The DiplomatDiscussion of India-Vietnam Security Relations @http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/surveying-indias-evolving-approach-to-maritime-security/

India and Vietnam Push Ahead with Strategic Security CooperationVietnam’s defense minister is in India, with a maritime security-focused agenda.

By Ankit PandaMay 26, 2015 

Vietnamese Defense Minister Phùng Quang Thanh is in India for a three-day visit this week. On Monday, Thanh met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar. Thanh’s visit to India is intended to bolster strategic ties between India and Vietnam and comes at a time of rising tensions in the South China Sea–where Vietnam disputes the sovereignty of various islands and reefs with China. Additionally, the Indian government has framed its approach toward Vietnam in terms of its proactive “Act East” policy. Parallel to Thanh’s visit to New Delhi, Indian and Vietnamese senior diplomats held their seventh deputy ministerial-level political consultation in Hanoi.

According to a statement posted on the Indian Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) website, “Gen. Thanh briefed Prime Minister Modi about defence and security related developments in the India-Vietnam bilateral relationship. Prime Minister Modi expressed satisfaction at the progress made in bilateral defence and security cooperation since the visit of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung.” Thanh’s visit carries forward the bilateral India-Vietnam agenda that was established during Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s October 2014 visit to India. Thanh “thanked Prime Minister Modi for India’s strong and growing defence and security relationship with Vietnam, and for India’s support and assistance in this regard,” and Modi, for his part, assured Thanh of “India’s full commitment to the strategic partnership between the two countries.”

Thanh’s visit resulted in a Joint Vision Statement, outlining the trajectory of bilateral defense cooperation between the two countries through 2020. Thanh and his Indian counterpart signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and oversaw the signing of a memorandum on coast guard cooperation in New Delhi.

India’s relationship with Vietnam has been growing deeper on the security front. During Dung’s visit last fall, New Delhi agreed to supply four patrol vessels to Vietnam to improve its maritime security capabilities. Incidentally, Thanh’s trip to India comes just over a year after Vietnam and China faced a major crisis after China moved an oil rig, flanked by People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) and coast guard ships, into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone. (See “1 Year Later: Reflections on China’s Oil Rig ‘Sovereignty-Making’ in the South China Sea“.) Beyond India, Vietnam has been pursuing closer defense ties with other partners. For example, shortly after Dung’s visit to India, the United States agreed to

partially lift its years-old arms embargo against Vietnam, specifically permitting the sale of U.S. defense equipment that would help Hanoi improve its maritime capabilities.

The South China Sea has, meanwhile, started to feature more prominently on the diplomatic agenda between India and Vietnam. Starting last year, New Delhi began featuring language on the South China Sea in joint statements with Vietnam. In September 2014, for example, ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India, Indian President Pranab Mukherjee visited Vietnam and, with his counterpart, issued a statement emphasizing freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and adherence to international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In the months since, India has emphasized the role of international law and arbitration in limiting crises in the South China Sea. In the wake of last summer’s oil rig crisis, Vietnam lodged a legal complaint against China as well, demonstrating further convergence between Hanoi and New Delhi’s preferred modes of dealing with the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea.

India’s growing relationship with Vietnam is part of a broader strategic eastward push into Southeast Asia. As Thanh met with Indian officials on Monday, four Indian warships set off for a deployment to the South China Sea. The Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet deployed the INS Ranvir destroyer, the INS Shakti fleet tanker, INS Satpura stealth frigate, and INS Kamorta anti-submarine warfare corvette to the region to participate in a four-day maritime exercise with Singapore’s Navy.

The four Indian warships will also be making portcalls in Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia. In its report on the Indian navy’s deployment to the South China Sea, the Times of India noted that the initiative was a product of New Delhi’s “Act East” policy. According to one senior naval officer, the deployment will also “[show] the Indian flag in this region of strategic importance,” and improve “interoperability between navies.”

Vietnam and India-US CooperationStronger U.S. ties with Vietnam nicely complement India’s Act East policy and its own strategic outreach to Vietnam.

By Sylvia Mishra and Pushan DasJune 10, 2015

This year is the 20th anniversary of the restoration of U.S.-Vietnam diplomatic relations. Over the years, the two countries have enjoyed a gradual normalization of ties, with a major fillip given recently by the visit of U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter. Washington’s engagement with Vietnam is an important indicator of America’s political commitment in the region. Carter’s visit to Vietnam was also closely followed by policymakers in India – as Carter said at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, the U.S. is looking for ways to complement India’s Act East policy. U.S.-Vietnam engagement could well act as a catalyst for India’s own growing ties with Vietnam. Over the last few years, Hanoi’s importance has been rising in New Delhi, owing in part to the latter’s Act East policy, and in part to energy security concerns and Vietnam’s geostrategic importance in maintaining regional balance.

Starting in the early 1960s, India has steadily built political ties with Vietnam, regarding the country as India’s “most trusted friend and ally.” Notwithstanding the close engagement, though, the partnership remained largely at the political and diplomatic level, with little progress on the economic and security front. With Prime Minister Narendra Modi injecting new vigor into India’s Act East policy, Vietnam has became central to India’s strategic calculus as one of the anchor countries of India’s policy in the region.

For India, the foundations for more robust strategic and security ties were laid during former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Vietnam in 2010. Further progress was made in September 2014, with

the visit by President Pranab Mukherjee. Broadening the scope of the India-Vietnam partnership, during October 2014, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung paid a state visit to India and signed a joint statement affirming Vietnam as an important pillar of India’s foreign policy, while also concluding multiple memorandums. This evolving relationship is receiving a further boost from American policies towards Vietnam.

Laying the Groundwork

At a joint news conference, Carter and his Vietnamese counterpart General Phung Quang Thanh affirmed that both the countries are committed to deepening the defense relationship and laying the groundwork for the next 20 years of partnership. Both countries signed a Joint Vision Statement in which the United States pledged its support for Vietnamese peacekeeping training and operations as well as cooperation in search-and-rescue and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The breakthrough opens the door to greater cooperation in the future.

The Joint Vision Statement follows Washington’s announcement last year that it would lift its ban on sales of weaponry to Vietnam. While the announcement did limit arms sales to equipment that will help Vietnam improve its maritime security, the move highlights America’s realist policies of bolstering the capabilities of countries in the region.  Amid heightened tensions over China’s expanding land reclamation and militarization, senior Republican Senator John McCain has argued that America needs to provide Vietnam with more defensive weapons. These statements and overtures reflect a marked change from America’s traditional policies toward Vietnam, thereby underlining the geopolitical shifts of the 21st century.

These shifts in America’s East Asia policy serve India’s Act East policy well. Revamped U.S. ties with Vietnam provide impetus to India’s own strategic partnership with Vietnam. On the other hand, Indo-U.S. cooperation in East Asia lends stimulus to the concept of the Indo-Pacific as a seamless strategic construct. Vietnam could possibly become the focal country in Indo-U.S. cooperation, as both New Delhi and Washington can benefit strategically. Meanwhile, the India-U.S. Defense Framework agreement should serve as a bedrock that coalesces India’s future engagements in the region.

Quadrilateral Challenges

In contrast to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – which saw only a very modest commitment from Australia and Japan – Indo-U.S. co-operation in the region is a realistic proposition with a clear alignment of foreign and defense policies. The U.S. is strategically and commercially invested in the modernization of India’s defense industry, bolstering India’s preparedness. On the other hand, even though India’s trade relationship with Japan is strong, and ties with Australia are growing, little headway has been made in the area of defense co-operation with either country. Instead, New Delhi’s relations with these two important Asia-Pacific countries has remained mostly political and diplomatic.

Japan’s offer to sell the amphibious sea planes in the form of the ShinMaywa US-2 reflects its reluctance to share critical technologies. India’s interest in the Japanese built Soryu -class submarines has been one-sided and has received little reciprocation so far. For defense co-operation to progress on the envisaged lines of militarily balancing China, this co-operation will need to progress beyond sporadic bilateral military exercises to the point where Japan is ready to share defense technology with its allies. Military and political posturing without deeper cooperation in the field of defense is of little benefit to India. Australia, on the other hand, has little to offer materially and is also constrained by the limited size of its military. However, Australia’s experience in operating with other militaries in the region is something India can benefit from. Given that bilateral defense cooperation in the region has yet to gain momentum, Indo-U.S. defense co-operation will be important in creating extended links to balance China’s growing military might.

Synchronizing Cooperation

India needs to extend more credit to Vietnam: $100 million is modest given the role it expects Vietnam to play within the Asia-Pacific context. Although it is encouraging that India is proactively reaching out to build ties with Vietnam, the scale and speed of engagement is disappointing. The supply of four off-shore patrol vessels is the highlight of the defense co-operation kick initiated last year. Yet Vietnam’s acquisition of Russian Kilo-class submarines and Sukhoi aircraft presents opportunities for India to provide training on platforms it has been using for years. The sale of the Indo-Russian supersonic Brahmos missile is another avenue that can be explored to bolster Vietnamese defense capabilities in the South China Sea.

It is also important for the United States to strengthen existing bilateral security frameworks to bolster the capabilities of regional powers. American endorsement of security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines in conjunction with a defense framework agreement and efforts to bolster Vietnam’s maritime capabilities are steps that will help institutionalize an architecture that can maintain balance in disputed areas. The India-U.S. Joint Vision and the mention of the South China Sea is India’s strategic response to the growing Chinese naval profile in the Indian Ocean Region. In this context, America’s outreach to Vietnam and India’s Act East policy are symbolic of India-U.S. cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

Sylvia Mishra and Pushan Das are researchers at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

India and Vietnam Advance Their Strategic PartnershipIndia and Vietnam are expanding their strategic partnership from energy and trade to defense and space — and beyond.

By Carl ThayerDecember 11, 2014

In 2015 Vietnam will become the country coordinator for relations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India for a three-year term ending in 2018. This will be an important partnership because the strategic interests of both countries markedly converged in 2014 and are likely to continue on this trajectory.

The new government in India led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi views Vietnam as an essential partner for its Act East Policy. Modi has injected new momentum in the 2007 India-Vietnam strategic partnership. For example, President Pranab Mukherjee visited Hanoi from September 14-17 and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung made an official visit to Delhi from October 27-28.

At the conclusion of President Mukherjee’s state visit he issued a joint statement with his counterpart, President Truong Tan Sang. This statement declared “that cooperation in national defense was an important pillar in their strategic partnership.”

To underscore this point President Mukherjee announced that the Export-Import Bank of India had signed a $100 million line of credit agreement with Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance, with an annual interest rate of two percent, to facilitate defense procurement over the next decade and a half. In the past Vietnam lacked

funds and used barter and/or partial payment to procure military equipment. Mukherjee also agreed to expand military training and assist Vietnam Navy’s strike capabilities.

In addition to defense and security, the joint statement enumerated five additional areas of cooperation: political, economic, science and technology, culture and people-to-people links, technical, and regional and multilateral diplomacy. Seven agreements across a number of areas were signed during Mukherjee’s visit indicating the growing breadth of bilateral relations.

When Prime Minister Dung arrived in India the following month, he was welcomed by Prime Minister Modi. Modi noted that his government had intensified engagement with the Asia-Pacific region because it was critical to India’s future. “And it is no surprise,” Modi declared, “that Vietnam has been at the forefront or our efforts… We have a shared interest in maritime security, including freedom of navigation and commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law.”

To underscore this point, Modi went on to observe,

Our defense cooperation with Vietnam is among our most important ones. India remains committed to the modernization of Vietnam’s defense and security forces. This will include expansion of our training program, which is already very substantial, joint exercises and cooperation in defense equipment. We will quickly operationalize the 100 million dollars Line of Credit that will enable Vietnam to acquire new naval vessels from India. We have also agreed to enhance our security cooperation, including counter-terrorism.

In private discussions the two prime ministers agreed to work with Japan in a trilateral format to coordinate positions on security and economic policies.

The joint statement issued by Modi and Dung at the conclusion of the latter’s visit included important commitments in five areas: defense, South China Sea, energy, trade and investment, and space.

Defense Cooperation

The joint statement noted that after reviewing past defense cooperation the two prime ministers were satisfied by the progress made and committed themselves to stepping up defense relations.

India-Vietnam defense cooperation currently entails: high-level exchange visits, an annual security dialogue, service-to-service interaction, naval port visits, ship construction, training and capacity building, assistance in maintaining military equipment, multilateral exercises, and cooperation at regional forums such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus.

Vietnam will use the lion’s share of the $100 million line of credit to procure four new Ocean Patrol Vessels (OPVs). The OPVs are capable of performing constabulary duties such as coastal surveillance and anti-piracy missions, as well as military missions.  Vietnam is now considering whether to approach a government or private shipyard to build the new vessels. When a contract is agreed it will mark the first significant transfer of military platforms by India to Vietnam.

Vietnam is also exploring the possibility of acquiring Indian-manufactured surveillance equipment such as unnamed aerial vehicles.

On the eve of Prime Minister Dung’s visit, P. K. Chakravorty, adviser to BrahMos Aerospace, revealed that Russia had agreed to sell the BrahMos hypersonic cruise missile to Vietnam. The BrahMos missile is an Indian-Russian joint venture and requires the agreement of both governments for the sale to a third party. Discussions between India and Vietnam over the sale of the BrahMos missile and the naval platforms to carry them reportedly were at an advanced stage.

No announcement on the sale of the BrahMos missile was made during Dung’s visit or subsequently. Media reports indicate that for the first time India has sent a clear signal that it may be willing to sell the BrahMos to Vietnam. The sale of the BrahMos appears contingent on India joining the Missile Technology Control Regime first.

India also agreed to continue to assist Vietnam in maintaining common equipment of Russian origins in both countries’ inventories.

India and Vietnam are currently discussing the expansion of military training to include pilot training for the Sukhoi Su-30 MK aircraft. Indian Defense Ministry sources report that an agreement is “likely to be finalized in the near future.”

In October 2013 India commenced underwater combat training for Vietnamese navy personnel to operate Vietnam’s new advanced Kilo-class submarine fleet. India will train up to 500 Vietnamese submariners in batches of 50 over a year-long program for each batch. Pilot training will represent a significant new development.

India has provided training in information technology and English language skills to the Vietnamese military. On October 28, India and Vietnam signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to establish the joint Vietnam-India English Language and Information Technology Training Center at the Ministry of National Defense’s Telecommunications University in Nha Trang. India has also agreed to assist Vietnam in capacity building for participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

South China Sea

In an interview with the Press Trust of India on October 27, prior to Prime Minister Dung’s meeting with Prime Minister Modi, Dung called on India to play a more active diplomatic role in addressing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Dung stated, “Vietnam hopes that India, as a major power in the region and the world, will actively support the parties concerned to peacefully resolve all disputes.”

The joint statement issued by Modi and Dung basically reiterated the wording on the South China Sea in the joint statement issued by presidents Mukherjee and Sang the previous month.

The key elements of both statements include: agreement that freedom of navigation and overflight should not be impeded, all parties should exercise restraint, avoid the threat or use of force, and resolve disputes peacefully in accord with international law. Both statements supported the implementation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Finally, both statements called for cooperation in ensuring security of sea-lanes, maritime security, combating piracy and search and rescue operations.

Energy

The Modi-Dung joint statement issued on October 28 noted that business leaders from India and Vietnam identified 13 priority areas: hydrocarbons, power generation, infrastructure, tourism, textiles, footwear, medical and pharmaceuticals, information and communications technology, electronics, agriculture, agro-products, chemicals, machine tools and other supporting industries.

Cooperation in the field of hydrocarbons represents the second most important component of the India-Vietnam strategic partnership.

India’s Oil and Natural Gas Company Videsh Ltd. (ONGC/OVL) has been active in Vietnam since 1988, when it was awarded an exploration license for Block 06.1 that is still producing natural gas. In 2006 ONGC acquired exploration Blocks 127 and 128. Block 127 was later relinquished on commercial grounds.

In 2012, when China objected to ONGC’s exploration activities in Block 128, ONGC tried to return the block to Vietnam but was dissuaded after intervention by the Department of External Affairs. In November 2013, Vietnam offered ONGC five blocks.

During Prime Minister’s Dung visit to India in October, ONGC signed a Heads of Agreement with PetroVietnam Exploration Production Company Ltd. (PVEP) for exploration in Blocks 102/10, 106/10 and 128. The agreement called for ONGC to take 40 percent equity in Block 102/10 and 50 percent in 106/10, both of which lie outside the waters claimed by China. PetroVietnam agreed to take 50 percent equity in Block 128 and thus spread the risk.

Also in October, India’s ONGC signed a MOU with PVEP, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Vietnam Oil and Gas Group, for joint exploration in nine blocks located in ONGC’s New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP) Blocks. Five of the blocks are in the Cauvery Basin (both onshore and offshore), while the remaining four are deep-water blocks in the Andaman-Nicobar basin. This marks a major step up in energy cooperation.

Vietnam promised India that it would extend full security to Indian oil companies operating in its Exclusive Economic Zones in South China Sea.

Trade and Investment

Two-way trade between Vietnam and India reached $5.2 billion in 2013 and is expected to reach $8 billion this year. Vietnam’s Ambassador to India, Nguyen Thanh Tan, estimates that two-way trade could rise to $10 billion in 2015 and $15 billion by 2020. Vietnam is currently India’s tenth largest trade partner.

Vietnam’s exports to India include electronics (mobile phones and components, computers and electronic hardware), natural rubber, chemicals, coffee and wood products. Vietnam imports animal feed, corn, steel, pharmaceuticals and machinery from India.

During Prime Minister Dung’s visit to Delhi, India offered a $300 million line of credit for trade diversification and strengthening of commercial ties.  The line of credit will enable Vietnam to import more polyester fabrics and yarns from India. Currently nearly half of Vietnam’s imports of raw yarn and fabrics come from China. India’s offer of a line of credit is aimed at diversifying Vietnam’s source of materials and thus reduce its dependence on China.

India ranks 30th on Vietnam’s investment ladder. Figures for the number of projects financed by Indian direct investment vary from 69 to 84 as of September 2014. Indian capital is concentrated in oil exploration, mineral exploitation and processing, chemical manufacturing, information technology, sugar and agricultural processing.  The figures for the amount of Indian invested capital vary from $254 million to one billion.

During Prime Minister Dung’s visit, Vietnamese officials and businessmen encouraged Indian investment in areas of particular expertise such as infrastructure (railways), power generation and distribution, international bidding for projects in Vietnam, information technology, education, pharmaceutical research and production and agro-products.

Vietnamese investment in India totals a modest $23.6 million.

Space

Space represents the fifth major area of India-Vietnam cooperation. The leaders’ joint statement of October 28 called for cooperation in space applications and the launch of Vietnam’s satellites. The leaders also

called for the completion of the Satellite Tracking and Data Reception and Imaging Center in Ho Chi Minh City.

 

Vietnam is poised to play a greater role in facilitating India’s Act East policy both as a formal strategic partner and as the next ASEAN country coordinator for relations with India. India’s new role should be welcomed by ASEAN members as it will add ballast to ASEAN’s efforts to maintain regional autonomy in Southeast Asia and a multipolar balance in ASEAN’s relations with external powers.

Geo-strategic interests between India and Vietnam are markedly converging. Both share similar concerns about maritime security and Chinese muscle flexing. Not only has India offered substantial support to Vietnam’s navy and air force but political-diplomatic support for Vietnam’s South China Sea policy.

Both India and Vietnam will benefit from the development of Vietnam’s offshore hydrocarbon resources. India is seeking new markets while Vietnam wants to enhance its economic heft.

India’s new role is not disinterested. Indian strategists have long called for stepping up relations with Vietnam to exert pressures on China as a response to China’s quasi-alliance with Pakistan and the pressures this brings on India. More recently, Indian strategists have called for stepping up relations with Vietnam as a response to Chinese in-roads in the Indian Ocean region especially with Sri Lanka.

Vietnam promotes a multilateral balance in its relations with the major powers.

The Times of India

India ignores China's frown, offers defence boost to VietnamIndrani Bagchi, TNN | Oct 29, 2014, 01.30AM IST

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Away from the media glare, Indian and Vietnamese leaders agreed to work with Japan in a trilateral format to coordinate positions on

security and economic policies. 

NEW DELHI: India on Tuesday took a decisive step towards countering China's assertive power, by committing to help Vietnam's defence modernization, a move that will resonate unpleasantly in Beijing.

After his meeting with visiting Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, Narendra Modi said, "Our defence cooperation with Vietnam is among our most important ones. India remains committed to the modernization of Vietnam's defence and security forces. This will include expansion of our training programme, which is already very substantial, joint-exercises and cooperation in defence equipment. We will quickly operationalise the $100 million line of credit that will enable Vietnam acquire new naval vessels from India."

For the first time, India sent clear signals that it may be willing to sell the Brahmos short range cruise missiles to Vietnam, a long-standing demand by Hanoi. The previous Indian government was a little hesitant, citing reservations by Russia (which is a co-developer). Russia has now indicated its willingness. India will wait to enter the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) before making a sale, but both countries have decisively crossed this hurdle.

Vietnam's importance to New Delhi was evident when President Pranab Mukherjee paid a state visit to that country, almost coinciding with Chinese President Xi Jinping's first visit to India.

READ ALSO: After submarine training, India likely to train Vietnamese pilots to fly Sukhois

China warns India about taking up Vietnam's offer for oil exploration in disputed sea

Making Vietnam the heart of India's Asia-Pacific policy, the Indian government has sent a clear signal to China that it would actively pursue its interests in the region. The PM tweeted: "My government has promptly & purposefully intensified our engagement in Asia Pacific region, which is critical to India's future." Interestingly, China's state councilor Yang Jiechi (who is also the special representative for India) was in Hanoi on Monday to look for a solution to their maritime territorial disputes.

Away from the media glare, Indian and Vietnamese leaders agreed to work with Japan in a trilateral format to coordinate positions on security and economic policies. India already has a trilateral with US and Japan, but a Vietnam-India-Japan trio would have big implications for the balance of power in Asia.

Significantly, India has agreed to share civil nuclear cooperation with Vietnam. The Indian atomic energy sector has wanted to sell the DAE's small 220 MW nuclear reactors to Vietnam. While the 2008 NSG waiver for India opens it up for nuclear commerce, there are several other steps before India can actually export nuclear reactors. But the process has started.

Modi reiterated India's stand that territorial disputes in the South China Sea should be resolved according to international law. China uses its historical claim to draw a '9-dash line' on the sea which it claims as its own.

The MINT

Last Modified: Fri, Aug 07 2015. 01 07 AM IST

South China Sea: India backs Vietnam, others against ChinaTerritorial disputes must be settled through peaceful means, says junior foreign minister V.K. Singh

Elizabeth Roche

India on Thursday supported the stand taken by some South-East Asian nations that have called for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, where China is locked in maritime disputes with many of its neighbours.

In his remarks at the fifth East Asia Summit foreign ministers’ meeting in Kuala Lumpur, junior foreign minister V.K. Singh warned that “in a world of inter-dependence and globalization, there is no option but to follow international laws and norms”.

India supported the “freedom of navigation in international waters, including the South China Sea, the right of passage and overflight, unimpeded commerce and access to resources in accordance with principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

“Territorial disputes must be settled through peaceful means, as was done by India and Bangladesh recently using the mechanisms provided under UNCLOS,” Singh said.

“India hopes that all parties to the disputes in the South China Sea will abide by the guidelines on the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. We further support efforts for the early adoption of a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea on the basis of consensus,” he added.

Singh’s comments follow China sparking alarm among its smaller neighbours in South-East Asia by expanding reefs, constructing military posts, and blocking vessels straying into what it claims are its territorial waters. China claims almost all of the South China Sea; Vietnam and the Philippines are contesting those claims.

According to an AFP report, South-East Asian nations were squabbling over a joint statement to be issued on tensions in the South China Sea, with China’s allies opposing strong criticism of its land-reclamation activities.

The Philippines and Vietnam in particular were pushing for stronger language on Chinese land reclamation, which could help shore up Beijing’s disputed territorial claims, but China was backed by nations such as Laos and Cambodia, part of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean).

India’s position is not new but assumes importance given that some Asean members, such as the Philippines, have been calling on it to make its presence felt within the region against the backdrop of an assertive China.

In India last month for talks with officials, Philippines foreign secretary Evan Garcia urged India to play a more prominent role in Asia as he warned of attempts being made by powers in the region to keep India out of discussions relating to the security architecture in South-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific.

Though he did not name any nation, Garcia’s reference seemed to be to China, with which the Philippines has had some tensions in recent months. In recent years, China has been wary of India’s inroads into the region it considers its backyard. China has expressed its annoyance at India prospecting for energy in waters off Vietnam’s coast. In 2011, an Indian naval ship was reportedly confronted by a Chinese naval vessel in the same area. India denied the incident.

Of late, India has scaled up its engagement with Asean and its members.

On Thursday, Singh described the Asia-Pacific region and its oceans as “a critical enabler of our prosperity and of our growing interdependence” while pointing to other threats to freedom of navigation.

“Maritime security remains under threat from non-state actors such as terrorists, pirates and people smugglers. Incidents of piracy have gone up in recent months and we can see that developments in coastal and island states can have an impact on security on the seas. In addition, sovereignty disputes have the potential for undermining maritime security and mutual confidence,” he said.

The Diplomat

Image Credit: Flickr/ FoxbatOne

Indian Air Force Chief Visits VietnamIndia and Vietnam continue to expand their strategic security cooperation.

By Ankit PandaSeptember 12, 201523 Comments

The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) chief marshall, Arup Raha, arrived in Vietnam on Thursday, where he was received by Vietnam’s minister of defense, General Phùng Quang Thanh. Raha is in Vietnam for a three-day visit where he will meet with a range of senior Vietnamese defense officials and discuss military cooperation between the two countries. Raha’s visit emphasizes the ongoing strategic convergence between Hanoi and New Delhi. Both India and Vietnam have expanded their defense cooperation in recent months, with high-level discussions about security cooperation becoming relatively routine.

Thanh, according to a report in Vietnam’s Tuoi Tre, “hailed Raha’s visit, considering it a boost to the traditional friendship, mutual understanding and trust between the two countries and peoples, particularly in defense ties.” To date, India and Vietnam haven’t focused specifically on air force cooperation, preferring instead to build their security ties around maritime security. The specifics of Raha’s agenda in Hanoi remain obscure for the moment. In broad terms, Vietnamese reports notes that the Indian air chief’s agenda will be broad enough to address strategic security cooperation between the two countries.

In under a year, India and Vietnam have generated considerable energy in moving their strategic partnership forward. Part of this is due to Hanoi’s growing perceptions of a threat from China after last summer’s oil rig stand-off in the South China Sea. As of 2015, Vietnam is also the country coordinator for relations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India, a position it will hold for three years, up to 2018 (Carl Thayer has discussed that in more detail in The Diplomat, here). For New Delhi, Vietnam has always been an important node in the country’s long-stated “Look East” policy, which the new Indian government has recast as as the more energetic “Act East” policy.

As I wrote in these pages in May, General Thanh visited India for three days. His time in New Delhi was productive, resulting in a range of memorandums of understanding (MoU) between the two countries. Thanh’s time meeting with Indian officials, including his counterpart, Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar, was focused on maritime security in particular. Thanh’s trip resulted in a Joint Vision Statement, which set out a road map for Indo-Vietnamese cooperation on defense cooperation. Thanh and Parrikar signed an MoU on defense and another on coast guard cooperation. Thanh’s visit carried on the momentum generated during Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s October 2014 visit to India. During that visit, New Delhi agreed to supply four patrol vessels to Vietnam (incidentally mirroring similar initiatives to bolster Vietnamese maritime security by Vietnam and the United States).

The Wire

Vietnam Will Never Be for India What Pakistan is to ChinaBy Manoj Joshi on 03/09/2016 • 22 Comments

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Hanoi wants closer ties with Delhi but is aware of the fact that this will not deter China’s rise.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc during his ceremonial reception at the Presidential palace in Hanoi, Vietnam. Credit PTI

Narendra Modi’s visit to Vietnam is the first bilateral by an Indian Prime Minister since Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2001. In today’s hyper-nationalist times, Modi’s visit assumes a larger-than-life form with

some Modi ‘bhakts’ virtually seeing the feisty South-East Asian nation as an instrument of Indian geostrategy in the same way that Beijing uses Islamabad against New Delhi.  This connection is underscored by the fact that Modi chose to visit Hanoi on his way to the G-20 summit in Guangzhou, where he is expected to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

The “Pakistan”  thesis doesn’t hold water for the simple reason that no other country in the world can be so self-destructive as Pakistan is in its rivalry with India. Vietnam, on the other hand, is a very smart country which has a ruthless understanding of self interest; after all, confronted with a rising China, it has not hesitated to befriend the United States, the country that was reponsible for the deaths of an estimated 1.5 million Vietnamese in the 1960s and 1970s.

Given where it is located, Vietnam almost certainly is looking to leverage its friendship with India to offset the rising power of its northern neighbour. But it is under no illusion that it can “take on” China; India is too weak to make up the power differential and its new friend, the United States, is too unreliable.

Following his meeting with Premier Ngyuen Xuan Phuc on Saturday, Modi announced a new $500 million line of credit for defence products and a target of $15 billion for two-way trade (currently it is around $9 billion). The two sides also signed agreements in areas like health, cyber security, ship building and naval information sharing. Indian investments are of the order of $1 billion in the area of food processing, fertilisers, sugar, auto components, information technology and agro-chemicals. Indian companies like ONGC Videsh have been active in Vietnam’s oil exploration efforts since the late 1980s despite some offshore areas being contested by China.

Vietnam carefully manages its ties with China. For the past 12 years, China has been Vietnam’s top trade partner with estimated trade anywhere between $66-96 billion per annum. Vietnam is part of China’s production value chain for making electronic goods and sub-assemblies.

The Indo-Vietnamese strategic relationship – now upgraded, in nomenclature at least, to a ‘strategic comprehensive partnership’ –  is important, but its importance should not be over-stated. In terms of substance, it is actually fairly modest, beginning with the MoU on defence cooperation that was signed by the defence ministers of the two countries in November 2009. India offers 50 slots to Vietnamese defence personnel under the India Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme. India had offered a $100 million line of credit to Vietnam to purchase four offshore patrol vessels that are currently being built in Indian yards. The two countries also have some unspecified cooperation in electronic intelligence in relation to Chinese naval activity in the seas of Vietnam. India has helped Vietnam train personnel who are operating its Kilo class submarines, and New Delhi has offered to upgrade and maintain Russian-origin equipment with the Vietnamese forces such as tanks, fighter aircraft, helicopter and ships.

So far, there is no reference to the Brahmos missile, though it is well known that India has been keen to sell the missile to Vietnam. Hanoi itself is likely to be cautious on such a deal which could be viewed as destabilising. The recent emplacement of a missile battery off the Chinese border in Arunachal was sharply criticised by China.

Hawks in India virtually equate Brahmos with a ‘Brahmastra’, the mythical war-winning weapon of the Mahabhrata. The fact of the matter is that it is a type of missile in service with many navies, though India and Russia may have developed a land-attack and air-to0ground version of it. An important aspect of any sale would be the Russian view, since they have a veto on its marketing. While Russia continues to sell weapons and systems to Vietnam, it will certainly be guided by China on any sale of the Brahmos to Hanoi. In any case, with its DF-21Cs and HQ-9 SAMs, China has more than enough to deal with Vietnam.

The Sino-Vietnamese relationship

Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngyuen Xuan Phuc will visit China later this month, following up on the defence minister, Ngo Xuan Lich’s visit this week. Hanoi is aware that its partners like India, Japan and

even the US are not a match for the power that Beijing, especially with its new friend Russia, can bring to bear on it. The Vietnamese may have given the Chinese a bloody nose in 1979, but Beijing’s adventure against Vietnam achieved all its military and political objectives. So it wants to maintain an even keel in its ties with Beijing.

Vietnam has settled its land border dispute with China, as well as that relating to the seas opposite Hainan island. What remains toxic, however, is the issue of South China Sea where Hanoi claims all of the Paracels, occupied by China, as well as the Spratlys, where the Vietnamese control 25 of the “rocks”, as compared to just seven by China.

Vietnam will not get too close to the US in order to anger China and neither will it get so close to Beijing as to discomfit Uncle Sam. US President Barack Obama’s visit to Vietnam and the decision to lift the American arms embargo is a significant development, but for now, little will happen till a new president is in office in Washington. But one thing is more or less certain — the Trans-Pacific Partnership is probably dead. Vietnam’s membership of the new trade agreement could have had major consequences. In any case, the US tends to be difficult in transferring cutting-edge technology to anyone and there is no indication that it will give Vietnam anything that will remotely upset the Chinese.

Vietnam’s key to dealing with China lies in the close party-to-party ties that the ruling establishments of the two countries enjoy. This relationship is quite deep, involving party organisations, institutions and personnel. Under General Secretary Ngyuen Phu Trong, the Vietnamese follow a policy that accepts the centrality of good relations with “socialist China”.

Yet, there is a well-spring of anti-Chinese feeling among the Vietnamese public, in part because of history, and in part arising from recent events like China’s forcible occupation of the Paracel islands.

More recently, the two countries have had issues with oil exploration, with China insisting that many blocs Vietnam has put on the international market are part of its territory, while in turn, China has offered areas which fall in Vietnam’s EEZ.

The big question is whether Hanoi will take up the South China Sea issue through the UNCLOS arbitration system following the successful example of the Philippines. The likely answer at this juncture is no. While Vietnam insists that peaceful settlement must be based on “equality” and respect for international law, China will be brazen and seek to strike a bilateral deal with Vietnam, after it has done so with the Philippines. At the end of the day, Vietnam will do what it considers best for its national interest. Indian policy makers would do well to understand that.

The Diplomat

India-Vietnam Relations After Modi's VisitModi’s trip to Hanoi was a step in right direction. What’s next for India-Vietnam ties?

By Sanghamitra SarmaSeptember 05, 2016

       

Amid the changing regional and global political tides, the India-Vietnam partnership is of strategic importance in the Asia-Pacific century. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Vietnam was very timely considering the fact that his government has laid significant importance on strengthening links with Southeast Asian countries through his “Act East Policy.”

Defense cooperation, the most important pillar of cooperation between the two countries, received a fillip with Modi announcing a new $500 million line of credit for Vietnam to facilitate deeper defense cooperation. Both the countries also agreed to tap into growing economic opportunities in the region, recognizing the need to deepen and strengthen defense and security cooperation. Indian Ministry of External Affairs Spokesman Vikas Swarup said that this visit by Modi has set a “new benchmark for India-Vietnam ties which will take the relationship to a whole new level.”

Along with this, both Modi and Nguyen Xuan Phuc, the prime minster of Vietnam, welcomed the facilitation of ongoing Indian projects and investments in Vietnam. Twelve MoUs covering the sectors of defense, space, IT, health, mutual recognition of standards, and cybersecurity were signed, as well as an MoU on cooperation between the Vietnamese Academy of Social Science and Indian Council of World Affairs. India pledged $5 million to set up a software park in Vietnam; Vietnamese companies were also invited to India to take advantage of the various flagship schemes and programs of the government. Modi stressed that enhancing bilateral commercial engagement between the two countries constituted an important issue in the comprehensive strategic agenda.

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Apart from these issues, the Indian prime minister also emphasized the need to further relations between the two countries on regional and international issues of common concern. There was, however, no precise mention of the issues on which both countries need to have a common voice.

In the final leg of the tour, Modi met Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, who appreciated India’s stance on the South China Sea issue. India supports freedom of navigation, overflight and unimpeded commerce in the disputed region, based on the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On an earlier occasion, India’s ambassador to Vietnam, P. Harish, had remarked that all parties must respect UNCLOS, since it represents the foundational aspect of the international law of seas and oceans.

The upward trajectory of cooperation between India and Vietnam since the 1990s reveals that the two countries have emerged as significant partners in the Asia-Pacific century. The need to sustain the current momentum of cooperation and to deepen it further, however, cannot be denied. India and Vietnam can come together on a much broader level to advance their comprehensive strategic partnership.

On the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation, India and Vietnam need to address issues like infrastructure, facilitation of trade, expansion of the trilateral highway (currently including only India, Myanmar, and Thailand), reduction of transaction costs, interconnectivity of goods and labor markets, and improving funding. These steps, among others, can increase the robust connectivity between the corridors. In today’s globalized world, there are a number of transnational security concerns ranging from piracy and

drug and human trafficking to global warming and climate change. Such threats cannot be faced by countries on their own. In this regard, a Joint Action Plan to tackle common threats will go a long way in not only addressing the problems but finding out solutions to eradicate these issues.

Modi did emphasize the necessity of enhancing bilateral commercial engagement and the need of increasing mutual investments. The prime minister has also been robustly promoting his “Make in India” campaign overseas, which makes it clear that India is a destination that no willing foreign investors can overlook. However, the percentage of trade with Vietnam is still minimal, making up only about 1.22 percent of India’s total trade. This is expected to rise in the near future with the realization of an ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement in services and investment. This can be complemented by the increased manufacturing capacities of both India and Vietnam, which have been getting good amount of FDI in their manufacturing sectors. India can further reap the advantages of the bilateral economic relationship if it gets integrated into the regional Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is currently being negotiated. India and Vietnam must also work for direct bilateral connectivity and ease visa regulations for business individuals.

In the defense sector, the developments are quite promising. Nevertheless, India and Vietnam can do more to develop signals intelligence and imaging, conduct joint military exercises, promote intelligence sharing, and increase surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in the region. Vietnam can also find new opportunities under India’s new defense policy, which has laid an emphasis on “Make in India.” India can engage in Vietnam’s shipping industry by helping Vietnam to construct a viable maritime infrastructure, providing much-needed investment and quality manpower.

With the rise in economic activities, technological advances, and environmental imperatives, there has been an increasing need felt by countries worldwide to throw greater emphasis on the generation of renewable energy. Investors and project developers can explore and look for new opportunities in areas of solar power, wind power, hydropower, bio fuels, and the development of photovoltaics. This will help to intensify cooperation between the two countries and complement government initiatives as well. The two countries can also seek to work together on exploring clean energy solutions and smart grid technologies.

The interplay of new forces in the Asia-Pacific, and the resulting new geopolitical equation, today demands that India and Vietnam come closer together to realize the benefits of cooperation. Recent bilateral accomplishments have no doubt been steps in the right direction but there is a need to overcome the bottlenecks to realize maximum gains from this collaboration. The strategic partnership reflects India and Vietnam’s common interests, which will help to leverage the full potential of the multifaceted bonds between the two countries. Together, India and Vietnam can consider the numerous opportunities to advance these shared strategic aspirations to etch their place in the Asia-Pacific century.

Dr. Sanghamitra Sarma is Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. The views expressed here are personal.

Not So Lonely at the Top: Vietnam’s Next Step in Power BalancingWith India, Hanoi has made another step in diversifying its foreign policy. But when do the returns start diminishing?

By Anton TsvetovSeptember 10, 2016 

      

On his way to the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Vietnam, where he met all the key players of local politics – the so-called four pillars. Modi went through the ceremonial motions, visited Ho Chi Minh’s mausoleum, fed the late leader’s carps, and spared no compliment to bilateral ties, referring to a mutual history of as long as 2,000 years.

It was no sideline event for the two countries’ relations and even less so for Vietnamese foreign policy. Not only did the parties sign a dozen of documents, but they also announced that their relations now carry the title of a “comprehensive strategic partnership” – a level previously achieved in Vietnam only by China and Russia.

For India, the visit was an important element in the Act East policy promoted by Modi. Coming right after a high-level visit to Myanmar, Modi’s Vietnam trip is a much-anticipated step in Delhi’s involvement in Southeast Asia – a maritime buffer between India and China, as well as a promising area of economic engagement in its own right. Modi opened a credit line of $500 million for the needs of bilateral defense cooperation, which has become an important element in Vietnamese military build-up. In 2014, India set out to provide four patrol boats to Vietnam and appears to be keen on selling the hypersonic BrahMos anti-ship missiles to the Vietnamese Navy. This is apart from the training program that India offers for Vietnamese crews that are to serve on the six Russia-built Kilo-class submarines.

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Though the practicalities of Vietnam-India relations show immense potential for bilateral cooperation, the upgrade of the partnership to a comprehensive strategic one is a crucial step for Vietnam’s overall foreign policy. With a dramatic history of participating in bloc confrontation during the Cold War, Vietnam is now pursuing a policy of non-alignment and diversification as manifested by the “three nos” principle and the da dang hoa da phuong hoa concept. According to Vietnamese political thinking, a wide network of partnerships is the only way to hedge against overdependence on any one state.

This policy is still in the making. Vietnam is only departing from excessive dependence on China and still suffers from an immense trade deficit. But Hanoi has managed to shift external reliance in other spheres to a number of partners: the United States is the country’s largest export market, Russia is the key arms seller, Japan is there for ODA, and South Korea is there for investment. Now India has become the latest addition to the in-group of strategic comprehensive partners and is likely to play an important role in Vietnam’s military modernization, cooperate in oil extraction projects, and perhaps serve as another counterbalance to China’s overpowering influence.

The big question is whether this strategy will work. China’s concern with Vietnam is particularly this kind of ‘stray off’ and the Vietnamese leadership will have to find a way – using American foreign policy rhetoric – to turn a “pivot” into a “rebalance.” As soon as Beijing feels that Vietnam’s ties with other major partners may bring an irreversible shift to the strategic environment, Hanoi’s policy will become self-defeating. That is why reassuring gestures, like the recent visit by Vietnamese Defense Minister Ngo Xuan Lich to China, are of crucial importance.

What kind of news is that for Russia? Moscow took real pride in how history has led Russia and Vietnam to a special kind of relationship. Now that Russia is not alone at the top of Vietnam’s friend list, it is

becoming clear that there is a race for influence on Vietnam, a pivotal state in the East Asia power equation. A promising economy, stable political system, well-trained military, and strategic location are drawing attention to Vietnam on behalf of great and middle powers from within and without the region. Bilateral relations have been on the rise, but the competition never sleeps. It’s not about how fast you run, but about who’s running faster.

Anton Tsvetov is an Expert at the Center for Strategic Research, a Moscow-based think tank. He tweets on Asian affairs and Russian foreign policy at @antsvetov. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not reflect those of CSR.

China-India Brief # 86

The Times of India

Wary of China, India offers Akash surface-to-air missile systems to VietnamRajat Pandit | TNN | Updated: Jan 9, 2017, 12.57 PM IST

Indigenously developed Akash surface-to-air missile. (TOI File Photo)

NEW DELHI: India is now actively discussing the possible sale of the indigenously developed Akash surface-to-air missile systems+ to Vietnam, even as the two countries steadily crank up their bilateral military ties with a watchful eye on a confrontational China in the Asia-Pacific region.

With Beijing continuing to thwart New Delhi's bid to join the 48-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group and get Jaish-e-Muhammed chief Masood Azhar+ designated a

terrorist by the UN, while also stepping up its naval forays into the Indian Ocean Region, India is responding by fast-tracking military ties with countries in China's own backyard. The expanding "strategic and military partnership" with Japan and Vietnam, in particular, has emerged a major thrust area.

Sources say the discussions under way with Vietnam on the Akash area defence missiles, which have an interception range of 25-km against hostile aircraft, helicopters and drones, come after India earlier offered BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles+ and Varunastra anti-submarine torpedoes to the country.

India, of course, will also begin training Vietnamese fighter pilots on its Sukhoi-30MKI fighter jets from this year, much like it has been tutoring sailors from that country on the intricate art of operating Kilo-class submarines for the last three years, as reported earlier by TOI.

Defence minister Manohar Parrikar says Vietnam "is a close friend" and several initiatives are in progress to further boost bilateral defence cooperation, ranging from help in upgrade of military equipment of the Vietnamese forces to training them on fighters and submarines.

All this comes in the backdrop of India and Vietnam deciding to "elevate" their "strategic partnership", which was established in July 2007, into a "comprehensive strategic partnership" during PM Narendra Modi's visit to Hanoi in September 2016.

Sources said Vietnam has shown "deep interest" in the acquisition of Akash missiles, asking for transfer of technology and joint production of the air defence system.

India, however, thinks it has to be an incremental process, with an initial off-the-shelf purchase followed by transfer of technology in maintenance and other areas.

"Talks are in progress to arrive at a common plan. It's relatively easier on the Akash front since the missile system is 96% indigenous," said a source. The two defence secretaries, incidentally, are slated to meet soon to identify the military projects and equipment under the new $500 million defence line of credit announced by Modi in September.

But it will be more complicated to sell the 290-km range BrahMos — or transfer technology — to Vietnam because the missiles are produced here under a joint Indo-Russian venture. BrahMos missiles still have an import content of over 60% from Russia.

On other fronts, however, India is fast expanding its military training, technology sharing, joint exercises, visits and exchange of experts with Vietnam. Faced with a belligerent China, Vietnam too has been strengthening its military capabilities by

inducting Kilo-class submarines and Sukhoi fighters from Russia, both of which have been operated by Indian armed forces for years.

It was in 2013 that India had kicked off the training of a large number of Vietnamese sailors in "comprehensive underwater combat operations'' in Navy submarine school INS Satavahana, Visakhapatnam.

Now, the training on Sukhois is all set to take off.