india army doctrine part2 2004

7/28/2019 India Army Doctrine Part2 2004

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PART- II

CHAPTER 4

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

SECTION 13 : JOINT OPERATIONS

SECTION 11 : OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

SECTION 12 : SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS


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SECTION 11 : OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVEOPERATIONS

Never forget that no military leader has everbecome great without audacity.

Clausewitz, Principles of War, 1812.

Planning Considerations

4.1 Strategic Level.

International Environment. There exists a stronginternational public opinion against war betweennuclear weapon states on account of the attendant riskof triggering a nuclear weapons exchange. Hence, anyintended military action requires careful calibration ofinternational support. Pro-active and aggressivediplomacy plays a pivotal role in preparing a suitablepolitical environment prior to launching operations.

Aspects such as economy, trade and commerce alsocome into play in such circumstances.

Synergy Between Diplomacy and MilitaryAction. Military conflict is usually the outcome of adiplomatic failure to ensure peaceful resolution ofdisputes. While coercive diplomacy may necessitatedeployment of military forces as a prelude to offensiveaction, large-scale mobilisation of forces would normally

follow a firm decision at the highest level to adopt themilitary option with minimum loss of time.

Conflict Termination. Conflict terminationrequirements and a viable exit policy should beincorporated at the national and appropriate militarylevels as part of overall campaign plans.

4.2 Operational Level.

Relation to Military Strategic Objectives.Operational level activity must directly contribute toachieving defined military strategic objectives.


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Freedom of Action. The operational levelcommander will dictate the nature of major operations,battles and engagements. Freedom of action to deployreserves, assigning priorities and allocation of combatand logistic elements is, therefore, of criticalimportance. This freedom of action will, however, bewithin the confines of political and military constraints.While recognising these constraints, the commanderwill convey a clear statement of his intent which outlineshis concept and establishes the objectives to beachieved by subordinate commanders within his theatreof operations.

Resources. The resources made available to acommander to accomplish his operational objectivesmay be tangible (such as formations and units, combatand services support assets) or intangibles (such asdelegated authority to achieve the given objectives).These give him freedom of action to exercise variousoptions. Resources must be held at the level whichensures their most effective employment. Operational

commanders must also utilise all civil infrastructure andresources available in their respective theatres toenhance their combat potential.

Civil Affairs. The operational level commanderwill have certain explicit or implicit responsibilities forcivil affairs within his theatre of operations. Movementof refugees and minimizing damage to civilinfrastructure will have to be considered, in addition tohis legal and moral obligations to minimize civiliancasualties. Once operations have ended, initially themilitary may be the only organ available to exerciseauthority in the area and, therefore, responsibilitiesrelating to civil affairs will assume greater importance.All formations entrusted with offensive operations inenemy territory will have an integral civil affairs elementto handle tasks relating to control of the civilian

population, management of resources and ensuringstability in captured territory. However, aspectspertaining to the transition to civil control must be built


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into operational plans and be put into effect at the veryearliest. This will ensure that fighting units are relievedat the earliest to carry out their primary roles.

4.3 Tactical Level. Employment of Firepower and Mobility.Commanders at the tactical level should ensureoptimum employment of all the resources available tothem and employ them effectively to fight decisivebattles.

Earmarking Objectives. All objectives at tacticallevel should lie well within the culmination point of theforces earmarked to achieve such objectives. Theyshould be in concert with, and part of the commandersoverall operational design. Success should be achievedwith overwhelming asymmetry and the use of firepowerand force multipliers and with least cost to life andmaterial.

Methodology of Conduct

4.4 Strategic Level.

Aim. The military aim of war must be derivedfrom the national aim and be clearly defined apart frombeing decisive and attainable. Each operation andbattle must contribute to attainment of the overallmilitary aim.

Terrain Considerations. Since the Indian Armyhas to operate along vast borders of greatly varyingterrain, it is important that planning for war, training anddevelopment of infrastructure is based on such terrain.Terrain is not neutral since it either helps or hinders themobility of a force. The advantages and limitations ofterrain should be identified and exploited for furtheringown operations. Terrain appreciation is, thus, a vitalcomponent in formulating plans. Military leaders must

develop the ability to use terrain skilfully and should beable to visualise own and enemy forces on a givenpiece of terrain for maximizing own potential and


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degrading that of the enemy. Implications of terrain ondifferent operations of war are available in variousGeneral Staff publications.

Warning Period. While it would be difficult tolay down any fixed warning period preceding a war,there will always be indicators and periods in whichanticipatory action can be taken. All planning shouldaim to mobilise forces in the minimum possible time inorder to take advantage of the many benefits that sucha step offers.

Maximising Force Potential. Ideally, this impliesplacing all available resources under one commander ateach level. However, due to paucity, these may have tobe placed under a commander only for particularphases of an operation or for a specified duration.Nevertheless, jointness is a prerequisite at theoperational and theatre levels.

Balanced Force. A force must be so

composed and structured that its full combat power canbe brought to bear in the most effective manner toachieve assigned objectives in the stipulated time.

Favourable Air Situation. A favourable airsituation over the tactical battle area, as well as theoperational level battle area prior to launch of ownoperations is a decided advantage. Strategicconstraints, however, may dictate the need for

achieving objectives in a short timeframe, wherein bothland and air campaigns may have to be foughtconcurrently. As a consequence a favourable airsituation may not always be available.

4.5 Operational Level.

Force Projection. This includes mobilisation,movement and deployment. Mobilisation encompassesmarshalling of manpower, equipment, stores andtraining as also activating part or all reservecomponents as required. This involves preparation ofwell-designed mobilisation schemes which should be


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frequently practiced and rehearsed. Anticipation ofmobilisation helps the Army to be physically andmentally prepared. Flexible logistic support is aprerequisite for force projection and should be cateredfor accordingly.

Shaping the Battlefield. The purpose of shapingthe battlefield is to create conditions which will facilitatethe success of own operations keeping the ultimate aimin view. In the human dimension, psychologicaloperations serve to unbalance the enemy, creatediscord and weaken his will to fight.

Decisive Operations. Military operations whichforce the enemy to submit to ones will are decisiveoperations. These are most effective when theapplication of combat power and force multipliers iswell-orchestrated and fully integrated throughout thebattle-space. Enemy vulnerabilities should be targetedto achieve a clear-cut victory. Such operations willinvariably be joint operations.

Protection. This relates to the ability to conservetroops, information and equipment so that these can beutilised at the decisive time and place. It has relevancein both defensive and offensive operations.

Sustainment. This is a continuous process whichstarts with mobilisation and continues till the end ofhostilities. Towards this end there is a need foroperational plans to be co-related to the availablelogistic support infrastructure.

Intelligence. Sound and timely intelligence iscritical for successful prosecution of war aims. Itincludes the entire gamut of obtaining information fromvarious sources, converting it to intelligence by passingit through stages of synthesis and analysis, and thetimely dissemination of processed intelligence to theuser.


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Offensive Operations

4.6 Offensive operations are a decisive form of winning awar. Their purpose is to attain the desired end state and

achieve decisive victory. Offensive operations seek to seizethe initiative from the enemy, retain it and exploit the dividendsaccruing from such actions. These operations end when theforce either achieves the desired end state or reaches itsculmination point.

4.7 Planning an Offensive.

Enemy Information. Every possible means of

acquiring intelligence and conducting surveillance mustbe employed to get accurate and timely informationabout the enemy. Of particular relevance will be hisstrategic thought process, intention, grouping offormations, deployment and location of reserves.

Joint Planning. No operation launched inisolation can be expected to succeed in future offensivescenarios. Planning and coordination for operations

should be undertaken jointly by all three Services andeach should complement the strengths and offset thevulnerabilities of the other while formulating a joint plan.

Surprise and Deception. With the availability ofmodern day high-technology surveillance means,achieving complete surprise will be difficult.Accordingly, more than the element of surprise, it isdeception at the strategic and operational levels which

need to be given greater importance as this could, moreeasily, contribute to success.

Simplicity of Plans. Even at the highest level,plans for offensive operations, must be simple. Acommon sense approach with minimum complexitieswill help in making the plan workable and therebyensure better coordination and flexibility. This isespecially relevant while planning joint operations.

Nuclear Factor. Future operations will beconducted against a nuclear backdrop; all planningshould take this important factor into account.


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Terrorism and Insurgency. Similar to thenuclear backdrop, a war in Jammu & Kashmir may haveto be fought against the backdrop of terrorism andhence appropriate measures for rear area security willhave to be inbuilt into operational plans.

4.8 Preparation for Offensive Operations.

Mobilisation. Offensive forces shouldmobilise within the shortest possible time in keepingwith the prevailing operational environment.

Force Posturing. Posturing by offensiveforces should be planned at the highest level to aiddeception and pre-empt the enemy.

Reliable and Foolproof Communications.Reliable and secure communications, with inbuiltredundancy, provides flexibility in employment of forcesand assists the commander in influencing the outcomeof battle.

Combined Arms Battle Concept. The

capabilities of all available forces must be understoodand the cumulative strength of every Arm and Servicemust be exploited fully to achieve optimum results.Similarly, their weaknesses must also be known so thatthey can be mitigated through appropriate employmentor deployment; this will obviate the possibility of theenemy taking advantage of weakness, if any.

Directive Style of Command. Offensive

operations throw up unexpected scenarios and fleetingopportunities which should be exploited to advantage.A directive style of command gives best results inoffensive operations.

4.9 Conduct of Offensive Operations.

Shaping the Battlefield. Adequate time andresources must be set apart for shaping the battlefield

before any offensive is launched. The results achievedwill be dependent entirely upon the ingenuity with whichfirepower is delivered; this includes counter airoperations and battlefield air interdiction, artillery


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engagements and strikes by surface-to-surfacemissiles. Offensive IW, including psychologicaloperations, must be exploited optimally to demoraliseand degrade the adversary.

Creation of Superiority at Points of Decision.Absolute superiority across the board will be hard toachieve. Forces should, therefore, be deployed for theoffensive in such a manner that they create forcesuperiority at well-selected points of decision.Overwhelming combat superiority or advantageousasymmetry reduces the time required for achieving

success. Indirect Approach. The essence ofoperational art lies in planning an indirect approach tothe objective. Concepts such as the turning move,envelopment and infiltration provide dividends out ofproportion to the force employed when seen in contrastto direct, frontal or head on operations.

Tempo of Operations. An offensive should

generate such a tempo that it should unbalance andparalyse the adversary. The design of operationsshould ensure that leading elements reach theirobjectives before the enemy reserves can be brought toeffectively bear on them.

Employment of Forces. Pivot or holding corpsshould be prepared to undertake offensive operations.Accordingly, only the minimum essential forces shouldbe committed to holding vital areas and the remaindershould be grouped, positioned and tasked to conductoffensive operations to improve the defensive postureand create windows of opportunity for development offurther operations. A few salient aspects are outlinedbelow:-

Strike Corps. Strike corps should becapable of being inserted into operational levelbattle, either as battle groups or as a whole, tocapture or threaten strategic and operationalobjective(s) with a view to cause destruction of the


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enemys reserves and capture sizeable portions ofterritory.

Contingency Planning. Formations should be

prepared to switch from one theatre to another inthe shortest possible time. Equipment commonalityand pre-planned, tailor-made logistic support shouldbe ensured to facilitate such switching.

Employment of Heliborne, Airborne andAmphibious Forces. These will primarily beemployed to augment the offensive capability ofconventional ground forces. They could also be

employed for security of island territories, offshoreresources and maritime trade routes.

Defensive Operations

4.10 Destruction of the enemys armed forces and breakinghis will to fight is the basic aim of war. This can be achieved bymajor offensive operations. Defensive operations are,nonetheless, necessary to ensure the security of own forces,provide the base for strike forces and to create a favourablesituation for offensive operations to be undertaken. Defensiveoperations must, therefore, be basically aggressive in designand offensive in conduct.

4.11 Planning for Defence.

Importance of Intelligence. Acquisition ofintelligence about the enemy is as important for

defensive operations as it is for offensive operations.

Offensive Defence. Defensive plans at everylevel must be offensive in nature. This implies that theenemy should be engaged effectively from the earliestavailable opportunity with every possible means in aplanned manner. It also implies taking offensive actionat every level, as part of a coordinated plan, to wrestthe initiative from the enemy at every stage during war.

A pre-emptive strike on his likely launch pads wouldcompletely upset the enemy's strategic design, causeimbalance in the disposition of his forces and wrest theinitiative from him right from the beginning of


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operations.

Pragmatic Appreciation for Defence.Defensive plans must be made after a very detailed anddeliberate appreciation of the enemys capabilities,intentions and interests, starting from the strategic andoperational levels and culminating in the identification ofthreat at the tactical level. The emphasis at operationaland tactical levels should be on effective surveillance,gauging of enemy intentions and retaining strongreserves rather than holding every inch of ground.

4.12 Conduct of Defensive Operations.

Accurate Reading of Battle. Accurate andcontinuous reading of battle by commanders at everylevel is a vital ingredient for fighting a successfuldefensive battle. Availability of real time information atall levels is essential for this purpose.

Improvement of Defensive Posture. Everyformation must have well-coordinated plans forimprovement of its defensive posture. Depending onterrain conditions, these could range from expansion of

its forward zone to capture of likely launch pads anddominating heights. Objectives for these offensiveactions should be selected in a manner that ensuresthat these operations do not jeopardise and unbalancethe subsequent defensive plans of the formation.

Heavy Attrition. Once the enemy offensivehas been discerned, all available firepower including air,armour, artillery and other weapon systems must be

employed in a coordinated manner to cause heavyattrition and seriously degrade the enemy offensive.

Employment of Reserves. The key to conductof a successful defensive battle is timely and skilfulemployment of reserves to thwart the enemy offensiveat the critical juncture in battle.

Ferdinand Foch, message to Marshall Joffre,Battle of the Marne, 1914.

Hard pressed on my right. My centre is yielding. Impossible

to manoeuvre. Situation excellent, I am attacking.


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SECTION 12 : SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

General Mikhail I. Dragomirov, Notes for Soldiers, 1890.

If your bayonet breaks, strike with the stock; ifthe stock gives away, hit with your fists; if your fists arehurt, bite with your teeth.

Special Forces

4.13 Characteristics. The Special Forces are specially

selected troops who are trained, equipped and organised tooperate in hostile territory, isolated from the main combatforces. They may operate independently or in conjunction withother forces at the operational level. They are versatile, have adeep reach and can make precision strikes at targets of criticalimportance. They are particularly valuable in the early stagesof a campaign when they can create conditions for decisiveoperations.

4.14 Concept of Employment. Allocation of tasks toSpecial Forces should be handled at the appropriate level.Special Forces will have access to the maximum possibleintelligence inputs relevant to the task and absolute securitywill be maintained at all times relating to their intendedemployment. The principle of direct control and missioncommand should be exercised. Special Forces units will betasked to develop area specialisation in their intended

operational theatres to achieve optimum effect.

4.15 Missions. Missions that could be assigned to theSpecial Forces are given below:-

Conventional War. Strategic and tacticalsurveillance of vital targets, early warning of enemyactivity in depth areas, denying strategic or operationalassets and terminal targeting by precision munitions.

Low Intensity Conflicts. Seek and Destroymissions including trans-border operations.


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During Peace. Hostage rescue, anti-terroristoperations and assistance to friendly foreigngovernments.

4.16 Planning Special Operations. Keeping in mind thecapabilities and far-reaching consequences of Special Forcesoperations, it is imperative that planning is conductedmeticulously in order to ensure success. Various aspects ofplanning include the following:-

Purpose. Commanders should specify thedesired effect rather than courses of action.

Selection of Targets. While the objectives aredecided at the strategic level, commanders in thetheatre of operations will evolve additional objectives forspecific operational plans. Simultaneous assessmentwill be carried out by the air force and naval elements incase they too are involved.

Intelligence. Intelligence agencies will be requiredto provide feasibility assessments prior to final

acceptance of the task. Success will result from theprecision with which Special Forces are employedagainst correctly identified enemy weaknesses.

Joint Planning. Plans must be evolved jointly inconjunction with the Air Force and Navy whereemployment of their resources is involved.

Surprise. In any operation, the force ratio wouldinvariably be against the Special Forces; accordingly,

achieving surprise will be essential for success.

Flexibility. Special Forces operations arecharacterised by great flexibility. This is fostered andenhanced by improvisation, self-containment anddetailed contingency planning.

4.17 Equipping. Because of the nature and gravity of theirtasks with inherent risks, Special Forces need to be equipped

with the very best of equipment and armament. The process ofidentifying needs and the pace of acquiring equipment for theSpecial Forces should, accordingly, be different from the rest


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of the Army in order to ensure that they are always suitablyequipped.

Conduct of Operations

4.18 Security of plans, appropriate navigation aids and thesupport of air defence elements for aircrafts utilised to insertSpecial Forces into enemy territory should be ensured.Battlefield air strike and electronic support measures duringlanding will also form an important part of the conduct ofoperations.

4.19 Insertion, Extraction and Recovery. Special Forces

will be trained for insertion by air, land, sea and inlandwaterways and detailed plans for extraction and recovery afteraccomplishment of missions are vital. Special Forces will be

prepared and trained for exfiltration and extraction from thearea of operations employing various means.

SECTION 13 : JOINT OPERATIONS John S. Mosby, War Reminiscences, 1887.

"It is just as legitimate to fight an enemy in the rearas in the front. The only difference is in the danger."


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SECTION: JOINT OPERATIONS

Jomini, Precis de l Art de la Guerre, 1838.

It is not so much the mode of formation as theproper combined use of the different arms, which willinsure victory.

4.20 The nature of future warfare requires harmonious andsynergetic application of land, sea and air forces. Jointoperations are the most essential requirement of future warsand have to focus on the seamless application of all available

resources to shock, dislocate and overwhelm the enemy. Thisnecessitates an intimate understanding of the capabilities andlimitations of each Service by the other two.

4.21 Optimal impact is achieved by evolving a jointoperational plan which effectively integrates all designatedresources. Joint operations encompass all actions required tosuccessfully achieve a designated joint objective and involvesactivities relating to marshalling, deploying and employing theallotted forces. It also includes the intelligence, communicationand logistic functions in support of such operations.

Principles of Joint Operations

4.22 Objectives. Joint operations will be planned anddirected towards clearly defined, attainable and decisiveobjectives so that the combat potential of all components is

exploited to obtain optimal effect.4.23 Centralised Planning and Decentralised Execution.It is important to retain the freedom of action of own forces.Towards this end, while planning and coordination must becentralised, there should be adequate decentralisation ofcommand and decision-making to the lowest practical level.

4.24 Unity of Effort. Planning for joint operations

integrates the combat power of the three Services and theiractivities in time, space and purpose. Joint operations producemaximum application of the overall combat power at thedecisive point towards attainment of common objectives.


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4.25 Speed. Modern weapons, equipment andcommunications continue to accelerate the pace of warfare.The joint planning and execution process must facilitate rapiddecision making and action.

4.26 Joint Focus. Jointness in training, intelligence,planning, execution and logistics foster inter-operability andcommonality of purpose in operations. Inter-operability ofequipment particularly that of communications needs specialemphasis.

Planning for Joint Operations

4.27 Planning for joint operations commences at the level ofthe COSC and involves allocation of objectives and missionsto designated successive levels of command of the ArmedForces.

4.28 Joint Planning Process. The COSC will nominate theService Headquarters responsible for the overall conduct of

joint operations and issue a directive defining the objectives,terms of reference and allocation of resources. An OverallForce Commander will also be nominated by the COSC.Thereafter, planning at various levels will be conducted asunder:-

Theatre Level. A Joint Operations Centre at thedesignated Command Headquarters will analyse thedirective and will refer back unresolved issues, if any, tothe COSC for a final decision. Thereafter, plans for

surprise, deception and IW will be evolved andcommanders in the theatre will issue their operationaldirectives to subordinate formations.

Operational Level. The directions of the OverallForce Commander will be analysed to decide on tacticalobjectives, lines of operations and decisive points. Jointstaff at each successive level will facilitate optimisationand synergisation of joint resources.


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Land-Air Operations

4.29 Recent conflicts have demonstrated that spectacularsuccesses can be achieved by well-coordinated and integrated

joint operations. Though the extent of involvement of eachService would depend on the missions assigned to it and theprevailing circumstances, the inherent speed and reach ofcombat air power allows rapid engagement of enemy groundtargets within and outside the tactical battle area in conjunctionwith ground operations. Air operations in support of land forceswill be planned jointly to obtain synergistic effect in thespecified theatre or area of operations. However, all such air

operations should contribute towards achievement of theoverall military goal.

4.30 Land Operations. These will be undertaken with theaim of capturing designated objectives and destruction ofenemy forces. Availability of intelligence, deception, attainmentof surprise, speed of operations and concentration of combatpower at the points of decision will be critical for success of

land operations.4.31 Air Operations. During joint operations, air power isemployed for conduct of air operations in support of landforces operations. The objective of air operations will be todegrade the enemys air power and reduce its capability tointerfere with the operations of own land forces, deny enemyland forces the ability to move unhindered, create animbalance in his force disposition and destroy or severely

damage his surface communications and logistic means. Airoperations will be the most effective means of disrupting themove of reserves and substantially reducing their potentialbefore they arrive at their point of application. Air operationsinclude tactical reconnaissance, counter air operations,battlefield air interdiction, counter surface force operations, airdefence, air transport (including strategic and tactical airlifts),airborne and heliborne assault operations.

4.32 Joint Planning for Air Operations. All Army and AirCommand Headquarters jointly set up Joint Army AirOperations Centres (JAAOC). Air support requirements of the


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land forces plan are intimated by JAAOC to the controlling AirCommand in the form of targets to be engaged and degree ofneutralisation required along with the timeframe in which toachieve these missions. Joint Operations Centre (JOC), at thelevel of Corps headquarters is the interface with designated airbases for providing air effort and liaison with JAAOC forallotment of air effort. Joint planning and execution facilitatesquick response to air support demands of land forces to bringabout synergised effect on the battlefield.

Airborne Operations

4.33 Characteristics. Airborne operations are conductedin hostile territory for executing an assault landing from the air.These may be conducted at the strategic or operational levels,either independently or in conjunction with other operations.With its inherent air mobility, an airborne force is an importantmeans to achieve simultaneity of force application and gaininga foothold across obstacle systems in circumstances in whichother forces would require considerably much more time to be

effective. Airborne operations can be launched at any stage ofa battle.

4.34 Missions. Due to their inherent flexibility, airborneforces are capable of being employed on various missionswhether these are strategic or operational. Operationalmissions are generally in furtherance of land forces plans andinvolve close cooperation with them. Though launchedindependently into the depth areas of the enemy, a quick link-

up by ground forces is essential for the success of an airborneoperation.


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4.35 Planning Airborne Operations. The sequence ofplanning of an airborne operation is illustrated below.

Airborne Force

Chiefs of Staff

CommitteeDirective

Joint Planning

Headquarters

Air TransportForce Ground Force

Air Transport Force

CommanderAir Force

Commander

Detailed Plan

Ground Force

Commander

Joint Planning

Conference

4.36 Conduct of Airborne Operations.

Command and Control.

Army. During flight, the air transport forcecommander will be the overall commander; afterlanding, the ground force commander will regaincommand of the land forces component.

Air Transport Force. The overall control ofthe air transport force will be with Air Headquarters,represented by the Air Command in the theatrewhich, in turn, will nominate a task forcecommander.

Conduct. During the execution phase, attention

needs to be paid to creating a favourable air situationand taking appropriate air defence measures. Suitable


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deception measures and a rapid link-up are vital to thesuccess of a mission.

Amphibious Operations

4.37 Bearing in mind Indias extensive coastline and manyisland territories, an effective amphibious capability is essentialfor safeguarding national interests and creating deterrence soas to ensure peace and stability in the Indian Ocean.

4.38 Tasks and Employment Scenarios. Our amphibiousforces have the capability to project a sustainable presence incoastal and offshore areas. Amphibious tasks are essentially

categorised as assault, demonstration, raid and withdrawaloperations. These tasks could be undertaken in variousscenarios including conventional war, defence of islandterritories, assistance to friendly littoral states in the region,peacekeeping under the United Nations Charter and any otherspecial operations necessitating employment of an amphibiousforce.

4.39 Command and Control. On the basis of the overall

situation, content and objective of the operations the COSCwill designate the Theatre Commander concerned who will beresponsible for the overall campaign. He will function with anintegrated staff from all component Services. The threeServices will nominate their respective component forcecommanders, ie the Commander Amphibious Task Force(CATF), Land Force Commander (LFC) and Air ForceCommander (AFC). Though the CATF will be the coordinator

among the three Services during the planning phase, theCATF, LFC, and AFC will function with individual andindependent access to the Overall Force Commander.However, during the embarkation, movement and assaultphases, and until the ATF is dissolved, the CATF will exercisecommand authority over the ATF. Besides, the CATF will havecommand authority over all forces operating in the AmphibiousObjective Area (AOA) including those that are not part of theATF.

4.40 Planning. On receipt of the operational directive fromthe COSC, the Theatre Commander will issue an initiating


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directive to the CATF, LFC and AFC. This initiating directive is,in essence, an amplification of the operational directive andcontains the information necessary to carry out the task.Thereafter the tri-Service planning staff will prepare detailedplans based on which a formal operational order is issued; thisconstitutes the basis on which the three Services componentswould make their detailed plans.

4.41 Conduct. The assault phase encompasses thepreparation of beaches for assault by naval guns, ship-to-shore movement of the landing force, link-up between surfaceand air-landed assault forces and landing of the remaining

elements of the landing force for accomplishment of themission. Detailed planning, preponderance of firepower, andcoordination for speedy landing of tanks, guns, vehicles andinfantry in correct sequence are vitally important for success ofamphibious assault. Air defence and maintenance of logisticsupport throughout the assault also need to be ensured.

A landing against organised and highly trainedopposition is probably the most difficult undertaking whichmilitary forces are called upon to face.

General C Marshall, Planning for Sicilian Landings, 1943.


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CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

SECTION 15 : NON-COMBAT OPERATIONS

SECTION 16 : UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

SECTION 14 : LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS ANDCOUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS


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SECTION 14 : LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTOPERATIONS AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

OPERATIONS

Low-intensity conflict is armed conflict forpolitical purposes short of combat between regularlyorganised forces.

Rod Paschall, LIC 2010, 1990.

Strategic Framework for LICO

5.1 Aim of Military Operations. When employingthe Army in LICO, conflict management rather than conflictresolution will be the political objective. Therefore, operationalobjectives and intensity of operations should be orientedtowards achieving a qualitative improvement in the situation

which may not necessarily be possible in a short timeframe. Itwill be preferable to aim at low profile and people-friendlyoperations rather than high intensity operations related only tobody and weapon counts.

5.2 Timeframe.

Precedence of Occurrence. LICO may have tobe undertaken prior to, simultaneously with or after theoccurrence of a conventional war. In certain cases,these may be the initial step in the escalatory ladder ofconflict that may have to be waged with an adversarybent on promoting and fuelling a proxy war. In othersituations such operations may have to be undertakenafter a conventional conflict while consolidating gains incaptured territory.

Duration of Operations. In order to ensure

that the Armys efforts are effective and proportional tothe task, LICO will generally be prolonged and will seea large number of changes in policy and directionalimperatives. Commanders and troops executing the


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mandate will move on after completing their tours ofduty during the conduct of such operations to bereplaced by others. It should be ensured that thisshould not result in an almost fresh start in any givenarea. Additionally, any tendency to resort to quick andseemingly efficient military-like actions which mayappear to resolve an immediate local issue but, in allprobability, may seriously hurt long-term objectives andfuture stability should be curbed without exception.

5.3 Higher Direction. The apex body of the higherdefence organisation will be responsible for conducting

reviews of the military aspect of LIC and advise theGovernment on the application of the military instrument ofpower. It will lay down clearly stated objectives to Army theatrecommanders, coordinate functioning with other governmentand non-governmental agencies and monitor current andfuture changes in the nature of LIC with a view to re-calibratethe nature and tempo of own operations. In addition, TheatreCommanders may also receive direct inputs from the localadministration. As distinct from conventional war, clear-cut

directions in a LIC scenario may not always be available.Military commanders must, therefore, possess a high degreeof tolerance for operating effectively in an environment ofambiguity.

Principles of LIC/Counter-Insurgency (CI) Operations

5.4 The well-established principles of war are equally

applicable to combat operations conducted within the overallambit of LIC. Some other principles will need to be modified forthe military environment. The commander on the spot willbalance the application of each principle depending upon thenature of each specific operation. The commonly understoodprinciples of CI and counter-proxy war operations are givenbelow:-

Primacy of Overall Aim. The scope and

intensity of CI operations relate to the probability offinding political solutions. Therefore operationalobjectives will need to be oriented towards achieving a


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qualitative improvement in the situation. Clearly statedoperational and tactical objectives should be directedtowards an equally unambiguous overall strategic aim.

Unity of Effort. This will be equally applicable tointra-force as well as inter-agency efforts. Apart fromthe Army, a large number of police and paramilitaryforces are often also committed in CI operations. Assuch, it will be essential to harmonise the efforts of eachelement and therein lies the importance of unity ofcommand. Loosely defined, yet responsive, commandarrangements may also need to be made within own

forces. Popular Support. Popular support is thecornerstone of all CI operations. All actions, includingmilitary operations, should be undertaken to seek thevoluntary and willing support of the people in theaffected area. Winning the Hearts and Minds (WHAM)of the population through low profile and people-friendlyoperations is the most essential aspect of successful CI

operations. In many a way they contribute even morethan the actual operations.

Dynamic Conduct. The conduct of militaryoperations should break free from set patterns,stereotyped plans and rigid responses. The insurgentswill invariably enjoy the support and sympathy of thelocal population and, thereby, remain ahead of thesecurity forces in terms of information. As a

consequence, security forces operations will generallybe reactive. It is, therefore, of utmost importance thatimaginative and innovative variations in time, scope andmanner of force application forms the basis of all CIoperations, to dominate the area, keep the insurgentson the run and gain physical and moral ascendancy.

Public Relations. The broad spectrum of allmilitary actions must be projected in a transparent,

honest and positive manner for maximum psychologicalgains. The action of the Army should aim at respectingand protecting human rights, reducing the threat to the


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people and inspire a sense of security. Any excessesby the troops, provoked or otherwise, or errors of

judgement of commanders, must be candidly andpromptly admitted and swift corrective actions taken ina free and fair manner whilst guarding against anyadverse effect on the morale of own troops. It needs tobe noted that the role of the media is critical inachieving a positive projection of military actions.

Code of Conduct. The military code of conductmust be strictly observed by all ranks. Guidelines,issued by the Chief of the Army Staff, are given below:-

Remember that the people you are dealingwith are your own countrymen; your behaviour mustbe dictated by this single most consideration.Violation of Human Rights, therefore, must beavoided under all circumstances, even at the cost ofoperational success.

Be compassionate, help the people and wintheir hearts and minds.

Operations must be people-friendly and itshould be ensured that least possibleinconvenience and harassment is caused to thepopulace.

Minimum force should be used and collateraldamage should be avoided.

Operations should not be undertaken without a

police representative. All operations against womenmilitants or terrorists should be conducted only inthe presence of women police personnel.

Be truthful, honest and maintain the higheststandards of integrity, honour, discipline, courageand sacrifice.

Sustain physical and moral strength, mental

robustness and motivation. Train hard, be vigilant and maintain highstandards of military professionalism.


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Synergise your actions with the civiladministration and other security forces.

Uphold dharma and be proud of your country

and the Army. Guidelines for Operating under Armed ForcesSpecial Powers Act, 1958. Detailed instructionspromulgated by the Adjutant General Branch, ArmyHeadquarters for conduct of operations under this Act,will be strictly adhered to. Salient aspects which needspecial attention are outlined below :-

Strictly adhere to the laid down rules,regulations and standard operating procedureswhen opening fire, conducting searches, arrestingand seizing arms, ammunition, explosive and otherincriminating material.

Accounting and disposal of apprehendedpersons and material must also be conductedscrupulously as per prescribed rules.

Provisions of procedure laid down in the Codeof Criminal Procedure must be adhered to whileeffecting arrest, search of women and searchingplaces occupied by women.

Provide immediate medical aid to all personsinjured during operations

Maintain detailed records of all actions taken

during operations. Promptly attend to the directions andinstructions of civil courts. When summoned by acourt, ensure dignified conduct and maintaindecorum of the court.

Elements of CI Operations

5.5 Intelligence. Superior manpower and weaponshave to be supported by efficient intelligence back-up forsuccess in CI operations. Concerted efforts are required toestablish an intelligence grid; this is a long-term process and,


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hence, continuity must be maintained even if units rotatethrough turnovers.

5.6 Psychological Initiatives. Psychological

initiatives play a major role in a CI environment. The plannedmanagement of information and other measures are importantto influence the opinion, emotions, attitude and behaviour ofhostile, neutral or friendly groups in support of current policiesand aims. Themes for psychological initiatives should bechosen objectively taking into account the perceptions of theselected target audience.

5.7 Information Management.

Media. Media caters to various needs of thepeople in society in peace and war. With its unlimitedcapabilities and reach, it is an effective force multiplier.Since insurgency is a battle for the hearts and minds ofthe people, media is the most potent weapon forconducting psychological initiatives.

Electronic Warfare. EW plays a key

role in supplementing intelligence. Timely andactionable intelligence is vital. This will go a long way inisolating scattered pockets of insurgents and deprivingthem of direction and coordination from their controllersand supporters.

5.8 Winning Hearts and Minds. Security forcesmust seek popular approval for their presence in insurgency-prone areas. WHAM involves actions to gain the confidence of

uncommitted elements of the population in addition toobtaining, preserving and strengthening support from friendlyinsurgents. WHAM focuses on undertaking civic actionprogrammes to present the Armys human face. These includeproviding education, creating medical facilities, constructionand development projects in addition to social activities aimedat improving the quality of life and promoting betterunderstanding and cooperation with local residents. Further,due consideration needs to be accorded to minimizeinconvenience to the populace during conduct of operationsapart from safeguarding human rights.


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5.9 Human Rights and Legal Framework. With theArmys prolonged deployment in CI operations, there is a needto develop due respect for human rights, notwithstanding thetense, stressful and turbulent situations at the grass rootslevel. In this regard the Ten Commandments issued by theChief of the Army Staff, as given earlier will be strictly followed.

5.10 Leadership. Good leadership is very importantand will prove effective in ensuring that troops are convincedthat the cause they are fighting for is just. Leaders need todisplay great tact and patience in coping with the difficulties ininsurgency situations.

Conduct of Operations

5.11 CI operations need to be conducted in two differentgeographical contexts, more so in proxy war situations. Thefirst is at the border or LC itself through which the insurgentcadre infiltrates. The second is in the hinterland, both urbanand rural, wherein insurgents establish bases and hides fromwhich strikes are launched. Therefore, it is essential that well-

coordinated operations need to be conducted to, first, checkinfiltration and then to deprive the freedom of action enjoyedby insurgents in the hinterland; this isolates them from theirsupport base.

5.12 Checking Infiltration and Exfiltration. The porosityof our borders, difficult terrain and inclement weatherconditions provide ideal conditions for infiltration. All possible

measures must be undertaken to check infiltration andexfiltration. Incisive appreciation of terrain will help identify thelikely infiltration and exfiltration routes, along which a multi-tiered surveillance grid should be established. Quick reactionteams should be based on surveillance centres to respondswiftly to any attempted infiltration and egress. In the long run,the success rate of infiltration attempts should be reduced sodrastically that insurgents do not consider it cost-effective.Whenever an obstacle, such as a fence, is created, it shouldbe backed by surveillance equipment and troops physicallyguarding it from both sides. Jungle bashing by large bodies,


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in the absence of intelligence, is the least effective method ofoperating in such conditions.

5.13 Operations in the Hinterland. These encompass the

urban, rural and forest areas. Each of these has its ownpeculiarities which dictate the deployment pattern and densityof troops in a given area. While inhabited urban areas willrequire firm but humane measures for population and accesscontrol and selective surgical operations based on specificinputs, more vigorous combat operations will be necessitatedagainst well-established camps in rural areas and forests. TheArmy is more suited for the second category of operations.

The deployment pattern and density of troops will be dictatedby the overall number of insurgents operating in the area, theirtactics and motivation, demographic realities, public attitudeand terrain in addition to the prevailing political, economic andsocial conditions. It will be imperative to ensure own securityand undertake measures to prevent the insurgents fromexploiting vulnerabilities and, if they do so, to respond swiftlyso that post-strike get away is prohibitively expensive for theinsurgents.

5.14 Small Team Operations. Resources of the securityforces will invariably be stretched over a large area ofresponsibility. In such an environment, operations based onsmall teams backed by good or specific intelligence increasethe chances of contact with and success against insurgents.


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Helicopters can be very effectively employed for various tasksin CI operations. CI units ferried by helicopters should beemployed for tasks of decisive nature where speed andsurprise are of paramount importance particularly in remote orinaccessible areas.

5.15 Minimizing Casualties. Unlike conventional war,CI operations are seldom time-bound. Casualties occur whenoperations are conducted without adequate intelligence, pooror inadequate standard of basic infantry skills and neglect offundamentals. No effort should be spared to minimizecasualties to own troops so as to maintain moral ascendancy

over the insurgents.

Counter insurgency operations must, of necessity,be an intimate mix of military operations, civic actions,psychological operations and political/social action.

Lt Gen SC Sardeshpande, War and Soldiering, 1993.


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SECTION 15 : NON-COMBAT OPERATIONS

He who knows when he can fight and when hecannot will be victorious.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 400-320 BC.

Types of Operations

5.16 As mentioned earlier, non-combat operations are

conducted primarily to assist the civil administration to meetsudden challenges to internal peace and tranquillity due tolocal disturbances initiated by a segment of the population ordue to natural or manmade calamities. The suddenness andintensity of the event may catch the civil administrationunprepared or unable to meet the immediate challenge, whilethe Army will be able to deploy speedily, provide relief andbring the situation to a state manageable by the civiladministration. It must be noted that management of disasters

is primarily a State subject.

5.17 Maintenance of Law and Order. Amongst all theduties generally performed by the Army in aid to civil authority,maintenance of law and order is the most important andsensitive. The lethality of weapons and the levels of violenceencountered on such commitments have been progressivelyescalating with a corresponding increase in the frequency ofthe Armys deployment. Under such conditions, deployment

and conduct of the Army has to be thought through andplanned meticulously bearing in mind prevailing sensitivities.The Army should work on the well established principles ofgood faith, the use of minimum force and prior warning to thepeople when compelled to take action.

5.18 Disaster Relief. The Indian sub-continent isvulnerable to floods, droughts, cyclones, earthquakes andaccidents. Disasters include earthquakes, landslides, floods,

cyclones, wildfires, and epidemics on the one hand andaccidents and man-made disasters on the other. The impact ofthese disasters is more predominant in under-developed and


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remote areas, where facilities to handle such calamities do notexist.

5.19 Humanitarian Assistance. These programmes

consist of assistance provided in conjunction with militaryoperations and training exercises. Humanitarian assistanceshould enhance national security interests and increase theoperational readiness of units performing such missions.These may include provision of medical care, basic sanitationfacilities, repair of public amenities and facilities, education,training and technical assistance.

Planning for Non-Combat Operations

5.20 Levels of Planning. The Army carries out planning fordisaster management at the national, state and field levels.The Ministry of Defence, including Headquarters IntegratedDefence Staff and the three Service Headquarters are involvedat the highest level. Command, Area or Sub AreaHeadquarters will interact with the civil administration, policeand other organisations at the State level, through periodic`civil-military conferences. Activities related to surveillance,

preparedness and prevention should, nonetheless, continueeven during normal conditions.

5.21 Full Utilisation of State Resources. All militarycommanders approached to provide aid must advise the civiladministration to first fully utilise their own resources. Theyshould synergise these with those of the Army once deployed.This is particularly applicable for duties involving maintenanceof law and order particularly in circumstances when the State


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Government may be of the opinion that the task is beyond itscapabilities. Though this may result in the Army having to stepinto an already deteriorated situation, it is necessary tomaintain its long-term credibility and effectiveness and hence

need to avoid high-handedness will be the key guidingprinciple.

5.22 Preparation. In order to be able to respond to any callin aid of civil authorities, it is important for all commandechelons in the Army to be fully aware of the availability anddeployment of State resources as also have completeunderstanding of the existing infrastructure in their areas ofresponsibility. Equally important is visualisation of the likely

role that the Army may be assigned in a specific area, given itsphysical and social peculiarities. The capability of the Army toundertake various non-combat operations will require an in-depth analysis and standard operating procedures should beworked out in consultation with civil administration. This willensure that minimum time is lost in deployment of troops andthat necessary training is imparted to own troops in advancefor the purpose. The Army has charted out detailed allocation

of responsibilities in all areas and all civil administrativeofficials are kept informed.

Requisitioning of Aid

5.23 Pre-Planned Aid. In cases where rendition of aidcan be planned, the civil authority will project its demandsthrough the State Government and Ministry of Home Affairs tothe Ministry of Defence which shall consider the demand. Toenable local military authority to make necessary preparations,

State Governments should keep the appropriate Armyformation headquarters informed regarding ongoingdevelopments and details of requests projected to the Ministryof Defence. Such formations or units will then carry outnecessary preparations and make outline plans for the task,including allotment of troops, equipment and movement. ArmyHeadquarters shall always be kept fully apprised of suchdetails.


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5.24 Aid in an Emergency. When time is shortthe designated civil authority may make a directrequisition to the nearest military authority formaintenance of law and order or for disaster relief.

Local military authority will provide the necessary helpwithout reference to the higher headquarters inexceptional cases where speed is essential to savehuman lives and property. However, in cases of asensitive nature, prior clearance of the ArmyHeadquarters will be obtained telephonically by theCommand Headquarters concerned. The sanction of

the Union Government will be obtained at the earliesteven in such cases by the concerned StateGovernments. During natural calamities and other

serious emergencies when time does not permitobtaining sanction of the Union Government, the localcommander may, at his discretion, comply with therequest of the civil authority to the best of his ability. Insuch circumstances, the civil and military authorities willimmediately report their actions to the UnionGovernment.

General NC Vi .

Internal security related operations have assumed anequal significance as the primary task of the Army andthese have now to be recognised as such.


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SECTION 16 :UNITED NATIONS (UN)PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The Blue Helmets, 1996.

The United Nations, as a neutral interveningforce and honest broker, remains an important factor inpeace-keeping and confidence building.

5.25 India has an enviable record of participating in UNpeacekeeping missions, having earned the respect andadmiration of all parties for the impartial and professionalmanner in which our forces have discharged their duties. As astable and mature democracy it is incumbent on India tocontinue contributing to peacekeeping efforts of the UN.

5.26 A UN peacekeeping mission is formally establishedafter a resolution is adopted by the Security Council and a

mandate to that effect is issued. Based on the mandate,missions can be classified as peace-keeping (Chapter VI) orpeace-enforcement (Chapter VII) as spelt out in the UNCharter. Chapter VI deals with the settlement of disputes bythe Security Council by negotiations, enquiry, mediation,conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resorting to regionalagencies or arrangements or other peaceful means. ChapterVII covers the actions to restore international peace andsecurity with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peaceand acts of aggression. These actions may include completeor partial interruption of economic relations or means ofcommunications and severance of diplomatic relations, and ifthese fail, resorting to operations (demonstration, blockadeand other operations) by air, sea or land force of membercountries of the UN. When deciding to operate under ChapterVII, the consent of the parties involved need not be obtained.

5.27 Principles of Peace-Keeping. The basic principlesof peace-keeping are consent of the parties involved,international support, unity of C2, impartiality, mutual respect,legitimacy, credibility and coordination of effort.


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5.28 UN Mandate. A mandate emerges from a SecurityCouncil resolution and will be the basic document for themission and invariably include the following elements : -

Components of the mission and their tasks. Ceasefire or other agreements.

De-mobilisation and re-integration of the groups andforces involved in the conflict.

Maintenance of forces during de-mobilisation.

Final disposition of the forces and groups anddisposal of their weapons and equipment.

Discontinuation of foreign military aid to all parties.

5.29 Rules of Engagement. This is an importantdocument which spells out the quantum and type of force thatmay be used and the circumstances in which it is to be used.Unit commanders of the mission must ensure that all ranksclearly understand these rules. When applying the rules ofengagement the basic tenets of minimum force, proportionate

action and minimum collateral damage must be ensured.5.30 Mission Directives and Instructions. A militarycontingent operating under UN auspices is issued directivesby the Force Commander and instructions by his staff. Allranks must understand these.

5.31 Functions of Military Personnel.

Under Chapter VI. Military personnel may

function as observers or as part of a contingent. Theprimary task of military observers is to collect anddisseminate information in the mission area. Acontingent should be prepared to perform tasks such assecurity, protection, civic action and logistics. Thecontingent could be called upon to carry out non-militarytasks also.

Under Chapter VII. In such a situation the tasks

(demonstrations, blockade or other operations) andfunctioning of the contingent would be similar to thatwhile functioning as part of a multi-national force.


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5.32 Preparatory Activity. Once the decision to participatein a UN mission is taken by the Government, detailed planningand preparation of the contingent will be a prerequisite prior todeployment. This will include reconnaissance, equipping,assembly and staging forward of the force, induction, supply ofthe force in the mission area and de-induction. Various staffbranches at Army Headquarters undertake theseresponsibilities and the overall effort necessitates a highdegree of coordination and cooperation for smooth executionof the mission. Detailed guidelines and instructions will be laiddown by the branches concerned.

5.33 Training. There are some differences in themethodologies of functioning, as compared to standardpractices in the Indian Army, when operating under the UN flagand the earmarked contingent must train for these. Thecontingent will be briefed in detail regarding the nature ofmission and envisaged tasks. Before induction, contingentswill train for aspects such as peace-keeping operations and CIoperations in addition to language training (if required). Othersubjects to be covered are:-

Interpretation of directives such as Rules ofEngagement.

Contingent management at unit and sub unit levels.

Public relations, media management and interactionwith non-government organisations.

Human rights, humanitarian affairs and legal

matters. Logistic planning and contingent profiling under thenew UN policies of wet and dry lease systems.

Pay and allowances including method ofreimbursement.

He who is unattached to everything, and onmeeting with good and evil neither rejoices nor recoils, hismind is stable.

india army doctrine part2 2004

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