industrial policy and competition enforcement: is there, could there and should there be a nexus?
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INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT: IS THERE, COULD THERE AND SHOULD THERE BE A NEXUS?. Nicolas Petit and Norman NEYRINCK 9 November 2012 GCLC Annual Conference 2012 www.chillingcompetition.com. Purpose of the Presentation. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
NICOLAS PETIT AND NORMAN NEYRINCK9 NOVEMBER 2012
GCLC ANNUAL CONFERENCE 2012
WWW.CHILLINGCOMPETITION.COM
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT: IS THERE, COULD THERE AND SHOULD THERE BE A NEXUS?
Purpose of the Presentation
Should there be a nexus between EU competition law and industrial policy?
Outline
I. Variants of Industrial PolicyII. A Review of the Economic LiteratureIII. What does EU law say about this?IV. Enforcement Implications?
Targeted Industrial PolicyTargeted Industrial Policy Competitiveness PolicyCompetitiveness Policy
Picking winners, saving losers
Supports specific domestic firms/sectors
State aid and government sponsored mergers
Reactive (Alstom) or Pro-active (EADS)
Strong anticompetitive potential
Horizontal policiesCorrect market failures Smart regulationCompetition policy as
part of competitiveness policies
Less anticompetitive, in principle
But non price competitiveness
I. The Two Variants of Industrial Policy
Targeted industrial policyTargeted industrial policy Competitiveness policyCompetitiveness policy
Pros Safeguards domestic
employment; keep capital national; big is beautiful; “infant industry” theory; etc.
Cons Asymmetrical
information; rent seeking; public choice issues; distortion of investment incentives
Pros Less documented Avoid the pitfalls of
industrial policy
Cons Poor empirical evidence Winners and losers Rent seeking “Sprinkling” of
resources
II. Review of the Economic Literature (1)
Targeted individual policyTargeted individual policy Competitiveness policiesCompetitiveness policies
Confirmative examples Alstom, EADS, etc. (+
China, Brazil and India)
Unsupportive examples Bull, Nokia (?), etc.
Confirmative examples Silicon Valley, Hartz
reforms in Germany
Unsupportive examples The Lisbon Strategy,
and the EU 2020 Agenda…
II. Review of the Economic Evidence (2)
III. What does EU law say about this (1)?
Treaty Law Article 173(1) TFEU: “The Union and the Member
States shall ensure that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Union's industry exist”.
But Article 173(3), industrial policy ‘”shall not provide a basis for the introduction by the Union of any measure which could lead to a distortion of competition”
III. What does EU law say about this (1)?
Case Law (post introduction of Article 173 TFEU) GC, T-17/93, Matra Hachette SA v. Commission, [1994]
ECR II-595 See also GC, T-112/99, Métropole télévision (M6),
2001, ECR II-2459, para 118 Bottom-line: competition policy does not apply in
a vacuum Best practice => EU competition enforcement should
pay heed to industrial policy considerations
IV. Enforcement (1)
So far, no space for targeted industrial policy: “The price of creating a European champion cannot
be to let a de facto monopoly dictate its commercial conditions on thousands of European firms operating with European derivatives” (J. Almunia, re. Deutsche Börse/NYSE prohibition)
And competitiveness? “Competition enforcement and advocacy also serve
other wider longer-term objectives such as enhancing consumer welfare, supporting the EU's growth, jobs and competitiveness in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” (Annual Report on Competition Policy for 2011)
IV. Enforcement (2)
Hot air?Not so sure
“the EU [must] develop a stronger horizontal coordination of its various instruments and policies. A more in-depth articulation of competition, trade and industrial policies has to be developed, in order to ensure a coherent and consistent approach to the protection of industrial value chains” (2011 Competitiveness Report).
Four strategic interests where adjustments may be deserved
IV. Enforcement (3)
Access to Resources Enforcement priority under 102 TFEU (EFD-style theories of
harm) Leniency against joint purchasing agreements 101(3) TFEU Increased scrutiny of mergers that involve the acquisition of
EU input manufacturers, by State-controlled foreign firms Fact finding
Innovation Build larger innovation capacities in Europe => more lenient
towards innovation-efficient mergers between EU firms, than re. mergers between non-EU firms
State aid => lower thresholds for industrial research and experimental research => avoid “Valley of Death”
Access to MarketsRestructuring… And the Competitiveness Defense?
Thank you!