who hover close to the poverty line. However, their true intent is to nurture vote banks. As a result of these energy subsidies, a heavy burden is placed on government budgets, while targeted beneficiaries often remain bereft of the intended benefit. Successive changes of government and ruling parties have not been able to cross the Rubicon of the energy sector price deregulation.

As oil exploration moves further offshore,

the demand for better and modern helicopters is bound to increase…


ind

iA’s

En

Er

Gy

sE

cu

rit

y

Large scale liberalisation and consequent privatisation of the sector, therefore, appear to be distant dreams. The Hydrocarbon Vision 2025, a document produced by the Indian government in 2000, recommended

intensification of exploration e f f o r t s a n d s e c u r i n g acreages in countries that appear highly attractive for ensuring sustainable long-term supplies such as Russia, Iran, Iraq and North Africa. The implication is that Indian off-shore assets could be

outside the EEZ. The Integrated Energy Policy Report of 2006 added that obtaining equity oil, coal and gas abroad do not represent adequate strategies for enhancing energy security beyond diversifying supply resources. An intent to

further explore the EEZ for more oil and gas discoveries can be read in this iteration.

While India’s Sixth Five year Plan had stipulated self-sufficiency in the development of domestic oil resources and pricing reforms, subsequent Five year Plans stressed the idea of self-sufficiency through ownership of resources outside India. The Twelfth Plan projects an alarming figure of import requirements as mentioned earlier. Whether seen against the backdrop of increasing energy demand or in the context of rising proportion of imported oil, the relevance of off-shore oil and gas exploration and production stands out as an important determinant of energy security. The safe and efficient operation of existing and future off-shore facilities remains predicated to off-shore helicopter operations.

The safe and efficient operation of existing and future off-shore facilities remains predicated to off-shore helicopter operations…


tHE

ind

iA –

cH

inA

Bo

rd

Er

co

nu

nd

ru

M

OF THE 33 TERRITORIAL DISPUTES in South Asian Region listed out by Wikipedia, nine are between India

and China; Aksai Chin, Shaksgam, Arunachal Pradesh (termed South Tibet by China), and Demchok, Chumar, Kaurik, Shipki La, Jadh and Lapthal – all areas between Aksai Chin and Nepal. Then are 11 territorial disputes between China and Bhutan, some of which can have adverse effects on India, should China resort to occupying these areas forcibly. Additionally, Chinese semi-permanent presence in Gilgit-Baltistan exponentially complicates resolution of India-Pakistan territorial disputes.

China is becoming increasingly aggressive across the Himalayas for multiple reasons. She takes pride in her ‘Middle Kingdom’ legacy but this mentality is laced with guilt from decades of humiliation. As she faces no serious external threat, chances of conflict in the East China Sea/South China Sea are few unless China herself ups the ante despite conventional inferiority vis-à-vis the US, which she is trying to offset through asymmetric means. Similarly, there is no serious existential threat to China but the restive regions of Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet need to be managed deftly. Plus failure to address the imbalance between the neo-rich coastal areas and the majority agricultural heartland is a recipe for instability. China simply wants to accelerate the boundary resolution

the india – china Border conundrum

China is becoming increasingly aggressive across the Himalayas for multiple reasons. She takes pride in her ‘Middle Kingdom’ legacy but this mentality is laced with guilt from decades of humiliation. As she faces no serious external threat, chances of conflict in the East China Sea/South China Sea are few unless China herself ups the ante despite conventional inferiority vis-à-vis the US, which she is trying to offset through asymmetric means. Similarly, there is no serious existential threat to China but the restive regions of Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet need to be managed deftly. Plus failure to address the imbalance between the neo-rich coastal areas and the majority agricultural heartland is a recipe for instability. China simply wants to accelerate the boundary resolution with India and Bhutan because this will help stabilise Tibet and Xinjiang.

with India and Bhutan because this will help stabilise Tibet and Xinjiang.

Territorial DisputeOf the nine territory disputes between India

and China, two major chunks of territory are the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. All other disputed areas lie south of the McMahon Line. Aksai Chin’s importance to China is the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway that China surreptitiously built in the 1950s. Arunachal Pradesh lies south of the McMahon Line. With regard to the Aksai Chin, the Sikhs had captured Ladakh and invaded China in 1841 but were defeated which led to a treaty between the Sikhs and China in 1842. This 1842 treaty stipulated no transgressions or interference in the other country’s frontiers.

Then in 1846, the British defeated the Sikhs which resulted in the transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh to the British. Successive British commissioners attempted unsuccessfully to meet with Chinese officials to discuss the border they now shared. Both sides were apparently sufficiently satisfied that a traditional border was recognized and defined by the natural elements, Karakoram Pass and Pangong Tso Lake. However, no boundary demarcation was done and the Aksai Chin area continued to be undefined.

In the Eastern region, British India and China had gained a common border after the British

Lt Gen Prakash Katoch

Prakash Katoch, former lt Gen, special Forces,

indian army.


tHE

ind

iA –

cH

inA

Bo

rd

Er

co

nu

nd

ru

M

annexed Assam on conclusion of the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1846). This resulted in the Treaty of yangdabo in 1826. Further British annexations through the subsequent Anglo-Burmese War expanded China’s borders

with British India eastwards, to include the border with Burma (now Myanmar). In 1914, representatives of Br i tain, China, and Tibet attended a conference at Simla in India and drew up an agreement concerning Tibet’s status and borders.

The McMahon Line was decided upon during the 1914 Simla Convention. The agreement was signed by representatives of British India, Tibet (Lonchen Shatra Dorje) and China (Ivan Chen), all affixing full signatures to the agreement and the appended maps showing the alignment of the McMahon Line on the maps.

Copies of these maps and the photograph showing the attendees of the Simla Convention in 1914 are shown below:

Representatives of those days are equivalent

to Ambassadors today notwithstanding the fact that the designation ‘Representative’ is still prevalent, as indicated by the ‘Special Representatives’ of India and China that currently continue to discuss the sensitive boundary issue. But despite the Chinese Representative (Ivan Chen) having affixed signatures to the 1914 Simla Convention Agreement, China reneged on it saying that the Chinese Representative did not have the permission of the Chinese Government, which is a lame and absurd excuse. The 1962 Sino-India War was fought in this territory. An agreement to resolve the dispute was concluded in 1996, including ‘Confidence-Building Measures’ and a mutually agreed LAC but in 2006, the Chinese ambassador to India stated that all of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. This was followed up with a military build-up and numerous incursions in the region, some penetrating more than a kilometre.

Pillaging the HimalayasChina’s Himalayan loot began silently in

the 1950s by transcending the boundaries of Tibet and steamrolling the occupation of

of the nine territory disputes between india and china, two major chunks of territory are the Aksai chin and Arunachal Pradesh…

mcmahon Line map 1 (1914 Simla convention) Bhutan tri-junction to tsang po/Brahmaputra


tHE

ind

iA –

cH

inA

Bo

rd

Er

co

nu

nd

ru

M

Having got tibet on its plate, china has suddenly staked its

claim to entire Arunachal Pradesh since 2006…

mcmahon Line, map 2 (1914 Simla convention) extends up to tri-junction of Burma, tibet and china

In Pakistani calculus, subcontracting itself to China is one solution to stabilise the region that will also nip any Indian designs westwards. China naturally grabbed the opportunity, initiating strategic footprints into Pakistan/POK. Reportedly, Pakistan is to lease out the Gilgit-Pakistan region to China for 50 years. Pakistani analysts also say that China wants to establish permanent bas es in P OK , which will become the geo-strategic pivot of China-Pakistan for forays into Afghanistan and Central Asia.

The push for India’s withdrawal from the Saltoro Range in the Siachen area is part of the same plunder of the Himalayas. Chinese ingress in Nepal is for the same reason. PLA soldiers in uniform have been sighted in northern Nepal by foreign journalists. Further east, China has been claiming the Doklam Plateau and Chinese road built between Zuri and Phuteogang Ridge that overlooks the disputed Charithang Valley. Doklam Plateau, if occupied by China, will turn the flanks of Indian defences in Sikkim and endanger the Siliguri Corridor. Hitherto, China was laying claims

Aksai Chin (38,000 square kilometres) that was part of Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir acceded by Maharaja Hari Singh to India post Partition. China’s National Highway 219 repaved recently runs now through Aksai Chin connecting Tibet with the Xinjiang region. This Chinese move was not mere territory grab but part of a larger integrated politico-military strategy that looked far into the future taking into consideration the long term requirements of resources, particularly energy that would increase in gargantuan proportions, plus the security of the long supply lines.

In Pakistan, perpetually in search of its identity, China has found an easy ally. Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam Valley (some 6,000 square kilometres of Indian Territory) to China. China resolved her borders with all countries less India and Bhutan, which was by design. In certain areas Chinese claim lines kept extending progressively as the years went by - from 1959 the claim line to more demanding one in 1963 and subsequently extending further in 1969 and 1975 so forth and so on.

A rapidly radicalizing Pakistan had launched an institutionalised jihad to kill the maximum number of ‘Shias’ on her own territory, particularly Gilgit-Baltistan.


tHE

ind

iA –

cH

inA

Bo

rd

Er

co

nu

nd

ru

M

only to Tawang. Having got Tibet on its plate, China has suddenly staked its claim to entire Arunachal Pradesh since 2006. What more proof is needed of Chinese irredentism? This is perhaps the ultimate objective in Operation ‘Himalayan Plunder’ for gaining control of the Himalayas right from POK all the way to Arunachal.

Ladakhi & Bhutanese Enclaves in Tibet

What remains shrouded in history are the Ladakhi and Bhutanese enclaves in Western

Tibet. The Ladakhi enclave consists of the vi l lage of Minsar (Men ser), near Lake Manasarovar (Ma pham), and its surrounding land, while Tconsists of Darchen (Dar chen) Labrang and several smaller monaster ies and

villages near Mount Kailas (Gangs rin po che, Ti se). The Ladakhi estate of Minsar which the King of Ladakh/J&K retained was ostensibly to meet the religious offering expenses of Lake Manasarowar and Mount Kailas. These enclaves were entirely surrounded by the territory of the Dalai Lama, but Ladakh (superseded by the

government of Jammu and Kashmir after 1846) and Bhutan continued to raise revenue there for some 300 years.

The status of these Enclaves has continued to be ambiguous. By the 20th century, both Kashmir/India and Bhutan claimed to hold their lands in full sovereignty. By contrast, the Lhasa government acknowledged that Ladakh/Kashmir and Bhutan held certain rights. Nevertheless Tibet tried to exercise its own authority as though the enclaves were no more than foreign-owned estates on Tibetan territory. These disputes were never fully resolved. When the Chinese invaded the area they never paid any compensation to either to Ladakh/Kashmir or to Bhutan. As such, these continue to be disputed territory. What is significant is that Chinese claim to Tawang is on the basis that the Tibetans visit the ancient Tawang Monastery every year to pay obeisance. By the same analogy, the Ladakhi enclave consisting of village Minsar (Men ser) and its surrounding lands should revert to India, while Tconsists of Darchen (Dar chen) Labrang and several smaller monasteries and villages near Mount Kailas (Gangs rin po che, Ti se) should revert to Bhutan for annual pilgrimages.

Acceptance of any intrusion in terms of chinese perceptions is that bit of territory having been ceded…

map in album of ministry of external affairs, Government of india


tHE

ind

iA –

cH

inA

Bo

rd

Er

co

nu

nd

ru

M

Major Cross Border IncidentsEarlier this year, Defence Minister A K

Antony had stated in Parliament that nearly 600 border transgressions had taken place along the 4,057 km long Line Of Actual Control (LAC) in the past three years (since 2010) and that some of these incursions were deeper than in the past. All these have been denied by China. However, in the unending list of cross border transgressions over the years, there have been three major ones. The first one was in September 1967 at Nathu La where the Chinese without warning opened fire on India troops on the bare stretch of the pass itself and followed it up with artillery fire. India suffered some 70 casualties. However, the Indian response was so intense that all Chinese defences at Nathu La and shoulders of the pass were razed to the ground and by own admission, the PLA suffered heavy losses with about 400 dead.

The second incident (Wangdung Incident) was in area of Sumdorong Chu, a rivulet flowing north-south in the Thag La triangle, bound by Bhutan in the west and the Thag La ridge to the north, where Chinese started intruding south of McMahon Line in June 1986, while claiming they were north of it. The initial intrusion of 40

PLA, one to two kilometres deep inside Indian territory, swelled up to 200 by August and Chinese even constructed a helipad. India even suggested a way out of the crisis by suggesting that if the Chinese withdrew in the coming winter, India would not re-occupy the area in the following summer but China rejected the offer. India then airlifted troops to occupy ridges overlooking the intrusion area. In October 1986, Deng Xiaoping warned India against taking any action, threatening to teach India a lesson like China did to Vietnam. Subsequently, China brought massive reinforcements into Tibet. Consequently, the Indian Army moved three Divisions to positions around Wangdung. Eventually, pursuant to political level parleys, the two sides agreed to a simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from the four border posts (two Indian and two Chinese - in the Sumdorong Chu valley).

The third and most recent intrusion (deepest since the 1962 Sino-Indian War) intrusion that the Chinese made in April this year was in the area of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in Ladakh Region. India officially acknowledged this intrusion was 19 kilometres deep inside Indian territory though the distance from KK Pass

attendees – 1914 Simla convention including chinese representative ivan chen and tibetan representative Lonchen Shatra dorje

chinese strategy has always been based on shock and surprise…


tHE

ind

iA –

cH

inA

Bo

rd

Er

co

nu

nd

ru

M

(North-eastern extremity of J&K State) was actually 30 kilometres. The Government of India also maintained that this was an intrusion at the local PLA commander’s level considering that the Chinese Foreign Minister was to visit India in close succession of the intrusion. These premises were unfounded since such a deep intrusion at local level is impossible given the control of CCP battalion level upwards.

Besides, Chinese strategy has always been based on shock and surprise. This was a psychological challenge posed to the

Indian hierarchy and India’s response was lukewarm, simply establishing a post in front of the Chinese intrusion. Eventually, the Chinese did withdraw but not before some 25 days displaying a massive

red banner stating this was Chinese territory and compelling India to dismantle its structures in areas near Chumar.

Present SituationThe India-China joint working group

meetings over the years have not made much headway. The April 2013 Chinese intrusion apparently did not come up for discussion during the Indian Foreign Minister’s visit to Beijing. This may have been construed by China as the soft image of India. Just before Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India, there was another intrusion by the PLA in Ladakh which was again downplayed by India. On June 12, 2013, three Chinese nationals (Sunni Muslims named Adil, Salamo and Abdul Khaliq aged 18-23 years) were apprehended by the army inside Indian territory near Sultanchushku in Ladakh carrying political maps in Arabic in the same area. It was not clear from where they had entered though possibly they could have entered through the Raki Nala, the Jeevan Nala or North of DBO.

It is significant to note that the April 2013 PLA intrusion too, was in the area of Raki Nala. Chinese nationals with fake Indian documents had been apprehended during 2012 also in the Eastern theatre on a mission to contact North-east insurgents. China has also been supporting ULFA and has supplied arms, communications

equipment and arms manufacturing capability to Indian Maoists and the PLA of Manipur. On June 16, 2013, Chinese troops intruded more than a kilometre into Sikkim’s northernmost point (called Finger Point). Only a month ago, Chinese soldiers had threatened to demolish stone structures in the area. That warning was subsequently echoed and endorsed by Chinese officials.

The 16th round of talks between the Special Representatives of India and China on the boundary question took place in Beijing on June 28-29, 2013. Maintenance of peace and tranquility border areas including possible additional Confidence Building Measures, ways and means of strengthening existing mechanisms for consultation and coordination on border affairs and methodology to enhance the efficiency of communications between the two sides were reportedly discussed, which is no different from previous such meetings without much headway though the usual fanfare of ‘fruitful talks’ was credited to the event.

There is proposal of a new Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) but that is of little consequence considering China’s past record of not respecting agreements. The latest example is the open defiance of the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace along the Line of Actual Control which India and China signed in 1993. In April 2013, China intruded 19 kilometres into India territory and brazenly maintained that the intruded area was on Chinese side of the LAC.

Just prior to the Indian Defence Minister’s visit to China in July 2013, Luo yuan, the Deputy Director at a PLA academy told Chinese reporters, “The Indian side should not provoke new problems and increase military deployment at the border areas and stir up new trouble.” Though these are routine Chinese tactics, they also smack of considerable arrogance. The issue was ignored by India. The next India-China joint exercise is scheduled in October 2013, which does not mean much because there has been no apparent change in Chinese attitude towards India including in stoking internal instability by supporting and arming insurgencies.

india has ceded over 400 square kilometres of territory to china in ladakh alone…


tHE

ind

iA –

cH

inA

Bo

rd

Er

co

nu

nd

ru

M

Analysis of Chinese BehaviourChina’s perceives herself as the second

pole after the US in the multi-polar world she strives for. However, within this ambit, she aims for an unequivocal China-centric Asia and as part of this strategy, views India an inconvenient hindrance. Hence the erratic ‘carrot and stick’ policy against India and the penchant to play the Pakistan card both politically and asymmetrically. Chinese strategy focuses on the mind of adversary’s political leadership as the centre of gravity, which it keeps attacking through multiple means. Therefore, acceptance of any intrusion in terms of Chinese perceptions is that bit of territory having been ceded. Analyses of the aforementioned three major cross border incidents shows that whenever India has taken a firm stand, China has backed off. This will remain a reality in future as well no matter the levels to which Chinese comprehensive power rises. To that end, the key uncertainty whether Chinese economic growth will continue or plateau or witness a bubble burst effect is already plaguing China.

Then there is the moot point whether China will be able to contain internal sub-national movements (Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia) or will they lead to increased violence thus limiting China’s external hegemonic designs. At the same time, whether Chinese nationalism becomes hyper with propensity to miscalculate or over-react to perceived sensitive situations will remain intrinsic to Chinese behavior. Unfortunately, our Foreign Minister’s trivialising the serious Chinese intrusion in April this year sent across a wrong signal and was reminiscent of Nehru calling loss of Aksai Chin a “small matter” to be settled without much difficulty. Such responses can only encourage China to nibble more of our territory. Capitalising on India’s neglect to border areas, China has built roads right up to the LAC that facilitate intrusions. There have also been reports of a road built by China five kilometres inside Indian territory. These reports have been denied by our government. The fact is that there is plenty of ambiguity under the ambit of ‘differing perceptions of the LAC’ by both sides. Both Aksai Chin and

Ladakh are known to have large uranium and mineral reserves though no mining has been undertaken.

According to former ambassador P Stopden (himself native of Ladakh), over the years India has ceded over 400 square kilometres of territory to China in Ladakh alone. This is not counting the illegal occupation of Aksai Chin (38,000 square kilometres) and Shaksgam Valley (5,800 square kilometres) by China. He would not make such statement without basis. The implications are, therefore, clear – there have been many intrusions in the past that have been hushed up and similar may be the case in the Eastern theatre. The comprehensive communication network developed by China in forward areas is also being used by China for covertly providing rations and money to villagers in selected areas including in East Sikkim to mould local perceptions and facilitate infiltration of Special Operations forces, when required.

The FutureIn the game of toying with the border and

nibbling territory, China is also launching attacks on the cognitive domain focused on the minds of the political leadership of India. This needs to be met resolutely. Ignoring intrusions apart, even smaller incidents such as acquiescing to not hosting the Tricolor in open at Demchhok in Eastern Ladakh, and stopping development work in the border village of Koyul in Leh for fear of the Chinese, will send completely wrong signals. The need for developing our border communications speedily was never more urgent, which we should do without the fear of China, even at the cost of minor confrontations. China will also use all possible means to bring all neighbours of India into the gravitational ambit of China, which is becoming clear in Bhutan. India must refashion its foreign policy accordingly.

At the political and diplomatic front, we should play on the overall territorial expanse of Tibet that India so far has not contested as being an independent country. Considering this vast

china is also launching attacks on the cognitive domain focused on the

minds of the political leadership of india…


tHE

ind

iA –

cH

inA

Bo

rd

Er

co

nu

nd

ru

M

expanse of territory, China should see reason to accept the McMahon Line as the international border with India. Aksai Chin must be returned to India with India guaranteeing access to China along China’s National Highway 219, which could be renamed Friendship Highway. The Minsar Enclave must be reverted to India, as should be the Darchen Labrang Enclave to Bhutan for sacred religious reasons. At best, these could be adjusted against Chinese occupation of Shaksgam Valley.

China perhaps is unaware that 1962 vintage documents de-classified in the US were categorical in stating that while some weapons can be given to the Indians to stave off the Chinese, it is in US interest to ensure that India and China never join hands. The Chinese leadership needs to take a cue from this unless they cannot get over the pleasures of jointly promoting terror with Pakistan. That is the reason Russia had proposed a Russia-China-India strategic partnership, which China has downplayed.


no

rtH

-EA

st

ind

iA

Northeast India – A Game Changer

NO R T H E A S T I N D I A H A S A N extraordinarily important international strategic dimension and is a vital part

of the nation’s defence architecture. It is not only India’s land bridge to Myanmar but also a gateway to Southeast Asia and beyond. The Northeast region is endowed with human and a variety of natural resources such as uranium, coal, hydro-power, forests, oil and gas. Gifted with highly fertile land, the Northeast region is the world’s largest producer of tea as well. It sits right in the hub of a geographical space which is home to nearly a billion people comprising the population of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, Southwestern China and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The strategic location and natural resources makes it a potential powerhouse of India for development and progress as also being a vibrant source of energy, oil, natural gas and limestone supplemented by the perennial water systems of the Brahmaputra and its tributaries. The fertile Brahmaputra Valley has huge potential for export of a variety of agro products - while its flora and fauna, natural scenic beauty, varied cuisine and remarkable local handicrafts and performing arts can act as a magnet for promotion of international tourism for neighboring as well the Western countries. Its proximity to international markets to both Southwestern China and Southeast Asia, makes this region a potentially important base for

nortH-EAst indiAits place in the national security calculus

There has been no major change in the military architecture in India’s Northeast region since 1962. In a strategic sense, India has remained more in a defensive posture all along the sensitive borders. The Northeast region has more than one persona. Traditionally, it has been associated with ethnic insurgency that has been aided and abetted by inimical forces operating from sanctuaries in India’s neighborhood. A bulk of India’s security and other strategic assets are heavily deployed to address twin threats to national security. Time is therefore opportune for national defence planners to consider bifurcation of the existing arrangements in this region into new sectoral responsibilities especially with a view to the future.

foreign and domestic investors and in tandem with the ‘Look East Policy’, can give the region the ability to tap into markets of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Regional groupings such as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technology and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the ASEAN can all act as catalysts for promoting wide-ranging economic cooperation for both bilateral and multilateral trade and commerce. This can be buttressed by free movement of goods along the India-Myanmar border. Building up of the necessary infrastructure to connect the ports of Chittagong, Sittwe and Haldia with the region, can provide a big boost to the entire region. This will enable the landlocked Northeast region access to the Bay of Bengal. There is also the growing network of airlines that will give fresh impetus to cross-border travel but also another form of regional integration in addition to existing arrangements.

The factors mentioned above are capable of releasing growth impulses of large magnitudes more than sufficient to enable this region to play a major role in the economic development and progress of our important Eastern neighbors and impress upon them the need to look at India as an economic partner than a threat and capable of engineering mutually beneficial prosperity and progress. It is within the gift of this region to become a great game changer and convert fortunes manifold times.

PM Heblikar

Pm heblikar, a former special secretary,

Government of india, is currently

the managing Trustee, institute of

Contemporary studies Bangalore (iCsB).


no

rtH

-EA

st

ind

iA

National Security ImperativesViewed from a national perspective, there is

need for a major effort to convert the inherent strength of this region into a powerful tool for our economic progress and socio-political interaction. It is a powerful tool that links itself to India’s national security objectives and interests. This, therefore, underlines the creation of a cogent policy to bring the Northeast region under the national security architecture and not merely allow it to continue as an attached office of the Home Ministry.

The National Security Council (NSC), which is at the forefront of efforts to evolve security policies in all its dimensions to be in tune with the ever-changing international

security environment, would do well to focus attention specifically to this region which has been neglected so far, hold periodic interaction in this region with the cross-section of the population for real-time assessments and solutions. This would equally apply to the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and

the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). An informal visit by the then Chairman, JIC, to Shillong in 1994, was most useful to help draw up a comprehensive assessment of the security situation in the region especially when there were tensions on a large-scale brewing in Manipur and sporadic increase in activities of the ethnic insurgents.

Synergies of several ministries dealing with the military, trade and commerce, transport and communications, tourism and culture, finance and planning must constitute the advisory arm so as to ensure that plans and programs are geared to being result oriented and buttress the activities of central agencies such as the North Eastern Council (NEC) and others. The time has come for recognizing the need for specific attention to this region in order to formulate policies and programs which can bring about a sharp upward inflexion in the growth curve and prospects for the rapid multi-dimensional advancement of this entire region, away from the daily concerns of insurgency and unrest.

Growth and prosperity are far better remedies for insurgency as there will be a manifold increase in job creation than ever before in the Northeast region.

Proactive Approach to Ensure PeaceThe ‘Look East Policy’ has also to rely on

the domestic players of the constituent states of the Northeast region. They have an equal, if not more important, stake and role in this kind of a comprehensive endeavor. The political leadership of this region must be integrated with efforts to define, promote and participate in related activities. During high level interactions between India and Myanmar or Bangladesh, Nepal, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Japan, South Korea and Japan, the involvement of two to three regional Chief Ministers is important. They would be the best ‘Ambassadors’, whose presence in government delegations will be a powerful force multiplier. This could also apply to other ‘agents of change’ such as Universities, Chambers of Commerce and Industries, think-tanks and possibly others.

There is currently comparative peace and calm in the Northeast region. This does not however convey the sense of the situation being under complete control from the point of view of national security. What is worrying is the lack of progress on converting existing fragile ceasefire agreements with major ethnic groups, into viable and long term political agreements with firm commitment from all concerned to observe the elements of the agreement in letter and spirit. Mizoram is a good example where there are visible ‘peace dividends in all fields’. The peace discussion with the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) has dragged on over several years without any solution is sight. Likewise is the case with the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). The delay is being seen as political necessity for the parties in power for their narrow tactical ends.

There are other groups that are keen on ceasefire but progress is limited. Even the post-ceasefire and agreement arrangements are lacking in purpose and direction. The insurgency situation in this region is not conducive to rapid economic progress and as long as it remains unbridled, it will remain a major stumbling

A considerable deal of current ethnic turmoil in the northeast region can be attributed to the anxiety to preserve ethnic identities…


no

rtH

-EA

st

ind

iA

block to development. The situation in Manipur is an example of this drift. With Myanmar and Bangladesh cooperating with India on this subject, the existing insurgency has taken the form of an internal movement which necessitates a ‘carrot and stick policy’.

Containing Ethnic TurmoilA considerable deal of current ethnic turmoil

in the Northeast region can be attributed to the anxiety to preserve ethnic identities. The British dealt with this complex issue through administrative measures and adherence to the basic principles of rule of law and strict enforcement of regulations. The founding fathers of Independent India were aware of the complex ethnic mix in this entire region and formulated and implanted several policies and programs to address the political and economic aspirations of the people and each of the ethnic groups.

The system of autonomous councils and regional councils was introduced through acts of parliament to address the perceived feeling of alienation. Experience has shown that these have not met the noble intentions as enshrined in the constitution. Several experts with life-long experience in the Northeast region opine that it is time to look at the possibility of constituting Zila Panchayats and Gram Panchayats in all Northeastern states on the same lines as in the rest of the country with the safeguards under Articles 242 and 243 of the constitution provided to these bodies. The need for further decentralisation of the administrative machinery in this region has perhaps become inevitable.

Traditionally, the Northeast region has come to be associated with insurgency and related ethnic issues. There is need to create a favorable ambience for better understanding of the situation and bring to the fore the other positive aspects. A shared integration with the rest of India and vice versa is therefore not an option but an absolute necessity. Another is the need is to create job opportunities for the youth of this region in the Gulf especially in the hospitality sector, business and commercial segments of the economy, secretarial and IT sector.

It will be seen that in the UAE, a majority of the salespersons and hospitality industry

professionals are from the Philippines. Compared to them, our youth from the Northeast region are better educated and carry themselves well in a professional environment. This has multiple benefits. The Ministry of Overseas Indians and Ministry of External Affairs could examine this aspect.

Revamping the Military and Security Architecture

There has been no major change in the military architecture in India’s Northeast region since 1962. In a strategic sense, India has remained more in a defensive posture all along the sensitive borders. The Northeast region has more than one persona. Traditionally, it has been associated with ethnic insurgency that has been aided and abetted by inimical forces operating from sanctuaries in India’s neighborhood. The other, most importantly, relates to the Tibet issue, covering Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. Thus, a bulk of India’s security and other strategic assets are heavily deployed to address twin threats to national security. Time has therefore become opportune for the national defence planners to consider bifurcation of the existing arrangements in this region into new sectoral responsibilities especially with a view to the future.

China remains the major worry for India’s strategic planners. Developments in our smaller neighbors namely Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Nepal require constant attention. India’s existing security template merits changes both in form and substance. Militarily speaking, a new dispensation is suggested wherein the present Eastern Command based at Kolkata would need to be split into areas of responsibility. Number 3 Corps at Dimapur could be relieved by the Assam Rifles of its counter-insurgency responsibilities in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya.

The vastly expanded Assam Rifles must see a major make-over in its operational role and break out of the Army’s shadow. With the footprints of the Border Security Force becoming more visible on the entire India-Myanmar border, the Assam Rifles need to

the indo-Himalayan belt has become a

covert battleground for intrigue and machinations…


no

rtH

-EA

st

ind

iA

play a major role in the Northeast region. It also has a significant position to provide safety and security to India’s ‘Look East Policy’. This force needs to remain in its traditional role, otherwise it could be deployed in the Left Wing Conflict Zones if one goes by reports that

the MHA is looking at this option. The Dimapur Corps could do well to move to Upper Assam towards Dinjan and Tezu. A reorganisation of military assets in this sensitive area will create

developmental opportunities in not only Upper Assam but also in Arunachal Pradesh. It will be a force multiplier in many ways and hasten developmental activities.

This realignment has to take into account the deployment of the Central Police Organisations (CPO) and intelligence agencies in this region especially related to the security of Arunachal Pradesh and Upper Assam in the context of Tibet is important. The gap left by the transfer of the SSB to MHA, following the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, is yet to be filled. The hasty decision to turn the SSB into a CPO will have its effects on India’s capability to undertake covert operations in the Indo-Himalayan belt. There is also diminution in other covert areas as well. A fresh look at this aspect is advocated. The founding fathers of the covert architecture in the 1960s understood the enormity of the situation. In essence, there is no change in the original assessment; things may just have gotten worse.

Indian army formations deployed in the West for counter-insurgency role provide specific induction training to units at designated battle schools. The same matrix could work wonders for them on the Tibet border. The need to familiarise officers and men about Chinese methods of overt and covert warfare, to understand Chinese psy-ops, strategy and tactics is very important. In simple terms, dedicated schools of instruction at Corps level could be tried out on an experimental basis. Unlike Pakistan, China requires special understanding given the cultural and other differences. For that matter, there is a need to inculcate more Tibet-oriented study and

understanding in all government agencies charged with the task of ensuring safety and security of Arunachal Pradesh.

The Indo-Himalayan belt has become a covert battleground for intrigue and machinations. The large Tibetan community in India is being increasingly targeted by Chinese agencies with the intention to split its unity and create divisions. The issue of the 17th Gyalwa Karmapa continues to be unresolved in the sensitive border state of Sikkim and has resulted in more serious problems. Further, there is the problem of the mushroom growth of Buddhist monasteries in different parts of India. The existence of some of these especially in Ladakh and in the proximity to the Siliguri Corridor is noteworthy. Most of these are not registered entities, as one would require them under the relevant sections of law. Some of these too have foreigners who are office bearers and are not or do not register with the local authorities. This is dangerous from a security point of view. The access to large funds by these monasteries is a matter of concern as is their ability to own or purchase land. Both are in violation of regulations on the subject.

The other major area of concern is heavy investments by Chinese agencies in India’s communications and power generation sector. The role of Huwaei, ZTE, China Telecom and the Wuhan Research Institute has been flagged at various fora by experts, both civil and military. The cyber threat posed by China is far greater than ever imagined. India is not the only country threatened by this menace. Its weaker and smaller neighbors are even more vulnerable and perhaps incapable to protect themselves. This too will impact India.

The area surrounding the Northeast region is gradually becoming internationally active. Myanmar’s return to the international mainstream has opened up many challenges for India; the most important one being to keep the process of democratisation on track. Myanmar holds the key to peace and security on the Indian side of the border.

A new approach to this region is now unavoidable and must become a comprehensive part of India’s national security policy.

the area surrounding the northeast region is gradually becoming internationally active…


dE

co

din

G t

HE

dr

AG

on

’s G

AM

E P

lAn

China’s Strategic Vision

THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) emerged from a ‘century of humiliation’ in 1949 after years of war

against the Japanese and the KMT. From the outset, the new regime set about consolidating its ‘homeland core’. It swiftly seized control over the outlying buffer territories, gateways to invasion of the ‘core’ in times past, including Xinjiang and Tibet. During the Korean War, when the aggressor North Koreans were driven up to the yalu River, China’s ultra-sensitivity to the buffer sparked its massive intervention which repulsed UN Forces South of the 38th parallel.

After Mao, China was fortunate to have a far-sighted, visionary leader in Deng Xiaoping. He synergised military and governance by combining Chairmanship over CMC with the position of CCP General Secretary and President. Thus, both Hu Jintao and his successor had several years of exposure to Military Affairs before assuming control of the Party, the Government and the CMC. Xi Jinping is the first leader to be elected to all three posts at the same meeting in March 2013. A ‘princeling’, he is a firm believer in the Mao-dictum, “Power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Thus, in the next decade, India could face China’s velvet-cloaked iron fist – such as the Depsang intrusion in April-May 2013.

Deng instituted the four-modernisations, which not only pulled China out of the morass

decoding the dragon’s Game PlanMaj Gen Pushpendra Singh

Over the past decades, we have constantly tried to mollify the Dragon. In the bargain, we have been inveigled into surrendering our bargaining chips one by one. Therefore, we should now strive to reverse some of this damage. Just as the Chinese have several times changed their stance on Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Jammu & Kashmir, we too must subtly pull back from our commitment to the ‘One-China’ principle, support Tibetan autonomy and the Uyghur’s struggle for religious freedom. Taking a leaf from the Dragon’s book, this shift should be gradual and subtle – over years rather than months.

that followed the Cultural Revolution, but also catapulted it to the status of a world-power in just twenty-odd years. While China’s galloping economy was transforming it into the manufacturing hub of the world, Deng advised ‘tanguang-yanghui’ – “Hide your strength and bide your time.” Hence, by September 2008, when the sub-prime crisis hit USA, China held the largest share of US sovereign debt - $618 billion. Sensing that the middle-kingdom’s rise was now unassailable, Hu Jintao shed ‘tanguang-yanghui’ and began flexing China’s diplomatic and military muscle.

As China’s super-charged economy’s appetite for energy and mineral resources swelled, she extended her strategic frontiers in phases. First, China laid claim to the oil-rich continental shelf - the North Pacific adjacent to Japan and Russia, the Taiwan Straits, the East and South China Seas right up to the Strait of Malacca. Later, when China began exploiting the Dark Continent she cast her nets to include Middle East and Africa. In December 2008, a Chinese naval task force unilaterally sailed into the Indian Ocean for anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Rear Admiral yin Zhou then proposed that the People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) set up a permanent base in the Gulf of Aden to support these operations. In January 2009, Huang Kunlun, writing in the Liberation Daily, articulated the theory of boundless national interests, “Wherever our national interests have extended so will the

maj Gen Pushpendra singh,

former GoC, mPB&o area.


dE

co

din

G t

HE

dr

AG

on

’s G

AM

E P

lAn

mission of our armed forces.” By April that year, during PLAN’s international fleet review, a Chinese Senior Admiral had a proposal for visiting US Admiral Keating, “Why don’t you take Hawaii East and we’ll take Hawaii West and the Indian Ocean?”

China’s Military Might• One of Deng’s four modernisations – that

of the PLA was taken up as a national endeavour. Special emphasis was laid on developing its 2nd Artillery Forces and for the first time in Chinese history, also on transforming the PLAN into a blue water force. Accordingly, the military budget remained consistently

above ten per cent of GDP for over three decades. As China’s economy raced to the world’s second spot, the PLA kept apace and emerged as a well-equipped, modern and formidable military in

five dimensions - land, air, sea, space and cyber-space. While it is capable of facing up to the USA, the PLA has also developed a doctrine for ‘winning short duration local wars under high-tech conditions.’ China’s defence industry and technology has developed some remarkable weapon systems:On September 25, 2012, China commissioned its first indigenous, ultra-modern aircraft carrier, Liaoning.

• The hull of China’s first Xia-class SSBN was laid in 1978, launched in 1981 and commissioned by 1983. Its second generation Jin-class SSBN, which was launched in 2004, carries 12x8,000km Jualang-2 SLBMs and poses a 24x7 strategic deterrent to the US and India. Four vessels are already in service and more could be deployed even as the development of its third-generation SSBN nears completion.

• Development of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles - mini-subs to be used either for swarm-attacks or reconnaissance is at an advanced stage.

• China has developed the world’s first hypersonic (Mach 10) anti-shipping

ballistic missile, capable of targeting a moving aircraft carrier strike-group at long range.

• China’s fifth-generation stealth fighter, the J-20, made its maiden flight on January 11, 2011, and is expected to be operational in 2017–2019.

• China is the only nation to actually demonstrate anti-satellite weapon capability.

Indian Strategic MuddleIn sharp contrast, Nehru’s total lack of

strategic sense became apparent soon after independence when the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) General Lockhart, sought the Government’s approval for a defence directive. “We don’t need a defence plan. Our policy is ahimsa; we foresee no military threats,” he told the astonished General, “The police are adequate for our security.” Only weeks later, the Army had to be rushed in to save Kashmir. But Nehru remained unfazed. When the Army was on the verge of completely routing the Pakistani invaders from Jammu & Kashmir, he ordered a halt to operations and went to the UN instead thereby creating what has turned out to be a permanent security nightmare.

The British had striven to bolster Tibetan autonomy to reinforce the buffer with China. On November 07, 1950, Sardar Patel warned Nehru about China’s inimical intentions, barely a month after she had invaded Tibet. Ignoring Patel, Nehru conceded China’s suzerainty over Tibet. In January 1951, the Assam government received reports about Chinese armed incursions across the Tibetan border and requested the C-in-C, General Cariappa to staunch the threat. But Nehru chided him, “It is not the business of the C-in-C to tell the PM who is going to attack us where. In fact, the Chinese will defend our NEFA Frontier. you mind only Kashmir and Pakistan.” In 1952, he down-graded India Mission’s status at Lhasa to a Consulate-General and later withdrew military ‘escorts’ at the trade posts at yatung, Gyantse and Gartok. All this without seeking any reciprocity or assurances on the boundary!

Then, in a volte-face in July 1954, he ordered Secretary General MEA to reprint the British-

china is the only nation to actually demonstrate anti-satellite weapon capability...


dE

co

din

G t

HE

dr

AG

on

’s G

AM

E P

lAn

era maps by excluding references to any ‘claim lines’ or undefined borders. These would now depict a clear Indo-Tibet boundary and become the basis for negotiating the boundary question. However, he did not consider it necessary to equip the Army for defence of these new-fashioned borders. Thus, India came to know about the road through Aksai Chin, 200 km within our area, only through an article in a Chinese magazine in 1957.

The neglect of the Armed Forces and their demoralisation under Krishna Menon’s acid tongue came to a head in 1959 with the resignation of General Thimayya - one of the saviours of Kashmir. A shaken Nehru sweet-talked the Gentleman General, appealed to his patriotic spirit and promised to correct all the wrongs, thus deceiving him into withdrawing the resignation. Next morning, he talked disparagingly of him in the Parliament.

In 1962, Nehru announced to the media that he had asked the Army ‘to throw the Chinese out!’ But the Army Chief was informed later, thereby completely marginalising the Services and triggering the 1962 debacle.

Indian Defence Forces: Apathy and Neglect

After a brief wake-up period during which India successfully withstood two Pakistani aggressions, for 35 years it was back to neglect of the Armed Forces with the defence budget languishing below two per cent of GDP – an eighth of Chinese allocations. The results are stark; a story of Babustani apathy and turf wars, missed deadlines and severe strategic disparities:

• The Indian Navy, which needs a three-carrier fleet, is down to one – repeatedly-refitted senior-citizen, Viraat. The inordinately delayed induction of the ‘Gorshkov’, has forced Viraat into yet another extension, impairing the capability to protect our sea-lanes.

• Arihant, India’s first generation nuclear submarine is yet to begin sea-trials. Weapon-trials will ensue and only then would the vessel become operational. Arihant will ultimately carry 12x700km

SLBMs. Meanwhile, even the conventional su b ma r i n e p ro g ra m m e ha s b e e n asphyxiated. Today, we are at two-thirds the submarine-strength sanctioned in 1985, while Chinese capability has made quantum strides.

• The Indian Air Force (IAF) is down to 31 squadrons and its transport fleet whittled to 40 per cent. This will shrink to 28 squadrons since negotiations are still on for the ten-billion dollar contract for 126 Rafale fourth-generation combat aircraft, first proposed by the IAF in 2001. Hence the aircraft is unlikely to be operationalised for at least another decade. As regards the fifth-generation fighter, the contract for joint development with Russia is yet to be signed.

• In a replay of the 1959 humiliation of General Thimayya, MoD’s ham-handed dealing of a personal matter compelled the COAS, General VK Singh to approach the Supreme Court in 2012. Then, attempting to embarrass him, the bureaucracy leaked his top secret letter drawing the PM’s attention to appalling deficiencies and obsolescence in the Army’s in-service arsenal. The leak blew the lid off the Government’s neglect of the force and caused a nation-wide furore. Immediate fire-fighting meetings were called by the Minister of Defence to give the impression that long-delayed action was finally being taken. However, one year later the actual state has only deteriorated further.

• Modernisation of the Indian Army has made no headway, be it in the regime of artillery, air-defence systems, night fighting capability or attack helicopters to name just very few of the long list of proposals languishing under Babustan’s strangulation.

• While China has developed first-class infrastructure in Tibet, Babustan has held-up 57 of 73 strategic roads due for completion by 2012-2013 conceding China

in February 2013, the chinese formally took over operations

of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port...


dE

co

din

G t

HE

dr

AG

on

’s G

AM

E P

lAn

a major advantage. The Government is belatedly thinking about removing these hurdles.

The Dragon’s Game PlanThe Dragon has adapted the ancient strategy

of t’an shih against India. This strategy strives to achieve long-term goals in thousands of patient slices. Each cut is calibrated to provoke only a minor reaction - more like termites rather than a fire-breathing dragon! This game has been active for over fifty years and gained momentum after Hu took charge and discarded Deng’s advice to remain turret down.

The strategy has worked at several levels as elaborated on in the succeeding paragraphs.

Internal Dissension A Chinese think-tank recently advocated

what China has been doing for the last sixty years - fragmenting India by stoking internal dissensions. To cloak her role, she has roped in Pakistan, Myanmar and Nepal to do the actual dirty work. Pakistan’s ISI funnels Chinese munitions and materiel to the Naxals through Nepal. China sympathisers in India in the government, media and academia, support Beijing’s moves like CPM’s support to China in 1962!

The Pakistan Card To tie India to South Asia, China has armed

and supported Pakistan including with nuclear weapons and missile technology. In further defiance of international non-proliferation norms, China has recently decided to build a 1000MW nuclear power plant in Pakistan. This will provide Pakistan with plutonium for its tactical nukes with which it hopes to stymie Indian conventional superiority; somewhat akin to the NATO versus Warsaw Pact scenario.

Seaward Squeeze China’s string-of-pearls is designed to choke

India’s sea-lanes while securing the passage of oil and other natural resources through the Indian Ocean. In February 2013, the China formally took over operations of Gwadar Port

in Pakistan located at the entrance to the Gulf of Hormuz. China has virtually pushed India out of Sri Lanka and is set to unveil its carrier-capable Hambantota Port. Bangladesh is next on their radar. India’s efforts to prevent Chinese expansion by reaching out to these two traditional friends have been nullified by sub-regional ‘netas’ whose massive egos and self-interests dwarf those of Bharat Mata. Myanmar has already provided facilities to the PLAN for a Maritime Army and airbase at Coco Islands enabling Chinese submarines to operate close to Indian waters.

Siege of Land Frontiers China has also successfully besieged India

along its land frontiers. The Quinghai-Lhasa railway, which came up after a monumental 22-year effort, facilitated unprecedented infrastructure development in Tibet – highways, airports and military bases. China then wrested Nepal from India’s orbit and plans to extend the railway from Lhasa to yadong and Zhangmu on two flanks of the Nepalese border. In addition to the Lhasa-Kathmandu road link, the Chinese have built a four-lane concrete highway through Eastern Nepal terminating just a few kilometres from the Siliguri corridor.

During his visit to Islamabad in May 2013, the Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang reiterated the plan to build the China-Pakistan Economic road-cum-rail corridor (Gwadar – Gilgit/Baltistan onto Xinjiang) for which a Chinese division is reportedly located in this restive region.

To the East, exploiting their military dominance over India, China has escalated the depth and frequency of border intrusions - the latest being the 23-km intrusion into the Depsang plateau.

Recently, Chengdu Mil i tar y Region conducted three major exercises close to the Indo-Tibet border during which its latest fighters validated the use of high altitude airfields in Tibet and Xinjiang.

China has taken control of major Indian rivers originating in Tibet. Zangmu Hydropower Station harnesses the Brahmaputra with five planned dams. The Sutlej has been dammed

the chinese have built a four-lane concrete highway through Eastern nepal terminating just a few kilometres from the siliguri corridor...


dE

co

din

G t

HE

dr

AG

on

’s G

AM

E P

lAn

at Parechu and Indus at Senge-Ali. Since India currently lacks the capability intervene effectively, China has a virtual stranglehold over North Indian rivers.

Diplomatic Manoeuvres Similar to the gradual slices into India’s

land frontiers, Beijing’s diplomatic stance too has made steady inroads into issues of core concerns of India as outlined below.

Package ProposalIn 1960, Zhou Enlai proposed that China

was ready to accept the Indian boundary alignment in the East, if India reciprocated in the West. In 1981, after both sides had tried to normalise relations, Deng once again made a similar informal proposal to a visiting Indian Member of Parliament. This time, he added that it would be on the basis of actual control of the borders. India felt that the proposal amounted to legitimising Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin in return for their acceptance of what is already legally in India’s possession. Hence India proposed a sector-by-sector examination of historical records. Thereafter, the Chinese hardened their overall stance.

Tawang Tract In 1985, Chinese negotiators claimed the

Tawang tract South of McMahon line. In 1986 Li Shuquing, Vice Foreign Minister (FM) stated, “The Eastern sector is the biggest dispute and key to the overall situation.” Two years later, Vice Prime Minister Wu Xuequian indicated that India would need to make concessions in the East.

Sumdorong Chu In 1986, the Chinese intruded across the

McMahon Line near Sumdorong Chu. Indian forces moved swiftly and occupied the heights dominating the Chinese positions. Deng Xiaoping warned that China would have to “teach India a lesson” if it did not pull back but Delhi held firm. India’s prompt military response and rare political resolve induced China to soften its stand. A beaming Deng Xiaoping then received the Indian Prime Minister in Beijing in December 1988. The conciliatory approach culminated in Wen Jiabao’s visit in 2005, which was the first ‘Strategic Dialogue’ in the Sino-Indian context.

Both sides agreed that a holistic view for a political settlement was the answer to the boundary question. The nitty-gritty technical approach was shed and the Joint Statement agreed that ‘in reaching a boundary settlement the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations...’ India interpreted this to mean that populated border areas would remain with their present nations.

Hu Jintao’s VisitBy 2006, Hu Jintao reckoned that Chinese

dominance over India was now secure. Hence, weeks before his Delhi visit, Sun yuxi the Chinese envoy in Delhi, claimed “...the whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. And Tawang is only one of the places in it. We are claiming all of that. That is our position.” Consequently, the visit ended in banalities, with only vague assurances that various irritants raised by the Indian PM would be looked into.

Intervention in the J&K IssueDuring the Hu-Obama summit at Pittsburgh

in September 2009, Hu proposed that the, “two countries should push for a proper resolution to regional issues in Korea, Iran and South Asia.” Later that year, prior to the Hu-Obama Beijing summit, the Chinese Vice FM announced China’s wil l ingness to mediate between India and Pakistan, if requested. Hurriyat’s Mirwaiz promptly welcomed China’s role in settling the Kashmir issue, revealing Sino-Pak-Hurriyat collusion. In Dec 2010, Chinese Assistant FM, Hu Zhengyue, while briefing the Beijing press corps ahead of Wen Jiabao’s Delhi visit, lopped off 2,057 km from the 4,057 Indo-Tibet boundary thereby implying that the Tibet-J&K portion did not form part of this border. China had maintained strict neutrality on the Jammu & Kashmir issue right up to the 1999 Kargil War. Hence, this represented a tectonic pro-Pak shift in their position. But it went unchallenged by India. Thus encouraged, the Dragon next established a major presence in Shia-dominated Gilgit-Baltistan.

in 1986, india’s prompt military response and

rare political resolve induced china to soften its stand.


dE

co

din

G t

HE

dr

AG

on

’s G

AM

E P

lAn

Li Keqiang VisitFollowing the established pattern of

previous visits, a controversy was created prior to PM Li Keqiang’s visit. In May 2013, Chinese troops intruded 23km across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to set up a tented camp on the Depsang Plateau. Although they withdrew after some hectic parleys, manoeuvres and unstated Indian concessions, the aim behind the blatant intrusion remains a matter of speculation. If one of the aims was to gauge how far India could be pushed to concede ground in Ladakh, they must have been well satisfied when Salman Khurshid likened the intrusion to acne, thereby discrediting India’s stand regarding the LAC. However, going by established patterns, their larger aim could well be to gradually gobble up the entire DBO sector up to the Karakoram then seize

the Karakoram Pass for the Gwadar-Xinjiang Economic Corridor.

ConclusionIndia needs to take cognisance of the

Dragon’s game plan and adopt concrete countermeasures. Foremost is the need to formulate a strategic vision on dealing with an aggressive Dragon. A review of moves by China in the past reveals that she has always respected India’s firm resolve while taking full advantage of every vacillation. The Indian security establishment therefore needs to cultivate the courage to be resolute, duly synergised with military credibility and assessments. India need to identify ‘red lines’ and share them with the three Services together with clear policies to deal with situations whenever such ‘red lines’ become at risk.


dE

co

din

G t

HE

dr

AG

on

’s G

AM

E P

lAn

our responses to the dragon’s game plan

also need an iron fist in a velvet glove...

Creation of military credibility requires the defence budget for India to at least be doubled to four to five per cent of GDP. Most importantly, a financially empowered group, including representatives from the Services must be made accountable for taking all security-related decisions within weeks rather than decades, as at present. Inter-departmental turf-wars must also be eliminated. For example, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) guarding the LAC reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and its radio equipment is incompatible with that of the Indian Army. yet, whenever a significant ‘incident’ occurs, the Indian Army has to be called in. This is a recipe for disaster and must be streamlined in national interest.

Current gaps in India’s conventional and strategic capability, particularly the delay in the operationalisation of the Agni-V missile capable of covering China and the third leg of the triad, have opened a window of vulnerability, which we must endeavour to close as quickly as possible. Therefore, self-reliance in defence modernisation must be achieved as quickly as possible by opening up the sector to the Indian industry in the private sector and foreign collaboration with suitably enhanced FDI.

The answer to the ‘string-of-pearls’ lies in creating a pair of golden fetters - the Southern fetter comprising the Quadrilateral of Democracies and other Indo-Pacific nations – an arc from Singapore to the Kurile Islands is already in place but it needs robust reiteration. This should be complemented on the Asian mainland by a chain of friendly land-powers - Russia, Mongolia, Central Asian Republics and Iran. India should promote strong, multi-dimensional ties with these nations. In addition,

Bangladesh and Sri Lanka must be weaned away from Beijing’s embrace. Obstacles created by sub-regional ‘netas’ must be tackled by the national leadership by moulding patriotic public opinion to support national strategy rather than being held hostage to parochial hysteria.

Over the past decades we have constantly tried to mollify the Dragon. In the bargain, we have been inveigled into surrendering our bargaining chips one by one. Therefore, we should now strive to reverse some of this damage. Just as the Chinese have several times changed their stance on Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Jammu & Kashmir, we too must subtly pull back from our commitment to the ‘One-China’ principle, support Tibetan autonomy and the Uyghur’s’ struggle for religious freedom. Taking a leaf from the Dragon’s book, this shift should be gradual and subtle – over years rather than months. Likewise, India should underline historical links with the Minsar Principality around Mount Kailas, which dates back to antiquity. This area is the fountainhead of rivers flowing into the North and North-Eastern Indian plains. Further, in view of Chinese dams on the Indus, Chenab and Brahmaputra, India should negotiate Indian presence on these sites for flood control. For all this, India would obviously need credible military strength, specifically the ability to intervene in Tibet.

The newly-installed Chinese leadership believes in Mao’s dictum, “power grows out of the barrel of a gun”. Hence, Indian response to the Dragon’s game plan also needs an iron fist in a velvet glove.


tHE

Ec

on

oM

ics

oF

dE

FEn

cE

Alongside the troubles concurrent and brewing, there are hopeful signs of matured realisation and some improvements in the situation. History proves that such improvements in inter-state tolerance are best nurtured under an incentive of deterrence. For the near future however, it is certain that India will continue to be tormented by proxy war and terror acts emanating from Pakistan, while being needled by China’s over territorial claims and land-sea encirclement. There is no doubt that when these inimical forces orchestrate to stalk conjointly, it cannot portend well for the Indian nationhood. As a corollary, it would be an abject failure of her state policies, diplomatic as well as military, if India is unable to deter these inimical powers to desist from their compulsive mission of undermining her.

“One sided pursuit of peace and disarmament is a powerful incentive to the adversary to intensify its own pursuit of war” —Luttwak

lt Gen Gautam Banerjee, former Commandant, officers Training academy, Chennai.

tHE EconoMics oF dEFEncEinvestment vs deterrence

Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee

The Algorithm of Defence Investment

The leaders of newly independent India had undertaken a noble mission - to once again make India a ‘Soney ki Chidiya’ (Golden Bird) as it was referred to in earlier times while bestowing upon her enslaved and emaciated people the joy of freedom and prosperity. There was a roadmap to that destination which, contrary to the current fashion of levelling simplistic insinuations against the ‘Nehruvian’ policies, did take off steadily, instilling pride among all Indians of that era. That was a path of progress, catalysed by an environment of peace and non-alignment and guided by the noble principles of ‘Panchsheel’ in devising healthy neighbourly relations.

As it appeared to the Indian intelligentsia of the 1950s, Tagore’s prophecy, “India would once again assume her exalted seat in the comity of nations ….” was coming to fruition. Indeed, in such a sublime scheme of regional solidarity, India’s military institution was seen merely as a burden upon the exchequer. But alas, the script went awry. Predatory neighbours just could not resist that temptation which had in the past enticed many marauding hordes to divest India of her prosperity.

As it had happened in the 10th century, the post-independence aggressions were instigated by the Indian State’s naive propensity of remaining defenceless and proclaiming that as a virtue! Territorial ambitions and an urge to put a chirping India ‘in her place’ thus provoked the Chinese aggression in 1962 and that by Pakistan in 1965, first in Kutch and then in Jammu & Kashmir. That chastised India to invest in her military empowerment. Thus, for the next two decades, any further anti-India adventurism remained deterred. But in the 1990s, when the world order brought the nation to a brink of economic disaster, defence preparedness had to be the first to be jettisoned. Admittedly, that had to be the worst among all the difficult options that confronted India at that time.

That set the predators on the prowl again. Our Western neighbour, devoted to the sole agenda of destroying Indian nationhood even if it meant going naked, now adopted new strategies - proxy wars in Punjab and Kashmir, subversion of Indian youth, aggression in Kargil and when nothing worked, terrorist attacks upon our defenceless civil society. The Northern neighbour, having gobbled up all lands and seas which she thought had always been under her


tHE

Ec

on

oM

ics

oF

dE

FEn

cE

india’s future will be decided by the

manner in which she deals with any form

of siege...

formal, notional or imaginary suzerainty, now engaged fulltime in boosting Pakistan’s capacity to create nuisance. This was an “all-weather friendship” between an autarchic nation and its unscrupulous lackey with the sole purpose of biting chunks of flesh off India while she remained militarily vulnerable.

Not that India was oblivious to the importance of military preparedness within the overall ambit of national security. So even if constrained by the excruciating challenges of strengthening the nationhood through investments in the fields of education, health, poverty eradication and economic development, India remained as the world’s seventh highest spender in defence. But as India marches into the second decade of the twenty-first century, the question remains whether our investment of over two lakh crore rupees per annum to maintain the world’s fourth largest defence forces is paying the right dividends. Does it deter those compulsive aggressors from their intuitive pursuit of dismembering India? Is India’s equation of investment against achievement of deterrence even? We owe this examination to the thirty per cent Indians who live in poverty and yet contribute to national security, while much of our defence allocation goes to keep the arms-exporting developed world in good health.

Adversarial Neighbourhood Hard-nosed strategic analysts opine that

India is central to an adversarial neighbourhood. Two of the largest, China and Pakistan, are overtly animus. Nepal and Bangladesh view India as the potential threat; Myanmar keeps its distance and Sri Lanka often plays truant. In building mutually beneficial inter-dependency, Bhutan is the only saving grace, analysts point out. Without delving into investigation over the alleged failings of our state-policies, the fact remains that a facade of bonhomie apart, ours is a most lovelorn region and that given an opportunity, there would be none to resist taking bites off India with due self-justification of course.

But that is the reality of international politics, a nation so central to the region is expected to have such issues. What however renders the regional situation stand out is the adversarial

combination of many poisonous factors - territorial ambitions, religious and ideological bigotry, neighbourhood nuclearisation, collusive proliferation, terrorism and high spending on conventional military muscle, all directed at India. The situation is further exacerbated when every neighbouring nation is embroiled in internal revolt in one form or another and each of them finds some excuse to ascribe their problems to India. In light of India’s proclaimed abhorrence of any offensive intent, she is but a state besieged from within and out as she is constantly undermined by internal rebellions, usually instigated externally. India’s future will be decided by the manner in which she deals with that siege. Meanwhile, there is no escape from building up effective military deterrence to keep the predators at bay.

Theology of Deterrence Strategists define ‘deterrence’ as a form of

‘negative incentive’ to control an adversary from actuating his hostile intent, aggressive or preventive. Consequently, it addresses the adversary’s psychology, beckoning him to understand that actuation of his hostile intent would fail to bring the intended profit as commensurate to the trouble taken. Truly, it is but a factual algorithm that is to be backed up by ‘convincing credibility’ of imposition of ‘deterrence of punishment’. Credibility, in turn, must emanate from demonstrated capability (like a snake bite) to defeat the adversary’s aggression or defensive opposition (like a porcupine’s quill) as the case may be. This is the easier, tangible part of deterrence but costly to achieve in measurable terms. The real complexity, however, lies in fine-tuning the ‘intangible factors’ that decide its effectiveness in convincing the adversary to desist from undertaking inimical acts even if ritualistic sabre-rattling goes on. To succeed, persuasions of this nature require in-depth knowledge of the target society’s values and the construct of its rationalities as well as delusions.

For the developed – nay, dictating world, deterrence is aimed at keeping their advantages secured from potential obstructionists.


tHE

Ec

on

oM

ics

oF

dE

FEn

cE

credibility must emanate from demonstrated capability to defeat the adversary’s aggression or defensive opposition...

This they are in position to do through the imposition of political, economic and military deterrence, the last recourse being considered to be the most immediate and effective. In rest of the situations, deterrence subsists on the powerful adversary’s ‘self-deterrence’ which may be borne out of political compulsions, civilised sentiments or fear of falling into a sticky cesspool of unending hostility. Here, the weaker party’s propensity of unleashing overt or covert insurgency and terrorism to deny the intended objectives of aggressive behaviour also plays its part, i.e. ‘deterrence of denial’ of, so to say.

Experience tells us that military deterrence has to be case-specific, to be construed in terms of the particular mode of warfare that it aims to prevent – conventional, sub-conventional and nuclear modes, for example. In other words,

deterrence has to be addressed specifically to every adversary identified and further, to each modes of threat posed by such adversaries. For example, Pakistan’s hostility against India needs to be deterred

at the conventional, proxy war, nuclear as well as terrorism levels. This one is an example of ‘complex deterrence’ that involves firstly, deterring each of the players, state as well as non-state, who sets the agenda in Pakistan, and secondly, institution of credible measures to defeat hostile acts in all of the above mentioned modes. With a perpetually adversarial China also in the fray, it is India’s unkind obligation to subscribe to this kind of complex deterrence.

Little, however, is discussed of what we may refer to as the ‘reverse deterrence’. This one causes the threatened party to arm itself to catch up with the power differential or to devise asymmetric means to prosecute its hostile designs. India’s nuclearisation after being hemmed-in from the North and West, is a fallout of the first category of reverse deterrence, while Pakistan’s official sponsorship of terrorism in India after failing to wrest Kashmir through conventional wars, is a result of the second. Presenting a despised prospect of getting stuck in a long-drawn mass uprising and irrationality

of nuclear brinkmanship, are other example of reverse deterrence.

Political theorists argue that in the contemporary era of mass empowerment, it is unnecessary, even forbidding, to capture territories to sustain national progress. One, the urge of tapping economic advantages that prompted one nation to capture another’s territory, can be better met today by surrogate means. Two, the cost of keeping a hostile population suppressed is so heavy that it undermines rather than strengthening the aggressor’s society. Notwithstanding the fact that the determinants of deterrence in our part of the world are somewhat different, it is important to note that the act of being deterred has cultural connotations. Therefore, the Western ideals of sanctity of life and liberty, preservation of societal assets and most of all, the expected norms of rationality in decision making, may mean differently to the power-wielders in this part of the world. Having been agitated by provocative perceptions, many of them have given themselves over to fanatic delusions. To them, chastising an inferior intransigent, revenge against humiliation and defence of religion, ideology or culture, may take precedence over preservation of life and property and the profit-loss equation or even their own existence as an individual, group or a nation. Obviously, Western norms may not be fully relevant here. We have to devise our exclusive formulae to deter hostility in our neighbourhood.

Interplay of Deterrence in South Asia

In the South Asian context, the key agents of instability besides the usual power-game of developed nations are - one, the common curse of internal instability; two, a fanatically obsessed Pakistan and three, a power hungry China. The latter two are bent upon possessing parts of India even if that means poisoning their own society. Thus, we find this predatory duo relentless in their mission to add new territories and control even more yonder. yes, neither will Pakistan remain content with the possession of Kashmir nor will China rest with Aksai Chin taken. To go about that business, the duo have colluded to strike at the only nation that might


tHE

Ec

on

oM

ics

oF

dE

FEn

cE

neither will Pakistan remain content with the possession of Kashmir nor will china rest with

Aksai chin taken...

some day, be capable of biting into their piece of the claimed pie.

Obviously, therefore, in a neighbourhood wherein xenophobia and predatory urge are so celebrated, there must exist the seeds of war. The other forms of deterrence having little significance in the regional context - so limited the mutuality of political and economic stakes are – the sole recourse left for India to prevent such seeds from sprouting is to impose military deterrence against both. There is little India can do to change such a situation. To protect her existential integrity, therefore, she must remain obliged to commit substantial resources from her meagre kitty to deter the duo from keep launching schemes to dismember her with military might.

Obviously, India’s deterrence has to be comprehensive, credible and cost-effective. Presently, India’s investment in imposing military deterrence has kept the Sino-Indian border-line quiet. It has even attracted China’s endorsement but tardy adherence to various Confidence Building Measures. India’s military deterrence, therefore, has worked so far. But since China is emerging from her quietude that she had adopted as a state policy to nurture modernisation and some trailers of her regional hegemonies are already in evidence, there are three issues which need deep consideration. These are: one, whether her current mood of military tranquillity on the borders will continue; second, given the feverish development of logistical infrastructure in Tibet, for how long will the tranquillity last; and third, how strong must India’s military deterrence be for China to keep the issue of borders settlement reserved solely for a politico-diplomatic solution.

With Pakistan, India’s conventional deterrence has been a success wherein the former has reconciled to the fact that her dream of having breakfast in Srinagar and flying her flag over the Red Fort would never come to fruition. It was thus that the case of asymmetric proxy war found favour in her strategy to satisfy her anti-India obsession. Here we may take note of two facts. One, India’s conventional military power was enough to prevent Pakistan from capturing

Kashmir but it was inadequate to impose a deterrence of punishment, thus allowing Pakistan the freedom to persist and two, through nuclear posturing, Pakistan communicates her belief that by her nuclearisation she has blocked India’s conventional retaliation while continuing to prosecute proxy war with impunity. Thus, while Pakistan’s deterrence over India has worked beautifully, the same may not be said about the reverse, annual investment of over two lakh crore rupees notwithstanding. The matter is not helped when we examine the possibilities of Pakistan turning into China’s surrogate nuclear arsenal in the same spirit as ‘outsourcing’ her Northern Areas and the Gwadar Port. Helpless Emperor Shah Alam II’s lease of the dewani of Bihar, Bengal and Odhisa to the East India Company in 1765 comes to mind.

Finally, we also need to appreciate as to how the colluding duo, in their anti-India machinations, manage to have the world’s power-group down-playing their pronouncements of blatant lies and nonchalant violations of international treaties and conventions, while humouring India’s hanker for just a ‘good boy pat’ is considered to be enough of a reward for the latter to stay in line. The obvious inference is that in international relations ‘naughty boy’ is better attended to than a sober one. It therefore makes sense for us to be ‘sober with a sabre at hand’.

There are many chinks in our armour that need strengthening for military deterrence to pay dividends.

Deterrence in Sino-Indian Context

Despite the occasional affront posed by hardliners in Beijing, the Sino-Indian equation is currently on a rational keel. That relationship with a great neighbour should be nurtured. The key factor in India being able to do so is the imposition of a healthy military deterrence to convince China to desist from attempting to satisfy her quest by military aggression. However, considering the high and ever


tHE

Ec

on

oM

ics

oF

dE

FEn

cE

despite the occasional affronts posed by hardliners in Beijing, the sino-indian equation is currently on a rational keel...

increasing capability gap, India’s deterrence over a much stronger neighbour, a none-too-pleased super-power in the making, would have to be rather extraordinary.

It would be banal to expect China to be deterred from her goal of ‘liberating’ her self-sanctified territories by the opposition posed by a dozen or more, of army divisions, naval men-o-war and air squadrons, the first being decidedly obsolescent in composition while the other two are partially so. Similarly, a dozen or two missiles of self-certified test-bed

capabilities are unlikely to make China lose her ‘will’ to fight. As demonstrated during the war in Korea, the Cultural Revolution and building of the great dam over the Huang He, in securing her controversial goals, China could not care

less about triggering innumerable casualties and widespread devastation. Even if faint voices of dissent are heard these days, the situation has not changed substantially.

Meanwhile, the Chinese autarchy has wisely stoked a sense of nationalistic fervour to its territorial aspirations that makes it a patriotic duty to support. Further, by coupling her economy to that of the developed nations, the Chinese leadership while repudiating international concerns, may not find any threat of economic sanctions too fearsome to deal with. Therefore, after a Deng-inspired ‘lie-low’ period of modernisation, as she gears up to flex her muscles in her traditionally methodical style, something more substantial has to be devised to deter China from ‘teaching us another lesson’.

Conversely, the aura built up by China is a perfect example of existential deterrence over India. This is so that contesting her, diplomatically or militarily, is practically unthinkable amongst the Indian policy makers. The deterrence is so effective that the latter feels it necessary to take up the cudgels of rationalising with its citizens, the former’s diplomatic provocations and regular intrusions across the border Line of Actual Control. In

contrast, all that China does to keep her border inviolable is to make occasional visits, while India can neither for a moment leave that line unattended, nor set foot across, let alone stoke trouble in Tibet.

For India to pose a workable deterrence against a severely unfavourable power differential, asymmetric methods may have to be adopted to exploit China’s sensitivities. We are aware that China’s goal is to retain power in the Party’s domain, which is considered imperative to its second priority that is securing her superpower aspirations. Both objectives are contingent upon her internal stability. Therefore, an Indian military capability that does not permit China to proclaim a clear-cut victory in a short period, ties down the People’s Liberation Army in a long drawn stalemate and provokes instability in Tibet, would dissuade China from seeking a military solution to her problems with India. China’s entrapment in such a quagmire might encourage Taiwan and other external and internal victims of her high-handedness to incrementally undermine her quest for greatness. That kind of gathering alliance of the tormented weak, as history tells us, is a sure formula for greatness to dissolve. China knows that.

Our cause is nurtured by the fact that in conventional military conflicts, smaller powers have in the past, and may in future, genuinely hope to defeat larger powers. However, a determinant to note here is that a weaker contestant is certain to lose if it adopts a strategy that is symmetrical to that of the stronger opponent; Belgium-Germany 1914, Falkland 1982, Iraq-Coalition Forces in both the Gulf Wars are a few examples. Conversely, smaller powers do better by adopting asymmetrical strategy to contest their more powerful opponent - French Indo-China, Algeria, Vietnam and Afghanistan, for example. To contest aggression from the North therefore, India could adopt a strategy that would hinge upon strong defence, offensive riposte and Special Operations deep into the Tibetan hinterland to present a prospect of, as discussed earlier, the aggressor falling into a deep and sticky cesspool – deterrence by denial.

The recent posture adopted by China


tHE

Ec

on

oM

ics

oF

dE

FEn

cE

Pakistan takes advantage of the theory that for a

conventionally weaker nuclear

power, the nuclear threshold is lower...

indicates that she articulates her nuclear power in the form of an existential deterrence. Being a nuclear state more in form rather than in substance, that is good for us since it is difficult to visualise India ever inviting a nuclear exchange with China. Danger, however, still lurks in the form of covert support to insurgents and to trouble-maker lackey – Pakistan. Thus, the conventional deterrence by denial will have to be complimented with reverse deterrence in two aspects. One, it has to be demonstrated that puppets stand no chance of success and that the assistance rendered to them would be but a sheer waste if not downright embarrassing. Two, such covert support would free India to pay back in Tibet.

Deterrence in Indo-Pakistan Context

India’s conventional deterrence has worked with Pakistan and that has led to the latter’s imposition of reverse deterrence over India through a combination of proxy war, terrorism and nuclearisation. The message is simple, “We have to keep gnawing at you. But you must not retaliate else we shall have to nuke you!” It, therefore, may be inferred that except in case of conventional war, India’s military deterrence over Pakistan fails both at the sub-conventional as well as nuclear level. The failure in the first instance is attributable to our inability to make Pakistan pay for terrorism while that in the latter case, India’s professed nuclear doctrine seems to permit Pakistan to attack in whatever manner she likes as long as the nuclear button is untouched.

Indeed it is a strange case. India, a superior power, remains deterred to the extent of watching helplessly as terrorists train within striking range, to unleash mayhem in her hinterland. Then she goes further, promulgating a military strategy that, flouting all campaigning norms, enjoins her troops to attack all over the frontline and having broken through, obviously at fearful cost, not to proceed beyond which Pakistan’s sensitivities may be troubled. Whosoever after all, has heard a superior, nuclearised military power, while being militarily tormented by a lesser adversary, taking comfort in preaching that “war is not a solution” and that “nuclear weapons are but political tools, not meant to

be used”! One may wonder as to why then have these capabilities at such high cost? This kind of suggestive statements encourage the India-baiters to perceive that the Indian leadership may either be cowed down by global powers or fail to steel itself in unleashing a decimating conventional war or even actuating its professed ‘massive nuclear retaliation’. It is a strange case of a state diluting its own deterrence! One can only sympathise with our unique predicaments.

Conversely, one may admire the effectiveness of Pakistan’s deterrence over India. Here, a smaller military power, inconsequential economically and devastated socially, has waged multi-pronged war against a stronger neighbour over many decades, while the latter remains chary of administering even a token rap on its knuckles. Further, that a recalcitrant state goes on to threaten the mighty world leaders with turning itself into a ‘failed state’ unless they keep her false pretentions afloat. Obviously, Pakistan takes advantage of the theory that for a conventionally weaker nuclear power, the nuclear threshold is lower and in that equation, the combination of tactical nuclear weapons with conventional capability goes to bolster the credibility of blackmail.

To turn the equation around, India may not need to spend more on defence. All she has to do is to accept that beyond a point, it is not necessary to be impressed by nuclear tantrums. After all, India’s nuclearisation did not stop Pakistan from intruding into Kargil nor could Pakistan’s nuclear voodoo dance stop India from evicting that intrusion. Our national leadership needs to accept that military response to aggression and proxy war is an aggression that may be recessed only at own peril. Whether ‘cold start’, ‘hot pursuit’ or retribution at the ‘time and place of own choosing’ or whether limited, conventional or hybrid, India must devise strategies to punish military aggression without being self-deterred. When credibly demonstrated, that strategy would foster credible deterrence for the good of all. Our current strategic demeanour does exactly the opposite. It rewards intransigence.


tHE

Ec

on

oM

ics

oF

dE

FEn

cE

it will take a decade or so to turn around india’s stagnant investment on defence...

Investment for Peace DividendAlongside the troubles concurrent and

brewing, there are hopeful signs of matured re a l i s a t i o n a n d s o m e i m p rov e m e n t s in the situation. History proves that such improvements in inter-state tolerance are best

nurtured under an incentive of deterrence. For the near future however, it is certain that India will continue to be tormented by proxy war and terror acts emanating from Pakistan, while being needled by China’s over territorial claims and land-sea

encirclement. There is no doubt that when these inimical forces orchestrate to stalk conjointly, it cannot portend well for the Indian nationhood. As a corollary, it would be an abject failure of her state policies, diplomatic as well as military, if India is unable to deter these inimical powers

to desist from their compulsive mission of undermining her.

As stated earlier, given the right impetus, it will take a decade or so to turn around India’s stagnant investment on defence. Meanwhile, to reap the benefits of investment, the national leadership may ordain India’s military transformation, allow professional merit to replace flab with muscle without hindrances contrived by nay sayers and save bureaucrats and scientists the burden of fiddling with military preparedness. India would do better by directly involving the military leadership in policy confabulations rather than through the medium of officials unqualified for that role. There is no need to be wary of that kind of charter; the same Defence Ministry had accomplished that task in the aftermath of 1962.

Then let the investments deliver dividends, let military deterrence keep the peace.

Acknowledgements1. “War: Past, Present & Future”, Jeremy Black,

Sutton Publishing Ltd, UK, 2000.

2. “Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age”, Ed Paul, Morgan & Wirtz, Cambridge University Press, India, 2011.

3. “Chinese Security Policy: Structure, Power & Politics”, Ross, Routledge, Oxon, 2009.

4. Ali Ahmed, “Interface of Strategic & War Fighting Doctrines in the India-Pakistan Context”, Strategic Analysis, Sep 2009.

indian Armed Forcescapt Bharat VermaVice Adm GM HiranandaniAir Marshal BK PandeyeisBn: 978-1-935501-73-2

indian defence reviewEditor: Bharat VermaeisBn: 978-1-935501-54-1

transition to Guardianship Vice Adm GM HiranandanieisBn: 978-1-935501-66-4

War in the Gulf lessons for the third WorldBrig VK naireisBn: 978-1-935501-72-5

War despatches Indo–Pak Conflict 1965lt Gen Harbakhsh singheisBn: 978-1-935501-59-6

eBook edition available on amazon.com, google play and applewww.lancerpublishers.us

Books available on www.lancerpublishers.com

0 25 50 75 100

3C

4C

50K

50C41M41Y

Job Number: BOEG_BDS_IND_2543M_AClient: Boeing

Date: 6/13/12

File Name: BOEG_BDS_IND_2543M_A

Output Printed at: 100%

Fonts: Helvetica Neue 65

Media: Indian Defense Review

Space/Color: Page — 4 Color — Bleed

Live: 195mm x 280mm

Trim: 210mm x 298mm

Bleed: 220mm x 308mm

Gutter:

Production Artist: D.Seymour

Retoucher:

GCD: P. Serchuk Creative Director: P. Serchuk Art Director: P. de Koninck Copy Writer: P. Serchuk Print Producer: Account Executive: D. McAuliffe Client: Boeing Proof Reader: Legal: Traffic Manager: Traci Brown Digital Artist: Art Buyer: Vendor: Color Inc.

Product: Boeing Defense Space & Security ApprovedDate/Initials

PUBLICATION NOTE: Guideline for general identification only. Do not use as insertion order.Material for this insertion is to be examined carefully upon receipt.

If it is deficient or does not comply with your requirements, please contact: Print Production at 310-601-1485.

Frontline Communications Partners 1880 Century Park East, Suite 1011, Los Angeles, CA 90067

195mm Live

210mm Trim

220mm Bleed

308m

m in

. Ble

ed

298m

m T

rim

280m

m L

ive

boeing.co.in

Boeing is proud of its longstanding partnership

with India. A partnership India can depend upon

to meet its developing requirements, from

surveillance, strike and mobility platforms to

C4ISR, unmanned systems and support services.

The most advanced systems and technologies

providing the greatest value for India. That’s a

partnership of endless possibilities.

ISSN 0970-2512 Jul-Sep 2013 Vol. 28 (3)

Ind

Ian

defen

ce R

evIew

Lan

ceR

indi d efence rev ie kaoboys of r&aw down memory lane b raman eisbn: 978-1-935501-48-0 indian...

Documents