Do industry associations influence corporateenvironmentalism in developing countries? Evidencefrom Trinidad and Tobago

Kalim U. Shah • Jorge E. Rivera

Published online: 11 September 2012! Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2012

Abstract As environmental regulations increase, industry associations play a growingrole in representing their respective members. This role has been documented in manyindustrialized countries but less so in emerging economies. In this study, we investigate thelevel of corporate environmentalism exhibited by member firms of two industry associa-tions operating in Trinidad and Tobago. Using a two-stage Heckman regression that cor-rects for the endogeneity introduced by self-selection bias in the evaluation of voluntarychoices, our findings indicate that firms that are members of the foreign-originatedAmerican Chamber of Commerce of Trinidad and Tobago appear to show stronger cor-porate environmentalism than those belonging to the locally formed Chamber of Com-merce. Enhanced institutional pressures from these respective industry associations, peersand competitors within associations, access and exposure to best practices, networkingopportunities and service bundling may explain these differences. These results suggestthat environmental policy makers in emerging economies may be able to leverage foreign-originated industry associations to promote stronger corporate environmentalism. Policymakers may need to consider how to encourage local chambers to emulate the some of theinstitutional conditions of foreign-originated ones.

Keywords Corporate environmentalism ! Industry associations !Chambers of commerce ! Developing countries ! Neo-institutional theory !Trinidad and Tobago

K. U. Shah (&)Arthur Lok Jack Graduate School of Business, The University of the West Indies, P.O. Box 4874,Max Richards Drive, Uriah Butler Highway N.W., Mount Hope, Trinidad and Tobagoe-mail: kalim_shah@hotmail.com

K. U. ShahFaculty of Environmental Studies, York University, HNES109, 4700 Keele St., Toronto, ON M3J1P3,Canada

J. E. RiveraDepartment of Strategic Management and Public Policy, School of Business, The George WashingtonUniversity, Funger Hall, suite 615, 2201 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, USAe-mail: jrivera@gwu.edu

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Policy Sci (2013) 46:39–62DOI 10.1007/s11077-012-9162-x

Introduction

Industry associations (IAs) are defined as organizations that represent a group of profes-sional, trade or commercial firms and can target a narrowly defined membership (e.g., theNational Armored Cable Manufacturers Association) or be multi-sectoral (e.g., the USChamber of Commerce) on a regional or national scale (King and Lenox 2000). Whilethere is a growing body of scholarship examining the influence of stakeholder pressures oncorporate environmentalism, few researchers have focused their attention on the role ofindustry associations as stakeholders in this regard (Henriques and Sadorsky 1996; Delmasand Toffel 2004). To date, most such studies continue focusing on IAs that are purveyorsof particular certification programs (e.g., the Chemistry Council’s Responsible Careprogram).

The sparse academic research on multi-sectoral industry associations (MIAs) means thatwe have little systematic understanding of what these ubiquitous organizations actually do(Barnett and Hoffman 2008; Barringer and Harrison 2000). This is so even though theyamass million dollar budgets and their lobbying activities significantly influence thecompetitive environment, shaping regulations in ways that affect industry growth andprofitability (Ingram and Inman 1996). In the United States for example, lobbying activ-ities of the US Chamber of Commerce have been linked to voting preferences of electedgovernment officials (Pjesky and Sutter 2002; Schuler et al. 2002). Many IAs also activelyinfluence national environmental debates, such as the National Corn Growers Associationdoes on US biofuels policy (Parcell and Westhoff 2006). But IA activity in the developingworld has drawn little attention, even as these countries face increasing industrialization,pollution and stakeholder angst.

Firms join IAs for a variety of reasons including to receive support for trade over abroader geographic area, to access training opportunities and market information and to berepresented on business and policy issues (Bennett 1997; Hukins 1992). By and large, firmsdo not join IAs for environmental reasons, but emerging evidence suggests that some mayjoin IAs to ‘‘free-ride’’ on the good environmental reputation of particular IAs and theirmembers (Delmas and Keller 2005). Firms that are members of some IAs may also facestronger pressure to show exemplary environmental performance (Delmas and Toffel2004; King and Lenox 2000; Hoffman 1999).

Some IAs ask firms to commit to environmental improvements and provide them withsupport to do so, certification and public acknowledgement for commitments made. Atbest, evidence is mixed on if such schemes actually enhance environmental performance inmembers, especially where explicit sanctions do not exist (King and Lenox 2000). Suchprograms often suffer the ill effects of ‘‘free-riders’’ who sign on for reputational benefitsbut do not make actual environmental improvements. For MIAs like Chambers of Com-merce, voluntary environmental commitment schemes are typically not a unique sellingpoint on offer, so the issue of ‘‘free-riding’’ is mitigated.1 So in considering membership toa Chamber of Commerce, environmental reasons are not typically a firm’s primary con-sideration compared to more traditional business services, opportunities and benefits(Clarke 2004). Yet, in developing countries, IAs like Chambers of Commerce participateon various national-level special government committees. As environmental issues

1 An exception is MIAs with specific policy agendas, such as the Business for Social Responsibility (BSR)organization that markets itself as a coalition of socially responsible firms. But even the BSR does notsponsor a certification scheme neither does it legitimize members’ environmental performance (Tashmanand Rivera 2010).

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permeate the work of such committees (Hillman et al. 2004), IAs increasingly contribute toenvironmental policy decisions.

Within the institutional environment of the Chamber, environmental issues undoubtedlyarise since environmental regulations and compliance, risk to business, technology andexpenses are part and parcel of the modern business environment. How these issues arehandled within the institutional context of the Chamber could ultimately impact onmembers’ environmental behavior. Further, given that institutional contexts within dif-ferent types of Chambers might vary, so too might impact on members’ environmentalbehavior. Do members belonging to different, perhaps competing, MIAs exhibit differentlevels of corporate environmentalism, even in the absence of environmental commitmentschemes or sanctions and given that MIAs cater to a diverse membership? Considering thisquestion is critical in developing countries where national-level MIAs of local origin andforeign-affiliated ones (like the American Chambers of Commerce) may potentially beinfluential players given the weak regulatory enforcement ability of government authorities(Rivera 2010; Shah and Rivera 2007).

In this study, we rely on sociology’s neo-institutional theory to answer this question andexplain how these different types of MIAs create institutional environments that, to greateror lesser extent, influence the corporate environmentalism of their members. By doing so,we expand the literature to MIAs, where previously it has focused largely on industry-specific associations and/or programs. Similarly, by placing our study in the developingcountry of Trinidad and Tobago and its burgeoning energy and chemical industry sectors,we enrich a literature still overrepresented by evidence from industrialized nations.

We also hope to stimulate discourse about the potential role and use of MIAs by policymakers in developing countries who are seeking alternative or additional vehicles throughwhich to create change rather than traditional, often insufficient, command-and-controlenvironmental regulations (Shah 2011c). The entrenchment of foreign-affiliated Chambersand the growing role of local Chambers in the economic and industrial landscape ofdeveloping countries urgently requires the attention of policy researchers especially wherethe activities of such organizations influence environmental protection and sustainabledevelopment.

Emerging economy context: Trinidad and Tobago

The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is an oil and gas-rich country in the southernCaribbean just off the South American mainland. Despite its small size, it is a majorinternational player in the energy sector, trading mainly with the United States, Canada,UK, Brazil, and Europe. Over 40 % of the country’s GDP and 50 % of governmentrevenues depend on the sector. Near 50 % of its national GDP is derived from the energysector and between 2003 and 2007 alone, US investments in energy-related projects areestimated at over US$3 billion (US Department of State 2009).

The oil and gas industry is comprised of upstream oil and gas production and explo-ration and downstream processing and manufacturing along with chemical production byfirms dependent on large inputs of cheap energy from oil and gas feedstock. The petro-chemical sector is also highly productive, and the country is ranked in the top fiveammonia and methanol producers in the Western Hemisphere. There is now increasedemphasis on natural gas production and downstream petrochemical and processinginvestments. Natural gas feedstock has made Trinidad and Tobago a leading world pro-ducer of chemicals such as methanol, ammonia, fertilizers, and liquefied natural gas. For

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example, in 2006, the United States imported 16 % of its natural gas, with some 73 % ofthis coming from Trinidad and Tobago (Lucie-Smith 2006). These sectors are largelyconcentrated with most production volume coming from multinational and state ownedfirms. Small and medium enterprises dominate downstream production and manufacturing.US, Canadian, British, German, Australian, and Indian multinationals among others alloperate in Trinidad and Tobago.

Unfortunately, as can be expected from this level of industrial activity, Trinidad andTobago is also the fifth largest carbon dioxide emitter per capita in the world (UnitedNations 2007). Freshwater and marine pollution, watershed degradation, air pollution fromfactory stacks and manufacturing particulates, solid and hazardous wastes from the oil,gas and chemical sectors are the other major issues. The Environmental ManagementAuthority (EMA) is the focal regulator gaining its authority through the EnvironmentalManagement Act of 1995. Like in many other developing countries, the EMA’s regulatoryfunctions suffer from poor implementation and enforcement because of lack of sufficientresources, lack of research, uncoordinated agency efforts, political interference and lack ofwill by government officials (Blackman 2000).

Simultaneously however, Trinidad and Tobago has seen tremendous growth in publicenvironmental awareness, attributable to increased media attention to environmental issues,increased NGO activity, and enhanced environmental education programs (Shah 2011b). Forinstance, between 2006 and 2010, the national debate on the building of two aluminumsmelters became a political watershed. For the first time in the country’s history, the envi-ronmental consequences of industrial development became the foremost topic on the publicagenda, spawning enough contention that political parties’ position on the issue was adeciding factor in the outcome of the 2010 general elections. The new government’s electionpromise of stopping the smelters was kept, much to the approval of the public which hadbecome galvanized against the smelters based on environmental and health concerns. Buteven before elections, enraged communities and the local academic elite successfully chal-lenged the EMA’s approvals of one of the projects in the High Courts, something that wouldhave been unheard of even a few years ago. A leaked cable2 from the then USAmbassador tothe US Department of Energy soon after a national symposium on the issue stated:

The public protests that accompanied Alcoa’s smelter proposal have no precedent inTrinidad’s long history of industrial development, as many academics during and afterthe symposium have pointed out. Taking inspiration from foreign environmentalists’protests…a vocal group of domestic activists succeeded in dominatingmedia coverageand reversing (government) policy. There are also growing calls for a national sus-tainable development framework, especially in reference to ‘‘mega-projects,’’ andgreater public involvement in determining the path of Trinidad’s development.

Strategic value of industry associations to firms

Chambers of Commerce are distinguishable from other industry associations in severalways, most notably by working with firms in multiple industries in a broad range ofproduction, manufacturing and service categories. Bennett et al. (1998) identified fourmain services offered by Chambers: the support of international trade, training,

2 This leaked cable was made publicly available through http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06PORTOFSPAIN931.html.

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information services and representation. Hawley and Taylor (2006) note that along-standing view in the United States is that Chambers function primarily to lobbygovernment to ease regulations. Doner and Schneider (2000) suggest that IAs undertake‘‘market-supporting’’ activities and ‘‘market-complementing’’ activities (e.g., creatingstandards). Andriesse and van Helvoirt (2010) found that Chambers were responsible forextensive alliance co-ordination across sectors in China, the Philippines and Malaysia.Hemphill (1992) described the range of trade association activities as ‘‘data collection,educational programs, facilitating technical standards and specifications, insurance pro-grams, legal assistance and government relations.’’ Staber and Aldrich (1983) distin-guished four IA activity areas: commercial, public, political, and solidaristic. Others statethat IAs serve as the bodies through which firms pursue collective strategy in the political(Hillman and Hitt 1999) or nonmarket environments (Baron 1995).

In emerging economies such as those in Latin America and the Caribbean, there arewell-established national Chambers, smaller provincial ones and foreign-originatedChambers the most significant being those of the United States and Britain. These latterChambers are best described as affiliated rather than subsidiary to their foreign originatorssince operational affairs, finance, administration and elections of officials are independent.3

In Latin America and the Caribbean, they network among themselves through the Asso-ciation of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACCLA).

Industry associations in Trinidad and Tobago

In this study, we focus on two nationally influential, highly visible industry associations:the American Chamber of Commerce of Trinidad and Tobago (AMCHAM) and theTrinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce (TTCC). Neither goes so far asto stringently regulate and standardize the behavior of member firms and membership isvoluntary.

The AMCHAM aims ‘‘to be the preferred private sector business organization for thestimulation of free and fair trade and investment within the Americas and the Caribbean’’(AMCHAM 2008). The AMCHAM is affiliated to the US Chamber of Commerce, theworld’s largest business federation representing more than three million businesses andorganizations of every size, sector and region. The US Chamber of Commerce coordinatesa network of twenty-four such local Chambers in twenty-one countries in the WesternHemisphere. This gives its membership a unique advantage in facilitating linkages, net-working, and developing activities that lead to the generation of business and marketaccess for their services and goods. Furthermore, these branch Chambers gain perspectivefrom the parent Chamber in the United States, and this in turn influences their position ongovernance issues such as environmental policy (O’Toole and Hanf 2002).

Although the Chamber does not state specific environmental objectives, it operatesan executive committee specifically dedicated to ‘‘Health, Safety and Environment’’.This committee has been in existence for over a decade and aims ‘‘to provide directionand leadership and proactively promote environmental safety and health values for thesustainable future of our companies, communities and nation’’. The AMCHAM has beeninvolved in influencing national environmental legislation, policies, and procedures to thebenefit of its members; fostering environmental awareness; building effective relationshipswith key ministries and nongovernmental organizations; and sharing best practices among

3 In the case of the AMCHAM in Trinidad and Tobago, the US Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago istraditionally made an honorary Chair of the Board.

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its membership. According to the AMCHAM, its membership is approximately 25 %foreign and 75 % domestic firms.

The Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce, established in 1879, isthe oldest industry association in Trinidad and Tobago. Its mission statement is ‘‘to berecognized by our members and the government of Trinidad and Tobago as the mostvibrant, influential and authoritative organization in Trinidad and Tobago and the leader inthe support of globalization as a means of wealth creation’’ (TTCC 2010). The TTCC isknown to be an effective lobbyist for industry interests and continues to make a profoundimpact on the development of the national economy. It expresses keen focus on generatingopportunities for its members to leverage shared resources, knowledge, and contacts inorder to create a competitive advantage in the global marketplace. To service its over fivehundred firm membership, the TTCC organizes initiatives around committees includingalternative dispute resolution, mediation and arbitration services, business referrals, cer-tifications, industrial relations data, and international trade negotiations among others.

The TTCC does not maintain any environmental management committee, but a Com-mittee on Community, Health and Wellness has from time to time addressed some envi-ronmental health issues. All new members subscribe to a Code of Conduct comprised ofeight principles, one of which specifically addresses ‘‘Environment’’ (see Table 1).

While all members are required to adhere to these principles under penalty of mem-bership termination should there be violation, this penalty has never been invoked on anyfirm, nor has any member come under investigation or threat of sanction even if envi-ronmental allegations are made in the media or by the EMA.

Industry associations as drivers of corporate environmentalism

The neo-institutional perspective

We believe that organizational sociology’s neo-institutional theory can provide importantinsights regarding the relationship between corporate environmentalism and industry asso-ciation membership (Hoffman 1999; King and Lenox 2000; Rivera et al. 2009). Neo-insti-tutional theory points out that firms operate within an external context of taken-for-grantedinstitutions4 that define what constitutes legitimate behavior. Thus, businesses are not onlyprofitmaximizers but also legitimacy seeking and susceptible to institutional pressures (Scott1995). Legitimacy is important for businesses because it enhances survival through increased

Table 1 TTCC ‘‘principle 8—environment’’ of its code of conduct

Members shall minimize any damage to the environment arising from their activities

Reduce the environmental and health impact of all operations through the responsible use of naturalresources, conservation practices and the reduction of waste and emissions

Insure that in the production of all goods and services they will meet lawful environmental standardsrelated to the industry

Arrange for the safe handling transport and the disposal of raw materials products and waste accordingto the law

Work in partnership with others to promote environmental change, increase understanding ofenvironmental issues and disseminate good practice

4 Institutions are understood as formal state organizations, policies and regulations, and informal sharedschemas, routines, norms, symbols, and ceremonial traditions that are highly stable and facilitate andconstrain the behavior of social actors (Hall 1986).

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respect and access to resources (Dacin et al. 2002; DiMaggio and Powell 1991).5 A centralinsight of this theory posits that firms facing similar institutional pressures tend to adoptsimilar structures and strategies becoming more similar over time (Jepperson 1991; Scott1995). This process is termed isomorphism. Institutional pressures are classified as coercive,normative, and mimetic to respectively emphasize the role of pressures exerted by govern-ment agencies, professions and other types of associations, and taken-for-granted socialexpectations. Each Chamber constitutes an inter-organizational network with itself in a defacto central position through which it is a facilitator of collaboration, dialogue, and strategicalliances among its members. The network becomes a platform for mimetic behavior wherelaggards can learn from leaders (Tashman and Rivera 2010; Doner and Schneider 2000).Building on these basic ideas, we propose that different industry associations generatecontrasting institutional pressures that are thus correlated with dissimilar levels of corporateenvironmentalism by their member firms. Below, we discuss in detail this proposition for theparticular context of Trinidad and Tobago.

Neo-institutionalism and industry associations

Industry associations in Trinidad and Tobago operate in a small economy highly dependenton natural resource extractive industries; dominated by large foreign firms; and under aninfant environmental regulatory regime where the EMA suffers from a systemic lack ofpolitical, technical, administrative, and financial resources. Thus, coercive institutionalpressures to comply with environmental regulations are relatively weak (Shah and Rivera2007).

The history of national development provides strong impetus for normative pressures(Acutt et al. 2004). The country experienced industrial ‘boom’ in the 1960s–1970s, ‘bust’in the 1980s and unprecedented rejuvenation in the 1990s. During the latter period how-ever, governments spoke highly of reducing economic vulnerability by using economicrents accrued from the energy sector for diversification into tertiary manufacturing andtechnological industries. Continued failure to do so propels public criticism of governmentindustrialization policy and the industries that benefit from it. Highlighting environmentalissues has become one means for activists to forward their arguments about ‘‘brokengovernment promises’’.

In this operating environment, the normative and mimetic pressures exerted by industryassociations on their member firms may play an important role. Industry associations havea strong interest in maintaining a positive industry-wide environmental reputation in orderto avoid increased scrutiny from environmental activists, media, and regulators (King andLenox 2000). Industry associations’ normative pressures usually exert influence on firmsby relying on peer pressure and embarrassment of those that do not comply (Hoffman1999). Improvement may also be driven by industry associations when individual firms aremade to be sensitive about their reputation and how they are perceived by fellow memberswho are peers and competitors.

Firms may also view their membership in industry associations as a marker of legiti-macy in the operating environment especially when peers are also members. Firmsimproving their corporate environmentalism because of legitimacy reasons may do so inorder to comply or stay ahead of regulation (Shrivastava 1995; Bansal and Roth 2000;

5 Legitimate businesses are those whose actions are seen as, or presumed to be, ‘‘desirable, proper, orappropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’’ (Suchman1995: 574).

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Banerjee et al. 2003; Clemens and Douglas 2006) or regain reputation lost to past envi-ronmental violations.

Mimetic pressures emerge from the tendency to imitate practices from successful peers.This tendency is higher when firms experience uncertain or ambiguous situations such asthose imposed by environmental management decisions (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).In situations short on information valuable to predicting the firm’s next strategic actions, firmsmay emulate the decision behaviors of market leaders. This kind of mimicry may occurunintentionally and indirectly, or explicitly, diffused by industry associations (Jennings andZandbergen 1995; Clemens and Douglas 2006; Shah and Rivera 2007). Industry associationscan also coordinate access to awealth of valuable environmentalmanagement knowledge andtechnical assistance including information sources, systems, technologies, and environ-mental experts and specialists that are unavailable or inaccessible outside of the association.

IAs could be considered as institutional entrepreneurs (Montiel and Husted 2009) wherethey create the ability tomotivate co-operation among their members by providing themwithcommon meanings and identities. Different IAs may possess similar social skills but mayvary in their interest in particular institutional mechanisms that give them the ability toenhance or transform members (Maguire et al. 2004). Mechanisms that could be employedinclude identifying political opportunities, framing issues and problems and mobilizingmembership by embedding newbeliefs, norms and values into social structures (Zilber 2007).

Foreign-originated industry associations like the AMCHAM that were originallyestablished in advanced industrialized countries may have enhanced visibility locally andabroad, further increasing expectations and monitoring of their members’ environmentalpractices compared to those of firms belonging to local industry associations. AMCHAMlike industry associations may also have enhanced capabilities and resources to accessforeign technologies, experts and best practice guides in a faster, less-expensive mannerthan local industry associations. The market and cultural context in the most advancedindustrialized countries is also more favorable to environmental and social protectionefforts and thus may make the top officers of international industry associations morereceptive to environmental policy concerns and regulations (Levy and Kolk 2002; Rivera2002). Based on these arguments, we suggest that:

Hypothesis 1: The influence of membership in an industry association originating froman industrialized country (like the AMCHAM) on strengthening corporate environmen-talism is greater than the influence of membership in an industry association of local,emerging economy origin (like the TTCC).

Research methodology

Sample selection

We focus on the population of firms in Trinidad and Tobago’s chemical and oil and gasindustries.6 A comprehensive list of firmswas compiled using Trinidad andTobago’s Central

6 The chemical industry includes paints and varnishes, pharmaceuticals, soaps and detergents, adhesivesand waxes, industrial gases, pigments and inks, pesticides, cement, glass and glass products, plastic prod-ucts, clay products, asbestos products, and plastic packaging. Oil and gas industries include oil and naturalgas exploration and production, refineries, bulk raw material manufacturers, industrial waste treatmentfacilities, structural fabricators, transportation of oil and gas, petrochemicals including downstream man-ufacturers, natural asphalt, and asphalt products (Central Statistical Office of Trinidad and Tobago 2004).

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Statistical Office database. From an initial list of 734 firms, we eliminated thosewith less than10 employees,7 those not directly involved in actual operations and processing (e.g., con-sultants) and those missing reliable contact information. Of the final sample frame of 231firms, 131 responded (45.2 % response rate). This is typical, if not better than expected, giventhat response rates are low in developing countries (Shah 2011a; Baruch 1999), where sen-sitive environmental data are being collected (Kirkpatrick et al. 2004; Rivera 2002) andwhensurveys are directed to top managers (Brunetti et al. 1998).

Representativeness of the 131 respondent firms was confirmed by t-tests comparingresponders to non-responders across firm age and size (two variables for which we had datafor both groups). No significant differences were found. Survey selection bias was testedby comparing the corporate environmentalism ratings of early survey responders to latesurvey responders (as a proxy for non-responders) as first suggested by Armstrong andOverton (1977) and used in similar studies including Husted and Allen (2006), Delmas andToffel (2004) and Christmann (2004). Results of t-tests indicated no significant difference.

Data collection

Two survey questionnaires were designed based on best practice methods to maximizeresponse rates (Hox et al. 1998; Dillman 1978). One survey targeted top firm managers andwas administered over a 6-month period to collect information about basic firm charac-teristics (e.g., size, location, industry association membership, etc.). Requests for inter-views were made up to four times over a 2-month period as necessary. Each firm surveywas conducted in face-to-face interviews. Through the interviews, managers also identifiedkey community, value chain, and government stakeholders who were aware of firms’environmental practices. This information was triangulated with other sources such ascompany reports and newspaper reports to further substantiate which stakeholders weremost informed. In this way, a short list of community, value chain, and governmentstakeholders were identified for each firm. The second questionnaire targeted these iden-tified stakeholders of each respective firm. In this questionnaire, stakeholders rated firmsbased on sixteen items across four categories. The data collected here were used to cal-culate the corporate environmentalism rating of each firm, that is the dependent variable inour analysis (see details under Dependent Variable section).

To ensure the validity and reliability of the overall scale, factor analysis and Cronbach’salpha were calculated. Scale validity was confirmed by factor analysis with varimaxrotation. A Cronbach’s a coefficient equal to .94 also indicated that the scale was reliablefor measuring the corporate environmentalism construct. Pedhazur and Schmelkin (2001)recommend that a Cronbach’s a[ .80 is acceptable.

Variable measures

Dependent variable: corporate environmentalism

In Trinidad and Tobago, as is typical in other developing countries, actual physicalenvironmental measurement data were scarce and where available, of uncertain reliability.

7 Local industry experts recommended that firms with less than 10 employees should be excluded as theyhad neither the resources nor motivation to go beyond minimal regulatory compliance, and it was doubtfulthey have expertise able to complete the survey questionnaire to be administered in this study. Thisrecommendation was accepted since response rates from this subset of firms were likely to be poor andinformation gathered of low quality, which would only serve to diminish the accuracy of the study.

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Thus, we followed a next best approach of measuring the firm-level corporate environ-mentalism using external stakeholder ratings.8 To do so, we adapted a scale originallydeveloped and validated by Banerjee (2002) to measure corporate environmentalism in theCanadian oil and gas sector (Banerjee 2002). This index assesses four areas of corporateenvironmentalism: internal environmental orientation, external environmental orientation,corporate strategic focus, and functional strategic focus. A total of sixteen question itemsacross these four areas comprise the corporate environmentalism rating (see Table 2). Eachquestion is rated on a seven-point Likert scale. One stakeholder in each of the three groups(government, community and business chain) completed the questionnaire for each firm.The overall corporate environmentalism percent score for each firm was obtained bycalculating the average for the three stakeholder ratings. That is, the Likert scores for allsixteen items included in the scale were summed for each of the three stakeholders, thendivided by the maximum possible score and multiplied by one hundred to yield a per-centage rating.

Independent and control variables

Table 4 summarizes the independent and control variable measures used in the analysis.The selection of control variables was based on the most prevalent causal variablesincluded in previous studies of corporate environmentalism (Christmann 2004; Bansal andRoth 2000).

We control for firm size since larger firms are found to sustain higher environmentalresearch intensities (Glanchant 1996) and more likely to join beyond compliance initiatives(DeCanio and Watkins 1998; Dasgupta et al. 2000; Karamanos 2000; King and Lenox2000). Industrial location is controlled since evidence suggests that firms inside ofindustrial parks come under more regulatory scrutiny (Deutz and Gibbs 2004) and syn-ergistic relationships with neighbors may result in (Zucker 1977; Cheng-Nan et al. 2004)increased environmental efficiency. Foreign market dependence is controlled sinceresearch suggests that for firms to export to industrialized markets, they are often requiredto raise their environmental standards to meet the stricter regulations (Christmann 2000;Dowell et al. 2000). Firm ownership is controlled since evidence suggests that state-runfacilities shielded from market competition may be less inclined to invest in environmentalmanagement (Darnall and Edwards 2006) and have higher pollution levels (Wang and Jin2007). Community location is controlled since urban-situated firms tend to experiencemore intense institutional pressures than those situated in rural areas. Urban stakeholdersare more assertive, better educated, better informed, and more politically organized thanrural stakeholders (Freudenburg 1991; Delmas and Toffel 2004) (Table 3).

Statistical analysis techniques

To test our hypothesis, we used a Heckman’s two-stage modeling process that corrects forthe endogeneity introduced by self-selection bias in the evaluation of voluntary choices(Greene 2000; Heckman 1978). This two-stage technique9 has been widely used to eval-uate environmental and economic benefits generated by voluntary programs and organi-zations (Arora and Cason 1995; Hartman 1988; Khanna 2001; Rivera 2002; Welch et al.

8 Other peer-reviewed research that have used survey scales to measure levels of corporate environmen-talism include Sharma and Vredenburg (1998), Sharma (2000) and Banerjee et al. (2003).9 The two Heckman regression stages were estimated separately using the SAS/STAT 9 software program.

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2000). Controlling for the endogeneity introduced by self-selection bias is necessary toavoid overestimating the effect of non-random membership in voluntary industry associ-ations (Hartman 1988; Heckman 1978; Maddala 1986).

In the first stage of the analysis, two probit regression models identify independentvariables, Xi, significantly related to membership in each of the two industry associations:the AMCHAM (Di1; model 1) and the TTCC (Di2; model 2) (Maddala 1986). These probitregressions are also used to estimate the probability of participation in each respectiveindustry association: the AMCHAM (Pi1) or TTCC (Pi2). The probit regression equationmodel for the AMCHAM is:

Di1 ¼ d þ aiXi þ ei; ð1Þ

where: Di1 = participation in AMCHAM; d = Regression constant term; Xi = Indepen-dent variables (Firm size, industry sector, export dependence, joint venture status);ai = Regression coefficient for independent variable Xi; ei = random error term. Depen-dence on foreign exports (to industrialized markets) is included as a control at this stage

Table 2 Scale used to measure corporate environmentalism of firms

Corporate environmentalism scale question items Factorloading

Environmental orientation: internal

1 Firm makes a concerted effort to make every employee understand the importance ofenvironmental preservation

.35

2 Firm has a clear policy statement urging environmental awareness in every area .82

3 Environmental preservation is a high priority activity in the firm .84

4 Preserving the environment is a central corporate value in the firm .79

Environmental orientation: external

5 The financial well being of the firm does not depend on the state of the naturalenvironment

.75

6 The firm has a responsibility to preserve the environment .79

7 Environmental preservation is vital to the firm’s survival .76

8 The firm’s responsibility to its customers, stockholders, and employees is moreimportant than its responsibility toward environmental preservation

.72

Environmental strategic focus: corporate

9 The firm has integrated environmental issues into its strategic planning process .85

10 In the firm, ‘‘quality’’ includes reducing the environmental impact .83

11 The firm links environmental objectives with other corporate goals .81

12 The firm is engaged in developing products and processes that minimize environmentalimpact

.82

13 Environmental issues are always considered when new products are developed or newservices offered

.83

Environmental strategic focus: functional

14 The firm emphasizes the environmental aspects of its products and services inadvertising

.85

15 The firm’s marketing strategies for products and services have been influenced byenvironmental concerns

.87

16 In the firm, product-market decisions are always influenced by environmental concerns .79

Cronbach’s alph .94

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since it is possible that local firms seeking market information/advantages to gaining entryin the US market might believe AMCHAM membership affords them this opportunity.Ownership status is included since majority of foreign-owned firms may seek TTCCmembership to gain local market information that could provide advantages to theirbusiness.

In the second stage of the analysis, an ordinary linear regression model is used toexamine the association between firms’ corporate environmentalism (Yi) and their proba-bility of participation in each of the different industry associations—the AMCHAM (Pi1)and TTCC (Pi2). The inclusion of these probability of participation variables also allowscontrol for self-selection bias in the estimation of the ordinary least squares regressionmodel (Maddala 1986).

Yi ¼ aþ biX2i þ ciPi1 þ ciPi2 þ e2i; ð2Þ

where X2i = Independent variables (IA membership, firm size, joint venture status,industrial location, and community location); Pi1 = Probability of participation in AM-CHAM; Pi2 = Probability of participation in TTCC; e2i = random error term. The errorterms are expected to be correlated because they involve measurement error and unob-served factors associated with industry association membership and corporate environ-mentalism. Industrial location (inside or outside of export processing zones) is includedhere as it has been shown to influence firm-level environmental responsibility (Shah andRivera 2007). Community location is also included since urban and rural communities mayexert different levels of normative pressure on firms based on affluence, availability ofinformation, education levels and level of NGO activity. This variable is not included in

Table 3 Measurement of independent and control variables

Variable Measurement

Independent

Industry association membership Dummy variable equal to one if a firm is a member of anindustry association and zero otherwise

American Chamber of Commerce ofTrinidad and Tobago membership

Dummy variable equal to one if the firm was a member of theAmerican Chamber of Commerce of Trinidad and Tobagoand zero otherwise

Trinidad and Tobago Chamber ofCommerce membership

Dummy variable equal to one if the firm was a member of theTrinidad and Tobago Chamber of Commerce and zero fornon-members

Control

Firm size The natural logarithm of the number of firm employees. Thenatural logarithm was used to normalize firm size (Greene2000)

Industrial location Dummy variable equal to one if the firm facilities were locatedinside of an export processing zone and zero otherwise

Joint venture with foreign partners The percentage of firm shares held by foreign interests

Joint venture with state partners The percentage of firm shares held by the state or state interests

Foreign market dependence The percentage of sales or services done in North America,Europe, and Japan in the last fiscal year

Community location Proxied using a dummy variable equal to one if the firm waswithin a two-mile radius of an urban community and zerootherwise

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the probit regression (stage 1) as it has no bearing on national-level IA membership(although the case might be different if district-level Chambers were being considered).

Results and findings

Descriptive results

Seventy-four percent of firms in the final sample (n = 131) were members of industryassociations. More specifically, 48 % of firms were members of the AMCHAM and 32 %were members of the TTCC. Descriptive statistics cross-tabulated by industry associationmembership and other predictive variables are presented in Table 4.

Table 5 below reports the correlation matrix that, as expected, provides initial evidenceto suggest that industry association membership is significantly associated with highercorporate environmentalism (r = .33; p\ .01). AMCHAM membership is also signifi-cantly associated with greater corporate environmentalism (r = .50; p\ .01) as is TTCCmembership. To check for possible multicollinearity problems, we estimated conditionindices and variance inflation factors. These results did not suggest that such problemsarose (Belsley et al. 1980).10

Probit regression results (stage 1)

Results of the probit regression analysis (stage 1)11 are reported on Table 6 below. Model 1correctly classifies 77.3 % of the membership decisions. Findings indicate that dependenceon foreign export markets is positively and significantly related to membership in theAMCHAM (p\ .05). This suggests that when firms are more dependent on foreign exportmarkets for their survival, they are more likely to become members of the AMCHAM. Thisis expected since a core function of the AMCHAM as an industry association is to facilitatetrade between local Trinidad and Tobago firms and the United States. The United States isthe major trade partner of Trinidad and Tobago accounting for nearly half of all trade, thuslocal firms will potentially be at an advantage to access the US market through allegiancewith the AMCHAM. Probit Model 2 (see Table 6) correctly classifies 78.1 % of themembership decisions and findings indicate that joint venture ownership with a foreignfirm is positively and significantly related to membership in the TTCC (p\ .05). Thissuggests that when firms are governed by an ownership structure consisting of a foreign-local joint venture, they are more likely to become TTCC members. Joint ventureresearchers point out that firms attempting to penetrate developing country markets usually

10 Condition index and variance inflation measures for the independent variables revealed weak to moderatedependencies among the independent variables. Belsley et al. (1980) suggest that condition numbers[ 30may suggest colinearity problems and variance inflation factors[ 10 may also require further investigation.None of the three models exceed these values (Model 3, OLS; condition number = 28.3, averageVIF = 4.47).11 The regression coefficients in our two probit models indicate the effects of specific independent variableson a cumulative normal function of the probabilities that the firms in our sample belong to the AmericanChamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) (Model 1, Table 6) or Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry andCommerce (TTCC) (Model 2, Table 6). That is, these probit coefficients cannot be interpreted as indicatingthe marginal effect of an independent variable on the probability of belonging to either AMCHAM orTTCC. For instance, in our Model 1 (see Table 6), the increase in the probability of being a member ofAMCHAM that can be attributed to a marginal change in firm size is determined by both the initial value offirm size and the values of other independent variable in the probit regression.

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find it useful to partner with local firms in order to better understand local operatingconditions and increase the likelihood of success (Blumentritt 2003). By extension, itwould be advantageous for such joint venture firms to become involved in local industryassociations such as the TTCC that is the most prominent such association.

Ordinary least squares regression results (stage 2)

Model 3 (see Table 7) reports the results of the ordinary least squares regression mod-eling corporate environmentalism; overall model fit, F(9.37), p\ .001. Findings indicatethat firms with higher probability of membership in the AMCHAM are positively andsignificantly (p\ .05) related to higher corporate environmentalism. From the AM-CHAM regression coefficient, it can be inferred that a 1 % increase in the probability ofbelonging to the AMCHAM increases the level of corporate environmentalism by .25 %score points. Firms with a higher probability of membership in TTCC have a negativebut non-significant relationship with corporate environmentalism. These results providesupport for the Hypothesis 1 argument that firms with membership in foreign-originatedindustry associations originally established in advanced industrialized countries (like theAMCHAM) are more likely to exhibit stronger corporate environmentalism than firmswith membership in local industry associations established in developing countries (likethe TTCC).

Table 4 Descriptive Statistics

Industryassociationnonmembers

Industryassociationmembers

Americanchambermembers

Trinidad and Tobagochamber members

Number of firms (%)

Total firms: 131 (100 %) 34 (26 %) 97 (74 %) 64 (48 %)a 42 (32 %)b

Dummy variables: N (%)

Community type

Urban 8 (6.1) 33 (25.1) 40 (30.5) 28 (21.4)

Rural 26 (19.8) 64 (48.9) 24 (18.3) 14 (10.7)

Industrial location in

Indust. park 19 (14.5) 57 (43.5) 40 (30.5) 26 (19.8)

Outside indust. pk. 15 (11.5) 40 (30.5) 24 (18.3) 16 (12.2)

Industry sector

Oil and gas 16 (12.2) 65 (49.6) 50 (38.1) 34 (26)

Chemicals 18 (13.7) 32 (24.4) 14 (10.7) 8 (6.1)

Continuous variables: mean (SD)

Corporate environmentalism (%) 46.8 (12.6) 56.8 (12.9) 61 (11.6) 52.6 (12.6)

Foreign joint ownership (%) 11.9 (25.8) 18.3 (26.6) 21.7 (28.7) 24.9 (29)

Foreign market dependence (%) 10.9 (22.8) 22.5 (33.5) 29.1 (37) 30.1 (39.5)

Size of firm (no. of employees) 87.7 (83) 155.8 (125) 172.3 (130.8) 198.2 (136.3)

State joint ownership (%) 4.3 (15.1) 6.5 (16.5) 8 (17.4) 7.2 (17)

a, b Does not sum to 97 firms but 106 since 9 firms are members of both industry associations

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Tab

le5

Correlation

matrix

CE

12

34

56

78

910

Corporate

environm

entalism

(CE)

1.00

1Indu

stry

sector

.20*

1.00

2Log

size

offirm

.44**

.26**

1.00

3Indu

stry

associationmem

bership

.33**

.18*

.29*

*1.00

4AMCHAM

mem

bership

.50**

.33**

.32*

*.57**

1.00

5TTCCmem

bership

.27**

.27**

.37*

*.41**

.41**

1.00

6Foreign

marketdependence

.46**

.19*

.28*

*.16

.30**

.25**

1.00

7Foreign

jointow

nership

.22*

.14

.09

.11

.19*

.22*

.10*

1.00

8State

jointow

nership

.16

-.02

.09

.06

.13

.05

.27**

.30**

1.00

9Indu

strial

location

.16

.12

-.01

.02

.10

.07

.16

-.07

.01

1.00

10Com

munitylocation

.14

.11

.16

.09

.15

.04

.04

.06

.02

-.06

1.00

*Prob.\

.05;

**Prob.\

.01;

N=

131

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Discussion

The results suggest support for our hypothesis that firms with membership in MIAsaffiliated to those in advanced industrialized countries, like the AMCHAM, are more likelyto exhibit stronger corporate environmentalism than firms with membership in localindustry associations, like the TTCC. The suggestion of this finding that AMCHAMorganization membership may be linked to stronger corporate environmentalism is coun-ter-intuitive when one considers that the arguable ‘‘anti-environmental’’ stance12 of the USChamber of Commerce should have an influential effect on regional affiliates.

Table 6 Probit regression anal-ysis (stage 1): membership inindustry associations

Model 1(AMCHAMmember)

Model 2(TTCCmember)

Constant -2.15 (.63) -4.02 (.87)

Industry sector .68 (.25) .62 (.29)

Log size of firm .31 (.14) .61 (.17)

Dependence on foreign exports .01* (.01) .01 (.01)

Ownership: joint venturewith foreign firm

.006 (.01) .01* (.01)

Ownership: joint venturewith state firm

.003 (.01) -.001 (.01)

N 131 131

-2logL 181.54 164.36

Chi sq for covariates 150.32*** 130.64***

% correctly classified 77.3 78.1

Table 7 OLS regression analy-sis (stage 2): corporateenvironmentalism

^ Prob\ .10; * prob\ .05; **prob\ .01; *** prob\ .001

Standard errors are in parentheses

Model 3

Constant 24.57 (7.64)

Log size of firm 3.73* (1.87)

Prob. firm is AMCHAM member 25.38* (11.96)

Prob. firm is TTCC member -10.97 (15.54)

Ownership: joint venture with foreign firm .06 (.05)

Ownership: joint venture with state firm .02 (.01)

Industrial location 3.88^ (2.09)

Community location 2.03 (2.24)

N 131

F value 9.37***

R squared .31

Adjusted R squared .28

12 Over the last few years, several major multinational members have voiced displeasure over the Cham-ber’s environmental stance including California’s biggest utility corporations, Pacific Gas and Electric andExelon; and Nike resigned from the executive but remains a member. General Electric and Johnson &Johnson have issued statements saying that they disagree with the chamber’s climate policy. Apple quit theChamber altogether stating that, ‘‘We strongly object to the chamber’s recent comments opposing the EPA’s

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From a neo-institutional perspective, the findings of our study indicate that the insti-tutional pressures exerted by the AMCHAM are more likely to be associated with strongercorporate environmentalism among its members than the pressures produced by the TTCC.To better explain the nature of the institutional pressures exerted by the AMCHAM and theTTCC, we conducted detailed follow-up interviews with executives and member firmrepresentatives of both industry associations. These included face-to-face interviews withmembers of the AMCHAM HSE Committee and the TTCC Community Relations Com-mittee who are top executives in the energy, oil and gas and chemical manufacturing fields.

In many ways, the AMCHAM is an institutional entrepreneur in the way it directly andpurposely implements mechanisms that support and encourage members’ corporate envi-ronmentalism. These include its Environment, Health and Safety (HSE) Committee,Annual HSE Conference and its regular environmental management publications. Fornearly 15 years, the organizational structure of the AMCHAM has formally included anEnvironment, Health and Safety Committee. This committee comprises top environmentalexecutives of member firms. It develops industry-wide environmental protection strategies,provides public comment and addresses the pressing environmental concerns of theirmembership. The TTCC has no such forum although its Corporate Social ResponsibilityCommittee formed in 2008 undertakes environmental initiatives. The activities of thisTTCC committee, so far, appear limited to philanthropic community activities rather thanstrategically directed at promoting environmental standards among members.

TheAMCHAMorganizes aHealth, Safety, and Environment Conference that has been heldannually for the last 15 years. In 2010, this conference attracted over three hundred regional andinternational firms. AMCHAM also holds quarterly member training seminars. During2009–2010, experts giving seminars included top scientists and engineers fromGERenewablesand GE Energy, as well as a lead author of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC), and the top environmental executive of Petrobras Brazil. These activities may con-tribute to diverse environmental management collaborations, information exchanges, anddiscussion opportunities. There is little record of environmental training events for TTCCmembers even though the association suggests this to be part of its organizational strategy.

The AMCHAM also emphasizes publication of environmental literature and dissemi-nation to its members. Since 2006, every quarterly AMCHAM journal has contained anenvironmentally focused article by an academic or expert practitioner with one issue peryear dedicated to health, safety and environment. In contrast, since 2006 one TTCCquarterly journal dedicated to water resources carried some environmental content andanother in 2007 dealing with corporate transparency obliquely mentioned environmentalinformation disclosure. Additionally, in its regularly published column in the TrinidadGuardian newspaper between 2007 and 2010, of its forty-three articles, only one focusedspecifically on environmental protection.

But perhaps the more powerful mechanisms contributing to the creation and evolutionof the AMCHAM institutional environment, so differentiated from others such as theTTCC are the indirect and sometimes less purposeful ways of doing things. These includethe AMCHAM’s modus operandi of service bundling to members, entrenched internationalnetworks and member imaging.

Firms join Chambers based on their needs for service benefits, their interest in theChamber’s ‘‘unique selling point’’ if any and value as a collective for representational and

Footnote 12 continuedeffort to limit greenhouse gases.…We would prefer that the chamber take a more progressive stance on thiscritical issue and play a constructive role in addressing the climate crisis.’’(Goldenberg 2009).

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lobbying purposes. Bundling of environmental services/information/opportunities withother Chamber lines of business is said to increase the ‘‘market penetration’’ of environ-mentalism among members. Where environmentalism is ‘‘sold’’ as a modular service/opportunity to engage within the Chamber, there is less likelihood of penetration (Brattonet al. 2003). Here the contrast between AMCHAM and TTCC practices is apparent. Whilethe AMCHAM bundles or integrates environmental messaging, tools and knowledge withits main business service lines, the TTCC (in earnest effort) takes a very modular approach.For example, AMCHAM executive seminars on topics like business risk would treat withenvironmental risk alongside financial and legal risk and are attended by CEOs. In otherChambers, such a topic is a ‘‘special’’ one not presented in the mainstream but in a ‘‘specialsession’’. The impact on top leaders becomes lost or diluted since member firms send theirenvironmental personnel to attend, not the CEO. In the TTCC bundling efforts are lessapparent and in two areas where ‘‘environmentalism’’ is part of an offering (i.e., therecently formed CSR committee and its community relations committee) it is summarilymasked or muted.

Of both industry associations, the AMCHAM exhibited older and stronger internationalnetworking relationships, especially with respect to the North American and Europeanmarkets. Also, the AMCHAM network includes long-lasting linkages with foreign firms,experts, and partner associations in North America and Europe while the TTCC network isjust beginning to emerge. This allows the AMCHAM to provide its member firms withmore cutting edge advice, exposure, and learning opportunities; factors that are critical forsuccessful adoption of environmental management practices (Collins and Roper 2005).While the TTCC is nationally respected, to a large extent, the AMCHAM is still consideredthe leading voice for the heavy industrial sectors. This high visibility and reputation allowsthe AMCHAM to have regular and easier access to top-level policymakers and prestigiousnational forums. This prominence and visibility may increase the expectations placed onAMCHAM members and increase scrutiny by NGOs and monitoring by regulators. It alsoworks to reinforce normative pressures on firms with lower corporate environmentalism,by peer companies seeking to improve industry-wide ‘green’ reputation (May 2005).

Table 8 summarizes evidence of the variation in engagement of the two industryassociations in terms of networking and training opportunities; prioritization of environ-mentalism in committees; publication and dissemination intensities, and foreign expertinteractions.

Conclusions

This study contributes to the public policy literature by providing new empirical evidenceabout the relationship between different kinds of multi-sector IAs and corporate envi-ronmentalism. We also contribute to the small body of work examining institutional factorsassociated with corporate environmentalism in smaller economies in the developing world.Current emphasis on large developing countries such as China, India, and Mexico may beof little relevance to the unique environmental vulnerabilities and economic context ofsmaller emerging economies (Blechinger and Shah 2011; Shah et al. 2008).

Our cross-sectional study of Trinidad and Tobago’s industry associations contributes tothe literature by suggesting that, compared to non-members, firms with membership inindustry associations in general do not show a statistically significant correlation withhigher corporate environmentalism. We point out, however, that membership in a foreign-originating industry association (like the AMCHAM) is more likely to be significantly

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correlated with stronger corporate environmentalism. These types of industry associationsappear to exert stronger normative and mimetic institutional pressures associated withenhanced corporate environmentalism because they may: (1) have more access to infor-mation about the latest environmental management technology and practices; (2) be moreaware of the newest and more stringent environmental preferences and standards devel-oped in industrialized countries; (3) be more visible and thus receive stronger demands andoversight to push their members to show exemplary environmental protection conduct; and(4) be more able to diffuse new environmental protection technologies and demands bytaking advantage of their central position within their network of members; and (5) be ableto bundle the promotion of corporate environmentalism in with its mainstream businessservice offerings, thus increasing diffusion among membership.

Public policy implications

We posit that industry associations originating from industrialized countries may beenlisted as alternative public policy allies to promote environmental protection in emergingeconomies. This is particularly important in most such jurisdictions where governmentsusually lack strong capacity to enforce environmental regulations. While industry asso-ciations may have been identified as potential drivers of stronger corporate environmen-talism by previous researchers (Hoffman 1999; King and Lenox 2000), not all industryassociations are equal in this regard. IAs such as Chambers of Commerce could prove vital

Table 8 Corporate environmentalism engagement by industry associations

American Chamber of Commerce of Trinidad andTobago

Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry &Commerce

Premier regional Conference on Health, Safety andEnvironment has been held for 13 years. In 2009attracted over 300 regional and international firms

Provides incentive for national recognition throughAnnual Health, Safety, Environment Awards forthe last 10 years

Under the HSE Committee, hosts industry trainingseminars, at least 1 per quarter, with internationaltechnical experts. For example, in 2009 someexperts providing training were scientists from GERenewables and GE Energy

Hosts other environmental issue sensitizationworkshops regularly. For example, in 2009 oneworkshop was facilitated by the Lead Author ofChapter 7 of the IPCC Report on Climate Changeand another by the top environmental executive ofPetrobras Brazil

Standing HSE Committee comprised of memberfirm HSE Executives; established over 15 years

The quarterly publication to members used todisseminate environmental knowledge. All issuessince 2006 have included an environmentallyfocused article by an academic expert orpractitioner

In each of the last 4 years, an additional special issueof the AMCHAM Quarterly has been published tocover health, safety and environment exclusively

Committee on Corporate Social Responsibilityestablished two years ago; main focus onphilanthropic initiatives including environmentalprojects

Annual Awards ceremony for members includes aCommunity Award which may also coverenvironmental performance

Although ‘‘Environmental Training’’ is stated inStrategic Plan, none have been hosted for membersto date

The TTCC publishes a bi-monthly column in theleading national newspaper, the Trinidad Guardianand in the last 43 columns between 2007–2009,only 1 article directly focuses on environmentalresponsibility

Of the TTCC Quarterly members Journal, in recentyears 1 issues in 2008 was dedicated to watermanagement including pollution and another in2007 was dedicated to Corporate Transparencywhich briefly touched on environmentalinformation disclosure

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allies to government agencies in these countries that lack mechanisms to apply strongcoercive pressures on industry.

Since firms typically join Chambers of Commerce more so because of network andbusiness pressures rather than for environmental goals means, the Chamber’s catchment offirms spans environmental leaders and laggards. Regulators may be able to partner withChambers through whom they can indirectly impress environmental regulatory goals uponlaggard firms, which regulators may have been unsuccessful in reaching through othermeans. The mediatorship of the Chamber could be more effective especially where inmany circumstances, regulators and environmental laggard firms already have brittlerelationships.

MIAs can be encouraged by policy makers to develop more multi-stakeholder part-nerships that complement regulation and build their capacity to guide members through theenvironmental regulatory system. This could potentially provide efficiency gains toenvironmental regulators use MIAs as intermediaries, thereby reducing government’sadministrative burden. The AMCHAM becomes an institutional entrepreneur that focusesattention on how Chambers work to influence its institutional context through technical andmarket leadership and discursive action. In effect, AMCHAM overcomes barriers to col-lective action and achieves sustained collaboration among numerous dispersed actors tocreate an institution differentiated from the TTCC.

Finally, policy makers should take note from the experiences of IAs. Specifically, whilethe AMCHAM does not ask members to sign a code of conduct that included environ-mental behaviour, as does the TTCC, it is the former whose members appear to be moreenvironmentally responsible. This suggests that the actions of the AMCHAM, imple-mented both directly and indirectly may be better at inculcating environmental behavior inmembers than the signing of a symbolic code of conduct that involves neither enforcementnor sanctions. This evidence might also suggest that policy makers need not pursue IAs toimplement certification schemes or increase coercion or sanctions for poor performers.Rather, it might be the very lack of these combined with the strong yet subtle actionsintegrated into the MIAs ‘‘business as usual’’ that makes the difference (Tashman andRivera 2010).

Limitations and future directions

Finally, it must be noted that this study’s evidence is based on the oil, gas and chemicalindustries known to be some of the most pollution intensive sectors of the economy. So,while we speak in terms of ‘‘higher’’ and ‘‘lower’’ corporate environmentalism, this mustbe placed in relative context. Even the top rated, most responsible firms in this surveyadmitted to ‘‘one or two’’ non-compliance violations in the last year due to for example,plant malfunctions, supplier-related accidents or production inefficiencies. Similarly, wemust note that we have not sought evidence here, nor have we found such that Trinidad’sIAs are ‘‘anti-environmental’’ in anyway, but rather, that one appears to have created moreof an institutional environment to have a positive effect on members’ corporate environ-mentalism than the other. Another important limitation is reliance on a survey of stake-holders to measure corporate environmentalism. Our analysis is not based on actualenvironmental performance data such as air or water pollution levels but on the perceptionof performance that stakeholders hold based on observations and interpretations of theoperations of each firm. When actual environmental performance data become available,future research can re-examine these relationships.

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