indian chemical export controls system and the australia group … · rajiv nayan discusses the...

Summer / Jan-June 2011

Summer / Jan-June 2011

EDITORIAL

INVITED ARTICLES Biometrics against Bioterrorism; Steps for

Trans-national Countermeasure Strategies

Mr. Shashank Singhal

OPINION Indian Chemical Export Controls System and the Australia Group

Dr. Rajiv Nayan

COVER STORY The BWC and Industry: A Plea for Industry Outreach

Ms. Cindy Vestergaard

COUNTRY PROFILE Chemical Weapon Profile: Libya

Ms. Pranamita Baruah

KALEIDOSCOPE

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL NEWS

BOOK REVIEW

2

3

7 .

11 .

14 .

18

19

25

Jan - Jun 2011 1

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES AND ANALYSES

CBW M a g a z i n eM a g a z i n eM a g a z i n eM a g a z i n eM a g a z i n eJournal on Chemical and Biological Wepons

Volume 4 Number 1-2 Jan-June 2011

ISSN: 0974-0619

EDITORIAL 2

INVITED ARTICLES 3Biometrics against Bioterrorism; Steps for

Trans-national Countermeasure Strategies

Mr. Shashank Singhal

OPINION 7Indian Chemical Export Controls System and the

Australia Group

Dr. Rajiv Nayan

COVER STORY 11The BWC and Industry: A Plea for Industry Outreach

Ms. Cindy Vestergaard

COUNTRY PROFILE 14Chemical Weapon Profile: Libya

Ms. Pranamita Baruah

KALEIDOSCOPE 18

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL NEWS 19

BOOK REVIEW 25

Journal on Chemical and Biological Weapons 2

Editorial

Editor &

Director General

IDSA

N S Sisodia

Executive Editor

Ajey Lele

Assistant Editors

Monalisa Joshi

Gunjan Singh

Avinash Anil Godbole

The seventh BTWC review conference isscheduled to be held in December 2011.

With this as the backdrop in the current issueof the magazine, Cindy Vestergaard arguesthat during the Seventh BWC ReviewConference the participating states will getan opportunity to recognise the scope ofbiology’s peaceful use.

Rajiv Nayan discusses the export controlmechanism of the Australia Group ofchemical weapons which have militaryimplications. He argues that India has anelaborate export control mechanism forchemical agents which if need be can be usedfor chemical warfare. Shashank Mayank inhis article argues that biometric provides acomprehensive defence capability againstthreats from adversaries.

This issue also features other regularfeatures like Country Profile, Kaleidoscope,Chemical and Biological News and BookReview.

As per our readers’ feedback, we wish topublish issues in the future that focus on asubject of particular concern. We would liketo inform our readers that the CBWMagazine is now a bi-annual onlinepublication.

Contributions and feedback are welcome andcan be addressed to: [email protected]

Jan - Jun 2011 3

Introduction

Due to various factors like advances inbiomedical technology, emerging

infectious diseases research and otherrelated activities, knowledge, materials, andequipment needed for manufacturingbiological weapons are spreading ratherrapidly. Consequently, fears relating to masscasualty terrorism and gross violations ofBiological Weapons Convention (BWC) arealso rising. Unlike nuclear weapons, whereat least 5–15 kilograms of fissile material isrequired to build a rudimentary fissionbomb, no such barrier exists for biologicalweapons. The dual-use nature of theequipment and supplies make biologicalweapon programs easy to hide under theguise of legitimate biomedical activities. Onlysmall quantities of pathogens are requiredfor seed stocks, and biological agents emitno detectable signal, making them virtuallyimpossible to detect remotely. There is ageneral term, biometrics, which includesprocesses for verification and identificationof individual or a group to ensure safety andsecurity for the general public from anythreat. Biometrics involves the autonomousrecognition of human’s physical andbehavioral characteristics through sensorymechanism. Biometric provides acomprehensive defence capability againstthreats from adversaries which increases itsrobustness. This can be done by using adetector to detect virus, bacteria, other microorganisms and biotoxins. It is expected toprovide the complete safety of the individualand the country.

History

Biometrics has become a critically importanttopic of research for scientist, researchersand engineers after 9/11. Following the fearsof Anthrax and other agents’ usage, there isa heightened level of attention to this kind of

BiometricsagainstBioterrorism;Steps for Trans-nationalCountermeasureStrategiesMr. Shashank Singhal

The author is a graduatestudent at IIT Roorkee.

Summary

Biometric provides a comprehensivedefence capability against threatsfrom adversaries which increases itsrobustness. This can be done by usinga detector to detect virus, bacteria,other micro organisms and biotoxins.It is expected to provide the completesafety of the individual and thecountry.

Invited Articles


threats and more measures are being put inplace in order to avert these threats. It isneedless to stress that biometrics plays amajor role in serving the purpose. On theother hand, India relies heavily on thetraditional security apparatus of the policeand other security agencies to deal withmany security challenges including crossborder terrorism, illegal migration andmonetary exchanges. Since 26/11, there is aneed to do more with reference to maritimesecurity as well. These kinds of threats makeit necessary for the Indian security systemto adapt biometric applications. However,despite this, research and developmentactivities in this field are lagging behind inIndia as not many institutes are involved inbiometrics research. Therefore, its timeIndia brings strong institutional support forresearch and development in this area sinceit can play a crucial role in counter-terrorstrategies.

Developed countries like the United Statesare paying much attention to addbiotechnology to their biometrics approach.This can be observed by looking at theadvancement of biotechnology in the UnitedStates. It is estimated that by the end of the20th Century, biotechnology contributednearly half a million jobs and $47 billion inbusiness revenue annually to the USeconomy.1 Similarly, China now has about20,000 people working in 200 biotechnologylaboratories.2 Mostly laboratories like thesework towards developing defencemechanism against biological attacks.

Using biotechnology inidentifying a biological attack

Biotechnology applications are extremelyuseful for tracking the source of any biologicalattacks and also for taking further actionagainst the culprits of that attack. However,the complexity of the system would requireadvance setup of coordination effortsbetween different agencies of the

government and outside. This is because alarge count of known viruses and bacteriacan be used in attacks and there can beunknown new microorganisms used for thesame. These can cause disease in humans,animals and crops. Even the worst case isthat the terrorists can project their attackfrom the subtle to the apocalyptic. Therefore,the first task would be to bring aboutcongruence in the disease-surveillance datafrom a variety of government and publichealth sources towards determining whichareas might get affected and to what degree.An effective defence requires settingpriorities which includes indentifying themost likely near-term threats andimplementing research, detection andresponse agendas designed to be able tobetter mange future threat scenarios.

Biometrics is a source that is rich in profilinginformation related to the biology like allDNA synthesis orders from all suppliersworldwide. Importantly, anticipation ofpotential terrorist strategies, analyses of thesymptoms related to all the probablediseases etc forms the basis for a promisingtechnology. A biometric system makes useof various sensory mechanisms to assessboth identity and physiological state of anagent. It also includes checking thesymptoms of the individual by facerecognition and diagnostic tests. These dataare then transferred to data managementbody where it is matched with diseasesurveillance data. In case an emergencysituation is identified as a biological attack,the next step is to identify the sourceorganism which leads to the next step ofspeedy disbursement of necessaryantibiotics and drugs in the affected areas.Fumigation of the ozone and otherdisinfectants are immediately used in thedisease prone area. Improved internationaldisease surveillance might also detect thepresence of covert biological weaponprograms in the event of an accident thatinfects the local population.

Jan - Jun 2011 5

International efforts

a. Diplomatic Coordination:

Efforts by the World Health Organization(WHO) to implement the Global OutbreakAlert and Response Network are well placedand the recently revised WHO InternationalHealth Regulations, which require reportingof any disease of international public healthconcern within 24 hours, when fullyimplemented, will have public health andsecurity benefits for all nations. These effortsneed sustained and global diplomatic andfinancial backing.3 Ultimately governmentsaround the world must know that thisspreading of disease does not depend onboundaries and public health is a great issuefor all mainly during international travel andcommodity transfer. Also this leads to thedevelopment of vaccine against thatparticular microorganism and to be servedto people for their future security.

b. Research Coordination:

Exchanges of best practices at pathogencollections or biocontainment facilities thatwork with deadly pathogens can beundertaken in order to improve safety andsecurity so that the risks associated withaccidents or diversion could be reduced. Thiswould help promote interaction amongbiomedical practitioners engaged inpotentially dangerous research.International association and collaborationamong biologists, medical professionals, andpublic health practitioners would helpaddress emerging infectious diseases and thetransparency produced through suchcollaborations would have, as a collateralbenefit, the potential to detect covertactivities.

Implementing defensive countermeasuresagainst biological attacks will require not onlyresearch but drug development anddistribution plan. According to the reports

of the Biotechnology Industry Organization,nearly 100 companies are seriously engagedin advanced research on finding answers tobioterrorism and its effects.4 Their researchincludes using technology facilities to developnew antibiotics, vaccines and antiviral drugs.Some of these are reported to be in theadvanced medical trial stages. Research isalso in progress in order to develop advancedoral vaccines that are capable of boostingimmunity in a shorter period compared tothe existing medicines5. Thesedevelopments, if effective will be usefulagainst bioterrorism attacks. Similarresearch is underway on other diseases aswell

Pre-emptive measures can be taken todestroy the weapon before they can belaunched, it can be done practically byopening the wings of biological facilities andweapons are easy to find. Research is alsounderway to identify simpler way to destroythese pathogens. Efforts to improveintelligence on suspect groups or individualsare useful; however, there are no technicalfixes in the offing that will allow intelligenceagencies to improve their ability to detectcovert biological weapon programs in thefuture.

Conclusion

The best way for the defence is to discoverand implement anti factor on organism-by-organism basis so that one can win in thisbiological arms race.6 It will be vital from astrategic perspective to consider carefullywhat types of biodefence work should beclassified. It needs to be debated furtherwhether it would be legal and wise to haveclassified biodefence research producegenetically modified pathogens that to ourknowledge, no adversary has yet created.Claire Fraser once said, “Terrorists couldpotentially make use of public genomesequences, however it is also argued that


such sequences should remain in the publicdomain because these ‘maps’ are stillrelatively rough. Genomics should be usedto identify and fight bioterrorism, not torestrict research.7 Hence with theadvancement of biotechnology, its resultsand new products should be included tobiometrics so that the future biological attackcan be easily recognised and may be stoppedbefore it will become epidemic. It is the righttime for India to pay attention to thebiometric side along with the research inbiotechnology. This will certainly make thenation to stand against any future bioterrorattack. Vaccines, antibiotics and drugs shouldalso be produced against every newmicroorganism. There should be completedatabase of all discovered genome sequenceswhich can help in the research activities ofthe nation.

Bibliography

Brower, V. (2003). Biotechnology to fightbioterrorism. EMBO reports , 227-229.

Dean A Wilkening, C. f. CombattingBioterrorism. Encyclopedia of Violence,Peace, & Conflict , 3, 356-367.

Greninger, C. F. (Summer 2004).Biotecnhology and Bioterrorism: AnUnprecedented World. Survival, vol. 46, no.2 , 143-162.

Muller, B. (2010). Security,Risk & theBiometric State:- Governing Borders andBodies. London: J. Routledge.

Endnotes:

1 Ernst & Young Economics Consulting andQuantitative Analysis, prepared for theBiotechnology Industry Organisation, TheEconomic Contributions of the BiotechnologyIndustry to the US Economy, May 2000, http://www.bio.org/news/ernstyoung.pdf

2 David Barboza, ‘Development of Biotech Cropsis Booming in Asia’, New York Times, 21February 2003.

3 Dean A Wilkening, C. f. Combating Bioterrorism.Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict, 3;p. 359.

4 Brower, V. (2003). Biotechnology to fightbioterrorism. EMBO reports, vol. 4, no. 3, p.228.

5 ibid

6 Greninger, C. F. (2004). Biotecnhology andBioterrorism: An Unprecedented World.Survival, vol. 46, no. 2, p. 154.

7 Brower, V. (2003). Biotechnology to fightbioterrorism. EMBO reports, vol. 4, no. 3, p.229.

Jan - Jun 2011 7

Opinion

India has an elaborate and comprehensiveexport controls system for chemical agents

that can be used for chemical warfare. Strictcontrol of chemical agents is consideredimportant because, of all the dual use items,chemicals constitute the largest category ofIndian exports. President Obama, during histrip to India, endorsed India’s candidaturefor the Australia Group. Later, Francesupported the Indian candidature. A teamof the Australia Group visited India in thelast week of April 2011 and interacted withIndian officials and experts working onexport controls.

Set up in 1985, the Australia Group has beencontrolling exports of chemical agents withmilitary ramifications from the verybeginning. It included Biological agents in theearly 1990s. After the operationalisation ofthe Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),it was assumed that this informal groupwould cease to exist. The Australia Groupreinvented itself. The CWC has detailedprovisions for export controls. It has threeschedules of chemical considered relevantfor chemical weapons. The Australia Groupcontrols some additional items outside theCWC list and uses this as one of the reasonsfor its continued existence. 1

The international community, of late, hasrealized the importance of bringing India intothe multilateral export controls regimesbecause of the increasing Indian profile. Themove started at the track-II level andresulted in the acceptance at thegovernmental level. Some countries haveexplicitly supported the Indian membershipfor the multilateral export controls regimesand many more are informally accepting themerit of India joining the regimes. Generally,analysts think that of all the multilateralexport control regimes, the membership forthe Australia Group will come first. However,the Government of India wants membership

Indian ChemicalExport ControlsSystem and theAustralia GroupDr. Rajiv Nayan

The author is a SeniorResearch Associate at IDSA,New Delhi.

Summary

Set up in 1985, the Australia Grouphas been controlling exports ofchemical agents with militaryramifications from the verybeginning. It included Biologicalagents in the early 1990s.


to all the regimes as a package and not in anincremental fashion.

Since the group is going to exist, it isrecommended that India should join theAustralia Group since it issues informalguidelines and classifies new items for exportcontrol. True, strategically, it is not asfascinating as the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) or the Missile Technology ControlRegime (MTCR) is. The membership mayprovide India an opportunity in managingexport of global commerce in chemical andbio-technology. There are a couple of issuesregarding the future of the Indianmembership to these groups. The first is thatIndia may have to move a third partyapplication to the Chair of the group that ithas fulfilled all the criteria. Secondly anassociated question that will be asked iswhether India has indeed fulfilled all thecriteria.

India has fulfilled all the criteria but puttingadditional items of the Australia Group in itsexport controls policy. The move is facingresistance from chemical industry. Puttingadditional item on the Indian Control listcalled Special Chemicals, Organisms,Materials, Equipment and Technology List,which is more popular by its abbreviationSCOMET, means additional licensing burdenmay be imposed on Indian exporters. Theitem 1 of the SCOMET list contains specialchemical items.

The Indian export control system hasimpressive legal, institutional andenforcement frameworks. India is asignatory to the CWC. As a result, it has toincorporate all the three schedules of CWCinto its control list which India has alreadydone. India has passed laws such as theChemical Weapons Convention Act of 2000.Section 17 of the Act lays down: “No personshall export from, or import into, India aToxic Chemical or Precursor listed in any of

the Schedules 1 to 3 in the Annex onChemicals to the Convention except inaccordance with the provisions of the Exportand Import Policy determined by the CentralGovernment from time to time… .” India isfurther amending the CWC Act to includesome enforcement provisions, especiallyregarding personnel.

According to a government of India notice2:

1. Exports of schedule 1 chemicals areprohibited. Further, no import ofschedule 1 chemical can take place exceptwith prior permission from the NationalAuthority obtained under Section 15 ofthe CWC Act 2000.

2. Export of schedule 2 chemicals to a non-State Party of the Convention isprohibited. Similarly, import of schedule2 chemicals from a non-State Party to theConvention is prohibited.

3. Export of schedule 2 chemicals to StateParties can be made only by thoseexporters who have obtained a generalpermission from the DGFT for two years(at a time). They are further subject toinformation and disclosure requirementsas laid down in the DGFT Notification.

4. Export of schedule 3 chemicals to StateParties is conditional upon informationand disclosure requirements as laid downin the concerned DGFT notification.

5. Exports of schedule 3 chemicals to non-State Parties can be made only afterobtaining an export license in this behalfand also subject to information anddisclosure requirements as well as End-Use/End User Certificate as laid down inthe concerned DGFT Notification.

6. All importers and exporters of schedule2 and schedule 3 chemicals are requiredto submit declarations to the Department

Jan - Jun 2011 9

of Chemicals on an annual basis asdetailed in the Chapter ondeclarations.

India issues notifications on trade policyunder another law, the Foreign Trade(Development & Regulation) Act. This1992 Act has been amended in 2010. Oneof the principal objectives of theamendment was to bring about tightercontrol on export or trade of dual-usegoods and related technologies. Throughthe new act, the Government of Indiaseeks to control services as well. Theamended act has included other thanservices technology as well. TheAmendment also focuses on provisionssuch as transfer, re-transfer, transit andtrans-shipment in the act, though theseprovisions had already existed in theIndian regulatory system.Transshipment control along withcapability to monitor the export ofAustralia Group controlled items is oneof the criteria for the Group membership.The amended rules also provide for thesearch and seizure with the approval of avery senior officer of the DirectorateGeneral of Foreign Trade. Thisamendment also grants enablingprovisions for establishing controls as inthe Weapons of Mass Destruction andtheir Delivery Systems (Prohibition ofUnlawful Activities) Act, 2005 or theWMD Act.

In 2005, the WMD Act was passed toimplement India’s commitment onUnited Nations Security CouncilResolution (UNSCR) 1540. The Section11 of the Act explicitly states: “No personshall export any material, equipment, ortechnology knowing that such material,equipment, or technology is intended tobe used in the design or manufacture ofa biological weapon, chemical weapon,

nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosivedevice, or in their missile delivery systems.”In addition, it has an intricate and gradedpenalty system for dealing with acts ofviolation. One of the criteria of themembership of the Australia Group is legalpenalty. The Act introduced several newelements into the Indian export controlssystem such as transit and trans-shipmentcontrols, retransfer provisions, technologytransfer controls, brokering controls andend-use based controls. Besides, theCustoms Act and the Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Amendment Act, 2004provide statutory authority for exportcontrols.

At the implementation level, the DirectorateGeneral of Foreign Trade is the nodal agencyfor granting license for SCOMET controlledchemicals. However, all the licenses for suchexport are referred to inter-service agency.The Directorate has devised severalparameters and a license application isscrutinized on these.

At the enforcement level, there areenforcement officers. The amendment in the2000 CWC Act is in progress to introducesome enforcement related provisions. Oncethis amendment is passed, enforcement armof the nodal agencies will be furtherstrengthened. As for the chemical industry,there are certain global problems, such asdifficulties in distinguishing a commercialconsignment from a chemical weapons-related consignment, establishingappropriate commodity thresholds, personalsafety inspectors and the diversified buthighly specialised nature of chemicals.Importantly, all major customs houses inIndia have their own chemical labs so anysuspicious items are immediately tested. Ifthere is need for further clarification, the itemis sent to a laboratory of the DefenceResearch and Development Organisation.


India will abide by the guidelines of theAustralia Group for export of chemicals.It could and should strike a right balancebetween confidentiality andtransparency. India has also anunblemished track record on not onlynonproliferation but also ondisarmament. It completed the task ofchemical weapons destruction within theset time limit. Membership of theAustralia Group will not only furtherauthenticate India’s principlednonproliferation policy on the chemicalweapons, but also enhance India’sparticipation in the global non-proliferation drive. To that extent, it is awelcome step.

Endnotes:

1 . For the comprehensive lists of the itemscontrolled by the Australia Group see,Australia Group Common Control Lists,accessed on 23 June 2011, available athttp://www.austral iagroup.net/en/controllists.html

2. Government of India, National AuthorityChemical Weapons Convention, Exportand Import of Schedule Chemicals, http://nacwc.nic.in/,accessed on June 6, 2011

Jan - Jun 2011 11

The BWC andIndustry: A Pleafor IndustryOutreachMs. Cindy Vestergaard

The author is a ProjectResearcher at DanishInstitute for InternationalStudies, Copenhagen.

Summary

Seventh BWC Review Conference willprovide the States Parties with anopportunity to move the nextintersessional process (2012-2015)beyond simple discussion. It willexpand the scope of biology’s peacefuluses while taking into account theimpact of scientific and technologicaladvances on the treaty.

Cover Story

A fter a history of violations, failedcompliance negotiations and almost a

decade of annual intersessional discussions,the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BWC) remains essentially, a paper tiger, afive-page gentleman’s agreement with nointernational means to instill confidence incompliance. The intersessional process of2002-2005 and 2007-2010 did increasestakeholder participation in BWC issues andprovide some areas of commonunderstanding, specifically in expanding thescope of biological activities for peacefulpurposes. Looking ahead to the SeventhBWC Review Conference, States Partieshave an opportunity to move the nextintersessional process (2012-2015) beyondsimple discussion to further recognizing andexpanding the scope of biology’s peacefuluses while taking into account the impact ofscientific and technological advances on thetreaty. For this to happen, however,bioindustry needs to be engaged.

A General Purpose Paper Tiger

Article I of the BWC categorically bansbiological agents and toxins in types andquantities that have no peaceful justification.This definition or so-called ‘general purposecriterion’ has been reiterated in past ReviewConferences to encompass all future scientificand technological developments relevant tothe Convention. It however contains nodefinitions or scope of what constitutesbiological activities for peaceful purposes orthose that would be expressly prohibited bythe Convention. It is this ambiguity thatleaves the treaty open to wideinterpretations and makes it difficult forstates to reconcile the obligation whichcommits parties to the ‘fullest possibleexchange’ of peaceful scientific andtechnological aspects (Article X) with thetreaty obligation that prohibits the transferof biological sciences for ‘hostile purposes’


(Article III). The intersessional process ofannual meetings did not bridge the peaceful/hostile purposes gap; but it was useful inincreasing stakeholder input and forelaborating some scope of peaceful purposes,specifically the recognition of the benefits ofcooperation on activities such as enhanceddisease surveillance, promotion of vaccinesand treatment, biosafety and biosecurity, andthe education of scientists.1 Accordingly, itcould be said that these activities are nowmore commonly recognized to be fallingwithin the treaty’s scope of ‘peacefulpurposes.’

A Role for Industry

Unlike its chemical counterparts that areactively engaged in drafting andimplementing the verification annex of theChemical Weapons Convention (CWC),bioindustry’s position against BWCverification created a strong commercialfactor in the political failure of compliancenegotiations. While various national andregional pharmaceutical associations notedin the 1990s that a compliance protocol couldhelp mitigate the threat posed by biologicalweapons, they argued that regular inspectionvisits of dual-use facilities could compromisesensitive commercial information andpotentially harm a company in good-standingif it were falsely accused of producingbiological weapons.2 It is not surprising then– even ten years later - that manygovernment officials are wary of re-openingcompliance discussions. The involvement ofbioindustry is therefore notably minimal inthe BWC process compared to a much higherlevel of participation by the nuclear industryin issues regarding the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and chemicalindustry in CWC implementation.

With the United States making it clear thatit “will not seek to revive negotiations on averification protocol,”3 the idea of third-

party oversight and implementation of theBWC remains off the negotiating table for theforeseeable future. The treaty howeverneeds to move beyond its status as a papertiger to inspire public confidence throughsubstantive action. For States Parties toexpand further the scope of peacefulbiological activities, they have to movebeyond (but still keep relevant) diseasesurveillance, biosafety and biosecurity issuesto focus on delineating the scope of ArticlesI, III and X. Without it, the treaty will lingerin ambiguity with no global guidance onpeaceful biological activities and advances,or their exports.

To this end, bioindustry’s innovation, directapplication and management of scientific andtechnological advances are crucial toward acommon understanding of peaceful science.Bioindustry’s awareness and engagement inbiological diplomacy is therefore necessaryfor further delineating the BWC’s peacefulscope, thereby strengthening Articles I, IIIand X of the treaty. In other words, withoutindustry’s involvement, there will be no realstudy on how it can be done.

A Role for the ISU

As States Parties to the BWC convene forthe Seventh Review Conference inDecember, there is an anticipation that athird intersessional process – and anexpanded Implementation Support Unit(ISU) to support it - will be agreed upon forthe period 2012-2015. To further increasestakeholder participation, the ISU should betasked alongside its plan of outreach to non-states parties to also conduct outreach toglobal biological industry with the objectiveof increasing their annual intersessionalparticipation.4 An increase in the personnelat the ISU already generally supported byStates Parties along with the developmentand implementation of industry outreachwould fit in with an expanded ISU role,

Jan - Jun 2011 13

particularly given its operation as anindependent organ that serves allstakeholders of the treaty, includingindustry. Such an outreach program wouldhelp to further bridge commonunderstandings by states parties andindustry – a necessity if they are ever towork together to clarify the BWC’s provisionswhile also ensuring commercial propriety.

The intersessionals yielding some elaborationon the treaty’s peaceful scope, the objectivefor the 2012-2015 annual process is to movethe BWC beyond talk to substantive action.By engaging industry through the third-party ISU rather than (but also including)national outreach, States Parties willindirectly begin to frame the treaty’sprovisions for peaceful purposes and preparethe Eighth Review Conference in 2016 for amore consensus-based approach to BWCclarity and compliance.

Endnotes:

1 For a fuller d iscussion on the BWC’sambiguities, the intersessional process and theprospects for a third intersessional round inexpanding the BWC’s peaceful scope see: CindyVestergaard and Animesh Roul, “A (F)utileIntersessional Process?” The NonproliferationReview, Forthcoming November 2011.

2 See. Statement of Principle on the BWC,Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturersof America (PhRMA), Washington, D.C., 16 May1996; European Federation of PharmaceuticalIndustries and Associations (EFPIA), PositionPaper, 1998; Forum for European BioindustryCoordination (FEBC) Position Paper 1998;Compliance Protocol to the Biological WeaponsConvention: A Joint Position of European,United States and Japanese industry, issued bythe FEBC, PhRMA, and Japan BioindustryAssociation, July 2001.

3 Under Secretary of State Ellen O. Tauscher,Address to the Annual Meeting of the StatesParties to the BWC, 9 December 2009.

4 Only a handful of bioindustry companiesparticipated in annual meetings during the

2007-2010 intersessional process such asBavarian Nordic, Amyris Biotechnologies,Emergent Biosolutions, Glaxo Smith Kline,Astra Zeneca, Ganymed Pharmaceuticals AGand Sloning BioTechnology GmbH.


ChemicalWeapon Profile:LibyaMs. Pranamita Baruah

The author is a ResearchAssistant at the IDSA, NewDelhi.

Summary

Libya’s association with chemicalweapon is not a recent phenomenon.It first began as a victim when, in1930, Italy’s autocratic leader BenitoMussolini authorized the use of sulfurmustard against the Libyan rebels.

Country Profile

Recently, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’sregime in Libya drew a lot of

international attention following the violentcrackdown on the protests there. As thesituation deteriorated further, the possibilityof Colonel Gaddafi using chemical weaponsagainst the rebels opened a new dimensionto the Libyan crisis. Soon, reports regardingLibya’s possession of weapons gradechemical stockpile started pouring in.

Libya’s association with chemical weapon isnot a recent phenomenon. It first began as avictim when, in 1930, Italy’s autocraticleader Benito Mussolini authorized the useof sulfur mustard against the Libyan rebels.However, since mid-1980s, Libya itself haspursued an offensive chemical warfareprogramme. At that time, several factorswere offered as drivers of Libya’s chemicalweapon programme. Firstly, in order tocompensate Libya’s military weakness vis-à-vis neighbouring states (particularly Egyptand Israel), Libyan leader Gaddafi felt itnecessary to pursue such a programme.Secondly, it has been argued that Libya went‘chemical way’ in concert with an aggressiveprogramme to develop a ballistic missiledelivery capability. Finally, increasingsecurity threat posed by the alleged pursuitof chemical weapons by neighbouring states(particularly Egypt, Iraq and Syria) alsolargely pushed Libya to pursue a chemicalweapons strategy.1

In the second half of 1980s, Libya initiatedits chemical weapon programme with thehelp of foreign suppliers (mostly fromWestern Europe). Its first chemical weaponproduction facility was established near thevillage of Rabta in 1998. It was believed thatthe new pharmaceuticals facility, known asPharma-150, could produce at least 100metric tons of blister and nerve agents in thespan of three years. Later on, two morefacilities, Pharma-200 and Pharma-300

Jan - Jun 2011 15

(Rabta II) were established. Of the two,Pharma-300 or Rabta II was establishedin Tarhuna, near the Libyan capital-Tripoli, to serve as a secure storagelocation. It was built using sandstoneshields and reinforced concrete in orderto survive air strikes.2 Therefore, it canbe said that Libya was aware of theillegality of its chemical weapons strategy.

In September 1987, allegations thatGaddafi was willing to use chemicalweapons against Chadian forces drewinternational attention. What concernedthe West most was that although Libyahad the capacity to start chemicalwarfare even when it was not going to bedecisively useful or even legitimate.Subsequently, in order to deal with theincreasing threat from Libyan chemicalweapons, the then US President RonaldReagan hinted at the possibility of amilitary strikes on the Rabta plant.However, before any attempt could bemade against it, the production capabilityof the Rabta plant was reportedlydestroyed by a fire. Later on, the fire wasdiscovered to be a hoax, intended todiscourage the US strike.

Nevertheless, soon enough, details offoreign assistance in Libya’s pursuit ofchemical weapons were revealed. SeveralWest German companies, includingImhausen-Chemie, were allegedlyinvolved in Libya’s chemical weaponprogramme. Finally, a total of twelvefirms from both Eastern and Westernbloc countries, including a few fromJapan, were named for their allegedassistance to Libya’s chemical weaponsprogram.3 Such revelations had asubstantive impact in isolating Libyafrom the international community.

In January 1993, the Chemical WeaponsConvention (CWC) opened for signature

and it came into force on April 29, 1997.However, Libya, along with Egypt and otherArab countries, abstained from signing it dueto Israel’s alleged nuclear arms programme.They further argued that chemical weaponsdisarmament could be effective only withinthe context of a regional WMD ban. Still,Libya attended the first CWC ReviewConference (RevCon) from April 28 to May9, 2003 as a non-state party. By October2003, Libya consented to US and Britishinspections of its WMD-related facilities toverify the state and extent of the former’schemical weapon and other WMDprogrammes.4 Interestingly, it was only onDecember 20, 2003 that Gaddafi publiclyacknowledged his government’s pursuit ofWMD in the past and pledged to abandon allsuch progranmes. In its statement, theLibyan government declared: “The GreatSocialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriyahhas urged the countries in the region to makethe Middle East and Africa a region free ofweapons of mass destruction.”5 Gaddafipledged to abide by all relevantnonproliferation treaties, including the CWC.

It is worth noting that in 2003, the USreached an important agreement with Libyaunder which the latter agreed to give up itspursuit for WMD in return for the restorationof normal diplomatic relations with the US.Accordingly, among other things, Libyadestroyed its longer-range missiles. 3,300aerial munitions which were used to dispersemustard gas and other chemical agents werealso abolished. In 2004, Libya joined theInternational Organization for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).6

Soon, OPCW inspectors started monitoringthe destruction of its aerial bombs designedto deliver chemical agents. It also began theverification process of Libya’s initialdeclaration of possessing 50,700 lbs. (~ 23MT) of mustard agent and 2.9 million lbs.(~1.315MT) of nerve agent precursor


chemicals. On March, the Hague-based bodyconfirmed the presence of 23 MT of sulfurmustard and approximately 1,300 MT ofsarin precursors. The inspections howeveralso revealed poor storage and maintenanceof the chemical agents. It was believed thatLibya manufactured some poor quality CWagents as well which probably begandegrading rapidly.7 This indicated Libyalacked either the technical know-how or thedesire to maintain and manufacture robuststorage of chemical weapons.

Although the Libyan regime claimed toextend unwavering support for internationalarms control and disarmament initiatives,the eradication process of its chemical agentsas well as chemical weapons productionfacility could not be completed as fast as wasinitially expected. It was primarily due to thespats between Washington and Tripoli overfunding and logistics. Besides, Libya wasallegedly reluctant to provide US and Britishofficials visas to monitor the process. TheGaddafi regime however citedenvironmental concerns for slowing down.8

In November 2005, Libya was granted anextension by the OPCW to destroy its entirestockpile of chemical weapons by May,2011.9 The OPCW recently reported that allof Libya’s delivery systems-the 3,300unloaded aerial bombs- were crushed bybulldozers in 2004. Nearly 13.5 metric tons(15 Tons) of sulfur mustard-whichconstitutes about 54% of Libya’s chemicalstockpile, have also been destroyed. Since2005, nearly 40% of the chemicals used tomake sulfur mustard have also beendestroyed. The twice-yearly inspectionsconducted so far also have not indicatedLibya’s intention to revive its chemicalweapon programme.10

Although Libya pledged to fulfill itsdestruction obligations by 2011, due to slowprogress and the recent political turmoil, it

seems unlikely that it would able to meet thatdeadline. As of February 2011, Libyareportedly still possessed 9.5 MT of mustardgas and more than half of the 1,300 MT ofprecursor chemicals used for developingchemical agents.11 It reportedly alsopossesses Scud B missiles. Although underthe 2003 agreement with the US, Libyaagreed to destroy the chemical weapons onlyafter the US helped Tripoli upgrade itsdefence through purchasing of otherweapons, later on, Tripoli alleged thatWashington backed out on its pledge.12

During the recent political crisis in Libya,there was an increasing concern that not onlyCol. Gaddafi could resort to use chemicalagents against the rebels, the extremists alsomight exploit the deteriorating securitysituation in the country and try tomisappropriate the mustard gas. All suchspeculations however were largely put torest when OPCW spokesman Michael Luhanstated that Libya destroyed its capacity todeliver chemical agents seven years ago13

and without the delivery systems, the utilityof the chemical agents is lessened. Extendingthe argument further, a former Westerngovernment official stated: “The (mustard)gas isn’t weaponized and I doubt if it couldbe within a military significant timeframe.The residual stocks of mustard gas areprobably badly degraded and as much of athreat to those holding them as to anypotential targets.”14 According to PaulaDeSutter, former Bush administrationdisarmament specialist, “Had the destructionprocess not started, we would be facing a farmore dangerous situation— On the otherhand, we would certainly feel more secure ifall of the mustard gas had been eliminated.”15

In spite of the fact that the recent politicalturmoil in Libya precipitated a large numberof unsubstantiated allegations concerningLibya’s remaining chemical weaponscapabilities and intentions, as of today,

Jan - Jun 2011 17

Gaddafi’s regime seems to lack dedicatedchemical weapon delivery system. Thechemical weapon agents, due to theirsuboptimal manufacturing and poormaintenance, are apparently not veryeffective. Although political instability anddeteriorating elations with the US and Britainhave slowed down the elimination processof the chemical weapons, Libya’s permanentrepresentative to the OPCW Director-General recently reaffirmed his country’sunwavering commitment towards CWCcompliance.16

Endnotes:

1 “NTI: Research Library: Country Profiles: LibyaChemical Overview”, April 2011, at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Chemical/index.html. (accessed on April 26,2011).

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 “Stated Government Policy (Libya)-Jane’sChemical, Biological, Radiological and NuclearAsses”, Jane’s, at http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-CBRN-Assessments/Stated-Government-Policy-Libya.html. (accessed onMay 10, 2011).

6 “US worries Gaddafi may use poisonous gas aschaos deepens”, Homeland Security Newswire,February 25, 2011, at http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/us-worries-gaddaf i -may-use-poisonous-gas-chaos-deepens. (Accessed on April 7, 2011).

7 “NTI: Research Library: Country Profiles: LibyaChemical Overview”.

8 “US worries Gaddafi may use poisonous gas aschaos deepens”.

9 “Libya lacks means to use chemical arms:Watchdog”, Reuters, February 27, 2011, ath t t p : / / w w w . r e u t e r s . c o m / a s s e t s /print?aid=USTRE71Q1PS20110227. (accessedon April 26, 2011).

10 “Libya destroying chemical weapons, sayswatchdog”, The Hindu, February 23, 2011, at

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article1483900.ece. (accessed on April 26,2011).

11 “US worries Gaddafi may use poisonous gas aschaos deepens”.

12 Ibid.

13 “Libya destroying chemical weapons, sayswatchdog”.

14 “Doubts surround Gaddafi’s chemical weaponarsenal”, Reuters.com, March 2, 2011, at http:// a f . r e u t e r s . c o m /articlePrint?articleID=AFN0222994420110302.(accessed on April 27, 2011).

15 “US worried by remaining Libyan ChemicalArsenal”, Global Security Newswire, February24, 2011, at http://gsn.nti.org/siteservices/print_fiendly.php?ID=nw_20110224_8664.(accessed on April 27, 2011).

16 “NTI: Research Library: Country Profiles: LibyaChemical Overview”.


KaleidoscopeChemical Weapons ConventionCoalition

The total elimination of chemical weapons hasbeen a matter of concern for the whole world.Recently in order to achieve this goal dozensof nongovernmental organizations fromvarious parts of the world agreed to form agroup which will work towards achieving thisgoal. They also hope to work towardspreventing the use of Chemical weapons byterrorists’ organizations.1 The ChemicalWeapons Convention Coalition is one suchgroup.

This group has been under planning for yearsand is a part of a very small number oforganizations which aim to achieve suchtarget. Non governmental organizations fromUnited States and Europe deliberated on thisissue and discussed the ‘founding document’for the organization.2

The aim of the organization is to compile dataregarding all the countries whether theyhave joined the CWC and also the size of theirchemical weapons arsenal and also to look atthe industries which can be used for illegalactivities. It is also targeted with the task ofproducing an annual report judging whetherthe member states are following the rules ofthe convention at their respective nationallevels.3

The various method undertaken by thegroups to achieve its goal are publicmeetings, written commentaries, letter-writing campaigns, interviews, analyses andeducational programs. The foundingdocument states that the primary targetaudience of the group are officials at all levelsof government.4 In addition to this, theHague based verification organization hasalso decided to support the group.5

The group identifies itself as “anindependent, international body whose

mission is to support” the global ban onchemical warfare materials “with focusedcivil society action aimed at achieving fullmembership of the Chemical WeaponsConvention, the safe and timely eliminationof all chemical weapons, preventing themisuse of chemicals for hostile purposes andpromoting their peaceful use.”6

Endnotes:

1 New Coalition Aims to Promote ChemicalWeapons Disarmament, Nonproliferation,January 22, 2010, By Chris Schneidmiller,Global Security Newswire at http://w w w . g l o b a l s e c u r i t y n e w s w i r e . o r g / g s n /nw_20100122_8824.php

2 Ibid

3 Ibid

4 Ibid

5 Ibid

6 Ibid

Jan - Jun 2011 19

Chemical and Biological NewsDISARMAMENT

Mauritania Establishes CWC NationalAuthority

May 11, 2011

The new Permanent Representative ofMauritania to the OPCW, AmbassadorMohamed Mahmoud Ould Brahim Khilil, hasinformed the Organisation that his countryhas established a National Authority toimplement the Chemical WeaponsConvention.

Ambassador Khilil made the announcementupon presenting his letter of credentials asPermanent Representative to Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü, on 9 May 2011. Healso requested technical assistance from theOPCW to strengthen the capacity of theNational Authority to fulfil its obligations,which the Director-General assured him willbe forthcoming.

All States Parties are obliged to designate orestablish a National Authority to implementthe provisions of the Convention on theirnational territory, and to enact implementinglegislation. Among their tasks, NationalAuthorities are responsible for preparingdeclarations to the OPCW and escortingOPCW inspections of relevant industrial andmilitary sites. They also act as focal pointsfor interaction with other States Parties andwith the Technical Secretariat.

Of the 188 States Parties to the Convention,186 have now established NationalAuthorities, leaving only two States Partiesthat have still to do so.

Source: http://www.opcw.org/news/article/mauritania-establishes-cwc-national-authority/

ARMS CONTROL

OPCW Expresses Concerns overChemical Weapons Stockpiles inLibya

May 06, 2011

The Executive Council of the Organisationfor the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW), which met from 3 to 6 May 2011,expressed its concern over the chemicalweapons stockpiles in the Libyan ArabJamahiriya, particularly regarding theirsecurity and destruction within theestablished deadlines.

“I have reminded the Libyan Governmentof its international obligation to meet itsdestruction deadlines, and I have alsoreiterated to the National Authority that theresponsibility for the physical security ofthose chemical weapons rests entirely withthe Libyan Government,” the Director-General, Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, saidin his opening statement at the ExecutiveCouncil.

The Council expressed their full support forthe actions being undertaken by theDirector-General in view of the situation,and encouraged him to continue his efforts.

The Executive Council, while noting theassurances given by the Libyanrepresentative, urged Libya to ensure thesecurity of the chemical weapons stockpilesand their destruction within the establisheddeadlines.

Source: http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-expresses-concerns-over-chemical-weapons-stockpiles-in-libya/


OPCW Graduates 13th Group ofInspectors

April 26, 2011

The OPCW held a ceremony at itsHeadquarters in The Hague Tuesday tomark the graduation of new traineeinspectors from a number of countries. The15-week training was supported by thegovernments of Belgium, Czech Republic,Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland,and United States of America.

“I am most grateful to all of the States Partiesthat provided support to the training ofOPCW inspectors,” said the OPCW Director-General, Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, in hisremarks at the ceremony. “The importanceof inspector training for the implementationof the Chemical Weapons Convention isparamount, and your efforts havecontributed significantly to assuring thequality of inspections over the comingyears.”

The trainees of Group L were from Australia,Brazil, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea,Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdomand Zimbabwe, and the graduates will joinan international team of more than 160OPCW inspectors.

Since entry into force of the ChemicalWeapons Convention in April 1997 theOrganisation has devoted over 230,000inspector-days to conducting some 4,450inspections of mainly chemical weaponsdestruction facilities and industrial sitesaround the world that States Parties havedeclared to the OPCW in fulfillment of theirobligations under the Convention.

For more information about the OPCW’sinspection regime, please visit our websiteat www.opcw.

Source: http://www.opcw.org/news/article/

opcw-graduates-13th-group-of-inspectors/

OPCW Completes 2000th Inspection

April 21, 2011

OPCW Director-General, AmbassadorAhmet Üzümcü with the PermanentRepresentative of the Republic of Korea,Ambassador Young-won Kim, OPCWHeadquarters.

On 21 April 2011, the OPCW reached asignificant milestone in the implementationof the Chemical Weapons Convention withthe completion of the 2000th inspection of adeclared chemical facility under Article VIof the treaty. The inspection was carried outat an industrial plant in the Republic ofKorea.

Industry inspections have so far coveredover 1,500 facilities in more than 80countries. In all cases, the OPCW has beenable to verify the activities declared by theStates Parties.

“Industry inspections constitute a keyelement of the chemical weapons conventionand an essential supplement to StatesParties’ own measures to monitor theirchemical industries” said OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü. “This milestoneachievement is a tribute to the dedication ofour inspectors, and to the active collaborationof our States Parties and their chemicalindustries.”

The Director-General added that “OPCWinspections are today accepted as a norm inthe global chemical industry, and thiscontributes significantly to the confidenceamong States Parties in our verificationregime. They also help raise awarenessabout the potential security risks involved.”

The Permanent Representative of theRepublic of Korea, Ambassador Young-wonKim, welcomed the announcement andunderlined the value of the continuing

Jan - Jun 2011 21

cooperation between the Republic of Koreaand the OPCW.

Under Article VI, States Parties “shall adoptthe necessary measures to ensure that toxicchemicals and their precursors are onlydeveloped, produced, otherwise acquired,retained, transferred, or used” for purposesnot prohibited under the Convention. Tradeof these chemicals is allowed among memberstates only.

Toxic chemicals are used for a variety ofpeaceful purposes from making ink toproducing pharmaceuticals. To allow forverification, States Parties declare legitimateactivities involving scheduled chemicals(chemicals that have been used as warfareagents or to make such agents in the past). The OPCW verifies such declarationsthrough a combination of data monitoringand on-site inspections without “undueintrusion into the State Party’s chemicalactivities”.

Source: http://www.opcw.org/news/a r t i c l e / o p c w - c o m p l e t e s - 2 0 0 0 t h -inspection/

OPCW Director-General MeetsPermanent Representative of theLibyan Arab Jamahiriya

March 11, 2011

The OPCW Director-General, AmbassadorAhmet Üzümcü, today asked the PermanentRepresentative of the Libyan ArabJamahiriya to call on him at the OPCWHeadquarters. The Director-Generalexpressed the concerns of States Partiesregarding the status of those chemicalweapons possessed by Libya that remain tobe destroyed, pursuant to its obligationsunder the Chemical Weapons Convention. He recalled that the responsibility for thephysical security of those chemical weaponsbelongs entirely to Libya, and asked that

every possible measure be taken to preventtheir possible use.

The Permanent Representative reiteratedto the Director-General the Libyancommitment to the implementation of theConvention, and that in accordance with theinformation he has received from Tripoli, thesituation regarding the chemical weapons tobe destroyed remains unchanged and undercontrol.

Source: http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-director-general-meets-permanent-representative-of-the-libyan-arab-jamahiriya/

NATIONAL ANDINTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENTS

E coli outbreak: Germany reports twomore deaths

Health minister insists that new infectionsare dropping despite news of two deaths and300 more E coli cases

Germany reported two more deaths and300 more E coli cases, but its health ministerinsisted that new infections were dropping,giving some hope that the world’s deadliest Ecoli outbreak was abating.

The health minister Daniel Bahr spoke beforean emergency meeting in Berlin with healthofficials from the EU, which is concernedabout Germany’s handling of the crisis.

“I cannot yet give an all-clear, but after ananalysis of the numbers there’s reason forhope,” Bahr told ARD television. “Thenumbers are continuously falling – whichnonetheless means that there can still be newcases and that one unfortunately has toexpect new deaths too – but overall newinfections are clearly going down.”


Bahr said the death toll had risen to 26 – 25in Germany plus one in Sweden.

Germany’s national disease control centre,the Robert Koch Institute, said the numberof reported cases in Germany had risen bymore than 300 to 2,648. Nearly 700 of thoseaffected have been taken to hospital with aserious complication that can cause kidneyfailure. Another 100 E coli cases are in otherEuropean countries and the US.

The Koch Institute did not fully back Bahr’soptimism. It said there was a declining trendin new cases but added that it was not clearwhether this was because the outbreak wastruly waning or because consumers werestaying away from the raw vegetablesbelieved to be the source of the E coli.

The EU’s health chief, John Dalli, meanwhile,demanded that German health authoritieswork more closely with international expertsin fighting the deadly epidemic, saying theyshould use “the experience and expertise inall of Europe and even outside of Europe”,according to Die Welt newspaper.

“The focus of this meeting is to ensure thatall the steps are being taken to get to … thefinal elimination of this contamination assoon as possible and to see whether any moreresources and efforts should be made,” Dallitold reporters as he went into the Berlinmeeting.

Outside health experts and even GermanMPs have strongly criticised the Germaninvestigation, saying the infections shouldhave been spotted much sooner.

Weeks after the outbreak began on 2 May,German officials are still looking for its cause.Spanish cucumbers were initially blamed,then ruled out after tests showed they had adifferent strain of E coli. On Sunday,investigators pointed the finger at German

bean sprouts, only to backtrack a day laterwhen initial tests were negative.

On Wednesday, the agriculture minister ofLower Saxony, who had first warned againsteating bean sprouts on Sunday, saidauthorities were still expecting new labresults from an organic farm that had beenthe focus of their investigation.

Gert Lindemann said authorities were stillconsidering the farm in Bienenbüttel innorthern Germany a possible source for the Ecoli outbreak.

Bahr reiterated that the source of theinfection might never been found, a stanceUS experts have called a cop-out.

A warning against eating cucumbers,tomatoes, lettuce and bean sprouts is still inplace.

Consumers across Europe are shunning fruitand vegetables, with EU farmers claiminglosses up to •417m (£372m) as ripe producerots in fields and warehouses.

Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/08/e-coli-germany-more-deaths/print

E. Coli Outbreak Tied to Deadly NewStrain

The new bacteria is a hybrid of two existingones that have combined to form a super-virulent strain.

June 2, 2011

The outbreak of a deadly form of E.coli bacteria in Germany has medicalexperts racing to pinpoint its source —perhaps on a Spanish vegetable farm — aswell as how this new strain could haveevolved.

Jan - Jun 2011 23

Researchers now say the new bacteria is ahybrid of two existing ones that havecombined to form a super-virulent strain.

The World Health Organization reports thebacteria has killed 18 people and sickenedmore than 1,500 people in six nations, withthe highest number of patients fromGermany. U.S. authorities report twotravelers returning from Germanycontracted the disease and remain seriouslyill, but have not spread the infection to others.

“You have an E. coli that’s quite nasty andthen it got genes from another toxic E.coli and it’s become even nastier,” said PaulWigley, professor of food-borne diseases atthe University of Liverpool.

Wigley said that the new strain is acombination of entero-aggregative E.coli (EAEC), which is an emerging microbeassociated with diarrhea in developingnations, and entero-hemorrhagic e.coli(EHEC), which is similar to the one thatcaused the deadly hamburger outbreak of E.coli O157.

“It can hang around for a long time in thegut, invade pretty well and produce a toxinthat damages the kidneys and can lead tobloody diarrhea,” Wigley said.

The bacteria likely came from human oranimal waste that came in contact with food.A Beijing lab that sequenced the genome ofthe bacteria with the help of German healthofficials said Wednesday that it appears tobe resistant to many antibiotics. In fact,using antibiotics, which break apart thebacteria’s cells, can release more toxins intothe body, Wigley said.

“All you can do is supportive therapy, givepatients fluid replacement, bloodtransfusions, and if kidney failure, thenkidney dialysis.” Officials with the Centers

for Disease Control in Atlanta caution againstpanic and are careful not to call it a “super-bug” that can jump borders at will.

“We are talking about a food-borneoutbreak,” said Christopher Braden, directorof CDC’s division of food-borne, water-borneand environmental diseases. “There’s apotential for this to be transmitted personto person, but no indication that it’shappened.”

Braden noted that so far, the disease has notaffected children as much as adults, and thatwomen are suffering more than men.

“Maybe it’s coming from something kids don’tnormally eat, or something about thisorganism that doesn’t affect kids as adults,”Braden said. “We still don’t know.”

European health officials initially said theybelieved the source of the outbreak wascontaminated vegetables grown in Spain, buthave since backed off that claim. There arealso reports that organically-grownvegetables like cucumbers were to blamesince they rely on manure fertilizers.

In the meantime, several nations havebanned food grown in Spain, while Russia hasstopped all European produce imports.

Source:http://news.discovery.com/human/ecoli-outbreak-bacteria-strain-110602.html?print=true

Organic food linked to E. colioutbreak?

June 12, 2011

If you are a health food freak who lives onsalads and swears by the benefits oforganically grown raw vegetables, it’s timefor a reality check. In 16 countries across theglobe, nearly 3,000 people have beensickened and 29 have died after eating raw


vegetables contaminated by a group ofbacteria collectively called Escherichia coli( E. coli).

Authorities first cited contaminated Spanishcucumbers as the culprit and now organicallygrown sprouts from Germany are being seenas the most likely cause. The source of theinfection still remains a mystery. Expertsbelieve organic sprouts, cucumbers,tomatoes or lettuce contaminatedsomewhere between farm and fork havecaused the disease.

Source: http://articles.timesofindia.indiat i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 1 - 0 6 - 1 2 / i n d i a /29649866_1_german-outbreak-coli-outbreak-organic-foods

‘Terrorists may be spreading killerE.Coli’

June 7, 2011

The deadly E. Coli outbreak could have beenspread by terrorists, say doctors, who addthat rogue groups may have deliberatelyimplanted the killer germ into fresh produce.Though Germany has been the centre of theoutbreak, Britain could also be hit as our fruitand vegetable supply is also vulnerable toattack, reports the Daily Star.

The chilling warning comes as German healthofficials said a toxic batch of bean sprouts areprobably behind the latest deadly outbreak.Scientists have warned people to avoidvegetables which are a popular ingredient inChinese stir fry dishes.

Klaus-Dieter Zastrow, chief doctor forhygiene at Germany’s Vivantes Hospitalin Berlin, was quoted, as saying: “It is quitepossible there’s a crazy person out there whothinks: ‘I’ll kill a few people or make 10,000ill.’ “It is a mistake not to investigate in thatdirection,” he added.

Source: http://articles.timesofindia.i n d i a t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 1 - 0 6 - 0 7 / u k /29628799_1_killer-outbreak-ecoli

Jan - Jun 2011 25

Book Review

ChemicalWeapons andWarfare by Brig.

(Retd.) K R

Padmanabhan,

Surendra

Publications (Delhi)

2010, ISBN: 978- 93-

80014-50-0

Dr. Shamshad Ahmad Khan,

The author is a ResearchAssistant at IDSA, New Delhi.

Summary

This book presents detailed accountsof Chemical and Biological weaponsprogram undertaken by differentcountries from the ancient time to thepresent day. It also traces the debateon banning these unseen weaponswhich caused 85,000 fatalities andresulted in 1,176,500 non-fatalcasualties since its full scale usage inWorld War I.

Brig (retd) Padmanabhan’s book,Chemical Weapons and Warfare, sheds

light on diverse aspects of chemical weaponsand chemical weapons programs undertakenby different countries during the First WorldWar and thereafter. In the introduction, theauthor argues that although chemicalwarfare agents were deployed during theWorld War I for the first time in the secondbattle of Yepres in 1915, its use can be tracedback to the ancient period. He writes, “OlderChinese writings dating back to about 1000BC contain hundreds of recipes for theproduction of poisonous irritating smokes foruse in war along with numerous accounts oftheir use” (p. 5) and it was in the 178 ADthat China used arsenic containing “soulhunting fog” to suppress a peasant revolt.Elsewhere in the world, the author notes,Chemical warfare was applied in the 5th

Century BC in Peloponnesian War betweenAthens and Sparta. The Spartans used “alighted mixture of wood, pitch, and Sulfur”to incapacitate the Athenians. Athenians alsoused “hellebore roots to poison the water ofPleistrus River” (p.6).

The author’s accounts suggest that in theancient times too there were demands, akinto the present day conventions on chemicaland biological weapons, not to use chemicalagents during the wars. When the Germanictribes used chemical agents to poison thewells of their enemies during their resistanceto the Roman legions, the Roman jurists inreaction to the incident declared “armis bellanon venis geri” (War is fought with weaponsnot with poisons) (p.2). This declaration bythe Roman jurists seems to have left a deepimpact on the debates regarding thedeployment of chemical agents in wars. In1854, when a British chemist proposed usingcyanide filled artillery shell against enemyships during the Crimean War, the BritishOrdnance Department rejected the proposalnoting that was “as bad a mode of warfare


as poisoning the wells of the enemy”(p.6).The statement by the British Ordnancedepartment suggests that they werereferring to Roman jurists’ declaration. Brig(retd) Padmanabhan mentions yet anotheragreement reached between Germany andFrance in 1672 when both the countriesconcluded the Strasbourg Agreement thatincluded an article banning use of “perfidiousand odious toxic agents” (p. 6).

So the author’s account suggests that beforethe World War I, responsible authorities hadbeen rejecting the proposals of initiating largescale implementation of chemical warfare onethical grounds. However, during the WorldWar I, many countries set aside these normsof not using chemical weapons and embarkedon chemical weapons development program.For the first time in the World War I, theGermans deployed chemical warfare agents.They attacked French and Algerians withChlorine gas in the Second battle of Ypressin April 1915, writes the author. After theWorld War I and during the inter war periodmany colonial powers used chemical warfareagents in an attempt to strengthen their holdon colonies and suppress the rebellions. Theauthor notes that Winston Churchilauthorized the use of Chemical weapons in1920 when Kurdish and Arabs revoltedagainst the British occupation in Iraq.Authorising the use of Chemical weapons,Churchil said, “I do not understand thissqueamishness about the use of gas. I amstrongly in favour of using poison gas againstuncivilized tribes” (p. 8).

The Chemical warfare deployed during theWorld War I caused so many atrocities thatat multiple international forums, the demandto ban the use of Chemical weapons grewstronger. Subsequently, in 1925 world’smajor nations signed the Geneva Protocolpledging never to use chemical and biologicalwarfare agents. This pledge implied ban onthe first use but not on the possession of

Chemical weapons. This treaty preservedthe right to use such weapons in retaliatorycapacity. Thus, the pledge could notdiscourage the use of the chemical weaponsand Italy, a signatory of Geneva Protocol,used mustard gas during the invasion ofEthiopia, killing 15,000 people. The authorgives a detailed account of contravention ofGeneva Protocol during the Second WorldWar by the Axis Powers including Japan andGermany (p.8-9). He also notes that in thepost-war period, chemical warfaredevelopment programs were undertaken bynon-western nations as well, ignoring the banimposed by the Geneva Protocol. Iraq usedchemical weapons against Iran during theIran Iraq War and thereafter against its ownethnic Kurdish citizens, killing almost 5000people (p.12).

Chapter 5, could be interesting to the readersas the author gives detailed accounts ofchemical agents and their variants that havebeen developed so far including theirchemical components and its effects. Theauthor also offers suggestions as to what todo in case the victims identifies that he/shehas been affected by the chemical agents.This account would be helpful for thosetreating soldiers in battlefield.

In chapter six, the author writes that manycountries including the US and the SovietUnion had also initiated other secretbiological weapons development programs.The US military developed a largeinfrastructure of laboratories, test facilitiesand production of plants related biologicalweapons. By the end of 1960, the US hasstockpiles of at least ten different biologicaland toxin weapons (p. 148). Similarly, USSRhas been developing biological weapons; the1979 outbreak of pulmonary anthrax in theSoviet Union is believed to have been causedby accidental release of anthrax spores froma Soviet biological weapons factory inServedlovsk, writes the author.

Jan - Jun 2011 27

In the same chapter, the author discussesmedical aspects of biological and chemicalweapons development and the ethicaldilemma that confronts the scientists. Tocurb the chemical and biologicaldevelopment programs he suggests that theindividual scientists should pledge not toengage knowingly in research and teachingthat will further development of chemicaland biological warfare agents. He argues that“Physicians and medical scientists shouldsupport methods for internationalepidemiologic surveillance …and shouldsupport the vaccine for Peace Programs forcontrol of ‘dual threat’ agents” (p. 153).

Barring typos that could have beencompletely avoided, the book is aninformative source to understand Chemicaland biological warfare undertaken bydifferent countries from the ancient times tothe present day.

indian chemical export controls system and the australia group … · rajiv nayan discusses the...

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