Success Factors in Managementof Large Projects

Presented to theApril 2001 Meeting of the

American Physical Society

byThomas B.W. Kirk

Associate Laboratory Director HENPBrookhaven National Laboratory

Washington, DCApril 29, 2001

Interesting Aspects of the SSC Story

History of the Scientific Mission

Aspects of SSC Project Management This Talk

International Science Context of SSC

Policy Perspectives on the SSC

T. KirkApril 29, 20 01

IndustrialHigh-TechProjects

SST/TGV/Chunnel

DefenseHigh-TechProjects

NIF/SDI/Patriot

Big ScienceProjects

SSC/SNS/RHIC/LIGO

Shared technologydisparate cultures

Shared Communities on High-Tech Projects

T. KirkApril 29, 2001

Traditional Focus Factorsfor ‘Big Science’ Project Success

Sponsor’s Priority View Users Priority View

1. Cost 1. Technical Performance

2. Schedule 2. Schedule

3. Technical Performance 3. Cost

these priorities are subject to a basic management principle:

“You can optimize one factor; you can improve two factors; you cannot optimize, or even improve, all three.”

T . KirkApril 29, 2001

Vital Additional Considerationsfor ‘Big Science’ Project Success

Communications partners must communicate clearly to achieve project goals

Management Technical Expertise sound technical experience i n the project technical areas is vital

Management Stability long-term management continuity promotes project focus and resolve

Technical Stability a stable technical baseline strongly aids timely project execution

Funding Stability funding stability allows successful schedule planning and execution

T. KirkApril 29, 20 01

Some Recent ‘Big Science’ Projects

Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) 1990-1998; Waxahachie, TX; $5.89b initial TPC; terminated by Congress 1993

Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) 1999-2006; Oak Ridge, TN; $1.33b initial TPC; in progress

Advanced Photon Source (APS) 1989-1996; Argonne, IL; $0.63b initial TPC; operational

Relativisitic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC) 1991-1999; Upton, NY; $0.50b initial TPC; operational

Continuous Beam Electron Accelerator Facility (CEBAF) 1987-1995; Newport News, VA; $0.26b initial TPC; operational

Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) 1992-1999; Hanford, WA & Livingston, LA; $0.29b initial TPC; start-up

SLAC B-Factory (B-Fac) 1994-1998; Stanford, CA; $0.29b initial TPC; operational

T. KirkApril 29, 2001

T. KirkApril 29, 2001

0

2

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Science Projects

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TPC Growth

Initial TPC

Project Success Factors

T. KirkApril 29, 20 01

Initia

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Fin

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SSC ($5.9B) -- -- 1.8 xx x xx ?

SNS ($1.3B) 1.0 1.0 1.1 ? ?

APS ($0.6B) 1.0 0.9 1.3

RHIC ($0.5B) 1.0 1.3 1.2

CEBAF ($0.3B) 1.0 1.4 2.0

LIGO ($0.3B) 1.0 1.0 1.0

B-Fac ($0.3B) 1.1 1.1 1.0

* Current expectation for incomplete projects

How Did the SSC Measure Up?

Communications - very poor - the project had three leaders [DOE Site Manager; Lab Director; Lab General Manager] who rarely communicated at all - the DOE Site Manager had no formal connection to DOE’s HENP Office - Laboratory managers received direction from two bosses, Lab Director & GM - SSCL Magnet division staff was forbidden to discuss magnet information with other SSCL staff

Management Technical Expertise - poor - the head of the superconducting magnet program had no prior experience in magnets or cryogenics - the SSCL general manager had no prior experience in particle physics or with the Energy Research Office of DOE [now the Office of Science]

T. KirkApril 29, 200 1

How Did the SSC Measure Up?

Management Stability - very poor - in the four-year period 1990-1993 the pr oject named:

6 project managers 4 business managers5 heads of conv. construction 2 experimental physics heads2 accelerator physics heads

- no technical or managment leaders from the Central Design Group moved into equivalent SSCL positions

Technical Stability - questionable - the assembled experience of the Central Design Group, “SSC Conceptual Design - SSC SR 2020” was banned as a source book by the SSC Laboratory - the aperture of the main ring dipole magnet was increased by 20% while the main ring quadrupole aperture remained as originally specified

Financial Stability - steady - the funding for the SSC Project, while threatened, was provided as needed

T. KirkApril 29, 20 01

This Speaker’s Conclusions

1. the SSC Project was politically visible in a much widerforum than previous science construction projects as aresult of its multi-billion dollar price tag

2. the attempt to bring in putative ‘big project expertise’from industry was partly successful but suffered from asevere cultural mismatch which caused rapid turnoveramong top managers and impeded successful progress

3. communications among the key project sponsors andthe key project managers was completely inadequate

4. essential technical expertise was critically lacking,especially in the key super-conducting magnet enterprise

T . KirkApril 29, 2001

SSC Outcome

The SSC Project was terminated by Congresson October 19, 1993.

T. KirkApril 29, 200 1

The Speaker’s Involvement With SSC

1985 - 1989 SSC CDG at LBL (on-assignment from FNAL)Technical Writing Team member, SSC SR 2020CDG Acting PM; CDG Business Manager; CDG Magnet Div. Head

1990 - 1991 Argonne National LaboratoryHEP Division HeadSolenoidal Detector Collaboration (SDC), Collab. Board Chairman

1992 - 1994 SSC Laboratory (on-assignment from ANL)SDC Project Manager & Co-SpokespersonSDC Dept. Head, SSC LaboratoryDeputy Director for SSC Project Closeout

1994 - Brookhaven National LaboratoryAssociate Laboratory Director for HENP

T. KirkApril 29, 200 1