Indigenous Australians and Islam: Spiritual, Cultural, and Political Alliances

David Edward Lawson

BSocSc (Hons) BScSc

A thesis submitted in the School of Social Work and Human

Services, Faculty of Health, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December 2010

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Indigenous Australians and Islam

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Acknowledgements

Whatever insights that emerge from this study, are owed to the many Indigenous, Muslim, and Indigenous/Muslim participants and associates who generously gave of their time and experiences. Special thanks and appreciation to Shahid Malik, Adam Bowden, and Beylal Racheha. To my supervisors Dr. Hossein Adibi and Professor Carl Trocki go my sincere appreciation for their valued guidance, wisdom, and patience. I am grateful to my fellow colleagues in the now defunct School of Humanities and Human Services, Carseldine Campus, for their invaluable support, encouragement, and collegial integrity. Finally my appreciation and thanks to Dr Kerryann Cook who demonstrated by example and attitude what it takes to produce a successful Ph.D.

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Abstract

Keywords: Indigenous Australians; Islam in Australia; Muslims; Religious conversion; discrimination; resistance politics; empowerment. This thesis examines why and how Indigenous Australians convert to Islam in the New South Wales suburbs of Redfern and Lakemba. It is argued that conventional religious conversion theories inadequately account for religious change in the circumstances outlined in this study. The aim of the thesis is to apply a sociological-historical methodology to document and analyse both Indigenous and Islamic pathways eventuating in Indigenous Islamic alliances. All of the Indigenous men interviewed for this research have had contact with Islam either while incarcerated or involved with the criminal justice system. The consequences of these alliances for the Indigenous men constitute the contribution the study makes to new knowledge. The study employs a socio-historical and sociological focus to account for the underlying issues by a literature review followed by an ethnographic participant observation methodology. In-depth open-ended interviews with key informants provided the rich qualitative data to compliment literature review findings. For the Indigenous people involved in this study, Islamic religious identity combined with resistance politics formed a significant empowering framework. For them it is a symbolic representation of anti-colonialism and the enduring scourge of social dysfunction in some Indigenous communities.

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Indigenous Australians and Islam

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Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction 1

1.1 Context and orientation of the study 1 1.2 Outline of thesis aims, themes, and objectives 7 1.3 Thesis conceptual and theoretical rationale 9 1.4 Primary objectives described 13 1.5 Review of orienting literature 15 1.6 Outline of chapters 20

2.0 Underlying Issues: Context and Analysis 23

2.1 Introduction 23 2.2 A history of Indigenous marginalisation, dispossession

and control 23 2.3 Identity and diversity issues and concepts 25 2.4 Social exclusion and identity 28 2.5 Cultural trauma and intergenerational disadvantage 31 2.5.1 Collective cultural trauma as a symptom of imperial,

colonial, and contemporary exploitation 31 2.5.2 Explaining cultural trauma 32 2.5.3 Indigenous Australians and a case for a

traumatised collective 33 2.5.4 Collective identity and trauma recognition 39 2.5.5 Key historical processes and era’s revealing

potential and actual trauma producing conditions for Indigenous people 41

2.5.6 Cultural trauma and African Americans 44 2.5.7 African American example of resistance culture 45 2.5.8 Resistance culture and African American Islam 47 2.5.9 African Americans, Indigenous Australians and prison 50 2.6 Discussion 52 2.7 Conclusion 53

3.0 Methodology 55

3.1 Introduction 55 3.2 Methodology rationale 55 3.3 Participant population 56 3.4 Procedures 56 3.4.1 Data collection methodology 59 3.5 Ethnographic and case study methods 61 3.5.1 Defending against claims of representivity 64 3.5.2 Burawoy and the Manchester School 65 3.5.3 Mitchell’s elaboration of Gluckman 65 3.5.4 Limitations of ethnographic and case research 68 3.6 What of the researcher/analyst? 71 3.7 Ethical considerations 73 3.8 Contribution to Knowledge 73 3.9 Fieldwork and interview data 74 3.10 Researcher field observations 75 3.11 Explanation of fieldwork priorities 76 3.12 Main fieldwork events 77

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3.13 Timeline of Sydney fieldwork 77 3.13.1 Fieldwork overview 77 3.14 Overview of the search for respondents 79 3.15 Timeline and fieldwork activity 81 3.16 Timeline of process to apply for permission to conduct

research within NSW Corrective Services institutions 94 3.16.1 Background 94 3.16.2 Procedure and timeline 95 3.17 Summary and conclusions 98

4.0 Interview Data Results 99

4.1 Introduction 99 4.2 Interview Transcript 1 of 2 99 4.3 Themes and issues arising from interview one 120 4.4 Interview Transcript 2 of 2 120 4.5 Themes and issues arising from interview two 139 4.6 Thematic analysis 140 4.7 Theme summary 160 4.8 Discussion 162

5.0 Theoretical and Conceptual Themes 167

5.1 Overview 167 5.2 An outline of global themes and influences 168 5.2.1 Globalisation and fundamentalisms 170 5.2.2 Globalisation and minorities 176 5.2.3 Globalisation and civil society 179 5.2.4 Global forces and Australian politics and culture 182 5.2.5 Neoliberalism and religious belief and practice 185 5.2.6 Contested multicultural definitions 187 5.2.7 Testing Australian multiculturalism 188 5.2.8 Issues of religious diversity and multiculturalism 190 5.2.9 Indigenous ‘rights’ literature and

resistance politics 194 5.2.10 Secularisation and religious resurgence 195 5.2.11 Secularism and political Islam 197 5.2.12 Secularisation and civil religion 198 5.3 Underlying factors associated with

Muslim discrimination 199 5.4 Re-grouping as labelled minorities 201 5.5 Religion and theoretical constructs 201 5.6 Conventional theoretical approaches to religious conversion 203 5.6.1. Psychological aspects of conversion 204 5.6.2 Sociological aspects of conversion 206 5.6.3 Religious conversion themes discussion 208 5.7 Religion and religious practices in Australia 210 5.7.1 Evangelical influences 212 5.8 Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical influences 217 5.8.1 Terminology, concepts and analysis 217 5.8.2 Social solidarity and social cohesion 221 5.9 Social movements 224 5.10 Collectivities and movements: joining the links 230

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5.11 Discussion and conclusions 232

6.0 Islam & Australian society: themes and perspectives 237

6.1 Introduction 237 6.2 Analytical and methodological overview 239 6.3 Islam in Australia: a sociological and historical overview 239 6.4 Phases of Islamic influence in Australia 240 6.4.1 Pre-1788 Muslim contact literature 242 6.4 2 The Macassan contact 242 6.4.3 Mythology, ritual, and Islam 244 6.4.4 Malay Muslim pearl divers 247 6.4.5 Cocos and Christmas Islander Muslims 250

6.4.6 The Afghan influence 251 6.4.7 Javanese indentured labourers 254 6.4.8 The Lebanese and Turkish Muslim influences in Australia 256 6.4.9 The Albanians in North Queensland 259 6.4.10 Islam and Australian ‘fear politics’ 260 6.4.11 Muslim experiences in times of national insecurity 262 6.4.12 The construction of ‘Lebanese crime gangs’ in Sydney 264

6.5 Discussion 265 6.6 Conclusion 268 7.0 Structures of power & Indigenous incarceration 271 7.1 Introduction 271 7.2 Royal Commissions and conflicting theories 272 7.2.1 Royal Commission outcomes 275 7.3 Definition of ‘underlying issues’ in relation

to Indigenous disadvantage 276 7.4 Systemic and institutional racism in the

criminal justice system 277 7.5 Underlying issues: the importance of context 280 7.6 Literature and analysis 281 7.6.1 The colonial era: regulation and governance of Indigenous Australians 282

7.6.2 The ‘Protection’ era: social Darwinism, segregation and control 286

7.6.3 The assimilation era: the rationalities of racial governance 290

7.6.4 The new culture of punishment: reversal and continuities 293

7.6.5 Redfern and political considerations: race and policing 295

7.6.6 Alcohol abuse and the criminal justice system 297 7.7 Discussion 298 7.8 Conclusion 301

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8.0 Indigenous Australians, Islam, and Alliances 305

8.1 Introduction 305 8.2 Identity (re)formation and Islam in prison 306 8.3 Identity and self-esteem 307 8.4 Islam and the prison system 309 8.5 An explanation of the radicalisation process within a prison environment 311 8.6 Alliances and associations within the prison system 315 8.7 The extent to which Indigenous alignment with Islam has to do with identity politics 316 8.8 Is Jihadism the new threat to replace Indigenous statehood? 317 8.9 Conclusion 321 9.0 Discussion: Implications and outcomes 325 9.1 Introduction 325 9.2 Summary of themes 325 9.3 Implications for the research topic 328 9.4 The Nation of Islam example 332 9.5 Conclusion 335

10.0 Conclusions 337 10.1 Summary of thesis argument 337 10.2 Summary of the conceptual process 338 10.3 Future directions 346 Glossary and Terminology 349 Appendix A 353 Non-Indigenous Converts to Islam survey 353

Bibliography 367

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Tables and Figure

Table 1 Muslim by Indigenous Status by Sex 80 Table 2 Major Religious Affiliations in Australia 212 Table 3 Religious Affiliation by Census Years by Percentage Change 213 Table 4 Australian Muslims - 2006 Census 238 Table 5 Religions in Australia 238 Table 6 Muslims in Australia by State and Territory 238 Table 7 Muslims in Australia by Capital Cities 238

Figure 1 Affiliation of Australians of all ages to major non-Christian religions 214

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Indigenous Australians and Islam

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1.0 Introduction 1.1 Context and orientation of the study

The inspiration for this research project originated from a February

2003 broadcast of a Special Broadcasting Services (SBS) documentary

entitled ‘Islam Dreaming’ (SBS, 2003). Reporter Julie Nimmo (2003) states

in the transcript of the introduction to the documentary:

Reliable figures are hard to come by, but Indigenous Australians are converting to Islam in increasing numbers. Some are drawn by the powerful spirituality of what is regarded as one the world's fastest growing religion. Others see Islam as giving voice to the world's oppressed and their own more immediate frustrations…

The Aboriginal men interviewed for the documentary claimed Islam

is providing them with a feeling of empowerment, to some extent

counteracting their feelings of oppression and marginalisation in Australian

society. When engaging with Islam, these men revealed the problems they

faced, not only from authorities but from Indigenous community leaders,

and the general public as demonstrated by Nimmo:

They are well aware of the impact of their words and that speaking publicly like this is risky. Interrogation and imprisonment are a real possibility. But equally unnerving is the threat of a public backlash (Nimmo, 2003).

The overall aim of this thesis is to test the claims made by Nimmo

and to further examine the precedents and repercussions of Indigenous

conversions to Islam. At the time of considering this topic as a suitable

Ph.D project it was unknown that conversion to Islam within the prison

system is a dominant theme, yet it is within the context of the post-

September 11 socio-cultural and political environments that the topic of this

thesis is embedded. This is related to the increasing occurrence of prison

inmates aligning with Islam in overseas prisons. The issue for prison

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authorities and Australian governments is also the fear of inmate

radicalisation. This is another important aspect discussed in this thesis.

Although the cross-cultural and religious convergence of Indigenous

and Islam is the analytical focus, it is necessary to expand the scope of

investigation to include global and historical perspectives. This is to

contextualise why the Indigenous struggle for economic and social parity

over time is yet to be realised, and to locate Islam in an Australian

sociological context. Furthermore, the concept and application of social

exclusion is employed to locate both Indigenous and Muslim actors within

theoretical and conceptual frameworks.

The tone of this study is as much cultural and political as it is

religious, and the investigation necessarily includes a critique of Australian

multiculturalism and national identity. This is to account for how Indigenous

converts to Islam feel how they belong in Australian society in terms of

historical and contemporary sociological circumstances. Social change

influenced by prevailing social attitudes and government ideologies and

policies act at a structural level to create uneven opportunities for social

inclusion. Under these circumstances, minority populations invariably find it

more difficult than others to maintain and improve their economic, social,

cultural, religious and political ideals. The increasing inequality associated

with unregulated capitalist expansion, the retraction of the welfare state,

religious conflicts, global terrorism, and ongoing ‘culture wars’ impact on

social relations and, therefore, impact on the well-being of marginalised

ethno-religious communities. However, the deeply embedded social

problems resulting form the effects of colonisation and Christian

imperialism are compounded by contemporary discrimination and control.

An immediate concern, then, is to draw attention to the dimensions of

inequality maintained over generations as is the case for many Indigenous

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Australians, and to examine whether some Indigenous Australians align

with Islam as a result of dissention and protest.

According to the 2006 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 1,011

Indigenous Australians identify as Muslims. Indigenous Australians number

517,200, and the total Muslim population is 340,392 or 1.7% of the total

Australian population (ABS, 2006a ; ABS Census, 2007). Only a small

sample of this population is the focus of this study. Overall, twenty three

Indigenous and non-Indigenous Muslim participants contributed to this

research. The research investigation location centres on the Redfern1 area

in New South Wales, with networks extending to many other Indigenous

communities. This particular geographic and demographic focus is for two

reasons. First, the most easily identified Indigenous Muslim group, the

Koori Muslim Association, is based at Redfern. This is the group from

whom a substantial amount of research data was obtained. Second, and

perhaps more importantly, Redfern is an important symbolic location for

Indigenous activism and still serves as a hub for the ‘Koori grapevine’2. ‘The

Block’ as it is commonly known remains the property of the Aboriginal

Housing Company (AHC) and was established ’in direct response to the

widespread discrimination Aborigines experienced in the private rental

market’ (Aboriginal Housing Committee (Standing Committee, 2004: 38)).

The area known as The Block is bounded by Caroline, Everleigh, Hudson

and Hugo streets and currently consists of Victorian era single fronted two

story dwellings, many of which have been demolished leaving patches of

open space. Today the block serves as both a living memorial to the vision

of the Whitlam government, and as a symbol of the troubled history

1 Redfern is an inner Sydney suburb with historical significance for Indigenous Australians. 2 This term refers to the centrality of Redfern as a communication hub for Indigenous people.

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between police and the Aboriginal community in Redfern (Donald, 2004). It

is no coincidence that a significant portion of this study examines the

inevitability of police intervention by way of the prison experiences of

Indigenous Muslims who recognise The Block as a cultural home and

centre for political resistance and religious activities.

A common reaction when discussing the topic of this research and

purpose of the project is one of surprise that, in fact, some Indigenous

people convert to Islam. Of even more surprise is the fact that Indigenous

peoples’ alliances with Muslims and Islam dates back to before the arrival

of the British in 1788 (MacKnight, 1976). Particular interest and concern is

expressed when discovering the fact that, now, Indigenous people are likely

to experience Islam for the first time while serving sentences in Australian

prisons, or being closely associated with someone who has.3

At the other end of the historical spectrum, between the

seventeenth century Macassan era and the late twentieth to early twenty

first centuries there is an almost unbroken connection between Indigenous

people in Australia and immigrants from the Muslim countries north of

Australia. Some of this history is relatively well known: the ‘Afghan’

cameleers are one group leaving a substantial contribution to the

development of modern Australia’s cultural and religious make-up.4

Alliances between Afghans and Indigenous people are less well explained,

yet their religious and spiritual differences have never been a major source

3 Studies in the US have found African-Americans have high conversion rates in prison. See Ammar, N., Weaver, R. and Saxan, S. (2004) Muslims in Prison: A Case Study from Ohio State Prisons. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology. 48(4): 414-428. 4 For a detailed account of Afghan influences in Australia see Christine Stevens, Tin Mosques and Ghantowns: A history of Afghan camel drivers in Australia (1989); Australia’s Muslim Cameleers: Pioneers of the Inland 1860s-1930s Philip Jones and Anna Kenny, (2007); Michael Cigler, The Afghans in Australia (1896); Peta Stephenson, The Outsiders Within: Telling Australia’s Indigenous –Asian Story. Sydney: UNSW Press.

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of conflict. If anything, the alliances have been pragmatic and cooperative,

and quite dissimilar to early Irish and Catholic relations in Australia notable

for sectarian and political strife (O’Farrell, 2000).

‘Islam Dreaming’ (SBS, 2003) served to raise some interesting

questions, some of which will attempt to be answered in the body of this

research. For example, why are Indigenous people over-represented in

Australian prisons in the first instance? Does collective cultural trauma

contribute to higher rates of incarceration? What are the circumstances of

the religious conversion process? Could prison conversions and alignment

with Islam be considered part of a new social movement network? These

questions have emerged as part of the research process and indicate the

complexity associated with Indigenous and Islamic issues. At a theoretical

level, a critique of the exercise of power ranges from coercive frontier force

and brutality, to the subtle manifestations of disciplinary and panoptic forms

of power. When combined with traditional forms of disciplinary power, to

those conceiving of individuals as already rationally calculating, social

actors are considered as individualised atoms of self-interest. Many

Indigenous people do not easily fit into, nor wish to be ‘shaped’ in this

manner (Foucault, 2008: 258). One of the aims of this thesis, then, is to

identify and analyse the differences between domination and modern

governmentality in the context of resistance politics. The relationship

between power and resistance also requires an insight into Indigenous

engagement with strategies that critique established forms of domination.

One of these is by choosing to ‘take care of the self’ by engaging in the

self-transformative practice of an Islamic world view which effectively allow

the acquisition of the ‘right’ to the truth (Hamann, 2009). This can also be

theorized as critical resistance offering possibilities for an experience of de-

subjectification, whereas neoliberal forms of governmentality continue to

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reinforce and expand Homo economicus as a form of subjectification that

can be directly linked to greater wealth disparity and increasing poverty,

environmental degradation, and growing rates of incarceration. (Hamann,

2009: 58).

Since Islam Dreaming was aired in 2003, the matter of global

terrorism has become entrenched in the public psyche and embedded in

government national security legislation. The implicit message in Islam

Dreaming is that Aborigines who convert to Islam are at risk of attracting

the attention of authorities because of possible radicalisation. This raises

an important aspect of this study which is to try and understand why

Indigenous Australians are attracted to Islam in the first instance; and then

to analyse how the conversion process might draw the attention of

authorities under the guise of national security and Islamic radicalisation.

The fear of terror is being translated into increased national security

measures in Australia, the U.S., Europe and the UK. Australia remains

committed to troop deployments in Afghanistan ensuring a visible profile for

those activists who associate ongoing terror threats with the United States

(US)-led western alliance in establishing democratic governance in Iraq and

to a reduced Taliban influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the time of

completing the final chapters of this research, most Australian Muslims

were defending their stance of repulsion at the growing number and

intensity of terror attacks world-wide. Simultaneously, Muslim communities

are facing increased surveillance from security authorities, and increased

fears of racial abuse and discrimination (Kabir, 2003).

For Indigenous Australians, the battle is still being waged for socio-

economic standards comparable to non-Indigenous society. Both

Indigenous Australians and Muslims in Australia have legitimate claims

against the state and Australian society for the removal of discrimination

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and inequality and improved socio-economic conditions. These structural

impediments and how they are negotiated form a background analysis as

outlined in the following section.

1.2 Outline of thesis aims, themes, and objectives

The thesis is a socio-historical analysis of the circumstances of

Indigenous conversions to Islam. There are three aims of the thesis. The

first is to document and investigate the socio-historic pathways of both

Indigenous Australians and Muslims in the context of government policies,

legislation, discrimination, and socioeconomic well-being. Second, to

investigate and explain the occurrence of Indigenous conversions to Islam

and the function NSW prisons play in the process. Thirdly, to establish how

Islam in the form of a socio-religious movement has become embedded in

the world-view of many Indigenous people. This focus is because Islam has

historically been a religion embraced by black Americans with its links to

slavery, emancipation, and self-empowerment. The three aims are

supported by in-depth interviews with Indigenous Muslims who provided

significant insights into local and global factors of influence. The hypothesis

is that some Indigenous Australians understand the long association with

Islam in Australia and have internalised an Islamic habitus5 within the field6

of Indigenous activism and resistance movements.

5 Pierre Bourdieu (1977) argues that the structures that typify social spaces give rise to 'dispositions' in the members of a social space. Dispositions can be understood as inclinations towards certain responses, as the tendencies to make one choice over another and to privilege one action over another, that is, the tendencies to regularly engage in certain practices as compared with other practices. Bourdieu's habitus is a system of such dispositions that endure across space and time. An individual may inhabit more than one habitus, and various habituses may overlap to some extent. However, any particular habitus is circumscribed by a group's homogeneity. Bourdieu describes how neoliberalism establishes itself as a doxa - an unquestionable orthodoxy that operates as if it were the objective truth - across social space in its entirety, from the practices and perceptions of individuals (at the level of habitus) to the practices and perceptions of the state and social groups (at the level of fields).

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To fully appreciate the plight of many Indigenous Australians is

difficult without an extensive reappraisal of conventional Australian history,

politics, and governance. Similarly, the history of Islam in Australia is

indicative of the fixation with ‘whiteness’ rather than religion, and Australian

nationalism rather than multicultural acceptance – at least in the early part

of the nation’s history. The exploitation and discrimination of minority

‘coloured’ groups has coincided with national development, and

xenophobia has been a hallmark of Australia’s economic and social

development. Cultural ignorance and racial arrogance embedded in

colonial and political ideologies have largely contributed to the cultural

dislocation, dispossession, marginalisation and multigenerational grief that

Australian Aborigines have experienced (Shannon, Panaretto, Doumany,

Canuto and Coyle, 2008).

The spiritual links between Aborigines and Muslims dates back to

pre-European invasion. The Afghan cameleers and Indian hawkers

established connections with Indigenous women when relationships

formed, and marriages occurred (Stevens, 1989). Many Indigenous people

understand these relationships in terms of common experiences of minority

exclusion and discrimination. Under these circumstances, it is not

surprising that contemporary Indigenous alliances with Islam are often

experienced as resurgent connections to somewhat familiar socio-religious

frameworks.

6 Bourdieu employs the notion of the field to explain the functioning and composition of social space across a society, as opposed to his theorization of the habitus, which explains the functioning of social space in particular and homogeneous environments shared by groups of people. Social space can be understood as made up of different, and distinct (although often overlapping) fields, which correspond to different spheres of activity and practice, such as the cultural, economic, social, and political.

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Generational precedence is supported by a global ‘black’

awareness of both a connection to African Muslim slaves transported to

America, and to the twentieth century event of the Nation of Islam and

Malcolm X (Essien-Udom, 1962). African Americans in the prison system

often experience Islam in the form of resistance or radical group

membership. Prisons in Europe (Smith, 2004) and the UK (Forde, 2008)

are known by authorities as potential breeding grounds for Islamic

radicalism. In Australia, the New South Wales Department of Corrective

Services claim prisoner radicalisation was a problem in the past but is no

longer (Moore, 2007). Despite this claim, all of the Indigenous men

interviewed for this research have had contact with Islam while in the

criminal justice system or in prison. The consequences of these alliances

for the Indigenous men and for prison authorities are examined in the

context of overseas and local experiences.

1.3 Thesis conceptual and theoretical rationale

Although the primary aim of this thesis is to investigate the social

circumstances of Indigenous conversions to Islam, this focus is only part of

the overall project. To only engage with the circumstances of religious

conversion, although important and relevant, is to misrepresent by omission

the historical and sociological precursors leading to the conversion

experience. Therefore, macro- sociological and socio-historical approaches

are adopted to account for the numerous factors of influence leading to

conversion. These theoretical and analytic considerations follow the in-

depth interview content of the Indigenous Muslim participants of this study.

The aim is to add a sociological dimension to complement the topics

discussed by the participants. These considerations are meant to add

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theoretical and analytic depth rather than detract from the insights offered

by the participants.

Comparisons will be made to conventional religious conversion

literature to formulate a unique conversion perspective. This is achieved by

documenting and analysing the sociological impacts of government

intervention in the lives of Indigenous peoples. A broad conceptual

perspective will locate the present socio-economic problems experienced

by many Indigenous Australians within significant historical, political, and

sociological contexts. This will partially account for the over-representation

of Indigenous Australians in the criminal justice system and serving prison

terms. The logic behind this strategy is that if prisons are the primary

location and impetus for conversions, it is legitimate to examine why

Indigenous people are increasingly over-represented in Australian prisons.

The concept of cultural and collective trauma (Eyerman 2004; Atkinson

2002) will be utilised to assist in this analysis.

The assumption that social exclusion is a significant underlying

issue for many Indigenous Australians forms a conceptual benchmark from

which to analyse the social conditions leading to Indigenous engagement

with Islam. Social exclusion is a short–hand term for what can happen

when people or areas have a combination of linked problems, such as

unemployment, discrimination, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high

crime and family breakdown. These problems are linked and mutually

reinforcing. Social exclusion is an extreme consequence of what happens

when people are unable to rise above their immediate struggles, often

because of disadvantage they face at birth, and this disadvantage can be

transmitted from one generation to the next (Social Exclusion Taskforce,

2007).

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A similar conceptual strategy will be employed to map the

sociological experiences of Muslims in Australian society dating from the

earliest documented engagement of northern Australian coastal Aborigines

with Macassan traders and trepang fishermen.7 Contemporary experiences

of Muslims in Australia will be compared and contrasted with the changing

Australian social, cultural, economic and political conditions dating from

pre-invasion to the present time.8 Particular attention will focus on

discrimination and bigotry as continuing themes in historical and

contemporary Indigenous Islamic relations with the wider non-Indigenous

and non-Muslim populations.

Of the enduring social determinants, racism and discrimination are

themes common to both Indigenous Australians and successive waves of

Muslim immigrants. Successive government policies concerning

immigrants, labour, and the regulation of Indigenous affairs are also critical

determinants in why and how Aborigines and Muslims are discursively

defined. Political and legislative complexity continues to impede the ability

of many Indigenous people to enjoy lifestyles comparable to other

Australians. An explanation of socially relevant themes examines in part

some of the underlying issues for Indigenous and Muslim societies, and

serves as a background to the main results chapters in the thesis.

This study employs a combination of ethnographic and case study

methodology to capture the environmental and individual perceptions of the

participants. Following the analysis of themes identified in the respondent’s

stories, dedicated chapters provide theoretical and conceptual, and

analytical depth to key issues. The stories of Indigenous Muslims, however,

7 See MacKnight, C.C., The Voyage to Marege': Macassan Trepangers in Northern Australia, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1976. 8 See Cleland, B., A History of Islam in Australia. http://www.islamfortoday.com/australia03.htm Retrieved 25 August, 2003.

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provide the rich qualitative core of data informing the central discussion

themes relevant to this study. All of the twenty three male participants

identified as Indigenous Australians and all were in various stages of

Islamic study and practice. A substantial body of ‘religious conversion’

literature deals with the personal, psychological, and psychoanalytic factors

influencing conversion. The sociology of religious conversion incorporates

what Snow and Machalek (1984: 167) describe as: a) the conceptualisation

and nature of conversion; b) the analytic status of converts’ accounts; and

c) the causes of conversion. This is a productive framework and is adopted

as a guide to the methodology of the study.

The primary purpose of this research is to ask the ‘why’, ‘how’, and

‘where’ questions; but more specifically to explain and analyse how the

circumstances and dynamics of Indigenous Australians’ relations with Islam

are conditioned by historical and contemporary social influences. An

examination of contemporary influences would be incomplete without

considering the recent histories of colonial, federal and state influences on

the well-being of Indigenous Australians. Such influences include, but are

not limited to, combinations of psychological and sociological factors

incorporating personal and social links between the generational effects of

colonialism, and contemporary economic, political, cultural, and religious

factors and influences.

These circumstances are complex and interrelated, but to gain an

appreciation of current social conditions, it is necessary to consider all

aspects of Indigenous socio-economic, cultural, political and religious

relationships with and between other Australians and the state. Because

this work is primarily a sociological study, it is also important to recognise

the individual and collective aspects of agency, or the degrees to which

individuals strive to achieve satisfactory states of well-being.

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Religious belief and participation are a traditional institution from

which adherents gain and nurture a sense of well-being. Yet there is a

qualitative difference between the claimed emptiness of material acquisition

and the self-sustaining holistic life-world of many Indigenous peoples.

Notwithstanding, the struggle for Indigenous well-being is socially located

within an increasingly radicalising global capitalist network. It is from here

that a sociological focus becomes the main theoretical and analytical tool.

As C.W. Mills (1959: 6) notes “The sociological imagination enables us to

grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within

society”. A macro analytical vision seeks to apprehend the local and global

diversity of religious worldviews and practices and their social and political

implications, and as Gorski (2003) points out, “situating the present more

firmly within the past” provides for a richer theoretical and empirical

understanding of present trends and cross-national variations in religion.

This macro socio-historical perspective adds depth and context to existing

conventional approaches to religious conversion literature.

At the micro-level, the task of this research is to achieve a better

understanding of religion as a lived experience in particular socio-

biographical contexts and to explore how macro and structural and cultural

changes shape the religious practices of individuals and of specific

historical cohorts (Dillon, 2003: 14).

In summary, this thesis employs a sociological theoretical focus to

contextualise the crucial factors identified by the Indigenous Muslim

participants to become religiously active at particular life stages.

1.4 Primary objectives described

The principle objective of this study is to describe and contextualise

historical and contemporary social, cultural, and political environments in

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relation to Indigenous Australians and Muslims in Australia. This objective

is achieved by using the Indigenous Muslim participants’ stories as a

benchmark for sociological investigation. The resulting analysis provides a

contextual benchmark for considering how and why religious conversion

takes place. This objective provides a broad outline of the significant social,

cultural, political, and religious factors of influence related to Indigenous

involvement with Islam. The objective incorporates elements of the main

research question: Why do Indigenous Australians align with Islam in

Australia?

A preliminary demographic investigation informed the main

fieldwork study by providing probable or likely population areas containing

both Indigenous Australians and Muslims for the purposes of preliminary

sampling and for identifying geographic and social factors for ongoing

research. This study involved a survey of all Australian States and

Territories to gain an overall demographic of Indigenous Australians

identifying as Muslims in specific geographic locations in Sydney.

Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2006 Census data were utilised for

the construction of demographic material.

A preliminary pilot study and analysis of internet-sourced stories of

converts’ to Islam has also been conducted for the purpose of revealing

themes, motives, and developing questions for the main survey

instruments. The findings from this study were compared to religious

conversion literature to establish a conversion process benchmark. This

study is included in Appendix A. The design and execution of the principal

data collection process followed from the initial orienting literature review

and preliminary analysis of internet-sourced conversion stories.

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The final component of the objective is to document, analyse and

compare the initial responses with the existing analysis and hypothesis.

The discussion and conclusions will complete the objective.

1.5 Review of orienting literature This thesis examines the unique occurrence of Indigenous

Australians converting to Islam either within the prison system or on

release. The conversion experience is then transferred to addressing

community issues such as the drug and alcohol abuse, violence, and crime

experienced in many Indigenous communities. This form of religious

conversion is a contemporary occurrence appearing in Australia since the

increasing political and social emphasis on countering Islamic radicalism in

a post-September 11 environment. Most notably, the terrorist attacks in the

United States (U.S.), the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Spain have influenced

the introduction of anti-terrorism legislation in those countries and Australia.

One effect of this increased awareness is to draw attention to Islamic

radicalisation within prisons. It is perhaps not coincidental that in U.S.

federal, state prisons and local jails, the proportion of the prison population

who are African American approaches 50 per cent (Bureau of Justice

Statistics, 2005). The Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that as of June 30,

2007, approximately 2.3 million persons were incarcerated in U.S. prisons

and jails. Black males are incarcerated at a per capita rate six times that of

white males (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007). In 2008, the number of

black non-Hispanic jail inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents was 831. The

ratio of Indigenous to non-Indigenous imprisonment has increased to 21.1

(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2005a: 32). According to Snowball and

Weatherburn (2006) this ratio is much larger than the disparity between

16

African American and white imprisonment rates (Bureau of Justice

Statistics, 2006). Full-time inmates of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander

descent in New South Wales (NSW) prisons during the 2007 inmate

census was 2072 or 20.1 percent of the total full-time prison population of

10,318 (Corben, 2008: 70). The trend has risen from 5.8 percent of the total

full-time male prison population (3719) in 1982 (Corben, 2008: 70).

The purpose of introducing these statistics is to establish a pattern

of ‘black’ incarceration leading to the increased potential for Islamic

radicalisation by other inmates. A link is also established with the

resurgence of Islamic practice associated with resistance politics which is

directly related to Indigenous Australian conversions to Islam. Although

there is a long historical association of Indigenous Australians and Islam in

Australia there is virtually no research explaining prison conversions in an

Australian context during the last two decades. In the U.S. the conversion

of African Americans to Islam has a longer history and is more

comprehensively researched. Robert Dannin’s (2002) Black Pilgrimage to

Islam is considered the most comprehensive work on early African

American and immigrant encounters and tensions and Samory Rashid

(2000) informs us that Islam in America has deep roots, with Muslims being

among the first and last slaves to be brought to the Americas (Diouf, 1988).

This is an important point because it links to an African American

association with Islam based on the repressive attributes of slavery.

Parallel with this recognition is the issue of Islamic tribalism where Farha

Ternikar (1998) explains that “Muslim Americans must confront their own

prejudices” and the “branching off in ethnic tribes” must be overcome

before Muslims can effectively confront non-Muslim prejudices (Ternikar,

1998: 41-42). This is also an important consideration because it negates

the popular notion that Muslims represent a unified political front. This

17

literature provides a benchmark with which to examine the links between

Indigenous histories of oppression and their association with Islam; it offers

an alternate view of Indigenous Australians as authors of their own

destinies by engaging with global Islam; and as with African Americans and

Islam, it negates the popular notion that Muslims and Indigenous

Australians represent a unified political front.

The most well-known organisation for having an enduring impact on

American Muslim identity is the Nation of Islam (NOI) (Karim, 20005)

Jamillah Karim notes that after Elijah Muhammad’s death in 1975, his son

and successor W.D. Muhammad “retained a sense of connection and

homage” to the NOI’s legacy of political and cultural empowerment (Karim,

2005: 498). This legacy is distinctly African American, and inextricably

linked to immigrant Muslim efforts to preserve and propagate the faith in a

new homeland. For Indigenous Australians the experience is somewhat

different. There has never been a historical and sociological association

between Indigenous Australians and a single or global Islamic-based

political and cultural empowerment movement.

Immigration in Australia during the 1980s witnessed an increase of

Muslims from the Middle East, so the current Islamic influence appears to

have a relatively short history. The striving by Indigenous Australians to

forge ‘first peoples’ identity and to achieve comparable socio-economic

parity with non-Indigenous Australian society continues as a work in

progress. Facing not only white hegemony, Muslim immigrants also

encountered Indigenous Australians, who have engaged with a history of

resistance and response to multiple forms of discrimination.

This literature enables a comparison with how Islam and Muslims

are perceived in Australia, and how historical influences have conditioned

certain groups to align with Islam. A further question to consider here is if

18

Indigenous Australians who convert to Islam associate histories of

oppression and control into their motivations to align with Islam, whether

the African American association with Islam informs, or acts as an case in

point for Indigenous Islamic-based resistance politics. The provisional

hypothesis is that Indigenous Australians do convert to Islam as a means to

assert resistance strategies against the historical effects of colonialism,

Christian dominance, and the exercise of contemporary political forms of

control. Just as African Americans have long associations with Islam in the

context of discrimination, prejudice, inequality and social exclusion, so too

Indigenous Australians, it is argued, maintain enduring historical memories

of exclusion and control. The literature will be examined further in chapter

two to establish a uniquely Australian perspective regarding Indigenous

conversions to Islam.

Australian scholars who have recently researched the cultural

dynamics of Indigenous Australians and Islam include Peta Stephenson

(2008; 2007; 2004; 2003) Stephenson provides the most comprehensive

contemporary Australian literature on Indigenous Australian and their

alliances with Islam. In her unpublished PhD thesis, Stephenson (2003: 3)

examines twentieth century cross-cultural partnerships and alliances

between Indigenous Australians and Asian-Australians. Although this work

examines Indigenous and Asian alliances and not Muslim partnerships

specifically, it does highlight the pre-invasion contact of Indigenous people

with those of Asian descent. Stephenson’s thesis employs a “cross or inter-

disciplinary approach that is partly a work of history combined with cultural

studies and literary criticism in conjunction with an examination of the

political and legislative arenas” (2003: 25).

In later literature, Stephenson (2008) explains how Islam and Islamic

practice is congruent with Indigenous identity and locates Indigenous

19

engagement with Islam within Homi Bhabba’s notion of ‘vernacular

cosmopolitanism (2008: 1). This is the task of identity formation, by

‘translating between cultures and negotiating traditions’ and implies a

compromise between cultural translation and cultural survival. In effect, the

dominant culture leaves little space for the emergence of specific and local

histories. Peta Stephenson, therefore, examines these translations and

renegotiations and also the practices of hybridisation resulting from such

interactions. This places Stephenson’s work within the domain of cultural

studies yet it is recognised that a cultural domain may not apply to the

spiritual experiences of Islamic practice and belief (Stephenson, 2008: 8).

My research probes Indigenous connections with Islam to elicit the

political and resistance aspects of engaging with ‘global Islam’. Global

Islam is considered to be the Islam practiced by 90% of the world’s Sunni

Muslims as opposed to the quasi Islam practiced by the African Americans

during the period 1930 – 1975. Yet it is a ‘quasi Islam’ that is often

espoused within the prison environment. This creates obvious difficulties for

those who wish to embrace the Sunni majority interpretation of Islamic

belief and practice mentioned above. The unique contribution this study

makes is to concentrate on how Islam is experienced by a small group of

Aboriginal men whose commonality is recognising and understanding the

empowering aspects of Islam. This socio-religious framework is then

introduced to their respective Indigenous communities to help overcome

hopelessness and despair.

A further area requiring explanation is the emerging literature

concerning the Islamic radicalisation of prisoners in the jails of the United

States, Europe, France and the United Kingdom. There is a significant body

of literature concerning the disproportionate imprisonment rate of

Indigenous Australians in Australian prisons. The Royal Enquiry into

20

Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, 1991 (RIADIC) provided ground-breaking

research into the underlying issues associated with disproportionately high

Indigenous Australian imprisonment rates. There also exists a small body

of literature concerning the role of religion and religious practice within

prisons. This literature is subsumed under the heading of prison chaplaincy

and concerns Christian religions. It is the aim of this research to examine

the literature concerning the application of religious practices in prison

related to Islamic practices. This includes the most prominent literature on

radicalisation. There appears to be little if any literature on the enabling

aspects of Islam in prison although the benefits of religious adherence are

well recognised. Overall, prison-religion research is conspicuously limited,

particularly that involving Indigenous Australians and Islam.

1.6 Outline of chapters

The introductory chapter has outlined the general orientation of the

thesis in terms of context, concepts, aims and objectives. In particular it has

emphasised the multiple factors of influence which determine the analysis

of religious conversion in a socio-historical context. Although this

orientation will be discussed fully in the following chapters it is suffice to say

that historical and current socio-political, religious and cultural factors

combine in what could be described as a complex network of interacting

influences leading to Islamic conversion.

Chapter two is a review of the literature concerning underlying social,

cultural political and religious issues impacting on Indigenous well-being,

their involvement in the criminal justice system, and eventual conversion to

Islam. The aim of this chapter is to establish a historical sociological

benchmark with which to analyse the current aspect of Indigenous

conversions to Islam.

21

Chapter three describes the methodology and provides the rationale for

adopting a participant observation case study approach. The chapter

provides a brief ethnographical overview of the communities in which the

converts inhabit. The in-depth interview data and the latter part of the

chapter analyses the main themes from the perspective of conceptual

orientation to the various sociological and socio-historical viewpoints. This

provides an orientation to the background underlying social and political

determinants influencing the lived experiences of Indigenous and Muslim

Australians. The chapter discusses and analyses the primary perspectives

enabling a comprehensive outline of contextual influences. Chapter four

continues with in-depth interview data and is followed with a summary of

the main themes in the interview data and associated analysis. Chapter five

is concerned with discussing the themes identified in the previous chapter

with underlying issues analysis. The important aspect of trauma effects in

relation to the over-representation of Indigenous imprisonment are

considered and discussed. Chapter six documents the place of Islam in

Australian society dating from the Maccassan contact prior to, and after

1788. The analysis extends to the present day to consider how Islam is

represented in Australian society. Chapter seven turns to explain the

disproportionate levels of Indigenous involvement in the criminal justice

system. The chapter outlines the continuity of control and governance of

Indigenous people that remains in various forms to the present. Chapter

eight investigates the occurrence of Indigenous alignment with Islam. The

analysis is supported by interview transcripts demonstrating the complexity

of Indigenous engagement with Islam.

Chapter nine analyses and discusses various options as to where this

research will lead, and what conclusions can be drawn from what is known

about the status of contemporary social policy in relation to Indigenous

22

Australian Muslims. This concluding chapter summarises and

contextualises the main themes within the scope of the overall research

project.

23

2.0 Underlying Issues: Context and Analysis

2.1 Introduction

This chapter contextualises the effects of colonisation and Christian

dominance in relation to current attempts by Indigenous Australians to seek

empowerment through Islamic practice and belief. The aim is to document

and analyse how the socio-historical treatment of Indigenous Australians

has lead to communities of social disadvantage. One of the social

outcomes of a history of dispossession is how communities and individuals

suffer the legacy of the past and how intergenerational dysfunction

manifests as collective trauma. One important and somewhat neglected

aspect of a trauma framework is the connection between intergenerational

trauma reproduction, and the overrepresentation of Indigenous Australian

in Australian prisons. A review of American studies on the collective cultural

trauma of African Americans is used as model from which to argue

similarities exist for many Indigenous Australians as is the high

imprisonment rates of black Americans vis-à-vis trauma backgrounds.

2.2 A history of Indigenous marginalisation, dispos session and control

The contemporary form of Australian national identity has grown

from the influence of immigrant settlement, and from earliest times was not

concerned with including Indigenous people and culture as significant

contributors to national definition. Collard (2000: 23) writes that: “The

country was colonised on the legal fiction of terra nullius, a Latin term

meaning ‘a land belonging to no one’. From this early stage in the history of

24

this country, Aboriginal people were not acknowledged or recognised at

all”. Yet Indigenous Australians continue in the political task of criticising

and attempting to overthrow the received European conceptions of

Aboriginal identity, and to replace them with more appropriate ones

(Stokes, 1997: 159). One particular form of identity assertion is found in an

Indigenous alliance with Islam, for whom some Indigenous people have

embraced as acts of empowerment (Jopson, 2003). Yet there remains a

contemporary form of psychological terra nullius in the guise of paternalistic

management practices contained within the bureaucracy of government

departments and the legalism of regulation and legislation.

In 1971 Kevin Gilbert (1933–1993) describes his impression of the

personal effects of Indigenous oppression and dispossession:

It is my thesis that Aboriginal Australia underwent a rape of the soul so profound that the blight continues in the minds of most blacks today. It is this psychological blight, more than anything else, that causes the conditions that we see on reserves and missions. And it is repeated down the generations (1977: 3).

Contemporary official recognition of past practices and the

generational flow-on effect of the consequences of removal from family,

community and culture are captured in the report of the National Inquiry into

the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their

Families (‘Bringing Them Home’) (1997). “The laws, policies and practices

which separated Indigenous children from their families have contributed

directly to the alienation of Indigenous societies today.…The harm

continues in later generations, affecting their children and grandchildren”

(Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, 1997: 3). “The

present plight, in terms of health, employment, education, living conditions

and self-esteem, of so many Aborigines must be acknowledged as largely

flowing from what happened in the past” (ibid.: 4).

25

The landmark Royal Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody

(RCIADC) 1991 made reference to the underlying issues which explain the

disproportionate detention rates of Aboriginal people (Johnstone, 1991).

The continuing high rate of Indigenous incarceration contributes to the

potential for increased contact with Islam within the prison system.

However, the reality of Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage is coupled

with other more recent events such as the rise of the fear of terrorism in a

post-September 11 environment, and the ubiquitous neoliberal economic

and political policies of Australian governments over the last three decades.

The following section examines identity and diversity constructs in relation

to government policies. The aim is to explicate how Indigenous identity is

masked by the impact of policies based on assimilation. Instead of

Indigenous peoples emerging from earlier and overtly racist regimes with

the ability and freedom to self-determine, it will be argued that, instead, no

tangible process has been made. The increased neoliberal focus of the

then Howard government, the ‘war on terror’, illegal immigrants, politics of

fear, and a general easing up of attention to Indigenous issues is

perpetuating low socio-economic condition of many Indigenous Australians.

The incumbent Rudd Labor government has made slight changes to

immigration policy, and Indigenous issues with a focus on removing some

of the harsher aspects of the former Howard Liberal Coalition government

policies.

2.3 Identity and diversity issues and concepts

By setting restrictions on immigration and criteria for granting

citizenship, the national governments of Australia have constantly shaped

national identity (Jupp, 1997). The assumed existence or possibility of a

single national identity provoked arguments over which aspects of national

26

heritage could legitimately be regarded as Australian (Stokes, 1997: 2). Not

until quite recently has a model of national identity been integrated into

what Jupp (1991) describes as a multiculturalism incorporating ‘loyalty to

Australia at all times and to her institutions and values and traditions’ (1991:

146). ‘Loyalty to Australia’ is a contested and debateable concept,

particularly in a post September 11 environment, in that it re-focuses

attention on a reconstructed identity based on previous policies of

assimilation. The United Nations Special Rapporteur (Glèlè-Ahanhanzo,

2002) notes:

The calling into question of the rights acquired by Aboriginals, the reorientation of the reconciliation process and the conversion of the anti-racism programmes into ‘Living in Harmony’ programmes more geared to assimilation goals are perceived as encroachments on multiculturalism (2002: 23-4).

The definition of Australian society was measured against an Anglo-

Australian multiculturalism that did not follow American affirmative action

principles or have the cultural emphasis of Canadian policy, and was

primarily concerned with social justice and social harmony rather than with

the preservation of ethnic differences (Jupp, 1997: 30).

Cleland (2001: 66) notes: “The Muslim experience in Australia

demonstrates the impact social attitudes, and the policies they create can

have upon peoples’ lives”. Since September 11, many Muslims in Australia

have experienced increased instances of racism, discrimination, vilification,

harassment, abuse and prejudice (Poynting and Noble, 2004). Maintaining

or reinvesting in strong religious and ethnic identity when other forms of

identity are defined by others is one avenue to demarcate and provide

support as Baumann (1999) has noted. Given that religion maintains its

position as a major social force, it follows that the characteristic form of

religious belief and interpretation in a given society is significantly

27

conditioned by the type and complexity of existing social patterns and

relationships (Johnstone, 2000: 33). On one hand, as van der Veer

observes: “confronted by racism and social discrimination, religion is

employed to reinforce one’s cultural particularity and identity” (1994: 119).

In the context of this literature review, Islam in Australia is an active

religious and identity system and an example of how certain groups employ

religion to reinforce their identities, or following Bourdieu (1991a: 22)

Religious power or religious capital “depends on the material and the

symbolic force of the groups and classes the claimants can mobilize by

offering them goods and services that satisfy their religious interests”. One

way of conceptualising the diversity of experiences is to accept that they

“affect the well-being of religious groups themselves and of the larger

society” (Wuthnow, 2004: 163). Religious traditions are not just theological

systems but on-the-ground activities engaged in by religious practitioners

and embedded in communities and social interaction” (Wuthnow 2004: 163,

1998, 1999). On the other hand, Indigenous Australians’ continually strive

for recognition as cultural survivors and first peoples and for claims to

ancestral land. Crossley (2005) raises the point of why individuals define

themselves in the specific ways they do and for many Indigenous people

identity is a contested issue. This is particularly so for those who have lost

connections with country and associated kinship network and relatives.

Giddens (1994: 6) recognises that modernity produces difference,

exclusion, and marginalisation. These conditions raise an existential issue

such as the continuity of self-identity. The existential question of self-

identity “is bound up with the fragile nature of the biography which the

individual ‘supplies’ about herself” (ibid.: 54) This implies, as Charles Taylor

(1989) notes, a knowledge of who we are, how we have become, and of

where we are going. The traits from which biographies are constructed vary

28

socially and culturally, with naming a primary element in a biography. For

Indigenous people removed from country as children, re-naming was a

common occurrence. This was a practice aimed at definitionally denying

Australian Aboriginal peoples their Aboriginality as described by Buti (ND:

29) as the:

most fundamental in the move to re-socialise indigenous children, was the practice of renaming children on their arrival at residential schools and Australian Aboriginal mission or other schools. The practice was common because it facilitated easier identification for teachers and superintendents and indigenous names were often held to be too difficult to pronounce, and transliteration of the names into English often produced ridiculous results. In the government operated 'native settlements' of Moore River and Carrolup in Western Australia, the practice of renaming arrivees was usual, as was the arbitrary allocation of birth dates.

To contextualise these comments, it is recognised that although

Indigenous Australians and Muslim Australians are numerical minorities in

a multicultural environment, both groups exert considerable influence in

debates defining Australian identity. This on-going debate connects with

local definitions of multiculturalism, in which Indigenous Australians

consistently argue for greater inclusion and recognition measurable by

evidence-based improvements in all socioeconomic indicators. Hunter

(2000: vi) proposes that: “unless Indigenous people are included in the

social and economic processes of Australian society, it becomes

increasingly difficult to break the vicious circle of welfare dependency and

unemployment”. Unemployment, however, is only one of the social factors

indicating the socioeconomic condition of Indigenous society. Social

exclusion is a further indicator of whether individuals and groups benefit

from mainstream society engagement.

2.4 Social exclusion and identity

The multidimensional aspects of social exclusion include

generational replications of poverty and low income encompassing a

29

broader concept of the wider causes and consequences of deprivation.

(Social Exclusion Unit, 2004). The United Kingdom government based

Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) definition describes social exclusion as:

a shorthand term for what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, unfair discrimination, poor housing, high crime, bad health, and family breakdown (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001: 11).

All of the above conditions apply, in a general sense, as being

indicative of the contemporary experience of a sizeable Indigenous

population, despite government claims of slightly improving socioeconomic

indicators (see Social Justice Report, 2003; Australian Institute of Health

and Welfare, 2008). Empirical data supports a realistic prediction that

(economic) equality “may never in fact be achievable in certain

circumstances” (Altman, 2000: vi), and that “as a group, Indigenous people

have the lowest economic status of all Australians” (ibid: 1). Given this

situation, it is not unreasonable to expect Indigenous actors to continually

seek alternative avenues of social inclusion, and positive forms of social

capital (Brough, Bond, Hunt, Jenkins, Shannon, Schubert, 2006). The

aspects of social capital contributing to positive consequences include both

sociability, and how “nonmonetary forms can be important sources of

power and influence…” (Portes, 1998: 2). Pierre Bourdieu (1985: 248)

describes social capital as:

[T]he aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances or recognition.

The dynamic, relational aspect of these circumstances point to the

ways in which more traditional religious expressions may be adapting to the

present increase in Australian religious diversity; how traditional groups

may be borrowing from newer groups; and how the newer groups may be

30

making adaptations of their own. For Indigenous Australians engaging with

Islam, this may afford a “second world of bridging capital” (ibid.).

To this end, it is hypothesised that Muslim communities in the more

ethnically diverse suburbs of Australian cities have the potential to provide

a religious and community framework able to support a more equitable and

communal social environment for those actors willing to embrace religious

and cultural diversity. However, the situation is quite complex given the

global repercussions resulting from terror attacks generally and the events

of September 11 and October 12 Bali bombings specifically. An important

and relevant perspective is noted by Cahill (2003):

The tragedy in the USA encapsulates the central themes of globalization, not just of economic globalization which the global intelligentsia and opinion-makers focus upon, but also of social and cultural globalization in which religion, language and ethnicity are intertwined with economic, political and media processes (2003: 5).

With the combination of global events and local responses, a

reconfiguration of national and religious profiles occurs in that: “increasingly

people have sought security through identification with a group closer to

their own experience and over which they have some control” (ibid.: 8 – 9).

Yet recent examples illustrate that religion, insofar as it is related to how a

people or culture define themselves, can be manipulated to become both

the liberator and the object of conflict. The apparently simple act of an

individual choosing a life-style change or a new religious framework is

made more complicated by the undercurrent of both historical and

contemporary circumstances. Generational family history and habitus

(Bourdieu, 1990) and stigma (Goffman, 1963; Falk, 2001) and current

political and administrative influences combine to present a web of

interlocking yet dialectic mechanisms of resistance and relationships.

31

The biographies of individuals are conditioned in a social

environment, meaning it is relevant to discuss a range of socio-political

concepts which both influence and are influenced by social actors. The

global nature of social relations is therefore considered in the context of

Indigenous and Islamic issues. Broadly, these issues are examined in

terms of changing government policies (mutual responsibility and retraction

of state ownership of public assets); a more equitable and sustainable

economic system (wealth and life-chances in view of financial market

governance); increased cultural and religious diversity (identification

issues); global spread of terrorism threats (radicalisation and stigma

resulting from anti-Western sentiment); and building a more equitable and

sustainable international order (economic and political equality).

2.5 Cultural trauma and intergenerational disadvant age

The aim of this section is to link the experiences of many

Indigenous people to that of trauma associated with generational

disadvantage which in turn is a legacy of past and present oppression.

2.5.1 Collective cultural trauma as a symptom of overarching imperial, colonial, and contemporary oppression

An important and relevant aim of the thesis is to investigate the links

between collective cultural trauma, increased incarceration rates and

religious conversion. The collective nature of Indigenous identity remains

an integral force uniting individuals in times of social upheaval. Therefore, it

is necessary to establish the relevance of cultural and collective trauma as

conceptual models able to explain intergenerational Indigenous

disadvantage. Collective recognition of Indigenous identity expanded to

collective recognition of trauma is a logical progression of examining

cultural trauma. Burgmann (2003: 4) notes that social movements are

32

‘imagined communities’ of the oppressed, disadvantaged or threatened.

Alexander, Eyerman, Giesen, Smelser, and Sztompka (2004:1) take this

one step further and propose that:

Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways Smelser (2004:43) adds: “A collective trauma, affecting a group with

a definable membership, will, of necessity, also be associated with that

group’s collective identity. Put simply, a meaningful cultural membership

implies a name or category of membership, and the social-psychological

representation of that category produces a sense of psychological identity

with varying degrees of salience, articulation, and elaboration…” The

combination of social group or movement membership and the concept of

collective cultural trauma is the focus of the following section.

2.5.2 Explaining cultural trauma Sztompka (2000) notes that a possible use of the concept of trauma

is to deal with the problem of “negative, dysfunctional, adverse effects that

major social change may leave in its wake” (2000: 450). A formal definition

of socio-cultural trauma is proposed by Smelser and Eyerman as: “a

memory accepted and publicly given credence by a relevant membership

group and evoking an event or situation which is a) laden with negative

affect b) represented as indelible, and c) regarded as threatening a

society’s existence or violating one or more of its fundamental cultural

presuppositions or group’s identity” (Smelser, 2004: 44; Eyerman, 2004:

62). Alexander (2004: 1) describes cultural trauma occurring “when

members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous

event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking

their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental

33

and irrevocable ways.” Alexander suggests cultural trauma incorporates

empirical concepts creating a space for “new meaningful and causal

relationships…” (ibid.) and illuminates an “emerging domain of social

responsibility and political action” (ibid.). At the core of these perspectives

is the difference between collective and individual trauma, in that:

collective trauma impacts on the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality. The collective trauma works its way slowly and even insidiously into the awareness of those who suffer from it, so it does not have the quality of suddenness normally associated with ‘trauma’ (Erikson, 1976: 153 – 154).

For traumas to emerge at the level of the collectivity, social crises

must become cultural crises. “Collective actors ‘decide’ to represent social

pain as a fundamental threat to their sense of who they are, where they

came from, and where they want to go.” (Alexander, 2004: 10).

2.5.3 Indigenous Australians and a case for a traumatised collective

The ‘trauma process’ necessitates claims and representations of

what constitutes cultural trauma. Claims about the shape of social reality

are explained as “a claim to some fundamental injury, an exclamation of the

terrifying profanation of some sacred value, a narrative about a horribly

destructive social process, and a demand for emotional, institutional, and

symbolic reparation and reconstitution.” (Alexander: 11) This definition

when linked to the history of Indigenous dispossession enables a

conceptual insight into the continuing unsatisfactory state of Indigenous

well-being.

Judy Atkinson in Trauma Trails, Recreating Song Lines (2002)

makes reference to trauma in the context of violence within “an urban/rural

coastal region of Central Queensland” (2002: 9), and the trauma trails of

the Aboriginal people who were removed from the “locations of the pain

34

and the disorder they experienced . . . from the mid-nineteenth century to

the beginning of the twentieth century” (2002: 10).

The layered trauma that results from colonisation is likely to be expressed in dysfunctional, and sometimes violent, behaviour at both individual and large-scale levels of human interaction, and these are re-traumatising (2002: 24).

Physical violence as a trigger for intergenerational trauma, and the

violence of colonisation are not necessarily inseparable, as one can

condition the other. Borrowing from Atkinson in that “trauma, if unhealed,

may compound” (2002: 24), a similar theme is continued in this thesis. The

difference is to extend the concept of violence and trauma as a legacy of

colonisation and to re-examine trauma as: 1) a contributing factor of

influence leading to arrest and incarceration; 2) trauma re-experienced as a

result of experiences in custody; and 3) trauma-inspired self-reflexivity,

‘crisis recognition’, and attempts to align with the tenets of Islam

Effectively, the pattern of violence and trauma is repetitive and

intergenerational as recognised in the stories of Indigenous inmates,

extended family members and friends. Trauma recognition constructs a

particular identity and habitus by way of a slow and insidious seeping into

the fabric and beliefs of people as community (Atkinson, 2002: 53).

Atkinson provides examples of the situations in which trauma is

experienced such as Shkilnk’s (1985) story of Grassy Narrows regarding

individual and collective trauma experienced as “anxiety, rage, and

depression; subjective feelings of loss, a sense of helplessness in the face

of conditions over which [people] felt they had no control; disorientation;

apathy; a retreat into dependency; a general loss of ego functions; and a

numbness of spirit” (Shkilnk,1985 cited in Atkinson, 2002: 55). Michael

Simpson (1993) argues the need for a broader and more holistic view of

post trauma reactions including community and communal responses to

35

trauma; the nature and effects of continuing and recursive violence; and the

recognition of the political context of trauma and its effects and the fact that

structural violence, such as that inherent in oppressive systems, has

potentially severe and continuing posttraumatic effects (Simpson 1993:

601). Simpson recognises that child abuse may be institutionalised in the

form of societal child abuse and:

bureaucratically designed and organised trauma within a country where political and social systems are perverted by a devotion to principles requiring that racially defined groups must be treated differently and, in all senses of that word, with prejudice (ibid).

In 2007, in response to the Northern Territory Report into sexual

abuse – called Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Makarle (Little Children are

Sacred) – the Howard Government announced a national emergency in

remote Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory (Reconciliaction,

2008). The Government’s ‘NT Intervention’ involved sending police and the

army into remote communities, alcohol bans, winding back Aboriginal land

rights under the NT Aboriginal Land Rights Act, health checks for Aboriginal

children and the quarantining of welfare payments in 73 Aboriginal

communities. With the exception of some prominent Aboriginal

commentators, Aboriginal groups strongly condemned the NT Intervention.

The authors of the Little Children are Sacred Report also spoke out against

the intervention, arguing that its heavy handed, top-down approach was

inconsistent with the recommendations in the report (ibid.).

The ‘Little Children Are Sacred’ report and the subsequent

‘intervention’ in the Northern Territory are applicable examples of what

Simpson includes in his definition of trauma-recursive events. This is most

apparent in the claimed intergenerational occurrence of child sex abuse

and the bureaucratic imposition of the response. The trauma producing

36

symptoms of contemporary Aborigines can only be fully understood within a

nineteenth-century legacy of the violence against the individual from

proselytisation and predatory missions, the structural violence of British

imperialism, and the physical violence of colonial warfare.

Empirical and statistical evidence is not always necessary to

understand and acknowledge the relative disadvantage of certain ethnic,

religious, or cultural groups, and for cultural trauma to be experienced. For

example, the material conditions of many Indigenous people and

communities remain largely unresolved, as have symbolic reparations in

terms of reconciliation and self-determination. According to Hunter (1999:

16) “Indigenous people’s living standards are both qualitatively and

quantitatively different to that of other poor and rich Australians”. The

resultant social exclusion experienced by Indigenous people is evidenced

by the increasing difficulty in breaking the vicious circle of welfare

dependency and unemployment. Social indicators such as arrest rates,

police harassment and being a victim of assault; being a member of the

‘stolen generation’; civic engagement; the loss of motivation; and ill-health

all point to areas of social exclusion. “Social exclusion, unlike poverty, is an

intrinsically dynamic concept, descriptive of a condition that develops over

time after prolonged social isolation and deprivation” (Hunter, 2000:

3).These circumstances would constitute a major crisis within the dominant

society if the conditions were experienced by the majority of non-

Indigenous Australians.’ ‘Crisis’ and ‘oppression’, then, become one with

collective cultural trauma in forming a conceptual framework involving

current lived conditions and indelible historical memories.

Although Sztompka (2004) explains crisis as a “chronic, permanent

and endemic feature of modern society, putting a question mark under the

whole project of modernity” (2004: 157), the socio-cultural context of

37

Indigenous oppression adds an extra dimension to this understanding.

People put value on security, predictability, continuity, routines, and rituals

of their life-world, even more so in the ambivalent social atmosphere of late

modernity (ibid.) The speed, scope, content, and social-psychological

framework of social change delivers destructive effects on the body social

(Sztompka, 2000: 452). Yet the anticipation of improved conditions

combined with the direct experience of disadvantage provides fertile ground

for the condition of cultural trauma. Cultural trauma is realised when people

start to be aware of the common plight, perceive the similarity of their

situation with that of others, and define it as shared. History and cultural

relevance provides a discursive space within which to construct and nurture

major cultural attributes, disasters, celebrations, and national identity. This

process could apply to any group within Australia and illuminates the dual

tendencies of ‘remembrance’ and selective ‘forgetfulness’. Two examples

are the ubiquitous Anzac memorials and remembrance celebrations, and

the scarcity of civil markers acknowledging Indigenous loss of life, land and

culture opposing colonial invasion. The contested nature of the relative

importance of these events underscores the contested and contextual

nature of remembering and forgetting. Memory is located not inside the

heads of individual actors, but rather “within the discourse of people talking

together about the past” (Radley, 1990: 46).

Collective cultural trauma, then, could be seen as being dependent

on the socio-cultural context of the affected society at the time the historical

event or situation arises (Smelser, 2004: 36). Furthermore, cultural trauma

must be remembered or made to be remembered; it must be culturally

relevant, and be associated with a strong negative affect (ibid.). The

gradual revelation of alternative histories, however, is placing greater

scrutiny on the benevolent and benign process of settlement, and in making

38

claims against authorities for reparation and due recognition of social and

cultural damage. In terms of collective cultural trauma, this should be seen

as an evolving process, or a traumatic sequence (ibid.: 453), and that

“cultural traumas are for the most part historically made, not born”

(Smelser, 2004: 37). Eyerman (2004: 60) uses the example of slavery as a

focus for collective memory in the formation of African American identity. As

a cultural process, trauma is linked to the formation of collective identity

and the construction of collective memory. Eyerman explains that slavery

became central in attempts to “forge a collective identity out of its

remembrance, forming a ‘primal scene’ that could, potentially unite all

‘African Americans in the United States, whether or not they had

themselves been slaves or had any knowledge of or feeling for Africa”

(ibid.). African American collective identity recognition and the link with

cultural trauma are important concepts to consider in relation to Indigenous

Australians, terra nullius, and dispossession.

Hoare (in Burgmann) describes the feeling of being ‘inside’ a social

movement:

Sharing common cause with others in response to the crises that affect us all brings forth incredible feelings of solidarity, camaraderie, empowerment and joy. The shared conviction that arises from standing up against what is plainly wrong is a tremendously positive and sustaining experience, and is without doubt the most effective remedy to feelings of hopelessness, despair and surrender (Hoare 1998: 22 quoted in Burgmann, p. 5).

It is recognised that an awareness of relationships emphasizing

grievances and discontent are not necessarily causal relationships. The

underlying assumption is that grievances are generated by socio-structural,

economic, and political strains and crises which produce psychological

distress and prompt individuals to participate in collective action

(Wiktorowicz 2004: 3). According to Alexander (2004) the collective nature

of cultural trauma occurs when members collectively feel they have been

39

subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their

group consciousness, marking heir memories forever and changing their

future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways” (Alexander 2004: 1).

Trauma should be conceptualised as a socially mediated attribution, rather

than a naturalistic phenomenon (ibid.: 8). This notion of an ‘imagined’

traumatic event seems to suggest the kind of process that Benedict

Anderson describes in Imagined Communities (Anderson 1991).

Anderson’s concern is not with trauma, but with the kinds of self-

consciously ideological narratives of nationalistic history. Yet these

collective beliefs often assert the existence of some national trauma

(Alexander 2004: 8). But it is imagination that informs trauma construction

even when the reference is to something that has actually occurred as to

something that has not (ibid.: 9). While every argument about trauma

claims ontological reality the concern is not so much with the accuracy of

social actors’ claims, and much less with evaluating their moral justification.

We are concerned only with how and under what conditions the claims are

made, and with what results. It is neither ontology nor morality, but

epistemology, with which we are concerned (ibid.: 9). Traumatic status is

attributed to real or imagined phenomena, not because of their actual

harmfulness or their objective abruptness, but because these phenomena

are believed to have abruptly, and harmfully, affected collective identity

(ibid.: 9-10). However, in the case of Indigenous Australians, the effects of

generational dispossession are a lived reality, and continued actual harm is

evidence of this process.

2.5.4 Collective identity and trauma recognition

Identity involves a cultural reference, and only if the patterned

meanings of the collectivity are abruptly dislodged is traumatic status

40

attributed to an event. It is the meanings that provide the sense of shock

and fear, not the events in themselves. Whether or not the structures of

meaning are destabilized and shocked is not the result of an event but the

effect of a socio-cultural process. It is the result of an exercise of human

agency, of the successful imposition of a new system of cultural

classification. This cultural process is deeply affected by power structures

and by the contingent skills of reflexive social agents (Alexander 2004: 10).

Resistance and protest movements are integral to Indigenous experiences

of dispossession. This has become more apparent since the emergence of

‘Indigenous rights’ discourse to the extent of a coherent and sustainable

acceptance of Indigenous disadvantage associated with European

invasions.

For traumas to emerge at the level of the collectivity, social crises

must become cultural crises (ibid.: 10), and the gap between event and

representation can be conceived as the ‘trauma process’ (ibid.: 11). The

predisposing influences or underlying social fabric which conditions

collective cultural trauma could also relate to habitus formation, setting in

motion a particular life-world orientation or perspective amenable to social

movement participation and a politics of resistance. This perspective is

acknowledged by Burgmann (2003: 49) in that although Indigenous protest

and resistance movements are both necessary and effective their support

base is extremely limited and “official policies towards Indigenous

Australians have long contributed to the fragmentation of their communities

and rendered political mobilisation difficult.” However, even if collective

grievance and protest linked activities are limited, established and reformed

habitus oriented to continual critique of social inequality drives many

Indigenous individuals to assert agency. Put differently, the sociological

theme of collective cultural trauma or simply, cultural trauma, as an

41

overriding cultural experience although manifesting as various personal and

social instances of negative, dysfunctional, adverse effects, also provides

the impetus for social change. (Sztompka, 2000: 450).

2.5.5 Key historical processes and era’s revealing potential and actual trauma producing conditions for Indigenous people

• Terra nullius - Initial invasion and colonising period signified by

wholesale social, community, and economic disintegration.

(dispossession)

• Protection policies - Missionary and ‘philanthropic’ influences.

These include ‘reservations’ or mission areas destroying tribal

organisation and culture.

• ‘Scientific administration’ includes the gradual intrusion of

bureaucratic management

• Assimilation or integrationist policies – From the 1930s ‘assimilation’

became the declared goal of Commonwealth and State government

policies.

• Welfare – little or no effective case management of welfare

payments.

• Self-determination policy – (Whitlam government) Aboriginal

communities deciding the pace and nature of their future

development.

• Land rights – (political resistance and public perceptions)

• Self-management policy – (Fraser government) Indigenous

communities managing government projects and funding.

• Native title – Rejection of the long-standing doctrine of terra nullius

(Mabo 1992)

42

• Multiculturalism – (Fraser government onwards Reaffirmed the ‘right

of all Australians…to express and share their individual cultural

heritage, including their language and religion’.

• Reconciliation movement – Triggered by the Report of the Royal

Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody tabled in federal

Parliament in May 1991.

The ‘Stolen Generations Inquiry’ culminated in the HREOC report,

Bringing Them Home, tabled in the Australian federal parliament on May 26

1997. This was an example where landmark historical issues relating to

questions of race, dispossession and assimilation evaded the reconciliation

process by becoming overtly politicised. The Bringing Them Home report

re-told stories of cultural and spiritual genocide, yet sections of popular

media and some politicians rejected the findings of the report. Lowitja

O’Donoghue reminded us in her speech marking the 10th anniversary of

the report, 35 of the 54 recommendations in the Bringing them home report

were ignored by the Howard government p.71 – “people build their own

prison and become simultaneously prisoner and warden (Baker, 1983: 40

cited in Atkinson, 2002: 72).

• Practical reconciliation – (Howard government) Practical measures

to overcome disadvantage in areas of health, education,

employment, and housing but with what evidence of substantial

improvements?

• The hyper-competitive logic of global neo-liberalism - A continuation

of assimilationist ideology where Indigenous people are expected to

rely on their own effort to realise individual and social

improvements, while being held responsible for their current

predicaments. This is a process of re-victimising by the legal,

43

welfare, medical, and political responses to existing trauma

(Atkinson, 2002: 77)

These policies, ideologies, and inquiries mask the trauma associated

with forced removals, actual physical and domestic violence that is rife

within some Indigenous communities. An intergenerational experience quite

often generated by unresolved social inequality is often repeated as

generational or acquired habitus. Nevertheless, the above mentioned

policies and concepts do not necessarily cause a trauma effect. The effects

of trauma most likely emanate from the sum of everyday experiences

likened to a trickledown effect. There would be a differentiation from policy

influences but linkages to long term habitus reproduction. This is best

explained by Pat O’Shane describing how trauma becomes entrenched in

societies and becomes a cultural norm, or the doxic condition according to

Bourdieu (1977).

Throughout Aboriginal society in this country are seen what can only be described by anyone’s measure as dysfunctional families and communities, whose relationships with each other are very often marked by anger, depression and despair, dissention and divisiveness. The effects are generational….I recognised al the things that had happened to me through my grandparents, and their parents; their brothers and sisters whom I had known as a child; through my mother and her siblings; through my cousins and my siblings. I recognised the things that happened to the thousands of other Aboriginal families like our family, and I marvelled that we weren’t all stark, raving mad (O’Shane, 1995: 151-3).

These reflections although couched in psychological terms do

indeed indicate enduring underling social structures of influence. Gagné

(1998) names four tiers which directly affect future generations as

colonialism; political and socio-economic dependency; the cultural

genocide of residential schools and the alcoholism and substance abuse

which has direct relationship to the residential school experience, and to

interference by federal governments with introduced social programmes

such as housing projects and welfare; and cultural bereavement, family

44

violence, accidental deaths, child abuse and sexual abuse (1998: 357 –

69). The multiple violations of the experiences of Indigenous Australians

interlinked with the institutional destruction of families have resulted in

violent behaviours across generations. Communities with low levels of

social cohesion contribute to the potential for increased participation in the

criminal justice system, and from the perspective of the high Indigenous

imprisonment rates, indicate this is the rule rather than the exception. This

is the important link between underlying conditions, intergenerational

reproduction of trauma and anti-social behaviour, and consistently high

Indigenous imprisonment rates.

The following section briefly outlines African American Muslim

experiences of trauma and considers how the conditions of slavery have

created similar patterns of trauma recognition and similarly high rates of

imprisonment.

2.5.6 Cultural trauma and African Americans Slavery in the form of collective memory is grounded in the identity

formation of many African Americans (Eyerman, 2004: 60). The distinction

is made between trauma as it affects individuals, and as a cultural process,

and this is understood as collective identity originating from the

remembrance of slavery (ibid.). Just as the remembrance of the Australian

Anzac experience has forged a nationalistic form of Australian identity, so

too has the memory of slavery been institutionalised. Organisations such as

the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)

founded in 1909 – 10 was in part a product of the “memory of slavery and

its representation through speech and art works…” (Eyerman, 2004:61).

Cultural trauma, therefore, refers to a dramatic loss of identity and

meaning, a tear in the social fabric, affecting a group of people that has

45

achieved some degree of cohesion (ibid.). The cultural reproduction of

trauma remembrance embodied in the social body forms a context in which

individual biographies and thus memories can be connected with others.

Social movements reconnect individuals by and through collective

representations, and they present the collective and represent the

individual in a double sense by forging the individual into collective memory

and representing the individual as part of the collective. The difference

between reconstructing a traumatic past, and directly experiencing

transgenerational effects of trauma is the difference between Eyerman’s

model and that of Indigenous Australians. For the subjects of this study at

least, involvement in the criminal justice system was a symptom of trauma

reproduction in real time. Yet their ability to effect resistance strategies was

not prevented even when in prison. An example of resistance concepts is

demonstrated in the following section.

2.5.7 African American example of resistance culture

The earliest black American Muslim communities were established

as a reaction to racist practices, evasive actions, and exploitative

relationships fostered by segregation during the Jim Crow era (Gardell,

1996 cited in A. Akom, 2003: 307). Lipitz (1988) referred to this as a

‘culture of opposition’ and a dialectical relationship between ‘underclass’

status and resistance and ‘white power’ (Akom, 2003: 307).

For black Americans, racism and exploitation promoted an oppositional

culture, and the argument could be made that similar ‘motivating’ social

conditions influence an Indigenous culture of opposition and resistance.

Within the Nation of Islam (NOI), the black achievement ideology

often coexists with an oppositional social identity (Akom, 2003: 307). The

dual response to conditions of racism and group discrimination and rigid

46

morals, self-determination, non-traditional Islam, and Black Nationalism are

the key elements to the NOI’s black achievement ideology (ibid.)

The terms black achievement ideology and mainstream

achievement ideology…as processes of inclusion and exclusion, as well as

mobility processes, are integral to identity formation and defining cultural

boundaries (ibid.: 308). The oppositional –culture explanation has three

main components 1) institutional treatment system; 2) the response to

institutional treatment; 3) how the group became a minority in the first place

(ibid.: 321). The oppositional culture explanation draws from within the

minority/family itself; and as a function of social structural conditions

(Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey, 1998: 536). Propositions for an

oppositional culture model drawn from an educational framework consist of

the following elements:

1) Involuntary minority (African American) students perceive fewer returns

than do dominant white students. This proposition is not supported

suggesting an understanding of the importance of schooling.

2) Involuntary minority students exhibit greater resistance to school than do

dominant white students. This hypothesis returned mixed results

suggesting differing contextual variations.

3) High achieving involuntary minority students are negatively sanctioned

by their peers for their achievement. This position is not supported because

peers understand and support effort and achievement.

4) Resistance to school accounts for the racial gap in school performance

between involuntary students and dominant white students.

The oppositional culture model explained above is based on the

concepts of societal forces and community and individual level forces

(Harris, 2008). The effect of social and community forces relate specifically

to members of subordinate minority groups who have been specific targets

47

of exclusionary policies (ibid.). Carrol and Ratner (2005: 607) extend this

model to state that:

…only through the construction of alternative forms of identity and community, alternative modes of living, and alternative forms of political action, within the context of social movements implanted in the everyday world, that people might be weaned from hegemonic constructions of their interests and identities.

Oppositional culture, therefore, takes in the senses of identity and

community that unify a group, the practices through which group members

meet each other’s needs and develop new needs that inform an agenda

change, and the specifically political organization which forms a practical

basis for visible collective action (ibid.: 608). This evolved model is useful

for conceptualizing both Indigenous alliances within specific circumstances

such as the prison, and the Indigenous oppositional culture residing at the

level of Indigenous resistance politics and activism generally.

2.5.8 Resistance culture and African American Islam

Remaining within an African American context, Edward Curtis

(2007) adopts black Muslim perspectives on the history of Islamism, the

twentieth-century transnational ideology that sees Islam as both a political

system and a religion. In addition to creating the famous Nation of Islam

and well-known Moorish Science Temple, African American Muslims by this

date had either established or come to dominate the leadership of many

Ahmadi Muslim mosques, the Islamic Brotherhood (or the State Street

Mosque of Brooklyn), the Addeynu Allahe Universal Arabic Association, the

Fahamme Temple of Islam and Culture, and the First Mosque of Pittsburgh,

which reportedly had sub-charters in Kirkwood and St. Louis, Missouri;

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Cleveland, Ohio; and Jacksonville, Florida

(Curtis, 2007: 683 – 4).

48

Curtis (2007) identifies three strains of African American Muslim

interpretive frameworks exemplified respectively by Malcolm X, the Nation

of Islam, and Shaikh Daoud Ahmed Faisal, the founder of the State Street

Mosque. Curtis (2007) shows how Shaikh Daoud Ahmed Faisal aligned his

community of believers with Islamist ideology; how Malcolm X became the

student and ally of new foreign and immigrant missionaries, though he

resisted their politicized interpretation of Islam; and finally, how members of

Elijah Muhammad’s Nation of Islam rejected the missionaries’ claims to

ultimate religious authority and instead defended Elijah Muhammad’s

prophetic voice (ibid.). These differing reactions are important, if for no

other reason than they disprove the notion, at least implied in the

arguments of many Islamophobes, that foreign Islamist missionaries have

been pied pipers leading all indigenous U.S. Muslims toward the deadly

ideology of violent jihad. A similar argument could be made for the methods

of inculcating prison inmates: firstly by other inmates; and secondly, the

interpretation by prison management.

After the Second World War, religious and cultural exchange

between African American Muslims and foreign Muslims, especially from

the Middle East, expanded dramatically. In one sense, this expansion of

ties was an acceleration of trends that began decades before, during the

flowering of Islam as a twentieth-century African American religious

tradition. As the modern anti-colonial struggle among persons of African

descent became an international black freedom discourse, more and more

African Americans and English-speaking people of colour began to link the

self-determination of African-descended people to the fate of Muslim

persons and Muslim-majority lands (ibid. :685). More recently, Indigenous

Australians have engaged with the later work of Malcom X and Ahmed

49

Deedat9 of South Africa. From the time of its origins as a topic in

international black English language discourse, Islam was associated if not

with an explicit black political nationalism then at least with ideas of black

self-determination and shared historical destiny. Shared historical identity is

an important topic in the discourse for some Indigenous Muslims who

believe in a direct genetic link to Africans who are claimed as the

antecedents of ‘modern’ Muslims (Davis, 2006). This may be linked to what

Curtis recounts when an African American leader, Timothy Drew

proclaimed himself a Muslim prophet, and established the Moorish Science

Temple in 1920s Chicago. Noble Drew Ali insisted that black Americans

were Muslim in religion, Asiatic in race, and Moorish in nationality, and

called on “Moors” to return to their original religion of Islam and their true

national identity (Curtis, 2007: 685).

Furthermore, African American Muslims in the NOI located the story

of black Muslim people in many epochs and locales, including ancient

Egypt, Muslim West Africa, Asia, a mythical Arabia, and the classical period

of Islam during and immediately after the time of Prophet Muhammad of

Arabia. These black Muslims “moved across” time and space, constructing

their contemporary identities by imagining who they had been in the past.

The broader African American interest in things Islamic and Muslim

and the heightened profile of black Muslims such as Elijah Muhammad and

Malcolm X also attracted the gaze of Muslims overseas (Curtis, 2007: 687).

One African American pioneer who had already articulated Islamist ideas in

print by 1950 was Caribbean immigrant Shaikh Daoud Ahmed Faisal (d.

1980). (ibid.: 689). Shaikh Daoud taught Islam from the Great Depression

until the seventies as a religion that was the true light of the Civil Rights

9 Shiek Ahmed Hussein Deedat (July 1, 1918 – August 8, 2005) aimed at providing Muslims with theological tools for defending themselves against the intense missionary strivings of many Christian denominations.

50

Movement. This father of American Islam paved the road for the Dar-ul-

Islam, Jamil al-Amin, the Fuqara, Imam Isa and the Nuwabians, and

Brooklyn’s Masjid Farooq through his Islamic Mission to America. Before

most Muslim missionaries had arrived from Afro-Eurasia, Shaikh Daoud’s

intellectual life bore the influence of Islamic reform and renewal

movements. Ibid.: 690)

2.5.9 African Americans, Indigenous Australians and prison

African Americans are over-represented in American prisons.

During the 12 months ending June 30, 2006, the number of inmates in the

custody of State and Federal prisons and local jails increased 2.8% to

reach 2,245,189 (Sabol, Minton & Harrison, 2007). In June 2006 more

black men (836,800) were in custody in State or Federal prison or local jail

than white men (718,100) or Hispanic men (426,900). Black men

comprised 41% of the more than 2 million men in custody, and black men

age 20 to 29 comprised 15.5% of all men in custody on June 30, 2006

(ibid.). Relative to their numbers in the general population, about 4.8% of all

black men were in custody at midyear 2006, compared to about 0.7% of

white men and 1.9% of Hispanic men. Overall, black men were

incarcerated at 6.5 times the rate of white men. The incarceration rate for

black men was highest among black men age 25 to 29. About between 5.7

and 8.5 times 11.7% of black males in this age group were incarcerated on

June 30, 2006. Across age groups black men were more likely than white

men to be incarcerated (ibid.).

These data range at the extreme end of a continuum identifying

incarceration rates per 100.000 of the general population. The question as

to why African American males are over-represented in American prisons

could also be asked of Indigenous Australians. If sentencing bias is

51

discounted as a factor in higher incarceration rates does it mean that

African Americans commit more crime and therefore experience more

frequent periods of incarceration? Does it also mean that African

Americans are less law abiding and less socially integrated as represented

by their high rate of imprisonment? These explanations are often raised by

right wing commentators and politicians as forms of simplistic and populist

appeasement. An alternative explanation considers the type of crimes

committed by this group that differ significantly from other offenders. The

explanation becomes more complex when considering the different rates of

incarceration between state jurisdictions. In most cases the crimes

committed are visible public disorder offences and those relating to alcohol

and drug abuse (Weatherburn, 2006).

Similar circumstances can be attributed to Indigenous Australians

who find themselves in prison. On June 30, 2002 the Indigenous

imprisonment rate was twelve times higher than the rate for non-

Indigenous prisoners, 1,488 per 100,000 Indigenous adult population

compared to 121 for non-Indigenous adult population.

(ABS, 2006). On a national level, the total prisoner population rose 6 per

cent from 25,790 last year to 27,224 this year, with the number of

Indigenous prisoners up 9 per cent (ibid.). The WA Parole Board’s former

Aboriginal community member, Craig Somerville, said the figures were the

continuation of a worrying trend. “I think it’s a symptom of the dysfunction in

the Aboriginal community … physically, socially and emotionally’

(Somerville cited in Perry 2007).

52

2.6 Discussion

The socio-historical treatment of Indigenous Australians has often

contributed to communal breakdown. One of the social outcomes of a

history of dispossession is that communities and individuals suffer

intergenerational dysfunction manifesting as collective trauma. It is argued

that the connection between intergenerational trauma reproduction, and the

overrepresentation of Indigenous Australian in Australian prisons is worthy

of consideration. A review of American studies on the collective cultural

trauma of African Americans is used as model from which to argue

similarities exist for many Indigenous Australians as is the high

imprisonment rates of black Americans vis-à-vis trauma backgrounds.

However, whether cultural trauma has an influence in Indigenous

affiliation with Islam as opposed to any other factors is a matter of debate,

however, the claim that collective cultural trauma in the form of identity

formation as in a pan ‘black resistance’ movement stands. The condition of

collective cultural trauma is something that has required reflection,

remembrance, ‘nurturing’ and general acceptance. Does this acceptance of

a trauma frame engender a ‘crisis of identity’ or enable strategy specific

Indigenous actions to ‘heal’ trauma? (see Atkinson, 2001).

Given that an oppositional culture exists in Indigenous contemporary

societies one the networks enabling an expression of this sentiment is

aligning with Islam. Historically and sociologically, this has been the case

for many African Americans with their long connections to Islam dating

back to the slavery period. Contemporary African American Islam is

associated with black militant groups, which emerged in the early part of

the twentieth century as the social movement Nation of Islam (NOI). The

NOI is a specific type of social movement because it not only is designed to

for winning black converts but also focuses on black socio-economic

53

issues. The other role of the NOI as a Black Nationalist movement

encouraged the creation of a collective consciousness and to sustain racial

and cultural pride. This was in the context of rapid social change during the

1930’s Depression and aftermath of World War I combined to create social

conditions provoking discontent among blacks. The fact that the early NOI

practiced an almost ‘cultish’ version of Islam, such as the idea of black

racial superiority and whites as evil contradicted the teachings of racial

equality found in orthodox Islam. The NOIs divergence from orthodox Islam

made them more inclusive and politically radical in their insistence on black

separation and their belief in the manifest destiny of the Black Nation to

inherit the earth (Marsh, 1996).

From the evidence provided it could be suggested that despite the

socio-economic issues facing African Americans, they were able to

collectively organise a political response based on a divergent form of

Islamic practice. The issue of interest in this study are the similarities and

differences between the broader aims, purposes and doctrine of socio-

religious groups such as the NOI and the more recent uptake of Islam by

Indigenous Australians. Indeed, some of the doctrine espoused by NOI

appears in the discourse of certain Indigenous Muslims.

2.7 Conclusion

The themes of pan Islamism and transnational saturation of

orthodox Sunni Islam came after the era of early African American ‘cultish’

versions of the Islamic thought and practice of the Moorish Science Temple

and the Nation of Islam. It is clear, however, that Islam had become a

potent signifier of black identity for some African Americans and that other

African Americans resisted this remaking of black identity in Islamic terms.

54

Rather than evaluating Indigenous Australians’ “Muslim-ness” by

juxtaposing their religious practices with some ahistorical model of the

“real” Islam (usually seen to be embedded in authoritative readings of

Islamic sacred texts), Indigenous Muslims have constructed what is

ultimately an imagined communal identity following the pattern of African

American Islam. Following Benedict Anderson, all human communities are

imagined and that communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/

genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined. For Indigenous

Australian Muslims a particular identity has emerged in which Indigeniety

and Islam provides powerful representational and symbolic capital as

members of the Pan-Islamic ‘black’ collective. Further, Indigenous

Australian Muslim identities, like all human identities, are dynamic and

negotiated, and not the rigidly defined and understood version of Islamic

practice claimed by prison management. Yet Indigenous Muslim tensions

over the meaning of their symbols, texts, rituals, doctrines, and narratives

are the discursive arenas in which to further trace the development of Islam

and Indigenous alliances in chapter seven.

55

3.0 Methodology 3.1 Introduction This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the methodology

rationale, subject population, procedures, timelines, objectives, limitations,

instruments, data collection, and ethical considerations. The latter part of

the chapter includes an explanation of data and the methods by which data

was obtained including internet-based stories of converts to Islam,

interviews and case studies.

3.2 Methodology rationale The logic of the research process is as follows. Firstly, a preliminary

internet based investigative study of converts to Islam was conducted to

provide a benchmark with which to compare the conversion process of

Indigenous Muslims. This initial study provided an orienting focus on

aspects of religious conversion in general, and conversion to Islam

specifically. Key points to emerge from this study were that religious

conversion is a gradual process whereby the convert moves along a

conversion process continuum over time. Often a crisis in the convert’s life

precipitated the motivation to seek religious engagement. The term ‘revert’

is often used in place of convert based on the premise that everyone was

born a Muslim. The details of this study are included in appendix A.

The main research methodology involved field observations in the

Sydney suburbs of Redfern and Lakemba, selecting Indigenous Muslim

interview participants, and analysing the data. To complement the data

analysis, separate chapters analyse and discuss underlying conceptual

themes, Islam and Australian society, governmentality and Indigenous

incarceration, and Indigenous Australians, Islam, and alliances. The aim is

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to construct an understanding of Indigenous Australian conversions to

Islam based on fieldwork research supplemented by literature analysis. The

following sections examine the fieldwork process in detail.

3.3 Participant population Twenty three Indigenous males self-identifying as Muslims from the

suburbs of Redfern and Lakemba were the principle data source. This is

because Redfern is an established centre of Indigenous activism, and

Lakemba is a Muslim majority suburb. These geographic areas were the

most likely places to find suitable participants. The New South Wales

Department of Correctional Services was approached seeking permission

to interview Indigenous Muslim inmates and correctional authorities. A

lengthy and detailed application process was eventually refused. A

complete timeline and explanation of the application to conduct research

within NSW Corrective Services facilities is included beginning on page 84.

This is a study of Indigenous men. This was not intentional and the

difficulty finding suitable male participants is acknowledged. There are two

issues worthy of comment here. Firstly, the patriarchal nature of Islam and

the particular circumstances of prison activity tended to emphasise male

participant significance. Secondly, female Indigenous Muslims are often the

partners of Indigenous Muslim male participants and wished to remain in

the background. Anecdotal evidence suggests female Indigenous Muslim

activity emphasised more of a spiritual dimension and less of activist role

as was the case for the males.

3.4 Procedures

The fieldwork for this research involved an in-depth study within an

Indigenous majority community – ‘The Block’ at Redfern – and the Muslim

majority community of Lakemba. An historical/comparative analysis

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theoretical focus coupled with a fieldwork participant observation approach

is used as data collection methodologies. As some of the data came to

light during the investigation, an iterative theory building process was

applied to supplement literature review analysis. Understanding the

historical nature of phenomena, events, people, agencies, and even

institutions is important. In many ways, it may be as important as

understanding the items themselves. Knowledge of the past provides

necessary information to be used in the present in order to determine how

things may be in the future. It is important to consider a development or

process such as Indigenous conversion to Islam and the possibility that the

contributing factors assumed to be critical in the process apply in national

and global contexts.

The oral testimonies of the Indigenous participants provided the

primary data for this research. The analytical task was to establish plausible

connections between the presumed cause (of Indigenous

overrepresentation in prison, and conversions to Islam) and the effect

(Institutional suspicion and control). The voices of the participants are

synthesised into the historical analysis of the factors determining the lived

experiences of Indigenous Australians. The aim is to reclaim the racialised

past because as Cowlishaw (2000: 101) states: “… the deletion of race

from analysis has contributed to the concealment of the painful

consequences of free movement in this space”. The underlying premise is

that racial discrimination is the basis for historical and current Indigenous

disadvantage, and incorporates the blurred boundaries between Aboriginal

identity and the national Australian identity.

The researcher’s position as a non-Indigenous person requires

clarification. Initial contacts with Indigenous primary respondents were by

way of introduction through a third person. It was by chance that this

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person became central to the fieldwork project. This is what Lofland and

Lofland (1995: 61) call ‘insider understanding’. A chance meeting took

place at a Lakemba bookshop selling Islamic material with the

owner/manager well known and respected in the Lebanese community.

Contact with officials from the Lebanese Muslims Association (LMA) which

manages the Imam Ali ben Abi Taleb mosque in Lakemba (Lakemba

Mosque) provided helpful information and contributed to the success of the

fieldwork endeavour.

A further important aspect of the methodology concerns the issue of

‘neutrality’. This research is motivated by a desire to resurrect and

reconstruct the experiences of Indigenous Muslims in order to recognise

past injustices as an underlying trigger for religious conversion. The

interrogation of what Pierre Bourdieu (1977) calls the doxic condition of the

overall social habitus is integral to this analysis. The process of researching

and contextualising the experiences of the respondents has presented an

inherently political and emotional research task. Therefore, it should be

considered in the context of a transformative research agenda dedicated to

the exposure of injustice, systems of domination and violations of human

rights associated with the ideological state apparatus of power (Althuser,

2006). Pickering (2001) examined how the experience of violence is

underpinned by experiences of emotionality. The barrier between

subjective experience and objective knowledge is usually stressed in

academic research. Several authors cited in Pickering (2001: 486) have

argued:

[T]he researcher is obliged to do ‘emotional work’, to understand the ways emotion assumes importance and to disrupt the taboo status of emotion in the research process. To reveal emotionality about one’s self, is not only to reject the neutral observer and knowledge maker role, it is also to take responsibility for the power relations inherent in the research process.

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The practice of researching Indigenous trauma raises a powerful

potential for academic research and writing as a ‘site of resistance’; as a

means to write ‘against’ violence and trauma rather than write ‘about’ it

(Scheper-Hughes cited in Sim 2003: 244-6). Overall this research performs

the political task of reading and writing ‘against the grain’ (ibid.: 245)

because to engage in ‘rational’ discussions about the political and social

meanings of traumatic events can only serve to overshadow, trivialise, and

compound the struggles, harms and suffering experienced by victims of

injustice (Davis, 2005).

3.4.1 Data collection methodology Semi-structured interviews coupled with informal focus groups

combined with note-taking and video recording of participant responses

were the physical components of the research endeavour. Data was

collected during the fieldwork employing a field research or participant

observation framework. The extent of actual ‘participation’ varied according

to the circumstances as Babbie (2004: 283) notes: “…the field researcher

frequently chooses a different role from that of a complete participant”. This

research project required a reflexive analytical methodology meaning some

degree of “insider understandings” (Lofland and Lofland, 1995: 61). This

applied in the case of investigating Islamic and Indigenous issues. For the

Islamic perspective a key informant provided valuable insights and access

to Muslim community members in Lakemba; and an Indigenous key

informant was equally valuable in many aspects of Indigenous socio-

cultural and political issues. This methodology assisted in becoming familiar

with the unique socio-cultural, religious, and political aspects of the

communities in which the investigation took place. Three aspects of

participant observation apply in the methodological investigation process of

this study.

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Participant observation is defined as a process in which a

researcher establishes a many-sided and long-term relationship with

individuals and groups in their natural setting, for the purposes of

developing a scientific understanding of those individuals and groups.

Participant observation makes no firm assumptions about what is

important. This method encourages researchers to immerse themselves in

the day-to-day activities of the people whom they are attempting to

understand. In contrast to testing ideas (deductive), they may be developed

from observations (inductive) (O’Reilly, 2005). The methodology requires

researchers spend time with relatively small groups of people in order to

understand fully the social milieu that they inhabit. In the role of ‘participant

as observer’ the researcher adopts an overt (open) role, and makes their

presence and intentions known to the group. This is an important

consideration for contextualising the meanings of various respondents in

Redfern and Lakemba – two very different communities. Despite

methodological concerns with ‘establishing rapport’ or ‘going native’, for

many researchers, this view of scientific inquiry has been subjected to

scrutiny and criticisms. The researcher often becomes a ‘fan’ or supporter,

though this does not mean attempting to act as one of the group.

On the other hand, engagement is used to an advantage. In this

case as the researcher, I explicitly drew upon my own biography in the

research process; e.g., having been personally and politically engaged as

part of the Muslim community before deciding to analysing it. This is an

example of reflexivity. It implies that the orientations of researcher will be

shaped by socio-historical locations including the values and interests (e.g.,

religious and cultural norms) that these locations confer upon them. What

this represents is a rejection of the idea that social research is, or can be,

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carried out in some autonomous realm that is insulated from the wider

society, and from the particular biography of the researcher.

An ethnographic focus for field research leads to an empathic

understanding of social science – it leads to researchers abandoning their

preconceptions as they are exposed to a new social milieu that demands

their full engagement. Berg (2004) cautions about placing theory before

research and to be open-minded about what it is we are researching, and

Ezzy (2002: 10) advises that “the researcher should enter into an ongoing

simultaneous process of deduction and induction, of theory building, testing

and rebuilding”. The research methodology, therefore, is aimed at exposing

underlying socio-historical issues supported by the stories of the

participants.

3.5 Ethnographic and Case Study Methods This study has employed both case study and ethnographic

methodology. Walters (2007) claims a lack of clarity about the terms

ethnography and case study because they can be used to describe a

research strategy, a research focus, the research methods, or the results of

a research study (Walters, 2007: 89). Walters discusses the “process [she]

went through to find a way of talking about and representing [her] research

in order to decide which words to use when the words on offer could

potentially mean many different things” (Walters, 2007: 89).

Cresswell defines ethnography as “a description and interpretation

of a cultural or social group or system” in which the researcher studies the

meaning of behaviour, language and interactions of the culture sharing

group (Cresswell, 1998: 58) case study as an “exploration of a bounded

system…over time” (Cresswell, 1998: 61) and understands them as trying

to accomplish different things. Cresswell admits to a certain overlap yet

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differentiates the terms by stating that in an ‘ethnography’ the entire cultural

or social system is the focus of attention, whereas in ‘case study’ a system

of people “is typically not the case” (Cresswell, 1998: 66).

Hammersley (1992: 183; 1998: 1) although acknowledging overlap

in the meaning of the two terms uses ‘ethnography’ to mean the much

broader ‘qualitative method’ and ‘case study’ to mean ‘a selection strategy’

alongside ‘experiment’ and ‘survey’. A ‘case’ is therefore “the phenomenon

(located in space/time) about which data are collected and/or analysed and

that correspond to the type of phenomena to which the main claims of a

study relate” (Hammersley, 1992: 184).

On the other hand, Silverman (2005: 126) claims the term ‘case

study’ refers simply to the particular topic of the phenomenon the research

sets out to study. In this respect, every research study is the study of a

case.

For Brewer (2000: 77), while writing about qualitative research,

states that “While not all case studies are qualitative, all ethnographic

research involves case study”, while Stake (1995: 86) takes the line that

case study is a choice of what is to be studied rather than being a

methodological choice and, like Cresswell, that what distinguishes case

study is its focus on a bounded system.

Merriam follows this by defining ‘case study’ as “an examination of a

specific phenomenon, such as a programme, an event, a person, a

process, an institution or a social group using both qualitative and

quantitative methods” (Merriam, 1988: 9). Merriam defines ‘ethnography’ as

a set of methods used to collect data, and as a written record, but not as an

object of study (Merriam, 1988: 23), while Travers claims ‘case study’ as

referring to research studies that are used as an ‘example’ to illuminate a

particular research approach (Travers, 2001: viii).

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Finally, Yin, while also acknowledging that ‘case study’ is often

confused with ‘ethnography’ (Yin, 2003: 12), defines ‘case study’ as “an

empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its

real life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon

and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003: 13).

In this thesis I took as the choice of object to be studied in

‘ethnography’ as understanding the way a group or social system works,

the meanings it gives to actions, artefacts and so on. ‘Ethnography’, thus,

investigates people in interaction in ordinary settings, and it looks for

patterns of daily living (culture), what people do, say and use in order to

find out what a stranger would have to know in order to be able to take part

in the group or society in a meaningful way. This results in a holistic cultural

portrait of the social group (Cresswell, 1998: 58 – 60).

’Case study’ on the other hand, following Stake, takes as the focus

of its study a bounded system of some kind (in this case religious

conversion to Islam in broad terms). The difference between the terms can

be stated thus: ‘case study’ does not ignore context but it focuses on the

case situated within a context. The emphasis of the investigation is on the

case. In this view, ‘ethnography’ provides a holistic view of a social group or

culture, and ‘case study’ an in-depth study of a bounded system or case or

set of cases. ‘Case study’ is able to explore a range of topics, while

(traditionally) ‘ethnography’ focuses on cultural behaviour, practices and

artefacts. In this way ‘case study’ differs from ‘ethnography’ in that it is not

seeking to understand a social group or system (unless a group is taken as

a case), it is seeking to understand a case within an acknowledged social

system. An important consideration, therefore, is to apply an ethnographical

perspective to describe the environments and social location of the

participants. The symbolism and social make-up of Redfern and Lakemba

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are considered as bounded social systems which overlap with non-

Indigenous and non-Islamic social systems. Each has their own unique

identifiable characteristics setting them apart while remaining

interconnected with mainstream society.

3.5.1 Defending against claims of lack of representivity

Mario Luis Small (2009) raises the important issue of defending

ethnographic and qualitative studies against claims by quantitative

methodologists that the study findings are not representative. Ethnographic

and qualitative studies which are expected to generate theory, and

empirical conditions in other cases are claimed to be problematic in terms

of generalisability, representativeness, and validity (Small, 2009: 5). This

focus sheds light on the debate over the relative methods of quantitative

versus qualitative research and substantiates the claim that small number

(n) studies return valuable new knowledge. Rather than claim ‘small-n’ case

study analysis is not statistically representative, Small (2009) argues for

solutions involving the development of alternative languages and clarifying

their separate objectives, rather than imitating the language of classical

statistics for problems to which it is not suited (2009: 10).

Small (2009: 19) offers two major alternatives which are based on a

further advancement to a case study being a revised extended case

method “by which researchers analyse a particular social situation in

relation to the broader social forces shaping it”. The extended case method

is most often associated with Burawoy (Burawoy, 1998; Burawoy et al.,

1991); and Gluckman and the Manchester School (Gluckman, 1961).

Mitchell (1983) and van Velsen (1978 [1967]) describe the core of the

extended case method somewhat differently however; the formulations of

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Burawoy and Mitchell will be examined below regarding their suitability for

applying to this study.

3.5.2 Burawoy and the Manchester School

For Burawoy et al. (1991) the extended case method is one of two

ways to relate conditions in a given case to the society at large in which it is

embedded. In the interpretive method, Burawoy argues, the case reveals

the essential nature of society at large. In the extended case method, the

case is understood by investigating the larger forces shaping conditions in

the case. (Geertz’s (1973) work on Balinese cockfighting would be

understood as a “ritual of resistance to colonial and then Javanese

domination”, and the economic and political forces shaping it would be the

subject of analysis (Burawoy et al., 1991: 278; Burawoy, 1998). The

‘extending’ is what the analyst does to understand the case: the analyst

investigates society at large to determine its impacts on the case at hand.

The relevance for this study becomes apparent when considering the case

of Indigenous people converting to Islam in prison as opposed to any other

social or institutional location. Both context and socio-historical pre-cursors

are accounted for. The extended case method searches for “societal

significance. The importance of the single case lies in what it tells us about

society as a whole rather than about the population of similar cases”

(Burawoy et al., 1991: 281).

3.5.3 Mitchell’s elaboration of Gluckman An earlier proponent of the extended case method, Clyde Mitchell,

provides a clearer answer to the problems inherent in Burawoy’s work.

Whereas Burawoy believes the key to the method is explaining local

conditions in light of external forces, Mitchell believes the key to the method

is its ability to uncover process:

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The particular significance of the extended case study is that since it traces the events in which the same set of main actors in the case study are involved over a relatively long period, the processual aspect is given particular emphasis. The extended case study enables the analyst to trace how events chain onto one another and how therefore events are necessarily linked to one another through time (Mitchell, 1983: 194).

This focus is generally consistent with the idea that fieldwork should

devote itself to uncovering mechanisms and tracing process, yet the

Mitchell’s method also overcomes issues of validity and statistical

representativeness. Considering this study has 23 informants, and with a

gender bias of males only, the question of inference is an important one to

resolve. Mitchell believes that statistical representativeness is an irrelevant

criterion, which implies that trying to find representative cases is a mistake.

Thus, he argues, “extrapolation is in fact based on the validity of the

analysis rather than the representativeness of the events” (Mitchell, 1983:

190). Determining whether the analysis is valid is the next step covered by

Mitchell and this is achieved by contrasting ‘statistical inference’ from what

he calls ‘logical’, ‘causal’, or more controversially ‘scientific inference’. The

former is:

the process by which the analyst draws conclusions about the existence of two or more characteristics in some wider population from some sample of that population . . .; the later, the process by which the analyst draws conclusions about the essential linkage between two or more characteristics in terms of some explanatory schema (Mitchell, 1983: 199 – 200).

The principle aim of this thesis is, therefore, to explore the

experiences of a small group of Indigenous Australians in order to

understand what was helping and hindering them in their conversion to

Islam. Previous media commentary (SBS, 2003) has claimed Indigenous

people are converting to Islam in increasing numbers, yet little is known

about the context, process, and individual circumstances of Indigenous

Muslims in Australia. As an example, a growing literature describes

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increasing radicalisation of prison inmates in the UK, U.S.A., and Europe,

yet these claims need to be considered in light of post September 11 fears

of terrorist activity. In Australia the ‘politicisation of fear’ and the institutional

reliance on maximum security accommodation for suspected terrorists are

factors leading to increased surveillance and the justification for harsher

anti-terrorism legislation. I could therefore have chosen to conduct what I

have defined above as an ‘ethnography’ of the locations in which

Indigenous to conversion is occurring. This would involve looking at the

complex interactions, behaviours and meaning making of other religious

converts, social attitudes, prison administration and Corrective Service

officers and so on. This would reveal an understanding of the ways in which

Indigenous converts were ‘enrolled’ into an Islamic framework. The other

methodological option was to conduct a number of what I have defined as

‘case studies’ of individual indigenous converts with the same ends in sight.

A choice of study that focussed on a number of individual’s rather than the

social group or the social system (of Australian society or the prison)

seemed a more appropriate focus for understanding what the experiences

of being an Indigenous convert were like. However, it was my intention to

understand the experiences of specific Indigenous converts in the context

of a socio-historical perspective. This stance aligns with the hypothesis that

past and contemporary social conditions have indeed contributed to the

final decision of individual Indigenous people to convert to Islam. Existing

research discusses the occurrence of prison conversions yet this was yet to

be tested in an Australian context. Furthermore, Islamic conversion within

prisons is problematised as an issue having national security implications

and when combined with gang formation within prisons, leads to

correctional management and political repercussions.

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The final decision was to use a combination of ethnography and

case study for the following reasons. A number of case studies allowed a

range of perspectives to illustrate a range of experiences of Indigenous

Muslims. This accounted for the possibility of ascribing similar experiences

to members of one group (Indigenous). A number of case studies also

allowed a ‘within-case analysis’ (a detailed description of each case and

themes within the case) followed by a cross-case analysis (a thematic

analysis across the cases) Cresswell, 1998: 63) and a discussion of

‘lessons learnt’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). In this respect a cross-case

analysis could also be made of non-Indigenous converts to Islam to further

establish any similarities and differences between conversion experiences

and particular circumstances. An ethnographic perspective was important

regarding the physical location of the research fieldwork which was

conducted on location in Redfern and Lakemba. Partly this was to

compensate for not being able to access NSW Corrective Services

establishments. It also provided the opportunity to expand the context of

understanding the local environments of both Indigenous and Muslim

actors.

3.5.4 Limitations of ethnographic and case research Luis Small (2009) questions the extent to which an empathetic

understanding of his informants, on the level of reflexivity in the work, or on

the extent to which the history of the neighbourhood informed the analysis.

Instead, Small (2009) focused on one of demography’s central concerns;

whether the neighbourhood was representative (Small, 2009: 8). (The issue

of whether the Redfern neighbourhood was considered representative of

other Indigenous communities is discussed in the interview data analysis

chapter). Many researchers doing ethnographic work in urban poverty,

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social inequality, and immigration are to ensure that their small samples are

‘unbiased’ or that their single-case studies are ‘representative’ or ‘not

selected on the dependent variable’.10 I will examine one issue, that of

‘generalisability’, as one of the most central concerns that quantitative

researchers raise about ethnographic research in the aforementioned

fields.

According to one of the most common practices in qualitative

sociology today is to conduct in-depth, open-ended interviews. Sometimes,

these are fielded on hundreds of respondents (Lamont, 1992; Newman,

1999); more typically, they involve a small number of interviewees (30 or

40). It is in this latter case that the problems are more salient, since the

questions of generalisability are more obvious and the answers to these

less clear. However, rarely will researchers enrol enough well-selected in-

depth interview respondents that their findings about subtle causal

relationships involving multiple variables will be statistically generalisable to

a large national population (Lamont, 1992; Newman, 1999). For that a

survey is the appropriate instrument.

Standard alternatives in light of these questions are sampling for

range and the snow-ball sampling. One consequence of snow-balling is

that the final interviewees are more likely to know one another than would

be the case had they been selected at random. Thus, they are more likely

to constitute a social network. For this reason, snowball samples in a small

study would be ‘more biased’ than a ‘random’ sample. (This type of critique

is often applied to interview-based studies of social networks.)

10 Qualitative case studies consistently sample on the dependent variable, that is, they document in detail the characteristics of for example immigrants involved in transnational activities but say little about those who are not. (Portes et al., 2002: 279; italics added)

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What proponents of the random selection approach to small-n in-

depth interviewing rarely mention is that many people who are cold-called

will not agree to long, in-depth interviews on personal topics with a

stranger. This often buried detail – how many people refused, hung up, or

were not home? – is critical. This was the case with the small group who

responded to interview requests for this research. Many more potential

participants were contacted than actually participated. Some were willing to

participate but personal or other circumstances intervened. These problems

suggest we should not assess either method by the standards of classical

statistics. In a deeper and more important sense, ‘bias’ is perhaps the

wrong term. What an in-depth interviewer with three dozen respondents

faces is not a ‘bias’ problem but a set of cases with particular

characteristics that, rather than being ‘controlled away’, should be

understood, developed, and incorporated into her understanding of the

cases at hand. Consequently, the sample employed in this research is not

representative and is biased in the classical statistical sense. There is a

place for a small interview study to make meaningful contributions to

knowledge, provided the language and assumptions through which it is

interpreted differ. As a suggestion, we might benefit from not calling

interviewees a ‘sample of n = 23’, but, instead, a ‘set of 23 cases’.

An underlying question asked of this study is to what extent socio-

historical, and by implication, geographic and spatial locations and

conditions influence conversion to Islam? By this I mean the immediate

area called The Block in Redfern, and the suburban location of Lakemba.

Both of these locales are described in the following chapter. According to

Small (2009), however, describing either the locations or obtaining more

data from the informants will make no difference to the lack of variation and

therefore generalisability. The small number of cases is part of the issue.

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As mentioned above, it was very difficult to get suitable informants to spend

the time necessary to gain meaningful data. In part this was because of the

transient nature of people moving through the area and the time necessary

to build up trust relationships.

3.6 What of the researcher/analyst? Following Bourdieu (2003) ‘participant objectivation’ as a technique,

a method, or, more modestly, a ‘device’ has helped Bourdieu immensely

throughout his experience as a researcher. Participant objectivation means

the objectivation of the subject of objectivation, of the analysing subject – in

short, of the researcher herself.

Participant observation, on the other hand, is the practice which consists in

observing oneself observing, observing the observer in his work of

observing or of transcribing his observations, through a return on fieldwork,

on the relationship with his informants and, last but not least, on the

narrative of all these experiences which lead, more often than not, to the

rather disheartening conclusion that all is in the final analysis nothing but

discourse, text, or, worse yet, pretext for text (Bourdieu, 2003: 281).

This technique is offered as a critique of participant observation.

Participant observation, as Bourdieu understands it, designates the conduct

of an ethnologist who immerses her - or himself in a foreign social universe

so as to observe an activity, a ritual, or a ceremony while, ideally, taking

part in it. The inherent difficulty of such a posture has often been noted,

which presupposes a kind of doubling of consciousness that is arduous to

sustain. Bourdieu asks how can one be subject and object, the one who

acts and the one who, as it were, watches himself acting? (Bourdieu, 2003:

281).

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Reflexivity as Bourdieu conceives it does not have much in common

with ‘textual reflexivity’ and with all the falsely sophisticated considerations

on the ‘hermeneutic process of cultural interpretation’ and the construction

of reality through ethnographic recording. Bourdieu adds: What is certain is

that one is right to cast doubt on the possibility of truly participating in

foreign practices, embedded as they are in the tradition of another society

and, as such, presupposing a learning process different from the one of

which the observer and her dispositions are the product; and therefore a

quite different manner of being and living through the experiences in which

she purports to participate (Bourdieu, 2003: 281 – 82). Here, the issue of

‘foreign’ needs to be explained in more detail. When the society is familiar

to the researcher or the society or subjects are already somewhat similar,

does this familiarity contribute or detract from the reflexive participation in

‘foreign’ practices? This question is considered because the researcher

identifies as a Muslim and is familiar with Islamic practices and beliefs. This

background which also includes an academic focus on the sociology of

Islam in Australian and global contexts assisted in making an otherwise

complex socio-religious life-world more easily comprehendible.

Bourdieu claims the most difficult thing, then, is not so much to

understand another society or group (which in itself is not simple) as it is to

avoid forgetting what is already known but only in a practical mode, namely,

that those being researched do not have the project of understanding and

explaining which is attributed to the researcher; and, consequently, “to

avoid putting into their heads, as it were, the problematic that I construct

about them and the theory that I elaborate to answer it” (Bourdieu, 2003:

288). Bourdieu claims the researcher must refer continuously to his or her

experience, but not, “as is too often the case, even among the best

researchers, in a guilty, unconscious, or uncontrolled manner” (Bourdieu,

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2003: 287 - 88). There is a reciprocal relationship between experts and

their surrounding social orders, that is, while experts shape public

knowledge and national culture, they are themselves constituted and

limited by the national knowledge they help produce (Boyer 2000; Masco

2004; Verdery 1991).

3.7 Ethical considerations This research project required a (Full) level three ethics approval

considering the need to interview Indigenous (and Islamic) participants. The

University Human Research Ethics Committee (UHREC) considered the

application at its meeting held 14 June 2005. The project was granted

conditional ethical approval subject to minor clarifications and corrections.

The ethics approval number is 4089H.

3.8 Contribution to Knowledge Generally, this study claims discriminatory practices as fundamental

to the situations in which many Indigenous people find themselves.

Indigenous discrimination has a history stemming from the initial contact

with the first wave of British colonialists in 1788. The contribution this thesis

makes is to separate out the various ways discrimination, and particularly

methods of control, has affected Indigenous people to the extent they have

become conditioned to aligned with Islam.

This study is exploratory and explanatory rather than definitive and

generalisable. The thesis presents a socio-historical analysis of the rise of

Islamic conversions amongst Indigenous males in the Redfern and

Lakemba suburbs of Sydney. A significant area of analysis focuses on

Islamic conversions within NSW prisons. This area of investigation is a new

focus combining aspects of Indigenous empowerment and resistance

strategies, and the contemporary alignment with Islam. Another important

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area of investigation is the process by which Indigenous people find

themselves in prison. The concept of collective cultural trauma is applied as

a construct to link socio-historical events with the prison experience. A final

area where this research might be considered unique is the analysis of

prison conversions using Pierre Boudieu’s theoretical concepts of habitus

and field within an overall “theory-of-practice” scheme (Bourdieu, 1977,

1990). The outcomes and conclusions will modestly contribute to an

emerging but scarce cross-cultural minority religious convergence

literature. At the boundaries of this literature, concerns are raised about

increasing conversions to Islam and the possibility of radicalisation. This is

mainly in the context of the terrorist attacks in the U.S. Indonesia, U.K. and

Spain, and the concern of many counties about national security related

issues. The findings, however, indicate that the Indigenous respondents to

this project held strong feelings critiquing imperial, colonial, and

contemporary structures which have contributed to the overall poor state of

Indigenous affairs in Australia.

3.9 Fieldwork and interview data

The aim of the following sections is to describe and discuss the

fieldwork process in terms of a participant observation case study

methodology. A brief summary of the participant observation process will

precede a discussion of the fieldwork process and identify one of the issues

impeding the research within the NSW Department of Corrective Services.

The data collection stage took place after a familiarisation phase in which I

attempted to contextualise and understand some of the important social,

cultural and religious dimensions of Redfern and Lakemba.

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3.10 Researcher field observations

To become part of a social scene and participate in it requires that

the researcher be accepted to some degree. This period of ‘moving into’ a

setting is both analytically and personally important. For the researcher, it is

important to regard the normal as unfamiliar – i.e., to make familiar strange;

e.g., people’s shopping habits, religious obligations and routines should be

seen as strange and challenged. Further, in negotiating access into a social

setting (for example a Muslim community), it is necessary to be aware of

local protocols, etiquette, power relations, and ethno-cultural differences

within the setting. Ongoing university studies of Islam and Islamic

communities and academic involvement with indigenous issues in Australia

has familiarised me to the point of not feeling a complete outsider when

approaching Muslims and Indigenous people.

However, initial reactions to the presence of the researcher can

cause a sense of personal discomfort, but this tells the researcher a great

deal about relations and concerns of people, and should be recorded and

not regarded as personal problems or weaknesses. For instance,

Indigenous people may challenge a researcher in order to protect or

promote their cultural interests, and ensuring their point of view and

ownership of knowledge in the final research project. Similarly, the Muslims

of Lakemba presumed certain etiquette and protocols would be observed

while engaging in community events and day-to-day social exchanges.

One of the main advantages of participant observation is its

flexibility. Fieldwork is a continual process of reflection and alteration of the

focus of observations in accordance with analytic developments. It permits

researchers to witness people’s actions in different settings and routinely

ask themselves in myriad of questions concerning motivations, beliefs and

actions. In addition, participant observation often employs the unstructured

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interview as a routine part of its practice. These two methods are

compatible: observation guides researchers to some of the important

questions they want to ask the respondent, and interviewing helps to

interpret the significance of what researchers are observing. The quality of

the project relies not only upon emotional commitment but also on the

quality of the researcher’s observations, field notes and analytical abilities.

An ethnographic approach or participant observation within a social context

incorporates three positive aspects: it is least likely to lead researchers to

impose their own reality on the social world;

1. it seeks to understand action: as to how and why practices and

relations change;

2. observers record their own experiences in order to understand the

cultural universe which their researched subjects occupy (subjective

experiences), and convey these observations to a wide audience

(from field-notes) within the (theoretical) context of explaining their

data.

3.11 Explanation of fieldwork priorities The core issue or problem of the thesis investigation is stated thus: To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing

factors do Indigenous people convert to Islam in a post- September 11

socio-political environment? - limited to two geographic areas in Sydney

Procedures followed The procedure followed was a diachronic11, qualitative, fieldwork-based

analysis grounded by literature reviews concerning colonial and

11 A diachronic analysis one that examines changes in key characteristics or variables over time. Another description is a socio-historical analysis which takes into account changing social norms during the span of European settlement in

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contemporary interventions in the lives of Indigenous Australians. Principal

research tools were:

• Semi-structured, formal and informal group and individual

interviews.

• Digital videorecording of main interviews. • Analysis of literature related to religious conversion.

• Participant observation using ethnographic fieldwork techniques.

3.12 Main fieldwork events

1. Getting the ‘lay of the land’ in Redfern and Lakemba. Observations

and impressions of two distinct communities provide a framework

for understanding the inherent tensions of researcher and

researched.

2. Finding the key informants and determining the scope of their

involvement in the research process. Developing trust during a

period of informal meetings and socialising

3. Moving about in the communities to document social relationships,

protocols, and forming general impressions of the socio-cultural

milieu. What was learned from this process helped to reformulate

research questions based on the initial research problem but were

unknown when the study was designed.

4. Recording interviews from selected respondents, taking field notes

and documenting observations

3.13 Timeline of Sydney fieldwork 3.13.1 Fieldwork overview Australia influencing perceptions of identity framed by nation-building and economic imperatives.

78

A total of twenty three respondents participated in open-ended

interviews. Although all respondents self-identified as Indigenous and as

Muslims, the particular circumstances required a ‘dialogue approach’ to

identifying important themes. The themes were then re-incorporated as an

unstructured script and employed as a basis for the main interview

questions. This methodology was most useful in trying to relay the

importance of underlying issues possibly contributing to involvement with

the criminal justices system.

The interviews and meetings took place in Redfern, Lakemba, and

Bankstown from 7 January 2006 to 30 January 2007 during two, three

week and two, two week block sessions of living and participating in the

various communities. Information and permission sheets were returned

before interviews proceeded. Participants were sought using the snowball

method after interviewing the key interviewees Rajab and Abbas. The

interviews were digitally videorecorded. Captured data ‘beyond the spoken

word’ was not necessary for interviews as they were conducted inside in a

controlled environment. The audio aspect was the prime concern because

of its digital clarity. Consequently, the video interviews were transcribed

manually relying on audio reproduction only. In terms of record-keeping the

digital video camera was a convenient medium for storing photo’s, video

and audio because of its automatic logging of times and dates.

Names have been changed and other personal information has

been de-identified. Confidentiality and trust were issues for some of the

respondents and considerable time was needed to organise the interviews

and obtain the trust of the interviewees.

Summary of open-ended interview themes:

• All the respondents were males with an average age of 28

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• All of the respondents had experienced contact with the criminal justice

system sometime during their lifetime.

• Most had served periods of incarceration for a variety of offences

ranging from public order offences to major assault and robbery. All of

the respondents described fractured and dysfunctional family

backgrounds.

• All of the respondents spoke powerfully about the effects of

colonisation, dispossession, separation, and the ‘reserve’ or mission

systems. The effects of Christian imperialism and its association with

colonial oppression was also a strong theme.

• On further investigation, 20 of the 23 respondents described one or

more family members as being removed from their original family.

• All of the respondents understood the compatibility of Islam with an

Indigenous world-view.

• Most identified with an African American concept of rights, and the

relevance of Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam (NOI). This was most

strongly demonstrated by the recognition of the ‘black brotherhood’ of

African Americans.

• Strong anti-Christian and anti-capitalism themes emerged.

• All of the respondents perceived their Islamic conversions as liberating

and a response or critique of the society that oppressed them i.e. white

society.

3.14 Overview of the search for participants

The research investigation entailed traveling to Sydney from

Brisbane. This was accomplished during the Christmas periods of 2005-06

and 2006-07, with three shorter visits during 2006. Essentially, the

researcher had no prior first-hand empirical data on Indigenous

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conversions to Islam. Secondary sources of information by way of media

and academic journal publications provided useful background information.

A limited amount of research fieldwork planning could be done from

Brisbane except to collate geographic and demographic data to assist with

locating the respondent sample. New South Wales has the highest number

of those identifying as Indigenous Australian Muslims (see Table 1 below).

The Sydney – Redfern location was chosen because of its profile as a

centre for Indigenous activism. ‘The Block’ in Redfern is also symptomatic

of the social decay of inner suburban Indigenous communities because of

development pressures, the condition of many of the houses, and the cost

of maintenance. More importantly, the ‘politics of the Block’ has ensured its

notoriety as a problem area for law enforcement compliance, and as a

symbol of black oppression and resistance. Drug and alcohol problems

have provoked constant police surveillance, yet despite these social

problems, the block remains an emblematic icon of Indigenous struggle for

land rights, self-determination, and political activism.

Table 1 Muslim by Indigenous Status by Sex (Austra lian States)

MUSLIM by INDIGENOUS STATUS by SEX (Australian Stat es) Adapted from Cat. No. 2068.0 - 2006 Census Tables 2006 Census of Population and Housing Indigenous Status

Indigenous by Muslim Non-Indigenous by Muslim not stated

Males Females Persons Males Females Persons Males Females Persons

NSW 200 154 354 85,450 78,381 163,831 2,520 2,080 4,600

ACT 3 8 11 2,272 2,034 4,306 30 26 56

QLD 115 68 183 10,412 9,224 19,636 267 234 501

NT 27 14 41 531 502 1,033 11 6 17

WA 87 61 148 12,116 11,195 23,311 400 326 726

SA 25 24 49 5,568 4,615 10,183 156 130 286

VIC 108 89 197 54,700 50,925 105,625 1,857 1,691 3,548

TAS 12 9 21 518 470 988 25 16 41

Total 580 431 1,011 171,887 157,685 329,572 5,289 4,521 9,810

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The aim of this research issue is not to quantify how many

Indigenous people are aligning with Islam but to ask why and how.

Nevertheless, as indicated in Table 1 (previous page), the overall number

of Indigenous people identifying as Muslim is 1,011 according to ABS

statistics. Of all Australian states, New South Wales has 354 people who

identity as Indigenous Muslims.

The ‘where to begin fieldwork’ question was central in deciding on

Redfern as a starting point. Redfern is known by Indigenous people as ‘the

Koori grapevine’: a central hub where many Indigenous people have lived,

met, socialised, and passed through. From this perspective it was

hypothesised that Redfern was the ‘right environment’ for alternative forms

of Indigenous social organisation.

From an Islamic perspective it was necessary to engage with those

Muslims who in any likelihood would know of Indigenous Muslims within

their communities. For this, Lakemba was chosen to begin the first phase of

the exploratory exercise. Living in the Lakemba environs, even for the

relatively short periods of the fieldwork, provided valuable insights as to

how these diverse communities went about their daily lives. The extent to

which Islamic principles regulated the rhythm of the local residents was

unmistakable in terms of dress, food, behaviour, attitudes, and religious

observance.

3.15 Timeline and fieldwork activity

Initial Sydney visit 3rd to 27th Jan 2006

First impressions and ‘blending in’

On arriving in Lakemba it became obvious very quickly that an

ethnographic participant observation methodology would be the most

beneficial in terms of understanding the community. The decision to blend

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in with the local Muslim communities and engage an ethnographic

participant observation perspective paid dividends. This methodology was

made easier because of my involvement with a university Islamic teaching

unit and understanding the requirement to dress conservatively and comply

with the ‘street etiquette’ of the society. For a Muslim society this means

offering Salaams (greetings) where appropriate, and avoiding conversation

with unaccompanied women. As more time was spent in the community,

and engaging with cultural and ethnic Muslims, and ‘learning’ how to look,

act, and converse with them, the more I felt comfortable and accepted. This

was a valuable insight for a white Anglo male to experience because it

‘decentred’ my place as ‘taken-for-granted’ in my own social environment in

Brisbane. Haldon St. Lakemba could easily have been mistaken for a

Muslim majority environment overseas rather than a suburb of metropolitan

Sydney.

Overview of perceptions – Lakemba and main street activity

Lakemba is a well established Muslim majority suburb in the south

west of Sydney. Within the length of the two main streets of Haldon St and

Wangee Rd, there are many Musalahs (prayer rooms). In fact, prayer

rooms could be found above many of the street-level shops, or in spaces

set aside for religious obligations. These places of ‘convenient worship’ are

invisible to the passing public and those unfamiliar with Islamic practice.

The number of Musalahs indicated a religiously observant society of

Muslims from Lebanon, Bangladesh, Philippines and India. The Lebanese

community appeared to maintain a dominant presence yet examples of

smaller ethically specific shops appeared north of the intersecting railway

line. The northern end of Haldon St. is the main shopping area and the

street architecture is devoid of the contemporary modernism more

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commonly associated with new shopping malls. There is a pervasive smell

of Middle-Eastern and South Asian cuisine and spices. Many women wear

the hijab and quite a few the full burqua in the streets of Lakemba. The

area has a high population of family units and young children. Burqua-clad

women pushing prams and conversing in groups on the busy footpaths

were a noticeable feature of the streetscape. The main Lakemba mosque

(Ali Ben Abi Talib Mosque managed by the Lebanese Muslim Association)

situated at the northern end of Wangee Rd has expanded its mosque

complex to include a new multi-story youth centre and administrative

offices. The mosque is the dominating structure and the main centre for the

religious observance of the Lebanese Muslim population.

Some of the shops engaged in orthodox cash-only monetary

exchange. A tenet of Islam forbids charging interest on loaned money or

Reba. Payment by credit cards is therefore not an option in theses

circumstances. Many of the shops and businesses cater for the specific

needs and requirements of the local population by way of food and clothing.

Social services such as welfare, health, education, and sporting

organisations are community-based. A lone hotel stands out of place in the

alcohol-free environment of this community of Muslims. The consumption of

alcohol is prohibited in Islam.

Overview of perceptions – The Block and community activity.

The comparative social order and activities of Haldon and Wangee

St Lakemba contrast somewhat to the observable social interactions on the

Block. The Block, in Redfern, Sydney was a small grant of urban land made

by the Labor Government in 1971. It was the first of its kind and was made

in recognition of the traditional cultural needs of Aboriginal people to live in

close community groups. The current physical layout, the social groups,

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and the surrounding and encroaching gentrification were points of

difference. The area including the Block was originally a collection of single

fronted terrace dwellings housing workers employed in the Everleigh

railway workshops circa 1900s. The Block is now owned by the Aboriginal

Housing Corporation (AHC).

In the early 1990s heroin began to infiltrate the block community

and the area gradually became so violent it was a dangerous place to

enter. Police rarely ventured into the community except in large numbers.

In 1997, the AHC started demolishing some of the houses that had become

derelict and were frequented by drug dealers. This has resulted in a

patchwork of run-down dwellings and open space, and a fractured

impoverished community. Today the Block is identifiable by a large

Aboriginal flag painted on the side of a building and visible when coming

into the Block from the railway station. During the day assorted groups of

Indigenous residents and visitors congregate in the open spaces to

socialise. After dark there is often more activity, particularly among the

younger members of the community.

Saturday 7 Jan, 2006 Bilal Racheha and the Andalus Bookshop

Bilal was the first main contact in Lakemba; The Andalus Bookstore,

168-176 Haldon Street, Lakemba was a well-known gathering place for

local Sunni Muslims; It served as a Musalah (prayer room), bookshop,

communication and drop-in centre; Bilal is a well-known Australian

Lebanese Muslim and is heavily committed to charity work in Africa and

within the local community. Bilal was very interested in the project and

provided much assistance with local knowledge and contacts. He

introduced me to Rajab, a key informant from whom other interviewees

85

were sourced. A meeting was arranged to meet Rajab for approx 6pm 10

Jan at a location in Haldon Street. The meeting appointment occurred

during a telephone conversation with Rajab. Bilal arranged the telephone

contact from his bookshop. Bilal’s assistance in providing contacts or

people of interest continued over the duration of subsequent visits.

Tuesday 10 Jan The meeting with Rajab and Abbas in Haldon Street café occurred

at approximately 6-30pm. Abbas acted as Rajab’s advisor and co-worker in

an Indigenous community organisation. The meeting purpose was to

explain the research project and ask for further cooperation regarding

access to other participants. It was explained that I wished to interview

Indigenous Muslim converts as to why and how they embraced Islam.

Rajab and Abbas were keen to establish my bonafides and how I intended

framing the thesis. There was a noticeable air of caution in the demeanor of

the two men. Over time, this cautious attitude changed to a cooperative and

beneficial understanding. The meeting lasted for about 2 hrs and covered a

wide range of issues. During the discussions, both men seemed interested

that someone was investigating this topic, while also remaining quite

guarded about any commitment to divulge sensitive or personal

information. The impression was that the meeting was very much an

exercise in establishing a trust relationship. Eventually it was agreed for me

to formulate the questions to be asked of Rajab and Abbas and to email

them for perusal before an official interview. The questions were emailed

on Thurs 12 Jan.

Saturday 14 Jan On the afternoon of Saturday 14th I attended the Eid al- Adha

Festival (Festival of Sacrifice), Gordon St, Lakemba. This is the festival

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celebrating the end of the Muslim Hajj or annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The

festival attracted a large crowd and had a carnival atmosphere. This was an

opportunity to take photographs and meet people to explain my research.

The festival reinforced an impression of social cohesion based on a

common Islamic identity.

Sunday 15 Jan

The Qurban Eid Festival (Feza Foundation) was held at the Fairfield

Showground. This is a multicultural festival showcasing Islamic culture and

is organised by the Feza Foundation, a non-profit organisation engaging in

educational, social and charitable activities in Australia. Rajab, Abbas and

families attended. Abbas introduced me to Kuranda Seyit. We spoke briefly

about my project and he offered some valuable comments. This was an

informal introductory conversation but the theme of Indigenous

dispossession and the non-racist aspect of Islam were mentioned as a

reason for Indigenous people easily engaging with Islam. As it happened,

this was a recurring theme raised frequently during the later interviews. The

rest of the conversation concerned local Muslim issues and the extent to

which they engaged in Muslim community issues.

Monday 16 Jan

Contact with sister Maryam (pseudonym) as pre-arranged by

telephone conversation was to seek assistance in finding contacts and

information. Sister Maryam knew of my research via other sources and

agreed to introduce me to a person or persons from the Lebanese Muslim

community who could help. We met at the front of the Lakemba Mosque 65

-67 Wangee Rd after Dhuhr prayers (1-30pm approx).

Maryam made introductions to Sheik Amjad (pseudonym) in the

offices of the Lakemba Mosque. Sheik inquired of the research, offered his

well-wishes, and asked me to wait until prayers were finished so he could

87

introduce me to a brother with knowledge of the topic. Consequently I met

brother Fawaz (pseudonym) who invited me to his place of work in

Lakemba. Fawaz’ office was nearby and a fruitful and welcoming

conversation ensued. Fawaz explained some of the dynamics within the

Lakemba Muslim community and the religious and social engagement of

some Indigenous brothers. He also recommended I speak to Rajib as the

authority on the topic and I explained the previous encounters at the

Andalus Bookstore with Bilal. We arranged for another meeting (16Jan) for

an evening meal at a local Lebanese restaurant in Haldon St.

This meeting consolidated and affirmed a reasonable trust

relationship due to the involvement of Fawaz, and some headway was

gained in terms of beginning to understand some of the dynamics and

relationships. For example, why was there an Indigenous involvement with

the Lebanese community? The meeting lasted for about 2 hours, after

which arrangements were made with Fawaz to meet again. In hindsight,

Fawaz intended to promote Da’wah and to encourage me to understand

Islam from a religious perspective as well as from a researcher’s

perspective. The potential for Da’wah work was also exhibited by Bilal and

to a lesser extent Abbas and Rajib. As it happened, I did not resist these

approaches and in fact most likely encouraged it because of my interest in

purchasing Islamic literature available in Bilal’s shop.

Thursday 19 Jan

It was decided to video record a session with Rajab at his drop-in

centre, Caroline St, Redfern (the Block). The recording commenced at

about 10-30pm after a meal with four other brothers staying at the centre.

Two sessions of one hour duration each were recorded on digital video.

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Thursday 26 Jan

January 26 is Invasion Day for Indigenous people and celebrated in

parallel with mainstream Australia Day. On this occasion a BBQ was held

on the Block for local Indigenous people and Muslims and organised by

Rajab and several other brothers. The event attracted about 30 attendees,

some who drifted in and out, but others who remained and cooked,

conversed and socialised. Parts of this event were also video-recorded, still

photographs were shot, and informal interviews undertaken. Much rich data

eventuated from this day.

One interesting event is worthy of mention. The Block has a history

of police intervention and this day was no different. There was no animosity

on this occasion despite the surveillance aspect of the two visits by the

police. In fact, they were invited to stay for a meal which they did. The

police were interested and grateful that no alcohol was available as it is not

consumed by devout Muslims.

The overall aim of the community BBQ was to demonstrate the

social nature of Islam and how it could provide an alternative social

organisation in an environment such as the Block. It was important the local

residents experienced Islam in general and Indigenous Muslims in

particular, as a social good. Many of the local children and youth are aware

of Indigenous Islam within the community and readily relate to its message.

The community BBQ concluded the research aspect of this visit.

Second Sydney visit 2 – 19th to 24th February 2006 This second visit involved consolidating and reinforcing established

networks and contacts.

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Monday 20 Feb Established contact with Fawaz, Bilal and Rajab. Dinner with Fawaz at his house.

Tuesday 21 Feb

Lunch meeting with Bilal and Rajab at a Wangee St restaurant. The

session was not officially recorded but further information regarding

Indigenous conversion to Islam was discussed. Notes were made

immediately after the meeting finished.

Thursday 23 February Meeting with Bilal at the bookshop before interviews with more

respondents.

Late lunch with Rajab and a request for me to take him to Central Station

early the next day. Spent the rest of the afternoon in Lakemba in discussion

with Rajab, and brothers Jawad and Hamza (pseudonyms). This was a

valuable time in terms of understanding some of the complex issues

involved in Indigenous and Islamic alliances.

Late on Thursday evening I arranged with Rajab to take him to

Central Station for his departure early Friday. This involved several more

hours of informal discussion and background information. One of the

themes was Islam in NSW prisons and this signaled a new area to

investigate of future visits to Sydney.

Third Sydney visit 13th to 21 April 2006 This was a follow-up visit to further research the prison aspect of

Indigenous conversions to Islam and to survey and interview respondents.

Friday 14 April Met Imran (pseudonym) at Bankstown Centro and arranged for

other brothers to meet later that day. Imran would wait until others could

join us for focus group discussion.

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Last minute change of plans for Interview with Imran – met again Saturday

Saturday 15 April Finally spoke to Imran at length about prison experiences but he

wanted assurances for confidentiality. Discussion ended with an agreement

to try and arrange to speak with other three brothers. Haaroon

(pseudonym) confirmed for Sunday 3-00pm at Paul Keating Park

Bankstown.

Sunday 16 April Met Haaroon after a mix-up about the location and then went for

refreshments. Haaroon was keen to talk about how Islam had changed his

life once released from prison and was disappointed the prison experience

of Islam was used as a political tool. Some of the information mentioned by

Haaroon revealed the extent to which Islam is so well known among

Indigenous prisoners.

Tuesday 18 April Confirmed with Rajib that Muhammad and Omran (pseudonyms)

and possibly one more might be willing to speak later in the week.

Mentioned to Bilal that time was running out to do interviews. It seemed

difficult to arrange interview times with some of these people but this is

understandable considering what they have been through i.e. trust and

confidentiality issues.

Wednesday 19 April A meeting with Muhammad, Omran, and Ahmad (pseudonym) has

been arranged for mid-morning at Bankstown. We arranged to meet

together at the railway line entrance to shopping centre. I waited some time

for Ahmad to arrive and he explained he had some issues with parole but

did not elaborate.

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We found a relatively quiet spot to talk and the discussion revealed

similar themes elaborated by other respondents. These conversations

convinced me to investigate the institutional side of prison conversions to

Islam. Spoke to Bilal before I returned to Brisbane about getting access to

the brothers in prison and he suggested I go with someone on a family visit.

This did not eventuate because of a lack of time. Perhaps it could be

arranged on the next visit over the Christmas break in 2007.

Final Sydney visit 4: 2nd to 30th January 2007 Final visit to seek permission from Corrective Services to interview

Indigenous prison inmates and prison authorities.

Tuesday 2 Jan, 2007 Met with Bilal at bookshop and discussed plans for this visit. The

focus this time was to ask NSW Corrective Services for permission to

interview Indigenous Muslims.

Wednesday 3 Jan Visited Sydney University library to formulate questions for prison

chaplains.

Thursday 4 Jan Visited NSW Corrective Services main office (20 Lee St Sydney)

and asked to speak to someone about Indigenous Prison conversions to

Islam. Spoke to Patricia Green (pseudonym) for 40 minutes and explained

my project. Patricia did not volunteer any information about conversions but

explained it might be better to discuss this with the prison chaplains. The

meeting ended optimistically with Patricia agreeing to contact other prison

chaplains. Sister Robin from chaplaincy phoned later that morning and

provided a brief outline of the circumstances of Islamic conversions. She

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volunteered to email Sister Helen to contact me about other contacts. At

this stage all of these enquiries were exploratory and unofficial.

Tuesday 9 Jan Meeting in Lakemba (Bilal’s new shop at same address) with Bilal

and Abbas.

Wednesday 10 Jan Sister Beverly from the John Moroney centre contacted me in

response to the email sent by Sister Robin. Sister Robin informed me that

there would be the first Chaplaincy meeting for the year on 13 February

and she would speak to Patricia about placing my enquiries on the agenda.

Thursday 18 Jan The morning was spent at Sydney University library finalising

questions and survey questionnaire for prison chaplains in anticipation of

further contact.

Wednesday 24 Jan Appointment with one more Indigenous Muslim brother at

Bankstown. Contacted by phone – could not make it today (Wednesday). I

would try again Thursday.

Thursday 25 Jan Meeting with Kahlid (pseudonym) confirmed for today adjacent to

Centrelink office Bankstown. (2 – 14 Meredith St) Introduced and sat at

outside café nearby and spoke for approx 50 minutes. This was an open

interview but Kahlid spoke of important background family issues leading to

his criminal activity. He appeared very calm and reflective. Later that day

Patricia Green phoned confirming contact with Fr Jeff Manning

(pseudonym), a senior Chaplaincy official from the NSW Department of

Corrective Services.

93

Friday 26 Jan Friday 26th January is Invasion Day for Indigenous Australians as

mentioned above and this time I attended the Yabun Festival, Victoria Park

and shot video footage and images.

Monday 29 Jan Confirmed meeting with Fr Jeff Manning for interview Tuesday

morning.

Tuesday 30 Jan Introductions were made to Jeff Manning from NSW Department of

Correctional Services and walked to a nearby café for the meeting. Jeff

explained briefly how there had been problems with radicalisation in NSW

prisons, but it was now under control. This is because the trouble-makers

(Lebanese prisoners) had been separated from the Indigenous prisoners.

He mentioned a degree of Indigenous dependency on the Lebanese

(financial and physical protection) Jeff only spoke about issues that were

already publicly available and did not seem keen to elaborate. This was

because of the sensitive nature of the research and its implications for

prison management and a previous NSW Parliamentary enquiry into certain

Muslim prisoners. However, the impression gained at the meeting with Jeff

Manning was that it would be difficult to obtain information from the

chaplaincy, the institution, and Indigenous Muslim prisoners. I spoke with

Dr Hossein Adibi (Ph.D supervisor) about this aspect and where the

research was leading to and he confirmed my suspicion that the authorities

would engage in institutional stalling. The process of the application for

permission to conduct research is discussed in the following section.

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3.16 Timeline of process to apply for permission to conduct research within NSW Corrective Services institution s 3.16.1 Background

The research focus originally intended to examine the

circumstances of Indigenous conversions to Islam within the general

location of the Block, Redfern, and Lakemba. As the research evolved, it

became apparent that prisons were a key factor in Islamic conversions for

Indigenous males. As the research proceeded, it transpired that every

respondent had experienced contact with the criminal justice system. The

decision was made to expand the enquiry to include the view of prison

chaplains, correctional officers, prison management, and a sample of

Indigenous inmates who had converted in prison or were aligned with Islam

in some way. This revised methodology would have provided, if successful,

a triangulation effect, offering all stakeholders a speaking voice. Instead,

the research relies on the responses of released prisoners and those

closely involved with Indigenous conversions to Islam. Only anecdotal

evidence is used to explain the prison institutional perspective. This is

supported by literature on overseas prison conversions but it provides an

incomplete account of Australian specific conditions. This is despite

Australia following Britain and the US in how it has reacted to the threat of

terrorism in general and prison Islam in particular. It can only be

hypothesized that the NSW Department of Corrective Services has taken

extreme measures to contain what it perceives to be a threat. This is not to

suggest a threat exists, or has ever existed, rather, the case of Indigenous

inmates converting to prison Islam is too sensitive to allow rigorous

investigation. The fact that evidence suggests religious ministry within

prison has beneficial effects for the whole prison community is not

emphasised by the authorities. To do so would lend credibility to the

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reformative aspects of Islam rather than its populist definition of promoting

radicalism. From management, institutional, political, and chaplaincy

perspectives it is perhaps easier to maintain a strong impression of control

rather than concede and incorporate a functional Islamic ministry.

3.16.2 Procedure and timeline The meeting with Patricia Green from NSW Department of

Corrective Services main office in Lee Street Sydney, and the resulting

meeting with the Chaplaincy official Jeff Manning, is where this timeline

begins. The aim is to explain the process taken by the researcher to obtain

permission to investigate the institutional and prisoner aspects of prison

conversion to Islam.

A concise explanation of the research project was discussed with

Patricia Green and a request was made for information on how best to

proceed with the project considering its sensitivity. It was suggested that

prison Chaplains be asked to cooperate in the research project. Over the

next few days contact was made with Sister Beverly and Sister Robin, both

of whom were employed as chaplains. A recommendation was made to

contact the Chaplaincy official, Fr Jeff Manning and consequently a

meeting was arranged for January 30, 2007 at the Lee Street head office.

Neither of the two chaplaincy sisters diverted from the standard ‘public

knowledge’ aspects of religious conversions in prison.

Fr Jeff Manning meeting – Jan 30 2007 The meeting lasted for approximately 40 minutes but little was

gained in terms of process or actual information except for the following. Fr

Manning indicated a familiarity with Indigenous conversions to Islam within

the NSW Corrective facilities but stated previous issues with conversions

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and gang violence were no longer a problem for the department. Jeff

indicated that during 2003-4 the problem of conversions, radicalism, and

Indigenous alliances with Lebanese prisoners was indeed a concern for

authorities. Because of the sensitive nature of the research it was

suggested a formal request for instructions on how to proceed be

addressed to the NSW Department of Corrective Services Commissioner,

Mr. Ron Woodham.

Formal request letter submitted

The email reply suggested an ethics application be submitted for

consideration by the NSW Department of Corrective Services, Research

and Statistics Division Research Ethics Committee. However,

Commissioner Woodham would have the final say.

The formal application process: • The email correspondence between Fr Manning and David Lawson

• The formal letter of request to the Commissioner asking for procedural

clarification

• The return letter from Judith advising of the requirement for a full ethics

application

• The submission of the ethics application

• The time taken for the committee recommendation

• The formal letter advising the application was unsuccessful

The formal response letter was dated 29 June and received 6 months after

the initial inquiries were initiated. The letter advised “there may be

questions of interest in relation to aboriginal communities and Islam” but the

“Corrective Services Ethics Committee decided that they could not

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recommend the approval of this research application, at this time, owing to

the following:

1. No contact has been made with the Imams or aboriginal

representatives in NSW;

2. No justification has been given as to why NSW inmates should be

the subject of this research.

A final comment in the response letter recommended contacting

Simon Eyland, Director, Corporate Research, Evaluation and Statistics for

“any further queries in relation to this matter.” An email sent immediately to

Simon Eyland requesting further instructions on how to proceed with the

research remains unanswered and all attempts to clarify the matter have

proved unsuccessful up to the end of October 2007.

In relation to the two reasons provided by the Department in not

recommending the application the following observations are noted.

1. From the initial inquiry through to the final response it was felt that

the Department did not wish to encourage research in this area

although it went through the motions of the formal application

process.

2. The Department staff contacted were polite but generally evasive

regarding articulating a clear process for expediting the research

project. This is evidenced by the 6 month waiting period to make a

decision not to approve the project.

3. One reason raised by the Ethics Committee was that “no contact

had been made with the Imams or Aboriginal representatives in

NSW”. This reason is rather confusing considering the ethics

application placed strict sanctions on contacting anyone concerned

with any substantial prior contact with interview participants. It was

assumed the community and individual contacts would be

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contacted if and when the project was approved. In any case,

preliminary informal inquiries had commenced both within

Indigenous and Muslim communities independent of Corrective

Services permission. It is therefore considered that the first

justification is unreasonable in light of proper process and

protocols.

4. The overall impression gained from the comments of Department

employees, previous employees, and Indigenous ex inmates was

that it would be very difficult to gain full access to the interviewees

and data requested.

5. This is in fact turned out to be true, as requests for further dialogue

were ignored.

3.17 Summary and conclusions

This chapter has outlined a detailed explanation of the methodology

rationale, subject population, procedures, timelines, objectives, limitations,

instruments, data collection, and ethical considerations. The latter part of

the chapter included an explanation of data and the methods by which data

was obtained, and the failed attempt to enrol the NSW Department of

Corrective Services into the research project.

The initial participant observation framework enabled a

familiarisation process to coincide with awareness that the two geographic

areas of the Block and Lakemba were distinctly different in terms of social

order and symbolism. The Indigenous owned Block struggles to remain

viable as a community while the Muslim majority Lakemba is dominated by

the regular routines of Islamic belief and practice. Both communities,

however, represent the diversity of Australian society while camouflaging

underlying histories of tension, optimism, despair, and stoicism.

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4.0 Interview Data Results

4.1 Introduction This chapter provides the interview transcripts followed by a

thematic analysis and discussion. It is usual to merge the theme analysis

with the interview data, however, in this case it was decided to leave the

transcripts in their original unbroken form. This was because of the

narrative continuity of the transcripts, and to allow the speakers an

uninterrupted voice. The objective of the interviews were to elicit

background and first-hand experiences of Indigenous involvement with

Islam.

4.2 Interview transcript 1 of 2 This transcript is the complete transcribed digitally video recorded

interview session at 51 Caroline Street, Redfern, Sydney January 19, 2006,

9-30pm. This was the address of the Koori Muslim Association. It was at

the time the only formal organisation of Indigenous Muslims anywhere in

Australia. The various speakers were all associated with the organisation

and came from local and regional communities. The interviews took place

after a communal meal and Islamic prayers.

Reproduction of speech has been kept as original as possible to

maintain the meaning, emphasis and mannerisms of the speaker. A

prominent Indigenous Muslim leader and numerous other Indigenous

Muslims participated in this interview. Following this transcript is an

analysis of the major themes, and a glossary of Islamic terms used in the

transcript appears in Appendix A.

[The original data remains as a digital video recording and names of the participants have been changed to protect anonymity]

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Question 1 : Islam and Muslims have been in this country for a long time,

what is it you are telling young Indigenous men converting to Islam?

Reply : Well basically, that my people are perceptive, and we understand

imperialism and we understand that what my people are saying is that

Muslims are saying Muslims are the best of creation what are they doing to

prove it, they know that it’s hypocritical that they say they’re the best and

they don’t prove/it’s like some people that I’m training to be a boxer and I’m

weight trainin’ and I’m a hundred kilo’s of muscle but I never enter the ring

I’m not the best of fighters if I’m telling people I’m only potentially – they

know now that there’s a difference between Islam and Muslims and they

understand rhetoric- they don’t want to be told about Islam they want to be

shown about Islam and the simple fact that Muslims completely contradict

the fact that if you come to a non-Muslim country and you don’t intend to

propagate and defend Islam you are not allowed to stay here but I don’t see

Muslims packin’ their bags and leavin’ ‘cause you have to validate the truth

and fight the oppressor but basically Muslims are the oppressor when Islam

assumes the role again of a liberating force that intends to liberate and/and

free the exploited and the oppressed, then and only then will the Muslims

and the non-Muslims see Islam for what it truly is a liberating force and my

people are the most oppressed and the most oppressed are the most

receptive to Islam but the one’s representing Islam are not representing it

properly- so that’s basically our message and because we believe Islam will

rid us from atheism, communism, capitalism and basically westernism

because we’re hostile to communism, we’re hostile to capitalism, and we’re

hostile to Christianity and Islam is the only answer and not just in the next

world but we need to be freed from this world because what Bob Marley

said you think you’re livin’ in heaven but you’re livin’ in hell - well my people

are livin’ in jahanam which is hell now and we can’t survive in Christianity –

that’s why Islam will lift us up-that’s why.

Question 2 : You said that the Muslims are the oppressor- from what

perspective do you think they are the oppressor?

Reply : OK- I give a 40 minute speech to a group of Palestinians – they said

he was a scholar alim I said to them after the 40 minutes they come and

approached me and I said – why won’t your people become Muslims and

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the sheikh said and I said imagine if a thousand of my men said we were

Muslim and went to your country and I planted an Aboriginal flag and I

called myself your leader how arrogant and racist would that be but then

some of my followers opened night clubs sold drugs exploited your women

but then sided with the Jew against you and I said to the sheikh – I

accepted that he was a scholar – I said would your people want to be

Muslim he said of course not and I said ask me again why won’t Indigenous

people of Australia accept Islam and he said it’s because of the Muslim –

that’s why they- they oppress – because they sided with the English against

the most receptive to Islam – but when you side with the oppressed/side

with the oppressor over the oppressed we find you as the oppressor also –

that’s why we won’t accept Islam it’s because of the Muslims – but

hopefully God willing the Muslims now will see that to/to bury deeper

spiritual roots in Australia you have to unite with the Indigenous people –

you never you never unite with the oppressor.

Question 3 : That’s a Koori person’s perspective about Muslims on a political

level – what’s their perspective of Muslims on a day-to-day social

interaction level, and what kind of environment do they come into contact

with these Muslims?

Reply : Well - I’ll give you an example – we had the Koori Muslim

Association of Redfern before we were an establishment – we were an

ideal just like Islam was an ideal in peoples’ subconscious they new we

were Muslims we represented Islam – but when we brought Muslims that

were Lebanese my people in Redfern automatically umm guessed that they

were drug dealers because Muslims sell drugs to my people – it doesn’t

matter if you’re practicing or you’re not practicing – people – that are

Muslim don’t fit stereotypes because, basically they don’t know the

difference between practicing and non-practicing Muslims – they saw

Muslims sell drugs and assumed Islam is a religion of drug dealers. So

basically in the interaction in prison we come into contact with thugs and

gangsters and/and basically the only people that my people – the only

Muslims that my people that my people have been in contact with are drug

dealers and thugs – Islam is not a gang – it’s not a bunch of drug dealin’

thugs Islam according to Allah he made us the best of creation we have to

prove it – but the interaction between Aboriginal people and Lebanese in

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general are very/very contradictory and very, very discredits Islam so – we

hope now to give a different message of Islam not just to Aboriginal people

but to Muslims in general – accept Islam for what it truly is –

Question 4 : Brother, you said-so there’s a lot of contact between Lebanese

Muslims and Kooris in jail – how do the – Lebanese in jail – justify or

explain their criminality to the Aboriginal people in jail – who are starting to

become aware of Islam and understand the principles of Islam – how do

they explain that to those Aboriginal men – what kind of reason do they

give for their current circumstances?

Reply : OK – I can’t really speak for how they explain it but I’ll tell you how

they explain it to me I visit prisons very regularly – and - what happened

was one of the Aboriginal men in prison – very big leader in there he’s

Muslim – Aboriginal - he said to me that Lebanese people told him he can

eat meat and say Bismillah and that makes it halal so I called this

Lebanese man out on a visit and I asked ‘im – what Islamic understanding

did you use to tell my people that you made the meat halal because you

can’t make halal what Allah made haram – and he said you say bismillah –

and it’s halal – that’s the ignorance of the Muslims not just in prison but in

general in Australia – I can theologically - overpower ‘em and I’m ignorant

and that means they’re less than ignorant so they justify it , the fact they

grew up in Australia that’s their that’s their understanding basically they say

they came to Australia – they left -they run from every war they’re in - and

they say we run from Lebanon we run from Iraq we run from Iran and they

want to teach us about Islam while they’re runnin’ from the same oppressor

we have – they justify it in the fact that – ignorance is a valid justification

that’s basically what they put it down to – I don’t say that they say that if

they’re ignorant of Islam they should not represent/I tell them – number one

you can tell people that you’re not Muslim - and they think that’s – heretic or

something/I say OK do you love Allah?/yes do you love Islam?/yes are you

willing to die for Islam?/they say of course – so if you’re willing to die – why

won’t you tell people you’re so pathetically weak that you’re willing to

practice Islam but there are people that love Islam more than you if you

come into contact with Aboriginal people say look there are Muslims in

Redfern that want to teach you about Islam that love Islam that don’t take

drugs don’t sell drugs – they might not –supposedly have knowledge but

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they have more knowledge than me but they love Islam more than me and

I’m too weak to practice it but I still believe it and they said they’re willing to

accept – that they’re too weak to practice it but they love it – that’s what

they’re willing to do otherwise I told them to tell people they’re not Muslims

because that betrays the essence of Islam and you betray Allah and Allah

will betray you so basically they have a duty now to practice Islam or get

out of Australia – I’m not Phillip Ruddock I’m not John Howard I’m the

Indigenous people of Australia – if you don’t want to follow Islam get out of

my country go back to Lebanon and exploit someone else - but don’t exploit

what I believe is Islam or Allah will destroy you because Allah took the

power from you and I believe God willing he’ll give it to the people that

deserve Islam the most – the Lebanese had a chance – a big chance in

history for Islam – they betrayed the essence of Islam , now Islam came

here – it came here through oppression – the reason why I believe that

Allah allowed us to suffer unbelievable unimaginable crimes and, and basic

punishment – is so then we can be given the message and the glory of

Islam-no-one loves Islam like the most oppressed just like in America but

Australia will be more dramatic in terms of conversion than America.

There’s no such thing as reactionary Islam Stephallah who tells me that

that means you defy divine decree that Allah wills whatever he wills – they

say that I’m a reactionary Muslim – I say that you’re not even a Muslim then

because if you tell me I was a reaction to oppression the first Muslims it

says in the Qur’an that they were a small weak band and hostile to any

attack and Allah rose them up well I believe God willing Allah will raise us

up now again – because we were oppressed destroyed and, and had

unbelievable crimes committed against us so that our blessing is Islam if

we were locked in a hole in the ground we’re in the darkness in Islam that’s

the age of ignorance when Allah lifted the lid and let the noor in then we

must be the noor of Islam and I want Muslims to tell me we’re not the light

of Islam – if we’re not then you tell me that you are if you can lead me to

Islam I’ll follow you but if you can’t you have to let us lead you to Islam

you’ve had Islam for 1200 years 1400 years we’ve had Islam for a few

months.

Question 5 : How can Islam give dignity, respect, and emancipation to

Aboriginal people - when its not from them? This is from an outsider’s

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perspective. Aren’t you just trading one cultural colonisation for another

cultural colonisation?

Reply : We don’t believe that we don’t believe that we became Muslim we

believe that this is the re-emergence of Islam for Aboriginal people not the

fact that I received Islam from my Indian descendants or other people of

Aboriginal decent received it from Afghans or the 900 year link to umm the

Indonesians but we believe that we were Muslims before – long before but

basically this is not an alien concept because people tell me what do you

have to be Muslim/and I go no you can be drunk and you can be on drugs

or you can be killing your wife or in prison – and you can be an exploiter or

you can join Islam and become a liberator because what it is/is my natural

predisposition is to become Muslim because revolution is my natural

instinct it’s part of my identity like psychology. In psychology they say your

predisposition well my predisposition is revolution and Islam – according to

the German saying revolution it means to change a structure to better Islam

was the greatest revolution that existed so it’s not an alien concept to

become Muslim from Aboriginal because there’s no distinction there’s no

[nothing] contradictory between Aboriginal and Islam.

Question 6 : You say you said your people were Muslim before – can you

elaborate on that?

Reply : Well basically – the majority of the Gamilaroi people from Moree -

whether they acknowledge it or not – historically we are the descendents of

Abraham and Mohammad Ali we are the most people except for a few

people that are not from Moree everyone knows in the Aboriginal

community of Moree that we’re genetically descendant of Muslims but then

– like Indigenous times said a few months ago it said black Australia’s 900

year old link to Islam – that’s just 900 years but we believe we were Muslim

before that we believe we were Muslims before the Arabs were Muslims

basically and we believe we can prove that categorically in any context.

Question 6a : Can you just elaborate a little bit more on that?

Reply : OK then basically theologically it says in the Qur’an that 124,000

prophets and 33,000 messengers and Allah sent one more came to every

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tribe and nation and we believe that we were Muslim and the fact that every

human is born Muslim with the submission to God and then over time you

become Hindu Jew Christian whatever but we believe in the same context

that Muslims say that Abraham, and Noah Adam and Jesus Pease Be On

Them All – they say they’re Muslim – because they believed in one divine

god – we believe Aboriginal people like Pemulwuy it says in his book he

said he believed in a transcendental creator Allah is the only transcendental

creator even though ahh Viamy called him – sorry Pemulwuy called him

Viamy his language was different to ours the word for creator in English is

God in Islam it’s Allah in the Bible in the Old Testament It’s Yarweh –

there’s only one god – we believe we worship one monotheistic God which

means we believe we were the first Muslims. We were the direct

descendants of Adam and everyone else is related to Adam - but –

everyone else moved to a continent where they mixed over hundreds of

thousands of years – Aboriginal people were isolated – and we believe

we’re the closest genetical [sic] descendants, ‘cause Adam was an African,

Eve was an Indian when you get an African and an Indian and mix they are

full blood Aboriginal not like myself darker than myself obviously but I have

in my veins the blood of the direct descents of Adam and Eve and I believe

scientifically that we can prove that beyond a doubt Islamically - we

believe everyone’s from Adam but we believe genetically we’re closer to

Adam than anyone else because of the mixture of the rest of the world we

believe we weren’t mixed for a hundred thousand years. We know that

Australia was never ever mixed until 200 years ago but basically within my

veins are the closet genetical [sic] descendants of Adam that’s our-that’s

our belief and if anyone wants to argue then use Islamic logic or use

scientific logic and we’re willing to challenge.

Reply : I’d like to add what sheikh has said – that Islam has been there for

all the creation of the human beings – and I quite agree that Islam has

come to all the people for a long, long, time. It is the unfortunate thing that

we have politicised and sectionalised and you cannot say that Islam is new

to the Aboriginal people and the fact that migrants have come here the

Muslim migrants – unfortunately there are many weak people in Islam who

have come to Australia and what we really lack is a true knowledge and an

understanding of the principles of Islam. And if we had the true knowledge

of Islam we would be able to – practice – and apply and present Islam to

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everybody in its true perspective and this has been the unfortunate thing

because of true lack of knowledge the true Islam hasn’t come and we carry

a lot of baggage of culture from different counties around But it is high time

now that we resort to the resurgence of getting true knowledge and try to

make ourselves true Muslims and strong Muslims so we can spread the

good religion to all good people for Islam has many good principles and

these principles are to be practiced in your daily life to improve your

situation to elevate yourself from those mundane things of this world which

we suffer from a lot of weaknesses in our practices – and in human

practices in many ways.

Question 7 : Would you like to add anything to that sheikh?

Reply : No Hamdillilah that is very, very good – I couldn’t have expressed it

better myself.

Question 8 : So what’s the plan from here? Now then like obviously Islam

has the potential to do things to - bring back all the dignity, hope, and

triumphs to the Aboriginal people across Australia what would be your do

you think ah the most practical – form – of spreading the message and

implementing the meaning of the message?

Reply : Well basically my people don’t want to be told about Islam they want

to be shown about Islam by their own people. Now we’ve had many, many

requests in Moree, Boggabilla, Walgett, and Mungindi by elders umm and

there was a large gathering um at the Aboriginal [rugby] league knockout –

some of their elders saw us in action and dialogued with us and they said

this is what we need and I, I made it quite clear that we were Muslim and

the reason why we didn’t drink and take drugs and sell drugs is not

accidental that fact that we were Muslim and we were revolutionary type

Muslims we weren’t backward Muslims we weren’t ignorant we weren’t

drug dealers we defied drug dealers we openly confront drug dealers and

tell them you have a certain amount of time to sell drugs in our community

then you’ll have to face us in combat and that’s not a threat that’s a promise

from Allah that Allah will rise us up and basically now in Moree we have

one brother he’s Muslim Aboriginal and he’s from the Gamilaroi we have

one brother Wirradjuri one from Dunghutti one from Bundjulung one from

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Gambaangeri so our main intention and effort now is to train these men

and send them back to their own communities so even myself I won’t be

their leader I we are not creating followers – we’re creating leaders so

we’re not creating sheep we’re creating shepherds we’ve had enough

sheep in wolves clothing now my people now we’re receptive to Islam

because they know it will uplift them um so basically –it’s like the Christians

they’re theologically retarded I tell them they’re spiritually dead they’re

intellectually retarded but they have something over the Muslims well not

the Muslims the Muslims have millions and millions in Australia but we have

nothing no material culture in Islam so when I went to Tinga not long ago I

told them about Islam and when I left - just before we left fourteen young

Aboriginal boys and girls prayed behind us and they accepted Islam they

said Shahada there’s no God apart from Allah Mohammed sal Allahu

alayhi wasalam is the last and the greatest of all the messengers but we

need an Islamic culture because the first Muslims the Arabs the first thing

they did was set up a masjid a mosque – and now – if the Muslims can’t

understand or perceive that Islam is for everyone they have to say that

Islam is just for them but Islam is for all mankind but the most oppressed

and the most exploited need Allah’s blessing more than everyone we have

Islam my people don’t so it’s our duty now to love – if you love something

so much love for your brothers is an Islamic principle the Muslims need to

practice what they preach and because they can’t spread Islam they need

to assist us to spread Islam if they’re not interested in Islam they need to

openly publicly tell people they don’t love Islam enough to spread it they

want to keep it within themselves but my people want Islam, they need

Islam and we can give them Islam, and the Muslims can assist us and

Insha’allah they can get more rewards than I can ever get by the simple

fact that if they give for the sake of Allah (which is an Islamic principle of

course) they don’t need anyone to pat them on the back and get a photo

with me as long as them and Allah new on the day of judgement Allah will

say what did you do for my deen what did you do for mankind oh Allah you

know what I did more than I did but the Muslims don’t think like that

anymore if the Muslims can’t practice Islam why would they expect my

people be able to practice Islam that’s basically my logic

Reply : Sheikh you rightfully say that you need a centre like the mosque and

mosque is not just for prayer but is the educational centre where we would

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receive true education – I’d like to make a comment on – the weakness of

societies because lack of true knowledge of Islam you can see the big

scourge today not only in the Aboriginal but the general community. I would

comment that in the large broad society we are suffering from the

difficulties of being involved in alcohol, drugs, promiscuity, gambling. Islam

frowns upon these things and we were to truly understand the problems of

being involved in these habits you would easily, want to give up these ah

weak habits for they today are destroying the nations and if you look at

every aspect of these four features that I mentioned you will see that they in

every corner and in every way in the every way of life that they are

detrimental causes which are degenerating the population at large in

Australia…[slight pause]

Question 9 : Sheikh could you please tell us a bit more of your own personal

journey and experience and development in the way of Islam? How did you

first come across Islam and what has progressed your journey in Islam?

Reply : Basically um - I was incarcerated for many, many years more than a

decade Alhamdulillah people can’t work out why I’m so happy that I was in

prison um, I was a violent criminal I was a dangerous criminal that – I’m

embarrassed to say - but - I’m not saying society propelled me and

basically it’s, it’s not just a matter of generation after generation of genocide

cultural destruction, racism, lack of unemployment [sic] um, hostility to

Indigenous people, exclusion from the mainstream population, no jobs no

education um basically no future, that’s why Islam is for us, because Islam

offers us an answer to everything of all of our problems in terms of

education in terms of, of in terms of, knowledge in terms of alcoholism,

drugs Islam is the answer when Christianity has been the actual evil in

terms of that like for example – in Moree I, I spoke to a lady – and I asked

her why she had within in her such Islamic principles, an Aboriginal lady

from Moree this is when I was a teenager and she told me that when the

Christians came they said thou shall not steal and they stole our land, she

said the priests they said thou shall not kill and they killed, she said the

priest told them they shall not rape and they raped all our women thou shall

not commit adultery and they did but when the Muslims came in particular

the Indians came and this brother may God bless him Mohammad Ali and

Ibrahim Ali when they said thou shall not kill they didn’t kill, thou shall not

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steal and they never stole and thou should not commit adultery or rape and

they didn’t that wasn’t the big impact of Aboriginal people in Moree- what

impacted them the most about Islam is when the Christian missionaries

came to steal their children the Muslims defended them and not only did

they defend ‘em Moree people can bear witness that their graves are in the

cemeteries they died defending people for the sake of God. That’s why

Aboriginal people embraced Islam – that’s why every single Aboriginal

person man woman and child are descendants of Muslims and if they don’t

want to admit it all they have to do is look in their ancestry – we accepted

Islam because the Muslims accepted the Khalifah – when the Khalifah said

defend then we defended and even when Australia went to war against

Turkey – these Muslims sided with the Khalifah over Australia they even

fired shots at Christians even killed Christians to defend my people – not

because my people were Aboriginal or whatever because that was their

Islamic duty to defend the oppressed In Islam there’s three rules – when

you see a tyrant you use your hands to chase-change it like the Indians did

– if you can’t use your hand you speak out against for the oppressed

against the oppressor – If you can’t – use your heart to detest it the

Muslims can’t do the last one – that’s the weakest form of faith – the

Muslims never speak against the oppressor against-for my people – why

would my people want to be Muslim? Woe to the Muslims for being like

that- but praise be to Allah for, for bringing Mohammad Ali and Ibrahim Ali

for Islam because that’s what made me Muslim and then I was in prison –

many, many years I was in prison – I, I, I um I was charged for killing

someone in prison I was in solitary confinement they call it the high security

unit everyone knows that’s in prison they will know this they see this people

will know this is not a boast this is not like er I want to be famous the fact

that I was like the lowest form of animal I was locked in a cell – they didn’t

give me a toilet they never fed me I was like an animal, and then I looked

out the peephole and I saw these men, black men, and I called out to ‘em -

can I get some books? I didn’t mean religious books I meant women books

I wasn’t a Muslim I knew the Muslims in prison they were cowards – they

sold drugs – I wanted to kill ‘em all I wanted to tell people that they’re not

Muslims – Malcolm X was a Muslim – he was the first Muslim I loved in the

world before I knew about my hero Prophet Mohammad Peace be Upon

Him and they said we got some books and I said ah OK – I come back from

my yard, sometimes they’d let me out into a little yard sometimes they

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wouldn’t and I read Malcolm X, Malcolm X, I started readin’ Malcolm X,

then one brother Sheikh Ahmet Deedat from South Africa I read his book –

and – then I, they started talking to me through the wall they told me about

Islam. They said Islam is for you and I said but I’m Aboriginal – and they

said can you be a drug dealer and Aboriginal and I said of course, they

said can you be a Christian I said of course, they said can you be a child

molester and Aboriginal I said of course. Can you be a drunk, - a drug

addict I said of course and they said why not Muslim – What could I say to

them, how could I argue – Islam and Aboriginal is not contradictory they’re

actually in essence they’re equally in essence with Islam because being

Aboriginal makes you a better Muslim and being Muslim makes you a

better Aboriginal It actually makes you a better human being – forget about

Aboriginals you’re a human being first but Islam makes you a better human

being the majesty that was Islam I saw in these men. I saw in these man

that were killers, and drug dealers and ex violent, you know, murderers and

they changed their lives through Islam and when I met them they changed

my life and I never saw ‘em again. I, I searched for ‘em and never saw ‘em I

don’t know who they were-I know who they were by name- but by nature

they were Islam – that’s what I knew Islam was and, and when I think about

the Muslims I never think about the Arabs – I always think about these

Aboriginal men that spent so many hours every day through the door talkin’

to me about Islam giving me books giving me food – that’s what I knew

Islam was and I knew I kept saying to myself for many years one day when

I become Muslim I’m going to do this – but I didn’t use drugs, everyone in

prison knew I didn’t smoke drugs or sell drugs , or take any type of drugs or

drink alcohol so they told me that I’m the closest to Islam, so I started

reading I read the Qur’an, I listened to ‘em, then I embraced Islam [29 30

24] and - that was the beginning – basically – of my journey…[slight pause]

Reply : You’ve – had a great opportunity of ah – of learning and ah it is the

opportune time that this learning process - has to be - broadened - in the

greater community – not only the Aboriginal community – but – by and

large to a lot of Muslims – themselves – to improve their knowledge of

Islam and to become better Muslims and then further, to get this message

to the non-Muslims for Islam is - a religion of which is truly understood, and

properly practiced will transform us from our lowly stature into a powerful

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nation, an all good Australian nation Insha’allah God be willing…[slight

pause]

Question 10 : You mentioned um Mohammad Ali and Ibrahim going to

Moree now this strikes me that um when you conjure up – say the word

Moree it conjures up a lot of imagery a lot of thoughts about social justice

activity in the seventies and – and really Moree had a big effect in NSW

and of things that were instigated from Moree and a lot of things from

Australia in general were instigated from NSW. Can you see some type of

connection there, or, does that mean anything to you or conjure up any

imagery to you, that I or when you had brought up the topic of Mohammad

Ali and Ibrahim their effect on Moree in general?

Reply : Well basically in the subconscious of Moree people they are the

most militant Aboriginals I’ve known more than Northern Territory more

than anywhere in-that I’ve ever known – they’re the most militant – not the

most political! I’ve met – the most political Aboriginal people are from

another complete area, but the most militant Aboriginal people I know are

from Moree. Now – they’re more culturally aware they’re more proud,

they’re more dignified um people say they’re the best fighters they’re the

most violent um but they’ve only reacted to oppression and reacted to

racism and murder and rape and they’ve become violent because society is

violent, and they say society is democratic, they say Australia is tolerant

and fair – but I don’t feel very – lucky – Australia is a lucky country but it’s

not lucky because in Moree – just thirty years ago sixteen people, a family -

a whole family would live in a tin shack with no running water, no electricity,

no sewerage, while these farmers lived on their land but within their

subconscious I believe that Islam was in their memory because they still

talk about this Mohammad Ali Mohammad Ali, and Ibrahim Ali so it’s still

within their structural power and in their culture that Islam existed and it’s a

simple, simple logical fact now – that – they-I believe they’ll be the first

large mass community of Muslims in NSW in Moree because they’re the

most receptive to Islam because they were Muslim before – and the fact

that they’re the most defined and they’re the most hostile to capitalism the

most hostile to assimilation the most hostile to communism and the most

hostile to Christianity because they were Muslim before that’s, that’s my

basic understanding on why they were the most militant what they call

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black activists in the sixties because their, their grandfather before me - not

my great, great grandfather but their actual grandparents were these

descendents of Muslims so they grew up with these people in their living

memory so because we’re basically oral people and we didn’t have a

written language like Prophet Mohammad Pease be Upon Him he was, he

was an unlettered man - in the Bible he said the prophet will come among

for all humanity and he will be unlettered – my people are unlettered too so

we passed down we have unbelievable memories which means if my

people were Muslims they could memorise the Qur’an better than easily

better than anyone because we have to pass oral traditions for thousands

of years and we have to make sure they’re intact – just like the Qur’an was

memorised and written my people have in their living memory Islam – and

that’s what made them the most militant people they were-and that’s what

will make the best of all Muslims again Insha’allah God willing…[pause]

Question 11 : On a family level now - how does your family fit in amongst

other Aboriginal families who aren’t Muslim? What do other Aboriginal

people who are non-Muslim react to your family?

Reply : Well in the community in general just like I can explain it from like –

from a personal point of view – everything I do in Redfern – everyone in the

Aboriginal community relates to Islam so that, that everyone that is a

member of the Koori Muslim Association – with other people I can’t control I

can’t convince I can’t talk to they can do their own thing Muslims do

whatever they want they can sell drugs and kill and rape they can be in

prison but I have no control over them but the men in our organisation God

willing I have some type of control so - with, with stereotypes they don’t fit

Muslims they don’t fit Aboriginal people – say Martin Bryant he killed

sixteen people and they never related that with their Christianity because –

for whatever reason he said he was a practicing Christian but they didn’t

relate that to Christianity but if I kick a dog – God forbid me I wouldn’t but

they’ll say that’s Islam - and within that context I’m tellin’ my people that are

Muslims to be exemplary figures and it’s a big task because whatever we

do it’s related to Islam. Now within the Aboriginal broader community - they

know we’re Muslim - they expect certain things from us – they expect us to

be like saints and – and we now know this is our duty we have a duty to

uphold an Islamic ideal we don’t care what other Muslims do they can do

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whatever they want. In America no one relates drugs or drug dealing to the

Nation of Islam to the black Muslims – African Americans – they relate to

drugs – Arabs, even Muslims so-called practicing Muslims, they relate to

drugs but not the Nation-with us they don’t relate drug dealing to us in this

community and in any community they do not relate promiscuity, adultery,

sex outside of marriage, alcohol or drugs and I’m not saying that there’s no

Muslims that don’t drink – but – very few people will- we are the largest

teetotallers in the world-meaning we consume the least amount of alcohol

in the world and my people are accepting that principle from the very

beginning and praise be to God that we accept it from the very beginning

when the Muslims were lacking in that context so aboriginal people have

seen us know as, as a sign of dignity, and strength and solidarity, and unity

and they’re all the attributes of Aboriginal tribal people. Now – the attribute

of Aboriginal people now are lust and greed and violence and they’re not

the attributes of tribal people they’re the attributes of the invader – so as a

Muslim I’ve gained the attributes of a true tribal person and not the

attributes of the invader, so basically – our tribal allegiances destroyed by

alcohol, drugs, and sexual assault and rape and paedophilia and

Christianity which is the worst form of Imperialism, but Islam promises us to

extricate or free us from atheism. Atheism is not just our main problem but

Christianity is our main problem because we say categorically that

Christianity is atheist- it’s a religion of drug dealers of alcoholics, of rapists,

and murderers and if the Muslims are like that it’s because of the Christians

Question 12 : Some people say, some Muslims say - that the Christians are

in fact people of the book and Christianity from someone outside the

perspective – it seems to have a lot more in common with Islam than

traditional Aboriginal beliefs. What would be your comment or answer to

that hypothetical assertion?

Reply : well basically to the Muslims I say categorically that Christians are

not people of the book – I challenge ‘em to say that Christians are people of

the book show me where it says you can marry someone they say a

Muslim man can marry a Christian woman Stephallah but I’ll never let my

son marry a Christian woman. Just on the surface they believe in God – OK

– But if I was to tell you your beautiful Muslim son wanted to marry a

Christian woman – but she told your son that God Allah and Jesus and his

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holy spirit holy ghost are one that means not much. But if Allah is Jesus

and Mary the Mother of Jesus gave birth to Allah – gave birth to Jesus it

means Mary gave birth to our God. That is blasphemy. You would never

accept that if I told you like that. Christians are not people of any book.

Look -the dictionary is a book but just say you’re a priest of the dictionary

you’re not going to let your son marry a priest with a dictionary. Christianity

and the Bible is not the word of God. The Qur’an is the word of God and

Christians now, even many modern-day Christians-50% of the Anglicans in

England-the Anglicans are saying you don’t have to accept Jesus as

God…Islam says that God is one he begets not nor has he begotten and

there is none under Him. He had no beginning and no end-if Jesus is Allah

kike the Christians then that means Allah had a beginning – and that’s shirk

– that is blasphemy. Basically Aboriginal people have more in common with

Islam than Christianity because Christianity says that a man is God – Islam

says Allah is God and he had no beginning and end – and the Muslims that

say that the Christians are people of the book I deny that openly to any of

them – tell me where in the Qur’an it says you can say God is more than

one. See Allah loves the number one because he’s one. Any number that’s

odd he loves because you divide it and it becomes one. Allah is not

three…Jesus is not the son of God he’s not God, and he’s not the holy

ghost if you say they’re people of the book I want to know what book you’re

reading. Islam condemns that categorically – they are blasphemies [sic]

they are atheists and I will not let my son marry an atheist – or I’ll, I’ll be an

atheist myself.

Question 13 : Do you think um do you think perhaps Muslims interpret that

particular part of the Qur’an to include the modern-day Trinitarian Christians

because it eases their conscience to collaborate with the oppressors?

Reply : Yeah – exactly – well basically when, when Jesus walked the earth

Peace be on Him – he said – He has come only for the lost sheep of Israel

not, not for the pigs and dogs he said – he said that – that’s what Christians

tell me - I accept whatever they tell me but basically Mohammad Peace Be

Upon Him came for all mankind, that’s, that’s basically what it is and when

Jesus was on this earth Christianity was monotheistic. When the Qur’an

says that they accept people of the book they accept people that are

Unitarian Christians. There are Unitarian Christians and Aboriginal people

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in the North Coast – they don’t accept Jesus as God – they don’t say Jesus

is the son of God – they say he is a prophet of God – that’s what is meant

by their people of the book. These blasphemies, these atheists saying that

Jesus is God they’re not the people of the book. Surely the one’s that

believe in God that has no beginning and end they basically are people of

the book and surely you can marry them…

Question 14 : Sheikh could you briefly explain your genealogy if you can?

How far back can you go as a Koori?

Reply : Um as far as Aboriginal people go basically. We say that, we say

that we’re the oldest living humans on earth – we say that we were in

Australia before – my belief is that Allah gave Australia to us and no one

else. And no one has any legal or moral rights to use force which is

Christianity, or subjugation to take Australia from us – but basically I have

European blood of course, Indian, Chinese, and Aboriginal but I identify as

an Aboriginal man, but basically I identify as a Muslim first. People say –

what are you first, but I say I’m Muslim first – I’ll tell you why because, I

come down to Redfern – this is the understanding of identity that is

distorted – why white men that tell Aboriginal people who we should be – I

come down there a few years ago and they said brother do you want to

score. I say I don’t use drugs, I don’t drink, I don’t smoke, I don’t want the

white man’s’ poisons, and they said you can’t be a real Koori because you

don’t drink – I said to ‘em do you have to be like a mongrel dog and drunk

and in the gutter to be considered Aboriginal? And they said of course not.

And I said but you stated that because I didn’t drink I wasn’t a true Koori –

why is it because you’re darker than me – what about my darker people are

they Koori too? And he said of course but they’re not drunk. So what’s your

perception of Aboriginal and what it is – is basically 90% of identity is made

up of language the language you speak directly influences your thought

processes – if you don’t have a language that’s uniquely yours you have no

identity. Aboriginal people have no identity. They say that it’s Koori culture

but I deny that it’s Koori – It’s English, it’s Christian, it’s communism, it’s

capitalism, and it’s atheism all mixed up with Koori, so we had to redefine

who we really were as Muslims and as Aboriginal people and someone can

tell me that this is not Aboriginal but tell someone in our congregation that’s

a full-blood Aboriginal that he’s not Muslim and he’s not Aboriginal then I’ll,

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I’ll be silent. But if you can tell him that you’re more Aboriginal than him in

terms of genetics in terms of language - he speaks his own language – in

terms of him being tribal initiated tell him he’s not Aboriginal – he might be

able to tell me but tell him! Because he’s uniquely Aboriginal he has no

European blood but the fact that he’s Muslim completely contradicts your

theory that you can’t be Aboriginal and Muslim. We never had to give up

anything as Aboriginals to become Muslim actually we gained much more

than we lost – we lost nothing. We inherited something – that was uniquely

ours in the beginning but Christians took this from us, and, and they say

that, basically I, I say to them like I said to the black Christians – they said

Christianity was a religion of giving, I said OK, let’s, we’ll go to Moree. Ask

the Christians, these white Christians that are farmers go onto their land in

the middle of the night and say – hey, I’m a black Christian - you’re a white

Christian give me my land back - what will they do they said they’ll shoot at

us. If it’s a religion of giving ask yourself what they gave you – and they

said to me they gave us poisons, they gave us diseases, gave us

Christianity, they gave us alcohol and drugs but what did they take? And

they thought for a minute – they’re smart men – they, they took our land,

they took our women, they raped our children, they took our language and

they took our children to Cootamundra and Bomaderry is that a fair

exchange? So they admitted after a short period of time that Christianity is

a religion of giving but they gave all the crap things to us and they took all

the good things so it really is a religion for the oppressor. Islam is a religion

for the oppressed and Aboriginal people are the oppressed. Christianity –

the white men are the oppressors so Christianity is not a religion for you –

that’s my, that’s my opinion.

Question 15 : It seems that the message you give to other Koori’s is that

they’re already Islamic – they’re already Muslims. How easy do you think it

is for them to accept that? Do they accept it readily or do you have to

convince them very much of that or not?

Reply : no they believe… [the people who haven’t been exposed] OK now

basically in context – I meet people from university – lecturers like yourself -

- Aboriginal people that are doctors, Aboriginal people that are football

players, and mothers and fathers and children, so obviously every context

and every dialogue I have to work out quickly just in a series of questions

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where to come from and then I’ll know who they are, where they grew up,

what their culture is, what their name is and that’s how we interact and

when we mention our last name and we automatically know each other and

if we are related to each other so in terms of interaction, just like the

Christian priests – they said – in conversation with them I said if you can

prove Jesus is God I’ll accept it. If you prove he’s a European man with a

straight nose not a hooked nose like a Jew I’ll accept it. But if I can prove to

you that God is God and Jesus is a man you accept it - they say of course

and after a 40 – 30 minute period they say we believe but we can’t accept –

and I say why and they because we’ve been brainwashed…and Islam

doesn’t have a sword – If my people or Australia doesn’t accept Islam the

Saudi’s aren’t going to cut your oil supply off – I don’t have this big massive

sword like these, like these heretics, like these fanatic land mass murdering

stealers would say that Islam is spread by the sword Christianity was also

spread by the sword Islam was never spread by the sword – we never had

an army, we never had soldiers, we had the majesty that was Islam that’s

all we had - when Christians ruled – they murdered, when the Crusaders

invaded Jerusalem they killed one hundred thousand women and children –

and men – not-they didn’t just kill Muslims they killed Jews and Christians –

Palestinian Christians they murdered and when Salah el-Din may God

Bless Him recaptured Jerusalem for Islam they let the Muslims and the

Christians, and the Jews – go – they never ever destroyed – Christian

historians will tell you that even George Bernard Shaw said the only religion

he would ever accept is Islam and that is from the greatest Western writer

that you accept or I accept or the world accepts. But basically they say they

believe, some say they will never accept because they’ve been

brainwashed and programmed by an evil Christian cult – and Muslims had

nothing to do with that. Christians did everything in the name of God they

say they were God’s chosen people but basically – what they did in the

world completely disgraces the fact that there could ever, ever could be any

believers in God because my basic belief is if that God of theirs – Jesus –

was so compassionate and merciful he would never forgive you for the

crimes you committed against my people – he would never forgive you and

if he come back today he would side with us over you because in the day

he sided with the oppressed over the Romans – now he would side with the

Koori’s over the English, over the Australians, over this John Howard

coward who says that - this is another crusade – just like George Bush

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said – the crusades are still going, like General Allenby when he conquered

Jerusalem he said the crusades are finally over in 1914 but Bush said

they’re still going so basically we have-we’re up against propaganda and

my people are used to propaganda – we’re used to lies, we’re used to

distortions and now we have to prepare ourselves for another psychological

battle. And as a Muslim, I’m prepared for that battle and prepared to

sacrifice the ultimate for that for the sake of Islam and for the sake of my

people so that they can receive Islam and if they don’t accept they don’t

accept but I have no power to make them I’m not in the Christian

missionary – I’m not a priest – I didn’t force my mother to become Christian

– Muslim whatever but all I have is the truth – you accept – you don’t

accept that’s the will of God.

Question 16 : So Sheikh, as Koori’s take up Islam where do you see this

evolving to? What do you see happening say in a few years time? How do

you see the situation evolving?

Reply : Well basically number one we want to see Redfern as a drug free

community – the government supposedly says it wants to get rid of drugs

but when they raid here the only people that get raided are the drug addicts

and not drug dealers – they blatantly openly defy the police. As Muslims it’s

our duty now to make them go. We’ll use force. If the police want to stop

us, let them stop us, but we will tell them categorically that you cannot sell

drugs in our community unless you front us because we are not going to

run and basically we’re not violent people but we’re in a situation now

where we’re basically where we’ve been pushed too far – Aboriginal people

– they want us to be drunk, they want us to be on drugs, they want us to be

killin’ our women, they want us to be in prison, and through Islam we’ve

accepted the principles of social justice and solidarity and humanity and for

the first time that I’ve ever seen Aboriginal people – look at us with pride

and they say when will you hurry up and come and-an Aboriginal woman

came up to me the other day and said we see you taking these young boys

to the gym, they come to your house – I’m Christian she said – but I don’t

want to be Christian I want my children my teenage son and daughter to be

Muslim – I didn’t make them say that – I don’t have the power to make

them, and, and basically it is our hope and our will if God wills, that all our

people become Muslim and the fact that some people in the government

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say that there’ll never be an Islamic state – that’s very debatable because

if, if um if the people, the Indigenous people of Australia ever get any

sovereignty - and we’re Muslim obviously we will follow Islamic principles

and we’ll follow Islamic law – we followed Christian law when we were

forced to so we should be able to accept Islam and follow it – once we

accept that we should follow it of course – when you force someone to

believe in something, they don’t want to believe in it, there’s no compulsion

in Islam – there’s no compulsion in religion – I can’t make no one believe in

anything – what it is, is they have to accept it and whatever they, their

logical and rationale, whatever their conscience will allow them to believe

in, they’ll accept it-that’s why they’ve so readily accepted Islam because it’s

rational and It’s logical and Aboriginal people are very rational and logical

and they know Christianity is hypocritical, we know it’s, we know it’s

hypocritical. We know that they lie, we know that they steal, we know that

they rape, we know that they murder, all in the name of democracy – they

do it across the Muslim world, so we’re very, very used to imperialism but

Islam is not imperialistic – it is a missionary religion – just like Christianity –

but – we’re not conquerors – we’re not the invaders – we’re not the

oppressors - we’re the oppressed and we accepted Islam readily – no one

forced us to be Muslims – no Muslim scholar came over and said I’m going

to make you Muslim, I’m going to steal your children you have to believe in

God, and all this garbage. We accepted Islam because our conscience

allowed us to accept it because it’s rational and logical, and we’ve come to

the conclusion now that Islam is our only hope – we have a small window of

opportunity – like I was telling brothers before when I visit prisons – they

have a chance, one small chance – of redemption – one small chance of

saviour – and if you’ve been saved you tell me you’re Christian I accept that

– if you’re on drugs-you’re a drug dealer, or bashed you wife just like – I’m

ashamed to say this, but this is the biggest killer of Aboriginal women, is

Aboriginal men – and they were Christian, but when we’re Muslim it’s like

one Christian priest told me the other day when you are Christian you are a

slave but when you’re a Muslim you’re free. I didn’t make him say that, but

he understood that when you’re a Christian you’re drunk, you’re on drugs,

you’re in prison. When you’re Muslim you’ve redeemed you’re resurrected

– you don’t have to follow it – or you don’t even have to accept it, but when

you do it seems to me that in many cases they make the best Muslims.

Because we accepted it not from a cult or a genetically or a family point of

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view – we’ve accepted it because we know that it will save us. So basically

my message is now that Islam is for the oppressed it’s for the Indigenous

people and Christianity is for the oppressor, and Allah knows best.

4.3 Themes and issues arising from first interview of participants (1 st visit 02/01/06 – 27/01/06) Issues concerning Indigenous Muslims specifically r elated to religious conversion a) the prison experience • Receptiveness to Islam while incarcerated • Influence by Lebanese inmates (Arab culturalist expression and

radicalisation) • The impression (public and govt) of militancy attached to criminality and

Islam • What or who is resisting Islamic chaplaincy in NSW prisons • Influence by Rajab and other prison chaplains • Prison politics and regulations regarding who acts as chaplain • The role of AFIC in determining Muslim Chaplaincy (control, politics &

theology) • Underlying sociocultural issues explaining extent of Koori incarceration • Degree of lower Koori recidivism and social rehabilitation due to

accepting Islam These influences and themes will be analysed further in the section

following interview transcript 2

4.4 Interview Transcript 2 of 2 – Redfern Da’wah Pr oject and other Islamic issues 51 Caroline Street, Redfern 19/01/06 The same respondents returned for this interview as for the

previous one except for the addition of one more Indigenous Muslim

towards the end. Although the majority of the views in this interview are

articulated by one speaker, there was consensus among the other

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participants. The speaker is considered a leader or Amir and is qualified to

speak on the topic of Indigenous Muslims.

Question 17: Why is [Redfern] important or significant to what you want to

achieve? What importance does Redfern have within the Australian and

particularly the New South Wales Aboriginal community?

Reply: Well basically Redfern was used as a political base for so-called

black militants in the sixties, where they launched their land rights and

social justice struggles and because it’s strategically known in Aboriginal

Australia, and this is our base because the majority of Aboriginal men, or

Koori men that, that are Muslim, they, they ring here, they come here, the

community know that this is a safe haven – and the kids come here. They

eat before breakfast if they’ve had no breakfast – they come in, they can

get on the internet or they can just talk where they feel, they feel they’re

safe, and strategically everyone that gets out here, from prison, or comes

here for the Aboriginal knockout12 they take the message, whether it be,

whether it be productive, or, or destructive, or negative or positive they take

that message back to the Aboriginal communities, and we believe that

through that Koori grapevine, people have already and will again take the

message of Islam back to their community so, that’s why we think Redfern

is strategically important.

Question 18: You said that they can also have the opportunity to take a

negative message back to their community, what negative messages? Can

you give us some examples of these negative messages?

Reply: Well, the negative things are basically the drug trade. The drug

dealers and the drug trade have infiltrated the Koori grapevine just like we

believe Islam will be a positive effect on the Aboriginal community – so

basically, the drug network distribution that’s run from prison, and from

here, these so called too black, too strong drug dealers, that sell poison to

our kids, they use that same Koori network that I’m usin’ to go to Moree and

Walgett, and to Boggabilla and Dubbo and using that same network to

spread the venom of heroin into our black communities. So, to counteract

that, we have the message of Islam, and, and we hope that people will

12 Aboriginal knockout refers to an Annual Football competition – see interview one

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accept it just like they’ve accepted heroin and drugs, and, and alcohol and

Christianity, that’s been destructive, and the physical proof that it’s

destructive of all our men – our strong black warriors are dead – from

heroin overdoses because black power never saved us from white powder

because spiritual power transcends material, it has no colour – Islam is the

spiritual truth to our redemption, and, and the proof that Christians are the

worst drunks that there are; the worst paedophiles; and basically they sided

and aligned themselves with Christian invaders, tells you that Christianity’s

not for us. So that the venom of heroin will be spread, by these same

network of these predators that are suckin’ the blood of our, of our

community and sellin’ and allowin’ our women to sell their bodies, for heroin

– they’re Christian, they openly say they’re Christian, as, as Muslims we

condemn them. And we, we defy them.

Question 19: You mention something called the Koori grapevine, can you

umm, just expand about…what exactly is this Koori grapevine?

Reply: Well, well what it is the network of commonalities where, say for

instance, somebody comes – and they might not commonly, be known to

us by sight, but soon as they mention our name or I mention my name my

name is Davis, or someone’s name is Roberts, or someone’s name is

Ballengary, or, or Suie, or, or Duncan, or Moran or whatever as soon as

you mention a name that’s commonly known, automatically someone will

know where you’re from, as that’s a Koori grapevine where we’re all related

or we’re culturally linked, and that’s how the, the venom of heroin, and

same as the venom of Christianity, were spread through our cultural kinship

networks, and we believe Islam is a positive force can also be spread like

that too.

Question 20: Why is Redfern so significant to that Koori grapevine? Why

Redfern in particular? Reply: Because Redfern’s commonly known in Aboriginal Australia as the

quintessence, or the, or the basic pre-requisite for all authentic Aboriginal

struggles in the sixties – it’s like the Black Panthers, or the Nation of Islam

the black Muslims are commonly known in America, Redfern is commonly

known as the black rights struggle. And we, we link with the struggles of the

past, but, the people that had the struggle in the sixties, are no longer, able

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to resist the venom of heroin and, and imperialism and they’ve become

from liberators to exploiters but Islam will uplift us and make us the

generation of warriors of the of the future.

Question 21: Do you think one of the problems with Redfern in particular, is

that because there’s so many people here from so many different tribes no-

one has complete authority power? So therefore, with that lack of a definite

authority figure, that negative things have been able to slip in through that?

Reply: Yeh, yeh that’s true, I believe that, umm, that dissention and

negativity, and disunity, have uprooted our Aboriginal allegiances and

solidarity and people can come in and - there’s no real power within

Redfern, umm, and people with vested interests in controlling us and

basically sellin’ us drugs, and because we have within, within our society

now a very, very weak constitution and very weak morals and, and very

weak disregard for elders – where Aboriginal men swear at our elders, we

treat our children bad, and basically but, within all that, you know, drug

abuse and alcohol abuse, and domestic violence, there’s still hope, there’s

still dignity, there’s still pride but it’s just waiting to surface. And sure,

people have used, with a vested interest to distort it, umm, we hope to

counteract that in the Redfern community.

Question 22: Sheikh, do you see the Redfern community as symptomatic of

a lot of other Koori communities in NSW and probably Australia as well?

Reply: I do, superficially, from the outsider’s point of view I live here in

Redfern, I’m known in Redfern. A lot of people know me – some may not

like me, umm, a lot do like me, but even the ones that don’t like me know

that I’m here for the community. I’m not paid to do this – I’m full-time cook,

umm, I take the kids to the gym, even the critics of the Muslim, can’t deny

me my rightful place in Redfern, but symptomatic it is some, some in terms

of scale that’s worse. The Northern Territory there’s petrol sniffin’,

Boggabilla, Brewarrina there’s, there’s one I every three girls, have been

molested by their uncles – and that’s a Christian concept, that’s a Christian

culture – it’s not in Islam, umm, so Redfern is kinda like a small, a small,

small scale of what Australia is but the venom that’s the heroin, and I’m not

focussin’ on that - intentionally but, the thing is when I was a kid there was

no heroin in Redfern or Boggabilla or Kempsey or nowhere, heroin is

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comin’ through, through Aboriginal drug dealers, to make money, to exploit

and – so their attributes now are, are greed and lust and violence and

exploitation, when basically, when basically my message of Islam is unity

and solidarity and brotherhood, and basically black defiance.

Question 23: What part does law and order or law enforcement have in the

social equation that is Redfern? How are the police…what kind of emphasis

do they have on law enforcement?

Reply: Well I can understand from the police point of view, they’re used as

scapegoats. They’re young, fresh umm, inexperienced police and they’re

placed in a hostile environment where Aboriginal people have always been

seen as negative, and basically like animals, so they place the white police

here in a hostile environment with low pay – their lack of knowledge of and

understanding of Aboriginal people have been very, very ignorant and

that’s like a powder keg and then what I’d say really annoys me is when

these police do these raids, I see drug addicts going to prison but the main

drug dealers – they’ve been given a green light. Let’s say I might be a little

bit believing in conspiracy theories, they had a Royal Commission into

police corruption, before that, the average common, so-called Australian

wouldn’t believe that there was police corruption but Justice Wood, the

Royal Commissioner said the police corruption goes all the way to the top,

and the fact that these drug dealers deal drugs with impunity, I’d have to

admit that, or have to accept, that, there are certain police that are on the

drug take, that accepted money from drug dealers, I don’t know how they

deal drugs with impunity and I don’t understand.

Question 24: You say impunity but I mean obviously umm, from an

outsider’s perspective I would assume that drugs are dealt very covertly

has this been your experience?

Reply: No, drug dealers deal openly in front of people, they, they tell me

and this is what I’m told, that there are cameras everywhere in Redfern. I

walk down there, I first started coming here you know, back in 2001 – 2002,

I come to go down to the gym and I used to bring a lot of young Aboriginal

boys with me, and girls to the gym, and drug would openly say what do you

want to score and I’d say I’m a Muslim and don’t ask me again. I’d come

back the next day the same people would say do you want to score I’d say

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I’m a Muslim and don’t ask me again. I watch them openly sell drugs, and

the police are always here so, it’s not overtly, if it’s overtly then I must be

unbelievable perceptive or intuitively – have intuitive perception to work out,

if I’m the only one that can see these drug dealers, which I don’t believe

well – I believe everyone can see ‘em because they do it in the open so,

they’ve been given another Neddy Smith13, the green light to sell drugs. I

believe they have a vested interest in, in sellin’ our community drugs to

keep us down, to kill us, to buy us off, or, or pollute our morality, basically.

Question 25: Do you see any evidence of collusion with the Aboriginal drug

dealers in Redfern with people of other ethnicities?

Reply : Oh definitely, I know for a fact in 2001 -2002 the Koori Muslim

Association before we were even established a group of Koori Muslims had

a BBQ on Invasion day that Australia calls Australia… we call it Invasion

Day – we had a BBQ and we invited about 25 -30 Muslims. Very large,

non-white lookin’ Muslims from different nationalities, and when we brought

them here, my people knew straight away or thought they perceived

straight away that they were drug dealers. When I asked my people why

you thought Muslims were drug dealers and they said that because

Muslims deal drugs to us they’re the major distributors of drugs in large

quantities to the Aboriginal drug dealers so we know Muslims sell drugs.

They might say that, oh we never heard of it but, look, there are drugs, and

drug dealers and addicts in Lakemba and the fact that they have reached a

stage of understanding with Islam, they’re Muslim basically and my people

are not Muslim, but on a level my people are equally affected by drugs

when Muslim, that means my people are better than the Muslims because if

the Muslims have Islam they should be higher in status socially and

economically and religiously and culturally than my people who don’t have

Islam, that means the Muslims are backward. They’re categorically

backward because, my people do not have Islam yet but when we do

receive Islam you’d have to concede we’re goin’ to be better in social status

and religiosity than the Muslims because we’re almost, or equally as bad as

them, and they have Islam and we don’t, so when we receive Islam, God

knows how good we’ll become.

13 Arthur Stanley “Neddy” Smith is a murderer serving a prison sentence in Long Bay Jail New South Wales

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Question 26: The instance, or the general amount of Aboriginal people

converting in jail - how prevalent is it?

Reply: Well from what I’m told from people that I visit, I visit umm, Koori

men in prison that are Muslim, I’ve been in prison with them umm, a lot of

‘em ring me, weekly, some ring daily I receive letters from them I

correspond with them, eighty per cent of Aboriginal people in prison now

are Muslim. Eighty per cent of Koori’s are Muslim. That’s what they tell me

and that I can’t deny because I know the majority of them that accepted

Islam, and a brother told me today that just got out of prison – he said only

very few Koori men now aren’t Muslim. I was the first Koori Muslim in

prison, I was the first Koori Muslim I ever knew, and, and it’s not the fact

that I predate all of them, the reason why, I know all of them that are

Muslim is because I was a Muslim before them, and I brought, according to

them, I brought them the Islamic message. Basically that’s what they say.

Question 27: Can you tell us a little more of how Islam evolved within the

prison system?

Reply: How it evolved? Question: Yeh. Reply: Well, well, just besides myself, that was in prison, that articulated a

culture of Islam, theology of Islam, they come into contact with Lebanese –

in prison. And it’s now like a gang, they’re like thugs, umm, I’m not say’in all

of ‘em but basically some of ‘em have accepted Islam from, from a

Lebanese non-practicing perception. So basically, if, Koori people are

accepting Islam on, on the word or the Da’wah of, of Lebanese Muslims

that do sell drugs, that are heroin addicts in prison – they don’t practice

Islam then if the Muslims are weak, then my people are going to be weaker

than the Muslims. So, but it’s my hope now to interact with all these

brothers and sisters that are in the prison system, that I personally know,

that I have credibility with them, and, and authenticity with them also I

wouldn’t say over them, but with them and It’s my hope now to bring them

to orthodox Islam not Salafi not Wahhabi none of all, none of that and the

majority of them are acceptin’ a distorted version – I wouldn’t even say

interpretation – a distorted version of Islam. But they’re, they’re the only

Muslims that they come into contact with are in prison. It’s sad, but

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Hamdillillah it’s good also, because, God wills whatever he wills, we

believe, so if they come into contact just like the Nation of Islam then

orthodox Islam would never have produced the likes of Malcolm X and Dr.

Mohammad Iqbal. So in this case, orthodox Islam would never have

produced these men that will become I believe the greatest of creation. So

God works like that and that’s my belief.

Question 28: From, a strategic, you could say political, perspective, how

does Islam influence people in the prison system?

Reply: Politically, it made ‘em aware of their social rights, it made ‘em

aware that, the socially destructive nature of their behaviour was wrong.

Basically, it made ‘em aware that – socially disadvantaged people have

been exploited with vested interests by other groups including Muslims. It

made ‘em socially responsible and politically active and religiously active in

the Muslim community so Islam basically awakened their subconscious and

their conscious values of a system outside their own little gang, or their own

little family, or their own little umm, understanding, so it made ‘em think on

a on a universal picture, umm, and now they know that Islam is not just for

the Arab.

Question 29: How did Islam affect you personally how you did your time? Reply: Well – I had many offers – to be involved in, drug dealin’ - I never, I

never was involved in it. I never sold drugs. I never used drugs in prison

and anyone that, sees this, or knows me personally – no matter if they don’t

like me or they do like me they can categorically say that no Rock never

used drugs, he never smoked drugs, he never drank, he never did nothing

while he was incarcerated and there was lots of evils and vices like

sodomy, homosexual activity an’ and the fact that, I was Muslim and

survived, and that all the dreamtime warriors bar five are dead. Only five

that are alive are Muslim.

Question 30: Can you tell us about the dreamtime warriors? Reply: Well – well, there was basically, a period of time when, when, when,

whites in prison were becoming superior. They can kill us with impunity and

get away with it…

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Question 30a: When was this? Reply: This was in the seventies and eighties – we’re a group of Aboriginal

men – tough, brave, umm, vigilant, and unbelievably credible with scruples

and decided, to create a pay-back system. And basically over time, the

pay-back system was distorted, through drugs, so basically the people that

were affected in the prison system – their allegiances became aligned –

with people that would do them harm like say, say for instance, if, a biker, a

white man, a Leb whatever you raped an Aboriginal woman and you come

into jail, people would getcha you wouldn’t get away from us. You would not

escape. And then over time, the pay-back system was distorted by greed

and lust and heroin and heroin sold us off. Or we sold ourselves to heroin

basically, we sold our souls and our pay-back system, that these men that

fought for us, before I even came to prison, when I came in, the system

was gone, like it was almost just like a relic. So umm, we sat down and

discussed to re-enact this pay-back system. And a group of men, decided

to bring it on themselves, that, if you do anything to a Koori man in prison –

doesn’t matter whether you liked him – I don’t care if he was a child

molester a killer or a rapist I don’t give a we didn’t give a shit. But if you did

something to one of us and we didn’t like you – sorry - if someone did

something to us and we didn’t like that Koori person it didn’t matter we’d

getcha. And that’s what stopped us from getting’ attacked in prison, and

now that power, and that unity and that solidarity, we’ve basically reverted

into Islam and outside here [Redfern] we need that power in the Aboriginal

community now – not in the terms of violence an’ but to react against

violence, to defend against violence and racism like, like the Cronulla riot.

I’ve been tellin’ Muslims for five years that Australia was contradictory and

hypocritical and racist and degenerate – but they wouldn’t believe me ‘til it

happened to them, now they’re sayin’ oh yeah brother now we know you’re

tellin’ the truth. Why, wasn’t my word good enough for you? It had to

happen to them for them to understand that my oppressor is your

oppressor so we have a common enemy.

Question 31: Can you tell us a bit, like the affect of the pay-back system in

prison? Like how did the power actually, like a step-by-step description to

the outside uninitiated person?

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Reply: Well basically, for example, someone came in they raped a Koori

woman. They were dangerous. They were what they call hard-core – they

were killers. So, no one did nothin’ to ‘em. So basically, we knew that, that

was the end of it, if nothing happened it makes them violent but what it is,

is, it stops violence because in prison, if somebody had the intention of

attacking one of our young men, in say Cessnock, or Maitland, where

gangs of white rednecks, of Klu Klux Klan, of all these so-called, kings, of

the prison system - if they had the intention to harm one of us, they knew,

categorically that soon as they got to another prison like Goulburn or

Lithgow, that was the end of ‘em. That stopped a lot of violence, the fact

that we unified under one banner and that banner’s been destroyed – we

can unite that banner again.

Question 32: Could you briefly explain how the Redfern Aboriginal Da’wah

Project is important for inmates coming out of jail?

Reply: Well we have a centre now at 51 Caroline Street Redfern it’s a two

bedroom unit and two brothers that come from prison now, they came to

me and, I spent many years as many would probably know that knows me,

I got out with no social skills no job no qualifications nothing I was never

rehabilitated in prison Islam is a rehabilitative process, so when they come

here, I’ve given them accommodation, they have a shower, they can go to

the gym, I’ve got ‘em employment, just little things with no assistance from

any Muslims, or any government department, just through our own

earnings, umm, we tried to provide food when young people come here,

even though they’re not Muslim, even though they’re not Aboriginal they

come here, they can eat, somewhere of like a safe haven, if someone

wants to come they get out of prison, initially for that first six months I visit

‘em contact ‘em send ‘em literature, umm, keep in contact tell ‘em about

our programme and basically they know me they know who I am, ahh, I’m

not just introducing myself in the prison system I’m, I’m commonly known

and, even by the guards and by the white inmates they commonly know

who I am and, and I’ve got credibility so when they come here they know

they got somewhere to come, to shower, to eat, to sleep, to get

employment, and if they wanna, do their thing, whatever do their thing but

at least they know there’s an alternative to the drug, and alcohol lifestyle.

It’s, it’s, it’s destructive, but at least they know there’s something for them

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that’s positive and powerful and, and constructive that they can have here

in the community. So it’s not just, that, we’re, we’re basically, ahh, we

believe Islam, Islam is a missionary religion, but in terms of social justice

it’s more than that for us. It’s just a place for these men to come and to

know, you know that it’s an alternative to the lifestyle that they’re already

livin’. And they, they express to me now that when I visit ‘em, they said

they’re very happy now that there is a centre but we want our own mosque.

We want our own bigger centre where people can sleep, and pray, and eat,

and train, so hopefully something like umm, Murawina preschool, the old

settlement there we could set up a prayer hall, a gym, a maybe ten bed

hostel with a shared shower, kitchen, and sleeping headquarters,

something like that but, this here’s [Caroline St] expensive, and umm, we’d

like to think that the Muslims have a vested, have a vested interest in

helpin’ propagate Islam because there’s eight rules, for givin’ charity. And

one of the rules or one’s that do Da’wah, and another rule is the one’s that

assist people in comin’ to Islam, and to defend the oppressed. I don’t know

what the Muslims are thinkin’ the rules are, but there’s eight rules for

financial assistance for Da’wah. One of ‘em’s for a traveler, one of ‘em’s for

the main umm, basically financial assistance for someone who’s doin’

Da’wah, so it’s my belief, God willing the Muslim would, would, or should

assist us in Da’wah because it’ll help the Muslims spread deep spiritual

roots within Australia with allegiances between Indigenous people, and,

the, the so-called foreigner, but we don’t consider them foreigners.

Question 33: How much help have you had so far with say, financial help

from the Islamic associations to expand your organisation?

Reply: None at all – not a cent umm, they know the programme. People like

AFIC, umm, I approached the Islamic Council of New South Wales and the

Australian Federation of Islamic Councils umm, they said they, their lookin’

into it I approached the Lebanese Muslim Association and they gave us a

box of books. My people don’t want to be told about Islam from a book,

they want to be shown about Islam. So I approached the Lebanese Muslim

Association they said Hamdilillah praise be to you may, may God praise

you, look after you in your glorious work and they gave me a box of books. I

said Hamdilillah that’s great, but what could I do with a box of books that for

people that are not Muslim? We need financial assistance, and, and, it’s in

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your Islamic principles to assist the people that do this work, if you can’t do

it, humble yourself enough to assist the one’s that can. So, not a cent yet.

Question 34: And what about from Koori organisations or even the state

parliament representatives. Have any of those people shown any interest to

date?

Reply: Umm, probably for the fact that I haven’t approached them. Umm, I

think if I was, say a Catholic priest or an Anglican priest or some other type

of priest or whatever I think they’d give me assistance but I couldn’t, you

know, discount them too quickly, maybe the Koori organisations would do it

because, we’re doin’ it predominately for Koori’s but I haven’t approached

the government yet at all I, I don’t think they’d give me any money anyway

– I’m not being pessimistic but, they’re hostile to Islam. They openly say

that they’re not - they openly say it’s not a war on Islam – but we as

Aboriginal people have felt the brunt, of, of their white hypocrisy, and we

are very, very perceptive, and very umm, very used to imperialism, so,

we’re not really intending to approach the government about it know they

say in prison there’s recidivism, but according to prison officials that I’ve

spoken to, the largest and the best recidivists are the Aboriginal men that

become Muslim – that’s from their own words – so why would they not

assist me? I can only believe that they’re not interested in, recidivism.

They’re not interested in stoppin’ Aboriginal people from, or anyone from

becomin’ prison, but a, but a governor from Ivanhoe prison told me that,

she told me that she wanted Aboriginal men, to stop getting’ dirty urines

from marijuana – I said well let me tell them about Islam. Because the

prison chaplain Waris Sharif, he has a non-conversion policy so if a Koori

man – a prisoner comes up and says tell me about Islam, he’s not allowed

to but if a Catholic priest or a Buddhist, or a, or a Jewish priest, they can

propagate their religion to ‘em. But she told me the men I’ve been in

contact with, umm, that come into contact with Islam they all had clean

urines. And she said she can’t understand why people are hostile to

Muslims because she watched their gradual change – she was trying to get

‘em on a bush gang, so that they could go out and work and earn money

for the prison, but because they had marijuana in their [someone knocks on

front door and answer is terminated]

Question 35: What are the goals and aspirations of the organisation within Redfern?

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Reply: Well the Koori Muslim Association now – we’ve established a base

of Islamic principles and Islamic goals and people know we’re Muslim. So

basically we’re a small [organisation] here in the centre but something like

Murawina pre-school, or something like that – I wouldn’t be, you know,

fixated on that particular centre itself but something like that where we can

have a multifunctional, place where one, one place could be a hall. We

want to purchase gym equipment so that umm, myself and some other very

dedicated members of the community could, could teach kick boxin’ and

boxin’ for the youth umm, a gym and basically, set one of the levels up as a

ten or fifteen, ahh room, hall for brothers that get out of prison, that are

interested in the programme - that are interested in liberating our people

through Islam – umm, culturally, they can have their own room, umm,

shower, kitchen, we want to set it up as a full-time soup kitchen for the

poor, umm, and basically give re-empowerment to our community, umm,

through the only way, or the only, only understanding that we have will, that

will have and be successful in the future and that’s through Islam – nothing

else has been successful in our community, everything including ATSIC14

has failed.

Question 36: In terms of the strategic position of The Block how do you

perceive this project development in relation to any prospective re-

development of The Block?

Reply: Well I think the re-development of The Block’s goin’ ahead slowly

but – whatever will always be here now, and we need to remain here now

because everyone expects us to be here and a lady said to me the other

day, you know I’d like my son to come down, and I’d like my daughter to

come down, so in terms of strategic placements we could never go now

because they’d be disillusioned and basically once you’ve been pushed so

far, and this is your greatest hope and we’ve failed, then, that’s our

responsibility because we are not just responsible for our individual selves

or our family, we’re responsible for a whole generation now, so Redfern is

strategically important for us because number one, it’s commonly known as

Aboriginal, even though there is a lot of Aboriginals at Mt Druitt, and now

the Koori Muslim Association is, is linked to Redfern. In prison, in Moree, in

14 ATSIC Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission disbanded in 2005

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North Coast, in everywhere you can imagine everyone knows that we exist,

and they’ll verge on hear soon – and we need to set up a bigger and better

structure for them to come here so that, it’s like, we understand that if

everyone had the same coloured car same make you don’t have a choice,

just the same as this promiscuous, this drug affected and alcohol affected

culture, violent culture, if we have no alternative then the kids have nothing

to choose so we have every family that’s affected by drugs and alcohol if

we have not one sober family, our children can’t say, well I know such and

such who, who is sober. So the only people that are now sober are

Muslims. Not Arab, not African, not Lebanese – us, so we, we know the

responsibilities that we have in the community now in the broader sense

too. And we accept that – we accept that challenge and we hope, we hope

we can live up to that. We hope we can live up to everything we already

are.

Question 37: And if you had the financial means and the infrastructure,

would you perceive that this organisation could expand interstate?

Reply: Well, basically in terms of dialogue, what I perceive, and I

categorically say this that Christians are theologically retarded and

spiritually dead but they have material culture that I can’t match but the

Muslims, they can match. The fact that they’ve got money and don’t spread

Islam, it’s not a financial thing for ‘em, it’s an intention and a cultural issue.

They can’t spread Islam because they don’t understand the complexities of

Aboriginal people. Prophet Mohammad PBUH15 he said when you go to a

tribe learn their language I ask the Muslims do you know my language? Do

you even know who I am? Do you even care? The first thing you learn

about a human being is, who they are so that you can give them the

message of Islam. The Muslims never cared who we were, they lived off

the fruits of colonialism. They sided with the enemy. It’s like me going to

Palestine and siding with the Jew over the Palestinian. What I wanted to

tell the Muslims is, your enemy in Palestine is my enemy, but when you

come to Australia, you don’t perceive that my enemy is your enemy –

actually my enemy is your friend. And that’s why we don’t want to be

Muslims like you. We want to be Muslims like Islam says. That’s why it’s

better we never accepted Islam from the Muslims – we accepted it purely

15 PBUH Peace Be Upon Him

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from Islam, and because the most oppressed are the most receptive, we

accepted that, but the people practicing Islam weren’t, liberators – they

were actually aligned with the exploiters, so, now in terms of financial, we

believe that a bigger centre, and the fact that we’ve got Kamilaroi people,

Wiradjuri people, Dunghetti, Kumbaingiri, Anaiwan – members of our

organisation – the simple fact that it takes training and knowledge, and all

these men are learning to come here and study and in a year or two they

can go back to their community, we can finance them and open their own

centre just like Redfern – it’s just a matter of logistics – it’s a matter of

money, it’s not a matter of theology or understanding Islam, or intention or

ability we’re just limit- we’re financially retarded. We’re financially limited,

but the Muslims have unbelievable finance, but the build five million dollar

Masjids16. But they can’t assist us in Da’wah. So if you come to a non-

Muslim country and you don’t intend to propagate and defend Islam you

can’t stay here. That’s an Islamic principle – I never made that up – Allah

made that up and I accept that because it’s logical and rational and my

conscience will only allow me to accept what’s logical and rational. I want

the Muslims to uphold their legal, their actual Islamic legal duty, just their

minimum of validating the truth and fighting the oppressor. If you see a

tyrant you use your hand to change it. If you can’t use your hand you use

your voice meaning you speak out against the tyrant for the oppressed. If

you can’t use your voice, despise it in your heart, but Muslims don’t despise

the oppressor, because they align themselves with the oppressor. Why

would Indigenous people that are oppressed, see Islam for what it truly is

when the Muslims are not practicin’ properly. It doesn’t matter if you fast

and pray, the Arab, they held Spain for eight hundred years - they had the

most powerful army the world had ever known – they destroyed the

Byzantinian Empire – they destroyed all the empires – the Roman Empire,

but, they held Spain for eight hundred years and not one pork eatin’, wine

drinkin’ Spanish man or woman says La iIaha illa Allah wa-Muhammad

rasul Allah there is no God but Allah and Mohammad is the Messenger, so

what did the Arab do? They’re did what they’re doin’ here, nothing. They

can’t perceive Islam like I perceive Islam. And I’m not smart, I’m not a

learned man. I’m ignorant, but if I’m ignorant then some people must be

less [sic] than ignorant.

16 Masjid Islamic term for mosque or prayer room.

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Question 38: You’re alluding to perhaps to the difference between Islam

and Muslims can you just briefly expand on that?

Reply: Well there’s a big disparity between Islam and Muslims, and my

people for lots of reasons they’re unbelievably intuitively perceptive - they

have intuitive insight. So in Islam they have knowledge that only the heart

sees. And through oppression and colonization and dispossession and, and

genocide, we’ve become unbelievably resilient and receptive-and

perceptive. Now we know that Muslims are not Islam, but the thing that took

me so long to become a practicin’ Muslim is the fact that I could not see

Muslims for what they truly were. And if they’re the best or they’re the

representatives of Islam, and they’ve failed, then according to logic then

Islam failed. But Islam is perfect and pure and the Qur’an remained intact

for all mankind. Allah perfected it. Not one dot according to Christian

scholars and Christian theologians has been changed of the Qur’an. So the

Muslims have no excuse for not givin’ the spiritual medicine of Islam. And

we believe that if you go to the doctor and you receive a script and you get

medicine [sic] and you take that to the chemist, and you get the medicine

then that medicine should cure you but if you’ve got the wrong medicine, or

you’ve taken too much then you become ill. Well e believe that Allah is the

doctor, the script is the Qur’an, and the medicine is Islam, and the Muslims

are not givin’ us the medicine, so we have to administer the medicine

because the Muslims have become sick also. So the ones that are sick can

never give the medicine. So the ones that have the medicine are the best

givers or administrators of the medicine and the fact that Koori people have

whole-heartedly accepted Islam – they embarrass the Muslims. They

actually literally embarrass the Muslims. There are brothers in prison now –

Koori Muslims – that refuse to eat meat that’s not halal. Then Lebanese, tell

them that’s halal because they said Bismallah – they made halal what Allah

made haram. And I tell them you can eat that meat, but don’t tell people

that’s halal and don’t distort my people because they don’t want to eat meat

that’s not halal. So the worst of the creation have become the best. Allah

created us the worst, but for Sahabah, may Allah reward them, they were

the worst drunkards – they buried their female children into the dirt, now,

they became Islam’s holiest warriors, the greatest scholars of Islam come

from them, and they were taught by a woman. But the fact that my people

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are the worst of creation- you have to be the worst to become the best. So

the first must become the last, because Prophet Mohammed PBUH he

said, that he didn’t know which was better, the first shower of the Muslims,

or the last. And I ask the Muslims are they a shower, because an individual

man is not a shower, a tribe is a shower ‘cause a shower means more than

one, more than a thousand, more than a hundred thousand and the fact

that my people now are a shower, we believe we’re the last, of the great,

basically re-emergence of Muslims in the world now, everyone has had

Islam except us. And, it’s our opportunity to ahh, except Islam now.

Question 39: Since the inception of the Koori Muslim Association, have you

been offered any other avenues to help our people?

Reply: In terms of what avenues? Question 39a: Ahhm, materialistic goods that’ve been out of range or,

anything else that you’ve been offered?

Reply: Yes ahhm, I’ve been offered by certain very pious Muslims

Hamdilillah and I thank Allah for them that in terms of say one Aboriginal

girl in Redfern she needed some material and some Muslims donated to

me but I had to make her wait for weeks and weeks and weeks while I got a

truck, because number one, Aboriginal people want us to take Islam we

don’t even have a vehicle so, we understand we’re spiritual people as

Muslims but, we live in a material culture so to go to Moree and Boggabilla

and North Coast and Goulburn prison and Lithgow prison we need a

vehicle so that’s why we’re financially, umm, basically, held back, but some

Muslims, and Hamdilillah for them they’ve offered us, some material

assistance but what we really need is a vehicle, a bus, ahh, meat, so we

can engage in Islamic charity work like in the guise of a soup kitchen so

that we can actually present Islam not from an Islamic terminology point

because non-Muslims can’t understand Islamic terminology they can

understand cultural Islam but what it is, it’s not theological it’s – in terms of

Zakat – charity is a Muslim’s fundamental so in terms of givin’ food out like

on the 26th January, Australia calls that Australia Day, we call that Invasion

Day – we have a free BBQ, the Koori Muslim Association have a free BBQ

for the people at Redfern so they can experience Islam instead of being

told about Islam, we’re showin’ them about Islam. And the fact that they see

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us prayin’, they know it’s Islamic. The fact that we give food, that’s Islamic.

So we don’t have to tell ‘em one thing about Islam, we show them Islam, so

it’s the Muslims’ opportunity now to assist us. And it doesn’t matter if one

single person doesn’t know you assist us you and Allah know. So, it’s like

out of humility and love for Allah we ask you for assistance basically. We

ask the Muslims in general for assistance, but not only that you’ll assist

yourself, by, by helpin’ us assist the non-Muslims to bringin’ them to Islam,

and this is the basic fundamental principle of Islam is Da’wah, and I don’t

mean goin’ from mosque to mosque, I mean goin’ into the heartland of a, of

a hostile country to Muslims but they’re not hostile to us. They’re hostile to

Muslims they tell me they don’t like Muslims, for good reason, but they like

Koori Muslims because we’re them and they’re us. We’re basically, we’re

basically like pioneers. I wouldn’t say pioneers like in the terms of land

stealin’ mass murderers, but I’d say what we consider ourselves is farmers

but not land-not white land, like exploitive land stealin’ farmers, but we

consider ourselves revolutionary Islamic farmers, where we plant the seed

of Islam, the idea of Islam in someone’s head by our principles and our

conduct, we plant that seed but we don’t just leave that seed to whither and

die we water that seed. Now how we water that seed is we take people

food, we pray, we look after their children and we do the things that people

can’t do. See, kids say to me, uncle can I stay at your house, a couple of

years ago – I said, I knew I wasn’t their uncle, genetically, but culturally I

was their uncle and I said you know, I was thinkin’ to myself and I said to

brothers, like Adam and other good brothers, I said if I didn’t have, If I didn’t

you know, if I used drugs and drunk, where would these kids go? And I said

I don’t have a place so I set up a centre for these young kids that want to

come as a safe haven. And, the fact that, no-one can perceive this it

seems like I’m unusually smart, which I’m not, or everyone’s ignorant. Or if

they’re not ignorant they don’t care then, I don’t know what the reason is,

but the fact that their children are cryin’ out for us to help ‘em – that means

we’re accepted and authentic and we’re credible in the community of

hostility against Muslims. We’re loved by the, by the non-Muslims.

Question 40: So a soup kitchen and a vehicle will allow us to spread our

message – whilst we’re out in the public rather than just talking we give

assistance and in that assistance they can see that we are there to help,

and with a vehicle we can go to more places and various other prisons, and

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do you think that’ll get our message out quicker, or no so much quicker but

more evenly spread so those that aren’t Muslim, come to the soup kitchen,

learn, or even just being there knowing that there’s a Koori Muslim

Association has provided that gives a positive influence to take back, to

their homes, to their people?

Reply: Yes the fact that we have a presence, umm, in the community for

example, Lyle Munro senior – very well known leader and elder and activist

has personally asked us to come to Moree and Boggabilla and Walgett and

Mungindi, and through long consultations with the elders of the community,

they knew at the knock-out, that our group were Muslim, they knew we

weren’t Christian, they knew we weren’t Buddhist, they knew we weren’t

atheist, the fact that they knew we didn’t drink, we didn’t take drugs and

we’re opposed to the things that are affected by them in the community,

they tell me, that policemen are havin’ children - police males are havin’ sex

with twelve year old Aboriginal girls in Boggabilla and havin’ children with

them – they are fed up with, with Christianity. They’re fed up with

capitalism, they’re fed up with atheism and communism, and they’re fed up

with westernism, and now, the most oppressed are being pushed so much

that they’ve accepted Islam but I don’t have the vehicle or the means, or I

have the intentions to go to these communities but, If I had a magic wand if

I had a bus I’d be in it tomorrow and I’d be in Moree. And the fact that, that

community is basically on their knees beggin’ they’re not beggin’ some

blonde-headed blue eyed white God called Jesus, they’re beggin’ the

Muslims to come to their community. I didn’t force them – they watched us

at the knock-out we interacted with the community, Lyle Munro senior

spoke to me at the grand final and he said that would you like to come to

Moree to tell us about Islam, because he knew that we had Muslim

descendants, and it’s in his living memory, that, he a sub-conscious of

Islamic understandings. But the fact that we’re cultural Muslims and we’re

theological Muslims and we’re practical Muslims and we’re sub-conscious

Muslims and we’re everything about Muslim, the fact that the Moree

community and Boggabilla, Walgett and Mungindi are really beggin’ literally

for us to come – now the Muslims say, well what can we do? What you can

do is give us a bus and help us go to Moree and help us spread Allah’s

deen. And we ask you out of humility, and love for Allah and compassion

for Prophet Mohammad PBUH to assist us, and, and we believe that you’ll

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be assisting yourselves. That’s what our main goal is to propagate and

defend Islam, and the fact that my people are 60 per cent Christian, the

one’s that I met don’t like Christianity, and the fact that they – when I tell

them about Islamic, Islamic law, and Islamic principles, they are so

receptive to it. It’s just that no-one’s ever approached ‘em. They’ve had

Muslims culturally, [yelling outside] in prison and in other communities –

that’s been very negative but in terms of dialogue they’re very receptive to

an Islamic principle and an Islamic way of life. And, and the fact that I can’t

deny these people, the fact if they told me they didn’t want to be Muslim I’d

still be their brother. But the fact that they want Islam, as a culture, not the

majesty that was Islam, the majesty that is Islam they want it as a living

breathing culture they want to be practicin’ Muslims – the Muslims have an

opportunity to assist me, and even come along – give us spiritual and moral

support and material support and financial support - this is the re-

emergence of Islam in the world. And that’s basically our main, our main

concept is charity work, social work but all in an Islamic guise we’re fully

Islamic, umm, and without Islam we’d be corrupt like everybody else, it’s

only Islam that has kept us this strong for this long.

4.5 Themes and issues arising from interview 2 Islamic propagation within the Redfern community an d in other Indigenous communities in NSW b) Koori reversion other than from within the criminal justice system Redfern Aboriginal Dawah Project • Koori alignment with Islam seen as complimentary (Malcolm X

example) • Liberation politics – the ‘right path’ of Islam (no drugs etc.) • Example by demonstration of practice – visible benefits to all • The Block as the Koori grapevine – central hub of information network

to other communities • Reclaiming the block from drug dealers and returning it to the

community via Islam • Re-establishing the block as a strong viable Koori community and halt

the social decay

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• Addressing the ‘policing’ of the block in terms of arresting dealers rather than users (police corruption?)

• The importance of a Redfern-based drop-in centre/halfway house for

Aboriginal • Muslims on parole and drug-affected community members etc. • Assessing the role of the Aboriginal Housing Company • Assessing the role of welfare agencies in how drug administration

policies are regulated • Addressing the ethnic and cultural sensitivities associated with Redfern

Koori’s (overcoming suspicion within the community of ‘helping agendas’

• Islam as the core spiritual opportunity for authentic Koori resurgence and empowerment

• Material and financial obstacles (gaining sponsorship funding, physical

infrastructure etc.) • The issue of Muslim organisations and lack of funding • The availability of the abandoned former pre-school on the block • The ‘message’ of the Dawah Project • Christianity and capitalism corrupting influences on Indigenous people 4.6 Thematic analysis The reparative nature of Islamic practice

The interview participants considered Islam is a liberating force for

the most oppressed and claim historical and contemporary forces of control

and power will be replaced by a liberating Islam demonstrated by example

and by Koori’s themselves. ‘Liberating force’ could be understood as

restoring or healing individuals and communities. There are deep

underlying social issues influencing the need for this speaker to associate

‘his people’ with a liberating force which is Islam. W.D. Fard (Muhammad)

in July 1930 in Detroit began his mission to empower African Americans,

telling people he was an Arab from Mecca sent by God to redeem his

chosen people (C. Eric Lincoln cited in Karim, 2005). Indigenous

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Australians have resisted the imperial expansion of European invaders, and

the message of Rajab is a liberating discourse expounded in a similar

fashion to W.D. Fard. W.D. Muhammad remarked about his father’s

teacher: “He came in the heart of the African American ghetto, peddling

fabric, and he would tell African Americans ‘You were not always what you

are now. You came from the Muslim land. Your people were Muslim.’” The

similarity to Fard’s message is apparent Rajab’s claim of returning his

community back to the people from the drug dealers through the message

of Islam.

The religious conversion aspect of an Indigenous alliance with Islam

reaches beyond an individual seeking religious change, and expands into a

collective recognition that Islam would be beneficial to many Indigenous

people. Individuality in the Western sense is inconceivable within Islam.

This is because an absolutely transcendental God leave no room at all for

the individual. The individual acquires from God whatever appearance of

individuality she might have, but has no autonomy, in sharp contrast to the

Western notion. The entire edifice of individual rights derived from the

natural state of the individual through a secular or ethical or political theory

is alien to the structure of Islamic reasoning. The individual has a reality,

but this is contingent upon a greater reality. Moreover, the backlash

expressed through the increasing religiosity of Muslim societies and the rise

of political Islam is reflected in the experiences of some Indigenous

Australian Muslims. This perception is no doubt influenced by the pain and

suffering acknowledged within many Indigenous communities, the

underlying issues of which have contributed in a broad sense to the decay

of Islamic and Indigenous civilisations. The division of Indigenous societies

into Western-defined political compartments is similar to the division of the

Muslim world into nation-states, republics and monarchies, democracies

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and autocracies. Just as it is too late to consider Islam regrouping as a

single empire or super-state inspired by religion it is unrealistic to entertain

an Indigenous state within the Australian nation. To some, both Islam and

Indigenous societies have lost their way, yet the message inherent in the

participants’ comments is that a re-empowered Islam sits very comfortably

with re-empowered Indigenous societies.

Siding with the oppressor along with their unwelcome social

attributes detracts from establishing relationships with Indigenous people,

even when the oppressors are other Muslims. There is a resistance to

accepting any theology or doctrine which has aligned, or is aligning with the

forces of oppression. The forces of oppression are the structural remnants

of colonisation and dominant forms of political control in contemporary

Australian society. In effect, Australian society has lost its soul and the

corrupting effects of alcohol and drugs are involving other Muslims in

criminal activity. [Some Lebanese Muslims are seen as aligning with the

oppressor] In Indigenous memory this is as an anti-colonial critique in the

broadest sense, and these feelings have been internalized over

generations and manifest as collective cultural trauma. The example

employed by Rajab is that of invading another country and disregarding the

established social norms of that country. This indicates recognition of wider

global forces and indicates the sensitivity felt by Indigenous Australians

regarding unequal relations of power.

Islam is posed as an ideal for Indigenous Australians yet it is offset

in the knowledge that Islam is also corrupting Redfern via the Lebanese

drug dealers and pushers. The oppressors (Muslims) are a bad example

both in historical terms and in the present – a history of Islamic oppression

due to corrupted versions of Islam. The other Muslims are identified as

Lebanese drug dealers and the Aborigines of Redfern identify them with

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Islam. It is not claimed that all the drug-sellers in the Redfern area are

Lebanese Muslims; in fact some are Aborigines as we discovered later in

the interview. Yet the link between Lebanese prison inmates, and

Lebanese contact with Redfern residents is established. The main insights

to emerge at this point are an Indigenous empathetic understanding of how

power relations condition the Indigenous Muslim relationship to Islam in

terms of its potential to liberate. On the other hand, the deleterious aspects

of drugs within the Redfern Indigenous community are associated with an

inferior form of Islam inherent in the actions of Lebanese drug-dealers.

Effectively, these Muslims have lost their way and the true essence of

Islam, and the individual responsibility for dedicating one’s life to the

foundation of the religion is lacking. Only living in harmony within the

community, mutual respect and modesty, staying in touch with one’s

environment and actively seeking knowledge that will lead to a closer

relationship with God will raise Islam to the status it once was.

Rajab’s experience in jail has formed his opinion that some

Lebanese preach corrupted and/or ill-informed version of Islamic principles.

Rajab thinks the Lebanese are ‘runners’ but they are running from the

same oppressor as the Aborigines are. The Lebanese also seem to Rajab

as having developed an attitude largely free of an Islamic guiding

framework partly due to being in secular Australian society. This can be

understood as these Muslims having missed the most important ingredient

of the spiritual dimension of Islam (tasawwuf). However, the resultant

behaviour is seen as exploitative and un-Islamic, and demonstrates Rajab’s

animosity towards these Lebanese. This attitude is also reflected in the

Redfern Indigenous community who recognised the drug-dealers as

Muslims. This ethno-religious tension is also recognised from a Lebanese

perspective. Bilal, a Lebanese bookshop proprietor in Lakemba formed the

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impression that Rajab and some other Indigenous Muslims did not blend all

that well into the Lebanese community of Lakemba. The reason given was

that some Indigenous Muslims “were out to get all they could” from the

Lebanese community without contributing anything back. The relationship

between Lebanese Muslims and Indigenous Muslims therefore appears to

maintain a tension based on Islamic principles of mutual obligation to

community. The lesser complaint raised by Bilal was that of a certain

ignorance of Islamic protocol when communicating with other Muslims. Yet

the tension also demonstrates how the power of Islam can unite the

Aborigines of Redfern to resist what they perceive as being bad for their

community (“They (the Lebanese) say that I’m a reactionary Muslim – I say

that you’re not even a Muslim”).

Cultural colonisation and identity

This theme is based on the question: Does Islam colonise

Indigenous culture, and if so, to what extent is indigenous culture lost to

Islam?

It is claimed by many of the indigenous Muslim participants that

Aborigines were always Muslim and that Islam is re-emerging as a belief

and practice. There is a revolutionary aspect or dimension about this new

emergence and it is part of the essence of being Aboriginal. “You can be

drunk and you can be on drugs or you can be killing your wife or in prison –

and you can be an exploiter, or you can join Islam and become a liberator”.

The long-term connection with Islam is also reinvested with a revolutionary

framework. This indicates willingness and a desire to invest in Islam

because it has no exploitative history. Rather it has a re-generational

aspect both in its long association with indigenous Australians and for

religio-cultural renewal.

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The Gamilaroi people of Moree are the single biggest genetic group

of Islamic descendents. How this ‘recognition’ came about is of interest and

is worthy of further investigation. One possibility is that Moree was

associated with the Freedom Ride of the sixties as part of the Aboriginal

resistance struggle. Another is found in the comment at question and reply

number 9. “[W]hen the Christian missionaries came to steal their children

the Muslims defended them and not only did they defend ‘em Moree people

can bear witness that their graves are in the cemeteries - they died

defending people for the sake of God”.

This response seems to implicate a more distinct lineage to ‘original

black Muslims’ despite the Islamic belief all people are born Muslim. The

response also indicates genetic and religious dimensions. There is also a

recognised similarity in the transcendental nature of Islam and Aboriginal

creation. Clearly this framework is more easily accepted than an imposed

Christian religiousity, at least for the Indigenous Muslims. Again, the claim

that many ‘weak’ Muslims have come to Australia requires a need to re-

invigorate sound Islamic teaching in this country.

The respondent claims a politicised and sectionalized Islam in

recent times, with gained cultural influences is present in Australia. (In fact

this could apply to many countries). Islam is not new to Aboriginal people.

The importance of an Islamic resurgence to elevate people from the

mundane things in life is apparent in this speaker. This is punctuated by a

form of Islamic practice and belief recognised by pious Muslims as an

‘authentic Islam’ – a form with resurgent and empowering properties, and

quite different from the stereotyped conservative forms of Islam such as

Wahhabism.

The Indigenous Muslims promote an anti-alcohol and anti-drug

message which is directly related to what is happening at Redfern. Islam is

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the message, and Indigenous Muslims are driving the improvement of their

own future attaching to an Islamic framework. This is indeed reaching out

through the Koori grapevine into regional areas and is readily accepted.

The networking ability of Indigenous Australians is congruent with Islamic

Dah’wah. On the other hand, Christianity’s link to colonialism and

imperialism by reference to it being spiritually dead, is rejected.

Non-Indigenous Muslims are thought of as not helping the

Aboriginal Muslims enough because they have lost their Islamic way. This

indicates a sound knowledge of Islamic values which embrace community-

building and communitarian values. Yet it should not be surprising

Indigenous people find a comfortable alliance with Islamic values. They are

quite similar to an Indigenous outlook in that, community-kinship and

sharing among relatives are the social glue holding many Indigenous

communities together.

The issues of the vices of modern secular western democracies are

contrasted with the sober and conservative aspects of Islamic practice. In

this case the speaker alludes to problems in society that Islam prohibits.

Yet this raises an interesting issue. The more oppressed a group is, the

more they are likely to accept a guiding framework with firm social

boundaries. On the other hand, the more a group in society experiences

freedoms associated with the west, the less they feel the need to embrace

old or traditional forms of social organisation. For example, new secular

social movements are replacing traditional religious frameworks, while

Islamic orthodoxy is experiencing resurgence in some Muslim-majority

countries. These are both national and global tensions, mutually

reinforcing, and inseparable from the process of cultural and religious

globalisation.

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Islam is seen as a ‘cure-all’ for the problems experienced by

Indigenous Australians while ‘Christianity’ is blamed for those ills.

Christianity ‘stole’ the children, while Islam literally defended Indigenous

people against the wrongs associated with Christianity. This claim may

appear as a relatively un-nuanced position to take yet understandable

given the individual and collective conscious histories of Indigenous

Australians. Nevertheless, Rajab does not attribute all Indigenous problems

to the conventional underlying social issues. “I’m not saying society

propelled me and basically it’s not just a matter of generation after

generation of genocide cultural destruction, racism, lack of employment,

hostility to Indigenous people, exclusion from the mainstream population,

no jobs no education and basically no future”. This is perhaps because

Islam is immediately available as an antidote, thus mediating the pain of

alienation and disadvantage in tangible ways. Islam defends the oppressed

and at the lowest point of Rajab’s prison career in solitary confinement (“I

was like the lowest form of animal I was locked in a cell – they didn’t give

me a toilet they never fed me I was like an animal”), he seized the chance

to gain knowledge of Islam by reading Malcolm X and Ahmed Deedat.

This example of ‘crisis-driven’ acceptance that life-changes are

indeed required for psychological survival in the harsh isolating conditions

of prison is sometimes the trigger for beginning the religious conversion

process. In fact, many people search for deeper meaning during or after a

personal crisis.

Militancy is an attribute of Moree Aborigines according to Rajab.

This is possibly directly related to first-hand experiences of oppression,

exclusion, and poverty suffered on their country. The double experience of

historical Islamic recognition and hostility to the symbolic forces

representing their oppression is manifested in strong and sustained

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militancy and activism. The living memory of Islam coupled with

oppression-related resistance and militancy is potentially a sound basis for

a successful Islamic transition.

The social formation of the Koori Muslim Association is such that

the patriarchal nature of the group emerges. The important issue of identity

is raised in that the combination of Indigenous and Islamic does not fit the

general stereotype of either group. Yet the stereotype is seen as negative

because of the Islamic association and it places a huge burden on the

Indigenous Muslims to counter the negativity surrounding Indigenous

behaviour. This is a very responsible outlook considering the bad publicity

attached to Redfern Aborigines. To uphold an Islamic ideal as an example

to Block residents and other Aborigines demonstrates the empowering

social potential of Islam in this context. This form of Islamic practice is

qualitatively different to media images and political portrayals of indigenous

community life. The anti-Christian crusade continues however, and is used

as a motivating force to overturn and expunge the perceptions and effects

attributed to Christianity and its associated imperial and colonial trappings.

Rajab is in theological disagreement regarding Christians being

people of the book and it touches on an established disagreement between

Muslims and Christians. This is an argument best left alone in the context

of this study but the comment that “Aboriginal people have more in

common with Islam than Christianity because Christianity says that a man

is God” is notable. From the perspective of the respondent, an Islamic

theology is removed from the ‘man-God’ argument. The response to the

question does however, demonstrate a theological and socio-political

tension between Islam and Christianity in the context of Indigenous

alignment. It is perhaps no coincidence that the work of Ahmed Deedat

(2002) critiques the distortions Christian missionaries attributed to Islam

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during the British subjugation and rule of India. It is the technique of

Deedat’s debate and da’wah style, rather than the actual content of the

message that is of interest here. Rocky appears to have developed and

adopted a similar strategy in his method of da’wah. The passages of

comment about Christianity are evidence of this similarity. Rocky is

practicing Islam by way of defending the faith against other religions. He

has taken on the role of leader within the Koori Muslim Association and is

referred to as ‘Sheikh’ reflecting the status and knowledge associated with

that title.

The belief that Muhammad came for all mankind is a more inclusive

framework which appears to better suit an Indigenous world-view. The

resistance exhibited in the above reply indicates a firm polarization within

the theology and doctrines of Islam and Christianity. It is seemingly an

attempt to discount all aspects of Christianity as a legitimate religion for

Indigenous people to practice. Although many Muslims agree the Holy

Trinity is incompatible with an Islamic theology, Indigenous Muslims and

many new Islamic converts who have converted from a Christian faith are

more inclined to stress this fundamental difference to support their

conversion to Islam. Evidence for this claim can be found in the responses

in the preliminary study of converts to Islam.

The issue of Indigenous identity is raised in this response and a

strong lack of indigenous identity emerges. The implication is that Islam is

an original attribute of Indigenous identity and that Christianity helped to

eradicate Indigenous identity. The Redfern drug problem is raised in the

context of Indigenous identity. The stereotypical ‘drunken or drug-taking

Aborigine’ is the dominant identifying feature. This is again associated with

Christianity and the negative aspects of colonial oppression. Islam is

framed as the religion for the oppressed. It is possible this interpretation is

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reinforced through the readings of Malcolm X, the work of the Nation of

Islam, and the Black Panther movement in the United States. In those

social movements Islamic practice and belief was appropriated by African

Americans to drive resistance movements and black activism.

The Indigenous way of understanding where people come from –

‘what is their country’? The anti-Christian critique remains in the form of

violence which is contrasted to the non-violence of Islam. “[W]e had the

majesty that was Islam that’s all we had.” The actions of ‘Christians’ were

done in the name of God, but if that god was “compassionate and merciful

he would never forgive you for the crimes you committed against my

people.” Rightly or wrongly, there is an underlying blaming mentality

associated with Christianity. And this is carried on to current political

circumstances where the war on terror is construed as propaganda. This

taps into the traumatic events of the past and forms a strong defence for

Islam as the liberating force.

(The concept of collective cultural trauma is discussed in a later

chapter. It is hypothesized that underlying trauma influences and

strengthens the desire of many Indigenous people to maintain their

resistance against the historical dominant forces of oppression which

continue to this day.)

We want to see Redfern as a drug free community but only drug

users are arrested – not the drug dealers. The Indigenous Muslims are the

front line in the fight against drugs in Redfern in recognition that the

damage has reached crisis point. “Through Islam we’ve accepted the

principles of social justice and solidarity and humanity.” This group of

Indigenous Muslims have taken the responsibility to right the wrongs of

their communities based on Islamic principles. This is extended to a

national level in the statement: “Basically it is our hope and our will if God

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wills, that all our people become Muslim and the fact that some people in

the government say that there’ll never be an Islamic state – that’s very

debatable because if the people, the Indigenous people of Australia ever

get any sovereignty – and we’re Muslim, obviously we will follow Islamic

principles and we’ll follow Islamic law.” This comment could be construed

by some as supporting a sharia-based Indigenous state. It also

demonstrates the extent to which Indigenous Muslims are prepared to

accept Islamic values as a correction to past and current injustices.

The freedom for Indigenous people to choose or not to choose

Islam is contrasted with the forced imposition of Christianity. The freedom

to choose Islam is supported by emphasizing its benefits, and this is done

in the jail as well as in Redfern and other communities. The jail however, is

where conflicting messages of Islamic propagation occur. As mentioned

above at question 4, certain Lebanese inmates espouse a corrupted

version of Islam, and the connection between Lebanese drug dealers in

Redfern is also relevant. The Indigenous Muslims have set themselves a

difficult task of countering the negative religious and social behaviors of

those abusing Islam. Yet this project is supported in the knowledge that:

“When you’re Muslim you’ve redeemed you’re resurrected – you don’t have

to follow it – or you don’t even have to accept it, but when you do it seems

to me that in many cases they make the best Muslims.”

The Redfern Da’wah Project

Redfern in general, and the Koori Muslim Association in particular,

serves as a collection and meeting point for various Indigenous activities.

Redfern is a strategic political and social hub for information distribution

and community care. A Koori grapevine is where we’re all related or we’re

culturally linked. Know throughout Australia as the central hub of

Indigenous activity. Whitlam era history now different yet the strength,

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resilience and vision of Indigenous communities determined to move

towards a better future despite having endured tremendous suffering at the

hands of historical forces and entrenched racism.

The drug trade and the koori grapevine used as a conduit supply

heroin but Islam can potentially reverse the damage if taken up. “Islam is

the spiritual truth to our redemption.” The link is again made with

Christianity. The anti-Christian critique is perhaps a simplistic form of

symbolic resistance against all the other attributes of colonial and modern

forms of Indigenous control.

It is claimed by Rajab that by using the koori grapevine to spread

Islam in the same way the drug trade has distributed heroin the message

will extend to other Indigenous communities, yet the decay of Redfern is

allowing drugs to dominate. Why has Redfern degenerated in this way,

particularly since it is in such a strategic location? The drugs would not

likely to have been such a problem in a functional well-regulated socially

cohesive community. Is this something specific to other Indigenous

communities and if so what are the social determinants contributing to the

breakdown of societies? What social changes are occurring that contribute

to the breakdown of Indigenous societies? Is Redfern any different to other

urban communities such as Kempsey for example? Poor socio-economic

conditions, social isolation, racism, negative political and media

interference, poor education, poor health and youth aimlessness all

contribute to feelings of alienation, and hopelessness. These conditions

foster alcohol and drug abuse including petrol sniffing and other variations

of illicit drug and substance abuse. These societies have reached crisis

point as do individuals when they recognise drastic life changes are

essential for survival. Rocky sees the redemptive power in Islam to bring

his communities back from the brink of destruction.

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“Dissention and negativity, and disunity, have uprooted our

Aboriginal allegiances and solidarity and people can come in and - there’s

no real power within Redfern. We have within our society now a very weak

constitution and very weak morals and very weak disregard for elders”.

Why has this happened? Is it an individual issue or a social problem? The

socio-economic issues discussed in the above analysis are the underlying

issues. No one single factor is responsible, yet the unresolved issues of the

past combined with changing societies have formed entrenched barriers

and problems. Despite these conditions, there is optimism that Islam has

the power to help restore these communities.

Heroin is the main problem for the Block Aborigines and it attracts

other junkies into the area. This problem did not exist previously but

Aboriginal drug dealers are driven by “greed and lust and violence and

exploitation.” The message of Islam is unity and solidarity and brotherhood,

and black defiance. The power of Islam is in its proven track record in the

U.S. Ever since Black Americans embraced Islam – even when it was a

corrupted version such as found in the nation of Islam – the religion

supported the foundation for self-respect and community-building, and a

platform for resistance politics and activism.

Rajab claims inexperienced police act on stereotypes which could

be reframed as institutional racism. Police are considered scapegoats

because they are only doing what most police do under these

circumstances, which is to deal with the immediate presenting issue which

is the drug users, not the pushers and dealers. This is a problem of

government not the police yet claims of police corruption complicate the

issue somewhat. Could the police solve the drug problem if the same thing

was happening anywhere else? What would be different? The issue here

is the continuing control and surveillance of Indigenous communities. The

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police presence at Redfern has always been disproportionate and in earlier

times created considerable tensions. Now the claim might be ‘selective

policing’ which is open to accusations of abuse of police powers.

If drugs are being dealt openly why is there no apparent control? A

possibility is that a blind eye is being turned for institutional and political

reasons as claimed by Rajab. No evidence is provided to support this claim

yet there is considerable redevelopment pressure because of the problems

associated with the Block. Yet the issue of Indigenous autonomy remains in

the balance because of the location of the strategic position Block. It is a

very valuable piece of real estate and developers are keen to move in but

the land is owned by the Aboriginal Housing Corporation. How has the

problem been allowed to continue without any real evidence of

improvement? One answer might be the decades of neglect in terms of

employment opportunities, poor standard of housing, large number of

transient people staying with friends and family. As noted by the

interviewees, Indigenous community problems are not limited to the Block.

For example, the Alice Springs town camps in the Northern Territory have

many of the problems associated with the Block.

Muslims are also selling drugs in Redfern and Lakemba making the

Islamic connection. The tension is between Muslims who sell drugs, and

Muslims who want to reform society. Caught in the middle are ordinary

Indigenous people who are witnessing the hypocrisy of Muslims associated

with drugs when other Muslims are trying to prevent it.

Eighty per cent of Indigenous people incarcerated in NSW prisons

are Muslim and 22 per cent of the prison population are Indigenous

Australians. Rajab claims he was the first to convert to Islam in prison and

instigated other conversions. The issue of prison Islam is relevant here

because this is where Islam takes divergent paths. It can either be

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reformative and beneficial, or radical and destructive. A later chapter will

discuss this tension in more detail.

The prison environment of gangs, drugs and violence has

contributed to a corrupted version of Islam propagated by some Lebanese.

This is termed prison Islam or ‘prislam’ in overseas literature. This

highlights the need for the preaching and practice of moderate Islam in

prison yet the question of why Islam is so problematic in prison remains for

prison inmates and authorities. The difficulty with authorities not

understanding the difference between strands of Islam is coupled to

negative attitudes to Islam in general. In terms of this research the

‘department’ denied access to investigate this matter.

The issue of maintaining control within the prison system is the aim

of prison authorities. Certain groups cause more trouble than others, and

Islamic radicalism is seen as a serious problem at the levels of prison

management and state politics. The problem exists in the case of in-prison

conversions by inmates versed only with minor knowledge espousing a ‘cut

and paste’ version of Islam. The other area of concern is those Muslims

who have been recently convicted or are on remand and are placed in with

the general prison population. Those charged with terrorism-related

offences are usually isolated in high security wings. The High Risk

Management Unit (HRMU) within Goulburn prison is the main location for

containing these prisoners.

Only moderate Islam, it is claimed, can help reconstruct individuals

and communities but there is a constant tension between opposing

theologies within and outside of prison. The difficulty is in allowing the ‘right’

message to emerge. What prevents this from happening? Prison

management, political interference, media pressure, and fear of Islam

(moral panics) all contribute to a negative view of Islamic practice within

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prison. Any form of Islamic practice in prison is heavily supervised and

treated with suspicion. It would be much easier for prison management to

deny Islamic worship all together, or combine it with the less controversial

Christian faiths. Discretion cannot even be delegated to Muslim prison

chaplains because there have been problems employing the right

candidates. The supply of Islamic material is limited for the same reason –

the fear of radicalising material being allowed to circulate. The fear of

radicalisation of Muslim prisoners does not just apply to threats of terrorism,

but in the case of Indigenous Muslims, the fear that militancy and political

activism will unite under the banner of Islam. This has been alluded to in a

previous reply.

Staying drug free in prison is difficult because of peer pressure and

the general oppressive conditions. Rajab did not engage in drug use within

prison but many other Indigenous inmates succumbed to heroin. Is this

because Rajab was influence by orthodox Islamic principles? How did

Malcolm X influence him? Why and how was Rajab able to survive in

prison? Was it due to his status and ability to defend himself? The answers

to these questions are complex and multifaceted yet there is little doubt that

Rajab and other Indigenous Muslims have internalised a durable and

robust ability to address their own and their community’s problems

Within the prison, Indigenous gangs once asserted authority but

were gradually undermined by drugs. There was a need to restructure a

defence and this was done by attaching to Islam within and outside of

prison. Rajab had the vision and conviction to espouse Islam as an antidote

to the problems experienced in prison and mainstream society. Effectively

this was a reaction to prison violence and to mainstream racism. One of the

aims was to restore the power balance and this would be achieved by

adhering to Islamic values and belief. Islam in this context is associated

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with spiritual power, rather than physical force, which adds an empowering

dimension within the difficult circumstances of prison confinement.

There was a perceived need for an Indigenous force within prison to

exact pay-back and assert dominance. Unfortunately, this is the way of life

within prison. The constantly shifting positions of power and dominance

within the prisoner population is divided by ethnicity and types of offences

committed. Physical and psychological survival are driving forces for

forming alliances and attaining gang membership status.

An Indigenous Muslim drop-in centre

Providing a halfway house for people coming out of jail based on

Islamic principles is core aim for Rajab. Islam is a rehabilitative process,

“so when they come here, I’ve given them accommodation, they have a

shower, they can go to the gym, I’ve got ‘em employment.” Other Muslims

are criticised for not helping with materials and finance. It is vitally important

to keep the centre viable, and appeals to the wider Muslim community fall

on deaf ears. This raises two important issues. First is the need for more

support for Indigenous prison releasees. The second is to gain wide-spread

Islamic community support for rehabilitative facilities based on Islamic

principles.

The Koori Muslim Association in Redfern would appear to be a

model organisation attracting the support of the wider Islamic community.

The fact that it found financial assistance difficult to achieve again raises

the issue of Islamic priorities regarding Indigenous involvement with Islam

within and out of prison. This in turn points to the potential for Islamic

politicisation or radicalisation. The reluctance to approach state and federal

governments for funding is understandable given the level of suspicion

directed towards Islam. Furthermore, the autonomy of the organisation

would likely be compromised due to the conditional nature of the funding if

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it was made available. However, support for an Islamic presence in jails is

noted by a “governor from Ivanhoe prison [who] told me that she wanted

Aboriginal men to stop getting’ dirty urines from marijuana – I said well let

me tell them about Islam.” This is an acknowledgement that an Indigenous-

focussed rehabilitative process based on Islamic principles is accepted by

some prison authorities. The [governor] “can’t understand why people are

hostile to Muslims because she watched their gradual change.” The

question remains as to why this would not work in the larger metropolitan

prisons.

Community funding and the Block

The Elouera Tony Mundine gymnasium on the corner of Everleigh

and Vine Streets Redfern is successful in providing recreational facilities

including circuit classes, yoga and dance as well as the main focus of

boxing. The gym is open to everyone and not just Indigenous people. This

is why government funding ceased in 2004. According to Alex Tui, the gym

manager “We have people who come up, they might be drug users or they

might be alcoholics, but they come up to the gym because they remember

this was a place where they found some kind of energy that was good for

them.” The difference between the Mundine gym and the Koori Muslim

Association is that the gym is open to one and all and focuses on physical

aspects of recreation but specialises in boxing training. The Koori Muslim

Association on the other hand aims to provide assistance underpinned by

Islamic principles.

The theme of Islam as a religion of the oppressed and Christianity

as a religion of the oppressor continues throughout the interview. In so

doing, the claim that Islam is reparative and empowering is also argued, yet

the form of Islam espoused by some Lebanese prisoners is disparaged. In

Islam Indigenous people have knowledge that only the heart sees, and

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“through oppression and colonisation and dispossession and genocide

we’ve become unbelievably resilient and receptive and perceptive. Islam is

perfect and pure and the Qur’an remained intact for all mankind. Allah

perfected it. So the Muslims have no excuse for not giving the spiritual

medicine of Islam. Indigenous Muslims have to administer the word of

Islam because other Muslims have become sick also. There are brothers in

prison now – Koori Muslims – that refuse to eat meat that’s not halal. The

Lebanese tell them that’s halal because they said Bismallah – they made

halal what Allah made haram.”

The Koori Muslim Association holds a free BBQ every year on

Invasion Day for the people of Redfern. This is so they can experience

Islam instead of being told about Islam - we’re showing them about Islam.

And the fact that they see us praying, they know it’s Islamic. The fact that

we give food, that’s Islamic. So we don’t have to tell them one thing about

Islam, we show them Islam. So now it is the other Muslims’ opportunity to

assist us. Again, these comments reinforce the reparative power of Islam in

the Redfern community. Rajab, however, wants to take the Islamic

message to other Indigenous communities. “To go to Moree and Boggabilla

and North Coast and Goulburn prison and Lithgow prison we need a

vehicle. We ask the Muslims in general for assistance, but not only that

you’ll assist yourself, by, helpin’ us assist the non-Muslims to bringin’ them

to Islam, and the basic fundamental principle of Islam is Da’wah”. Da’wah,

according to Rajab, does not mean “going from mosque to mosque, it

means going into the heartland of a hostile country to Muslims. But in the

case of other Indigenous people they’re not hostile to us. They’re hostile to

Muslims and they tell me they don’t like Muslims, for good reason, but they

like Koori Muslims because we’re them and they’re us.” Rajab and others

are appealing for financial and material assistance based on Islamic

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principles. “We consider ourselves revolutionary Islamic farmers, where we

plant the seed of Islam, the idea of Islam in someone’s head by our

principles and our conduct, we plant that seed but we don’t just leave that

seed to whither and die we water that seed. Now how we water that seed is

we take people food, we pray, we look after their children and we do the

things that people can’t do.”

The theme is one of propagating Islam for the betterment of

Indigenous communities. The main goal is to propagate and defend Islam,

and the fact that 60 per cent of Indigenous Australians are Christian is not a

deterrent. The people that Rajab speaks with “don’t like Christianity”, and

“when I tell them about Islamic, Islamic law, and Islamic principles, they are

so receptive to it.” Yet the message has to be taken to the people and

demonstrated how Islam can bring about changed conditions and individual

spiritual renewal. Rajab claims the communities of Moree Boggabilla,

Walgett and Mungindi “are really begging literally for us to come – now the

Muslims say, well what can we do”? A functional working building and

transport, plus financial and moral support from Islamic organisations and

other Muslims is what is required.

4.7 Theme summary 1. Issues concerning Indigenous Muslims specifically related to religious conversion a) the prison experience • Receptiveness to Islam while incarcerated (crisis-driven situational

opportunity ) • Influence by Lebanese inmates (Arab culturalist expression and

radicalisation) (opportunism and exploitation ) • The impression (public and govt) of militancy attached to criminality and

Islam (community and political prejudice )

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• What or who is resisting Islamic chaplaincy in NSW prisons (administrative and managerial power )

• Influence by Rajab and other prison chaplains (positive agency ) • Prison politics and regulations regarding who acts as chaplain

(administrative and managerial power ) • The role of AFIC in determining Muslim Chaplaincy (control, politics &

theology ) • Underlying sociocultural issues explaining extent of Koori incarceration

(ineffective government and community policies ) • Degree of lower Koori recidivism and social rehabilitation due to

accepting Islam (reparative ) 2. Issues concerning Islamic propagation within the Redfern community and in other Indigenous communities in NSW b) Koori reversion other than from within the criminal justice system Redfern Aboriginal Da’wah Project • Koori alignment with Islam seen as complementary (to an Indigenous

world-view) (Malcolm X example) • Liberation politics – the ‘right path’ of Islam (no drugs etc.) (reparative ) • Example by demonstration of practice – visible benefits to all

(demonstrable ) • What is said is what is felt – this is how the disadvantaged feel

(debilitating experience/self-concept ) • The Block as the Koori grapevine – central hub of information network

to other communities (nucleus of communication ) • Reclaiming the block from drug dealers and returning it to the

community via Islam (reparative ) • Re-establishing the block as a strong viable Koori community and halt

the social decay (reparative ) • Addressing the ‘policing’ of the block in terms of arresting dealers rather

than users (police corruption?) (law and order ) • The importance of a Redfern-based drop-in centre/halfway house for

Aboriginal for Muslims on parole and drug-affected community members etc. (reparative )

• Assessing the role of the Aboriginal Housing Company (development

pressure )

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• Addressing the ethnic and cultural sensitivities associated with Redfern

Koori’s (overcoming suspicion within the community of ‘helping agendas’) (discrimination )

• Islam as the core spiritual opportunity for authentic Koori resurgence

and empowerment (reparative ) • Material and financial obstacles (gaining sponsorship funding, physical

infrastructure etc.) (fundraising/support ) • The ‘message’ of the Da’wah Project (Islamic principles ) • Christianity and capitalism corrupting influences on Indigenous people

(the imperialism of the Christian West) (marginalisation/dispossession )

One dominating theme is the reparative nature of Islamic practice for those

suffering the effects of historical and contemporary disadvantage.

4.8 Discussion Through daily exposure to a threatening environment, where signs

of disorder are common, community members begin to accept that other

people cannot be trusted (Ross et al., 2001). Communities with high levels

of disorder present residents with observable signs and cues that social

control is weak (Skogan, 1986; 1990). In these communities residents

report noise, litter, crime, vandalism, graffiti, people hanging out on the

streets, public drinking, run-down and abandoned buildings, drug use,

danger, trouble with neighbours and other incivilities associated with a

breakdown of social control. These social and community activities and

conditions are emblematic of some Indigenous communities.

Community or neighbourhood disadvantage is associated with

mistrust because of the disorder common in these areas. Residents of

disadvantaged neighbourhoods have significantly lower levels of trust

because those communities often have high levels of disorder (Ross et al.,

2001).

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Indigenous community disorder identified by the participants

reinforces a sense of powerlessness that makes the effect of disorder on

distrust even worse. Perceived powerlessness is the sense that one’s own

life is shaped by forces outside ones control. The opposite is the sense of

personal control which is the belief in the mastery and control to shape your

own life. Exposure to uncontrollable, negative events and conditions either

in the neighbourhood, or stemming from deep-seated historical damage,

promote and reinforce perceptions of powerlessness. In communities

where social order has broken down, residents often feel powerless to

achieve a goal most people desire – to live in a clean, safe environment

free from threat, harassment and danger (Gies and Ross, 1998).

Individuals who feel powerless may feel unable to fend off attempts

at exploitation, unable to distinguish dangerous persons and situations from

benign ones, and unable to recover from mistaken complacency. In

contrast, those with a sense of personal control may feel they can avoid

victimisation and harm and effectively cope with any consequences of

errors in judgement. Thus mistrust emerges in disadvantaged communities

with high levels of disorder, among individuals with few resources who feel

powerless to avoid harm (Ross, Mirowsky and Pribesh, 2001). Community

disorder destroys the sense of control that would otherwise insulate

residents from the consequences of disorder. Thus, the very thing needed

to protect disadvantaged residents from the negative effects of their

environment – a sense of personal control – is eroded by that environment.

This is an instance of what is named structural amplification (Ross et al.,

2001). Structural amplification exists when conditions undermine the

personal attributes that otherwise would moderate their undesirable

consequences. The situation erodes resistance to its own ill effect. More

generally, it exists when a mediator of the association between an objective

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condition and a subjective belief or feeling also amplifies the association.

The mediator of an undesirable effect is also a magnifier of that effect

(Ross et al., 2001). However, structural amplification may also work in the

reverse order. If the association between community disorder and mistrust

is mediated and moderated by a sense of powerlessness, then an

empowering mediator has the potential to restore community trust and

disorder.

How are the themes connected? Islamic practice and belief has the potential to restore individuals

and communities. In the case of the Indigenous Muslim participants this

can be achieved by eliminating alcohol, drugs, and violence. Although this

would not address the underlying socio-economic conditions such as

employment and education, nor health and general well-being, Islamic

practice and belief has the ability to restore trust. Firstly the concept of trust

is elevated to a spiritual dimension where the most important trust in Islam

is believing in God because it is impossible to become a Muslim without

believing in God. This has the effect of delegating trust to a higher being.

Moreover, Islam is also a source for political mobilisation and skills,

practices, and values which could be considered social capital. The nature

of political and religious trust is that it is both a source of social cohesion

and a potential source of conflict between other groups in society (Jelen

and Kuenzi, 2005). This is a significant problem for Islam given its negative

media and political coverage over the past decade. This also raises the

difficulty for those who wish to promote Islamic practice and belief as a

social good. Yet Rajab in particular has managed to impart the positive role

of Islam within other Indigenous communities.

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How do the themes relate to Indigenous conversions? There are potential benefits once converted. The conditions many

Indigenous people face are the same conditions influencing the motivation

to convert to Islam. The Islamic world-view is the liberating force by raising

Indigenous individual and community self-respect. Islam creates a sense of

normalcy where daily routine is organised around spiritual and practical

activities. Belonging to the world-wide brotherhood of Muslims makes

adherents feel accepted and part of the group. If enough community

members adhere to the same or similar principles it is reasonable to

assume a whole-of-community change will occur. Rajab notes on more

than one occasion in the interviews that his people are receptive to Islam.

They are receptive to Islam because Islam represents a better future. Even

if the representation is idealised or imagined, it still carries a powerful

message of potential empowerment. Islam is a socio-politico-religious

system that challenges Western societies and governments as well as

other religions. The conditioned mistrust of many Indigenous people of

governments and their policies, combined with the legacies of historical

disadvantage, inequality, and dislocation are discussed in the next chapter.

This broadens the analysis to include the underlying conditions influencing

the conditions many Indigenous Australians find themselves in today.

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Indigenous Australians and Islam

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5.0 Theoretical and conceptual themes 5.1 Overview

The literature reviewed in this section critically examines

background and underlying macro social conceptual issues beginning with

colonisation and working through to issues associated with globalisation

and multiculturalism. The aim is to make connections between global and

local influences and provide a benchmark from which to better

understanding how Indigenous Australians and Muslims in Australia are

located in the social milieu. Specifically, the impacts of the evolving social,

cultural, and political influences since European invasion are critical in

examining the comparatively high Indigenous incarceration rates. The

continuing tensions between impressions of an increasing Muslim

population in Australia and conservatively held views of what constitutes

the ethno-religious make-up of Australian society remain as difficult social

and political debates. An examination of socio-historical underlying issues

also assists in clarifying how social and political change influences and is

influenced by the discursive functions of government policy.

Indigenous Australians have historically been subjected to political,

cultural, and social control based predominantly on theories of white

superiority, paternalism, and government policy mismatches (Gilbert,

1977). Immigrants to this country have periodically been subjected to

selective entry conditions based around labour supply issues and racial

discrimination. These conditional circumstances have substantially

prescribed identity formation leading to somewhat polarised divisions in

society. This was most apparent during the nineteenth and early twentieth

century’s, as exemplified in the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 and other

acts regulating the movement of Indigenous Australians and non-Anglo

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immigrants and workers. (National Archive of Australia.

http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/item.asp?dID=16). The result was the

experience of unease with cultural difference, and general indifference to

the plight of Aborigines. The following analysis of the literature discusses

the relationships between the Anglo-Saxon majority, Indigenous

Australians, and non-white immigrants in the context of globalisation and

the changing political landscape. The chapter discusses the conceptual

orientations of the various sociological and socio-historical viewpoints.

5.2 An outline of global themes and influences The purpose of this section is threefold. The first is to contextualise

the current status of Indigenous well-being within a larger global context.

This will connect Indigenous resistance strategies and social movement

activism to those of African Americans as is the case with the Redfern

Indigenous converts to Islam. Secondly it will allow a socio-historical

analysis to emerge by examining how attitudes and government policies

have changed over time. Thirdly, it will account for how current economic

and political ideologies have contributed to the way Indigenous affairs

administration are managed. The aim is to provide a comprehensive

analysis of background influences impacting on current perceptions and

government policies concerning Indigenous Australians and Muslims

Australians.

The increasing rate of globalisation over the past three decades has

witnessed socio-political, cultural and religious change in terms of how

nation-states mange economies and populations. Although earlier British

Imperialism and colonialism fall into a globalisation framework, the rates of

economic and cultural flows around the globe have intensified (Robertson,

1992; Giddens, 1994). The recent rise of international terrorism is

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contextualised in relation to global geopolitical relations yet Indigenous

socio-economic disadvantage remains in the realm of state and federal

governments. The exceptions are United Nations pronouncements and

reports highlighting Australia’s negligence toward Indigenous Australians in

terms of socio-economic improvements. Indigenous activism maintains

pressure at a global level yet the Australian state argues for national

autonomy regarding its treatment of Indigenous Australians. Arguably,

there is a greater threat to the long-term well-being of Indigenous

Australians than the event of a terrorist attack in Australia. Yet cultural

globalisation has raised anxieties about national identity, and new popular

resistance movements are formed to contest a range of social issues.

Immigration has changed the make-up of Australian society from

predominantly Anglo-Celtic, to one of many ethnicities, nationalities,

cultures and religions. In today’s conditions the attribution of a single

ethnicity to one place, region or nation becomes difficult to sustain (Holmes,

Hughes and Julian, 2007: 477). However, many Indigenous Australians are

yet to fully realise the socio-economic benefits flowing to other Australians.

This major issue is the crux of the problem underpinning the focus of the

thesis, which is to investigate how and why rapid social change encourages

new alliances between oppressed and marginalised groups.

Within a globalisation context, the continuing spread of Islam

through immigration is a challenge to established notions of Australian

national identity. Yet an Islamic presence in Australia attracts little attention

except for claims that some ethnic groups are associated with criminal

activities. For example, recent media coverage has linked Lebanese youth

to criminal gangs, yet it is no coincidence that higher rates of Lebanese

offenders are found in NSW prisons (ABS, 2007b)

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5.2.1 Globalisation and fundamentalisms

Definitions of globalisation range from a “minimalist economism,

through broad political-economy, to an expansive and, at times,

undisciplined sociology. The problem of conceptual borders is a real one”

(Rudd, 2001: 18). Robertson narrows the conceptual focus by referring to

an objective intensification in global interactions and an emerging

consciousness of the world as a single place (Robertson, 1992: 6).

Furthermore, Quiggin (2001: 249) argues that:

[G]lobalisation is simply the international manifestation of the general shift towards market-oriented neoliberalism, and away from social-democratic intervention, which has taken place since the early 1970s. According to this view, the growth of unregulated international capital markets is closely intertwined with the shift to free-market domestic policies including privatisation, capital market deregulation and the abandonment of Keynesian macroeconomic management.

Economics has arguably become the dominant discourse in

debates about globalisation (Delanty, 2000: 87), although the “seriousness

of the consequences of economic globalisation for worldwide inequalities,

cultural globalisation is an important variant” (Pickering, 2001: 49). As an

economic theory, neoliberalism can be viewed as a selective reworking of

the tenets of classical political economy (Peters, 2001: 14). Neoliberalism

stresses the emphasis on individual rights as opposed to collective

representation. This ideological and political shift has serious implications

for marginalised groups and Indigenous Australians. Nonetheless,

neoliberalism preserves the central idea of classical economics that the

free market is an essential prerequisite for the free society. Invoking a

definition of freedom as individual freedom from state interference and

freedom for the market, the commitment to neoliberalism is predicated, by

definition, on a marked opposition to the idea of the welfare or protectionist

state (2001: 14 -15). Neoliberalism assumes that economic behaviour can

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be understood in terms of the human attributes of 'rationality, individuality,

and self-interest' (2001: vii).

However, neoliberalism also posits that all aspects of human social

behaviour are motivated by these very characteristics. A model in which

“the social is re-described in terms of the economic” (2001: 15),

neoliberalism operates as a theory of the social founded on a narrowly

economistic notion of human behaviour, which it deems identical to human

nature itself. The neoliberal redefinition of the social in terms of the

economic is primarily in terms of the language of quantifiability, calculability,

cost-benefit rationalisation and business management techniques

(Bourdieu, 1998a: 31) and as the 'scientific description of reality' (1998b:

94). Importantly, historically or socially-constituted logic or rationality is not

recognised by the neoliberal worldview as valid, with neoliberal discourse

embarking on a program of methodical destruction of collectives (l998h: 95-

6, original emphasis).

Neoliberalism is, hence, a political agenda predicated on a certain

vision of the social world; one that legitimates a certain scientistic view of

that world and deems as illegitimate opposing views about the world.

Neoliberalism is founded on a particular principle of vision, but, if one takes

its self-definition seriously, one must believe that it does not privilege any

one point of view but merely presents the truth about things as they are.

This is why Bourdieu terms neoliberalism as doxa: the self-definition and

presentation of neoliberalism as a self-evident truth about the human and

social, which is beyond question (Bourdieu, 1998a).

The negative effects of the establishment of neoliberalism as a

paradigm both for governance and for understanding the social are

experienced in a plethora of ways in different societies. From a global

perspective the state has begun to abdicate its role as a guarantor and

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protector of social benefits in the spheres of education, health and welfare

(Bourdieu, 1998a: 34). Increased working hours driven by competition

between states, economic insecurity affects not just the working class but a

middle class as well, with options for permanent jobs with benefits being

replaced by temporary and underpaid jobs (1998a: 37). According to the

tenets of conservative thought, individuals have to bear responsibility for

the situations in which they find themselves. Neoliberalism is an all-

pervasive paradigm and method for shaping habitus-producing structures

and Bourdieu posits that the state is the agency that grants the paradigm its

all-pervasiveness, through the economic, cultural, or social policies that it

advocates. Commentators who observe global forces agree that they affect

national governments, communities and individuals. Robertson (1990) and

Giddens (1990; 1991) consider subjectivity and culture as central factors in

the current acceleration of globalisation process.

The multi-causal or multidimensional aspect of the globalising

process leads to the claim that globalisation disenfranchises national

communities by compromising governments' ability to control domestic

economic, political and social conditions (Reich, 1992; Hall, 1992; Arnason,

1990; Hirst and Thompson, 1992). In reality, national governments strive for

more control by retracting previously established benefits in the name of

efficiency and rationalisation.

Globalisation breaks down the nexus between nation, state, societal

community and territory by the differentiating as well as homogenising

process. The issue at hand for Waters (1994) is; if due to the processes of

globalisation, the nation-state is dissolving, what happens to citizenship and

welfare rights and liberal democracy? On the other hand, the process of

globalisation offers possibilities such as “the revival of previously oppressed

nationalisms [and] genuine religious freedom based on genuine religious

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choice” (Waters, 1994: 234). Socially, increased population movements

and the rapidity of communication of information have been held

responsible for eroding established national identities, yet others who feel

economically disadvantaged and politically disenfranchised by globalisation

have migrated to escape their oppression (ibid.). For Australia, this has

meant an increase in Iraqi, Afghan, Palestinian, Lebanese, and Pakistani

immigrants, many of whom are Muslim.

At the global level, the varying kinds of interrelationships between

religion, culture and nationalism imply that the emerging new order will see

greater levels of ethnic and religious conflict (Cahill, 2003: 11). Yet religions

“have both moral and institutional assets that, if mobilised and equipped,

could provide uniquely important contributions to solving conflicts”

(Vendley, 1999: 1). At the local level of communities, religious institutions

have the potential to replace that which has been eroded by globalisation.

Traditional institutions promoting human welfare are under pressure to

cope with family breakdown, market inequality, and state bureaucratic

confusion. At another level the globalisation process increases the

tendency of social and cultural arrangements to recede and for people to

become increasingly aware that they are receding (Waters, 1995: 3). Two

areas where tensions occur are within religion and secularism, and

capitalism and economic equality.

Two of the most serious threats to modern Western democracies

are fundamentalisms; one of a religious nature and the other of an

economic character. In this context it is important to consider globalisation

and resurgent fundamentalisms because many nation states including

Australia have introduced public awareness campaigns to the dangers of

potential terrorism-related risks. The contemporary examples of al-Qa'ida

as a radical political offshoot of Islam; and the ubiquitous dominance of

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‘market fundamentalism’ exhibit the hallmarks of the effects of globalisation

and of reversions to fundamentalisms. Islamic fundamentalism is a term

commonly used to encapsulate the al-Qa’ida universal jihad against what is

described as a “dry, miserable, and spiritless materialistic life” (bin Laden,

2002). Market fundamentalism is a term described by Joseph E. Stiglitz

(1942-), as another name for economic neoliberalism (Stiglitz, 2002). Taken

individually, both fundamentalisms serve different masters but interact with

severe repercussions for global peace, justice and equality. They have the

ability to re-align allegiances, form coalitions and demolish others. Beeson

and Bellamy (2003: 340) alternatively state:

The fundamental disconnect between the rhetoric of liberalism, democracy, human rights and security, on the one hand, and the reality of marginalisation and disadvantage on the other, fuels a growing chorus of opposition to an array of processes subsumed under the rubric of ‘globalisation’.

Socioeconomic inequality has as its corollary, the energy to

motivate actors toward seeking solace from the conditions of

marginalisation and isolation. To some extent religious fundamentalisms

and the less extreme instances of religious revival and resurgence indicate

a generic dissatisfaction with the effects of the omnipresent nature of

Western capital expansion. Yet as Bellamy and Beeson note:

One of the most striking qualities about globalisation is the persistence of difference and the continuing centrality of notions of “we and they” in the construction of identity, values, interests, norms and hence appropriate action (ibid: 344). For fundamentalisms such as al-Qa’ida, the ‘dissenting’ voice is

visible and demonstrably destructive as evidenced by terror attacks and the

threats of global insecurity, albeit as understood from a modern Western

perspective. However, the lived reality of powerlessness and alienation felt

by many in the West is problematic when considering fundamentalism as a

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driving force for social change. The nominal understanding of a

fundamentalist world-view implies a reversion to substantive core

statements of established authority, therefore excluding alternative and

perhaps more liberal expressions of accommodating viewpoints. For some

Indigenous and Muslim Australians who feel marginalised and socially

excluded, there is an increased propensity for political activism and social

protest. Yet global media coverage of Middle East conflicts including

individual suicide bombings also raises levels of discrimination and

prejudice.

A specific issue related to this study is the ability for alternate,

moderate and competing voices to be heard within the over-riding

discourse of fundamentalist rhetoric and without being classified as a social

threat at best, or fundamentalist at worst. This is an important consideration

because of the implicit stereotyping of Indigenous converts to Islam as

potential Islamic fundamentalists or jihadists. This is not so much about

freedom of religious expression, but the degree to which religious

expression is considered subversive. Similarly, so-called radical Imams are

claimed to influence Muslim youth by the particular strand of Islam they

espouse. Unfortunately, Islam in general is often stigmatised as a result of

a few outspoken clerics. Just as important, however, is why some in society

are attracted to both the oppositional aspects of Islam than its more

generally accepted and recognised benefits. The implications of wearing a

fundamentalist label vary according to how it ‘fits’ within acceptable liberal

definitions. For example, the rise of modern fundamentalism and

fundamentalist-like movements in all the major religions has a long pre-

history according to Marty (2003); and that “in the United States, the New

Christian Right was a key interest group with which political candidates

from both major parties had to contend” (ibid.: 44). The comparative

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acceptability of a Christian based ‘fundamentalism’ is in stark contrast to

relatively moderate Islamic movements who distance themselves from

militant and destructive regimes like al-Qa’ida. The contingent nature of

circumstance, therefore, dictates to some degree how a chain of events are

re-packaged into different meanings and interpretations. The concern and

the problem is that by association, certain groups will be less able to exert

claims for inclusion, religious freedom, and cultural expression because of

mounting public fear attributed to a single unifying event; that of the radical

fundamentalist attack on American soil on September 11. Within these

contexts the issue of Indigenous alignment with Islam is further analysed in

relation to globalisation and minorities.

5.2.2 Globalisation and minorities

Important questions underpinning an examination of the processes

of globalisation ask: What are the key attributes of global neoliberal

paradigms, including neoconservatism, that impact directly or indirectly and

result in Indigenous alignment with Islam? Would Islamic conversion occur

irrespective of the socio-political landscape or does the current neoliberal

situation create conducive environments for social change? How do the

social effects of neoliberalism provide an impetus for the search for

alternative meanings, and how strong is the connection with the

globalisation/neoconservative debate? What are the links between

hegemonic contemporary American neo-conservatism and the economic

and social policies of Australian governments?

These questions underpin the assumption that colonialism was a

global phenomenon, yet post-colonial Australia has continued to

disadvantage many Indigenous Australians. Frontier violence and

dispossession have been replaced with successive government ideologies,

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policies, techniques of power, and iterations of capitalist exploitation. The

sensitivity felt by those communities who have suffered as a result of

authoritarian religious persecution or colonial imposition of Western culture

may also be sensitive to the authoritarian overtones of neoconservative

economic and political rhetoric.

Neo-conservatism has influenced the conservative agenda in the United States, through its calls to significantly increase defence spending, its agenda of challenging regimes hostile to US interests and values, desires to push free-market reforms abroad, and the general support for a policy of militarism to ensure the United States remains the world’s sole superpower www.encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/neoconservative.

The heart of the matter is very much the intersection of American

Foreign Policy with the politics of the Middle East, West Asia generally, and

Israel in particular. The current Australian – US alliance suggests an

accommodation of beliefs and attitudes in sympathy for those of the current

Bush administration in the United States. A concern is the ‘flow-on’ effect of

neoconservative beliefs and practices infiltrating Australian domestic

politics and policy decisions; a combination of market economics and social

conservatism. As with the neo-conservatives in the US, the Howard

government (1996 – 2007) assumed a moral right to impose its values on

the rest of the world as well as within Australia. This served to further

marginalise refugees and Aborigines. At the domestic level of Australian

politics this is reflected in re-defining attitudes toward domestic security

adding to the discomfort of Middle East ethnicities in general and Australian

Muslims in particular. Engendering this sentiment is the propensity to

“compartmentalise communities and reify the boundaries between them”

(Beeson and Bellamy, 2003: 341). Beeson and Bellamy add that: “attacks

on the symbolic centres of American power reflect a [….] process of identity

construction: American hegemony is associated with a morally corrosive

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world order that actively works against the interests of the third world

generally and the Arab world in particular” (ibid.).

The globalising effect of terror and its neoconservative political

response has the effect of prioritising national defence and anti-terrorism

measures as dominant discourses. Domestic Australian legislation in the

form of the ASIO Act Amendment Bill 2002 and the Security Legislation

Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 are two legislative instruments to deal

with international terrorism. These legislative attempts to curb domestic

terrorism reflect the rushed introduction of the USA Patriot Act in response

to September 11. As part of the ‘new organising principle’ attached to a

resurgence of national security rhetoric, Hocking (2003: 356) notes that:

“civil and political rights must bend to accommodate the overarching needs

of national security.”

It is within the current discourse of intensified focus toward national

security and the consequent over-ruling of civil and political rights that faith

communities reclaim their importance and significance as moderating social

institutions. Religious or faith communities create social capital for the

social and economic well-being; and maintain and develop the group’s

cultural and linguistic heritage down the generations and assist in

maintaining its image, identity and reputation (Cahill, 2003). These two

aspects of social capital indicate a positive contribution

which is built around bonds, bridges, links and acceptance of the other indicates the processes that facilitates individual and social well-being and positive communal and societal outcomes within a nation or group (Cahill, 2003: 20).

Faith communities also have the potential and obligation to

challenge the wrong, misguided actions and false values of government,

institutions and of individuals. Cahill adds: “Civil societies need to give to

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religion the social and political space to play this role since, because of

their grassroots contact, faith communities are often the first to detect an

emerging issue (ibid.: 21). When reflecting on the present resurgence of

neoconservative influence in the United States, and in Australia during the

Howard government era, the social and cultural dimensions of faith

community influence become highly charged.

Australian Muslim communities face the double responsibility for

positive cultural and counter-cultural roles expected of any faith community,

yet the ability to do so is contingent and precarious given the direction and

intensity of neoconservative influence. This complexity is encapsulated by

Carroll (2003) who asks “what kind of religion, in which tradition, promotes

peace instead of war, tolerance instead of contempt, and self-criticism

instead of smug superiority”? (Carroll. 2003: 12). The role of religion is

indeed contingent on ‘which religion’ and how it is publicly perceived as

being either benign or malevolent. The unfortunate and inaccurate Islamic

association with terrorism often precludes the reality of other meaningful

alliances to emerge in a social setting conducive within civil society.

5.2.3 Globalisation and civil society

The cultural organisation of a global civil society assumes “the

growing number and influence of political interactions by actors other than

states or corporations” (Thomas, 2001: 516). Thomas notes that civil

society is organised culturally, and is therefore a rational, moral and

‘modern’ project of value attainment over which there is much conflict

(ibid.). This project is not neutral vis-à-vis religions even as religions are

practised within it and must engage with civil society. Yet a civil society

offers meaning and purpose where political and economic structures do

not.

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Political systems have become procedural and managerial. The

‘common good’ is difficult to define and subject to the pressures of

competing voices. The economic system is at once local and global with

markets being transactional and devoid of a morality commonly associated

with immediate and proximate acts of exchange. The system of economic

distribution has opened up extremes of poverty and wealth. Global

corporations now maintain greater economic and political influence than

some nation-states, with their main motive for existence being profit for

shareholders. These institutional and civil systems have the effect of a form

of neo-colonialism in the way inequality is individualised, power is

exercised, and minority groups forced to the margins of society. However,

markets and states depend on virtues not created by either the economy or

the nation. The hope that in the liberal imagination politics could be

superseded by economics is yet to be proven, while neither politics or

economics answer the larger questions of ‘who’ and ‘why’ (Sacks, 2002:

40).

From the perspective of the globalising thesis, “people, cultures,

societies, and civilisations previously more or less isolated from one

another are now in regular and almost unavoidable contact” (Beyer, 1994:

2). Contested identities within a given space are as old as civilisation itself

yet the core problematic issue of “mutability of character” remains as a

legacy of the globalising process. The term raises the paradoxical situation

of the “corrosion of inherited or constructed cultural and personal identities,

yet also encourages the creation and revitalization of particular identities as

a way of gaining control over systemic power” (Beyer, 1994: 3).

According to Sacks and many other commentators, we live in an era

of a ‘politics of uncertainty’ (Sacks 2002: 68). The pace of technological,

cultural and economic transformation in the twenty first century is quite

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different from that of the nineteenth century although both periods are

similar in the immensity of change. Social change and its effects are briefly

noted below.

Contemporary change is rapid and dramatic. William Ogburn uses the term

‘cultural lag’, where material culture is being transformed faster than non-

material culture such as modes of governance and social norms (Ogburn

1964).

The breakdown of the institutions of social life. Aspects of life that did not

experience dramatic change such as a job for life, a marriage for life, and a

place for life now exhibit the economic, personal and geographic upheaval

that has become systemic. Relationships once stood outside the world of

contracts and economic exchange and were constitutive of personal

identity.

Loss of sense of control. The forces of financial markets, currency

movements, technological change, the economic climate, international

politics and the natural environment exhibit volatility, complexity and

unpredictability. In what Giddens claims as “high” or “late modernity” the

self, as the above social phenomena, has to be reflexively made (Giddens

1994: 3). Referential points become blurred and unstable and personal

meaningless becomes a fundamental psychic problem in circumstances of

late modernity (Giddens, 1994: 9). These effects and consequences of

rapid social change are more disempowering for those already

marginalised and suffering historical disadvantage.

Considering advanced consumer cultures are built on a rapid

succession of artificially produced and temporarily satisfied desires,

substantive meaning systems are reduced to transient and multiple

interpretations. Faced with meaninglessness and superficiality, there is a

danger of individual despair and social disintegration. The refusal to accept

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meaninglessness leads to a search for a framework of meanings and

values, providing an overall sense of the world. Weber (1922) maintained

that religion is concerned with those ‘irrational’ aspects of life that are

insoluble by science. This is a cognitive need explanation that accounts for

a general need for answers, but not for the unique style and the unique

content of religious answers. Nor does it account for the replacement of

‘religious’ answers by secular activities. In Australia religious participation

and belief has not given way to secularism, and currently there are 135

religions practiced (ABS, 2006b)

Yet this overview and explanation does point to two common factors.

1. Religion does have the capacity to provide meaning and purpose,

although meaning and purpose can vary from benign to malignant. For

example, many Indigenous Australians claim the rationale for Christian

imperialism was control and oppression.

2. Those who feel threatened by change have the option of turning to

religion as a source of stability and as an expression of things that do not

change, or even as an avenue of liberation from oppressive social

conditions. This is the case with the Indigenous Muslims who have aligned

with Islam as a resistance strategy to counter the effects of drugs, alcohol

and violence.

5.2.4 Global forces and Australian politics and culture

Australia is a country whose cultural identity has, from the very

beginnings of white settlement, been formed in the midst of global forces

(Holton, 1998: 198). Reynolds (1989: 11) states that: “Ever since the

beginning of settlement there has been people who have argued that

Australia was conquered by the British and that superiority in arms was in

itself justification for everything that followed”. The ‘global’ forces that

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determined Australia as an Imperial outpost have proved devastating for

Indigenous Australian cultures, with the genocide of whole peoples and the

repression of traditional ways of living (Reynolds, 1987). Pickering (2001)

makes the point that

it easy to suppress the fact that mainstream Australian culture owes its existence to what is arguably a far more destructive programme of imperialism, and to divert attention from the pressing need for reconciliation at many levels between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians” (2001: 54).

Concerns remain in the Australian community about the economic, political

and social effects of globalisation. The entrenchment of economic

rationalism in government as a result of international financial pressures is

one example of global economic influence.

Globalisation has been characterised as a threat to Australia’s

political culture on a number of fronts. The ability of the Australian polity to

uphold its own fundamental values and determine its collective identity is

influenced by incursions of international organisations upon national

sovereignty and the effects of large-scale migration on social cohesion

(Strachan, 1998). While extreme reactions to increased population

movements may assume a tone of racial or, more commonly, cultural

superiority, more moderate responses claim that new arrivals ought to forgo

the practices and beliefs of their mother cultures and adopt those prevailing

in their new place of residence. This social shift is becoming more apparent

with the rise of fringe right wing political parties in Germany, Britain, and in

Australia. However, (Rudd, 2000: 19) writes that the entrenched neoliberal

orthodoxy has delivered a “considerable growth in national and average

personal incomes …and unleashed vast quantities of investment capital

into capital-hungry emerging markets”. Whilst globalisation has generated

considerable economic growth in the expanding western economies, the

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level of income disparity within and between the developed and developing

world has increased. This pattern of inequality is replicated in Australia

where the living standards of Indigenous Australians “are qualitatively and

quantitatively different to other poor and rich Australians in the nature and

extent of destitution experienced in much of their community” (Hunter,

1999: 1).

The situation also points to a failing ability of the state to adequately

provide the conditions whereby Indigenous actors can claim social,

economic, and cultural security. Since the days of policies based on racial

characteristics, it is argued the contemporary forms of political and

economic governance are only marginally raising the health, education and

economic conditions of many indigenous Australians. The final report of the

Reference Group on Welfare Reform (McClure Report, 2000) identifies the

need for fundamental reform because “the current social support system

may be failing many of those it was designed to help” (2000: 2). The report

recognises Australia “is in the midst of a profound economic and social

transformation” (McClure Report, 2000). Other groups such as those

following a conservative political agenda feel similar sentiments; except it is

quite often they who seem to believe Indigenous people take an

unreasonable share of the welfare dollar (Hanson, 1996). That form of

response indicates dissatisfaction with the political policy of multiculturalism

incorporating positive discrimination or affirmative action, yet fails to

engage with the legacy of negative historical circumstances and current

economic and social circumstances of Indigenous disadvantage.

Effectively, global neoliberal economic movements and regimes tend to

isolate whole communities at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum,

not least because of the individualistic nature of how socioeconomic

disadvantage is addressed as public policy.

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5.2.5 Neoliberalism and religious belief and practice

In the present era of globalisation, neoliberalism depends upon the

persistence of tradition for its legitimacy and its attachment to conservatism

– in the areas of the nation, religion, gender, and the family. Giddens

(1994) argues that neoliberalism is hostile to tradition, being one of the

main forces sweeping away tradition as a result of the promotion of market

forces and an aggressive individualism (Giddens, 1994: 9). It follows then,

that religious tradition is caught in the contradictory aspects of

neoliberalism as explained by Rose (1996). For Rose, the strategy of

advanced liberalism or neoliberalism is to govern through the regulated and

accountable choices of autonomous agents – and to govern through

intensifying and acting upon their allegiance to particular communities

(Rose, 1996: 61).

The techniques of power alluded to here are political in that they

are inscribed within forms of political rationality, but are not ‘means for

acquiring power’ but the very material form of power itself (Dean, 1994:

147). This concept recognises that central to the means of governance and

administration of the state […] is the objective of promoting, shaping, and

regulating the conduct of individuals and groups (ibid.: 149). This

framework has consequences for minorities who wish to assert claims not

coinciding with the general utilitarian nature of the modern neoliberal state.

Instances of cultural heritage claims against economic development are

one area where Indigenous religious and cultural beliefs become the focus

of legal and ideological challenges. The Hindmarsh Island Bridge in South

Australia is a case in point. The bridge (now constructed) is the

development that led to the controversial Royal Commission into

Ngarrindjeri spiritual beliefs, in particular the so-called "secret womens'

business". The High Court case of Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth,

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arguments were put regarding the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act, concerning

heritage protection legislation. The Act sought to remove the protection of

the federal heritage legislation with respect to Narrandjeri women's claims

over 'Kumarangk' or Hindmarsh Island. The Narrandjeri women argued in

the High Court that the federal government did not have the power under

section 51(26) of the Constitution to legislate in a manner detrimental to the

people of a particular race, and that only beneficial legislation was possible.

The case was decided on the basis that the legislation in question merely

constituted an amendment to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander

Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) and that as a general rule, a power to

make law must also include the power to amend it. The position with

respect to legislation that seeks to take away or infringe a common law

right, such as native title, remains open (Strelein, 2007) Possible

Constitutional Challenge17

http://www.mabonativetitle.com/info/possibleConstChallenge.htm see also

(see Brunton, 1996; Mathews, 1996; Maddox, 1999; Nettheim, 1996,

Weiner, 2002).

Beyer (2003: 337) notes that:

groups that are or see themselves as excluded from the dominant structures of power and influence can use their religious identity as the basis for claiming inclusion on the basis of the exclusivity or uniqueness of that identity. To deny these claims would constitute the denial of their freedom of religion, more broadly, their human rights. Rose, 1989: 266) identifies this as “[t]he practice of articulating

oneself in terms of one’s victimhood, of identifying oneself in terms of one’s

survival, of forming an identity by discovering oneself to be part of a group

of those likewise excluded, demeaned, damaged by others…” (Brown cited 17 For a full timeline of the events concerning the Hindmarsh Island Bridge see Aboriginal law Bulletin http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ILB/1999/95.html ‘Unfinished Business: A History of Flawed Decision-Making’ (1999) 4 (25) ILB 19

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in Rose, 1989: 269). The act of ‘speaking out’ or making visible an internal

belief is at once empowering and disempowering. Foucault’s project could

equally be understood “as giving voice to subjugated traditions within the

West, to giving expression to the ‘Other of Reason’ as was argued in

Madness and Civilization (Bendle, 2002: 15).

From the perspective of detraditionalisation and the resultant loss of

social cohesion by the individualistic influences of neoliberalism, a reduced

ability exists within the power imbalance for marginalised groups to reclaim

positions of influence. This is not always successful as in the Hindmarsh

Island Bridge case, and it highlighted the unequal power of definition

attributed to the dominant structures of the law and why Indigenous

socioeconomic wellbeing is not substantially improving compared to other

Australians.

5.2.6 Contested multicultural definitions The form and description of ‘multiculturalism’ in Australia is

continuing as a social and ideological problem. Australian multiculturalism

evolved not regarding Indigenous Australians as relevant until 1989, or

considering religious minorities as relevant (Jupp, 2002).The current

Federal government states that; “The freedom of all Australians to express

and share their cultural values is dependent on their abiding by mutual civic

obligations” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2003).

On the other hand, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Social Justice

Commissioner argues that the government “opposes recognising a right of

Indigenous peoples to self-determination in domestic policy formation as

well as in international instruments” (Social Justice Commission, 2002:

46).The 2002 Social Justice Report notes: “Ultimately, when we scratch

beneath the surface of the Government’s rhetoric their approach is exposed

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as a reductive, minimalist one that is not prepared to accommodate

Indigenous aspirations or recognize any distinct status of Indigenous

peoples in any meaningful way” (ibid., 2002: 47). Jupp (2002: 2) adds that

“while agreeing Australian immigration and multicultural policy has been a

success, it is also a much more of a contested area than was previously

supposed”. Although multiculturalism replaced assimilation as policy, it

could be argued that some contemporary aspects of multicultural critique

avoid, rather than confront, the reality of diversity and difference in the

global community. By association, religious practice and ethnic

identification will remain a contingent and provisional commodity as long as

the ideals of multiculturalism are contested in the realm of politics.

5.2.7 Testing Australian multiculturalism

Critical multiculturalism as described by (McLaren 1994: 47)

interrogates the construction of difference and identity in relation to a

radical politics. It is positioned against the neo-imperial romance with a

single language speaking ethnicity grounded in a shared or ‘common’

experience of ‘Australia’ that is associated with conservative and liberal

strands of multiculturalism (ibid.: 53). Although they would like officially to

distance themselves from racist ideologies, conservative multiculturalists

pay only lip service to the cognitive equality of all races and charge

unsuccessful minorities with having ‘culturally deprived backgrounds’ and a

‘lack of strong family-oriented values’. This ‘environmentalist’ position still

accepts black cognitive inferiority to whites as a general premise and

provides conservative multiculturalists with a means of rationalizing why

some minority groups are successful while other groups are not. This also

gives the white cultural elite the excuse they need for unreflectively and

disproportionately occupying positions of power (ibid.: 48). One particular

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invidious project of conservative or corporate multiculturalism is to construct

a common culture which refuses to treat whiteness as a form of ethnicity,

and in doing so posits whiteness as an invisible norm by which other

ethnicities are judged (ibid.: 49)

This form of multiculturalism uses the term diversity to cover up the

ideology of assimilation that undergirds its position. (Ravitch, Schlesinger,

Cheney & Finn 1995). This is reinforced by adopting the position that

English should be the only official language. The cultural capital of the

Anglo middle class is the standard of achievement, yet it fails to interrogate

the high status knowledge or the dominant regimes of discourse and social

and cultural practices that are implicated in global dominance and are

inscribed in racist, classist, sexist and homophobic assumptions.

Recent popular conservative texts appeal to national unity and a

harmonious citizenry and can be readily traced to earlier currents of

Christianity and social Darwinism. Reference is made here of the ‘Stolen

Generations’. Segregation, the dominant policy in the early 1900s, sought

to separate the Aboriginal population from the non-Aboriginal population.

This was often accomplished by placing Aboriginal people in reserves or

missions. However, the 'half-caste' children and the fairer skin children

were considered 'saveable' and were removed from their Aboriginal families

and absorbed into non-Aboriginal culture. The policy of biological

absorption, developed during the 1930s, sought the 'complete mergence of

the Aboriginal mixed raced population with white Australia'. Haebich writes:

'Strict state regulations of Aboriginal reproduction to produce progeny with

progressively less Aboriginal features, together with social engineering

programs involving the wholesale removal of mixed race children, would

ensure the breeding out of Aboriginal physical characteristics and cultural

practices.' (Haebich, 1996).

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In contrast to biological absorption, the policy of assimilation sought

a social rather than a racial explanation for indigenous disadvantage. The

focus shifted from biological racial explanations to social factors. Although

the focus was on the 'light skinned' so-called 'half-castes', Aboriginal

children of 'darker complexion' were also removed. (Buti, 2000). The power

of conservative multiculturalism lays claim to its constituents by conferring a

space for the reception of its discourses that is safe and sovereignly

secure. It does this by sanctioning empiricism as the fulcrum for weighing

the “truth” of culture. For example, intelligence quotients and test scores

become the primary source of “evidence” in what constitutes successful

school citizenship. Yet as Foucault points out, subjectivity is not simply

constituted through discourses and social practices of subjugation. It could

be argued that conservative or corporate multiculturalism are sub-sets of

the larger ideology of neoliberalism which in turn reflects to the direction of

global capital and cultural flows while remaining within the definitional

power of the nation state.

5.2.8 Issues of religious diversity and multiculturalism Contemporary notions of Australian multiculturalism as in North

America, includes the presumption that a religious marketplace exists,

driven by consumers who make decisions about faith products based on

rational choices about their needs, and the relative benefits and costs

(Beaman, 2003) Australia has no state-endorsed religions making such a

marketplace possible. Yet in Australia, as in America and Canada, the

assumption of free choice should not be confused with diversity (ibid.).

Specialization and market differentiation are undoubtedly important but

what is the nature of religious pluralism in Australia? Does diversity only

extend to providing descriptions and demographic details of dominant and

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marginalised religions? And can it be assumed that all religions in the

multicultural mosaic are equally legally protected and socially accepted, as

the ‘illusion’ of multicultural policy is designed to do. Leading from these

questions is the requirement to critically examine the relation between the

following conceptual themes:

1 The acceptance of the numerical and cultural dominance of mainline

Christian religions and religious affiliation (Bouma, 1995).

2 The challengeable notion that an Anglo-Catholic hegemony is

constructed as the normal against which the “other” is established.

3 Persecution and systemic disadvantages faced by religious groups who

fall outside the mainstream (Beaman, 2003).

From the work of Gramsci (1971), religious hegemony relies on a

sense of what is ‘normal’ religion and works to construct borders and

boundaries around the ‘normal’ religion. For Gramsci the concept of

hegemony relates to a form of domination by the means of the organization

of consent through the manipulation of ideas. It is the cultural domination of

one class by another (ibid.). (Adding to this critical theoretical perspective,

Alexander and Smelser (1999) note that “radical critics celebrate the end of

common cultural values” (1999: 3) and this perspective accounts for

diversity and the need to explore the domination and hegemonic processes

(Beaman, 2003: 314).

A multicultural society is one characterised by religious plurality, a willingness to live and let live among religious organisations, a spirit of respect for religion, and of willing cooperation from governments and their agencies at all levels with religions (Bouma, 1995: 296).

Australian society and its religious landscape described by Bouma

(1995, 2000, 2002, 2003), and Bouma and Hughes (2000) is one of the

most multicultural and plural in the world. Australia is not only a nominally

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religious country; it is a nominally Christian country (Bouma, 1995: 287).

Moreover, given the Catholic and Anglican dominance, the religious

aspects of that plurality manifest as a “very strong, historically prominent

Anglo-Celtic Christian religious community” (ibid: 288).

Australian nation-state identity remains cast in the long shadow of

Anglo-Catholic dominance, both religiously and institutionally. The subtle

yet ubiquitous presence of a unique Australian-Christian nationalism

contradicts the fact that its apparent domination has failed in its

fundamental sociological aim to remake Indigenous Australians. Indigenous

people in Australia have not only survived, but are also demonstrating a

resurgence of vitality in a variety of arenas and communities around the

country (Armitage, 1995).

An important area of contested interest is the continuing challenge

for Indigenous Australians to ‘prove’ the validity of religious and spiritual

beliefs in relation to land claims or sites of spiritual significance. The linkage

between the contested terrains of Indigenous identity and definition by

others is significant and reflects a history of poorly understood constructs of

Indigeneity. As mentioned briefly above, the Hindmarsh Island Bridge issue

is evidence of the inability to accept a non-empirical construct; in this case

“when a group of Ngarrindjeri women were accused by the State of South

Australia of deliberately fabricating a claim for a sacred site in order to halt

the construction of a bridge between the South Australian mainland and an

island in the mouth of the Murray River” (Weiner 2002: 52). A subsequent

Royal Commission was established to inquire into:

Whether the ‘women’s business’ or any aspect of the ‘women’s business’

was a fabrication and if so:

(a) the circumstances relating to such a fabrication;

(b) the extent of such a fabrication; and

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(c) the purpose of such a fabrication (Stevens 1995: 3).

Maddox (1999) suggests “four ways in which a deeply secularised culture,

with little to sensitise it to the needs of religious minorities, is likely to react

to Indigenous communities’ religiously-based claims. It may:

1) ignore the religious elements of a tradition, subsuming them

under a category such as ‘culture’ or ‘custom’

2) cherish unfamiliar religious forms for their perceived strangeness

3) decry unfamiliar religious forms for their perceived irrationality

4) interpret unfamiliar religious forms through the framework of

possibly inappropriate familiar forms” (Maddox 1999: 2).

At one level it is suggested that Indigenous religious traditions are

now being used as strategic resources in native title claims (Kolig 2003:

209). This achieves a “useful and politically highly active ideological corpus”

(ibid.: 210). Kolig adds: “It is then, especially the juxtaposition of

rediscovering the past and establishing a kind of continuity, often seemingly

tenuous, with the assertion of authenticity despite the glaring hegemonic

influences…which makes this phenomenon so conspicuous and raises so

much suspicion” (ibid.:210). It also reflects the increasing predominance on

instrumental rationality, in Max Weber’s sense of achieving utility effects

through a rational appraisal of culture and belief (Weber 1947: 115).

However, another important feature of the ‘contested belief’

framework is its use by neoliberal and economic rationalists to plant the

seed of doubt in the minds of the general public. Very often these

commentators, right-wing think-tanks, and journals speak on behalf of the

Howard government and its political agenda. This is a subtle but effective

format with which the government uses to create wedge politics.

To some extent, Muslims in Australia face similar conflicting issues

of multicultural and religious definition within the framework of the

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overriding civil religion of Australian nationalism. At a local community level,

with the Mosque as a focal point for religious concentration, ethnicity and

culture blend into a common religious purpose. Beyond the immediate

confines of the mosque, religious and cultural difference is relegated to the

dress, appearance, beliefs, food and festivals of the adherents. The degree

of discrimination or acceptance is dependent on the multicultural

intelligence of the surrounding community and the history of relations

between and within a specific community.

The relational aspect of these circumstances are reflected in a

dominant White imaginary, more recently absorbed into the process and

condition of multiculturalism. Yet the field of struggle and the intricacies of

negotiating multiculturalism and Anglo-white hegemony remains an

unfinished project. Social tension exists within the contested arena of

expanded visions of Australia as a global citizen and what this means in

terms of national identity. The degree of legitimacy extended to particular

groups, cultures or religions is contingent on global events. Indigenous and

immigration policy reflects both a continuity of previous political regimes

and discursive practices centred on established relations of power but

incorporated into a new discourse of national security.

5.2.9 Indigenous ‘rights’ literature and resistance politics

The Australian example of the slow evolution of Indigenous land

rights and cultural heritage protection and legislation is partially a result of

the misinterpretations and inflexibility of the legal-juridical system in

understanding Indigenous constructs of spirituality and belief systems and

practices. This points to the dominance or bias of an Anglo-Christian

oriented legal-juridical system and its inability to accommodate religious

deviance that complicates established economic and cultural codes. These

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observations reflect a resistance to cultural and religious difference and

indicate a discriminatory aspect of legal and bureaucratic processes. This is

not to suggest discrimination is intentional, only to raise it to the level of

obvious existence.

Indigenous Australians experience the difficulty of the dominant

juridical-legal process in recognising spiritual and cultural sites in relation to

pro-development pressure. Examples include the difficulties associated

with native title and land rights negotiation, and cultural heritage sites such

as the case of the Ngarrindjeri ‘women’s business’ on Hindmarsh Island,

South Australia, 1994-1996 (Weiner, 2002). Both of these examples

highlight Indigenous resistance to cultural and religious difference when

compared to the considered norm of social organisation. This is despite the

socio-historical extent of oppression of Indigenous Australians and the

more recent discrimination of Muslim populations in Australia (Kabir 2003).

5.2.10 Secularisation and religious resurgence

Following Marx, religion serves the dual purposes of diversion and

legitimation (Marx, 1977: 159-191). When ‘legitimation’ becomes extreme

the focus becomes the expression of radical discontent, and mobilises

commitment among its members in violent causes. It is this propensity for

religious dualism that affords examination in the context of a post

September 11 environment.

The intellectual swing away from religion and toward secularism as a

social movement is raised by Bauman (1999) who challenges the claim that

religion is thought of as a private affair only, “not as a driving force for entire

groups or a significant symbol system of identification, demarcation and

support” (Baumann, 1999: 2). This literature re-engages with the idea that

religious identity is important for minority groups, even if mainstream

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religions are losing strength in the face of an increasingly secular society.

This is in line with the existing body of knowledge in that the general

consensus is that “religion is intimately connected with both the problem of

social order and the meaningful nature of social relations” (Turner, 1991:

xi). Berger (1999: 2) makes the point that: “the assumption that we live in a

secularized world is false. The world today…is as furiously religious as it

ever was, and in some places more so than ever.”

The arguments supporting the secularisation thesis will not be

rehearsed here although the basic tenets of the theory will be outlined. The

secularisation thesis posits that religion no longer has the moral and

communal binding ability as it once did, and that the nation-state has

greater claims in this regard due to its secularising nationalist ideology

(Anderson, 1983). Bellah (1996, 1988) calls this newer secular sentiment

‘civil religion’ that incorporates a reinvented function of ceremony and ritual

reflecting the ‘ambitions’ of the imagined community encompassing the

nation.

The association of the terms civil religion and secular society

denies, however, the resurgent religious nature of society as proposed by

Berger (1999). Berger raises three pertinent questions regarding the

resurgence of religion:

1 What are the origins of the worldwide resurgence of religion?

2 What is the likely future course of this religious resurgence?

3 Do the resurgent religions differ in their critique of the secular order?

(ibid. :11-13). These questions raise the issue of “how civil religion relates

to the political society, on the one hand, and to private religious

organisation, on the other” (Bellah, 1988: 99). Additionally, the question of

state neutrality in relation to both religion and ethnicity requires

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examination. The role of the Western nation-state is, after all, to “square

free competition within limiting boundaries” Baumann, 1999: 45).

An alternative set of reasons explaining the alleged global resurgence of

political religion is made by Sahliyeh (1990). 1) The destabilising impact of

modernisation; 2) As a response to a generalised ‘crisis atmosphere’; 3)

explainable by allusion to a ‘resource mobilization model.’

5.2.11 Secularism and political Islam

Secularisation is said to have been a period in the world’s political

history when the influence and authority of religion and the church was

subsumed by the authority known as the Westphalian synthesis. The norms

of authority entailed in the four main strands of the synthesis “amount to a

political theology, a doctrine of religion’s role in society” (Phillpot, 2002: 76).

Four strands define the essential features of the Westphalia synthesis: 1)

states are the legitimate polity in the international system; 2) states refrain

from seeking to alter the relationship between religion and politics in other

states; 3) religious authorities exercise few if any functions, still less any on

a transnational level; 4) states seek far less vigorously to promote the

welfare of religion than they did prior to Westphalia (ibid.). The most recent

challenge to this orthodoxy came in the form of al-Qa’ida.

Political Islam can be broadly defined as consisting of two broad

movements, “those operating in countries where the Muslims are a minority

and therefore a subject community, and those operating in countries where

Muslims are a ruling community” (Ameer, 2000: 11). Political Islam is

potentially affirming and regressive, depending on competing perceptions

of Islamic identity. Examples of affirming political Islam are manifested in

the mobilization of Islamic identity towards such goals as the legitimate

right to self-determination (ibid.: 14). Manifestations of political Islam as

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regressive or antagonistic refer primarily to the policies and practices of

fundamentalist regimes in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan. The

phenomenon of political Islam is divisible, then into three broad areas;

legitimate attempts to self-determination; authoritarian “traditional” regimes;

and the existence of fundamentalist movements seen as an outgrowth of

deeper societal crises (ibid.: 104).

Given that global civil (or secular) society is organised culturally

(Thomas, 2001: 516) it does not follow that civil society is essentially both

Western and national, yet it bears the marks of the West but is thoroughly

global and in many ways anti-Western. Contemporary global civil society

and the place of religion within it are intrinsic to current global discourse

due to its embodiment of a universal humanity.

5.2.12 Secularisation and civil religion

The idea that social change influences religious change and vice

versa is a theme consistent with contemporary discussions of how religion

is embedded in the fabric of society. On one hand, the political doctrine of

secularism describes how citizens, even devout citizens, agree to live and

try to flourish in a polity that is not governed by religious principles and

practices (Bilgrami, 2003: 89). On the other hand, Bellah (1988) describes

civil religion in a way that implicates a dominant yet neutral religious

influence embedded in the ceremony and rituals of the state and nation.

This influence raises the issue of how civil religion relates to the political

society, on the one hand, and to private religious organisation, on the other

(ibid.: 99). This has relevance to the relationships between Australian civil

religion and the particular social, cultural, and religious circumstances of

Indigenous Australian Muslims. The over-riding theme of Australian civil

religion may encourage Indigenous Australians to seek a resurgent interest

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in alternative religious and spiritual directions as it has with other

Australians. The secular nature of contemporary society and the

destruction or gradual loss of the strong religious/spiritual components of

Indigenous society due to frontier and colonial processes leaves open the

option of religious revival but without the paternalism of early Christian

missionaries.

Yet secularism has come under attack over the last two decades

because fundamentalisms have spearheaded the resurgence of religious

values, institutions and organisations (Nasr, 2003: 67). Nowhere is the

scope of change produced by fundamentalism more evident than in the

Muslim world (ibid.). Islamic fundamentalism indicates a link between

religion and politics on a world scale (Robertson, 1992) and it has the

potential to both empower and create social problems. For the Australian

state, quite different circumstances prevail in relation to secularisation and

the influence of civil religion and fundamentalisms. The constitutional

separation of religion and state is unambiguous, yet the influence of civil

religion and its relation to the state is not quite so readily separated.

5.3 Underlying factors associated with Muslim discr imination

Muslims have been in Australia for nearly 150 years yet they have

invariably been treated differently to other Australians with the exception of

Aborigines. During the late 19th century there were fears of non-white

ethnically different populations destroying white Anglo Christian society.

Government legislation introduced in 1901 ensured continuous selective

immigration policies maintaining a majority of ‘white’ Anglo-Protestant

society based on the ‘White Australia’ policy.

Security issues related to national interests during the world wars

placed Muslims in Australia under surveillance including the Ottoman Turks

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during the World War 1. During the Second World War, the Australian

Government perceived that some Malays who arrived in Australia as

university students could have been affiliated with the Malayan Communist

Party and therefore might pose a security threat to Australia. Anecdotal

evidence reveals that some Indians suspected of disloyalty were also

placed under surveillance, and when Italy invaded Albania and declared

war on the Allies, Albanians were classified as ‘enemy aliens’ (Kabir, 2006).

Colour, not religion was the area of concern during the colonial and White

Australia periods, however, religion has become the new focus.

Contemporary political emphasis on national security in a post

September 11 environment has promoted Islamic issues to policy priority in

terms of surveillance and control. Localised instances of recurring

discrimination based on appearance and association evidenced by a

hardening attitude against Muslims and historical antipathies and long-lived

antipathies have grown in the specific context of the current geopolitical

climate (Kabir, 2006). Since September 11 2001, with Australia’s

engagement in the ‘War on Terror’ there has been a rapid shift of opinion

against the Muslim population among some members of the wider

community. Muslim Australians are viewed as the ‘enemy’ by some

Australians. Visible Muslims in their Islamic attire or loose clothing, such as

women who wear hijabs (headscarves), chaddor (garment or shawl

wrapped around the head and body) or abaya (a loose black robe from

head to toe) or bearded men in their traditional shalwar-kurta (trouser shirt),

jilbab (long loose outer garment) and topi (cap), have sometimes been

verbally and physically abused and called ‘terrorists’. Arguably, the

Australian Government’s new anti-terrorism legislation and the surveillance

hotline ‘Be alert not alarmed’, which asks Australians to monitor their

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surroundings, have further marginalised some Muslims. Occasionally

politicians have also linked Muslim asylum seekers with terrorists.

5.4 Re-grouping as labelled minorities

Marginalisation leads to outsider status and eventual reclaiming of

‘social citizenship’ by forming into alternative social identities. Rather seen

as powerless, regrouping is an active process of re-empowerment based

on a common anti-social outlook. Non-representation in mainstream society

is replaced by membership in an ‘other’ group falling outside of an Anglo-

Australian archetype.

[Aboriginal] Redfern became a sphere of Indigenous protest, and a heroic

site of resistance to European culture and colonialist control (Shaw, 2000).

The Block is presented simultaneously as a place of successful Aboriginal

political struggle and as an example of failed (urban) Indigenous self-

determination. In the recent rush of renovation, restoration and re-

development in the surrounding areas of Darlington, Redfern and

Chippendale, the impoverished ‘blackness’ of the inner Sydney Aboriginal

community has become bounded by a sea of increasingly affluent

‘whiteness’.

5.5 Religion and theoretical constructs

The first part of the following section examines religious conversion

theories and concepts, followed by a brief overview of religion in Australia.

The status of religious belief and practice in Australian society and religious

conversion literature reveals a latent political field of interlocking individual,

social, cultural, and institutional factors of influence. The analysis of

religion in Australia will indicate the changes in both the shift in belief and

practice, and an increasing religious diversity. It is argued that a latent

Anglo-centric bias exists at the levels of political and media coverage of

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Islamic issues despite the cultural and religious diversity of Australian

society, yet the discursive construction of Islam is a challenge to the

orthodoxy.

The application of Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, and

doxa, and religion and the state, will provide theoretical frameworks with

which to analyse the various components of political and religious

involvement. This will construct the framework for further analysis using

Bourdieu’s concepts including the production of religious capital. The work

of Michel Foucault, (power, discipline, and governmentality); Nick Crossley

(social movements); Anthony Oberschall (collective action); and Alfred

Schutz (social formation and solidarity) contribute to the theoretical

component of the chapter. These perspectives contribute to forming a

theoretical understanding of social relations and alliance formation.

The final section of the chapter draws together the religious aspects

of Australian society and conversion literature and establishes the field in

which Indigenous conversion to Islam functions. Religious and cultural

difference is examined in relation to the state, and how collective

movements respond with a politics of resistance. The aim is to suggest

religion in Australia is a politicised entity in the context of globalisation and

neoconservative political governance.

Within a globalised neoliberal environment, and particularly since

September 11, Islam has become a form of religious capital able to be

produced depending “on the state of the structure of objective relations

between religious demands and religious supply” (Bourdieu, 1991: 22). This

appears to be happening with the resurgent Evangelical mega-churches

such as Hill-song in Australia, but much less so for traditional institutions

such as Anglicanism. However, religious engagement begins with religious

conversion which is a significant aspect of this research.

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The progression from religious conversion, to religion in Australia is

linked to the political economy of religious supply and demand how

alliances of resistance are formed during collective action. The first section

in this chapter begins with a review of the various theoretical approaches to

religious conversion.

5.6 Conventional theoretical approaches to religiou s conversion

The three broad categories of religious conversion are considered in

this section are theological, psychological, and sociological. Theological

and psychological aspects are discussed as background concepts while the

sociological focus is given more prominence due to the focus of the study.

A summary of a theological model is presented by Bernard

Lonergan (1972). Lonergan’s way of conversion describes the experience

of de-centering that enables us to re-centre in our centre that is God. He

presents conversion as a complex process of transformation involving

various judgments, decisions and actions that move us from an established

horizon, usually formed through the desires and addictions of the false self,

into a new horizon of knowing, valuing and acting, informed by our true self

that has its ground in the being of God. In Method in Theology, Lonergan

distinguishes three phases in this process of transformation - intellectual,

moral and religious conversion - that create a dialectic (Lonergan, 1972). In

summary, intellectual conversion clarifies the horizon of our knowing. It

questions and eliminates deeply held, distorted myths about reality, to

enable divine wisdom to be the only source of our knowing. Moral

conversion shifts our criteria for decision making from the satisfaction of the

self as the basis of choice, to the discovery and pursuit of truth and value.

Religious conversion integrates the history of our conversions and

establishes us firmly in our centre in God (ibid.). A theological perspective

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clearly establishes a ‘moral centre’, and although Lonergan bases his

method on Christian theology, the outcome of conversion is to make

decisions based on “a radical change in our consciousness at the highest

level of its expansion” (Buzzelli, 1973). A theological methodod of religious

conversion is very different to a sociological understanding and this is

recognised as a shortcoming if viewed from a religious believer’s

perspective. The academic perspective or progression of religious

conversion, then, might be considered as spiritual (theological); individual

or personal (psychological); and social (sociological). Religion for

sociologists is generally seen a symbolic system with interpretive and

cultural dimensions.

5.6.1. Psychological aspects of conversion

Psychological literature concerning religious conversion attributes

personal or individual factors in determining motivations for conversion.

Psychological research has established that religiosity has a buffering

effect in relation to alcohol and other substance abuse in a sample of urban

adolescents (Wills, Yaeger and Sandy 2003).

Buffering is discussed by John Bowlby (1907 – 1990) and John

Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth (1913 – 1999) (attachment theory); Motifs and

religious conversion are considered by Alfred Adler (1870 – 1937)

(compensation for personal inferiorities and lack of power); Gordon Allport

(1897 – 1967) analyses the differences between mature and immature

religion; The concern of Abraham Maslow (1908 – 1970) is the hierarchy of

needs pyramid; and Erik H. Erikson (1902 – 1994) examines stage theory

and identity conflict.

Other studies have indicated that religiosity is a protective factor

with regard to health status. Of these, Levin 1996; McCullough, Hoyt,

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Larson, Koenig, and Thoresen 2000 demonstrated ‘religiosity is inversely

related to adult mortality…” (cited in Wills et al.). Wills et al. suggest

buffering occurs because religiosity affects attitudes and values and may

be related to perceived meaning and purpose in life. The example of

buffering occurring because of relations to coping processes, social

networks, or both, is an important point and Wills et al. further note: “In the

domain of social processes, religiosity could be associated with the

characteristics of an adolescent’s network of adults and peers and may be

related to integration in the larger community through participation in social

and service activities (Brook, Balka, Win and Gursen 1998; Umberson

1987; Wallace and Williams 1997), a factor that also could work to produce

buffering effects (Cohen, S. and Wills 1985)” (cited in Wills et al. 2003).

With little alteration, the concept of buffering and religiosity could be

adapted to suit the situation of Indigenous Australians and their alignment

with Islam. This is not to imply a substance abuse connection specifically,

rather, to suggest the utility of this approach when examining other

negative social aspects deemed by Indigenous people as detracting from

their overall well-being. As mentioned above, the precursors to Indigenous

inequality and disadvantage are socially embedded and intransigent.

Buffering then, in relation to religiosity and the alignment of Indigenous

Australians with Islam could be seen as an ameliorating effect when

considering long-term social inequity.

The aspect of revealing and analysing the social influences

impacting on the motives for Indigenous alignment with Islam is a critical

component of this thesis. Without it, the analysis would tend toward a

conventional religious conversion framework, leaving out a substantial

sociological dynamic. However, the concept of buffering is a worthy

inclusion to consider in the final analysis.

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5.6.2 Sociological aspects of conversion

Ali Köse (1996: 253) contends the possibility of religious conversion

likely at certain times in the life cycle, and Lewis Rambo (1993) presents a

‘systemic’ stage model of religious conversion, in contrast to a sequential

(stepwise) stage model and claims there is no one way to define

conversion (1993). Rambo’s stages (or phases) of conversion are called

context, crisis, quest, encounter, interaction, commitment, and

consequences. John Loffland and Rodney Stark: Social networks –

presented a seven point scale or sequential “funnel” (Lofland and Stark,

1965: 863) and a four-level typology of religious “commitment”. However,

social networks during conversion and prior to conversion are significant

aspects of the Lofland and Stark model. Prior socialisation is one aspect

missing from the analysis (Greil, 1977). (This is why the histories of

Indigenous oppression are important considerations for recognising

underlying foundations for religious conversion). However, within sociology,

it has become:

conventional to treat demographic characteristics, structural or personal frustrations, and the like, as completely responsible for “pushing” persons into collectivities dedicated to protest against the social order (Lofland and Stark, 1965: 864).

The factors in this model although important, are considered incomplete by

Lofland and Stark (1965). The complete (summarised) model of

conversion according to Lofland and Starke a person must:

1. Experience enduring, acutely felt tensions

2. Within a religious problem-solving perspective,

3. Which leads the person to define themselves as a religious seeker;

4. Encountering the deviant perspective (D.P.) at a turning point in the

person’s life,

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5. Wherein an affective bond is formed (or pre-exists) with one or more

converts;

6. Where extra-cult attachments are absent or neutralised;

7. And, where if the person is to become a deployable agent, is

exposed to intensive interaction (Lofland and Stark, 1965: 874).

This model applies to cult membership and although parts of the model

could be applied to conversion to Islam in the case of this study, the

circumstances and contingencies are quite different. Nevertheless, the

argument made in previous chapters is that histories of oppression and

social-dysfunction influence the high rate of Indigenous incarceration.

Therefore the “situational contingencies” (ibid.) of the prison appear to

create the tension which in turn creates some disposition to act.

David Snow and Richard Machalek (1984) propose a model of religious

conversion within the context of “new” religious movements. Three

fundamental issues in the study of conversion are: (a) the conceptualization

and nature of conversion; (b) the analytic status of converts’ accounts; and

(c) the causes of conversion and generalizations about them (184: 168).

Both sociologists and psychologists agree, according to Rambo (1998), is

that almost without exception, changing to a new religious orientation takes

place through kinship and friendship networks of one sort or another.

Rambo names three more important things that happen in a conversion

process: (a) virtually all religious groups emphasise the importance of

relationships with the leader of the group, and with members of the group;

(b) the way in which the convert’s life interpretation or rhetoric changes;

and (c) the notion of role changes. Role is very powerful in shaping

peoples’ perceptions and behaviours (Rambo, 1998). For example, people

converting within a prison environment feel they have a new perception of

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themselves that can empower them to do things, to believe things, and to

feel things that they have not been able to prior to that time.

Waddington (1992: 13-20) proposed a model not of religious

conversion but of a ‘flashpoint model’ of public disorder. The flashpoint

model asserts that riots occur when certain events (flashpoints) prompt an

outburst of anger amongst a group of people who: (a) are frustrated and/or

resentful about the conditions in which they live (or some set of government

policies deemed immoral); and (b) have lost their stake in the existing

political and moral order. Waddington argues that inequalities of power,

material resources and life chances are the main contributing factors to (a).

The New South Wales Department of Corrective Services

(NSWDCS) authorities claimed the type of Islam practiced in prison was

often one lacking commitment but containing a rebellious and radical

content. From the perspective of prison management, Waddington’s model

closely represents how Corrective Services authorities view prison

conversions to Islam. How NSWDCS manages Islam within the institution is

an important aspect of this research and will be discussed further below.

5.6.3 Religious conversion themes discussion

Religious conversion in a broad sense is a complex process

entailing personal choices and sociological factors and influences, but as

discussed above it is not solely due to a lineal cause and effect

relationship. From a sociological perspective it is of interest to examine the

problem of the relationship between the religiosity of the individual and the

religiosity of the system of which the individual is a member. The sociology

of religion poses the questions of the role and significance of religion in

general, as well as that of understanding the beliefs and practices of

particular groups and societies (Hamilton, 2001). The idea that human

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beings are individuals embedded in immediate social contexts as well as

larger cultures and religious traditions means that any attempt to explain

conversion must be interdisciplinary (Paloutzian, 1996).

The religiosity of the system of which the individual is a member is

something that is both conditioned by individuals and influences individuals.

An important additional consideration is the social structural and general

characteristics of the system as a whole. The degree of differentiation and

autonomy of religious influences in relation to other social sectors, and the

strategic location of, and relation between groups is what is meant here.

But by religiousness of the overall system referral is made to the religious

culture of the environment, and it could be assumed that within a prison the

religious culture would be devoid of conventional visible cultural influences

such as religious signification, symbols, architecture or language. Prison

conversions are conditioned by a high sense of social isolation and concern

for safety and status (prison environment) and a desire to belong,

reconnect, communicate, and differentiate (from prison authority and

routine). This is not to deny individual motivations to seek religious

commitment similar to a theological model; however, European, British, and

U.S. studies reflect similar patterns of marginalised ‘black’ and Hispanic

prison inmates converting to Islam. This aspect of prison conversion will be

discussed in more detail in a later chapter.

The following section explains how religion and religious belief in

Australia have changed over time from predominantly Anglo-Christian, to a

multi-faith society. It will be argued that although Australia is a secular

nation, religion and politics are often fields of alliance and resistance, and

that certain religious affiliations have the power to redefine Australian

identity and to create multiple identities.

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5.7 Religion and religious practices in Australia

Religion in Australia is unremarkable in terms of individual choice

and practice, and in the context of mainstream churches. The secular

democracy of Australia clearly separates the formal link between religion

and the state. Fewer people are affiliating with mainstream Christian

religions yet late modern democracies are experiencing a religious

resurgence of sorts. This is despite an increase since 1966 of people

stating ‘no religion’ (ABS, 2006). In Australia, there is a trend away from

traditional religious observance and practice to non-traditional such as

Buddhism. Some see this as a shift away from traditional older mainstream

religious organisations rather than decreasing religiosity. Conceptually, a

socio-cultural shift from modernity to post-modernity has witnessed a

breakdown of traditional social structures and identities, and an uptake of

multiple identities, which from the perspective of the sociology of religion,

incorporates spirituality in any of its many dimensions. New age religions

and a resurgence of older practices such as Paganism, Wicca, and

Satanism are evidence of a resurgent spiritual awareness, and a religious

reformation on a worldwide scale (Clarke, 2006).

Often people will ‘shop around’ for relevant religious and spiritual

experiences and even take selected parts of different religions in

combination to comply with specific individual outlooks and values. This

pattern of religious engagement is a move away from a traditional ‘one

religion for life’ practice, to a postmodern perspective where “one discovers

multiple positions or positionalities” (Hopkins, 1997: 206).

Sociologist Robert Merton has said all institutions tend, over time, to

be degenerative. No church, denomination, or Christian movement has

ever been automatically self-renewing: they all lose their founders' fervour

from the second generation onwards. On the other hand, new religious

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movements (NRM) emerge and societies become more multicultural as is

the case in Australia. Furthermore, new religious observance patterns and

strengths of belonging to religious communities are difficult to separate

from a global society. New religious movements and non-traditional

religions are attracting new and different adherents as a result of increased

globalisation, immigration, and humanitarian refugee programmes, and by

the ‘commercialisation’ of religion in the case of Evangelical churches.

Australian census statistics reveals that while millions identify as

Catholics, Anglican, or other Protestant denominations, fewer are actually

claiming religious affiliation (Table 2 following page). The percentage of

Anglicans has reduced from 34.9 in 1961, to 18.7 in 2006, while Catholic

affiliation has increased slightly during the same time. New religious

movements in the Christian tradition such as Evangelical and

Pentecostal/Charismatic are becoming more popular religions in

contemporary Australia (Table 3 p. 213). Pentecostalism has become the

largest and fastest growing segment of Christianity in the world, while Islam

is also one of the fastest growing non-Christian religions in the world. The

Muslim population in Australia nearly 350,000 (ABS, 2006), with the largest

concentrations in Sydney's western and southern, and Melbourne’s north

eastern suburbs.

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Table 2. Major Religious Affiliations in Australia

MAJOR RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS

Christianity Anglican Catholic Other Total Other

religionsNo

religion Not stated/

inadequatelydescribed

Total

Census year

% % % % % % % '000

1901 39.7 22.7 33.7 96.1 1.4 0.4 (a)2.0 3 773.8 1911 38.4 22.4 35.1 95.9 0.8 0.4 (a)2.9 4 455.0 1921 43.7 21.7 31.6 96.9 0.7 0.5 (a)1.9 5 435.7 1933 38.7 19.6 28.1 86.4 0.4 0.2 12.9 6 629.8 1947 39.0 20.9 28.1 88.0 0.5 0.3 11.1 7 579.4 1954 37.9 22.9 28.5 89.4 0.6 0.3 9.7 8 986.5 1961 34.9 24.9 28.4 88.3 0.7 0.4 10.7 10 508.2 1966 33.5 26.2 28.5 88.2 0.7 0.8 10.3 11 599.5 1971 31.0 27.0 28.2 86.2 0.8 6.7 6.2 12 755.6 1976 27.7 25.7 25.2 78.6 1.0 8.3 11.4 13 548.4 1981 26.1 26.0 24.3 76.4 1.4 10.8 11.4 14 576.3 1986 23.9 26.0 23.0 73.0 2.0 12.7 12.4 15 602.2 1991 23.8 27.3 22.9 74.0 2.6 12.9 10.5 16 850.3 1996 22.0 27.0 21.9 70.9 3.5 16.6 9.0 17 752.8 2001 20.7 26.6 20.7 68.0 4.9 15.5 11.7 18 769.2 2006 18.7 25.8 19.3 63.9 5.6 18.7 11.9 19 855.3

(a) Includes 'object to state'. Source: ABS data available on request, Census of Population and Housing.

5.7.1 Evangelical influences

Connell (2005) identifies the rise of mega-churches in Australia, and

religious establishments such as Hillsong in Sydney, and Paradise in

Adelaide are part of the revitalisation of this form of religious practice

(Bouma, 2006: 149). The Sydney branch of Hillsong Church operates from

Baulkam Hills and Waterloo. The church attracts a total attendance of over

20,000 on any given weekend, and the reputation of the church continues

to expand, having a dynamic influence and impact in Australia and many

other nations. Hillsong also has churches in London, Kiev and more

recently Cape Town, South Africa and Stockholm, Sweden (Hillsong cited

in Bouma, 2006: 150-51). Bouma notes the theological rhetoric is often

patriarchal, promoting traditional family values, and “maintain a well-

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articulated critique of high divorce rates, , abortion rates and non-marital

sex (ibid.: 152).

Table 3. Religious Affiliation by Census Years by P ercentage Change

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

2001 2006 Change '000 % '000 % %

Christianity Anglican 3 881.2 20.7 3 718.2 18.7 -4.2 Baptist 309.2 1.6 316.7 1.6 2.4 Catholic 5 001.6 26.6 5 126.9 25.8 2.5 Churches of Christ 61.3 0.3 54.8 0.3 -10.6 Jehovah's Witness 81.1 0.4 80.9 0.4 -0.2 Lutheran 250.4 1.3 251.1 1.3 0.3 Orthodox 529.4 2.8 576.9 2.9 9.0 Pentecostal 194.6 1.0 219.7 1.1 12.9 Presbyterian and Reformed 637.5 3.4 596.7 3.0 -6.4 Salvation Army 71.4 0.4 64.2 0.3 -10.1 Uniting Church 1 248.7 6.7 1 135.4 5.7 -9.1 Other Christian 497.9 2.7 544.3 2.7 9.3 Buddhism 357.8 1.9 418.8 2.1 17.0 Hinduism 95.5 0.5 148.1 0.8 55.1 Islam 281.6 1.5 340.4 1.7 20.9 Judaism 84.0 0.4 88.8 0.5 5.8 Other religions 92.4 0.5 109.0 0.6 18.0 No religion 2 906.0 15.5 3 706.6 18.7 27.5 Not stated/inadequately described 2 187.7 11.7 2 357.8 11.9 7.8 Total 18 769.2 100.0 19 855.3 100.0 5.8

Source: ABS data available on request, Census of Population and Housing.

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Figure 1 Affiliation of Australians of all ages to major non-Christian religions

Such core notions as liberation and enlightenment are increasingly

being interpreted as a means to an end, the end being the profound

transformation of society rather than as an individual goal. As with the

Christian lobby in America, and to a lesser extent in Australia, Christian

groups exercise political power of influence in electoral politics. In fact

NRMs are integral to a new politics where governments frequently engage

with multiple social and religious movements vying for funding and applying

lobbying pressure. Indeed, the Pentecostal movement could be considered

compatible with conservative neoliberalism in terms of its compatibility with

consumer capitalism and conservative social values. Perhaps this is

unsurprising considering max Weber’s analysis of the role of Protestantism

in the rise of industrial capitalism.

In Australia, some conservative politicians identify with groups such

as the Hillsong mega-church. In a post-modern age where religious

collectivities can openly believe in creationism, it is interesting that this form

of Christian fundamentalism is acceptable from a political perspective. The

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Australian treasurer Peter Costello is a regular attendee of Hillsong

gatherings (Costello, 2005), and Hillsong as Australia’s newest, wealthiest

and largest single church was opened by Prime Minister Howard on his

return from visiting the scene of the Bali bombings in October 2002 (SMH,

2003)

There is now a direct formal link between conservative politics and

conservative religion with the Families First Party (FFP) political party

becoming a national political party in August 2004. The FFP promotes a

strong Religious Right platform, including opposition to school sex

education, euthanasia and prostitution, and outspoken support for

censorship. At another level the influence of the religious right is felt by the

addition of the Exclusive Brethren into political lobbying and donation

assistance. Marion Maddox (2005) explains:

With conservative politicians, business and Christian leaders finding common ground, and heartened by electoral success in America and elsewhere, a loose coalition is now pushing New Zealand down a worryingly rightwing path. The eruption of the Exclusive Brethren is just the latest in a series of increasingly prominent religious presences.

John Howard relied for his 1995 return to the Liberal leadership on

the support of a secretive conservative Christian grouping within the Liberal

Party called the Lyons Forum. The religious right has become increasingly

outspoken within the party, with Treasurer Peter Costello arguing that

Australia’s problems will be solved not by legislation but a return to the Ten

Commandments, and former Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson

declaring that, without Jesus, ‘we’re a mob of dirty rotten sinners and we’re

on the path to hell’ (Maddox, 2005).

The point of this short excursion into Pentecostal Christian religious

alliances with conservative politicians and politics is to reveal an

explanatory framework which separates Christian conservatism into right-

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wing alliances, and by default, a coalition emphasising the Christian

heritage of Australian political institutions. It is also indicative of the

increasing influence of neoconservatism inherent in Australian politics. This

contrasts with the place of Islam in Australian society, where nominal

tolerance is exercised so long as Muslims assimilate into Australian society

and engage with Australian values. This is noted by Johns and Saeed

(2002: 209) regarding the order in the popular assessment of religions in

Australia:

Buddhism is intellectually chic, and there is a broad appreciation in educated circles of the sacred sites and spirits and reverence for land and nature of Aboriginal spirituality. Islam, on the other hand, is widely viewed through stereotypical lenses, and conversion to Islam (as opposed to Buddhism, for example) is regarded as an aberration. It is argued, then, that new forms of religious membership, affiliation

and participation are taking over (or have taken over) from the conventional

Anglican, Catholic, Presbyterian/Methodist/Uniting cleavages dating back to

1996 (Bean, 1999: 555). The degree to which conservative Christianity

influences contemporary Australian politics is difficult measure, but in any

likelihood the congregations of these churches provide ambiguous financial

and moral support in return for conservative social values entrenched in

policy. This reinforces the place of Christianity in Australian political

institutions, and while perfectly legal, it negates the value of non-Christian

religions as contributors to the still Anglo-centric power bases of Australian

politics. This is noticeable in the subtle political and media bias when topics

of national significance are raised. The terrorist attacks of September 11

galvanised perceptions of Muslims and the threat of radicalisation and was

reinforced in Western Europe by the Madrid train bombing (11 March,

2004); the London tube and bus bombings (7 July, 2005) and in Australia

with the Bali bombing (12 October, 2002). Muslim minorities in Western

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Europe, the U.S., and Australia face a myriad of issues in relation to ethno-

national identity, the adaptation of religio-cultural norms and values, and

matters of everyday social and legal citizenship. Nevertheless, Islam in

Australia poses a challenge to orthodox constructions of identity politics

and represents a new force in the secular field of Australian society.

The following section outlines a theoretical synthesis by applying

Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, and doxa, and his theory of the

state. This will provide an explanatory framework with which to

contextualise the narrowing focus on power relations and resistance

strategies.

5.8 Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical influences

5.8.1 Terminology, concepts and analysis

To effect a synthesis of objectivism and subjectivism Bourdieu has

constructed the concepts of habitus, capital, field, and doxa.18 These

concepts are useful for analysing and explaining the nature of relationships

involved in religious conversion in the specific context of this study, which is

the prison. The decision-making process can only be understood in terms

of the life histories of those who make them, wherein identity has evolved

through interaction with significant others. For Bourdieu, individual action

and belief must always be culturally and socially situated, for we are all

born into a social setting. The dispositions of ‘individual beliefs and

perceptions are located within ‘positions’ or social structures. Within these

social structures Bourdieu gives primacy to social class, but ethnicity is also

a useable concept. Bourdieu sees a ‘reflexive’ relationship between

‘dispositions’ and social structures This concept encapsulates the ways in

18 These terms are fully explicated in Bourdieu’s Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (1998c); Pascalian Meditations (1997); Language and Symbolic Power (1991); and Outline of Theory of Practice (1977).

218

which a person’s beliefs, ideas and preferences are individually subjective

but also influenced by the objective social networks and cultural traditions

in which that person lives (Bourdieu, 1977: 72).

The system of dispositions acts as a mediation between structures and

practice (ibid.: 487). Habitus influences not only the types of decisions

made, but also the ways in which they are made.

The system of dispositions people acquire depends on the

(successive) position(s) they occupy in society, that is, on their particular

endowment in capital. Capital is any resource able to be appropriated for

either economic, cultural, social, or symbolic gain or profit. The position of

any individual, group, or institution, in social space may thus be charted by

two coordinates, the overall volume and the composition of the capital they

hold or represent. A third coordinate, variation over time of this volume and

composition, record their trajectory through social space and provides

invaluable clues as to their habitus. This is done by revealing the manner

and path through which they reached the position they presently occupy

(Hodkinson & Sparkes, 1997).

The undifferentiated social space inherent in late modernity

(Giddens, 1991) tends to form distinct microcosms endowed with their own

rules, regularities, and forms of authority. This is what Bourdieu calls fields.

A field is in the first instance, a structured space of positions or force field

that imposes its specific determinations upon all those who enter it.

Therefore a field is an arena of struggle through which agents and

institutions seek to preserve or overturn the existing distribution of capital. A

further property of field is its degree of autonomy to exercise or insulate

itself from external influences (Bourdieu, 1977).

Just as habitus informs practice from within, a field structures action

and representation from without, offering the individual a range of possible

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stances and options. Those agents who occupy the dominant positions in a

particular field tend to pursue strategies to conserve the existing distribution

of capital, while those relegated to subordinate locations are more likely to

deploy strategies of subversion or resistance (Chopra, 2003).

The concepts of habitus, capital, and field are therefore internally

linked to one another as each achieves its full analytical potential only when

combined with each other. Combined they enable the concept of doxa to

emerge within a specific field. Doxa is considered as an unquestionable

orthodoxy that operates as if it were the objective truth. This occurs across

social space in its entirety, from the practices and perceptions of individuals

to the practices and perceptions of the state and social groups (at the level

of fields) (Chopra, 2003). Bourdieu (1998a) terms neoliberalism as doxa,

represented as a self-evident truth about the human and social which is

beyond question. The status of neoliberalism as doxa is “what gives the

dominant discourse its strength” (1998a: 29). Bourdieu considers

neoliberalism an all pervasive paradigm and method for shaping habitus-

producing structures, and what occurs at the level of the habitus

(‘practices’) also occurs at the level of the state (ibid.).

Bourdieu’s habitus and field are useful analytical tools and a

‘practical’ theory. The prison habitus as field determined by authoritarian

and regulated conditions of existence expanded out to systems of

institutional governance (frontier conditions, colonialism, white Australia),

and contemporary neoliberal economic and conservative governance are

examples of this concept. Each of these fields embodies overlapping micro-

fields of social space and conceptualised over time. ‘Practice’ defined as

those embodied activities and competencies that are ‘learned’ and carried

out by individuals in a social space. An example relevant to this study is the

practice(s) of prison existence acquired as a result of being integrated,

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acclimatised and shaped in a particular type of environment. By extension,

this applies to social space as distinct and overlapping fields corresponding

to different spheres of activity and practice, such as the cultural, economic,

social and political (Bourdieu, 1991). These learned practices in turn enable

individuals to negotiate interactions with other individuals in that social

space.

The structures that typify the social spaces such as a prison tend to

modify the habitus to make one choice over another and to privilege one

action over another, that is, the tendencies to regularly engage in certain

practices as compared with other practices. Bourdieu claims there is a limit

to the possibilities ‘allowed by the perceptual framework corresponding to

any habitus. What sets this limit and lies beyond it is Bourdieu’s doxa. To

question the doxa is an act essentially in the order of heresy, for it is to

question the very basis on which not just particular practices or dispositions

ultimately rest, but on which the very system that is the basis of all

practices in a habitus ultimately rests (Chopra, 2003: 426). Essentially, this

is what happens in a prison environment – on a daily basis as part of prison

routine, and particularly in the case of ‘radical’ Islamic alliances.

Importantly, the doxa is habitus-specific, thus implying that what is doxa for

inhabitants of one habitus need not necessarily be doxa for the inhabitants

of another. Again, this mirrors the relationship between prison management

and detainees.

As mentioned above, the habitus inherent in (Islamic) religious

practice in Australia generally, and within prisons specifically, indicates an

unequal distribution of power and resources. The performance of Islamic

rituals, or the relations that structure a field, operate as a non-negotiable

currency of exchange in relation to the institutional rituals of the dominant

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society and the prison. On the other hand, Islamic practice embodied in

prisoner habitus does translate as valid capital for the field.

The prison (field) as an autonomous institution and structure with

specific fields and prison Islam as a field within a field, yet inmates come

into the prison environment with their individual habitus conditioning the

functioning of social space shared by other groups of people. Bourdieu

argues that social practices are generated through the interaction of

agents, who are both differently disposed and unequally resourced, within

the bounds of specific networks which have a game-like structure and

which impose definite restraints upon them. (Crossley, 2002: 171). Further

theoretical analysis will continue in the next section examining social

solidarity.

5.8.2 Social solidarity and social cohesion

Social solidarity and cohesion are concepts relevant to further

explore relationships between community members in relation to the

position of outsiders to that of whole societies, towns and villages, families

and clubs. The different worlds of meaning that manifest within them, and

the sense of identity, belonging and orientation that members variously

have and feel towards them (Crossley 1996: 92) refers to the manner, for

example, in which one group ‘constructs’ the other and then institutes and

enforces an identity upon that group and a partitioning and differential

treatment of them. Crossley (1996) examines an example of racist ideology

(see also Gilroy 1992; Goldberg 1993) (There Ain’t No Black in the Union

Jack and Racist Culture respectively). These are what Crossley names as

‘hatred ideologies’, but the converse is the feeling of belonging to a

community, especially when one is away from it. This result is the

community members’ sense of self is bound to a sense of the group: the

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group’s central myths and symbols tend to be interwoven with the personal

narratives of its members because their personal history coincides with that

of the group (Crossley 1996: 93). The group members ‘thinking as usual’ is

the style of thinking which is accepted, valued and which works in those

groups, since it is from those groups that this thinking (largely) derives.

They thus find that they ‘fit’ in this group more easily than in others (ibid.:

94), and the members have an identified place in the group meaning they

are recognised and have status.

These perspectives inform a general insight into the intricacies of

social formation which can then be applied to social movements and social

movement theory. For example Schutz demonstrated that a community is

more than a mere population of people in a space; that it is constituted

through interlocking systems of roles and taken-for-granted assumptions,

which are activated in and through interactive praxes (in Crossley 1996:

95). But this is where the parochial intimacies observed by Schutz are

negated to a large degree by prolonged periods of ‘rationalisation’ which

has effectively routinised and instrumentalised many social spheres, not to

mention globalized and standardised most cultural forms (ibid.: 96). “The

social world, according to this view, is regulated by large impersonal

bureaucracies whose modus operandi negates the significance of

particularistic cultural norms and values” (ibid.). It is the loss of certain

‘interdependencies’ that Elias (1978b) (What is Sociology) identifies as

emotional, physical, and financial dependencies, all of which have been

shown to be central to the construction of solidarity and dynamism of social

life. It is such interdependencies which ensure that no one person in a

group can act without affecting all of the others (ibid.). At one level the

degree of adaptability of people to conform to certain proscribed social

norms is evidenced by the degree of conflict in society. For Indigenous

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collectivities, the trauma associated with continued socioeconomic

inequality does not appear to have spread to reparative or conciliatory

outcomes.

The theoretical value of incorporating this schema is to enable a

comparison of the strength or weakness of social ties as they affect

Indigenous people before and after ‘conversion’ or alignment with a Muslim

community. Statistical and empirical evidence suggests various socially

disrupting breaks in the continuity of Indigenous citizenship, hence the

preconditions and presence of Indigenous social movements. Yet the

option exists for alternative religious, spiritual, community, and political

expression and practice. A ‘common-sense’ viewpoint would be to conclude

Indigenous people would try to maintain the “interlocking systems of

roles…” within their own family, kinship, and language groups. But this

outlook does not account for the loss of ‘interlocking systems’ due to the

influences of past bureaucratic, political practices and ‘regimes of truth’

(Foucault, 1980). Even when these links are reinstated, they are not

always complete or satisfactory. However, this does not exclude the

cultural connection as Indigenous nor rule out a parallel process of

‘belonging’ in multiple communities. As discussed briefly above, the

analytical task is to identify and examine the social factors influencing the

motivations of individual actors to engage collectively. This involves

examining Indigenous perceptions of ‘belonging’ to community and how this

influences further decisions. Further to this angle of enquiry are the way

structures of dominance effect underlying conditions influencing

empowerment and solidarity potential. An unqualified hypothesis suggests

proximity to, and acceptance of, cultural difference are important

preliminary conditional states prior to engagement with Islam. Tarrow

(1998: 20) describes a similar process as “political opportunity structures”.

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5.9 Social movements

The following definitions and conceptual variations regarding social

movements are presented as a cross-section of different authoritative

perspectives. The aim is to construct a) a conceptual and theoretical

benchmark for analysing the social process of religious conversion as a

new social movement; and b) to locate the particular variation of Islamic

conversion in a political context. The hypothesis informing these aims is to

suggest that Indigenous conversion to Islam understanding the process is

based on an awareness of a politicised Islamic movement.

Crossley (2002: 8) claims social movements as “key agents for bringing

about change within societies” Social movements are…”natural

experiments in power, legitimation and democracy. Their existence,

successes, failures and more generally their dynamics, though all incredibly

difficult to read and interpret, allow us to gauge the workings of the broader

political structures of our society” (ibid.: 9).

Burgmann (2003: 4) describes social movements as social and

distinguished by movement and operates at the level of civil society unlike

a purely political movement. “The possibilities for opposition and protest in

the global era are enhanced if a social movement has a trans-national

framework”: this links to signs of an emerging alternative civil society

(Cohen and Rai 2000: 16 cited in Burgmann 2003: 4).

For Indigenous peoples, a persistent dilemma arises regarding the

need and advisability of forming alliances with those other peoples and

organisations with similar yet distinct purposes and objectives (Morris 1996:

215).

The ability to confront, through electoral politics, the structural obstacles posed by the settler state to Indigenous self-determination presents not only a formidable practical problem, but also an inherent contradiction

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between expressions of independent Indigenous sovereignty and Indigenous participation in the system of the colonizing settler state (ibid.).

According to Burgmann (2003) official policies toward Indigenous

Australians have long contributed to the fragmentation of their communities

and rendered political mobilisation difficult. Indigenous Australians do not

represent a large enough segment in Australian society to feel they can be

an effective participant in mainstream politics (Fleming 1996). This is not to

deny significant and enduring agency on the part of numerous Indigenous

organisations and groups to collectively unite for political purposes. The

Tent Embassy19 began as a response to the then Coalition Government's

refusal to recognise land rights. The ‘embassy’ is only one of many

historical and contemporary resistance and activism movements

demonstrated by Indigenous individuals and groups. Fleming notes that in

relation to Native American people and other minority groups in the United

States,

Indian people, in the main, do not feel they are part of the mainstream, nor do they necessarily wish to be. This is, in part, because American Indians were for the most part, unwillingly consumed by American society” (Fleming 1996: 234).

Comparisons could be made here to the similarities of the forcible

attempts to incorporate Indians into American society and Indigenous

Australians into Australian society. For American Indians it was the

reservation system, and in Australia a similar system existed to firstly

isolate, and then assimilate Indigenous Australians. A common response to

this treatment continues in the form of belief that government and other

paternalistic organisations and individuals were acting in the best interests

19 The Aboriginal Tent Embassy has become part of Canberra's physical and political landscape. It has intermittently existed on the lawns of Old Parliament House since Australia Day 1972 and permanently since Australia Day 1992. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/chron/1999-2000/2000chr03.htm

226

of Indigenous peoples. For both American Indians and Indigenous

Australians “it is no wonder that with histories of oppression and cultural

genocide, the first peoples’ of North America and Australia view their

federal governments’ political processes with suspicion” (Fleming 1996:

236). The underlying issue is one of the suppression of Indigenous identity

due to assimilation and integration policies, and unwillingness through

increasing awareness that historical wrong-doings have never been

satisfactorily resolved for Indigenous Australians. This became obvious

during the process of data gathering, with questions asked for the

Indigenous respondents’ understanding of these historical events. A later

chapter will examine and discuss the impacts of socio-political processes

and Indigenous affairs. .

Communities can be communities of affection and shared material

life, like families; they can be communities of interest, like political lobby

groups; they can be communities of shared commitment or history, such as

religious or ethnic groups (Maddox 2001). The ‘Aboriginal community’ and

the Islamic community are terms of identity often functioning on multifarious

levels, while also containing numerous local and descent-based

communities within them. Communities exist within a wider society but not

all communities are fixed. At times people move, or find that they have

been moved, beyond the affective or organisational ties of a community to

which they once belonged, and to which they may still feel a kind of

(changed) belonging. Indigenous actors may join with Muslims but remain

attached or detached to any number of social, cultural, and political

combinations of community. Moreover, the picture needs to include not only

intersections or conflicts between communities at the same level, but also

among or between higher and lower level communities, from the family to

the state and at all levels in between.

227

These instances do not exhaust the range of ways in which a

person fits into the web-like network of the state, society and community.

As communities of resistance demonstrate repeatedly, people often rely on

ties – affective, organisational and more loosely associative – to protect

them against the efforts of the dominant society to impose itself upon them,

or to shape it in a particular form (Maddox, 2001). An important and

somewhat influential social movement is that of the anti-globalisation

network. One of its platforms critiques the spread of neoliberal economic

reform (Burgmann, 2003). At a local level the implication of reform instituted

social change is demonstrated by increasing gradients of inequality in

society. When individuals engage in collective protest action or solo acts of

resistance which are supported by webs of association, they assert their

membership in particular communities against the wider society. In the

case of Indigenous and Muslim alignment, it is not difficult to suppose that

this engagement would elicit differing responses from other members of the

wider society. When the location of individuals and their various

communities within a competitive market economy is taken into account,

the situation becomes more complex. Barber (1996: 30-1) points out that

cultural, sexual, and ethnic identities may be intersected by market and

civic identities which pull individuals in a number of different directions.

For the purposes of this study it is hypothesised that Indigenous

actors align with existing communities of like-minded people who are both

potential emancipators and empowering agents. Historically this has

included liberal-minded settlers and administrators, trade unions,

communists, green movements and environmentalists, and various

sections of academia and the political left. However, it is useful to

differentiate between cooperative, collaborative and consensual alliances

and those where Indigenous knowledge is used to empower or promote

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non-Indigenous interests. Indigenous relations with the Communist Party of

Australia have been explained by Geoff McDonald (1982) in Red Over

Black: Behind the Aboriginal Land Rights. One of the main concerns raised

by McDonald is that Aboriginal land rights and a possible treaty would be

used to establish a separate Aboriginal nation under Communist

domination (1982: 13). There is an interesting parallel between the fear of

Communism in post WW11 Australia, and the fear of global political Islam

in a post September 11 environment. In both cases, the association of

Aborigines firstly as dupes of communists and then Islamic radicals will

require further investigation. That Indigenous prison inmates are taken

advantage of by opportunistic (radicalised) Muslims is a common

perception, yet this viewpoint overlooks the idea of mutual recognition. Both

Indigenous and Muslims ‘know’ repression and discrimination as applied

mechanisms of the dominant society. However, the inequitable collective

advantage of mainstream society is neutralised to some extent by minority

groups creating new, and strengthening old, affiliations and associations.

The combination of ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Islamic’ is one instance where the

numeric, religious, cultural, political and social frameworks of established

power and advantage is able to be reassessed. However, from the

perspective of mainstream society and sections of the media and

government, these alliances were seen as a threat to the order and make-

up of Australian society. This is just one example of how power and

authority define the continuing disputes over Indigenous well-being and

entitlements by engaging in divisive and unproductive debates. Invariably it

involves contested notions of identity framed within ideological definitions of

nation, culture and religion. Contested or oppositional ideologies such as

the communist atheist east and the democratic Christian west have moved

out of academic favour, yet as one trend disappears another emerges. The

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authoritarian Muslim east and the democratic secular west are descriptions

loaded with meaning and portent. The galvanising effect of September 11

and the continuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have ensured media

prominence of speculative Islamic radicalism. Similarly in the early stages

of Indigenous resistance and protest activity which gained national attention

with the ‘freedom rides’ in 1965, Indigenous activism was seen as

threatening to the legal deception of terra nullius and the lie of peaceful

colonial settlement. These are emotive and powerful images to incorporate

into previous histories notable for what they did not discuss. The

Indigenous protest movement was, and remains, by any of the definitions

outlined, a social movement. As a social movement it makes demands

against the nation-state but nevertheless exists in a global environment

linking it to other groups with common interests.

Two other relevant examples are the ‘imagined communities’ of

black Americans contesting their oppression and disadvantage originating

from slavery. Another is the collective solidarity of Indigenous responses to

deaths in custody and the stolen generations. Maddox (2001: 17) defines a

collective or individual protest or acts of resistance which are supported by

webs of association, assert their membership in particular communities

against the wider society. Both of these geographically distinct and diverse

groups ‘recognise’ each other as resisting discourses of colonialism and

oppression. For some Indigenous Australians, their alignment with Islam

provides an opportunity to apply social movement theory, or collective

action theory (Oberschall 2004) as a method of understanding these

relationships.

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5.10 Collectivities and movements: joining the link s

Categorising Indigenous social movements is uncontroversial in that

numerous movements past and present represent a social “process of

confrontation characterised by capacity for protest” (Burgmann 2003: 4). In

this sense, these movements are ‘imagined communities’ of the oppressed,

disadvantaged or threatened (ibid.). The solidarity of Aboriginal

communities against ‘deaths in custody’ is an ongoing assertion of identity

membership. In the case of Indigenous actors aligning with Islam, ‘identity

politics’ is reconstructed into ‘new collective identities’, but combining

identity politics with a reflexive monitoring within the new Muslim dominated

group or community. Bagguley (1999: 75-76) states that: “Social

movements are centrally an expression of collective reflexivity and not just

an aggregation of, nor merely an arena for, self-reflexivity”.

In reality, and based on the tenets of Islam, the demographic within

any Muslim community is diverse. Yet within the Muslim collective, socially

shared activities and beliefs directed toward the demand for change or the

maintenance of order are difficult to analytically separate. This is partly due

to the internal order and construct of the community as an Islamic

community, with its intrinsic socio-religious configuration, and its variable

reflexive attitude and propensity to engage or not engage with the dominant

non-Muslim society. Civil engagement may be driven by positive (welfare,

pastoral or social justice) or negative issues such as anti-discrimination

campaigns. Day-to-day social interaction is likely to be no different to any

other in an ethnically diverse society. Differences may occur, however,

within ethnically concentrated communities, leading to more specific

cultural practices as a result of individual and community influenced

habitus. Discernable markers of difference (or distinction) such as clothing

become less ‘visible’ within discreet communities. On the other hand, for

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Muslims, especially women, the issue of unconditional social acceptance of

the hijab and burqa is contingent and area specific. Clothing carries certain

visible clues as to the ethnicity and religious orientation of the wearer.

Unfortunately, media and political comments regarding Islamic dress tend

to polarize the population and maintain attitudes based on ‘us’ and ‘them’.

From a sociological perspective it is hazardous to assume collective

action as “a unified datum” (Melucci 2000: 25). Rather, it is more productive

to “discover the plurality of perspectives, meanings and relationships which

crystallize in any given collective action” (ibid.). Maddox (2001) provides a

slightly different perspective to Melucci, in that different groups at different

times move between and within certain social movements. This perspective

allows a certain analytical space to investigate the dualities of Indigenous

issues and those of the Muslim collective. Theoretically, Indigenous actors

could maintain existing cultural and social relations within discreet kinship

and community networks while simultaneously engaging with Muslims and

Islamic life-world criteria. The underlying hypothesis in advancing this

perspective is the knowledge of broad Indigenous discontent with the

normal channels of political communication. Burgmann (2003: 7) makes the

point:

When people make what they perceive to be eminently reasonable demands upon relevant authorities and find these authorities either resistant or incapable of offering redress, direct action is a common resort, and the formation of a social movement a logical outcome.

Burgmann’s (2003) comment could be extended to conclude that if

not the formation of a social movement, then disappointment, resentment,

disempowerment, and misrecognition are likely to simmer and foment.

These feelings are more pronounced when long-term grievances continue

to be inadequately addressed as is the case for many Indigenous people.

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5.11 Discussion and conclusion

In this section the analyses of the sociological themes of

globalisation, neoliberalism, secularism and nationalism have outlined

conceptual and theoretical insights into various socio-cultural influences at

global and local levels. The groups in society most likely to benefit least

from neoliberal policies are those who have been historically marginalised.

The increasing social problems of uneven wealth distribution can be linked

to the excesses of neoliberal ideologies. For many Indigenous Australians

inter-generational disadvantage continues.

The contemporary paradigm for the democratic West presents the

paradox of competing fundamentalisms. The reality for the West generally,

and the United States specifically is revenge driven by righteousness,

intolerance and long term historical resentment. Cordesman (2004) writes:

“The US is not the political, economic, and social model for every culture

and every political system”20 (2004: iii). The difficult question arises as to

how Australian Muslims are responding to the predicament of those whose

normal daily routines are being absorbed into the discourses of insecurity

and fear. Anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiment exists in some

sections of the Australian community, and this is historically linked to

conservative ideas resisting cultural and religious differences.

The secular nature of Australian society belies the fact that previous

and present governments benefit from Christian-based financial and voter

support. As the number of Muslims increases, the long-held tensions

regarding Australian identity are also challenged. Australian nationalism

was borne out of an alliance with Anglo-Christian values and social

20 This statement carries further credence following the US then global financial meltdown in late 2008.

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constructs, yet mainstream Christian religions are now in decline while

Buddhism and Islam are on the increase (ABS, 2006).

The socioeconomic conditions of many Indigenous Australians

remain below that of other Australians. The inequality divide appears to be

widening rather than closing. Unresolved symbolic issues complicate and

intensify a quest for resolution. The degree to which Indigenous people

engage with Islam because of long term unresolved social exclusion is yet

to be determined, yet a ‘common bond’ exists at some levels of society.

Islam in Australia is placed in an invidious position of defending

against implied connections with events not of its making. Global political

and religious conservative influence assisted by market fundamentalism

suggests a confluence of ideology and reactive forces. One part of the

reactive force is the struggle of Indigenous and Islam to gain legitimacy

where propriety is in short supply.

Research continues to analyse the disadvantages of globalisation,

particularly in the areas of neoliberal economic and political practices as

dominant regimes. Since the events of September 11, a resurgent

literature has emerged explaining the fundamentalist aspect of Islam and

the threat to global and internal nation-state security. And literature

abounds with histories of oppression and consequent efforts to seek the

freedom to exert cultural, religious, and political autonomy. This literature

points to both positive and negative influences determining the retraction of

some religious faiths in the advance of secularism, and the resurgence of

other faiths in response to secularisation and anomie associated with late

modern societies.

For Indigenous Australians increased depersonalisation and

alienation exists in an increasingly stratified society. With the retraction of

the welfare state and advances of neoliberal policies many Indigenous

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peoples continue to be made dependent on the state. Economic

management and policy outcomes driven by neoliberal ideology does not

appear to have substantially benefited those who are least able to effect

social change.

This section has linked historical and contemporary issues probing

tensions and relationships between globalisation and inequality, neoliberal

political and economic ideology, secularisation and religious resurgence,

and multiculturalism and social exclusion. Within these analyses the

religious community dimension is included to gain an understanding of the

specific dynamics associated with an Islamic oriented Indigenous

participative relationship. An Australian focus positions Indigenous actors

as choosing their destiny in a sensitive political climate tempered by global

events and a resurgence of social conservatism and economic

fundamentalism. The section outlined and discussed major macro-

sociological frameworks which established the context for considering the

influences conditioning the decision by Indigenous Australians to convert to

Islam. The conclusions demonstrated the complexity of social relations

concerning political ideology, multiculturalism, national identity, and

religious belief and practice. The analysis was concerned to identify how

Indigenous inequality is trapped in sets of hierarchical social relations. It is

argued that hierarchical power relations remain as a feature of

contemporary society and although subtle in there appearance they are

pervasive in their application.

This chapter has contextualised and drawn together the theoretical

and conceptual issues discussed in the literature review by developing and

applying an overall theoretical and analytical model. Conventional

approaches to religious conversion were discussed first and later compared

with the experiences of Indigenous converts to Islam. The application of

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Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ has assisted in understanding the situation of

Indigenous peoples by examining the generative processes giving rise to a

certain habituses and the individual sets of dispositions and schemas

and/or the collective interpretive resources and lifeworlds of specific social

groups and communities (Crossley, 2002 173).

The behaviour of groups and communities is governed by their

subjective interests, which favours a sociological question asking why

members of one particular group might share a particular disposition to

collectively align in with other groups. The particular dispositions, schemas,

styles, and know-how common among groups and individuals with similar

social problems are likely to form common alliance for collective gain. This

is relevant for groups perceived as ‘outsiders’ in relation to ‘mainstream’

groups. These questions are significant in the case of Indigenous alignment

with Islam particularly considering the ethnic, cultural and social

differences. Yet the issue is not so much with the internal dynamics of the

Indigenous/Islamic relationship, but with the combined Indigenous and

Islamic alignment and the reactions, attitudes, and discourses emanating

from mainstream sources. However, there are compelling analytical

reasons for understanding the rhetorical resources and the discursive work

done by differing constructions of the social relationships both before and

after engaging with Islam (in the case of Indigenous adherents) see

Augoustinos et al. 1999.

The theoretical application of Bourdieu’s enables a comprehensive

coverage of influences from macro global effects to micro social

psychological analysis. This involves a need to understand historical and

contemporary influences as they relate to various sociological theories and

concepts, such as the structural ‘contradictions’ or tensions which generate

potential grievances embedded in lived experiences.

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These perspectives provide a benchmark for examining the

complex relationships between capitalist societies; the historical and

sociological factors influencing Indigenous societies; and how social

injustice manifests in personal and intergenerational dysfunction. Fraser

(1995: 68) claims that ‘cultural domination supplants exploitation as the

fundamental injustice’. The corollary of cultural domination is cultural

recognition, and struggles for recognition occur in a world of exacerbated

material and socioeconomic inequality. The basic argument made in this

chapter is that Islam defends a cultural politics of difference and

compliments a politics of equality. The actual religious conversion process,

therefore, becomes enmeshed in history, culture, politics, and religion.

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6.0 Islam & Australian society: themes and perspectives 6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed and analysed the underlying

conditions ultimately leading to the over-representation of Indigenous

people in the criminal justice system generally, and prisons in particular.

This was found to be strongly related to regimes of continuous historical

control and governance leading to fractured and displaced communities

and individual alienation.

To contextualise the place of Islam in Australian society a historical

overview of Muslim contact is discussed in the following section beginning

with the Macassan influence in Northern Australia dating back to the late

16th century. In the 1850s Muslims arrived as ‘Afghan’ cameleers during the

exploration and pastoral development of inland Australia. Muslim Malays

followed in the 1870s during the lead up to the 1901 introduction of the

Immigration Restriction Act. Since the arrival of the Afghans, Ottoman

Turks, Albanians and Javanese have settled in Australia. The era of the

White Australia policy meant that only white European immigrants were

able to settle in the country. The most recent and populous phase of

Muslim immigration began during the 1970s and has continued in varying

degrees to the present day. During this period Turkish Muslims, Lebanese-

born Muslims, and Bangladeshi-born Muslims also established

communities in Australia (Kabir, 2003). The following Tables adapted from

the 2006 Australian Bureau of Statistics identify relevant quantitative

aspects of Islam and Australian society.

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Table 4 Australian Muslims - 2006 Census Religion by Count of Persons 1996 2001 2006 Christianity 12,582,764 12,764,342 12,685,836 Buddhism 199,812 357,813 418,756 Islam 200,885 281,578 340,392 Hinduism 67,279 95,473 148,119 Judaism 79,805 83,993 88,831 No religion 2,948,888 2,905,993 3,706,555 Not stated 1,550,585 1,835,598 2,223,957 Total 17,752,829 18,769,249 19,855,288 Table 5 Religions in Australia Religion by Percentage 1996 2001 2006 Christianity 70.9% 68.0% 63.9% Buddhism 1.1% 1.9% 2.1% Islam 1.1% 1.5% 1.7% Hinduism 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% Judaism 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% No religion 16.6% 15.5% 18.7% Not stated 8.7% 9.8% 11.2%

Table 6 Muslims in Australia by State and Territory Muslims by State/Territory: 2006 Census Data: State % of Population Calculated No. NSW 2.6% 170,279 VIC 2.2% 108,512 QLD 0.5% 19,522 SA 0.7% 10,600 WA 1.2% 23,509 TAS 0.2% 953 NT 0.6% 1,157 ACT 1.3% 4,212 Table 7 Muslims in Australia by Capital Cities Muslims by Capital City: 2006 Census Data: City % of Population Calculated No. Sydney 3.9% 160,648 Melbourne 2.9% 104,185 Brisbane 0.8% 14,104 Adelaide 0.9% 9,952 Perth 1.5% 21,676 Hobart 0.3% 601 Darwin 0.9% 654 Canberra 1.4% 4,523

• In 2006, Islam was the third largest religion after Christianity and Buddhism, representing 1.7% of the population (340,392 Muslims).

• Hinduism was the fastest growing religion with a 55% increase from 2001 to 2006. The next fastest group was “No religion” (Agnosticism, Atheism, Humanism, Rationalism) with a 28% increase.

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• The rate of Muslim increase dropped from 40% in 2001 to 21% in 2006. The total population increased by 5.8% in 2006.

• In 2006, 48.7% (almost half) of Muslims were less than 25 years old, compared with 33% for the total population.

• In 2006, 47% (almost half - 160,000) of Muslims were Sydneysiders. • Tables 1 – 4 adapted from 2006 ABS census

6.2 Analytical and methodological overview

The analysis in this chapter will focus on the various stages of

Islamic presence and migration to Australia. It will be argued that racial and

economic discrimination experiences by Muslims in Australia became

institutionalised since the arrival of the Afghans and varying degrees of

discrimination and racism have continued to impact on present generations

of Muslims. Summary comparisons will be made of how Indigenous people

and Muslims find collective solidarity because of enduring and collective

histories of discrimination. This discussion will lead to the prison experience

of both groups and how alliances are formed based on similar themes of

marginalisation. The importance of employing a broad socio-historical

critical methodology is restated because of the strong linkage between past

events influencing the present. The following review outlines Islamic

influences and social relations in Australia since the sixteenth century, with

a focus on comparing social interactions between the dominant settler

society, Muslims, and Aborigines.

6.3 Islam in Australia: a sociological and historic al overview The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of Islamic

influences and social relations in Australia since the 16th century, and to

compare social interactions between the dominant settler society, Muslims,

and Aborigines. The purpose is to develop a background context for

understanding current relationships based on successive waves of Islamic

influence in Australia. The argument is made that from the earliest contact

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with Aborigines, Muslim explorers, traders, labourers, and immigrants have

imparted experiences significantly different to those of the dominant settler

society. These differences are accentuated by contemporary retrospectivity

linked to Indigenous struggles for equality. On one hand there is continuity

of generational mutual recognition and links to early Muslim contacts, while

on the other hand, the birth of Australian nationalism has forged outcomes

rooted in discrimination, inequality, and non-recognition. The various

phases of Islamic influence in Australia began with the Macassan Muslim

contact in the 16th century, to the 21st century multicultural influence of

Muslims numbering more than 350,000 of whom 128 904 were born in

Australia and the balance born overseas (ABS, 2006).

6.4 Phases of Islamic influence in Australia

Several different phases of Islamic influence have occurred in

Australia. The first pre-European settlement phase concerns the visits to

the north coast of Western Australia, Northern Territory and Queensland as

early as the 17th century by Macassan fishermen (Worsley, 1955;

MacKnight, 1976). The second phase dates from 1788 onward with the

arrival in Australia of Indian and Arab Muslim convicts, Afghan camel

drivers and Indian hawkers and pedlars (1867 – 1910), Malay divers (circa

1870), and Turkish and Lebanese migrants from the late 1900’s (Jupp,

2001; Mathews, 2005; Kabir, 2003; Humphrey, 1989). The most recent and

populous wave of Muslim immigration began during the late 1960s and

early 1970s with the arrival of settlers from Iran, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

South Africa, and Albania. During the 1990s Muslims arrived from Somalia,

Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iraq and Fiji (ABS, 2006).

The occurrence and influences of Islam in Australia which stretches

back to early 15th century pre-European occupation, beginning with the

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claim that Chinese Muslim Admiral Cheng Ho21 visited the northern

coastline of Australia in 1404-1433 in a fleet of open-sea ships (Menzies,

2002). The first maps of Australia were produced by the Persian Muslims

Muhammad Ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi and Abu Isak Al-Farisi Istakhari in 820

CE and 934CE respectively (Cooper, 2007). The map of the Sea of Java by

al-Khwarizmi shows Cape York Peninsular, as a "V" shaped Gulf of

Carpentaria and a curved Arnhem Land. The later map of Abu Isak Al-

Farisi Istakhari also includes an outline of the northern coast of Australia

from the Kimberly to the Townsville area (Underwood, 2005). Although it is

claimed Muslim Chinese explorers mapped sections of the northern and

eastern coasts of Australia in the fifteenth century (Fitzgerald, 1953;

Menzies, 2002), Macassan fishermen and traders from the east-Indonesian

archipelago sought trepang22 (bêche-de-mer or sea slugs) from the shallow

waters of the northern Australian coastline. The Macassan fishing and

trading activities forms a basis for contrasting contemporary Muslim and

Indigenous alliances by tracing the historical and sociological aspects of

political, social, and cultural changes. The following section explains the

Maccassan and Indigenous relationships and how they established a

benchmark from which successive Indigenous and Muslim experiences are

measured.

21 According to Menzies, Admiral Zheng He and his fleet circumnavigated the world in the fifteenth century and visited Australia long before any European explorers. Menzies claims that the great European explorers such as Columbus, Magellan and Cook used maps that were based on those drawn by Zheng’s crew in their own exploration of the world (Menzies, 2002). Menzies’ claims have been contested by other scholars.

22 When dried, trepang, (sea cucumber or sea slug) is used as a delicacy in soup, particularly in China, and reached Chinese markets via Timor Laut, Koepang, and Macassar (Worsley, 1955).

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6.4.1 Pre-1788 Muslim contact literature

The literature concerning Muslim contact in Australia before

European invasion falls mainly into the disciplines of archaeology,

anthropology, and history. See Berndt & Berndt, 1954; Tindale, 1926;

Cleland, 2002; Worsley, 1955; McIntosh, 1995; MacKnight, 1976; Mitchell,

1995; Mulvaney, 1989; Russell, 2004; Thompson, 1949. Archaeological

work was conducted by MacKnight at Anuru Bay near Millingimbi in

Arnhem Land in 1966-7, and an extensive study of the literature available

at that time was examined (MacKnight, 1972, 1976, 1981; MacKnight and

Gray, 1970). McIntosh (1996) investigated the links between Macassan and

Indigenous relations and how they are represented in ritual dance in a 1996

cultural festival in Macassar. The methodology in this chapter is to apply a

sociological focus to further investigate and analyse the historical and

anthropological literature. It is noted that the extant scholarship on early

non-European contact with northern Australia is too extensive to allow a

comprehensive review. Instead, the literature dealing specifically with

Muslim and Indigenous aspects will be discussed and analysed.

6.4 2 The Macassan contact

The Macassan fishermen came from Macassar (or Makassar) in the

Southern Celebes (Sulawesi), and visited the northern coast between the

Coburg Peninsular and the Edward Pellew Group from 1720 to 1906,

although the activity may have begun much earlier (Dodson, 2007). Some

islands were visited more than others, with Groote Eylandt commonly

visited but according to Macknight, Melville, Bathurst and the Wellesley

Islands only occasionally (Macknight, 1972: 284; 1976: 36). The seasonal

south easterly trade winds brought the sailors to the Australian coastline,

and the north westerly winds took them back to Macassar several months

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later. Importantly, it is the contact with Aboriginal communities that makes

the Macassan visits significant. The ‘Macassan era’ provides insights into

how non-European Muslim cultures have negotiated social, cultural,

religious, and economic relations differently to those of the imperial Britain.

The Macassans established seasonal camps and processing

factories for curing trepang (Worsley, 1955; Macknight, 1972), and

Aborigines participated in trepang collection and bartered goods such as

turtle shell (Mitchell, 1996). Inter-cultural exchanges between Aboriginal

communities and the Macassans encroached little on the Aboriginal way of

life. Macassan influence in Aboriginal culture and history is represented in

varied ways. For example, cave paintings depicting traditional Macassan

sailing vessels or ‘prau’ demonstrate the enduring socio-cultural importance

of the Macassan and Indigenous relations (Mathews, 2005). Macassar

artefacts have been found by numerous archaeological studies in

Aboriginal settlements along Australia’s north-west coastline (MacKnight,

1976). The Macassan and Indigenous cross-cultural interactions were

precursors to an almost unbroken Muslim presence and association with

Aborigines in modern Australian history.

MacKnight (1976) describes the process of contact between the

Macassans and numerous Indigenous tribes as one based on a maritime,

commodity-based economy, with the Aboriginal people maintaining a

coastal economy. The work which Aborigines performed ranged from diving

for trepang, and constructing smoke houses for curing the sea slug.

Aborigines engaged in fishing, firewood cutting and well-digging.

Effectively, Indigenous peoples engaged in viable and productive labour

exchanges underpinned by aspects of mutual benefit and trust. Yet there

appeared to be no ‘equivalent value’ concept in terms of labour exchange.

This is perhaps due to the political function associated with the primacy of

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ceremonial or ritual practices over purely economic considerations. Kinship

was the underpinning social organisation, and the Macassarese were

considered as ‘brothers’ (Worsley, 1955). The exchanges were also

significant because they were free of the exploitation commonly associated

with the class dominance and modern capitalism since the arrival of

Europeans – a system surviving for several decades after colonialism was

established in Australia.

However, in 1907, the Commonwealth Government ended the

trepang trade with Macassar after a lengthy period of harassing the Malays

with customs demands. This was a consequence of increasing control by

the government of the day and by the dictates of the White Australia policy.

Consequently, the productive and mutually beneficial exchanges between

Aborigines and Macassans was abruptly halted. Although the cultural and

trade relations ceased, strong connections were maintained through the

reproduction of rituals, and the influence of Islam remained as the

distinguishing legacy of this period.

6.4.3 Mythology, ritual, and Islam

Anthropologists and researchers have established strong

connections between the Indigenous rituals and some aspects of Islamic

faith. McIntosh (1996) investigated Islamic references in Yolngu mythology

and ritual with the aim of understanding the ways in which aspects of Islam

have been creatively adapted by Aborigines. The extent to which Aboriginal

people reoriented and expanded their existing cosmological, religious, and

social world view to incorporate Macassan influences is a significant issue

given the social and cultural disruption experienced since 1788. Of the

numerous researcher’s examining Macassan and Indigenous contact, it

was Worsley (1955) who concluded that Aboriginal people “transformed

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their history of contact with Macassans into a mythical and ‘Golden Age’”

(1955: 8-10). In Worsley’s opinion this was because of the comparative

difference in the problematic dealings with white society that Indigenous

history of Macassan contact had become an idealised past. This is

significant, because similar idealisations have occurred in other Muslim and

minority group alliances in more recent times. Specifically, Indigenous

Muslim and African American converts have often employed romanticised

versions of past treatment with which to contextualise current relationships

with the dominant society. For example, the slavery era in America has

been ascribed an Islamic focus due to its African origins. Similarly,

contemporary ‘black’ and Indigenous Muslims acknowledge the influence of

the Nation of Islam, Elijah Muhammad and Louis Farrakhan.23) (This

aspect of Indigenous connections to an Islamic framework is discussed in

more detail in a later chapter). Aborigines came to an understanding that

there were other people in the world and that these people followed

different rules (McIntosh, 1996). This understanding was complimented by

the performance of the Wurramu ceremony allowing Aborigines to see

themselves as being part of a network of peoples united by a single law

(i.e. that of Walitha’ walitha also known as Allah) (MacIntosh, 1996). At the

same time it was also a conceptual weapon in struggles against domination

by outsiders (ibid.). There was a significant power imbalance between the

visiting Macassans and Aborigines both in number and material

23 The mission of Eijah Muhammad was to restore and to resurrect His lost and found people, who were identified as the original members of the Tribe of Shabazz from the Lost Nation of Asia. The lost people of the original nation of African descent, were captured, exploited, and dehumanized to serve as servitude slaves of America for over three centuries. His mission was to teach the downtrodden and defenseless Black people a thorough Knowledge of God and of themselves, and to put them on the road to Self-Independence with a superior culture and higher civilization than they had previously experienced. http://www.noi.org/history_of_noi.htm This issue will be discussed further in a later chapter.

246

possessions. Canoes, cloth knives, metal axes, and significantly, alcohol

and tobacco, prompted Aborigines to question why they needed to work for

the Macassans in order to get the things they wanted. They were also

beginning to see themselves as being impoverished in relation to, and even

dependent on, the Macassans. Gradually, Aborigines perceived of having

done something wrong ‘at the beginning of time’. The end result was that a

particular series of historical events came to be seen as having their

foundation in the Dreaming or creational era. Berndt and Berndt (1954)

describe the Macassan mortuary ritual from which they say the Aboriginal

variation was based:

When a Macassan dies, a djira grave-yard is made, and a hole dug in the ground. After the burial, the officiating Macassan sings; the others wait quietly, and when he has finished they all reply djialji! Djilalji! Then the wurramu post is placed on the grave; it is carved to represent the dead man, and symbolises his spirit. Al the Macassans dance for him in a special way, bending forward in a ring with their [backs] to the post, eyes closed and heads bowed. They then open their eyes and sing; and this continues for several hours (Berndt and Berndt, 1954: 61).

The ceremony as interpreted by McIntosh is about an idealized

unity between all peoples through their joint association with a particular

body of law, that is, Birrinydji and Walitha’ walitha, but it is also concerned

with salvation (McIntosh, 1995). The ceremony is symbolic of a historical

association with the ‘Other’. The songs and stories are about a partnership

in ‘law’ between Aborigines and Macassans, but they also functioned to

affirm Aboriginal identity and rights in relation to the ‘Other’ (ibid). This

paradoxical situation indicates high levels of intellectual sophistication able

to interpret, symbolise, and make sense of complex social relations.

Considering that relations between the Macassans and Aborigines

deteriorated significantly in the late nineteenth century both groups

recognised their interdependent histories: “[T]hey are a part of our history,

and we are in theirs. There are laws that bind the groups as one” (David

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Burramurra cited by McIntosh, 1996). However, it is not accurate to say

Aborigines in north east Arnhem Land were or are followers of Islam.

Rather, they absorbed and creatively adapted aspects of Islam suited to

their own needs. The strength of the relationship is indicated by

contemporary native title sea claims by the tradition owners of Croker

Island based on the complex relations between Aborigines and Macassan

fishers (Russell, 2004). The following sections discuss more recent Muslim

arrivals following the establishment of the colonial presence after 1788. The

Muslim groups in this analysis are considered in relation to the socio-

economic pressures of industrialisation and colonial expansion.

6.4.4 Malay Muslim pearl divers

From the early 1870s Malay Muslim divers were employed in the

pearl, pearl shell, and bêche-de-mere (trepang) harvesting industries (Jupp,

2002; Kabir, 2004). Malay Muslims were also crucial to the development of

the sugar industry in North Queensland. In the late 19th century, so-called

'Malays' from South-East Asia were brought to Australia to work as

indentured labourers in the shell-rich waters around Thursday Island,

Darwin and Broome. Employed as divers, cooks, pump hands, and

crewmen, Malays provided shellers with a source of cheap labour. The

work was dangerous, and exploitation was common (Cleland 2002).

Mostly Muslim Malay men without families were recruited through

an agreement with the Dutch to work on Western Australian and Northern

Territory pearling grounds. By 1875, there were 1800 Malay divers working

in Western Australia. Jupp (2002) notes the word ‘Malay’ is used loosely in

Australian historical records, sometimes referring to Macassarese and

Buginese. It was the Buginese and Macassarese who were the first Malay

people to be based temporarily in Australia. The Malay presence was

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seasonal, their camps temporarily established on the mainland coast and

nearby islands, with smoke houses to dry and cure trepang as discussed

above (Macknight, 1976). Because of loose definitions, ‘Malays’ and

Macassarese are sometimes considered the same group, but from a

sociological perspective there is an important distinction. While the

Macassans interacted with Indigenous tribes on the northern shores of the

Australian coastline, the Malays came later to be employed in the pearling

industry. The difference is the relatively peaceful and mutually beneficial

trade and cultural relationships of the Macassans and Aborigines,

compared to the exploitative economic relationship between Malay divers

and their employers.

The dangers of deep diving, the unattractive living conditions, and

low wages effectively discouraged white divers. Malay employees were

concentrated in Broome, which had emerged as a major centre of pearling,

producing 80 per cent of the world’s pearl shell by 1898 (Manderson, 2002:

579). Malays continued to be employed in the pearling industry until the

1960s but some were employed to work on sugar cane and pineapple

estates. The exploitation of immigrant labour to carry out the work ‘white’

labour found physically difficult and intellectually demeaning became a

point of contention in Australian society. Dark skinned workers were

thought to be more suited to the hot humid climate of northern Australia.

Labour shortages encouraged the use of Kanakas24 to cut sugar cane.

These trends indicate a ‘racial’ hierarchy linked to the preference for

Australian labour except for dangerous or unpleasant working conditions.

Following the passing of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901,

exemptions were given for Asian workers because the work was

24 Workers from the South Pacific were brought to Australia, often against their will, to work for British farmers in appalling conditions. After Federation, this practice was eventually stopped and the "Kanakas" deported, as they were seen as unfair competition to the white workforce.

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considered unsuitable for white men. This created a paradox: the cheaper

labour of non-whites became unavailable due to the insistence of

controlling the entry of dark-skinned immigrants.

By the turn of the century, Broome was the world's major

pearlshelling centre. It was home to a varied and sometimes explosive mix

of cultures, that included Malays as well as Japanese, Chinese,

'Koepangers' (usually from Timor), and Aboriginal people. Living conditions

were basic, but in the 1930s the Muslims in Broome established a small

mosque. With the implementation of the White Australia Policy, non-

European indentured labourers were excluded from most industries.

However, the shellers successfully lobbied for an exemption on economic

and racial grounds. A Royal Commission agreed in 1916 that white workers

were unsuited to the physical demands of pearlshelling. Malays continued

to be employed in the industry until the 1970s.

In the postwar years, Malays were at the centre of controversies

that highlighted difficulties in both the White Australia Policy and the

indentured labour system. In 1947, the Chifley government attempted to

deport a group of Malay seamen who had been admitted during the war as

refugees. The plight of these men, many of whom had married Australian

and Indigenous women, won considerable public sympathy. At about the

same time, leaders of the Malay community in Broome came into conflict

with the pearl-shellers when the Malays sought to improve their working

conditions. At the urging of employers these 'troublemakers' were deported

(National Library of Australia, N.D.). Further deportations were thwarted in

1961, when students, unionists and others protested against the treatment

of two Malay pearl divers. Public concern over such cases reflected

growing unease with the operations of the White Australia Policy.

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In the 1950s and 60s another group of Malays were treated very

differently, often invited into the lives and homes of ordinary Australians.

Under a co-operative development scheme known as the Colombo Plan,

thousands of students from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan and

India came to Australia to attend local tertiary institutions. The early Malay

experience was one of labour exploitation which turned to racial

discrimination, yet the work done by indentured labour was not considered

‘white man’s work’. This contradictory situation only served to reinforce the

social hierarchy and cement the claims by white Australians that the

dominant culture remains Anglo-centric and ‘non-white’ labour be

marginalised and exploited.

6.4.5 Cocos and Christmas Islander Muslims

The Australian-administered territories of the Cocos (Keeling)

Islands and Christmas Island are home to several hundred Malays. The

Cocos-Malays are descended from workers brought to the Cocos Islands in

the 19th century to harvest copha. They are Muslim, and have maintained

much of their own culture and traditions. Australia took control of the

islands in 1955.

Chinese and Malay indentured labourers were introduced to

Christmas Island when British interests undertook phosphate mining there

in the 1890s. The industry expanded significantly in the 1950s, attracting

many workers from the Cocos Islands. Christmas Island became an

Australian territory in 1958, but indentured labour arrangements continued

until the 1970s. In recent decades, the Muslim population of Western

Australia has been boosted by arrivals from the two territories. By 1981,

there were more Cocos Islanders on mainland Australia than in the islands

themselves. Communities in Port Hedland and Katanning have built their

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own mosques. In Katanning, Malay participation in the halal meat industry

has increased the town's economic prosperity.

The common themes of exploitation and discrimination continued

with the arrival of the Afghans who as a group contributed significantly to

the exploration and development of inland Australia.

6.4.6 The Afghan influence

The Afghan experience in Australia stretches back over 160 years,

and the outback is littered with small legacies of their giant contribution as

contract labourers brought in with their camels to help build overland

telegraph and rail links in the 19th century. They ferried food to remote

pastoral stations, married Aboriginal women, and built mosques in Broken

Hill, Adelaide, Marree and Perth. To this day, groves of date palms mark

the trails they forged carrying supplies and explorers.

Although vital to Australian development, the cameleers lived on the

margins of society in what became known as "Ghan towns". The White

Australia, an organised labour movement resentful of competition, and the

motor car, signalled the decline of Australia's first Muslim community

(National Library of Australia, N.D.)

Between 1850 and 1900 a sizeable number of Muslims from the

North-West of the Indian sub-continent, popularly known as the ‘Afghans’,

were brought to Australia to work in the private and public sectors (Hassan,

1991). The Afghans became members of camel teams used for exploration

and the cartage of goods and supplies in the outback of Australia. While the

cameleers were called ‘Afghans’, only a minority were from Afghanistan.

The men also came from present-day Pakistan, Iran and Egypt.

The camel teams were more efficient than horses and bullocks in

the drier and sandier remote regions. The construction of the overland

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telegraph line between Adelaide and Port Darwin in 1872 would have been

almost impossible without the expertise of the Afghan cameleers. The

exploration of inland Australia and the establishment of the wool and

industry depended on the camel trains and their Afghan leaders (Kenny

and Jones, 2006). Over a period of sixty years some 2,000-4,000 Afghan

camel drivers came to Australia (Stevens, 1989). As the Afghans were not

allowed to bring their wives to Australia, some married local Aboriginal

women, yet their occupation forced them to live lonely and isolated lives

(Hassan, 1991). In part, this was due to discrimination based on their colour

and ethnicity rather than their Islamic practices (Kabir, 2003). Afghans and

their assistants along with many Indigenous people lived in fringe camps on

the outskirts of some inland centres.25 Furthermore, the Afghan camel

drivers were considered racially inferior which justified their exploitation and

the wider ‘white’ community denigrated the Afghans because they were

perceived to be an economic and racial threat (Kabir, 2003).

The predominant social condition experienced by Aborigines,

Afghans and other minority groups was the impact of race theories based

on Social Darwinism. This was formalised by the enactment of the

exclusionist and discriminatory Immigration Restriction Act 1901 or the

‘White Australia Policy’. However, by the late 19th century, representatives

of all the colonies had discussed the exclusionist immigration policies on

three occasions, in 1880, 1888 and 1896. Under the Immigration

Restriction Act, 1901, all aliens who attempted to enter Australia had to

submit to a medical examination at their first port of call and a dictation test

of fifty words, in any prescribed language specified by the immigration 25 The Ghantown at Marree (Hergott Springs) in South Australia, one of the country's most important camel and railway junctions, remained segregated as late as the 1950s and in its heyday it was called Little Asia or Little Afghanistan. The remains of the oldest mosque in Australia are also near Marree (Stevens, 1989).

253

officer (Willard, 1967). Resident ‘coloureds’ also had to apply for a special

certificate to enter another state. After 1901, this restriction prevented the

camel men from making their customary migration across borders to follow

work opportunities. For about thirty years previously, the Afghans and their

camel trains played a significant role in the exploration and economic

development of the drier regions of the continent. Yet it was mainly

economic discrimination that eventually forced the efficient and better

suited camel trains out of business. Markus (1979: 180) discussed an

important aspect of labour relations in the 1890s:

The arrival of the camel adversely affected the European carriers who were already suffering losses because of a drought and increased competition after the opening of the Nyngan to Cobar railway. A further complication was the standing dispute between the carriers and the pastoralists at the time of the arrival of the camels: it was feared that the new element in the situation would tip the scales in favour of the pastoralists… In the context of the increasingly depressed conditions of European carriers and their battles with the European pastoralists, the Afghans and their camels were especially unwelcome.

Organised white labour unions objected to the practice of Afghans

working for considerably less than Australian workers so the nature of the

conflict was economic, but racial ideas reinforced prejudices and

contributed to discrimination. Despite the racial and economic hurdles, the

Afghans and their camels were crucial to the economic development and

exploration of semi-arid regions. It is with some irony the Afghan cameleers

are now commemorated by that which made them redundant - The Ghan

train in central Australia, which travels on the railway line they helped

create.

The second group of Afghani immigrants arrived in Australia

following the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Over two

million Afghanis fled Soviet attacks on hospitals, schools and mosques.

Australia accepted a small number as refugees which increased the

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Afghanistan-born population to almost 1,000 during the early 1990s. The

majority settled in Victoria and New South Wales. Following the Soviet

withdrawal, factional fighting led to the emergence of the Taliban, which

imposed strict Islamic religious controls on the population. On-going civil

war supported by external countries caused more Afghanis to flee. Some

were accepted by Australia as refugees. A severe drought in 2000 saw

several hundred more Afghani asylum-seekers arrive in Australia by boat

(Museum Victoria N.D.).

While most of the early Afghans had returned to their homeland by

1901, another group of Muslim labourers arrived in Australia during the

latter part of the nineteenth century. These were the Javanese who differed

from the Afghans, both in the nature of their work and relations with their

employers.

6.4.7 Javanese indentured labourers

Javanese Muslim indentured labourers arrived in the north

Queensland town of Mackay in the 1880s to work on the sugar plantations.

The working conditions of this group were conditioned by the dictates of

white plantation owners, and unlike the Afghans who came to Australia as

free labourers, the bonded Javanese, Melanesian, Cingalese and Malay

labourers were often forced to live in prison-like conditions whilst their

labour was exploited by white employers (Kabir, 2004). Following

previously established patterns of exploitation based on definitions of racial

inferiority, the Javanese and other Asiatic indentured labourers filled the

lowest ranks of the economic structure and performed the most menial and

tedious tasks (Kabir, 2003). The similarity between bonded labour and

slavery is made by Schermerhorn (1978) and it is this observation that

cements the doctrine of racism inherent in British colonialism and American

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slave ownership.26 The abolition of slavery by the British but cheap labour

was necessary for the profitable operation of Queensland sugar mills. The

Javanese were ‘suitable’ because “they appeared to be submissive and

skilled in sugar cane plantation work” (Kabir, 2003: 122). The Javanese

were preferable to Melanesians because they could be used continuously

in wet weather, and did not have the same high death-rates as the

Islanders (McGrath, 1976). Hassan observed that the main reason behind

the exploitation of the Javanese was their inability to speak and understand

English (Hassan cited in McGrath, 1976). Over time, there was a

generational relaxation of Islamic practice among the Javanese in Australia

– the Abangan and Santri Javanese Muslims. The Santris were the

practicing Muslims and were very pure in their religion. The Abangans were

only concerned with the ‘customs in their lives’. The first generation was

very religious but successive generations learned about Islam from outside

contacts such as Imam Rane in Brisbane (McGrath cited in Kabir, 2003).

However, the first three generations tended to retain their cultural practices

due to their limited knowledge of English. Prejudice in schools and public

and media discrimination as part of an established pattern. William Lane in

The Worker (1890s):

Are the white men of Australia willing to permit their women and children to be inoculated with loathsome diseases and polluted by the presence of the swarming hordes of Asia? Will the white people who are engaged in business pursuits without a protest suffer themselves to be ousted by Javanese, Syrians, Chinese or Japanese? Should all white people unite to save their race and civilisation from going down before the black, brown and yellow invaders? (Lane cited in Markus, 1979).

26 Slavery in the United States began soon after English colonists first settled Virginia in 1607 and lasted as a legal institution until the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1865 (Bennett, 1966).

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Lane’s commentary is typical of the race-based patriotism of the mid

to late nineteenth century. Contemporary Australian nationalists and

nationalist movements regard the late nineteenth century with nostalgia in

terms of its adherence to the ideology of white racial superiority. Nationalist

movements make direct links to both cheap coloured labour and its

polluting effect in an ‘imagined’ white society. See: National Republicans:

The Movement of Australian Nativism

http://home.alphalink.com.au/~eureka/index.html and William Lane, 1861 –

1917. Nationalism and the labour struggle: The Roots of Australian

Nationalism http://home.alphalink.com.au/~eureka/lane.htm.

Like the Afghans, the Javanese were considered racially inferior,

and as a consequence this group was readily exploited and stereotyped.

The Javanese did not pose a direct economic threat to the white working

class, rather, in the case of plantation sugar production the Javanese were

considered an economic good to be exploited in line with the dominant

ideology of the day.

6.4.8 The Lebanese and Turkish Muslim influences in Australia Lebanese immigration to Australia began in the latter part of the

nineteenth century and the community which now numbers more than

180,000 people has made a profound contribution to the development of

Australia as a nation (ABS, 2006). As for the Turkish-born immigrants, the

multicultural era of the late 1960s and early 1970s led to the arrival of large

numbers of Lebanese-born Muslims. According to ABS figures, the number

of Lebanese-born Muslims has increased from 3,407 in 1971, to 181,751 in

2006. The Lebanese constitute the largest Muslim group in Australia with

the first Lebanese-Muslim Association founded in 1956. The Imam Ali

Mosque in Lakemba was completed in 1976 and is now one of the largest

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mosques in Australia. Australians of Lebanese ancestry live all over

Australia with concentrations of more recently arrived settlers in Sydney

and Melbourne. During the 15 years of war in Lebanon beginning in 1975,

750,000 people fled Lebanon as refugees to Europe, the USA or Australia

(ABS, 2006). Lebanese migration and settlement in Australia has been one

of the three main waves, with the first two mainly Christian27 and the third,

mainly Muslim. The immigration and settlement experience for each group

has been quite different. The first wave commenced around 1880, although

there were some earlier arrivals. These early immigrants were known as

Syrians but they were classified as Turks by the colonial governments of

the day. The area now known as Lebanon was still under Ottoman control.

Many of these people intended to join relatives in New York but, exploited

by unscrupulous shipping agents, found themselves in Australia instead.

Life was not easy without English or contacts. Undaunted, immigrants with

capital became small businessmen opening warehouses and drapery,

hairdressing and grocery shops. Others quickly helped fill a need for

itinerant hawkers selling their wares all over the country, often supplied by

the newly established shopkeepers and warehousemen. When the hawkers

amassed enough money they opened their own stores, often in country

towns. Once the decision to stay in Australia was made they sent for the

rest of their extended families. The second generation spoke English, were

well educated and entered most professions (Batrouney, 1985).

The great majority of these first migrants were Christians including

Maronites, Orthodox and Melkites. A small number of Druze settled in

South Australia. In Australia many Lebanese Christians supported the

existing Orthodox and Catholic communities. The first Melkite church was

27 The Lebanese Christians are Maronite Catholics, Melkite Catholics and Antiochian Orthodox (M. Humphrey, “Lebanese” in Jupp, ed.. The Australian People, pp. 562-3.

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established in 1895, the first Maronite in 1897 and the first Orthodox in

1901 (Jupp, 2001).

Significant numbers of these migrants or their Australian born

children served in Australia's forces during both world wars. During WWI

when some young men or their parents were still classed as Turks many

enlisted and fought on all fronts. Many became military interpreters in the

Middle East. Many lost their lives. In World War II young men and women

from most families enlisted. They served with distinction in all three armed

forces in overseas conflicts and in Australia (ibid.). Many were imprisoned

and many were killed in the service of their country.

The second wave came between 1947 and 1976 when about 43,000

Lebanese settlers, very few of whom were assisted immigrants, arrived in

Australia (Batrouney, 1985). Nearly all were educated to at least primary

level and many already spoke two languages, Arabic and French, and

quickly learned English. Like the first wave the decision to migrate had

usually been made for economic reasons. Many of these migrants were

"chain migrants" who had come to join other family members or

acquaintances, already settled in Australia, who could offer support. There

were also church and community organisations established by the first

wave ready to help them. In the prevailing climate of high employment jobs

were soon found in factories or businesses owned by community members.

Other newcomers started small businesses of their own, manufacturing

clothing or furniture, opening milk bars and garages or driving taxis. They

worked hard and, in the main, quickly improved their situations.

The outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in 1976 brought about the third

wave of Lebanese settlers. More than 16,000 Lebanese moved to Australia

between 1976 and1981. Many came under the Australian Government's

Special Humanitarian Program. This allowed people who had close

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Australian connections and whose lives and safety were threatened by the

war, entry to Australia. They were not classed as refugees and had to rely

on their own, often very limited, resources and those of their Australian

"connection." They then became part of a chain sponsoring further

immigrants putting an even greater strain on their resources. Many of these

migrants, having experienced war and loss, had few possessions. Most

spoke only Arabic and many had limited or disrupted education. Many were

from rural areas with few skills which could be adapted easily to work in

Australia where there was no longer full employment. As most of these new

arrivals were Muslims, Islamic societies became their focal points. Sunni

mosques were established in both Melbourne and Sydney.

Lebanese community groups in Australia are usually based on religious

affiliations or village associations rather than national identity. These

groups help to meet the differing cultural, settlement and welfare needs of

the people from particular faiths or villages and towns. There are also

Lebanese associations which help bring the different groups together.

Lebanese settlers and their descendents have made a valuable

contribution to the development of the professional, business, political and

cultural life of Australia.

6.4.9 The Albanians in North Queensland The first wave of Albanian Muslims arrived in Australia between

1900 to the 1920s with more arriving after the second European war.

During the decade 1930-1940 Albanian ‘Jugo-Slav’ and Russian (Tatars or

‘white’ Russian Muslims) migrated to Queensland, congregating around the

sugar cane areas of Cairns and Mareeba, and the cotton and tobacco

regions on Brisbane (Underwood, 2001). The following decade saw the

arrival of Muslims from Bosnian, Albanian, Bulgarian and Russian

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backgrounds. Gaining entry to Australia was only the first of many trials that

faced Albanian immigrants. Their lack of English made it difficult to secure

employment, even though most were young and single, eager for

opportunity, and accustomed to hard labour (National Library of Australia,

N.D.) Some moved from Queensland to establish orchards and market

gardens around Shepparton in Victoria. In the 1960s, the Victorian Albanian

community worked to found mosques in both Shepparton and Melbourne.

In Western Australia, Albanians settled as farmers in the wheat and sheep

areas of York and Northam (Kabir, 2006).

When World War 11 came, Albanians in Australia were declared to

be 'enemy aliens'. Their details were registered, and their movements and

activities were monitored. in 1942 the heightened fear of invasion, as well

as reports of fascist sympathisers amongst some Italian and Albanian

settlers, led to widespread internments in Queensland. Eighty-four

Albanians were interned, although most were released after seven or eight

months in camps at Enoggera and Cowra. Some were later called up to

work on construction projects with the Civil Aliens Corps (ibid.).

6.4.10 Islam and Australian ‘fear politics’ Many Muslims in Australia suffer from discrimination and animosity

resulting from media and political propaganda. Indigenous Muslims are

subjected to discrimination based on their Aboriginality and their status as

practicing Muslims. This is not a new development in a post September 11

environment although the problem has become more acute during the

previous decade. Islam and Muslims in Australia have been subjected to

the same nationalistic preference for a dominant white Anglo-Saxon

society. The main difference is the association of Muslims with terrorism,

yet the political response has remained remarkably similar in its ability to

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exploit a politics of fear (Jamrozik, 2002; Lawrence, 2006). Australian

history is limited when it conforms to a ‘white blindfold’ perspective. The

unresolved ‘white Australian issue of the lies associated with British

invasion continue in the form of ‘dog whistle’ politics associating refugees,

‘illegal immigrants’ ‘queue jumpers’ and other ‘threats’ to social cohesion

with the contemporary social and political resurgence of conservative

politics. The social outcomes of a decade of political and economic

conservatism in the U.S. and Australia during the Geoge W. Bush (2001 –

2008) and John Howard (1996 – 2007) regimes has witnessed a retraction

of civil liberties and Indigenous rights in the name of ‘national interest’.

The ability of Islam to offer an ‘alternative’ religious and community

framework in addition to traditional Anglo-Catholic orientations is also a

central theme. The purely ‘religious’ aspect of Indigenous alignment with

Islam is, however, only one aspect of a more holistic and inclusive life-

world. Yet an active and vibrant Islamic presence in Australia in the present

political circumstances raises the perennial issues of national identity and

tests multicultural tolerance. In a post-September 11 environment, public

anxiety, racism and discrimination has increased regarding the presence of

Islam and Muslims in Australia (Wise and Ali, 2008). The importance of

historical and current practices, policies and laws are germane to this

enquiry, in that social circumstances change but the notion of ‘governance

of populations’ only changes in its application, not its intent. To this end, the

search by Indigenous people for alternative and additional means of identity

within Islam affords the opportunity for examining this alliance within the

framework of power relations extending from the global to the local.

6.4.11 Muslim experiences in times of national insecurity

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What has been established so far? Racial discrimination the result

of white superiority, economic expansion, and Australian nationalism - an

ideology rooted in the flawed rationality of British Imperialism and colonial

expansion. Aborigines have always suffered the worst yet ‘coloured’

immigrants have been scapegoats for the belief in a ‘white Australia. The

Afghans discriminated against because of their ethnicity rather than their

religion. Only relatively recently (since 9/11) has the religious dimension of

Islam been a major point of concern. Muslims have become the new source

of social fear. The new social panic is conflated with weak Australian

nationalism, global insecurity, and religious fundamentalism within the

secular Australian society. Yet the flawed rationality associated with a ‘fear

of the other’ is easily tapped by populist media commentators and

politicians. So the current ‘fear of Muslims’ is a continuation of the historical

unease associated with difference in relation to common norms and values.

The historical link with an ‘enemy’, ‘enemy aliens’, and potential

danger to Australia during times of war or perceived threats to national

security is a continuing theme in the socio-cultural landscape of Australian

society. The terminologies of ‘acceptable’, registration, censorship,

surveillance, internment, deportation, ‘security’ classification, and security

threat are employed to discriminate and identify. Members of ethnic groups

who had once conformed to Australian nationalist standards, such as the

Germans and Ottoman Turks, were no longer desirable because their

country of origin was at war with the Empire (Kabir, 2003: 140). Hastings

(1997: 32) makes the observation:

During wartime nationalism flares up extremely quickly against some real or imagined threats and can become “overwhelmingly and irrationally strong” against those threats. It mainly occurs irrationally when a particular ethnicity or nation feels itself threatened and thereby it resorts to defence of its particularist values at any cost.

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The surveillance, discrimination and internment experienced by

Muslims in Australia during both world wars was not because of their

Islamic faith but because they were considered to pose a threat to the

Allied cause. They became the victims of restrictive policies just like other

non-Muslim enemy aliens. The groups most affected were the Ottoman

Turks28 and Indians in Australia29 during World War I, and Javanese

Muslims, Indians and Albanians during WW II. During World War II,

surveillance was confined only to people suspected of ‘disloyalty’ to

Australia. In times of war and/or national security crises questions of colour

and ethnicity were overridden by security factors either to be overlooked in

favour of national service (Javanese Muslims) or stereotyped as threats to

the national security i.e. the Albanians. The Indians, although British

subjects, were also kept under close surveillance, partly due to their

‘potential threat’ to the British Empire. Their demands for the end of British

rule in India in the 1940s coincided with World War II (Kabir, 2003: 184).

The Albanians of North Queensland experienced the most negative impact

during World War II. This was because the Albanian-client government

declared war on the allies in June 1940 (Carne, 1978).

National security and the war with Turkey prompted a skirmish in

Broken Hill otherwise known as “The New Year’s Day Massacre”,

according to a headline in Barrier Daily Truth, 2 January 1915, p. 12. The

two unemployed Afghans from Broken Hill who resorted to violence as “a

mark of loyalty to the Sultan” (Stevens, 1989: 161) Australia being at war

with Turkey assisted the authorities to link the two men with the ‘Turks’

although one was an Afghan and the other an Indian. Their actions were a

28 Ottoman Turks as a group were people who spoke and wrote only the Turkish language, and who worshipped only according to the Muslim faith. 29 The number of Ottoman Turks residing in Australia during the time of WW1 was “only a handful” (Kabir, 2003: 144).

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result of frustration at being unemployed and because of anti-British

sentiment, yet their suicide notes made reference to Islam and the Qur’an.

The affair was politicised by William Morris Hughes, Federal Attorney-

General and Acting Prime Minister. “I see it is alleged to have been an act

of the Turks. If so it shows the necessity for rigid supervision of all enemy

subjects.” The Broken Hill incident had clearly shown the danger of allowing

enemy nationals to be at large (“Marihuana-inspired Patriotism Led to

Battle of Broken Hill”, Daily Mirror, 14 May, 1962, p. 20).

6.4.12 The construction of ‘Lebanese crime gangs’ in Sydney

Lebanese youth in Sydney have become the new ‘moral panic’ as a

collective who are supposedly committing serious crimes in the outer

western suburbs of Sydney ‘Moral panic’ is now a term regularly used by

journalists to describe a process which politicians, commercial promoters

and media habitually attempt to incite (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995).

Ethnic gang rapes, the Cronulla riots, Lebanese drug merchants, and

Lebanese motorcycle members of the motorcycle gang ‘Notorious’ have

attracted heavy media and political commentary.

Sydney is the main centre of Middle Eastern immigration, with

seven out of every ten (107,405 or 72.2 %) of Australia’s Lebanese

immigrants settling in Sydney (Collins 2005: 190-2). Sydney is thus a good

site to explore contemporary issues of immigrant criminality and immigrant

victimology in Australia.

Collins, (2005) uses the framework of moral panic about ethnic

crime in Sydney that has exaggerated the criminality of ethnic minorities.

This moral panic has caused distress for many Australians of minority

immigrant background who are now tarred with the brush of criminality and,

for some, terrorism, particularly in the aftermath of September 11 and the

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Bali and London bombings. This moral panic has reinforced negative

stereotypes about minority communities, is reinvigorating racism and

prejudice and, as a consequence, is threatening the social cohesion in one

of the world’s most successful multicultural societies. Moreover, the moral

panic about ethnic crime has diverted attention away from the meaningful

policy responses that are needed to address matters of crime in particular,

and cosmopolitan societies in general. (Collins, 2005: 192).

The great danger of the current moral panic about ethnic criminal

gangs in Sydney is that the criminality of a few begins to be portrayed as a

criminality of a culture. This leads to the negative stereotyping of many of

Sydney’s diverse immigrant cultures. It also leads to the possibility that

responses and analyses portray ethnic youth crime in Sydney in a very

different way to than response to crime committed by gangs of youth of the

majority Anglo-Celtic background.

6.5 Discussion The sociological implications of the relations between the northern

Australian coastal Aborigines and the Macassans are significant. The

archaeological and anthropological study approaches when examining

cross-cultural interaction often place Indigenous people as passive

receivers of alternative technological cultures. This position overlooks the

significant and sustained Indigenous agency to resist the social and cultural

problems associated with changed social relations resulting from

colonisation. According to Rubertone (1989), when discussing Native

American experiences: “Without political histories, we are denying the

politics of the past that concern Indian people today including their

struggles to preserve their traditional religious beliefs and graves of their

ancestors” (1989: 33). These observations set the tone for two important

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aspects of Indigenous and Muslim relations in Australia. Firstly, the Muslim

life-world of Macassan engagement with Indigenous peoples left an

indelible impression of productive cooperation and inter-cultural exchange.

The alliances indicate aspects of Indigenous agency imbued with functional

mutual recognition of difference. Secondly the later colonising period by the

British was antagonistic to the established relations of both Indigenous and

Muslim. The non-recognition of systematic and beneficial trade and social

relations between Macassans and Northern coastal Aborigines was

symptomatic of the tenets of terra incognito and terra nullius. The concept

of terra nullius relied on the belief that ‘Australia’ belonged to no one.

Claiming the land as terra nullius — 'empty land' or 'land belonging to

nobody' — Europeans set out the foundation of land law that was to last

more than 200 years and have devastating effects on the original

inhabitants of the land. By using the principle of terra nullius, the British

Government claimed sovereignty over Australia, ignoring the rights of

Indigenous people who had lived there for at least 60 000 years (Council

for Aboriginal Reconciliation,

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/orgs/car/index.htm). Furthermore, from the

1850s and before the introduction of the ‘White Australia’ policy

(Immigration Restriction Act 1901) in 1901, Australian governments and

labour unions became increasingly concerned about the presence of non-

white economic immigrants and ‘undesirables’. The intention was to

promote a homogenous population similar to that in Britain. Under “White

Australia” only Europeans, and then mainly northern Europeans, could

immigrate to Australia. The underlying notion of (white) racial superiority is

qualitatively different to that of ‘brotherhood’ which is based more on

kinship, social inclusion, and mutual recognition. The Maccassan and

Indigenous experiences set a precedent for the Muslim individuals and

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groups who found themselves in Australia either as ‘forced labour’ or free

citizens. The pattern of relations was one based on colour discrimination in

favour of ‘white’ Anglo or European settlers and workers. ‘Coloured’

workers were exploited for their cheaper labour cost, and their ability to

work in hot humid climates and in industries unsuited to ‘white’ labour. The

groups in the following sections presented a paradox: they were recognized

for their ability to work in dangerous and low-paid occupations, yet their

presence disturbed the notion of a ‘white’ Australia.

Racial discrimination and social control gained legitimacy from the

deterministic theory of Social Darwinism embedded in the underlying

doctrine of British colonialism. From 1901 onwards, discrimination based on

racial superiority was exercised through the ‘White Australia’ policy. The

Afghans and the Asiatic later arrivals were considered racially inferior

people who could be easily exploited. The Afghans were considered an

economic threat, however, while the other groups were simply exploited.

The underlying desire for retaining racial homogeneity through government

policies drove the economic discrimination directed at Afghans until they

could no longer continue as cameleers. Some Afghans and many

Indigenous people became fringe dwellers who set up shanty town-like

housing on the outskirts of many outback towns. They were segregated

and banished to the periphery of society, having encountered economic

failure and little or no recognition for their invaluable contribution to the

expansion of trade and exploration.

Similar conditions were applied to other non-white immigrants who

were initially valued for their ability to work in conditions unsuited to white

Europeans. The combined fear of racial impurity and employment insecurity

culminated in the White Australia policy. For Muslims in Australia it was

rarely their religious beliefs and practices that attracted discriminatory

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practices but their ethnicity and ‘colour’. For Indigenous Australians

conditions were much worse and they were sometimes shunned even by

the Afghans, who judged them by Islamic values. This did not prevent

them, however, from cohabiting and often marrying Indigenous women to

help cope with their loneliness, isolation and discrimination. Toward the end

of the Afghan era many returned to their home country, while others

remained, serving as forebears to numerous Afghan Indigenous family

groups. Others became economically successful businessmen yet Afghans

who were married to Indigenous Australian or European women were not

entitled to Australian citizenship during their life-time. These relations are

perhaps the most enduring in terms of generational Muslim and Indigenous

alliances yet little is known about many of these genealogies. Partly this

could be due to the social stigma attached to claimed Indigeneity and

Afghan inheritance in times past. However, in many cases there is a

resurgent interest and considerable recognition of belonging as less

attention is focussed on the divisive issues of race and religion. See

Historians Blainey and Windschuttle; Politicians Deakin and Howard; and

‘white labour movement activism.

6.6 Conclusion

The treatment and acceptance of Muslim migrants in Australia with

the exception of the Maccasans was seen to be conditional on their skin

colour, language, and national security rather than their religion. This

changed in the 1990s and after September 11 when Islam became the

focus of concern. The Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, the Madrid

bombing in 2004, the Beslan tragedy of 2004, the Australian Embassy

bombing at Jakarta in 2004 and the 7 July 2005 London bombing have

269

made Muslim extremists the ‘new enemy’ of the West. These tragedies

have also impacted on the daily lives of moderate Muslims residing in the

West.

The comparison between the relatively harmonious and beneficial

relationship between the Macassans and Northern Australian coastal

Aborigines stand in contrast to the racial discrimination of the frontier and

White Australia periods. During this time, Indigenous Australians

established relationships with Afghan cameleers and hawkers and these

unions continue the long link between Aborigines and Islam in Australia.

However, although some mainstream Australians and politicians now vilify

Muslim Australians as ‘terrorists’, Indigenous Australians still suffer the

legacies of a racialised past. For Indigenous Australian Muslims one can

conclude that religion and Indigeneity have become a criterion of

discrimination in contemporary multicultural Australia.

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Indigenous Australians and Islam

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7.0 Governmentality & Indigenous incarceration 7.1 Introduction

Seeking to explain what may cause the disproportionate levels of

involvement of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system is of direct

relevance to this study. Explanations are complex; most identify a number

of factors responsible, but differ as to the combinations of factors thought to

be at work. Some interpretations attribute over-representation to

discriminatory treatment at various stages within the criminal justice

system, including sentencing. Intentional or unintentional bias is often

asserted but difficult to evaluate in a systematic way. Other explanations

look to the incidence and patterns of offending, while many concentrate on

the “underlying issues”, that is, those factors which bring Aboriginal people

into conflict with the criminal justice system in the first place.

The present socio-economic status of many Indigenous Australians

indicates the discourses of social exclusion continue in Australia, and both

Muslim and Indigenous groups share a common marginalised status within

Australian society. While Indigenous Australians suffer the consequences

of a colonial past, both groups are subject to the consequences of a

globalised present, and both are historical and contemporary victims of

political posturing and social suspicion. The aim of this chapter is to

examine and analyse the underlying social conditions and sociological

factors contributing to the over-representation Indigenous people in NSW

prisons. This is relevant because a high Indigenous prison population

relative to non-Indigenous prisoners indicates an enduring social problem.

If high rates of Indigenous incarceration are linked to higher rates of

criminal activity the question of why this is occurring is also relevant.

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7.2 Royal Commissions and conflicting theories

Two significant reports: The Royal Commission Into Aboriginal

Deaths In Custody (RCIADIC) 1991and the Report of the National Inquiry

into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from

Their Families (‘Bringing them home’) 1997 have thoroughly investigated

and made recommendations into Aboriginal deaths in custody and the

stolen generations. The RCIADIC is widely acknowledged as the most

thorough legal enquiry ever conducted into the lives of Aboriginal people

(Marchetti, 2005). The National Report, consisting of five volumes, was

tabled on April 15, 1991 and made 339 recommendations regarding the

underlying issues surrounding the Aboriginal deaths in custody.

The RCIADIC Report argued that the most significant contributing

factor to over-representation was the socially, economically and culturally

disadvantaged position of many Aboriginal people. They belong to a

substantially alienated, marginalised, disempowered segment of Australian

society. Indigenous people are frequently extremely disadvantaged in

almost every aspect of society, especially in terms of life expectancy,

health, housing, education, employment and income. High levels of violence

and substance abuse are often experienced in many Aboriginal

communities.

One of the central findings of the RCIADIC “is that a multitude of

factors, both historical and contemporary, interact to cause Aboriginal

people to be seriously over-represented in custody and, tragically to die

there”( RCIADIC, 1991). Weatherburn (2006) commenting on the ability of

the Commission to analyse the connections between the numerous factors

of influence noted: “the Commission found itself confronted with an

avalanche of evidence implicating a multitude of factors any or all of which

could, directly or indirectly, contribute to Indigenous over-representation in

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prison” (2006: 3). The Commission argued that Indigenous imprisonment is

simply a manifestation of Indigenous cultural, social and economic

disadvantage, in all their manifold forms (ibid.). Marchetti (2005) notes that

the Redfern and Palm Island Riots are evidence that little has changed

regarding relationships with the police and Indigenous people in some parts

of Australia.

The Bringing them home report was established in response to

increasing concern that the general public’s ignorance of the history of

forcible removal was adversely affecting both the recognition of the needs

of its victims and their families, and the provision of services. The report

therefore aimed to raise public awareness of the facts and issues

surrounding past policies of forcible removal, and in doing so address the

continuing impact of those policies on the lives of Indigenous Australians.

The Ministerial Council of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs

(MCATSIA) is tasked to evaluate and monitor the implementation of the

Bringing them home recommendations. The purpose is to show whether

there are significant differences in the economic and social characteristics

of those impacted on by the forcible removal of children, in comparison with

those Indigenous Australians who were not removed from their families.

Evidence from the analysis suggests that those who were removed from

their families suffered poorer outcomes over a range of discrete socio-

economic indicators. A summary of the results indicates:

• Higher rates of people with a disability or long-term health condition

(68.8 per cent (for those removed) compared to 55.3 percent (who

were not removed));

• Lower rates of completion of Year 10 – 12 schooling (28.5 per cent

compared to 38.5 per cent);

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• Lower rates of living in owner occupied housing (16.9 per cent

compared to 28.3 percent);

• Higher rates of being a victim of physical or threatened violence

(33.5 per cent compared to 18.1 per cent);

• Lower rates of retention to Year 10 (28.5 per cent compared to 38.5

per cent);

• Lower rates of participation in sport or physical recreation activities

(35.4 per cent compared to 47.0 per cent);

• Higher rates of smoking (70.5 per cent compared to 51.2 per cent);

• Higher rates of being arrested more than once in a five year period

(14.6 per cent compared to 8.8 per cent); and

• Lower rates of full-time employment (17.8 per cent compared to

24.8 per cent) (MCATSIA, 2006: 8).

The MCATSIA report indicated that in 2006 no headline indicator was

better for those removed from their families. Weatherburn (2006) notes

that although the Indigenous imprisonment rate has increased, Government

responses to the Royal Commission have had no effect. As of March 2008,

the national average daily Indigenous imprisonment rate was 2,157 per

100,000 adult Indigenous population (Corrective Services, 2008). The

highest Indigenous imprisonment rate was recorded in Western Australia

(3,554 per 100,000adult Indigenous population), followed by South

Australia (2,407) and New South Wales (2,363) (ibid.). The average daily

number of full-time Indigenous adult prisoners in Australia in the March

quarter 2008 was 6,507, comprising 5,938 (91 per cent) males and 569 (9

per cent) females. Almost 78 per cent of the total Indigenous prisoner

population was located in New South Wales (2,028). Indigenous people are

13 time more likely to be imprisoned than non-Indigenous persons.

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7.2.1 Royal Commission outcomes

The Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council (AJAC) considered that, among

other things, the recommendations focused on procedure rather than

intended outcomes, leaving unaddressed broader questions concerning the

underlying causes of Aboriginal contact with the criminal justice system,

and the structural deficiencies in the way in which the system deals with

Aboriginal offenders. In other respects, AJAC argued, the

recommendations are so broad as to be meaningless (AJAC, 2000).

Marchetti (2005) argues that the RCIADIC privileged orthodox (legal)

perspectives and excluded non-orthodox (non-legal) perspectives. This is

an example of what Bourdieu would call the heresy of challenging the doxic

condition (Bourdieu, 1977). Royal Commissions such as the RCIADIC are

“oriented to the quite limited highly pragmatic and, indeed, reformist goal of

producing specific recommendations for policy”, which will ultimately

constrain their potential for radicalism (Salter, 1990 cited in Marchetti,

2005).

The struggle between criminological and sociological perspectives

with a focus on underlying issues, such as institutional racism, and lawyers

wanting to investigate the deaths in custody was the field of socio-legal

practice. A particular field in a society can be viewed as an embodiment of

the valuation of, exchange of, and struggle over the resources of the field,

between different groups of inhabitants in the society (Chopra, 2003: 427).

Status and social capital tensions arose between senior lawyers during the

report writing process and ideology and particular interests intervened. The

outcomes of commissions, according to Simeon (1987) are attributable to

the political and disciplinary predispositions of those involved in conducting

the investigation. In other words the habitus embodied in the different

professions of law and social science determined the practices of each

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group. There is a range of practices and dispositions for any particular

habitus, which corresponds to what is thinkable within that habitus. There is

thus a limit to the possibilities ‘allowed’ by the perceptual framework

corresponding to any habitus, and what sets the limit and lies beyond it is

doxa.

Public disorder and violence offences appear as the major causes

of Indigenous prison sentences (ABS, Prisoners in Australia, 2007). Yet it is

insufficient to rely on a statistical representation without examining the

underlying social conditions influencing the actions and behaviour leading

to eventual imprisonment. Indigenous incarceration needs to be understood

against a backdrop of life experiences such as removal and separation of

children, community breakdown, loss of human rights, and attempted

eradication of Indigenous cultures and languages (Rintoul,1993). The

increasing higher rates of Indigenous imprisonment also require

contextualization within the debates of globalisation, racism and social

movements.

7.3 Definition of ‘underlying issues’ in relation t o Indigenous disadvantage

In determining what constitutes an 'underlying issue', Elliot

Johnstone, Commissioner of the Royal Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths

in Custody (RCIADC) examined all social, cultural, legal and economic

matters as they directly and indirectly affect the constantly high rate of

imprisonment of Aboriginal people in this State. In sum, an 'underlying

issue' can be defined as understanding the 'why' and 'how' of high rates of

Aboriginal incarceration. Examining the 'why' and 'how' has meant

attempting to cover a broad range of complex and wide-ranging issues

impinging on the lives of Aboriginal people in Australia. Some of the major

'underlying issues' which form the foundation of Aboriginal powerlessness

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include: the ongoing marginalisation of Aboriginal matters in areas of

government policy and practice at Federal, State, and Local levels; the

power of vested interests which, often in association with government

instrumentalities seek to deny Aboriginal aspirations; misinformed beliefs

and practices toward Aboriginal people among many sectors of non-

Aboriginal society, that impact on the day by day lives of Aboriginal people;

the ongoing effect of missions and other forms of institutionalisation on the

socio-cultural and economic lives of Aboriginal people; and some of the

adverse effects of contemporary Aboriginal social life brought about by

Aborigines themselves, as well as those from outside of Aboriginal society.

Underlying issues are therefore those phenomena that arise in considering

the legal, cultural, social and economic factors as they occur independently

of the other society or through their inter-relatedness to it (RCIADIC, 1992).

7.4 Systemic and institutional racism in the crimin al justice system

Systemic and institutional racism in the criminal justice system are

recurring themes in the literature of Indigenous imprisonment (Cunnen,

1992, 2006; Craigie, 1992; Gale, 1990). According to Blagg et al. (2005)

Systemic racism is not about whether individuals hold racist views but

about the uneven impact of laws, policies or practices. Put another way,

systemic racism can to some extent be measured by outcomes and results

rather than intentions. Racial discrimination in sentencing is indirect rather

than direct (Snowball and Weatherburn, 2006). Because no one has yet

shown that racial bias in the way in which police and/or prosecuting

authorities choose to exercise their discretion is a significant contributor to

Indigenous overrepresentation in prison does not mean it does not occur.

This form of discrimination is extremely difficult to detect and measure

empirically (Blagg, 2005)

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There is a positive correlation between offence seriousness and

penalty seriousness. Violence in previous offences is likely to influence the

penalty when next appearing in court. Offenders who breach community

service orders are highly likely to be sent to prison. The prior record of an

offender is of fundamental importance in sentencing because the history of

an offender can operate to deprive him or her of any leniency. It can also

provide justification for giving more weight to factors such as retribution,

deterrence or community protection. “Past failures lead inexorably to more

severe penalties….as a further step in the search for a measure that will

have some effect in bringing about law abiding behaviour” (Fox and

Freiberg, 1999: 270). Age is also a relevant consideration because

rehabilitation has been held to play a more important role and general

deterrence a lesser role in the case of young offenders (Weatherburn and

Snowball, 2006). The apparent difference between adult Indigenous and

non-Indigenous adult offenders in the likelihood of imprisonment appears to

be due to the fact that, by comparison with non-Indigenous offenders,

Indigenous offenders:

• Have much longer criminal records;

• Are more likely to be convicted of a serious violent offence;

• Are more likely at any particular court appearance to be convicted of

multiple offences;

• Are more likely to have breached a previous court order; and

• Are much more likely to have re-offended after being given an

alternative to full-time imprisonment, such as periodic detention and/or

a suspended sentence.

Indigenous respondents to the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander Social Survey (NATSISS) were far more likely to have been

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charged with, or imprisoned for, an offence if they abused drugs or alcohol,

failed to complete Year 12 or were unemployed. Other factors that increase

the risk of being charged or imprisoned include: experiencing financial

stress, living in a crowded household and being a member of the ‘stolen

generation’ (Weatherburn, Snowball and Hunter, 2006).

Per head of population, Indigenous residents of NSW appear in

court on criminal charges about nine times more often than non-Indigenous

residents. The gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous rates of

appearance is especially notable where violent crime is concerned, with

Indigenous rates of appearance being approximately 11 times higher for

sexual assault, 19 times higher for aggravated assault and 17 times higher

for robbery (ibid.: 14). According to Weatherburn and Snowball (2006),

policy to reduce Indigenous over-representation in prison, then, should

focus on:

• Reducing levels of Indigenous involvement in crime, particularly violent

crime; and

• Reducing rates of recidivism among Indigenous offenders, particularly

following placement on community based sentencing orders.

It is here that addressing underlying socioeconomic conditions will

play a crucial role in reducing the high rate of Indigenous involvement with

the criminal justice system. Another factor is whether reverting to Islam

while in the system has reduced involvement in crime and recidivism. The

conditions of child neglect and abuse; parental psychiatric problems

(particularly maternal depression); family dissolution and violence; poor

school performance; early school leaving; drug and alcohol abuse; and

youth unemployment are conditions associated with poverty, social and

family breakdown. Cunneen (2006) challenges Weatherburn and Snowball

(2006) about systemic bias versus crime reduction strategies which do not

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address the important structural underlying issues. As mentioned above,

underlying issues present a problem for investigators for numerous reasons

yet their importance in understanding social problems should not be

understated. The following section advances the argument for considering

underlying issues within the context of the enduring difficulties facing many

indigenous people.

7.5 Underlying issues: the importance of context

Questions posed to this point ask why Indigenous Australians are

over-represented in the criminal justice system, and to determine if

Indigenous incarceration is symptomatic of wider social forces and

influences. It is important to provide the contextual sociological background

to the rates of Indigenous incarceration because it provides context, clarity

and validity to the research endeavour. For example, without considering

the history of the relationships of Indigenous peoples with the dominant

society since European invasion circa 1788, the present occurrence of

Indigenous involvement with the criminal justice system would be relatively

meaningless. The question of why Indigenous people are over-represented

in the criminal justice system is therefore a critical methodological

consideration to overcome, which once resolved, will enable the next

incremental investigation to proceed in a logical progression. The

investigative progression also applies to Islam, both in its uptake in

Australia from historical-sociological perspectives, to the present debates

on global Islam. This perspective will be addressed in detail in a later

chapter. The methodological aim of this section is to analyse the social,

political, economic, and cultural factors and influences relevant to

Indigenous Australian involvement with the criminal justice system. A socio-

historical background analysis is necessary to fully encapsulate factors of

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influence and to provide a relevant social context. The argument is that

many Indigenous people readily associate the history of dispossession and

exclusion with present-day social problems. The first section deals with the

historical control of Indigenous Australian beginning with the first contact

with Europeans and ending with contemporary Indigenous engagement

with institutional management and control resulting in over-representation

in the prison system. It will be argued that in post 1788 Australia,

Indigenous Australians have been, and continue to be, subject to

techniques of control not exercised on non-Indigenous members of society.

During the frontier period of early European occupation of country, scientific

racism justified the removal and dispossession of Indigenous societies.

Colonialism as a globalising force succeeded because racism was a

fundamental element of the social structure of the time. Yet the underlying

historical and structural forces that created and sustained racism in colonial

Australia are still debated as ‘culture wars’ by some conservative

commentators30. The current rate of Indigenous representation in the

criminal justice system is a reflection and symptom of a continuous history

of repression and control. These issues discussed and analysed in the

following sections.

7.6 Literature and analysis

The purpose of this review is twofold. The first is to analyse the

condition of present-day incarceration rated by tracing the history of control

exercised over Indigenous peoples by government policies. The analysis

will conclude by discussing possible sociological reasons for Indigenous

over-representation in Australian prisons. The overall aim of this review is

to document, discuss and analyse a range of themes framed within a 30 See Keith Windschuttle, 2003. The Fabrication of Aboriginal History. Vol 1, Van Dieman’s Land 1803 – 1847. Sydney: Macleay Press.

282

sociological perspective. The first section of the review covers theoretical

overviews contributing to context and orientation to the theme of the

chapter. Section two documents and analyses the debilitating occurrence of

alcohol abuse and criminal activity and how this results in early

incarceration.

7.6.1 The colonial era: regulation and governance of Indigenous Australians

The Indigenous peoples of Australia were incorporated by conquest

and labour exploitation by state controlled racial hierarchies and racialised

citizenship through processes that were often contradictory and

inconsistent (Mullings, 2005: 673). Indigenous claims for sovereign status

as autonomous nations have been strongly resisted and contested by the

dominant society. Instead, ‘accumulation by dispossession’ has remained

the feature of the Australian state, with the relational aspect of racism

enabling the dispossession of the Indigenous people producing

accumulation and advantage for others (Harvey, 2005: 45). Dispossession

of land, labour, resources, and rights in the early stages of European

expansion has led to new forms of dispossession by gentrification in

metropolitan and suburban areas of the major cities. A key factor in

understanding high contemporary Indigenous incarceration rates in

Australian prisons has its origins in the control and management regimes of

colonial settler society (Hogg, 2001). Racist policies and attitudes played a

significant part in underpinning how Indigenous people would be treated

and managed. Racism is associated with modernity and it is linked to

European expansion and consequent enslavement of Africans, colonialism,

and imperialism (Mullings, 2005). It is no coincidence that African

Americans have suffered similar debilitating conditions as those of

Indigenous Australians. The historical emergence of nation states such as

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Australia has ‘whiteness’ as an uncontested attribute of social and cultural

composition. No other modern nation-state formation has relied so heavily

on a monocultural ethnic composition to express its national identity.

It will be argued that rather than a recent occurrence, Indigenous

peoples have been subject to extraordinary regimes of control since

Europeans first arrived in Australia. This has not been a linear process, but

a series of interconnected phases of governance and policing. This concept

is borrowed from Foucault’s work on the governance of populations,

particularly the contingent nature of policies as reactions to certain social

problems. Given the ample literature examining the oppression of

Indigenous peoples, and the recency of collective memories, the narratives

of oppression and dispossession remain vivid and alive for Indigenous

peoples.31 These narratives are reflected in the Indigenous over-

representation in prisons and in other major socioeconomic indicators such

as poorer health, lower education, inadequate housing, and lower income,

than other Australians. It is because of this indisputable evidence of the

current poor state of Indigenous well-being that the collective memories of

the historical precursors are merged with the present.

From the foundation of the British penal colony in New South Wales

in 1788 the official position of the imperial government was that Aboriginal

people were British subjects protected and bound by British laws then

applicable in the new colony (Hogg, 2001) Phases include frontier

expansion and rapid appropriation of Indigenous country with little or no

regard for the original users of the land. This was a period that reduced the

numbers of Indigenous people due to disease (smallpox) and settler

violence. Justification for the violence against indigenous people was

31 In a similar manner, the resurgent interest in Gallipoli and the Kakoda experiences of the world wars are being encouraged and cultivated as ‘re-remembering’ by younger generations with no living memories of the actual events.

284

rooted in the principles of racial superiority symbolised in the conclusion of

terra nullius.32 There could be no meaningful protection against settler

violence where the law sanctioned dispossession and punished Aboriginal

resistance and retaliation, especially when settler occupation ran well

ahead of effective civil authority in many parts of the country (Hogg, 2001).

Intermittent warfare, ‘punitive expeditions’ and other forms of extra-judicial

violence were the more common currency of ‘justice’ on the frontier,

persisting into the twentieth century in northern Australia (ibid.). Despite

Indigenous resistance to their dispossession from country, varying degrees

of dislocation, marginalisation and criminalisation continued. With the close

of the transportation era, punishment in the Australian colonies underwent

a slow and uneven transition from a reliance on corporal and capital

punishment and the use of places of secondary transportation, to a

commitment to the penitentiary principle and cellular confinement (Kerr,

1988; Finnane, 1997). Contrary to the familiar historiography of western

punishment in which predominantly corporal punishments gave way to a

system of carceral penalty in the nineteenth century, bodily punishment and

restraints remained a crucial instrument of power and control within the

local colonial settler order.

Over time, the prison became a mechanism of punitive control over

colonised peoples from the centrality of colonialism and race to forms of

penal and legal repression (Purdy, 1996). From the mid-nineteenth century

doubts emerged as to the appropriateness of imprisonment as a measure

of punishment for Aboriginal people. South Australian governor George

Gray noted in 1841 that: ‘To a civilised man imprisonment presents but a

slight terror. To an aborigine the loss of liberty is an almost inconceivable

idea’ (cited in Kerr, 1988: 99-100). (The loss of liberty is an important factor 32 The term terra nullius means ‘land belonging to no one’.

285

today, and when combined with separation from family, isolation coupled

with vulnerability contributes to the suffering of Indigenous inmates in

prison). Yet bodily punishments and restraints continued to be inflicted on

Aboriginal people in many places as an alternative to confinement, and

justification was based on racial inequality and subordination. There is

sufficient evidence that flogging, use of neck chains and tying or chaining to

trees were commonplace methods of control and punishment and they

prevailed well into the second quarter of the twentieth century in central and

northern Australia (McGrath, 1995: 34-37). There is also evidence that

juries had always been reluctant to convict settlers charged with violent

crimes against Aboriginal victims, including homicide (Markus, 1990: 108).

The effects of these practices was to delineate and preserve a

sharp boundary between colonialists and Aborigines in frontier

environments characterised by moral ambiguity, social instability and the

uncertain status and presence of civic authority (Hogg, 2001). The

dehumanised Indigenous subject of punishment and control provided a

necessary support for colonial settler modes of life, for practices of

dispossession and for modes of governance administered at considerable

distance from the central organs of state power. They are not without some

resonance within contemporary penal culture in Australia. This point will be

revisited in the discussion of the relevance of Islam in prisons in which

alternate oppositional power structures are made available to Indigenous

inmates via engagement with the structure and discipline of Islamic

principles.

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7.6.2 The ‘Protection’ era: social Darwinism, segregation and control

The protection era was ostensibly a period when a more humane

approach towards the treatment of Indigenous people took place. The

general consensus was that Indigenous people were a ‘dying breed’ and

the aim was to ‘smooth the dying pillow’ (Loos, 1976). The aim was a policy

of containment to separate and isolate Indigenous peoples from the rest of

society, and was embodied by the Aborigines Protection Act 1909. The

purpose of this section is to argue that the ‘protection’ period was one of

increased administration, control, and surveillance and less of a reliance on

physical bodily punishment as a form of coercion.

The protection era of Indigenous management by the state

incorporated other practices of a segregative and tutelary nature in line with

the increasing institutional uptake of monitoring, surveillance, supervision,

and what Foucault has named the ‘carceral archipelago’ (Foucault, 1975:

298). It created a whole society of docile bodies submitting to the will of the

state. “We have seen that, in penal justice, the prison transformed the

punitive procedure into a penitentiary technique; the carceral archipelago

transported this technique from penal institutions to the entire social body”

(ibid.) Whether in the form of missions, government reserves, reform

schools or children’s homes they sought to establish an on-going

supervisory relationship between white authority (church or bureaucratic

official) and Aboriginal people and necessitated forms of administration and

infrastructure that were quite alien to frontier conditions (Hogg, 2001). Civil

authority became more active in reflecting the control techniques of British

imperialism such as the moral and civilising missions to bring the benefits

of Christian, European and British civilisation to the non-European races of

the world (James, 1998: xiv). The influence of ‘imperial humanitarianism’ on

policy, attitudes and sentiments in the Australian colonies was limited but

287

significant according to Reynolds (1989: 183-93, 1998). This administrative

era was an important ideological shift towards the ‘management of

perceived social problems: that of lawlessness attributed to racial

discrimination.

Protection policies were in part a response to settler violence and

exploitation of Aboriginal people, but the regimes established throughout

the mainland in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generally

embodied more positive aspirations and objectives, albeit based on the

hegemonic assumptions of social Darwinism. The ‘doomed race’ theory

meant that Aborigines, condemned by their inferiority would die out, and the

theory served to erase Aboriginal culture and selectively train Aboriginal

people in the values and habits of European civilisation (Hogg, 2001). The

theory transformed into policies conferred enormous powers on white

officials to control the lives of Aboriginal and communities, to which there

was little objection among white citizens or government officials. Of those

who exercised the power to define were Christian missionaries who by

default reshaped the fabric of Indigenous spiritual, social, cultural and

linguistic world views to reflect a European value system. Since the

European colonisation of Australia, Indigenous Australians have had

contact with missionaries and their missions. This relationship has been a

difficult one. In some instances missions became instruments of

government policy, engaging in practices such as forcibly separating

Aboriginal children from their families in order to maximise control over the

child's education into Christian ways and beliefs. In this way, missions

contributed to the suppression of Aboriginal cultural practices and

languages. However, not all missions were agents of government policies.

Some respected Aboriginal ways of life and the importance of ceremonies

and cultural practices.

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(http://www.dreamtime.net.au/indigenous/spirituality.cfm#a) Accessed 19

Feb 2006

Despite the acceptance of Indigenous culture as important, many

examples can be found of the complicity of the Christian missionaries, who

became agents of government policies to disenfranchise the Indigenous

population of their cultural and spiritual heritage and to supplant it with the

religion of the colonisers Kidd (1997). Pearson (1998) and Attwood (1986)

amongst others have written about the role of the missionaries and their

part in furthering the dispossession of Aboriginal people from both their

physical and spiritual worlds. A critical tool that aided this process was the

bible, especially in those communities in which language was still being

used, for its translation provided the missionaries with leverage over the

now weakened communities for whom they were asked to administer. The

appropriation of language had also become a sinister tool with which to use

against its owners in the fight to civilise and to possess the hearts and

minds of the colonised. The irony for Aboriginal communities is that these

very same people who sought to distance their ‘charges' from the excesses

of colonial exploitation, were themselves part of the spiritual destruction of

Aboriginal communities (Lowe, nd:

http://www.fatsil.org/papers/research/lowe-1.htm Accessed 19 Feb, 2007)

Indigenous reactions to this form of ‘forced’ or coercive assimilation helped

to fuel the desire of many Indigenous people to later re-establish social,

cultural, and spiritual contact; to reform and repair the lost contacts with

relatives and country during the separation era. It was only in recent times

that a visible and meaningful institutional response to the segregation and

separation policies appeared in the Royal Commission into the Separation

of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families

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established in May 1995 in response to efforts made by key Indigenous

agencies and communities.

Policies and institutions established under legislative regimes dating

from the late nineteenth century, when laws were passed throughout

mainland Australia permitted segregation on racial grounds (Attwood, 1989;

Haebich, 1992; Goodall, 1996; Kidd, 1997). These regimes separated

Aboriginal people from white communities onto reserves, missions and

stations and subjected them to special regimes of control, tutelage and

conversion to Christianity. These coercive practices extended to denying

basic rights of citizenship, controlling personal movement and freedom to

associate, child rearing and education, household management,

employment, and the erasure of language and culture. The extent to which

legislative and administrative control impinged on the lives of Aboriginal

people is demonstrated by the ‘total’ administrative control in Queensland

and Western Australia. In these states a system of disciplinary offences,

courts and imprisonment was provided for as part of the administrative

regime established under the legislation (Nettheim, 1981; Kidd, 1997;

Evans, 1999; Haebich, 1992).

Institutional surveillance and control operated beyond the

boundaries of reserves, missions and camps in a variety of other ways. The

scope of executive power and discretion meant that those not placed on

reserves or stations commonly lived under the threat of being removed.

Those formally exempted from legislation were required to carry ‘dog tag’ or

‘passport’ exemption certificates, which entitled them to exercise certain

rights, denied others under the control of protection acts. The exemptions,

however, could be summarily rescinded and were subject to conditions

requiring their holders to pursue non-Aboriginal life-styles, and avoid

contact with families and communities. Even with provisional admission to

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civic citizenship, people were still vulnerable to heightened surveillance and

intervention by police and other government authorities (Hogg, 2001).

The legacy of the comprehensive normalising and assimilationist

visions of legislators and administrators was a mix of neglect, exploitation,

social invisibility and administrative surveillance and control (Kidd, 1997).

These circumstances were akin to reserves as de-facto prisons devoted to

total control not dissimilar to contemporary state institutional prisons. This

point is an important reminder of the similarity in the historical imagery of

many Indigenous people. For many Indigenous people there is a blurred

distinction between memories of fractured generational ‘incarceration’ and

dispossession, and that of actual involvement in the criminal justice system.

For these people there is not a definable boundary separating the

regulatory regimes of everyday life, to that of imprisonment.

7.6.3 The assimilation era: the rationalities of racial governance

New South Wales acted on popular sentiment concerning the

ideology of assimilation in 1937 and reconstituted the Aborigines’

Protection Board around the policy of assimilation and renamed it the

Aborigines Welfare Board. Legislation introduced in 1940 provided

administrative powers to address the ‘problem’ of Aborigines “living in close

proximity to towns in much the same way as the unemployed lived during

the worst years of the depression, and in that regard they are a great

annoyance to the community” (Parliamentary debates on the 1940 Act

quoted by NSW Government submission on pages 37-8).

Norbert Elias (1978, 1982) described the ways in which refined

feeling, human sympathy, mutual identification and sensitivity to the

suffering of others characterised civic life in the modern nation state. These

sentiments were differentially cultivated, channelled and aroused according

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to race in the case of Indigenous Australians. Assimilation policies refined

the separation process of removing whole communities away from the

sensitivities of white civilisation as noted above. While these policies belong

to the rationalities of racial and colonial power, they also drew for their

moral support on extensive popular sentiment and feeling. The practices

assumed a subject bereft of the ‘normal’ white European structure of

psychological affects and refined sensibilities, one governed only by the

instant, and by fleeting passions and immediate pleasures and pains. This

made it necessary to remove children in order to ‘civilise’ and assimilate

them. But it also made it possible, culturally and emotionally, to execute a

policy that was otherwise unspeakably cruel and callous (Hogg, 2001). As

discussed above, there is continuity in the institutional requirement for

control and regulation of Indigenous lives that is rooted in racialised notions

of civilisational superiority. This reproduction is embodied in the distinctive

modes of governance characteristic of the liberal states of the West since

the nineteenth century and employs social measures and norms enabling

government from a distance (Donzelot, 1972; Rose, 1989; Foucault, 1991)

The overwhelming desire for a uniform and assimilated population

in the image of white society has prompted many Indigenous people to

either become antagonistic to white society or to succumb to the anomie

and aimlessness associated with cultural dislocation and social separation.

This is clearly demonstrated by continued resistance to assimilation policies

and a striving for recognition as first peoples with certain defined rights and

status, but it is also tempered by the damage of past policies. It would be

difficult to imagine that the history of Indigenous control by the state has

been forgotten or forgiven. As increasing research lays bare the

rationalities and methodologies of Indigenous governance the more it

acknowledges the relationship between past events and current

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circumstances. This is not to imply a direct causal relationship or a simple

answer to increasing Indigenous incarceration rates. It does, however,

demonstrate the extent of social damage done to the structure of

Indigenous communities and their sensitivity regarding authoritarian control.

In a previous chapter the concept of cultural trauma was discussed, and it

is from this perspective that many Indigenous victims of assimilation

policies suffer from.

Regulation and governance of populations became more nuanced

as the deviances and pathologies of various kinds were scientifically

categorised and allocated to their appropriate domains of technical

expertise. The increasingly differentiated institutional and discursive

complex modulated to some degree the conditions of penal severity. The

increasing concern for correction, normalisation, integration and optimal

social functioning placed penal incarceration at the end of a continuum of

measures of social government, most of which functioned to shepherd and

regulate individuals within the domains of socialisation, the most important

of which were the family and those institutions revolving around the family

such as the school, medicine, public health, welfare, and other socially

organised activities. Within the same institutions that traversed the

Aboriginal family and communities from the end of the 19th century, the

same logic of social governance was in significant respects inverted.

Indigenous people were to be integrated, socialised, and merged into

Australian society not by policing, supporting and augmenting the

Aboriginal family, but only by destroying it (Hogg, 2001). Prevailing social

attitudes labelled Indigenous families and communities as antithetical to

social order and ‘civilised’ values. Aboriginal families and communities were

the sites of reproduction of Aboriginality and culture, and thus had to be

ameliorated and even eliminated. Far from being cultivated and supported,

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and governed at some distance from the political and bureaucratic authority

of the state, Aboriginal lives were brought under the most direct

administrative authority, and people were denied the rights and means of

participation in the social institutions of civil society (ibid.).

While the existence of protection and segregation policies insulated

Indigenous people to a degree against criminalisation and penal

incarceration, surveillance, control, and forms of institutional treatment

often amounted to the same thing. This is a recurring theme in the history

of Indigenous affairs in that the double jeopardy of prosecuting Aboriginal

offenders left them to return to regimes of administrative segregation. Child

removal policies revealed by the ‘Stolen Generations’ Royal Commission

was instrumental in launching both directly and indirectly, the criminal and

carceral ‘careers’ of large numbers of people.

7.6.4 The new culture of punishment: reversal and continuities

From a Foucaultian governmentality perspective, modern forms of

power are seen to occur less through the formal structures of the nation-

state and more through a complex network of localised power relations.

These relations cannot be reduced to any one-way domination of one class

by another, but are made up of shifting alliances between individuals and

groups, which fracture and re-form according to different issues and

interests (Foucault, 1978: 96). At the most micro and apparently non-

political level is the construction of the active or self-governing citizen

(Dean, 1999: 168; Rose, 1996: 40).

Several points about power, governance and religion are pertinent

to this study. Firstly, the issue of power in relation to the historical

Indigenous experience vis-à-vis invasion, dispossession, assimilation, and

multiculturalism is one of an unequal relationship with the state. Secondly,

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neoliberal governance works in conjunction with tacit understandings and

discursive practices associated with fields of knowledge. Thirdly, as

Carrette (2000: 146) acknowledges: “religious discourses are always

framed and positioned in and through the human process of

power/knowledge” and “religion is a sphere of force relations in the wider

cultural network – it inescapably exists as a manifestation of power”.

Fulkerson and Dunlap (1997: 117) maintain that a Foucaultian inquiry

“concerns the relation of practices and languages and institutions that

produce ‘truth’ about reality while ‘subjugating’ other possibilities. These

points provide an insight into the multidimensional aspect of power relations

and to advance the following propositions:

1) the over-riding regime of neoliberal governance determines the agenda

for relationships of power due to its ubiquitous nature and global spread.

2) Indigenous cultural, spiritual, religious, and political discourses mount a

challenge for neoliberal governance in that they present alternative options

and priorities that somehow have to be accommodated by the state. The

‘truth claims’ of the dominant discourse usually maintains the status-quo at

the expense of truth claims posing as threatening the smooth running of the

neoliberal economic state.

3) Religious discourse has the ability to provide its own form of discursive

function in that it challenges the discourses of competitive individualism and

economic policy. An extreme example of this model are global Islamic

organisations such as Hizb-ut Tahir who promote an anti-Western, anti-

capitalist doctrine based on a conservative and orthodox perspective of

Islamic governance. At a local level, it is not difficult to imagine why

Indigenous alliances with Islam create concerns and tensions for both State

authorities and prison management.

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7.6.5 Redfern and political considerations: race and policing

The relationship between the overtly racial practices of the past and

the present is demonstrated by comparing the proximity of surrounding

white sensibilities and Indigenous interests. One such case is the area in

Redfern known locally as ‘the Block’. Situated close to centre of Sydney it is

much sought after as a prime development site. The area is owned by the

Aboriginal Housing Corporation Ltd, and is the subject of concern for white

sensibilities that overlook the significance of the Block as an Indigenous

social hub. This area was also the location where Indigenous respondents

were interviewed for this research. The reason for discussing this issue is

to demonstrate the difficulties Indigenous residents of the Block have in

constructing a continuous socio-cultural narrative without it being fractured,

and in this case, colonised. For some years the Block has become

rundown, unsafe, and a problem area for drug use and distribution. Many of

its residents have experienced contact with the criminal justice system and

it is this connection that is important to examine. The long history of

dispossession has culminated in the prospect of further relocation because

of developer interest in this prime piece of real estate.

A redevelopment scheme for the Block named the Pemulwuy

project, and designed with the history and culture of Indigenous connection

to the area in mind, is being contested by the Redfern Waterloo Authority, a

body formed to redevelop a more expansive area of nearby properties. The

NSW government withdrew its support for the Pemulwuy Project despite

the recommendations to the contrary by the Social Issues Parliamentary

Inquiry into the Redfern riots. In 2004 the NSW government put in place a

statutory Authority that over-rides the City of Sydney as the planning

authority, declared the AHC's land 'state significant', and is proposing to

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reduce the residential density on the Block effectively limiting the number of

Aboriginal families who could live there.

The New South Wales Minister for Planning through the Redfern

Waterloo Authority (RWA) has expressed publicly his intention to reduce

the number of Aboriginal houses proposed on the Block and disperse at

least half the community (Sartor, 2006). However this type of dispersal

policy has had a devastating effect on Aboriginal communities. The RWA's

policy toward Aboriginal housing on the Block would simultaneously isolate

Aboriginal people from their community and family support networks and

create cultural conflict in neighbourhoods that were previously peaceable.

The forced assimilation of the Redfern Aboriginal community would be

catastrophic and would create the need to provide additional social and

human services to substitute for the natural cultural and social supports

found in a community setting that would be lost. This is not to suggest that

Aboriginal people cannot integrate or interact with the rest of society, but

that interaction should be natural and above all voluntary and the terms

dictated by Indigenous people.

The consequences of reducing the number of Aboriginal houses on

the Block will produce socially undesirable outcomes. Reducing the number

of homes on the Block will also reduce the number of eyes on the streets,

invariably resulting in the surrounding area becoming unsafe, especially at

night. No community safety strategies have been proposed by NSW

Government to counter-balance the loss of natural surveillance. It is no

coincidence that high numbers of Indigenous people from the Block have

contact with the criminal justice system. Effectively, this area and its social

problems are symptomatic of many Indigenous societies in other parts of

Australia. There is a strong relationship between depressed and

dysfunctional societies, and the high incidence of Indigenous incarceration.

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Yet there are fewer Indigenous communities which have been subjected to

the degree of politicisation than the Block.

Redfern is the birthplace of the civil rights movement and Aboriginal

communities from around Australia will retaliate to any attempt to forcibly

remove the Aboriginal community or undermine self-determination and

autonomy over Aboriginal land.

(http://www.ahc.org.au/redevelop/R&D%20Project%20History.html

Accessed 19 Feb, 2007).The actions and intent of government and

developers mirrors the attitude and practices of previous policies. Removal,

dispersal, and forced assimilation are terms used in this contemporary

politicisation of Indigenous affairs. Attempts to relocate Indigenous

residents out of Redfern have continued in one form or another since 1968,

when the South Sydney Council and the NSW state government, through

the Department of Housing, began a resettlement project moving

Aborigines from the inner city to Green Valley, Mt Druitt, and Campbelltown

(Price, 2003).

7.6.6 Alcohol abuse and the criminal justice system

Several scholars in this field have examined alcohol abuse and

imprisonment frequencies. Hall, Hunter and Spargo (1994) found that the

risk of an Indigenous person ever having being held in a police lockup,

increased with the frequency of drinking and the amount of alcohol

consumed, even after controlling for respondent age and sex variables.

Hunter (2001) found that the marginal effect of alcohol use on the risk of

arrest was as large as that of unemployment. In 2002, Butler, Levy, Dolan

and Kaldor showed that 28 per cent of all prisoners in NSW were

intoxicated at the time of the offence that led to their imprisonment. This

compares to the corresponding figure of 11 percent for non-Indigenous

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inmates. Research by Weatherburn, Snowball and Hunter (2002) analysed

the odds ratio risk of having ever been charged, against variables

measuring drug and alcohol abuse and a number of other risk conditions

that placed people into an involvement in crime situation. Their findings

indicated the only factor in the model reducing the risk of being charged

was completing year 12. The most important predictors of criminal charges

are alcohol and illicit drug use, rating higher than unemployment, financial

stress, or living in a crime-prone area.

Similar results appeared for the odds ratio for imprisonment,

although economic variables played a bigger role but drug abuse remained

the strongest independent predictor of Indigenous imprisonment with

alcohol abuse coming third (Weatherburn, Snowball and Hunter, 2006).

The combinations of high rates of drug and alcohol abuse, child

maltreatment and juvenile involvement in crime are therefore inextricably

intertwined, and provide a base from which to examine strategies for supply

control, rather than treatment and harm mitigation. (Weatherburn, 2006).

7.7 Discussion

Royal commissions raise the hopes of those whose very existence

rely on tangible outcomes, yet governments are able to evade facing

difficult solutions to enduring social problems because of the way society

accepts the doxic structure. This points to the extraordinary effort required

to alleviate the enduring underlying socio-economic conditions of many

Indigenous people.

Some of the factors named by the RCIADIC as contributing to the

disproportionate incarceration rates of Indigenous Australians included drug

and alcohol abuse, poor school performance, poor parenting, poverty,

unemployment, low wages, poor housing, geographic mobility, peer group

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pressure, welfare dependence, the age structure of the Indigenous

population and institutional racism (Weatherburn, 2006). Because of the

‘information overload’ the Commission argued that Indigenous

imprisonment is simply a manifestation of Indigenous cultural, social and

economic disadvantage in all their manifold forms.

Noel Pearson named this approach as the symptom theory of

Indigenous incarceration meaning that Indigenous over-representation in

prison is nothing more or less than a symptom of Indigenous disadvantages

(2001). Following this argument, by reducing disadvantage the number of

Indigenous people in prison will also be reduced. The origins of this

argument reside in the notion that crime is a product of economic and

social disadvantage, and that by reducing poverty, the crime rate will also

reduce. Precedents for this argument are found in the policy ‘U.S. War

Against Poverty’ (Cohen & Felson, 1979: 588), but rather than a reduction,

crime rates actually increased.

In Australia, poverty became a political issue during the 1987

federal election campaign when Prime Minister Hawke made his pledge

that by 1990 no child will need to live in poverty. The later Keating

government's programs of Priority One and Working Nation failed our youth

according to Baldwin (1996). Six years on from Hawke’s statement and, “for

all Labor's intended good, Labor's dream has become Paterson's curse”

(Baldwin, 1996). Yet for all the criticism Hawke's commitment to no child

living in poverty, the Hawke/Keating government actually reduced child

poverty by one third.

Three key issues that can help alleviate poverty are affordable

housing, employment and education yet Tebbutt (2003) claims little

progress has been made by the Howard government in assisting those

most in need (Tebbutt, 2003). Clearly this includes Indigenous people, as

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their socio-economic disadvantage remains considerably lower than that of

non-Indigenous Australians. In addressing why Indigenous disadvantage

remains high, the progressive side of politics blame inadequate Federal

Government funding or failure to properly implement the Royal

Commissions recommendations (Cunneen & McDonald, 1997 cited in

Weatherburn 2006). Conservatives, on the other hand, argue the quantity

of money or the recommendation implementations are not the problems,

rather the way the money was spent (Weatherburn, 2006). This polarisation

of political policy debate is demonstrated further by the comments of

Senator Rachel Siewart from the Australian Greens, and Helen Hughes

and Jenness Warin from the Centre for Independent Studies: two

ideologically opposed policy and political bodies. The Greens proposed an

increase of $2.1 billion dollars to improve Aboriginal housing, and another

$250-$500 million per year to raise Indigenous health standards. Hughes

and Warin, on the other hand, claim over-generous welfare policies,

communal land ownership, and language and culture preservation policies

are to blame for Indigenous disadvantage (Weatherburn, 2006; Hughes,

2005). Underscoring this perspective is the absence of the liberal concept

of private property rights in conjunction with native title legislation. When

this is coupled to uneconomic remote homelands, this is at the core of

Indigenous deprivation according to the Centre of Independent Studies

researchers. Three points arise from this discussion of the politicisation of

Indigenous disadvantage. First, increased funding has not reduced

Indigenous socio-economic conditions, rather it has worsened. Second,

urban Indigenous people suffer disadvantage just as their counterparts in

rural and remote do, thus negating the claim by Hughes and Warin that

language and culture preservation policies are the cause of Indigenous

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disadvantage (Hunter, 2006). Third, the rate of Indigenous incarceration is

rising steadily.

A more productive methodology to analyse Indigenous

disadvantage is to examine contingency events within certain historical

periods, rather than conceptualising cause and effect in linear terms. Brady

(2004) examines alcohol abuse as arising from the relaxation of the

discriminatory restrictions of alcohol provisions current in the nineteenth

century. By the 1960s, liquor had become a potent symbol of emancipation,

and the drinking of alcohol had become inextricably associated with

equality and status. A linear causal methodology would attribute

widespread alcohol abuse to the effects of colonisation and dispossession

rendering Aboriginal people, or anyone else for that matter, highly

susceptible to alcohol abuse (Saggers and Gray, 1997; Brady, 2004).

When the social aspects of parental modelling, peer influences, and alcohol

availability are taken into account, the number of Indigenous children

initiated into alcohol abuse rose as role models became abusers. Once this

endless vicious cycle became socially entrenched, communities and

individuals easily turned to other drugs such as heroin, cocaine, cannabis,

and petrol and solvent abuse in remote communities.

7.8 Conclusion

This chapter examined why Indigenous people are imprisoned at

rates much higher than other Australians. This is important because

imprisonment is a concrete example of violence and hopelessness and a

living reminder of concentrated oppressive and confining habitus reinforcing

the trauma of individual experiences resulting from intergenerational social

dysfunction.

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The chapter has attempted to outline and explain the continuity of

control and governance exercised over Indigenous people that continues to

this day. The aim was to demonstrate why Indigenous people are over-

represented prison because of their fractured and dislocated life histories.

Government policies have created a situation whereby many Indigenous

people suffer the effect of these policies as collective cultural trauma,

evidenced by high rates of incarceration.

The precarious nature of identity in late modernity is held in place

through a temporary unification of different elements (or networks) of the

social world in which they are embedded. Yet for many Indigenous people,

fractured social, cultural, and economic networks have remained constant

since European invasion. The insecure nature of their very existence has

depended on uncertain and contingent networks that have disconnected

rather than attached. Country, kin, tribe, community, and family have

invariably been reduced in terms of attachment to each other as a unified

network. Indigenous people have at once become a hidden, but

nonetheless constituent part of the construction of the nation by the fact of

their described identity by others. In reality, the social conditions of

Indigenous peoples are always contested, historically and socially situated,

and depend on the state. But despite the fracturing of societies,

reintegration is a common theme in contemporary Indigenous affairs. Much

is being done at the community level to reconnect and link up disconnected

individuals to lost families. But for those who remain disconnected, daily life

often involves interacting with the criminal justice system and the

experience of incarceration.

The perception of being a prison inmate is linked to a negation of

the identity incorporating all of the socio-cultural elements of being

Aboriginal. Yet the prison is also a locus of change for some. Following the

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terminology of Bourdieu (1977) it is a ‘field’ on which Indigenous inmates

learn the ‘game’ determined by interactions, power struggles, alliances and

negotiations together with formal regulations. The prison as a locus of

change is the theme of the next chapter and the central focus of this

research project. What takes place within the prison walls that determines

how and why Indigenous Australians align with Islam.

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Indigenous Australians and Islam

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8.0 Indigenous Australians, Islam, and Alliances

8.1 Introduction

The working hypothesis of this thesis is that some Indigenous actors

look to Islam partly as a reflection of their frustration in not achieving

meaningful recognition within mainstream society. For the participants in

this study, there was a positive correlation between seeking Islam, and

involvement in the criminal justice system. The argument made in previous

chapters is that the legacy of history has contributed to much of Indigenous

peoples’ current circumstances and is a direct consequence of their

experiences of colonialism and the recent past. These historical and

contemporary experiences contribute to the disproportionate rates of

Indigenous incarceration in Australia. Indigenous imprisonment cannot be

understood in the absence of wider power relations that have shaped the

nature of the colonial response to Indigenous communities, both historically

and as a matter of contemporary reality in Australia (Cuneen, 2001: 1-9).

This aim of this chapter is to document and analyse the local occurrence of

Indigenous alignment with Islam. Identity formation and its relationship to

Islam is the first area of discussion. Identity and self-esteem issues form

the next area of investigation. Within the context of Islam and the prison

system, an explanation of the radicalisation process within a prison

environment incorporates the alliances and associations within the prison

system. The extent to which Indigenous alignment with Islam has to do with

identity politics is then discussed followed by the question of whether

Jihadism the new threat to replace Indigenous statehood.

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8.2 Identity (re)formation and Islam in prison Indigenous imprisonment is part of the political process that has

direct historical continuity with the processes of colonization and

dispossession (Reynolds, 1989) and the establishment of colonial Australia

as a penal colony (Hughes, 1986). The theoretical interest lies in examining

the role of identities in preserving prisoners' sense of self, ontological

security, and social cohesion among prisoners. It draws on two sociological

models of prison life. The 'indigenous model' assumes the constraints

imposed by the degradation and rituals of imprisonment promote inmate

solidarity above all else, whilst the 'importation model' prioritises external

societal roles (such as racial group) and cultural influences in structuring

prison hierarchies and group relations. The role religion plays in re-forming

the imposed prison identity is also considered. This is of considerable

policy relevance because of the significant minority ethnic disproportionality

in prison populations (Phillips, 2008). An argument made by Edney (2001)

suggests “the principle and practice of Indigenous self-determination

cannot be separated from the nature of Indigenous imprisonment” (Edney,

2001: 3). Self-determination for Indigenous Australians is a fundamental

construct embodied in the RCIADIC report. The absence of any form of

autonomy in prison represents “perhaps the antithesis of what is required

by self-determination” (Edney, 2001: 7), and contributes to undermining the

social capital of Indigenous communities. Established identity constructs in

these situations collapse and then remade within the polarising

environment of the prison. Prison inmates are accustomed to dividing the

world into separate groups and cementing their identity by rhetorically

dissociating themselves from other groups of inmates.

Gabriele Marranci’s (2006) argument claims identity allows people

to make sense of their autobiographical selves; and enables people to

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express their autobiographical selves through symbols. What we ‘feel to be’

determines our personal identity and this is conditioned by socialization

(family of origin, life experience, socio-cultural environment). For many

Indigenous inmates, identity confusion exists as an existential threat and

ontological insecurity (Giddens, 1994). Yet these feelings are quite likely

fed by the remnants of deeper underlying identity confusion attributable to

policies of removal, social alienation and powerlessness.

8.3 Identity and self-esteem

Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1979) identifies that self-esteem has a

paramount relevance for identity formation and that people categorise

social and non-social stimuli in order to self-identify with others and to form

‘in groups’ which differentiate themselves from ‘out groups’. According to

Tajfel, personal esteem can only be achieved through in group

membership. Personal identities, therefore, depend upon the social identity

of the in group, and the self-esteem of each member of the group depends

upon the self-esteem of the others involved within such an in group. Tajfel

understands social identity as contributing to individual identity as the result

of social group dynamics. To enhance their self-esteem, individuals

undertake a process of depersonalisation in order to become part of a

group. Regarding the form of Islamic group often termed prison Islam, it

provides prototypes through the stereotype of the other, which in this case

is the modern and secular, in other words the West. This would somewhat

explain why fundamentalist groups decide to adopt the most anti-modern

tool available: a strong belief in an infallible and divine scripture.

Previous chapters reviewed and analysed the underlying conditions

leading to the over-representation of Indigenous people in the criminal

justice system generally and prisons in particular. This was found to be

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strongly related to regimes of continuous historical control and governance

leading to fractured and displaced communities and individuals.

Chapter six examined the Islamic presence in Australia and

concluded with an overview of the social and religious circumstances as

they apply in a post September 11 environment. It was found that Islam and

Indigeneity have degrees of compatibility not experienced between non-

Indigenous Australians and Christianity. A reason for this is the ease in

which Islam accepts ‘marginalisation’ and inequality as an intrinsic attribute

of Islam as a way of life. Islam is recognised globally and serves to

collectively identify adherents as part of the ummah (community of

believers).

Previous results from this investigation indicated a statistically

significant number of Indigenous prison inmates reverting to Islam while

incarcerated in NSW prisons. According to prison authorities, a small

percentage of Indigenous and non-Indigenous prisoners are said to have

been ‘radicalised’ while in detention. The issue of prisoner radicalisation

relates to globalisation, and nation-state interests of national security and

local terrorist group formation. It also relates to the use of radicalisation

discourse by prison authorities as a political tool to justify increasing

surveillance, monitoring, housing, and isolating potentially difficult

prisoners.

The following section examines the prison as an institution, its role

in society, and the reshaping of individuals within its confines. The section

discusses and analyses the dynamics within the prison, and the socio-

historical legacies of the inmates.

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8.4 Islam and the prison system

The prison system effectively incarcerates, isolates, and

economically controls the most dynamic members of the lower class.

Steady increases in prison populations worldwide place demands on

authorities to build more prisons but in Australia, as in America, prison

populations are over-represented by Indigenous Australian and African

American inmates respectively. These groups are marginalized citizens in

terms of suffering consistently lower socioeconomic conditions including

health, education, housing and employment. This is not to claim any

particular biases in the criminal justice system, nor to deflect from the fact

that the high rate of Indigenous contact with the criminal justice system is in

large part a reflection on the high rate of Indigenous involvement in crime

(Weatherburn, Fitzgerald & Hua, 2003).

The point relevant to this section is to examine the prevalence of

African American conversions to Islam within U.S. prison systems. The

review will discuss literature dealing with other overseas experiences of

conversions to Islam in prisons. The aim is to demonstrate the wide-spread

occurrence of Islam in prisons and to discuss why Islam is attractive to

‘black’ and marginalised prisoners.

The U.S. versions of Islam practiced in prison are variously named

‘Prislam’, ‘Prison Islam’ or ‘Jailhouse Islam’, indicating that a particular “cut

and paste” version of Qur’anic interpretation forms the basis for a radical

and corrupted version of Islam. This development has important security

and radicalisation repercussions for U.S. prison authorities, but these

concerns are extended to, and linked with, the overall discourse of national

security in a post 9/11 environment. The radicalisation of Indigenous

Australian Muslims within NSW Corrective Services facilities is an issue

which has a set precedent. According to verifiable sources prisoner

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radicalisation was reported in some NSW prisons in 2003, and as late as

July and August 2006 in a national Australian broadsheet newspaper

(O’Brien, 2006: Kerbaj, 2006). Although the issue of (Indigenous) inmate

radicalisation is of significant interest, it is not the priority of this research to

determine if in fact this is occurring and to what extent. Rather, as

explained previously, a more beneficial approach is to examine the

sociological aspects of prison activity which leads to certain individuals and

groups aligning for particular purposes. For Indigenous inmates, the

underlying conditions influencing their involvement with the criminal justice

system and prison career is of considerable importance. The extensive

background information relayed to the researcher coincides with the

disrupted lives due to historical events. Without exception, every

interviewee described a background of social trauma. However, brief

excursions into the aspects of radicalisation are helpful in explaining the

underlying conditions for potential recruitment by radical influences. On a

macro sociological scale, the wider national and global aspects of Islam

and the West are considered to incorporate theoretical and empirical

benchmarks.

A logical conclusion able to be drawn from this outline is that

prisons serve to reproduce criminals rather than rehabilitate them. The shift

from bodily punishment at the behest of a sovereign head, to the more

‘humane’ socially isolated environment of the modern prison is the

dominant mode of legally separating those who break social rules, from the

rest of society.

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8.5 An explanation of the radicalisation process wi thin a prison environment

Identifying the factors which may lead to radicalisation, and some of

the arguments used to justify it, are important considerations when

examining not just observable or perceived radicalisation, but also the

tendency for coercive behaviour of any kind. As an example, we could

imagine that (Islamic) radicalisation is on the extreme end of the continuum

with many other forms of recruitment and coercive forces in between. A

simple example is to describe the distinction between Islamic radicalism as

understood by the Wahhabi/Salafi ideology of groups such as Bin Laden,

and the strict following of the Wahhabi/Salafi creed of the Saudi state. One

is the enemy of the United States and the other is a long-term ally. The

point is that the Wahhabi doctrine is often stereotyped as an austere and

uncompromising form of Islamic doctrine. Yet there is a considerable

difference between a fundamentalist interpretation and a radical

interpretation as demonstrated by various terrorist groups.

It is also important to understand prison radicalisation as a two-

stage process. Alienated individuals or groups who have become highly

radicalised are not necessarily a threat within the prison system. It is only

upon release that further steps may be taken to either seek out radical

influences, or instead, become moderate and observant Muslims. From

European and American examples only a small minority of radicalised

individuals actually cross over to become terrorists: by financing, lending

facilities to, or encouraging active terrorists, or by actively participating in

terrorist attacks. This is a large step, evolving over time with increasing

indoctrination, reinforcement and training. Following the ‘career’ path of a

potentially radicalised individual should not be difficult for intelligence

operatives if cooperation with prison authorities is part of their modus

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operandi. The NSW Department of Corrective Services cooperate with not

only the state and federal police, but other security agencies such as ASIO.

There are a range of potential factors in radicalisation and no single

factor predominates. It is likely the catalyst for any given group or individual

becoming radicalised will be a combination of different factors particular to

that group or person. Potentially radicalising factors include the

development of a sense of grievance and injustice. As has already been

noted, the terrorists' version of history and recent events is highly negative

and partial in its interpretation of past interactions between Islam and the

West.

• The process of globalisation , in particular over the past two

decades, has had ramifications right across the world and in many

countries the effect has been not just economic, but also political,

social and cultural change on a significant scale. Given the impact

on local ways of life, those already predisposed to be suspicious of

the West can seek to portray these changes as a deliberate attempt

to replace traditional structures with Western models, rather than as

the consequence, for good and ill, of modernisation. This applies

particularly to a great many Indigenous Australians who feel

disenfranchised due to the historical legacy of oppression and

dispossession.

• Alongside this is often a simplistic, but virulent anti-Westernism .

The presence of Western interests, and sometimes military forces,

in Muslim countries - even though this is at the request and with the

permission of a country's government - is seen by some as an

affront and a source of shame. Indigenous inmates within the prison

system easily relate to the frustration, anger, and powerlessness

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associated with colonialism, the White Australia policy, and

numerous policies designed to afford privileges to some sections of

society at the expense of others. It would be a mistake to expect

these underlying and deeply-rooted sentiments to remain dormant

in the volatile social environment of the prison.

• Also some argue that the West does not apply consistent

standards in its international behaviour. Conflicts such as Bosnia

and Chechnya are cited, where Muslims have been the victims of

violence, and it is argued that the Western nations have failed to act

quickly or effectively enough to protect them, ignoring many positive

interventions. In particular, this applies to perceptions of relations

with Israel and the approach to the Middle-East Peace Process,

where the UK is actively committed to a two-state solution, with a

viable Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel.

• Specific events - for example, the Coalition action to restore

sovereignty in Kuwait, the UN authorised actions in Afghanistan to

remove the Al Qa'ida terrorist organisation and the Taliban

government sponsoring it and then restore stability there, and US

and UK action in Iraq to remove a serious threat to international

security and subsequently to promote a democratic and pluralist

government - are sometimes portrayed as attacks on Islam itself,

regardless of the actual rationale for the action. Media coverage of

isolated and unacceptable incidents involving Western forces in

Muslim countries, where individuals fail to live up to the standards

we have set ourselves in the treatment of prisoners and civilians,

may also be used to convince susceptible individuals that the West

is antipathetic to Islam.

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For some Muslims and Indigenous Australians alike, a potential

factor is a sense of personal alienation or community disadvantage, arising

from socioeconomic factors such as discrimination, social exclusion, and

lack of opportunity. While an individual may not be relatively

disadvantaged, he or she may identify with others seen as less privileged;

also different generations within the same family may have significantly

different views about these issues. An important factor is exposure to

radical ideas. This may come from reading radical literature on Islamic and

other subjects or surfing the Internet (where many types of radical views

are strongly promoted), but more often radicalisation seems to arise from

local contacts and from peers. Exposure to a forceful and inspiring figure,

already committed to extremism, can be important here. This person may

be associated with a particular place (e.g. a mosque) or can be a national

or international figure, seen on video or heard on audio tapes. Inspiration

from a distance is important and there is evidence that the rise of the

Internet, with its ability to connect people, to pass ideas between them, and

then pass those ideas on to others has had a significant impact on the

accessibility and flow of radical ideas. Yet it should also be considered that

the tension between Islam and the West is easily and cynically inflamed by

certain media outlets, politicians, right-wing nationalists, and by those

whose interests lay in maintaining high levels of public fear to ensure

continuing support for the ‘war on terror.’

None of these factors are conclusive and they are probably best

viewed as considerations which may influence radicalisation. The examples

are of a general nature indicating some similarities for both Muslims and

Indigenous Australians and why radicalisation is based on sociological,

rather than psychological factors. Re-empowerment and group solidarity

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are key missing determinants in the causal relationship of radicalisation

based on a somewhat disingenuous interpretation of Islam.

8.6 Alliances and associations within the prison sy stem

The social process of engaging with Islam by Indigenous

Australians involves a variable combination of influencing factors. Prior

recognition by NSW prison authorities of radicalisation in prisons provides a

benchmark for examining the relationships between Indigenous inmates

and other groups. The main influences appear to be Lebanese Muslim

inmates who have historically aligned themselves to Indigenous detainees.

The following dialogue is part of an extended transcript describing the

conditions and environment of Goulburn ‘Supermax’ prison.

Christopher Binse, (Former Goulburn Gaol Inmate): There's a friendship,

there's alliances with certain groups within the, within the prison system.

You know, the Aussies, the Islanders, and the Asians, they hang out

together there. You know, they're cool, you know? The Lebanese and the

Aboriginals, they hang out together, and the Chinese, they're cool, you

know.

Brian Kelly, (Commander, Security NSW Corrective Services): If there's an

assault by an Asian inmate on an Aboriginal inmate, that Aboriginal inmate

will go back to his people and they will number up and then try and square

off with the Asian inmates. It's just a cycle which just increases, it

snowballs. (Masters, 2005)

The reasons for this are for proselytising their particular ‘cut and

paste’ version of Islam, and for instrumental purposes as well. This alliance

is founded on relations of power, with the Lebanese providing physical

protection and economic security. Both groups are familiar with the daily

contingencies of conflict and violence but Lebanese inmates enjoy a

greater degree of social support than many Indigenous inmates. From the

personal observations of the researcher, Lebanese inmates might be

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classified as ‘entrepreneurial’ in the methods they employ to establish and

maintain prison hierarchy.

8.7 The extent to which Indigenous alignment with I slam has to do with identity politics

Charles Taylor (1989) observes modern identity is inherently

political, because it ultimately demands recognition. Is the practice (and

therefore demonstration) of Islam by (relatively powerless Indigenous

individuals) within a closed society such as a prison, a demonstration of

identity politics? According to Olivier Roy (2004, 35) “the religious

community is increasingly seen as an identity group, emphasising the ‘us

and them’ approach.” This could signify the process of drawing lines

between true believers and the rest of the world as well as denoting a

situation in which the believer thinks of himself as being in a minority

identity group. “The feeling of being part of a minority is an issue not of

demography but of alienation from a dominant culture that is totally secular

or that refers to religion in a neurotic way.” (ibid.: 36). In the case of

Indigenous inmates the issue of belonging has credence in relation to the

dominant ‘outside’ community and the dominant nature of prison life. Both

of these circumstances entail degrees of alienation and the concomitant

desire for personal authenticity gained through group identification. The

shift from an alienated and universal aimlessness of outside existence, to

one of a reconstructed member of a faith community demands

demonstrations of faith membership within the confines of available

religious guidance. But as Roy (2004, 38) explains: “…through the

weakening of prior social ties, identities are recast by a reference to codes

of comportment, values and beliefs, and not on a ‘substantial’, even

reconstructed new identity.” These concepts align somewhat with the

impressions of some prison chaplains, who understand the utility of group

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identity, specifically for Indigenous ‘conversions’ to Islam. This is not to

discount the religious benefits associated with Islam, and in all reality, it is

likely that combinations of motivating factors occur simultaneously. Muslim

identity is recast as according to what are seen as purely religious

behavioural patterns, and not on the basis of a given culture. This points to

the universal nature of Islam having the ability to cross ethnic and cultural

divides and to identify the adherents as a religious community. The

corollary is that if radicalisation occurs, it is more likely to separate the

believer from the collective Islamic community. Most radical militants are

engaged in action as individuals, cutting links with their ‘natural’ community

to fight beyond the sphere of any real collective identity. Although this

condition is far removed from the regulated environment of the prison, the

link between associating conflict with Muslims is apparent by the interest

shown by the West. Similarly, the Indigenous struggle for self-determination

is usually cast in conflictual terms because its claims reside outside of the

normalised boundaries of liberal democratic constructs of individualism.

8.8 Is Jihadism the new threat to replace Indigenou s statehood?

There is an underlying assumption by some that global Islam will

replace western democracy as a system of government. Others have

feared Indigenous land rights and treaty activism would eventuate in

Indigenous groups claiming the ‘back yards’ of ordinary Australians. It will

be argued here that comparisons can be drawn between earlier fears in

Australia that Indigenous owners would reclaim their land, and those of

contemporary Islamists advocating the re-establishment of the Khilafah.

Both of these themes imply a radical shift in the way Australian identity and

political governance might be altered. The Indigenous issue is unresolved

as far as a satisfactory reconciliation is concerned, particularly when

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separate Indigenous government departments have been replaced with

mainstream provision of services. This makes the implicit statement that

Indigenous people ‘belong’ with the rest of mainstream Australians and

other ethnic groups, and no longer have the ‘visibility of receiving ‘special’

treatment. This is despite the fact that on all social indicators, Indigenous

people lag behind other Australians. The shift in government policy follows

the ideology of cultural assimilation and economic neoliberalism, and

overlooks the complex issues associated with Aboriginal rights as first

peoples. The Australian economy is embedded in broader, historically

specific socio-cultural regimes, each with distinct structures and processes,

dominant and subordinate strata, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic blocs,

and patterns of struggle (Antonio and Bonanno, 2000). Broadly,

materialism and consumption drive an economic agenda with a priority on

maintaining the capitalist thrust of western liberal democracies. Moreover,

recent Australian government policy has meant that ‘citizenship’ and

refugee policy33 has replaced multiculturalism both in name and in practice.

This new reality of emphasising citizenship instead of

multiculturalism raises two important issues. First, there is an assumption

that a progressive tolerance for minorities means antipathy for the dominant

culture or conventional view. An allied assumption concerns what

constitutes a ‘dominant’ or conventional view. The second issue concerns

the political manipulation of ideas that are designed to foster a sense of

community based on a common identity (as a nation of Australians). The

problem arises when ethnic, cultural, and religious difference ‘disturbs’ the

public’s concept of what constitutes ‘acceptable’ demonstrations of

33 According to Galligan and Roberts (2003: 2) “the multicultural account of Australia as a nation of diverse cultural groups has been taken over by the Australian Citizenship for a New Century. The Citizenship Council eschews any notions of common national identity or shared culture in favour of ‘public acceptance of diversity’ and abstract civic values”.

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Australian life. The imagined identity of mainstream Australians will always

be contested, and instead of bringing individuals and groups together the

opposite is often the case. Social polarisation occurs because of the

imposed political ideology of an idealised citizenry based on the normalised

or conventional dominant mainstream liberal principles of individual

equality. For example, most European countries have right-wing populist

parties opposed to immigration and increased mobilisation around the issue

of Muslim minorities (Fukuyama, 2006). What is required, according to

Fukuyama, is that national identity must be clearly defined and expressed,

and a failure to be clear on national identity leaves a society vulnerable to

being overwhelmed by those with a much better sense of community

identity. Fukuyama bases this premise on the challenge facing liberal

democracies in relation to the integration of Muslim immigrants (ibid.) but

blurs the distinction between ‘moderate’ law-abiding Muslims and radical

Islamists. The point is that either ‘too many’ or ‘too radical’ is harmful to

pluralistic democracies. The effect is to disrupt the social psyche by

implanting notions of radicalism and loss of imagined community

(Anderson, 1991).

For the relatively limited and insular cultural history of Australia, it is

the unresolved Indigenous issue that acts as a socio-cultural reminder of

how the country was acquired. The imposition of an imagined idealised

identity at the expense of Indigenous Australians is embedded in the history

of Australia since 1788. For the original Indigenous inhabitants and their

antecedents who were successively removed, ignored, separated,

assimilated, integrated, and then overlooked in the wake of September 11,

the Australian national identity has only posthumously included Indigenous

Australians, albeit in paternalistic and patronising terms.

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It could be argued that the period of affirmative action in the late 1960s to

the mid 1970s has been completely replaced by a resurgent nationalism

which requires the citizens of the nation state to identify as one coherent

body. This is odd considering the effect of cultural globalisation is to

practically demonstrate the multicultural nature of not only the nation state

but the ‘global state.’ On one hand the political and economic ideologies of

neoliberalism encourages a ‘melting pot’ of cultures based on the free

exchange of people and goods in an increasing globalised world. On the

other hand, there appears to be a reactive resurgent fear of immigration

with its associated connotations of different cultures, religions and laws. An

obvious example to demonstrate the potential for the politics of fear is the

application of sharia law as a part of Islamic social practice. Although this is

not applicable in Australia, it is frequently used as a case study for adhering

to liberal democratic values. The logical progression to include Fukuyama’s

view that jihadism is aided by the quest for identity spawned by migration to

Muslim minority countries such as Australia is particularly so if it fails to

offer meaningful economic and cultural integration.

Disaffection and disaffiliation within a Muslim community can

provoke terrorism, just as the Cronulla riots in 2006 were a predictable

response to a growing sense that the dominant Australian-Anglo culture

was being undermined. These instances, if left unchecked, result in

resurgent demonstrations of imagined identity, but it is only those with a

reinforced sense of belonging that reject the option of multicultural

tolerance, such as right-wing groups.

A simple response to this occurrence is to claim that Indigenous

inmates convert as a form of protest, or to recast and make sense of the

experiences of previous exclusion (Roy, 2004: 47). This may or may not be

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the case but it provides a benchmark from which to examine prison

conversions in more detail

Within prisons and in Indigenous communities Islam serves a

discursive function: that of a powerful oppositional force to institutional

authority, and as the promise of empowerment, status, and identity for a life

outside of prison. Its power resides in both the global ummah and the

strong links with ‘black’ minorities. The power of Islam lies more in

symbolism than in actual threats to the social cohesion of mainstream

society. The common denominator is a recognition that both Islam and

Indigenous Australians suffer from domination by Western powers.

Recognition of domination is the ‘hook’ attracting Indigenous attention,

whether intentional or by chance. Islam is therefore a discourse specifically

constructed by Indigenous people for the purpose of regaining individual

and collective power in an otherwise oppressive environment.

8.9 Conclusion

The collective identity aspect of Indigenous involvement is

conditional and contingent. For example Indigenous ‘converts’ align with

other Indigenous converts more strongly than with the general Muslim

population, as their major alliance is with Indigenous ‘brothers’ or Muslim

‘brothers’. Indigenous people are over-represented in the criminal justice

system because they commit more public disorder types of crimes.

Influencing factors are poverty, social dislocation, poor education,

unemployment, drug and alcohol problems, aimlessness and

hopelessness. A significant contributing factor is the unresolved social and

political resolution of the destruction created by previous administrative and

political decisions which have left a legacy of dysfunction and

powerlessness.

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The majority of Indigenous respondents in this project had served

prison time. Many experienced Islam for the first time while in prison. All

experienced Islam with the knowledge of colonialism and oppression, and

how groups such as the Nation of Islam (NOI) and Malcolm X captured

oppressed African Americans. The imagined power of NOI to mobilise a

collective to re-empower a significant bloc of marginalised blacks is a

familiar metaphor for Indigenous Australians. And just as the NOI doctrine

was based on an unorthodox version of Islam, its message was overtly and

powerfully political.

Indigenous people who have reverted to Islam and many who have

not, reflect on the hypocrisy of the Christian message by referring to

colonialism and the resulting treatment they received. Christianity appeared

to be a significant influence in re-making the identities of Indigenous people

and therefore excluding them from access to traditional land, culture and

language. As one respondent claimed “Christianity is the religion of the

oppressor – Islam is the religion of the oppressed” (M, 2006).

Other significant themes concerning how Islam was perceived by some

Indigenous respondents:

• Islam is the natural religion of Indigenous people because of their

genetic connection and lineage to early African peoples34

• There is no contradiction between Indigenous cosmology and Islamic

theology in that the belief in one transcendent being or God is common

to both.

• Many Indigenous people can re-tell stories of the attitudes to and

treatment of ‘Mohammedans’ who were mostly people from what is now

34 The Nation of Islam in the U.S. also made reference to this point in claiming their close association with Islam. In this case it was black Africans who were transported to America and the oppression of slavery that galvanised this group.

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known as Afghanistan. Many Indigenous Islamic connection go back to

this period.

The main points considered in this, and previous chapters will be

summarised in the following discussion chapter.

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Indigenous Australians and Islam

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9.0 Discussion: Implications and outcomes

9.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses and discusses various options as to where

this research will lead, and what conclusions can be drawn from what is

known about the status of contemporary social policy in relation to

Indigenous Australian Muslims. In particular the interest is how an Islamic

influence realigns an Indigenous perception of society, and how both

Indigenous Australians and Muslims in Australia express desires for

equality and positive social recognition.

9.2 Summary of themes

By way of review, what follows is a summary of the key themes

discussed in this thesis. The longevity of minority cultural groups being

portrayed as deviant, or as a threat to a stable cultural order can be traced

back to the arrival of the British in 1788. Ethnic minorities are presented as

threats, with overt positionings of ‘us’ and ‘them’, in which the former is an

assumed mainstream audience, and the latter is the cultural minority. In

general terms, Muslims, Asian-Australians and Indigenous Australians

suffer greater negativity in the media than do other ethnic groups.

Individuals who affiliate with, or who are associated with, these specific

cultural groups endure greater degrees of vilification than do others. In its

most simplified form, this situation is the context and explanatory

framework for the over-representation of Indigenous people in prison; the

continued discrimination of Muslims; and the attempts by Indigenous

Australians to regain empowerment and self-respect. Put another way,

incarceration is the definitive representation for many Indigenous people of

the circular and intergenerational debilitating social effects of dispossession

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and discrimination. If this were not the case, Indigenous people would not

be over-represented in the criminal justice system to the extent they are. To

accurately rank the order of underlying and current influences is almost

impossible, yet it has been claimed in this thesis that disproportionate

involvement with the criminal justice system is one symptom of collective

cultural trauma. The trauma discussed here is widespread and deeply

embedded in the habitus of many Indigenous people. The corollary is the

inability of the state to effectively address the underlying issues influencing

Indigenous disadvantage because policy focus is to apply reactive practical

solutions without addressing the difficult and complex histories of

oppression. Since the increasing rate of globalisation and resurgent

neoliberal principles, the doxic social condition has slowly reverted to social

conservatism and economic fundamentalism. The discursive orthodoxy is a

creation of the lack of ethical and moral dimensions embedded in neoliberal

ideology.

Applying Bourdieu, neoliberalism establishes itself as doxa

described as an unquestionable orthodoxy that operates as if it were the

objective truth. Doxa embeds across social space in its entirety, from the

practices and perceptions of the state and social groups. The contemporary

ubiquitous nature of the neoliberal paradigm as a doctrine of governance

has managed to establish itself as “a credible vision, at once universal and

foundational, for describing social reality itself” (Chopra, 2003: 422).

Neoliberalism preserves the central idea of classical economics that the

free market is an essential prerequisite for a free society. This outlook

implies freedom as individual freedom from state interference and freedom

of the market. The commitment to neoliberalism is predicated, by definition,

on a marked opposition to the idea of the welfare or protectionist state

(Peters, 2001: 14-15).

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The underlying assumption of neoliberalism is that economic and

social behaviour can be understood in terms of the human attributes of

rationality, individuality, and self interest. The neoliberal redefinition of the

social in terms of the economic is primarily in terms of the language of

quantifiability, calculability, cost-benefit rationalisation and business

management techniques (Bourdieu, 1998: 31). Those parts of the social

fabric not translatable to mathematical terms are accordingly discarded; “a

radical separation is made between the economic and the social, which is

left to one side, abandoned to sociologists as a kind of reject” (ibid.). The

outcome of this claim is that the social cannot pose any legitimate

objections to neoliberalism, since it cannot be represented as a variable in

the equation. Furthermore, Bourdieu (1998) argues that neoliberal

discourse views and presents itself as the “scientific description of reality”

(1998: 31) claiming the status of objective, scientific truth whose truth-value

transcends history. This is what allows neoliberal discourse to “embark on a

programme of methodological destruction of collectivities” (ibid.: 95-6).

Neoliberalism as doxa, is therefore a self-evident truth about the

human and the social which is beyond question and is what gives the

dominant discourse its strength. The negative effects of the neoliberal

paradigm both for governance and for understanding the social are

experienced in a variety of ways. According to Bourdieu, the over-riding

achievement of neoliberalism is nothing other than the oldest dream of

capitalism; the establishment of a framework for the more efficient

accumulation and distribution of profit according to Darwinian principles.

Individuals have to bear responsibility for the situations in which they find

themselves.

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9.3 Implications for the research topic

Bourdieu asserts that any research must be composed of two

"minutes." The first an objective stage of research - where one looks at the

relations of the social space and the structures of the field. The second

stage must be a subjective analysis of social agents' dispositions to act and

their categories of perception and understanding that result from their

inhabiting the field. Proper research, he says, cannot do without these two

together (Bourdieu cited in Mouzelis, 2007) This theoretical approach has

been employed in the analysis of Indigenous alignment with Islam in the

context of the interview transcript (pp. (199 - 217).

In Pierre Bourdieu's work, the habitus comprises perceptual

structures and embodied dispositions which organise the way individuals

see the world and act in it; “the cognitive structures which social agents

implement in their practical knowledge of the social world are internalized,

embodied social structures” (Bourdieu 1984: 468). The individual agent

develops these dispositions in response to the determining structures (such

as class, family, and education) and external conditions (field)s they

encounter. They are therefore neither wholly voluntary nor wholly

involuntary. Crucially, the habitus is derived directly from the

socioeconomic or structural position in which individuals find themselves.

For many Indigenous people the habitus is shaped by the lived conditions

of colonialism, inequality, dispossession, inter-generational poverty, ill-

health and unemployment. Dispositions indicating alienation, social

exclusion, and minority status inform their daily social interactions. On the

other hand, political debate, discourse or even policies are particularly

prone to the obstacles posed by deep-rooted dispositions which resist the

force of good argument. Nationalism is one example Bourdieu (2000) gives

of this. For many Indigenous people, nationalism is reminiscent of invasion,

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colonialism, and numerous technologies of power associated with

governance and control. The historic denial regarding the facts of

dispossession by large sections of Australian society conforms to the

objective structures of political power subsumed within a discourse of

‘national interest’ and uncritical histories. Socio-cultural conflict or tension

arises when established histories of Australia’s past are challenged. Put

differently, the socio-cultural habitus or the functioning social space at the

micro-level, describes the relationship between a particular group of people

and the practices of those who inhabit that shared space. The shared social

space of Australian society is shaped by the dominant discourse and

discursive practices embedded in Western liberal democratic ideals. The

embodied activities and competencies that are ‘learned’ and carried out by

individuals in a social space by necessity reflect the values and ideals of

the dominant society. The periods following the events of 1788 are

recognisable by the various iterations of power embedded in the structures

of authority informed by Australian identity and emerging nationalist

sentiments. The structures that typify social spaces give rise to dispositions

in the members of a social space. Dispositions can be understood as

inclinations to certain responses or tendencies to make one choice over

another, and to privilege one action over another. The nature of a system of

such dispositions (habitus) that endures across space and time is

recognisable in the form of national identity discourse. On the other hand,

an Indigenous habitus may be largely acquired as a result of being

integrated, acclimatised, and shaped in the particular environments of

resistance discourse formed around anti-colonial, anti-capitalist, or anti-

Christian sentiments. When referring to the responses in the research

transcript, strong resistance sentiments were expressed leaving a space for

the re-empowering discourse of Islamic principles to emerge.

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Bourdieu’s ‘field’ refers to objective structures of power and material

inequality which accumulate around any form of practice. A field is a setting

in which agents and their social positions are located. The position of each

particular agent in the field is a result of interaction between the specific

rules of the field, agent's habitus and agent's capital (social, economic and

cultural) (Bourdieu, 1984). The main thrust of Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology is

the focus on the idea of power and control (Peillon, 1998). Bourdieu’s

analysis of fields of activity is about access to, control over and struggles

for capital, as fields are structures in terms of domination. Only those who

can mobilise the relevant resources are able to take part in the struggles

which define a field. Resources take the form of economic, cultural, social,

and symbolic capital. Therefore, if Indigenous people lack any of these

forms of capital relative to the majority society, it places them in a field in

which the effort of struggles is largely unproductive. On the other hand,

Islamic alliances provide a form of capital which is both empowering and

symbolic. For Bourdieu, the accumulation of one kind of capital represents

the stake of the struggles in one particular field. The overarching field of

power or central structure of domination is for Indigenous Australians the

nation state which is a political field. Interconnecting sub-fields are

governments, bureaucracies and administration concerned with Indigenous

welfare. These sub-fields maintain control of economic capital, and

prescribe dominant cultural values and social capital. In terms of symbolic

capital, incremental but significant re-distributions are occurring. Land rights

legislation and the recent apology to the stolen generations are examples

of symbolic cultural capital. Yet the state as a political field determines the

political struggle for the monopoly of symbolic violence and for the right to

formulate the law as was the case with the Northern Territory Emergency

Response legislation (2007). The control over the formulation and delivery

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of Indigenous welfare and policy programmes constitutes both a resource

within a ‘welfare’ field and a major stake within it. (Peillon, 1998: 217).

What then, do the overlapping fields of institutional power and

authority invested in the structure and management of the criminal justice

system offer Indigenous people caught up in the system? Conversely, what

does the resistance politics embedded in the discourse and practice of

Islam by Indigenous Australians pose to the nation state, and at a another

level, prison authorities?

An important issue to consider is the habitus construction in prison.

This is because, as discussed above, Indigenous people are

overrepresented in Australian prisons and the prison is the site where many

Indigenous inmates become involved with Islam. The prison habitus could

be conceptualised as extra influential layers imposed on the individual by

force for actual survival. This is in line with Erving Goffman’s (1961) ‘total

institution’, where previous social meanings are deconstructed and then

reconstructed to reflect the institutional or organisational field. However,

there is a transitional ‘learning’ period for newly arrived prisoners which

may be uncomfortable and demeaning, hence the desire for common group

membership with internal consistency of behaviour, rules, and dispositions.

“The application of rules is not determined by their intrinsic logic, as

rationalist philosophers would have it, but by social agreement” (King,

2000: 420). Gang power is less alienating for individuals within the group

and provides the opportunity for inter-gang competition usually driven by

hierarchical power-related violence. Belonging to an ‘outlaw’ religious group

works in a similar fashion and is why prison Islam has an opportunistic

gang-like structure with links to ‘outside’ power associated with global

Islamism, Jihadism, fundamentalism and violence. (The less Islamic the

more gang-like and this should not be confused with actual criminal intent

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to carry out terrorist acts). It should also be stated that even if prison Islam

is fundamentalist in nature it does not necessarily follow that militancy or

violence will result.

9.4 The Nation of Islam example

Groups such as the Nation of Islam, though appearing at first to look

like manifestations of dissent, have actually functioned in U.S. history as

vehicles of social control, since their teachings have not attacked the root

causes of oppression Curtis, 2007). The argument that the absence of a

direct and organised assault on the political economy and patriarchy of the

United States effectively sustains the status quo, reflects a partial view of

political action and resistance. Rebellion also includes cultural acts of

resistance that reject the values and expectations of the powerful. In this

sense, the NOI’s activities, and the growth of Islam more generally among

black Americans, were extremely rebellious in the 1960s. During the 1950s,

the Nation of Islam permitted a space for an anti American critique of the

Cold War. During the Vietnam era, in the middle of a civil rights movement

that was an important component of U.S. foreign policy, many in the Nation

of Islam and other African American Muslims rejected American

nationalism; refused to serve in Vietnam; criticised the civil rights

movement as hollow; and challenged the legitimacy of the non-official state

religion, Christianity.

The argument could be made that the responses and sentiments of

Indigenous Muslims are demonstrating similar liberation discourses while

simultaneously embracing the formative tenets of Islamic belief and

practice. Similar too are the reactions of Australian federal and state

governments, and the concerns of the senior hierarchy of NSW Department

of Corrective Services management. The NOI example demonstrates a

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parallel between the reactions of U.S. government officials and those in

Australia.

Curtis (2007) explains that the way the Nation of Islam Muslims

dressed and talked, in addition to the pictures they drew and the poems

they wrote, questioned the cultural foundations of the state and its

legitimacy to rule. The fact that U.S. government officials associated

members of the NOI with violent revolution, despite the lack of any

organised effort in the movement to confront authorities with violence,

indicates the extent of the ideological challenge. According to one observer,

the NOI was among the most watched organizations in the government’s

Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) (Curtis, 2007). This

evidence indicates that the message of the Nation of Islam and its

members was politically dangerous in some way.

Indigenous Australians aligning with Islam face one additional

complication regarding their choice of faith. The events of September 11

and subsequent terrorist attacks in Spain, the U.K. and Indonesia have

mobilised media and political commentary. Concerted campaigns to

construct a ‘politics of fear’ have gradually influenced practice (in

Bourdieu’s usage) in that Islam is generally regarded with suspicion within

certain sections of Australian society, media and politics. Additionally,

Indigenous Australians who find themselves in a cycle of intergenerational

socio-economic disadvantage generated in part by associated latent

trauma conditions would appear to be poorly placed to effect positive social

and economic changes. Yet as has been demonstrated using the Nation of

Islam as a model for re-empowerment, so Indigenous Muslims are

experiencing Islam as a source of resistance and empowerment. This is

despite the danger of ‘speaking the unspeakable’, or put another way,

challenging the orthodoxy. In so doing, the Indigenous Muslims have

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gained cultural and religious capital in the field of Indigenous resistance

and empowerment politics. Effectively, Indigenous Muslims are redefining

the nomos (what constitutes the doxa at the level of field) by self-

determining the relations that structure the field. The relations that structure

a field operate through the legislation of what kind of resources count as

valid currency of exchange, that is, what kinds of resources translate as

valid capital for the field. Thus, in the overlapping fields of politics, culture

and religion, what different groups challenge each other for is not just an

increase in the amount of capital they possess, but the criteria by which

something is considered genuine cultural capital, and for the right to define

that nomos (Chopra, 2003: 426-8). The nomos of the field of Indigenous

self-determination, as Chopra, (2003) notes is arbitrary and can be

understood appropriately only in terms of the history of a particular field in a

particular society. The contested nature of the concept of Indigenous self-

determination is offset somewhat by Indigenous Muslims converting

religious capital into cultural capital which resists or circumvents previously

imposed definitions of what is considered legitimate capital. The state is

historically the agency, which, through policy, sets the exchange rate

between different fields. Bourdieu views neoliberalism as just the sort of

‘value system’ between fields, at once altering the fields and, at the same

time, naturalising the meta-value as the essential value for every sphere of

sociality. Within a post September 11 environment, the capital invested in

Islamic conversion and alliances is a powerful instrument with which to

reflect back into Indigenous communities as a concrete example of

resistance and empowerment strategies.

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9.5 Conclusion

As was the case with the Nation of Islam, the ideological and

cultural resistance the group offered could also be applied to Indigenous

Australians converting to Islam. The resistance and empowerment

strategies exhibited by Indigenous Muslims in this research had their

origins in histories of oppression.

The enduring hardships experienced by Indigenous peoples during the

early periods of government control caused many children to be thrust into

confrontation with adult responsibilities early in life. Such people often

develop a high degree of politicisation evidenced by continuous resistance

and activism by various Indigenous social movements. This is despite

periods of incarceration or life-time involvement with the criminal justice

system. The neoliberal project treats the individual as essentially the

proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for

them. The Muslim theory of society emphasises the self-affirmation of the

individual. The individual’s moral worth is shaped by the contributions of the

community of believers, even as that community is itself shaped by what

the individual has to offer it. This is an empowering concept in and of itself

and within practice, decouples its adherents from ideological engagement

with the less appealing aspects of dominant society.

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Indigenous Australians and Islam

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10.0 Conclusions

10.1 Summary of thesis argument

Imperialism and colonialism destroyed the essence of Indigenous

societies without making satisfactory amends. For many Indigenous

Australians the ‘original sin’ of invasion and terra nullius has never been

satisfactorily resolved. Unlike other colonised states Australia remains at

odds by not reconciling with Indigenous peoples. Indigenous tribes were

dispossessed of their land and the means to provide economic and cultural

means. Some Aborigines were massacred; Aboriginal children were taken

without their parents' consent, sometimes with good intentions but mostly

not. These events have left legacies of social and cultural dysfunction and

intergenerational disadvantage.

Modernisation in the form of nation states and the legacies of

imperialism has also contributed to the fracture of many Islamic societies.

Contemporary and historical regional conflicts in Middle Eastern lands have

become symbolic of the socially constructed tensions between and within

Islamic states and the West. For both Indigenous peoples and Muslims,

administrative legal systems based on Western processes of rationalisation

and domination have been instrumental forces in the modernisation project.

Australian colonial administrators and later, governments, placed

Indigenous issues and affairs under specific departments and were

considered subjects of the British Empire. Emerging post-colonial policies

encouraged cultural homogenisation (assimilation) through education with

schools teaching the dominant language and emphasising national

loyalties. In Muslim societies education is paradoxically instrumental both in

the formation of secular and Islamic nationalism. The increased weakening

of Indigenous social structure through removals and dispossession have

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provided virtually no access to equitable power sharing, and the nation-

state remains the dominant intervening power. Indigenous Australians have

largely remained as a periphery collective in terms of gaining benefit from

mainstream (Western) service provision. The three inter-connected causes

of the post-1960s catastrophe of the communities included alcohol, the

poison of passive welfare, and disconnection from the real economy.

The contingencies of imperialism, colonialism, the White Australia policy

and contemporary shifts to neoliberal governance have compounded the

disadvantage experienced by many Indigenous Australians. Numerous

royal commissions, enquiries, reports, and official statistics adequately

quantify the extent of the issues affecting Indigenous Australians. The

Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody discussed the

important topic of underlying issues explaining the disproportionate

detention rates of Aboriginal people. However, the number of Indigenous

people being incarcerated is increasing on a yearly basis. The prison and

criminal justice systems are the common factors uniting Indigenous and

Muslim as found in this research. This is not an isolated precedent, but a

process following closely that of the African American experience.

10.2 Summary of the conceptual process • At a global level, Islamic identity has replaced secular nationalism which

has become an existential threat to the West.

• This is a broad statement indicating a trend having become more

pronounced since 11 September and as a reality in parts of the Middle

East. Global media coverage and political posturing has assisted with

public opinion formation which in turn challenges long-held notions of

national identity in an increasingly ‘global village’.

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• Many Indigenous people rebel against the unchanged or worsening

conditions they face as disempowered members of an otherwise

affluent society.

• Indigenous Australians’ political and strategic development remains

relatively ineffective despite continuous decades of resistance and

activism.

• Australian national security is currently linked to the global awareness

of ‘Islamic terrorism threats’, although the Islamic aspect is overplayed

and attributed to Muslims in general.

• When military (or political) reactions outstrip in their severity the events

that caused them, grave processes are set in motion which widen the

gulf and propels resistance into extremism.

• Many Muslims and Indigenous people make this connection and

understand it, even if the majority of people do not engage in any form

of extremism. For Indigenous people, the recent Howard Government

‘Intervention’ program in the Northern Territory is a case in point.

Decades of ineffective government policy and mismanagement have

contributed to the social decay in many remote Indigenous

communities. The ‘intervention’ has done little to empower Indigenous

communities, rather the opposite is true.

• There appears to be a new wave of Islamic awareness among the

ummah regarding group solidarity as a response to continuing injustices

within Islamic states and the secular world.

• Many Muslims in Australia are aware of the poor state of Indigenous

affairs. Partly this is brought about by their own country-of-origin

histories, particularly those from Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Sudan

and Somalia.

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• There is a simmering resentment by many Indigenous Australians

against the Australian state authority on the legal basis of denial of self-

determination in real terms as evidenced by all social determinants

(inhibited social, economic and political development)

• High rates of Indigenous incarceration indicate fundamental problems

when dealing with the underlying factors of influence leading to

Aboriginal imprisonment. Imprisonment is often seen as a rite of

passage for younger Aborigines. On the other hand, prison can also

become the nexus for radical personal change triggered by

experiencing Islam. This point is a critical juncture in terms of how the

experience is interpreted by prison authorities, because as mentioned

above, prisoner radicalisation is the fear of prison management and

state politicians.

The long debated motive for the British colonisation of Australia has

revolved around England’s need to resolve problems with overcrowded

prisons. It is ironic indeed that twenty first century Australian prisons are

over-represented by Indigenous prisoners, and those who convert to Islam

are often further stereotyped and regarded with suspicion by many non-

Indigenous Australians.

For the Indigenous people involved in this study the dominant

themes revolve around group politics, identity, resistance, and self-

empowerment. For them it is a critique of Australian nationalism driven by

Indigenous inequality, and psychological and physical separation. The

‘system’ has afforded these Indigenous people no favours; rather, it is

blamed for forcing them to the margins of society making them ‘fringe

dwellers’ on their own country.

The notion that Indigenous disadvantage has become a Muslim

cause in the case of Islamic conversions assists in claiming a form of

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recognition as a re-empowered collective. Many Muslims in Australia are

sympathetic to Indigenous historical and socio-economic issues. This is

partly due to the long association with Indigenous Australians beginning

with the sea-faring Macassan trepang collectors and traders.

It could be argued that the universal nature of Islam is better suited

to contextualising the condition of Indigenous Australians than the nation

state which has effectively exploited Indigenous people and country without

fair and reasonable recognition and compensation. It seems unlikely, at

least in the near future, that attempts to redress Indigenous disadvantage

will make significant improvements. The so-called war on terror and the

current economic crisis will reprioritise government agendas to realign with

the immediate crisis afflicting global consumer sentiment. The continuation

of neoliberal economic and social governance is making it more, not less

difficult for Indigenous Australians to attain significant advances in their

socio-economic well-being. On the other hand, an Islamic economic

framework contains the ethical and moral dimensions missing in radical

capitalism. The Islamic ummah in Australia is in a strong position to assert

its proven authority in these areas. Additionally, for Indigenous Australians,

bottom-up or popular action remains an option for those unable to obtain

relief through personal agency or Indigenous political and social

participation.

Some Indigenous men employ their alliance with Islam (either within

or outside of prison) strategically and tactically. This does not mean that a

purely instrumental use of Islam is the main factor in their reversion or

alliance. In fact, the degree to which adherence to Islamic principles is

practiced is evidence of strong spiritual and religious dedication and

commitment leading to self-empowerment and solid identity formation.

Thus the theoretical frameworks for conditions amenable to religious

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conversion are socially located in the total institution of the prison.

Conversions to Islam have become common place in prisons where

minority groups are over-represented. This raises the problematic question

of why some groups continue to be caught in the criminal justice system

more than others. In the case of African Americans, their histories of

oppression were expressed through socio-religious movements such as the

Nation of Islam. The links between ‘black nationalism’ in the U.S. and

Indigenous social movement activism are similar in intent. Both groups

recognise the capital of collective action to politicize their status as

marginalised and disadvantaged members of society. The fact that

discrimination based on racist policies and social attitudes have contributed

to the enduring disadvantage experienced by Indigenous Australians is

beyond dispute.

Secular consumer societies in late modern western democracies

tend to have precarious relations with religious groups and institutions. The

separation of church and state although constitutionally ensured, does not

extend to willing acceptance of all faiths and belief systems. The dominant

Anglo-Christian base of Australian national identity is being challenged

ideologically and numerically by non-Christian religions. Islam in Australia is

experiencing a resurgence fuelled by immigration and demography.

Many indigenous Australians describe a history that builds on a

feedback loop of increasing disconnection. An increasing awareness of

connectedness diminishes to the point where social cohesion is lost. Within

a feedback loop of increasing disconnection new social movements emerge

in which to exercise political mobilisation. The numerical and political

isolation of Indigenous Australians could be attributed in large part to

racism. The Aboriginal response to white control is to actively maintain a

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politics of resistance. Within the repressive environment of the prison a

politics of resistance continues in the form of Islamic alliances.

The term ‘religious conversion’ is inadequate to account for the

multitude of influences and motivations leading to the acceptance of Islam

within the violent environment of the prison. Indigenous inmates know

violence under the name of colonisation and its continuing form under the

name of exploitation. Contemporary globalisation, government policy, the

interests of multinational companies, all converge to promote a self interest

that rewards individualism and competitive domination. For many

Indigenous communities there are multiple destructions, the foundation

destruction being loss of connection to country, Dreaming and kin.

A prominent theme in this thesis is the concept of collective trauma

associated with the fundamental loss of connections. Cultural trauma is

realised when Indigenous people collectively remember horrendous past

events. For some this manifests as enduring dysfunctional families and

communities. The multiple violations of the experiences of Indigenous

Australians conditioned by institutional destruction of families contribute to

violent behaviours repeated through generations. The rate of potential

offenders and perpetrators increases in dysfunctional communities and by

default, higher rates of contact with the criminal justice system. The claim of

this thesis is that historically conditioned events lead to the ultimate

realisation that imprisonment is the catalyst for change. This was clearly

demonstrated in the dialogue of the Indigenous Muslims interviewed in this

study. However, although Islamic practice in prison is beneficial and

empowering, it is perceived by prison management as a threat if

radicalisation occurs. A difficulty exists for prison management in how to

allow a reasonable exposure to religious engagement, and that of

misreading overt expressions of Islamic identity. The reality lies somewhere

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between concerted attempts by inmates to exercise power and control, and

prison management politicising Islam to justify increasing surveillance and

harsher treatment of prisoners.

Prior to, but particularly after September 11, 2001, Australian

governments in line with most Western governments have become

increasingly wary of identifiable ‘home grown Islamic organisations. Fears

of nefarious efforts at recruitment, or to socialise and groom potential

radicals underpin government and security organisation concerns. Since

the events of September 11 there have been notable ‘over-reactions’ to so-

called national security threats in Australia involving intrusive surveillance,

monitoring, questioning, and suspicion-related interventions.

Often this places Islam in general and some Muslims in particular in

a form of double jeopardy. The social good of Islam is misrepresented in

preference to suspicion and fear, making it more difficult to harmoniously

coexist within dominant society expectations. Public acceptance and

government support is conditional on groups and individuals continually

demonstrating ‘Australian values’ such as embracing government

integration agendas, sporting and educational assimilation, and political

neutrality. For most Muslims and Islamic groups in Australian society this

form of benign assimilation is acceptable. It is indeed rewarded by positive

public awareness and community-based programs which are liberally

funded. However, far from being prepared for a meaningful place in

European society, Indigenous Australians were more often controlled within

'total' institutions under the auspices of the state: institutions where

individuals and groups are under total control with no real agency in their

lives. Such 'total' control led to a position where Indigenous peoples were

only socialised to life within institutions, not in the relative freedom of

society at large. The hardships endured by Indigenous children in

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government and other institutions severely affected their physical health

and the abuses they suffered affected both their physical and mental well-

being.

The argument that neoliberal dominance increases the number of

disengaged people and dysfunctional communities and makes it more

difficult to return to the working mainstream is indisputable. Yet in Australia,

Indigenous disadvantage has become entrenched during the post 1980’s

surge of neoliberal dominance. The truly disadvantaged as many

Indigenous communities are, remain continually isolated from any

economic and social benefits extended by well-meaning government

policies.

It is understandable given the historical and current circumstances,

that some Indigenous people perceive Islam as a safe harbour in which to

shelter from the storm of oppression and social exclusion. An Islamic

framework embraces the historical legacies of injustice and racial prejudice.

This becomes more acute within a prison environment. Unlike previous

Christian ‘civilising’ projects acting as defacto cultural, social, and religious

colonial reformers, Islam has no other agenda than to provide comfort,

support, agency, and hope. Islam is no halfway house dividing colonial

ambitions and ethnocentrism. As more of the oppressed seek an alternative

Islamic framework, the more it is realised how the toxic and destructive side

of modernity is to some Indigenous minorities.

Islam has the potential to provide a moral resurgence seemingly

lacking in a neo-liberal political and economic environment. This is an

important ‘correction’ to existing political circumstances. An Islamic life-

world immediately connects with the long history of Indigenous oppression

and provides a solution for a resurgent agency to move past the old

interlocking dynamic of black entitlement and white obligation. Islam affords

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the opportunity for personal responsibility but without the conditions of

government political paternalism.

The last word on the difficult question of how to move forward as an

enlightened, humane, and inclusive society free of discrimination, prejudice

and fear is given to Noel Pearson. Historical empathy and emotional

empathy are two distinct categories as Pearson notes. The former is based

on a legitimate history, while the latter is shallow and simplistic. We as a

nation appear to be languishing in a shallow and simplistic mode, our vision

clouded by materialism, accumulation, rampant capitalism, and existential

anxieties. Non-Indigenous societies and modern Western democracies

have much to learn from the societies we tend to feel most anxious about –

Indigenous and Islamic. Both offer alternative ways of living, thinking,

acting, and responding.

10.3 Future directions There are several directions in which this research might be expanded.

1. The question of Indigenous over-representation in prisons needs to be

revisited in terms of political action to address the enduring underlying

social issues influencing the rate at which Indigenous people are being

incarcerated. At an institutional level, the complete prison-industrial

complex needs to be examined for its effectiveness in reducing crime.

Public and political attitudes also need to be challenged regarding the

acceptability of warehousing prisoners to create an impression of a

safer society.

2. The concept of trauma recognition in many Indigenous people is

perhaps a worthwhile area of research to better understand the context

in which dysfunction in Indigenous communities exists. Continued

research and funding opportunities require expanding trauma-related

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issues in Indigenous societies. The complexities involved in repairing

this damage begins with recognising the importance of socio-historical

factors in determining intergenerational repetition of the violence/trauma

cycle. However, the healing process is complicated when incarceration

becomes part of the destructive cycle.

3. A comprehensive institutional investigation of the circumstances

involving Islamic conversions would benefit inmates and prison

management. More effort is required to convince corrections authorities

of the benefit religion has in inmate management and reducing

recidivism. Further research into how Islam is both empowering and

potentially harmful within a prison environment is a necessary

component of any future study, but Islam should not be used as an

excuse for stigmatisation and discrimination. However, for a beneficial

role of Islam in prisons, hard-line attitudes and treatment require being

replaced with more humane systems of management. Within the prison

it would be instructive to re-train corrective services management to

accept the value of religious participation as a central tenet of

rehabilitation.

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Indigenous Australians and Islam

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Glossary and Terminology

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and c ommunities: Within this thesis the term ‘Indigenous Australians’ refers to two distinct cultural categories; mainland Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and are used as an inclusive term for the traditional or First Peoples of Australia. When referring to specific instances representing either Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander peoples or cultures the names ‘Aboriginal’ and ‘Torres Strait Islander’ will be used. For generic reference, the term Indigenous will appear more often but is in no way meant to portray a homogenous understanding of culture. Similarly, “the plural terms peoples and communities acknowledge the diversity of Aboriginal peoples and communities within Australia, all of whom have different histories, political dynamics, social situations, cultural characteristics, economic resources and administrative capacities” (Atkinson, 2002: x). Murri and Koori: Curthoys (2002:xvi) describes Murris as “the term derived from local languages, meaning ‘our people’ or ‘us’ for Aboriginal people in southern Queensland and in the central section of Northern New South Wales”. Kooris is the “term given to Indigenous people in southern and eastern New South Wales” (ibid.). ‘Whitefella’ and ‘blackfella’ are used when vernacular meanings are being alluded to, or in reference to colloquial expressions of racial difference. Islam and Muslim peoples and communities: When speaking of Islam and Muslims it is recognised many ethnicities and cultures share a common faith despite some interpretational and regional differences. Where the issue of ethnic, cultural, and religious sensitivity arises, every attempt will be made to maintain a neutral terminology while accepting ethnic and cultural difference as the normative assumption. Religious conversion and reversion: Religious ‘conversion’ and ‘reversion’ are terms having subtle differences depending on religious orientation. From an Islamic perspective “Every person is born a Muslim because we are all created by the One Almighty God hence, a preferred term would be reversion rather than conversion” www.themodernreligion.com/islam_conversion_main.htm (Accessed March 8, 2005). A non-Muslim may not be aware of this difference and instead use the term conversion. For the purpose of this thesis, ‘conversion’ and ‘alignment’ are terms most used, however reversion will be used when appropriate. ‘Acceptance’ of Islam is another form of recognising the incorporation of the Islamic socio-religious framework. For the purposes of this study it is not necessary for an individual to have formally converted to Islam. This is because formal conversion is just one stage in a process of enculturation, socialisation, and religious practice (Rambo, 1993: 1). Rambo (1998) assumes that conversion is what a group says it is, leading to the questions of how a particular group experiences conversion and what their expectations are.

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Islamist, Islamicist: Islamism is an umbrella term commonly applied to a variety of Islamic movements that are in reality quite diverse. Islamist or Islamicist refers to a specialist in the study of Islam or a member or supporter of an Islamic revivalist movement (Stanley, 2005). In the current political climate Islamist refers to the radicalisation of Islam and is increasingly used to describe a person or group espousing political Islam. Indigenous glossary Yolngu – an inclusive name for the various clans and language groups who inhabit the northeast coast of Arnhem Land and nearby islands.

Balanda – Non-Aboriginal; a person with ‘white’ skin e.g. Macassans, Europeans.

Birrinydji – A Dreaming being in the image of the Macassan bunggawa or boat captain. Walitha’ walitha – Allah; a universal being and person familiar for members of the yirritja moiety.

Bunggul - a ritual or ceremony. Warramu - the spirit of the dead. Grokman - the spirit of the dead. Dhuwa - Aboriginal society is divided into halves or moieties, the dhuwa and the yirritja.

Yirritja - a moiety in north-east Arnhem Land society, see above. (adapted from McIntosh, 1996) Islamic glossary Al-hamdu lillah – An Arabic phrase meaning “Praise to God” or “All praise belongs to

God. The phrase is found in the first verse of the first sura of the Qur’an, and

the term is often shortened to Hamdala. Alim – A Muslim scholar and the singular form of Ulema. Bismillah – An Arabic noun recited several times as part of Muslim daily prayers. Da’wah – literally means “issuing a summons” or “making and invitation”. In Islamic theology, the purpose of Da’wah is to invite people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, to understand the worship of Allah. Deen – An Arabic word usually translated as “religion” but also as “way of life”.

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Hadith - The hadith are oral accounts of the Prophet Muhammad’s life and times in 7th century Saudi Arabia. Halal – An Arabic term designating any object or action permissible to use or engage in, according to Islamic law. It is the opposite of Haram. Haram – In Islam the term is used to refer to anything that is prohibited by the faith. Hizb-ut Tahrir – An international pan-Islamist, Sunni, vanguard political party whose goal is to combine all Muslim countries in a unitary Islamic state or caliphate, ruled by Islamic law and with a Caliph head of state elected by Muslims. Imam – An Islamic leadership position, often the leader of a mosque and the community. An imam is the one who leads the prayer during Islamic gatherings. Insha’Allah – An Arabic term meaning “God willing” or “If it is God’s will”. Jahanam – One of the seven ranks of hell. Tradition consigned unrepentant wicked Muslims to this layer of hell to suffer while awaiting their eventual transfer to paradise. Khalifah or Caliph – Head of the Islamic community. La ilaha illa allah – Is one of the major pillars of the Muslim faith meaning There is no God but Allah. Masjid – Literally means ‘a place of bowing down’. Masjid usually means a mosque. Muslim Brotherhood – A Sunni transnational movement and the largest political opposition organisation in many Arabic states, particularly Egypt. Noor – Is the Arabic term for light PBUH – A Muslim phrase ‘Peace be Upon Him’ said after mentioning, or out of respect for, a Prophet. Sahabah – Companions of the Prophet Muhammad. Shahada – The Profession of Faith that converts to Islam must recite. It is also referred to as someone that affirms or attests, or bears witness. This is the first of the five pillars of faith. Stephallah or Astaghfirullah – An Arabic phrase meaning “I ask Allah for forgiveness”. Ulema – Muslim scholars Wahhabi – plural Wahhabis – Followers of the strict puritanical teachings of ‘Abd al-Wahhab.

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Zakat – The fourth of the Five Pillars of Islam and is the obligatory alms or charity tax imposed on all practicing Muslims.

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Appendix A

Non-Indigenous Converts to Islam survey 35 Major themes: personal stories of conversion to Isl am n= 43 Main thematic factors influencing conversion 1) Feelings of personal loss or crisis, emptiness, lack of meaning of life, loss of personal direction 2) Doubts, inconsistencies, shortcomings of existing religion/theology 3) Positive attributes of Islam (eg religious life-style, ethics, and morals)

4) Meeting, questioning and/or socialising with Muslims (including marriage partner) 5) Cognitive/spiritual search for spiritual, religious, theological or philosophical answers 6) Cognitive/secular oriented enquiry or revelation about Islam/Muslims Positive thematic factors associated with Islam once converted 1) Sense of personal empowerment 2) Sense of religious/social completeness, comfort, meaning, purpose 3) Supportive friends, relations, Islamic Ummah, sense of community 4) Changed world-view perceptions 5) Islam as logical and natural, with ritual, guidelines and boundaries Negative thematic factors associated with conversion and adherence to Islamic faith 1) Fear of adverse reactions from other’s (non-Muslim) (family, racism, discrimination)

2) Difficulty negotiating satisfactory mixed religion/relationship outcomes

35 The websites consulted include: (http://www.muhajabah.com/journeytoislam.htm;http://www.islamfortoday.com/converts.htm#COTW ; http://www.shariahprogram.ca/articles/convert_revert_islam_birthright.shtml http://www.islamicgarden.com/conversion.html http://www.convertstoislam.com/Stories/stories.html )

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3) Unwelcome attention from government security agencies 4) Negative perceptions of Muslims (terrorism, fundamentalism, gender inequality)

5) Geographic and social isolation from Muslims and/or Islamic Ummah 6) Difficulties associated with changed religious status Summary of responses: converts to Islam n=43 Factors influencing conversion Total factors 1 Feelings of personal loss… 19 2 Doubts about existing religion… 16 3 Positive attributes of Islam… 6 4 Socialising with Muslims… 29 5 Spiritual, religious, theological, philosophical orientations… 8 6 Cognitive revelations… 14 Positive thematic factors post conversion 1 Personal empowerment… 2 2 Sense of completeness, comfort, meaning… 13 3 Supportive friends, relations, Islamic ummah… 4 4 Changed world-view perspectives… 3 5 Islam as logical and natural… 3 Negative thematic factors post conversion 1 Fear of reaction by others… 5 2 Difficulties negotiating mixed religious/family relations… 3 3 Unwanted attention from security agencies… 2 4 Negative perceptions of Muslims/Islam… 6 5 Geographic and social isolation… 1 6 Difficulties with changed religious status… 6

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Discussion and Analysis 1) Feelings of personal loss or crisis, emptiness, lack of meaning of life, loss of personal direction This theme appeared 19 times out of 43 responses in the revelations of

why people converted to Islam. The personal realisation of

meaninglessness stimulated some people into actively searching for

meaning, other people spiralled into depression and others reached a crisis

point. Respondent 6 noted: “Basically I just used to drift from one point of

view to the next and to do my best to ‘fit in’ with whichever group of people I

was with”. No social or cultural explanations were apparent for this aimless

existence, although any number of underlying social and cultural factors

may have contributed to this condition. Another person (8) wrote: “[t]here

remained a part of me that was filled with longing, a feeling that I clumsily

describe as an ache or yearning for the Absolute; a need to surrender to

something much greater than myself and my surroundings”.

How is it that some people seem to instinctively kn ow something is

missing in their lives? (Spiritual/ theological) H ow has the

socialisation of these people determined their curr ent predicament?

What is different about those who intellectualise a nd those who are

motivated by concrete social conditions? (low socio economic, lack of

suitable housing, drug or alcohol addictions, troub le with the law)

Person (8) continues: “[e]ither we have faith in and we worship God or we

have faith in and we worship man-made systems. The first is done

knowingly and leads to contentment. The second is usually done

unknowingly and leads the individual on a deceptive path that is perpetually

unfulfilling”. An acknowledgement is made here that an almost unconscious

adherence to materialism is not only unfulfilling for this person, but a

356

conscious and reflective consideration of alternative means to achieve

contentment.

Once again, this point raises the issue of secular materialism as a

borderless system of meaning while a religious system has the potential to

maintain boundaries and provide direction.

What are the attributes of contemporary Australian society

contributing to the sense of emptiness that a relig ion seemingly

replaces or compensates for?

Two respondents (11&16) identify as becoming quite aimless and

disillusioned after leaving the armed services.

Does the order, routine, and discipline of the arme d forces operate in

a similar way to the order, routine, and discipline of some religions?

Although both these people experienced the services negatively, they

nonetheless searched for meaning once returned as civilians. This might be

explained from a moral perspective. Respondent 11 drank to excess in the

army, this being a feature of the socialising within some sections of the

forces. The other person (16) attended a fundamentalist, independent

Baptist church but became involved in a moral argument due to the

hypocrisy of several church members. On both occasions, the two

respondents turned to Islam to help rectify what appeared to be extremes

of moral difference.

What is the relation between moral direction, adher ence to the Islamic

faith, and the attributes of contemporary secular m aterialism?

Respondent 20 explained: “…I lived a comfortable, privileged life, in the

‘western lifestyle’ sense – financially secure, educated and trained, healthy,

with no major crises in my life. I married. I worked. I travelled. I indulged

myself. Food, wine, entertainment, weekends away, fancy hotels, overseas

trips. Eat, drink and be merry. Having no children, I had no real

357

responsibilities. I sought mainly to entertain myself, and have a good time”.

Yet this person recognised that: “[…] that period just seems like a life

without purpose, and it’s truly painful for me to look back and see 25 years

of a Godless life”.

In all of these examples there is an unexplained relation between so-called

secular existence and notions of a higher purpose. Yet converting or

reverting to Islam for these people has solidified their quest for meaning

and thrown into sharp relief the alternative aimlessness of previous

outlooks and existence.

Is it only when one becomes enmeshed in a new and supportive environment that a clear picture emerges of the folly and futility of previous lived experiences? Or does the reverse happen, in that desperate situations call for radical re-appraisals of direction, with religion and belief one avenue of salvation? How is it possible to separate these factors out without examining the social and cultural environment within which these factors are embedded? 2) Doubts, inconsistencies, shortcomings of existi ng religion/theology This theme appeared 16 times in a total sample of 43.

A purely psychological analysis might suggest a separation of social factors

and the inherent ability or inclination of people to develop a spiritual,

religious, or theological orientation or framework independent of undue

social and cultural influence.

Sociologically, this seems improbable, but it does indicate the enormous

variability and number of permutations the relation between religious belief

/practice and social/cultural influence provides.

Further explanations of respondent feelings of loss or crisis combined with

the factor of doubts and inconsistencies in existing religion reveal a social

and cultural perspective.

358

Respondent 21 – A (personal) crisis instigated reinvolvement with the

Catholic Church to the point of “You could say I was a Catholic junkie”.

However, this person became aware over time of the inconsistencies of the

church to the point of suffering what he thought was depression. This

example raises the question of guilt, shame, or confusion in the process of

relinquishing powerfully felt and long- held beliefs, for that of a different

religious orientation.

Respondent 22 – Was disillusioned with parents’ chosen religion and

“…inside I was hurting. I wasn’t being true to myself”. Eventually this

person returned to the church and became a Catholic, questioned aspects

of church doctrine, relinquished Catholicism, and turned to Islam for

answers. These two examples highlight a strong relation between feelings

of personal loss or crisis; and doubts, inconsistencies, and shortcomings of

existing religion/theology. When a long held-held orienting and guiding

framework of reference becomes untenable, what takes its place?

What are the social and cultural processes in place making major life-

changing events difficult to begin, continue and co mplete? Or

conversely, what are the social and cultural factor s prompting change

and then maintaining adherence to a particular fait h or ideology?

If. as these testimonials suggest, a crisis is the triggering motivating factor,

then what prompts these people into remaining in unhappy or unproductive

circumstances for a crisis to occur?

It would seem that the fairly even combination of feelings of loss or crisis,

and doubts in the consistency of an existing religion are complimentary, in

that one influences the other. Take for example the case of Indigenous

religion and the feelings of personal loss associated with removal and

dislocation from country. Important issues of identity and cultural practice

become enmeshed with continually changing social dynamics; usually to

359

the detriment of identity, belonging, and religious belief and practice. It

could be reasoned that for an Indigenous person to convert to Islam, some

aspect of an Indigenous religious, spiritual, social, or cultural framework is

missing, unrecognised, or underdeveloped. On one hand, these

testimonials suggest that proximity and socialisation play the most

significant part in influencing conversion to Islam. Or is the contact and

socialisation an end product of the search-for-meaning process or a

relatively separate influence?

What questions are required to differentiate betwee n conversion to

compensate for loss, and conversion due to social a nd cultural

proximity and immersion? What difference does it ma ke to the

adherent in each case? Does an urban Aborigine in W estern Sydney

identify with ‘culture’ in the sense that it would harbour feelings of

loss and alienation if not able to be realised in m eaningful practice?

What is the connection with Islam if a ‘solid’ Indi genous ‘traditional’

link also exists? If loss of ‘culture’ is not the i ssue, then what other

factors might influence an alliance with Islam?

On the other hand, if the underlying motivation to embrace a different

meaning framework, or to remain with the existing framework, is indeed to

‘search for meaning’ in a world that no longer makes sense, then in a

multicultural society, what are the constraining and enabling factors?

Is a search for meaning a rebuttal of the pluralism , materialism and

relativism of modern society? What fears and anomie lie behind the

desire for alternate, logical, and guiding meaning systems? What

evidence is required to support a social factor inf luence?

(socioeconomic etc?)

Respondent 24 - “I felt a lacking in my own life that was Christian in name

but materialistic in reality. This produced a desire to find meaning…”

360

Respondent 25 - Found contradictions in Christian teachings although

“raised as a strict Roman Catholic”

Respondent 26 – Grew up as a Christian “but my family was not really

religious”. This person was socialised into being distrustful of different

religions and beliefs and had to overcome this prejudice.

Respondent 30 – Embracing Islam: “It came from my own search for truth

and a meaningful understanding of Christianity”. One of the concerns of this

person was: “what I saw as the lack of certain guidance about how to live

everyday life”.

Respondent 31 – “[Q]uestioned my family’s belief in a way as to ask why

are we believing in this religion. Is it something Italians do automatically?”

The response from the parents: “we have always been this”. This person

describes the lack of (school) education as not allowing us to make a

choice.

Respondent 37 – “It was the charismatic evangelist Billy Graham, armed

with the New Testament and a tone of paternal superiority” that triggered

this person’s “decade long quest for inner fulfilment”.

3) Positive attributes of Islam (eg religious life-style, ethics, and morals)

This factor attracted seven out of 43 responses. Common responses such

as “I quickly began to admire the ethics of Muslim families” (3), and: “Of

knowledgeable Muslims, [we] found that there was something very real,

almost tangibly so. The faith and obedience to Allah and their religion had

bestowed on these Muslims a beautiful graciousness…” (5).

In searching, respondent 8: “was introduced to living Islam. There was a

quality inherent in the people I encountered […] that I found immediately

striking and attractive; a generosity that amazed me. Even amidst the

361

hectic activity of the busy marketplace I sensed a feeling of serenity, a

sensation that everything that was occurring was in its rightful place”.

Respondent 14: “learned the truth about Islam. How it values peace and

equality and doesn’t treat women badly at all”, and: “Islam has everything

the soul needs for nourishment. It has everything an individual and a family

and a community needs. It’s holistic, and down to earth, and spiritual – all

at the same time. It is humbling”.

Respondent 28 – Theological consistencies and: “The ritual of prayer also

attracted me”

When asked why she (34) had embraced our [Muslim] religion: “I used to

feel very peaceful deep in my heart, even though I was in a strange society

far away from my homeland”.

These responses are congruent with the principles of Islam as a faith and a

way of life.

How different is lived Islam from Australian secula r materialist

experience? What are the main experiential differen ces?

4) Meeting, questioning and/or socialising with Mu slims (including marriage partner) This factor scored the most responses of 30 out of 43. This suggests that

meeting, questioning and socialising with Muslims is the most likely activity

associated with the eventual alliance with Islam.

The Imam at Preston Mosque (Shiek Fahmi El-Imam) estimates that about

2,000 Melbournians, mostly of Christian background, have converted to

Islam in the past 10 years. “Usually after meeting Muslims, visiting Islamic

countries or reading about Islam…”

Of the 30 responses, nine people either were married, or later married,

Muslims.

362

Seven had Muslim friends; four proactively sought answers by asking

questions of Muslims; four had contact with Muslims at university; others

were exposed to Islam by socialising through travel, work, and visiting

Mosques.

Do multicultural environments such as those in Lake mba,

Broadmeadows, Preston or Auburn attract more Indige nous converts

than areas of lesser social and cultural diversity? If so, what other

factors assist or hinder conversion in those enviro nments?

What is the relation between Islamic visibility (Mo sques, schools,

shops, dress and population numbers) and rate and n umbers of

converts? How can this be tested?

5) Cognitive/spiritual search for spiritual, relig ious, theological or philosophical answers Eight respondents demonstrated specific orientations toward discovering a

religious/spiritual framework suited to their particular world-view. This

orientation is different from those people who became eventual converts by

proximity and socialising with Muslims. The former group pursued a more

individualistic theological, philosophical, and personal journey in their

search for religious/spiritual satisfaction.

Respondent 17 – “I went on a journey searching all the different faiths and

I ended up being a born-again Protestant Pentecostal Christian”. This

person became an almost ‘obsessed’ religious scholar but eventually came

to realise some serious shortcomings of Christian doctrine.

Respondent 18 – “During my teenage tears, I used to spend hours

wondering about, and searching, for truth and knowledge”. “I was now open

to exploring totally different religions”.

Respondent 19 – Looked to religion for meaning and existence via

Christian religions, Hinduism, Judaism and Buddhism.

363

Respondent 25 – The same as above. Both these people had traumatic

early experiences. 19 had friend who died, and 25 came from a broken

family.

Respondent 30 – came from a religious family: “Spirituality and religion are

very important in my family”. This person as a minister’s

daughter…struggled to reconcile her discomfort with aspects of Christianity

and explored different denominations and religious cults…”.

Respondent 32 – Grew up in a Christian home where prayers were said

daily and church was attended regularly. Unable to accept parent’s beliefs.

Later: “I studied every new religion I came across – desperately looking for

something concrete that confirmed what I believed”.

Respondent 36 – “[A]fter years of spiritual struggle, he turned to Islam”.

Respondent 42 – “I have always been a person with faith”. “I looked toward

Eastern religions at an early age and continued my searching of various

religions though never really finding spiritual fulfilment. Mainstream

Christianity, into which I was born, provided some comfort, but not many

intellectual answers”.

6) Cognitive/secular oriented enquiry or revelatio n about Islam/Muslims This group came to embrace Islam mainly through the influence of others

and not, to any degree, by any intrinsic religious or spiritual faith driving the

search for fulfilment as in the case of the previous group.

Respondent 10 – A gradual introduction to religious difference and coming

from a background of relative religious isolation.

Respondent 11 – Involved with anti-religious stepfather and experienced a

troubled early adulthood. Realised that religion might provide the answers

and over several years of turmoil, found Islam.

364

Respondent 12 – Religiously naïve but inquisitive. Came across a mosque

by chance and made enquiries.

Respondent 14 – Isolated, had no friends and was teased at school. “My

home life, also, was less than perfect. I started suffering from deep

depression that would stay with me for years”. Tried various religions,

mostly New Age but illness provoked a more intense search for something

more meaningful.

Respondent 15 – Came from a materialistic family with practically no

religious instruction.

Experienced many personal conflicts leading to eventual discovery of Islam

through a friend.

Respondent 22 – Became disinterested and disillusioned in religion but

later in life realised something was missing. Went through periods of doubt

until meeting Muslims and asked questions.

Respondent 24 – Progressive conversion to Islam after experiencing

various materialistic and meaningless pursuits.

Respondent 26 – Came from a non-religious but xenophobic family.

Struggled with conflicts over religious difference emanating from family of

origin.

Respondent 27 – Struggled with social and geographic isolation while

becoming involved in Islam.

Respondent 31 – Did not receive any meaningful guidance from the

Christian society nor from school education.

Respondent 34 – Wanted to learn about Islam from the experience of

contact with Muslims.

Respondent 35 – Drifted away from the church of origin and became

interested in fellow Muslim workers. Gradually influenced by example and

desire for congruent belief system.

365

Respondent 38 – Decided to convert after several years of introspection

and research.

Respondent 42 – Questioned material security and looked for “more to life

than living, enjoying life and dying.

How and why is gender significant considering the f our to one ratio of

women aligning with Islam as to men? Do Indigenous women

experience spirituality/religiosity differently to men?

Keywords: isolation (3) troubled, naïve, unhappy (home life),

meaninglessness (2), ascetic, materialistic (3), disillusioned, emptiness,

non-religious, prejudice (within family), questioning, disinterest,

introspection.

Responses and keyword summary suggest lack of social/community

involvement. The reasons for this are many and varied. The social and

individual factors indicating troubled, unhappy, disinterested, disillusioned,

introspective, and meaninglessness do, however, indicate aspects of social

alienation or exclusion, or of ‘not belonging’.

Materialistic and un-religious, tend to indicate satisfaction with conforming

to secular consumerism without the need to explore deeper meanings of

society.

There is a similarity in the felt experiences in themes 1 and 6

1) Feelings of personal loss or crisis, emptiness, lack of meaning of life,

loss of personal direction and;

6) Cognitive oriented enquiry or revelation about Islam/Muslims

The same general feeling of lack of meaning drive the search. However,

theme 5 (Need for spiritual, religious, theological or philosophical answers)

366

was more faith based in motivation without evoking negative personal or

social experiences although two respondents experienced personal crisis.

367

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