School of Distance Education

SKT1C04- INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS: THEORIES AND CONCEPTS (SANSKRIT-GENERAL)

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS: THEORIES AND CONCEPTS

(SKT1C04)

STUDY MATERIAL

I SEMESTER

CORE COURSE

MA SANSKRIT (GENERAL)

(2019 Admission onwards)

UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

CALICUT UNIVERSITY- P.O

MALAPPURAM- 673635, KERALA

190204

School of Distance Education

SKT1C04- INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS: THEORIES AND CONCEPTS (SANSKRIT-GENERAL)

SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT STUDY MATERIAL FIRST SEMESTER

MA SANSKRIT GENERAL (2019 ADMISSION ONWARDS)

CORE COURSE:

SKT1C04 - INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS : THEORIES AND CONCEPTS

Prepared by:

Dr. ARUN JAGANATHAN V R

GUEST LECTURER DEPARTMENT OF SAHITYA

SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF SANSKRIT KALADY, ERNAKULAM

Scrutinized By:

Dr.MINI.T PROFESSOR

DEPARTMENT OF SAHITYA SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF SANSKRIT

KALADY, ERNAKULAM

MA Sanskrit General – StudyMaterial

SKT 1CO4 : Indian Philosophical Traditions: Theories and Concepts

Unit One – Epistemology

Indian epistemology or the theory of knowledge attempts to provide a rational basis for

an intelligible discourse on matters of common, everyday experience, on the one hand, and in

concentrating on the subject of cognition, it attempts to offer insights into the real, that is,

essential, nature of this subject, the being who cognizes. In this sense, the concern with

epistemology in Indian philosophy may be said to represent a philosophy of being and knowing

involving, thereby, the metaphysical concern implicit in epistemology, where the subject-object

distinction in the case of knowledge of the subject breaks down.

By third century, different schools established with their fundamental ontological,

metaphysical and epistemological theories clearly summarized in their respective basic works.

The basic ideas contained therein, which were compiled by the different thinkers into a system of

thought, were certainly older. The commentators to these basic works elaborated the fundamental

points from within their own tradition in order to make them understandable to the uninitiated,

whilst at the same time defending the tradition against attacks from opponents. It is significant to

note that the commentators took the first opportunity to mention the means or instruments of

cognition accepted by the school, because this epistemological concern set the framework within

which the ontology and the metaphysics were established.

Each school accepted a fixed number of means of cognition and, for the major schools of

Indian philosophy, the number ranges from one to six. So, for example, the materialist accepts

only sense perception as the most important and reliable means of cognition, the Buddhists and

the Vaiśeṣika school accept inference as well, the Sāṁkhya school accepts verbal testimony or

scriptural authority in addition to these two, with the Nyāya school accepting four means by

granting, in addition to the three, ›comparison‹ also as a means of valid cognition, etc. The

enumeration of the means of cognition accepted by a school, although traditional, is not merely

arbitrary. Reasons are supplied by the commentators to show why the specific number and nature

of the instruments of knowledge are adequate for the school in question, thereby preempting any

criticism by an opponent for being irrational.

Some important conditions of Indian Philosophy can be summarized into four points: (a)

the knowledge which one means of cognition furnishes must be new and not attainable by any

other means; (b) one means of cognition may aid another in furnishing knowledge, but the means

of cognition in question should not be reducible to another—so, e.g., when perception aids

inference, as in inferring fire by seeing only the smoke in the distance, the knowledge gained

here cannot be reduced to the cognition supplied by perception (of the smoke) alone; (c) the

knowledge obtained by one means of cognition should not be contradicted by another means of

cognition; and (d) the accepted means of cognition should appeal to reason, a condition that

applies especially to verbal testimony or scriptural authority as a means of cognition, in which

case the knowledge concerning the revealed truth must appear probable and be

made intelligible in terms of human experience, otherwise such a means of cognition would fail

in its intention.

Some thinkers like Ramanuja says that, error should be seen rather as a lack of

knowledge. In other words, there is no error as such and one should speak, instead, of a failure in

cognition to distinguish the positive features of an object from the negative ones. Some others

like that of Saiva siddanta say that error is the cognition of an object as something other than

what it is. A rope seen as a snake entails an affirmation of qualities which in fact can only be

denied of the object. Sankara the upholder of Advaita holds the view that finally one cannot

adequately explain or account for how an object is erroneously cognized. How a rope comes to

be seen as a snake, for example, cannot be determined. In error there is some kind of reality that

exists as long as the error obtains, which is why one may be afraid of the so-called snake. Some

kind of relative truth has to ascribed to such a cognition, just as in a dream water can quench

thirst, and seeing a rope as a snake can cause fear, a certain validity obtains as long as one

remains in error.

Jainism accepts that theoretically there can be an infinite number of standpoints and

perspectives, although seven have come be traditional. One Jaina thinker says that these are the

only logical possibilities if one combines the following possible statements about any object of

inquiry: a statement can be either positive, or negative, or neutral (i.e., indescribable, namely that

an object cannot be described adequately from all viewpoints at once). The conclusion, then, is

that the theory of manifoldness in Jainism takes all cases into consideration when talking about

an object. Basically it is a simple theory which avoids making one-sided (ekānta), absolutistic

judgements and statements about any object of enquiry. This is to say that an object or any theme

of discussion should be approached, according to Jainism, from various perspectives and

standpoints. Depending on the point of view an observation may be, for example, both correct

and incorrect, as with the colour of an object depending on the light, or with a person who can be

both father and son at the same time. The basic point is simple: depending on the standpoint or

perspective a particular view or statement can be both true and false at the same time: someone

can be both a father and a son at the same time, namely, with respect to a particular person, i.e.,

depending on the standpoint.

Unit Two – Ontology

All Indian philosophical traditions are deeply engaged with ontology, the study of being,

since clarity about the nature of reality is at the heart of three intimately connected goals:

knowledge, proper conduct and liberation from the continued suffering that is part of all human

existence. The formulation of a list of ontological categories, a classification of reality by

division into several fundamental objective kinds, however, is less widespread. There is little

room for a doctrine of distinct, if related, ontological categories in a philosophical school that

takes reality as one; even less if that one lies beyond description. If the phenomenal world is but

illusory appearance, as, for example, in the Vedanta of Sankara, then a determination of kinds of

entities does not recommend itself as a means to adequate analysis of the world. Even the

Sankhya tradition’s realism reduces the world to an evolution from two fundamental entities,

spirit and matter. Categories make sense within the context of a pluralistic realism, an analysis of

the world that finds it to be composed of a multiplicity of real entities. Such a view is found to

some extent in Jaina philosophy, but is primarily defended and developed in the Nyaya -

Vaisesika school.

The Nyaya - Vaisesika categories are seven: substance, quality, motion, universal,

particular, inherence and not-being. While all are understood as real entities and objects of

knowledge, substance is most fundamental as each of the others in some way depends on

substance. Substances are nine: earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, self and mind. The first

four are atomic: they may combine to form macroscopic substance, such as a clay pot, but in in

composite form they are indestructible atoms, as are the last two. Ether, time and space, likewise

indestructible, are unitary and pervade all. In its irreducible parts, all substance is eternal; every

composite whole is a destructible substance.

The Nyaya metaphysics recognizes sixteen padarthas or categories and includes all six

categories of the Vaisesika in the second one of them, called prameya. These sixteen categories

are pramana (valid means of knowledge), prameya (objects of valid knowledge), samsaya

(doubt), prayojana (aim), drishanta (example), siddhanta (conclusion), avayava (members of

syllogism), tarka (hypothetical reasoning), nirnaya (settlement), vada (discussion), jalpa

(wrangling), vitanda (cavilling), hetvabhasa (fallacy), chala (quibbling), jati (sophisticated

refutation) and nigrahasthana (point of defeat. Nyaya epistemology

The Nyaya epistemology considers knowledge (jnana) or cognition (buddhi) as apprehension

(upalabdhi) or consciousness (anubhava).

Knowledge may be valid or invalid. The Naiyayikas (the Nyaya scholars) accepted four valid

means (pramana) of obtaining valid knowledge (prama) – perception (pratyaksha), inference

(anumana), comparison (upamana) and verbal testimony (Sabda).

Invalid knowledge includes memory (smriti), doubt (samsaya), error (viparyaya) and

hypothetical reasoning (tarka). Perception

Pratyaksha (perception) occupies the foremost position in the Nyaya epistemology.

Purusa and Prakrti stand at the apex of Creation arises from these two principles coming

together. Purusa is bewitched by Prakrti and Prakrti is only too eager to oblige by displaying her

charms. The 1st product of creation is Mahat. Mahat is the highest principle; it is the intellect or

Buddhi. From Mahat, arises Ego (Ahamkara) and then the mind (Manas.) Subsequently the 5

sense organs (Jnanendriyas,) 5 organs of action (Karmendriyas,) 5 objects of the senses

(Tanmatras) and 5 gross elements (Pancabhutas) are created. This is creation. In dissolution, the

process is reversed. We have accounted for 23 Tattvas here. The other two are Purusa and

Avyakta, together forming the 25 Tattvas. It is this enumeration that earned the appellation

Sankhya for this philosophical system.

The world is said to be unreal because it exists in the middle but not in the

beginning and the end. It is indeed not possible for non- existence to come into existence or for

existence to become non- existence. Therefore, when things are seen to exist in the middle and

not in the beginning and end, it can mean that things are non- existent because they were not

there yesterday and will not be there tomorrow, or it can mean that it was always there, and that

its coming into existence is merely a seeming, and that this seeming of things coming to be is

false. The latter alone is the Advaitic truth, and the former is the falsity of superficiality that

Advaita negates.

Unit III: Psychical apparatus in Indian Philosophy

The place of mind in the philosophical systems of India. That mind is of subtle physical

nature and that self is postulated as higher than mind in the hierarchy is being pointed out. Mind

can be man's own friend to elevate him or his foe debasing him. An integrated approach

extending beyond the mind in psychiatric care is suggested. Scientific and technological

advances do not necessarily preclude a transcendent (spiritual) dimension to the total care.

Unit IV: - Semantic tools of Pūrvamīmāṃsā

Most schools of Indian philosophy have an atomistic view of meaning and the meaning-

bearing linguistic unit. This means that a sentence is put together by combining words and words

are put together by combining morphemic elements like stems, roots, and affixes. The same

applies to meaning. The word-meaning may be viewed as a fusion of the meanings of stems,

roots, and affixes, and the meaning of a sentence may be viewed as a fusion of the meanings of

its constituent words. Beyond this generality, different schools have specific proposals. The

tradition of Prabhakara Mimamsa proposes that the words of a sentence already convey

contextualized inter-connected meanings (anvitabhidhana) and that the sentence-meaning is not

different from a simple addition of these inherently inter-connected word-meanings. On the other

hand, the Naiyayikas and the Bhatta Mimamsakas propose that words of a sentence taken by

themselves convey only uncontextualized unconnected meanings, and that these

uncontextualized word-meanings are subsequently brought into a contextualized association with

each other (abhihitanvaya). Therefore, the sentence-meaning is different from word-meanings,

and is communicated through the concatenation (samsiarga) of words, rather than by the words

themselves. This is also the view of the early grammarians like Katyayana and Patanjali.

The term artha in Sanskrit is used to denote the notion of meaning. However, the

meaning of this term ranges from a real object in the external world referred to by the word to a

mere concept of an object which may or may not correspond to anything in the external world.

The differences regarding what meaning is are argued out by the philosophical schools

of Nyaya, Vaissṣika, Mimamsa, various schools of Buddhism, Sanskrit grammar, and poetics.

Among these schools, the schools of Nyaya, Vaiseisika, and Mimamsa have realist

ontologies. Mimamsā focuses mainly on interpreting the Vedic scriptures. Buddhist thinkers

generally pointed to language as depicting a false picture of reality. Sanskrit grammarians were

more interested in language and communication than in ontology, while Sanskrit poetics focused

on the poetic dimensions of meaning. The tradition of Prabhakara Mimamsa proposes that the

words of a sentence already convey contextualized inter-connected meanings (anvitabhidhana)

and that the sentence-meaning is not different from a simple addition of these inherently inter-

connected word-meanings.

Unit V: - Kashmir Śaivisam and Indian Aesthetics

Almost all the major schools of Indian aesthetics were founded by Kashmiri theoriticians

-the Alankara School by Bhamaha, Riti School by Vamana, Vakrokti School by Kuntaka,

Dhvani School by Anandavardhana and Auchitya School by Kshemendra. Though the concept of

Rasa was evolved by Bharata, and perhaps by thinkers even before him, it was only the great

Abhinavagupta who perfected it as an integrating \theory basic to the aesthetic philosophy of the

Indians. Nor was the contribution of those Kashmiri rhetoricians any less important who

analysed, interpreted, elaborated and commented upon what the original exponents propounded,

thus providing the building blocks on which the Indian aesthetic thought stands today. Profound

thinkers like Udbhata, Bhatta Lollata, Shankuka, Bhatta Nayaka, Bhatta Tauta, Rudrata,

Ruyyaka, Mahima Bhatta and others. The issues they raised, the solutions they provided, the

views they propounded provided grist to the great intellectual debates about the relation of

aesthetic object and aesthetic experience which raged throughout India for quite a long time. To

understand the full significance of the art-ideas introduced by the successive Kashmiri thinkers,

we shall have to look at them in the overall perspective of the development of Indian aesthetical

thought. As we know, it is in the Natya Shastra, the legendary Bharata’s monumental treatise on

dramaturgy, that we find the first systematic exposition of Rasa-a concept central to Indian

aesthetic thinking. Supposed to have been written between the 2nd century BC and the 2nd

century AD, the Natya Shastra provides a deep insight into the psychology of aesthetic

experience.

Among the earliest to address these questions was Bhatta Lollata who lived in Kashmir in

the late 8th century or the early 9th. A contemporary of the great Shaivite thinker Bhatta Kallata,

Lollata approached those questions as a Mimansaka or grammarian. His works have

unfortunately been lost, but from what we learn from the Abhinava Bharati, Abhinavagupta’s

commentary on the Natya Shastra, Lolatta took only the denotational sense of the word

nishpattih into consideration and interpreted it as causal origination. Rasa, he said, is an effect of

which the vibhavas or the aesthetic object is the direct cause. It resides in the original historical

character (Rama etc.) represented on the stage, as well as the impersonating actor. The actor feels

himself as the represented historical personage during the duration of the enactment but

remembers his real nature through the faculty of anusandhana or recollection.

Abhinavagupta wrote Abhinavabharati, a commentary of Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata. For the

first time he brought a technical definition of rasa. As per him, Rasa is the universal bliss of the

atman coloured by the emotional tone of a drama. Abhivangupta introduced a ninth rasa

called Santam which denotes the peace or tranquillity. These total nine rasas make the Navarasa.

Abhinavagupta’s work is almost unparalleled in Indian intellectual history. Although, he is

labeled as a Saiva philosopher, his works comprises of various currents of intellectual thinking

such as Aesthetics, dramaturgy, music, tantra, yoga, literary criticism, devotional poetry,

cognitive science, emotions, philosophy of mind, language. His works fall in various categories

such as commentaries, poems, manuals of religious rituals, philosophy etc. His most important

work is Tantraloka, which is an encyclopedia of Tantra and synthesis of the Trika system. Trika

System is another name of Kashmir Shavism and refers to three-fold science of man and his

world. The supplementary work to Tantraloka is Tantrasara which is a summary of the

Tantraloka. His commentary known as Abhinavabharati on Bharat Muni’s Natyashastra forms an

essential part of the Indian discourse on poetry, drama, dance and music. Other writings include

Pratyabhignya, which stands for identifying and not attaining. Knowledge has always had a very

important place in the Indian society. There is an unusual sense of humanity that exists in his

commentary on the Gita. He is a more egalitarian, which can be observed in his works.

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