inflation hedging it & trading it - company – deutsche...

47
Deutsche Bank Corporate Banking & Securities Inflation Hedging it & Trading it

Upload: lamnguyet

Post on 28-Mar-2018

236 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Deutsche Bank Corporate Banking & Securities

Inflation Hedging it & Trading it

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank

Introduction Why­inflation,­why­now?

1.0 Deutsche Bank’s capabilities and credentials in this market ­ 1.1­­How­Deutsche­Bank’s­inflation­offering­differs­from­ competitors 2.0­­ Market­Overview­–­the­rise­and­rise­of­inflation­volatility ­ 2.1­ Components­of­Inflation­indices

3.0­­ Inflation­Linked­Bonds 3.1­ Inflation­Linked­Bonds ­ 3.2­Real­Yield­and­Breakeven­Inflation­and­Inflation­Protection ­ 3.3­Indexation­and­Breakeven­Inflation ­ 3.4­Risk­Measures,­EM­Sovereign­Linkers,­Seasonality,­ ­ ­ and­US­TIPS ­ 3.5­UK­Index­Linked­Gilts,­EUR­Sovereign­Linkers,­and­other Important Markets ­ 3.6­ILB­coupon­frequency­and­settlement­characteristics­

4.0­­ Inflation­Swaps 4.1­ ILS­Swaps­and­Markets ­ 4.2­UK­Swaps,­Corporate­Linkers,­and­US­Swaps ­ 4.3­ILS­Indexation ­ 4.4­ILS­Pension­Fund­demand

5.0 Assessing Relative Value 5.1­ Linker­Asset­Swaps­and­the­Leverage­Effect ­ 5.2­5­sources­of­Asset­Swap­Difference ­ 5.3­What­is­the­‘Fair’­Price­for­Inflation­Protection? ­ 5.4­Fair­Credit­Spread­of­Inflation­Linked­Bonds ­ 5.5­Hedge­with­Bonds­or­Swaps 5.6 Summary

6.0­­ Inflation­Options ­ 6.1­ Inflation­Options ­ 6.2­­Who­are­the­major­players­in­the­options­market? ­ 6.3­Option­Products ­ 6.4­What­are­the­trading­opportunities? 6.5 Option Strategies 6.6 Creating Optimal Hedges

7.0­­ Deflation­tail­risk 7.1­ Deflation­Tail­Risk:­DB­5­Year­Note 8.0­­ Case­Study­–­Zero-Coupon­Option­Trade

9.0­ Further­Reading ­ 9.1­Inflation­Hedging­for­Institutional­Investors

10.0 Contacts ­ 10.1­Deutsche­Bank­Global­Inflation­Team

Contents

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 4

There has never been a better time­to­talk­about­inflation:

–­Inflation­has­been­running­ above central bank targets again –­At­the­same­time­monetary­ policy seems to be constrained ­ by­high­unemployment,­ ­ elevated­debt­levels­and­fragile­ ­ financial­markets –­Higher­uncertainty­about­the­ ­ inflation­outlook­raises­the­ ­ incentive­to­hedge­inflation­risks­ –­Any­investor­with­a­bond­ ­ portfolio­is­exposed.

Deutsche Bank is very strongly positioned to advise clients on what­to­do:

–­We­were­recently­voted­Interest­ ­ Rate­Derivatives­House­of­the­ Year by Risk Magazine –­We­have­a­large­global­inflation­ derivatives trading and structuring team –­We­have­extensive­experience­ ­ of­helping­clients­find­inflation­ solutions.

The­Deutsche­Bank­inflation­team­has­developed­this­briefing­document­to:

–­Set­out­the­challenges­ ­ and­opportunities­faced­by­ clients –­Explain­the­products­and­ ­ strategies­we­have­developed.

The­Deutsche­Bank­Global­Inflation­team­can­help.

Introduction Why­inflation,­why­now?

1Deutsche Bank’s credentials and capabilities­in­the­Inflation­marketHow­Deutsche­Bank’s­inflation­offerings­differ­from­competitors

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 6

We­offer­a­full­range­of­ inflation­services Our primary capabilities are demonstrated by our leading position in­the­league­tables;­we’ve­also­played­an important role in maintaining order

Date DealNo.­Leads

DB UBS RBS Barc HSBC GS JPM Nomura BNPPCredit Agricole

BOA SG Calyon MPS RBC CS ING Citi MS Others

24 Sep 09 UKTI50 4 1 1 1 1

29 Sep 09 ACGBi25 3 1 1 1

21 Oct 09 BTPei41 4 1 1 1 1

27 Jan 10 UKTI40 4 1 1 1 1

21 Apr 10 BTPei21 5 1 1 1 1 1

11 May 10 UKRAIL47 2 1 1

26 May 10 UKTI50 4 1 1 1 1

27 Jul 10 UKTI40 4 1 1 1 1

14 Sep 10 ACGBi30 3 1 1 1

27 Jan 11 UKTI55 4 1 1 1 1 1

09­Feb­11 OATei27 5 1 1 1 1 1

24 May 11 UKTI34 4 1 1 1 1

08 Jun 11 BTPei26 5 1 1 1 1 1

26 Jul 11 UKTI34 4 1 1 1 1

25 Oct 11 UKTI62 4 1 1 1 1

22­Nov­11 UKTI29 4 1 1 1 1

Total number 7 8 9 5 7 4 3 3 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

in­the­secondary­markets,­distributing­and­recycling­bonds­and­swaps­across­the­world.­DB­is­the­global­leader­in­inflation-linked­bond­syndication.

Issuing­long­dated­inflation­in­large­sizes­can­be­difficult­to­manage;­debt­managers turn to the strongest banks who­have­the­best­track­record­for­risk­management­and­distribution­–­Deutsche Bank leads in this space. Lead­syndication­mandates­awarded­to­market­counterparties

*between­September­2009­and­November­2011 Source:­Bloomberg,­Deutsche­Bank

Deutsche Bank’s credentials and capabilities in­the­Inflation­Market

1.0 Deutsche Bank’s credentials and capabilities­in­the­Inflation­Market

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 7

We­are­outperforming­the­competition­around­the­world Deutsche­Bank­is: ­ –­No­1­in­BGC­market­share­for­all­US ­ ­ products­–­Inflation,­Asset­Swaps,­ ­ ­­­Options­(2010-) ­ –­No­3­in­ICAP­market­share­for­ ­ ­ UKRPI­Inflation/Asset­Swaps­ ­ ­ (2009,­2010)­ ­ –­No­1­in­BGC­market­share­for­all­US­ ­ ­ products­(Inflation,­Asset­Swaps,­ ­ ­ Options)­2010 Fig.1:­ Global­Linker­Syndications­as­Lead­Manager Source:­Bloomberg,­Deutsche­Bank

Deutsche Bank Competitors

Fig.­2: Total­Syndication­Size­for­Global­Linkers­(mm) Source:­Bloomberg,­Deutsche­Bank

Deutsche Bank Competitors

Fig.­3: USD­Inflation­Market­by­Volume­2011 Source:­Bloomberg,­Deutsche­Bank

Deutsche Bank Competitors

DB

UB

S

RB

S

Bar

c

HS

BC

GS

JPM

No

mu

ra SG

BN

PP

RB

C

Cal

yon

MP

S

Oth

ers

ING

CS

CA

4

2

0

6

8

10

12 Number ofSyndications

MS

ML

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

DB

UB

S

RB

S

Bar

c

HS

BC

GS

JPM

No

mu

ra

BN

PP

Cit

i

SG

ML

MS

RB

C

Cal

yon

Oth

ers

ING

CS

CA

MP

STotal SyndicationSize

0 0

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

1.0 Deutsche Bank’s credentials and capabilities­in­the­Inflation­Market

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 8

We­are­outperforming­the­competition­in the UK Fig.­1: UK­Linkers­Syndications­as­Lead­Manager Source:­Bloomberg,­Deutsche­Bank

Deutsche Bank Competitors

Fig.­2: UK­Linkers­and­Nominals­Syndications­as­Lead­Manager Source:­Bloomberg,­Deutsche­Bank

Deutsche Bank Competitors

Fig.­3: UK­Linkers­Total­Syndication­Size­(mm)­ Source:­Bloomberg,­Deutsche­Bank

Deutsche Bank Competitors

Fig.­4: UK­Linkers­and­Nominals­Syndications­as­Lead­Manager Source:­Bloomberg,­Deutsche­Bank

Deutsche Bank Competitors

DB UBS RBS Barc HSBC GS JPM BNPNomura

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

DB UBS RBS Barc HSBC GS JPM BNPNomura

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

DB UBS RBS Barc HSBC GS JPM BNPNomura

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

6

5

4

3

2

1

DB UBS RBS Barc HSBC GS JPM BNPNomura

0

1.0 Deutsche Bank’s credentials and capabilities­in­the­Inflation­Market

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 9

Integrated­trading,­structuring­ and research Unlike­some­of­our­competitors,­Deutsche­Bank’s­inflation­trading,­structuring­and­research­professionals­work­closely­together,­combining­strategic and technical expertise with­the­macro-economic­insights­so­important­to­this­offering.

Bloomberg Forecasts,­inflation­linked­bonds,­inflation­swaps­and­inflation­linked­options­(figure­1).

The market is pricing much more upside­risk­than­downside­risk­–­contrary­to­what­we­see­in­other­markets.

Trade­Finder State­of­the­art­inflation­analytics,­from­bond­carry­and­butterfly­scans,­to­forward­matrices­for­the­main­inflation­swap­markets­(figure­2).

Fig.­1: Our­inflation­page­on­Bloomberg­DBII

Fig.­2: Inflation­on­Trade­Finder­

1.1 Deutsche Bank’s credentials and capabilities­in­the­Inflation­Market

2Market­Overview

Components­of­Inflation­indices

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 11

All­G7­nations­issue­inflation-linked­bonds

Markets US­TIPS­–­the­US­Sovereign­linker­market­is­the­largest­globally­with­a­total­market­value­of­over­USD1000bn.

UK­–­IL­Gilts­–­first­issuance­1981;­total­market­value­exceeds­GBP270bn.

EUR­sovereign­linkers­-­total­market­value­exceeding­EUR320bn­as­of­now;­France,­Italy,­&­Germany­issue­ILBs.­Italian,­German­and­Greek­ILBs­are­linked­to­euro­area­inflation;­France­issues­bonds­linked­to­EUR­inflation­and­bonds­linked­to­FRF­inflation.

Industrial country sovereign linker markets­–­Other­important­markets­include­Australia,­Canada­and­Sweden.­AUD:­govt­suspended­issuance­in­2003,­started­again­in­2009.­Sweden:­linkers­account­for­almost­30%­of­total­govt­bond­market,­higher­share­than­in­any other industrial market.

EM­sovereign­linker­markets­-­most­LatAm­inflation­markets­have­long­histories;­Brazil­is­the­largest­market,­suppression­of­investment­restrictions­in 2006 spurred international demand. Chile,­Colombia­&­Uruguay­also­issue­ILB.­Israel­is­big­(USD27bn­market­value).­More­recently:­South­Africa,­Poland,­Turkey­(2007)­and­South­Korea­(2007).

Fig.­1: A­Fast­Growing­Asset­Class Source:­Deutsche­Bank

­ US­ ­ ITL ­ UK­ ­ DEM ­ JPY­ ­ Gr ­ FRF­ ­ SEK CAD AUD

2.0 Market­Overview­–­the­rise­and­rise­of­market volatility

‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘09 ‘11‘10‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08

0

1,800 total outstanding, $ bn

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,000

800

600

400

200

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 12

Food and beverages

HousingApparelTransportationMedical CareRecreation

Other

Education andCommunication

Energy14

10

374

11

7

6

74

%

‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘09 ‘10‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08

Food

Alcoholic drinks

HousingFuel & light

Catering

Cigarettes & tobacco

Clothing & footwearPersonal goods & servicesMotoring expendituresFares & other travel costsLeisure goodsLeisure services

Household goodsHousehold services

14

4

4

4

6

6

7

24

26

3

4

4

%

12

Food & beverages

Clothing & footwear

Furniture & household goods/maintenenceHealth

Alcohol & tobacco

Housing, water, electricity & other fuels

Recreation & cultureEducationRestaurants & hotelsOther goods & services

TransportCommunication

%13

4

6

6

12

16

15

23

2

129

2.1 Market­Overview­–­the­rise­and­rise­of­market volatility

Fig.­3: US:­CPI Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Fig.­1: UK:­CPI Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Fig.­2: UK:­RPI Source:­Deutsche­Bank

3Inflation­Linked­Bonds

Inflation­Linked­Bonds Real­Yield­and­Breakeven­Inflation­and­Inflation­Protection Indexation­and­Breakeven­Inflation Risk­Measures,­EM­Sovereign­Linkers,­Seasonality­and­US­TIPS UK­Index­Linked­Gilts,­EUR­Sovereign­and­other­Important­Markets ILB­coupon­frequency­and­settlement­characteristics

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 14

Inflation­Bonds­‘Linkers’ Inflation­Linked­Bonds­(also­known­as­inflation­indexed­bonds)­or­‘Linkers’.

These are Treasury bonds designed to­cancel­the­capital­eroding­effects­ of­inflation.­Called­TIPS­(Treasury­ Inflation­Protection­Securities)­in­the­ US,­their­interest­rate­remains­fixed­but­ the principal is adjusted to match changes in a price index.

For­example: A­vanilla­fixed­rate­bond­pays­a­fixed­coupon and redeems at 100 ­ –­Interest­Paid­=­Fixed­Rate­*­ Constant ­ –­Notional­(e.g.­5%­*­100­=­5) ­ –­Redemption­=­Constant­Notional­ ­ ­ (e.g.­100)

A­‘Canadian­style’­Linker­pays­a­‘real’­coupon and redeems at 100 in ‘real’ terms ­ –­Index­Ratio­=­­CPI­Index­on­ ­ ­ Payment­Date­/­CPI­Index­on­ Issue Date ­ –­Interest­Paid­=­Fixed­Rate­*­Inflated­ ­ ­ Notional ­ –­=­Fixed­Rate­*­Notional­*­Index­ ­ ­ Ratio­(e.g.­2%­*­100­*­1.5­=­3) ­ –­Redemption­=­100­*­Index­Ratio­ ­ ­ (e.g.­100­*­1.5­=­150)

Some­ILBs­(like­US­TIPS­or­OATei/i)­have­a­deflation­floor,­meaning­a­principal­repayment­of­minimum­par­is­guaranteed by the issuer.

Fig.­1: Vanilla­Fixed­Rate­Bond­versus­Inflation­Linked­Bond Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Real ­ Nominal

3.1 Inflation­Linked­Bonds

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10

6%

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

Year

7%

8%

9%

10% Coupon Principal

80%

60%

40%

20%

0

100%

120%

140%

160%

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 15

Real­Yield­and­Breakeven­Inflation Components­of­nominal­interest­rate: ­ –­Real­yield ­ –­Expected­Inflation ­ –­Risk­Premium ­ –­Liquidity­Premium

Issuing nominals means investors need compensation­for­inflation­uncertainty.

Linkers­save­issuers­the­risk­premium­by providing certainty about real cash flows­in­the­future­i.e.­their­increase­ in­purchasing­power­is­‘locked­in’.­(figure­1) Fig.­1: Components­of­Nominal­Yield­ Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Inflation­Protection With­positive­inflation,­the­ILB’s­cash­flows­will­increase­over­time­to­secure­the­investor’s­purchasing­power.

Compared to a nominal bond early coupon­payments­will­tend­to­be­lower,­and­the­final­repayment­will­tend­to­be­higher.

The­examples­below­assume­an­annual­coupon­and­inflation­at­2%.­(figures­2­and­3). Fig.­2: Nominal­cash­flows Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Coupon­Linker­(2%)­ ­ Notional­Conventional­(rhs) ­ Coupon­Conventional­Bond­(4%)­ Notional­Linker­(rhs)

Fig.­3: Real­cash­flows­(purchasing­power­ of­the­CFs) Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Coupon­Linker­(2%)­ ­ Notional­Conventional­(rhs) ­ Coupon­Conventional­Bond­(4%)­ Notional­Linker­(rhs)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10

6%

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

7%

8%

9%

Nominal Yield

Breakeven RateIndex Linked Bond

RealYield

Inflation Expectations

RiskPremium Liquidity

Premium

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not’l10

60

40

20

0

80

100

120

140

6

4

2

0

8

10

12

14

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not’l10

60

40

20

0

80

100

120

6

4

2

0

8

10

12

3.2 Inflation­Linked­Bonds

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 16

Indexation To­offer­inflation­protection­you­need­to:­(i)­choose­a­price­index,­(ii)­define­precise linking rules.

Price­index:­typically­a­non-seasonally­adjusted,­official­consumer­price­index.

Indexation:­the­‘Canadian’­model­is­now­the­benchmark,­adopted­among­others­by­TIPS,­EUR­ILBs­and­new­UKTi­(figure­1). –­Problem:­CPI­only­monthly­and­ ­ published­with­a­delay –­The­price­factor­used­to­inflation­ ­ adjust­cash­flows,­the­‘Daily­­ ­­ Inflation­Reference’­(DIR),­is­a­linear­ ­ interpolation­of­ ­ the­two­monthly­values­of­the­official­ price index three months earlier and ­ two­months­earlier,­e.g.: ­ ­ –­The­DIR­for­1­June­is­the­ ­ ­ ­ official­CPI­March­(released­ ­ ­ ­ mid-April) ­ ­ –­The­DIR­for­1­July­is­the­ ­ ­ ­ official­CPI­April­(released­ ­ ­ ­ mid-May) ­ ­ –­The­DIR­for­23­June­is­ ­ ­ ­ :­CPI(Mar)­+­22/30­*­ ­ ­ ­ [CPI(Apr)­–­CPI(Mar)]

Breakeven­Inflation Canadian­style­linkers­are­quoted­in­real­terms­and­the­real­price­(P)­-­real­yield­(r)­relationship­is­equivalent­to­that­of­a­conventional­bond­(c:­coupon):

ILBs’­value­is­often­expressed­in­terms­of­inflation­rather­than­in­terms­of­real­yields­by­considering­the­difference­in­yield­between­nominal­and­real­bonds.

BEI­(Breakeven­Inflation)­is­the­inflation­rate­that­equates­the­expected­return­of­an­ILB­and­a­comparable­nominal­bond;­i.e.­if­actual­inflation­until­maturity­exceeds­BEI,­linkers­outperform­nominals.

In­practice,­the­market­looks­at­simple­yield­spreads­(figure­2).

Fig.­1: Indexation Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Fig.­2: BEI­≈­nominal­yield­–­real­yield Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Real Yield ­ Nominal­Yield

Jan ‘04 Jun ‘04 Nov ‘04 Apr ‘05 Sep ‘05 Feb ‘06 Jul ‘06

100

99

98

97

96

101

102

103

BTP

ei 0

8

BTA

Nei

10

BTP

ei 1

0

OA

Tei 1

2

BTP

ei 1

2

OB

Lei 1

3

BTP

ei 1

4

OA

Tei 1

5

DB

Rei

16

BTP

ei 1

7

OA

Tei 2

0

BTP

ei 2

3

GG

Bei

25

OA

Tei 3

2

BTP

ei 3

5

OA

Tei 4

0

Breakeven Inflation

%

4.54.03.53.02.5

1.52.0

1.0

5.05.56.0

3.3 Inflation­Linked­Bonds

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 17

Risk Measures –­The­concepts­of­duration­and­ convexity can be applied to linkers ­ in­the­same­way­as­for­conventional­ bonds –­But­in­the­case­of­linkers,­duration­ ­ describes­the­sensitivity­of­the­price­ to a change in the real rate –­Linkers­have­a­higher­duration­than­ same maturity conventionals –­Convexity­rises­exponentially­with­ ­ duration,­for­the­same­maturity­ILBs­ have a higher convexity than nominals

EM­Sovereign­Linker­Markets –­Most­Latin­American­inflation­ markets have long histories; Brazil is ­ by­far­the­largest­market,­suppression­ ­ of­investment­restrictions­in­2006­ spurred international demand –­Chile,­Colombia­&­Uruguay­also­ ­ issue­ILB –­Israel­has­a­large­linker­market­ ­ (USD27bn­market­value) –­More­recently­South­Africa,­Poland,­ ­ Turkey­(2007)­and­South­Korea­(2007)

Seasonality –­Seasonal­movements­in­price­indices­ ­ mean­that­inflation­accrual­is­not­ linear –­Quoted­real­yields­of­ILB­adjust­to­the­ ­ changing­inflation­uplift­ ­ ­ –­real­yields­&­­BEI­exhibit­ seasonal patterns ­ ­ –­detecting­the­seasonal­ pattern in prices is important ­ ­ ­ for­valuing­ILBs –­Estimation­of­seasonal­factors­is­not­ ­ without­difficulties,­especially­in­the­ ­ euro­area­where­there­is­instability –­There­is­no­consensus­on­their­ precise value

US­TIPS –­The­US­sovereign­linker­market­is­the­ ­ largest­globally­with­total­market­ ­ value­in­excess­of­USD1000bn ­ (figure­1) –­TIPS­were­first­issued­in­1997;­in­ ­ recent­years,­there­have­been­three­ ­ 5y,­three­30y­and­six­10y­auctions­per­ ­ year;­in­February­2010­30y­TIPS­were­ ­ reintroduced,­replacing­the­20y –­Maturities­range­from­1y­to­30y

Fig.­1: US­TIPS­total­outstanding­market­value Source:­US­Treasury

3.4 Inflation­Linked­Bonds

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 20122010

300

200

100

0

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000 USDbn

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 18

UK­Index­Linked­Gilts –­The­UK­linker­market­is­the­oldest­in­ ­ Europe­(first­issuance­1981) –­Total­market­value­exceeds­ ­ GBP270bn­and­more­than­20%­of­ ­ sovereign­debt­is­linked­to­inflation –­Traditionally­bonds­have­an­8M­ ­ indexation­lag,­but­since­Sep­2005­all­ ­ new­issues­follow­the­3M­lag­model;­ ­ UKTi­have­no­deflation­floor –­Issuance­has­been­weighted­towards­ the long end –­Maturities­range­from­1Y­to­50Y,­ ­ with­issues­available­on­all­main­ ­ curve­points­(figure­1)

Fig.­1: UK Total Outstanding Market Value Source:­UK­DMO

EUR­Sovereign­Linkers –­Euro­area­sovereign­inflation-linked­ ­ bond­(ILB)­markets­are­expanding­ ­ rapidly­with­the­total­market­value­ ­ exceeding­EUR320bn­today –­France,­Italy,­Germany­&­Greece­ ­ issue­ILBs –­Italian,­German­and­Greek­ILBs­are­ ­ linked­to­euro­area­inflation;­France­ ­ issues­both­bonds­linked­to­EUR­ ­ inflation­and­bonds­linked­to­FRF­ ­ inflation –­Maturities­range­from­1Y­to­32Y,­with­ issues available on all main points on ­ the­curve­(figures­2­and­3)

Fig.­2: EUR­Sovereign­Linker­Issuance Source:­National­Treasury

­ FR­ ­ DE ­ IT­ ­ GR ­ EUR­(rhs)

Other important markets include Australia,­Canada­and­Sweden –­AUD:­govt­suspended­issuance­in­ ­ 2003,­but­started­again­in­2009.­ ­ Strong­liability­related­demand­from­ ­ PF­and­insurance­companies –­Sweden:­linkers­account­for­almost­ ­ 30%­of­the­total­government­bond­ ­ market,­a­higher­share­than­in­any­ other industrial market

Fig.­3: Sovereign­Linkers,­Outstanding­Volume Source:­National­Treasury

­ Germany­­ Fr­(FRCPIxt) ­ France­ ­ Italy ­ Greece

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20112010

50

0

100

150

300

200

250

350 USDbn

201120102009200820072006200520042003

5

10

15

0

20

25

50

100

150

0

200

250

300

350Linker IssuanceEURbn

Total Outstanding, excl GreeceEURbn

2031

2033

2015

2017

2019

2021

2023

2025

2027

2029

2035

2039

2037

2041

5

10

15

0

20

25

30

35

40 EURbn

2013

3.5 Inflation­Linked­Bonds

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 19

Price­index BBG Index lag Deflation­floor Coupon

US CPI-U CPURNSA 3M YES semi-ann

UK RPI UKRPI 8M/3M NO semi-ann

FRCPI­x­tob,­FR FRCPXTOB 3M YES annual

HICP­x­tob,­EMU CPTFEMU 3M YES annual

IT HICP­x­tob,­EMU CPTFEMU 3M YES semi-ann

JP CPI­x­fresh­food JCPNJGBI 3M NO semi-ann

SE CPI SWCPI 3M YES­(new­ILB) annual

CA CPI CACPI 3M NO semi-ann

GR HICP­x­tob,­EMU CPTFEMU 3M YES annual

DE HICP­x­tob,­EMU CPTFEMU 3M YES annual

AU CPI­quarterly ACIF 6M YES quarterly

3.6 Inflation­Linked­Bonds

Most­ILBs­have­coupon­frequency­and­settlement­characteristics­in­line­with­ the nominal market

ILB­coupon­frequency­and­settlement­characteristics

4Inflation­Swaps

ILS­Swaps­and­Markets UK­Swaps,­Corporate­Linkers­and­US­Swaps ILS­Indexation ILS­Pension­Fund­Demand

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 21

Inflation­Linked­Swaps­(ILS)­–­a­pure­inflation­product­as­opposed­to­a­real­rate product.

What­is­an­Inflation­Swap? The­cash-flows –­Receive­Compounded­Inflation­from­ ­ Start­to­Maturity:­pay­one­cash-flow –­CPIt/CPI0­-1 –­Pay­a­known­Fixed­cash-flow­at­ Maturity –­(1­+­X%)^t

What­is­the­break-even­rate? –­Receive­Compounded­Inflation­from­ ­ Start­to­Maturity:­pay­one­cash-flow –­CPIt/CPI0­-1 –­Pay­a­known­Fixed­cash-flow­at­ Maturity –­(1­+­X%)^t

ILS­Markets The­most­liquid­ILS­are­typically­those­linked to the same price index as the inflation-linked­government­bonds­of­the­corresponding­market­(US­CPI-U,­EUR­HICP­ex-tobacco,­French­CPI­ex­tobacco,­UK­RPI).

For­the­major­markets,­ZC­ILS­are­usually­quoted­for­tenors­out­to­30­years,­sometimes­50­years.

Fig.­1: Inflation­Swaps

(1+BEI)N–1

Fixed

Floating

Client

CPI(N)

CPI(0)–1

4.1 Inflation­Swaps

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 22

UK­Swaps­and­Corporate­Linkers Non-sovereign­inflation­supply­in­bonds­&­swaps­has­grown­rapidly­in­the­UK­in­particular 2006 and H107.

MarketPrice­Index

Lag CPI­Fixing

US CPI-U 3M Interpolated

Euro­areaHICP­ex­tobacco

3M Straight

FranceCPI­ex­

tobacco3M Interpolated

UK RPI 2M Straight

US­Swaps The­inflation­swap­market­has­developed­rapidly­since­2004,­and­is­now­comparable­to­its­European­counterparts­in­terms­of­liquidity.

A­lack­of­‘natural’­inflation­swap­supply­translates into structural richness in swap­BEI­vs­bond­BEI…­and­wide­linker­ASW discounts. Fig.­1: Bond­Breakevens­vs­Swap­Breakevens Source:­Deutsche­Bank

­ USCPI­ZC­swap­rates ­ TIPS-implied­ZC­B/E

Fig.­2: Measures­of­Relative­Value:­ASW­Spread­and­Z-spread Source:­Deutsche­Bank

US­Linker­Z-spread­discount ­ US­Linker­ASW­discount

4.2 Inflation­Swaps

01 J

an 1

4

01 J

an 1

6

01 J

an 1

8

01 J

an 2

0

01 J

an 2

2

01 J

an 2

4

01 J

an 2

6

01 J

an 2

8

01 J

an 3

0

01 J

an 3

2

01 J

an 3

4

01 J

an 3

6

01 J

an 3

8

01 J

an 4

0

01 J

an 4

2

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0 %

TII A

pr

13

TII Ju

l 13

TII Ja

n 1

4TI

I A

pr

14

TII Ju

l 14

TII Ja

n 1

5TI

I A

pr

15

TII Ju

l 15

TII Ja

n 1

6TI

I Ju

l 16

TII Ja

n 1

7TI

I Ju

l 17

70

60

50

40

30

20

-10

10

0

80

TII Ja

n 1

8TI

I Ju

l 18

TII Ja

n 1

9TI

I Ju

l 19

TII Ja

n 2

0TI

I Ju

l 20

TII Ja

n 2

1TI

I Ja

n 2

5TI

I Ja

n 2

6TI

I Ja

n 2

7TI

I Ja

n 2

8TI

I A

pr

28

TII Ja

n 2

9TI

I A

pr

29

TII A

pr

32

TII Fe

b 4

0TI

I Fe

b 4

1

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 23

ILS­Indexation For­FRCPIxt­&­US­CPI,­the­indexation­lag­convention­is­the­same­as­for­the­corresponding­inflation-linked­bond­markets –­Strong­demand­has­led­to­a­low­ ­ level­of­real­interest­rates,­lock­in­ ­ low­financing­costs –­PFI­projects­with­inflation­component­ ­ (usually­bonds,­but­typically­ ­ transformed­into­ASW) –­Credit­wrapping­allowed­corporates­ ­ to­issue­highly­rated­debt­which­ is more appealing to institutional investors

But­has­fallen­significantly­during­the­credit crisis.

Main­sources:­regulated­utilities,­PFIs,­property­leases,­railway­companies,­retailers,­supranationals.

Alternative­supply­has­led­to­two-way­swap­market­and­narrow­swap-bond­B/E­spread,­but­swap­richness­has­increased again during the crisis.

4.3 Inflation­Swaps

ILS­Indexation

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 24

ILS­Pension­Fund­demand –­In­the­UK,­pension­indexation­to­RPI­ ­ (LPI)­is­more­explicit­than­elsewhere­ and the pension industry is larger ­ than­in­other­European­countries –­Accounting­rules­(‘Financial­ ­ Reporting­Standard­17’)­have­ ­ encouraged­pension­funds­to­match­ their indexed liabilities more closely –­As­a­result,­demand­growth­from­ ­ pension­funds­and­life­insurers­has­ ­ outstripped­supply­leading­to­low­ ­ real­yields­and­expensive­BEI­at­the­ ­ long-end­of­the­curve­But­has­fallen­ ­ significantly­during­the­credit­crisis –­Long-term­investors­own­the­ ­ majority­of­ILB­as­a­hedge­for­ their real liabilities

Fig.­1: Real Yields Source:­Deutsche­Bank

US UK ­ France

Fig.­2: UK­Non-sovereign­Inflation­Supply Source:­Deutsche­Bank

­ UK­Non-sovereign­inflation­supply

Fig.­3: UK­Non-sovereign­Inflation­Supply Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Other Rail Utility

4.4 Inflation­Swaps

-4.0

-3.5

-3.0

-2.5

-2.0

-1.5

0

-0.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

%

2009 2023 2036 2050 2064 Q311Q305 Q306 Q307 Q308 Q309 Q310

500

1,000

1,500

0

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000 GBPm

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20112010

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000 IssuanceGBPm

5Assessing Relative Value

Linker­Asset­Swap­and­the­Leverage­Effect 5­Sources­of­Asset­Swap­Difference What­is­the­‘Fair’­Price­for­Inflation­Protection? Fair­Credit­Spread­of­Inflation­Linked­Bonds Hedge­with­Bonds­or­Swaps Summary

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 26

Linker­Asset­Swap –­Investor­buys­an­Inflation­Bond –­Investor­agrees­to­pay­away­all­the­ ­ cash-flows­(P+I)­from­the­bond –­Investor­receives­in­return­Libor­+­ ­ x%­until­maturity­as­well­as­a­ principal payment

The­Leverage­Effect Sophisticated investors may not be­able­to­borrow­to­buy­additional­nominal­bonds­due­to­constraints,­hence­are­willing­to­give­up­some­of­their excess return.

Some­investors­just­like­the­pick-up­over­equivalent­tenor­nominal­bonds­on­asset­swap­(figure­2).

For­example This­is­how­we­expect­a­Linker­to­increase­in­the­Eurozone­over­time.

Why­is­this­important? Sovereign­default­is­currently­very­real­possibility…­like­for­like­exposures­need­to­be­carefully­assessed­for­fair­value­–­some­investors­have­increased­credit­risk­for­very­little­reward.

Fig.­1: Linker­Asset­Swap Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Fig.­2: The­Leverage­Effect Source:­Deutsche­Bank

­ Inflation ­ Libor

5.1 Assessing Relative Value

Libor + X

Inflated Notional Inflated Notional

Notional

InvestorLinker

CPICPI

0 5 10 15 20 25

Constant Swap Notional

Increasing Credit Exposure

30 35 40Years 45 50

150

100

50

0

200

250

300

350 Notional

“The­increasing­credit­exposure,­and­thereby­return,­on­a­linker­asset­swap­generates­significant­outperformance…” –­Daragh­McDevitt,­ ­ Global­Head­of­Inflation­Structuring

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 27

5­Sources­of­Asset­Swap­Difference

PV01­difference –­Linkers­have­a­higher­duration

Swap­richness –­The­spread­between­inflation-linked­ ­ swaps­and­implied­bond­break-evens­ ­ gives­rise­to­different­asset­swap­ ­ levels­for­linkers­and­nominals –­It­also­usually­tells­the­story­of­swap­ ­ supply­and­demand…

Seasonality –­See­the­section­on­page­3.4

Credit­/­Liquidity –­Mis-priced­credit­cost­leading­to­ ­ ‘value’­for­issuers

Tax –­Favourable­deferrals­for­issuers­ encourage supply

The­difference­between­a­nominal­asset­swap­and­a­Linker­Asset­Swap­of­the­same­maturity­is­a­function­of­the­larger­credit­exposure,­the­term­structure­of­credit­and­the­swap­richness.

For­example 20 bps richness results in an additional 28­bps­on­asset­swap­–­a­40%­increase.

Fig.­1: Measures­of­Relative­Value Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Adjusts­for­ Dirty­Price

Accounts for­Cashflow­Pattern

Accounts­for­Term Structure

of­Credit

Fair­Value­Discounting

Par­par­ASW

Net­Proceeds­ASW

Z­spread √ √

‘Richness’ √ √ √ √

5.2 Assessing Relative Value

“Of­these­comparative­measures…­richness­is­the­true­measure” –­Stephane­Salas,­ ­ Global­Head­of­Inflation­Trading

5­Sources­of­Asset­Swap­Difference

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 28

What­is­the­‘Fair’­Price­for­Inflation­Protection?

Inflation­‘Breakeven’­is­not­equal­to­market­inflation­expectations­but­is­a­factor­of –­Inflation­expectations –­‘Risk­Premium’ –­‘Liquidity­Premium’

Inflation­expectations­over­the­very­long run are hard to judge but tend to be based on current economic policy –­ECB­target­rate­is­‘under,­but­close­ ­ to­2%’

Risk­Premium­includes –­Potential­change­in­monetary­policy­ ­ target­(e.g.­4%­plus­or­minus­1%­ ­ instead­of­under­2%) –­Abandonment­of­monetary­policy­ ­ in­favour­of­employment­or­ currency board –­EUR­breakup,­expansion­or­ succession –­Asymmetric­elasticity­of­inflation:­ ­ wages­are­easier­to­raise­than­to­cut

Liquidity­premium­includes –­Relative­demand­and­supply­for­ ­ inflation­bonds­v­nominal­bonds –­Balance­sheet­costs­of­holding­ ­ inflation­bonds­to­recycle­inflation –­Opportunity­cost­of­capital­for­cash­ ­ used­to­hedge­inflation

5.3 Assessing Relative Value

“The biggest mistake people make with­inflation-linked­bonds­is­thinking­that­the­breakeven­inflation­is­the­market’s­expected­inflation­rate. It is not and should not be. The­breakeven­includes­what­the­market­expects­inflation­to­be­and­the­major­portion­of­the­risk­premium­that­you­should­find­in­ the­nominal­market,­and­the­liquidity­premium” –­Markus­Heider,­ ­ Global­Head­of­Inflation­Research

What­is­the­‘Fair’­Price­for­Inflation­Protection?

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 29

Fair­Credit­Spread­of­Inflation­ Linked­Bonds Issuing­Linkers­equates­to­borrowing­more over time in nominal terms i.e. it can­be­thought­of­as­a­set­of­forward­starting bonds.

Forward­starting­bonds­=­greater­credit risk.

Two­components­to­fair­price: –­The­issuer’s­current­credit­spread­for­ ­ the­maturity­of­the­bond –­Forward­credit­spreads­for­each­of­ ­ the­forward­starting­borrowings­i.e.­ ­ forward­credit­spreads

A­simple­point,­but­investors­may­not­recognise and price this correctly.

Fig.­1: Linker­as­a­Series­of­Forward­ Starting Bonds Source:­Deutsche­Bank

­ Initial­Principal­Amount­ ­ Fwd­Borrowing­Year­1 ­ Fwd­Borrowing­Year­2­ ­ Fwd­Borrowing­Year­3 ­ Fwd­Borrowing­Year­4­ ­ Fwd­Borrowing­Year­5 ­ Fwd­Borrowing­Year­6­ ­ Fwd­Borrowing­Year­7 ­ Fwd­Borrowing­Year­8­ ­ Fwd­Borrowing­Year­9

Fig.­2: Creating­a­synthetic­30-year­old­Nominal­Bond Source:­Deutsche­Bank

5.4 Assessing Relative Value

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8Years 9 10

60

40

20

0

80

100

120

140 Borrowed Amount

=

EUR 100mm

EUR 25mm

EUR 25mm

EUR 50mm

20y @ 130bp

10y @ 100bp 30y accreting @ 175bp

30y @ 150bp

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 30

The­Question­is… Hedge­with­Bonds­or­Swaps Traditionally,­many­investors­have­primarily­considered­inflation-linked­bonds to hedge exposure.

However,­a­more­modern­approach­is: –­Bonds­can­be­cheaper­or­more­ ­ expensive­than­swaps –­Buy­the­cheapest­asset –­Hedge­the­inflation­with­swaps –­Opportunistically­switch­ ­ between­assets

This­also­gives­a­lot­more­flexibility­to­hedge­the­desired­cash­flows,­since­at­the­long-end­there­are­only­relatively­few­bonds­outstanding­(and­liquidity­can­be­better­as­well).

Fig.­1: Swap­Inflation­Price­–­Bond­Inflation­Price Source:­Deutsche­Bank Past­performance­is­not­a­reliable­indicator­of­future­performance

UK Italy ­ France­(French­CPI)­ ­ Germany ­ France­(Euro­CPI)­ ­

The Bond Universe Value­within­the­UK­–­for­example Figures­3­and­4­on­the­right­depict­the­value­that­can­be­created­by­switching­between­similar­maturity­nominal­and­inflation­linked­bonds.­

Figure­2­below­depicts­the­value­in­switching­between­short­and­long­maturity linkers.

In­terms­of­trading­capability,­how­does­this­work? We­should­always­be­free­to­switch­between­UK­Bonds­and­UK­Linkers.

Fig.­2­: PV­Gain­of­UKTi40­over­the­UKTi27 Source:­Deutsche­Bank Past­performance­is­not­a­reliable­indicator­of­future­performance

Switch­in ­ Switch­out

Fig.­3: PV­Gain­of­UKTi27­over­the­UKT27 Source:­Deutsche­Bank Past­performance­is­not­a­reliable­indicator­of­future­performance

Switch­in ­ Switch­out

Fig.­4: PV­Gain­of­UKTi40­over­the­UKT40 Source:­Deutsche­Bank Past­performance­is­not­a­reliable­indicator­of­future­performance

Switch­in ­ Switch­out

5.5 Assessing Relative Value

Nov

10

May

16

Oct

21

Ap

r 27

Oct

32

Ap

r 38

Sep

43

Mar

49

Sep

54

Feb

60

40

20

0

60

80

120

100

140

-20

1/10 3/10 5/10 7/10 9/10 11/10 1/11 1/1211/119/115/11 7/113/11

2

-2

0

4

6

8

10 PV Gain (%)

1/10 3/10 5/10 7/10 9/10 11/10 1/11 1/1211/119/115/11 7/113/11

2

0

4

6

8

10

12

14 PV Gain (%)

1/10 3/10 5/10 7/10 9/10 11/10 1/11 1/1211/119/115/11 7/113/11

2

-2

0

4

6

8

10 PV Gain (%)

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 31

To­sum­up… –­Given­the­displacement­between­ ­ inflation­and­nominal­markets,­there­ ­ are­opportunities­for­arbitrage –­Asset­swap­spreads­on­linkers­ ­ represent­a­premium­for­credit­that­ ­ is­hard­to­price,­and­when­coupled­ ­ with­demand/supply­imbalances­and­ ­ higher­duration,­they­offer­a­pickup­ ­ to­nominals­for­the­same­underlying­ issuer –­Switching­between­equivalent­risk­ ­ sovereigns/supra­sovereigns­can­ ­ often,­driven­by­dynamics­of­the­ ­ cross­currency­swaps­market,­ ­ provide­additional­yield­pick-ups

–­These­displacements­can­be­ ­ assessed­by­a­variety­of­metrics –­The­value­of­switching­is­evident­ ­ from­the­incremental­excess­pickup­ that is generated by selling the costlier asset to buy the cheapest ­ asset­from­time­to­time ­ ­ –­Used­as­a­systematic­strategy­ this can yield substantial returns over medium term horizons –­These­represent­incredible­ ­ opportunities­for­‘asset-heavy’­ ­ investors,­and­the­markets­will­ ­ likely­normalize­with­time,­hence­ ­ it­is­important­to­act­quickly

5.6 Assessing Relative Value

“There­isn’t­one­risk­free­curve,­there­are­100,­150,­200…­the­key­is­when­do­you­pick­‘the­fruit’,­when­is­the­bond­cheap­enough?” –­Daragh­McDevitt,­ ­ Global­Head­of­Inflation­Structuring

“…there­are­incredible­opportunities­for­asset-heavy­investors…it­is­important­to­act­quickly” –­Haroon­Sana,­ ­ Global­Head­of­Rates­Sales

Summary

6Inflation­Options

Inflation­Options Who­are­the­major­players­in­the­options­market? Option­Products What­are­the­trading­opportunities? Option Strategies Creating Optimal Hedges

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 33

A­relatively­new­market,­inflation­options­traded­between­Europe­and­the US have doubled every year since trading­started­in­inflation­swaps­in­2002/2003.­2010­saw­a­particular­growth­spurt.

Long­term­growth­looks­set­to­continue­at­this­explosive­rate,­which­is­clearly­indicative­of­its­importance­to clients and represents a substantial opportunity to DB as intermediary between­buyers­and­sellers­of­inflation.

Interbank volumes reached 50bn in 2010,­up­from­13bn­in­2009,­and­just­1bn in 2005.

Fig.­1: London­Options­Volumes Source:­Tullett­Prebon

Fig.­2: NY­Options­Volumes­ Source:­Tullett­Prebon

6.1 Inflation­Options

01

/09

03

/09

05

/09

07

/09

09

/09

11

/09

01

/10

03

/10

05

/10

07

/10

09

/10

11

/10

01

/11

03

/11

400

200

600

0

800

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800 Volumes(millions)

01

/09

03

/09

05

/09

07

/09

09

/09

11

/09

01

/10

03

/10

05

/10

07

/10

09

/10

11

/10

01

/11

03

/11

1,000

2,000

0

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000 Volumes(millions)

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 34

The market is becoming more and more­complex­as­sophisticated­new­players­such­as­hedge­funds,­liability­driven­investors,­and­non-life­insurance­practitioners are added to the mix.

Any­client: –­holding­a­bond­portfolio –­subject­to­tail­inflation­–­high­or­low –­who­has­revenues­or­liabilities­that­ ­ are­indexed­to­inflation is­exposed­to­inflation­risk.

6.2 Inflation­Options

Hedge Fund Real Estate Investor

Asset Manager

Inflation Options Market

Insurance Company Pension Fund

Directional/RV Trades

Hedge LPIRevenues

Hedge LPILiabilities

Buy DeflationProtection

Monetize EmbeddedFloors

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 35

Year­on­Year­cap/floor­ –­YoY­floorlet­:­Max­[­K­-­YoYt­,­0­] –­With­YoYt­=­It/It-1­-­1 –­A­5­year­0%­YoY­floor­costs­140c­ or 30bps p.a. –­Demand­from­retail­notes­>>­Supply­ ­ from­premium­sellers

Zero­Coupon­cap/floor –­ZC­floor:­Max­[­(1+K)^t­-­It/I0­,­0­] –­A­10­year­0%­ZC­floor­costs­36c –­Supply­from­linkers­and­asset­swaps­ ­ >>­Demand­from­deflation­hedgers

Limited­Price­Index­(LPI) –­LPIt­=­LPIt-1­*­{­1­+­max­[­min­[­YoYt­,­ ­ 5%­]­,­0%­]­} –­Inflation­observed­annually,­collared,­ ­ compounded…­and­paid­at­maturity –­Demand­from­LDI­funds­>>­Supply­ ­ from­real­estate­investors

Fig.­1: 5y­0%­YoY­floor­HICPxT Source:­Deutsche­Bank Past­performance­is­not­a­reliable­indicator­of­future­performance

Fig.­2: 10y­0%­ZC­floor­HICPxT Source:­Deutsche­Bank Past­performance­is­not­a­reliable­indicator­of­future­performance

Fig.­3: Limited­Price­Index­(LPI) Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Fig.­4: DB­Inflation­pages:­DBII

6.3 Inflation­Options

07/09 01/10 07/10 01/11 07/11 01/12

40

20

60

80

0

100

120

-2%YoY Inflation -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%

1.0

2.0

0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0 %

01/07 01/08 01/09 01/10 01/11 01/12

100

50

150

200

0

250

300

350

400 Price (bps)

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 36

LPI­Collars­represents­a­great­inflation-hedging alternative Inflation­risk­for­Pension­funds­and­other­liability-driven­investors­is­big,­ 20­–­30%­of­scheme­risk.

Breakevens­are­deemed­expensive:­if,­for­example,­breakeven­is­3.7%­and­the­scheme­expected­inflation­of­2.8%,­hedging­loses­value­(figure­1).

What’s­the­solution? Cover­inflation­risk­by­creating­an­inflation­collar –­Pay­LPI –­Receive­RPI

Expert­historical­perspective Markus­Heider,­responsible­for­European­inflation­research­at­DB­Global­Markets­Research,­provides­a­useful­long­term­perspective:­this­graph­shows­how­the­volatility­we­have­seen in the last three years is nothing compared to the last 200 years. In the long­run,­inflation­is­a­very­volatile­entity,­which­means­risk­and­therefore,­opportunity.

The­relative­stability­we’ve­seen­in­the­last­20­years­can­very­quickly­change.

Significant­risk­factors­currently­include­governments­with­unsustainable­deficits­and­globalisation;­the­need­to­hedge­inflation­risk­is­becoming­increasingly relevant.

Fig.­1: Assumed Constant Year on Year Inflation­Return Source:­Deutsche­Bank

RPI­ZC­Swap ­ ­ 100%­LPI­Collar

Fig.­2: Consumer­price­inflation,­y/y%,­11-yr­MA Source:­EH­Net­

UK US

1.­­ US­war­of­Independence 2.­­ Napoleonic­Wars­deficit­monetised 3.­­ 1st­Industrial­Revolution:­productivity-led­deflation 4. US Civil War 5.­­ 2nd­Industrial­Revolution:­productivity­rebounds;­gold­finds 6.­­ Fiscal­monetisation­during­WWI 7.­­ Great­Depression 8.­­ Fiscal­monetisation­during­WWII 9.­­ Fiscal­monetisation­during­Vietnam­War;­oil­shocks 10.­­Volcker­clamps­down­on­inflation

6.4 Inflation­Options

-2%-3%-4% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8%

-30

40

50

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

Payoff

30y Breakeven3.55%

180017751750 1825 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000

-10

15

10

5

0

-5

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

“The catalyst that makes this trade work­is­inflation­at­above­5%­–­this­5%­strike­is­currently­lower­than­spot­inflation­–­a­change­from­the­last­five­years” –­Nicolas­Tabardel,­ ­ Global­Head­of­Inflation­Volatility­ ­ and­Exotics

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 37

Market­vs­Economist­Expectations UK­RPI­future­inflation:­the­market­in the long term is pricing much more­downside­risk­than­upside­risk.­In­the­UK,­the­risks­of­inflation­overshooting are much higher than them undershooting. This is contrary to what­we­see­in­other­markets.

In­Europe­and­the­US,­there­is­more­balance; caps are becoming more much­more­expensive­than­floors.

Consensus economist predictions indicate that market implied volatility is­too­high;­tails­are­too­fat­and­the­skew­is­too­deep.­Caps­have­no­natural­supply­in­Europe­or­the­US­so­the­tail­risk­is­always­expensive­(figure­1).

In­Europe,­volatility­is­too­high,­tails­are­too­fat,­and­the­skew­is­too­steep.

What­does­this­mean?­ Selling­volatility­now­is­a­good­idea.

The­skew­was­pricing­floors­higher­than­caps;­the­skew­is­now­symmetric­(figure­2).

Fig.­1: Skew­prices­floors­higher­than­caps Source:­Deutsche­Bank

SPF­prob­distribution­for­5y­infl­forecast ­ ­ Market­Implied­Probability­from­EUR­YoY­caps/floors 1.­ Deflation­risk­is­overpriced 2. Consensus economist predictions imply market implied volatility is too high 3.­ ‘Fat­Tails’

Fig.­2: Ratio­of­market­implied­probability­vs.­Economist­Expectations Source:­Deutsche­Bank

6.4 Inflation­Options

0

25

30

35

20

15

10

5

<0 0 - 0.5 1.0 - 1.5 2.0 - 2.5 3.0 - 3.5 >4

%

0

25

20

15

10

5

<0 0 - 0.5 0.5 - 1 1 - 1.5 1.5 - 2

Inflation Print (%)

Value in selling ‘wings’distribution i.e. far out ofthe money caps and floor

2 - 2.5 2.5 - 3 3 - 3.5 3.5 - 4 >4

30

“Tail risk continues to remain overpriced­with­both­tails­almost­equally­flat,­reflecting­the­high­uncertainty­over­the­inflation/deflation­debate” –­Nicolas­Tabardel,­ Global­Head­of­Inflation­Volatility­&­Exotics

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 38

Collars­(figure­1) –­Sell­Floor –­Buy­Cap

Strangles­(figure­2) –­Sell­OTM­Floor –­Sell­OTM­Cap

Straddles –­Sell­Floor­and­Cap­at­same­strike

Range Accruals –­Pays­N/12­*­Fixed­Rate,­Annual –­N­=­No.­of­months­1%­<­YoY­EUR­ ­ HICP­<3% –­5y­Note­with­DB­funding,­Fixed­ ­ Rate­=­3.25%

Fig.­1: Long­(0,3)­Collar Source:­Deutsche­Bank

Fig.­2: Short­(0,3)­Strangle Source:­Deutsche­Bank

6.5 Inflation­Options

-6

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-5 -3 -2-4 -1 1 20 3 654 7 8 9 10

Payoff (%)

YoY Inflation Print (%)

-5

1

0

-1

-2

-3

-4

-5 -3 -2-4 -1 1 20 3 654 7 8

Payoff (%)

YoY Inflation Print (%)

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 39

Building Blocks –­Selling­a­0%­YoY­floor –­Selling­a­1x­/­2x­cap­spread

Premiums –­5Y­0%­floor­generates­120c –­5Y­2.5%­cap­costs­320c –­2x­5Y­5%­cap­costs­200c

Using­these­components… Zero­cost­and­benefits­from­inflation­between­2%­and­7.5%.

Covered­Linker­Switches –­Sell­nominal­bond –­Buy­Linker –­Sell­year­on­year­caps­@­2.5%­on­ coupons and principal

OATei22 OATei32

Covered Caps (%) (%)

Upfront­Premium 5.00% 14.90%

Running­Premium­(annual,­30/360) 53 bps 92 bps

Real­Yield­Pick-Up 43 bps 51 bps

Minimum­Inflation­to­outperform­nominal 1.49% 1.63%

Fig.­1: Sell­0%­floor,­But­1x/2x­Cap­Spread Source:­Deutsche­Bank

6.6 Inflation­Options

-1.5

3.0

1.5

2.5

1.0

-2.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5

-1.0

-2 -1 1 20 3 654 7 8 9 10

Payoff (%)

YoY Inflation Print (%)

7Deflation­Tail­Risk

Deflation­Tail­Risk:­DB­5­Year­Note

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 41

Deflation­tail­risk:­DB­5­Year­Note Investors­can­take­advantage­of­the­substantial­dislocations­in­the­Inflation­Option­Market­by­selling­deep­out­of­the­money­Inflation­Floors.

A 5­year­DB­Deflation­Note provides a return over 3.5%­per­annum­if­YoY­Eurozone­Inflation­prints­above­-2.0%,­providing 235bps­of­pick­up­over­5y­EUR­Swap­Rates.

Euro-zone­inflation­printing­below­-2.0%­is­an­unprecedented­event,­never­seen­in­ANY­Euro­economy.

The­below­note­details­indicative­terms and compelling­reasons­for­investors­to­take­on­this­risk­for­above­market returns. The last section looks at­variations­in­USD,­GBP­in­addition­to­alternate­ways­of­monetizing­the­opportunity­in­EURs.

The underlying market dislocations are­unsustainable­and­will­soon­be­removed­by­exogenous­liquidity­provided by real money accounts. This opportunity represents clear value.

DB­Short­Deflation­Risk­Note­–­Indicative Trade Terms

Indicatitive Terms

Currency EUR

Format DB­Funded­Note

Maturity 5 years

Issue­Price 100.00

Re-Offer 99.00

Redemption121­-­Floor(T),­minimum­

return­of­0.00

Where

FLOOR(T)121­*­Sum­[Floor(t)­for­

t­=­1,2,3,4,5]

Floor(t)12­*­Max­(Floor­Strike­-­YoY­

Inflation,­0%)

Floor­Strike -2.00%

YoY­Inflation

CPI(t)­/­CPI(t-1)­-1­ Where­CPI(t)­is­the­EUR­HICP­ex­Tobacco­Index­(CPTFEMU­Index)­3m­

prior to Observation Date t CPI(t-1)­is­the­EUR­HICP­ex­Tobacco­Index­(CPTFEMU­

Index)­15m­prior­to­Observation Date t

Reference­Rates 5y­Inflation­B/E­­­ 2.01% 5y­Swap­Rate­ 1.61% Max­IRR­ 3.56%

7.1 Deflation­Tail­Risk

Deflation­tail­risk:­DB­5­Year­Note

8Case­Study:­Zero-Coupon­Option­Trade

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 43

During­the­first­six­months­of­2010,­a­Toronto-based­insurer­purchased­deflation­protection­worth­$21.539­billion­in­notional,­paying­$173.7­million­in­premium.­The­10-year­zero-coupon­0%­options­were­denominated­in­dollars,­euros­and­sterling,­and­were­executed by Deutsche Bank and Citi.

The­other­side­of­the­trade­was­largely­taken­by­California-based­fixed-income­manager­Pimco,­which­reported­it­had­sold­more­than­$8­billion­of­10-year­zero-coupon­0%­inflation­floors­in­a­filing­dated­August­27.­The­floors­were­sold­in­return­for­more­than­$70­million­in­premium,­with­Deutsche­and­Citi­as­counterparties.

The­transaction­made­perfect­sense­for­both­participants.­For­the­insurer,­the­0%­floors­acted­as­a­hedge­against­deflation­and­the­impact­that­would­have­on­its­equity­portfolio.­At­the­same­time,­Pimco­was­able­to­cash­in­on­0%­inflation­floors­embedded­in­its­sizable­portfolio­of­Treasury­inflation-protected­securities­(Tips).­Dealers­say­the headlines generated by the trade had­a­positive­impact­on­the­market,­encouraging other clients to express

their­views­on­the­direction­of­inflation­by­buying­or­selling­zero-coupon­options.

Daragh­McDevitt,­DB­Global­Head­of­Inflation­Structuring­said,­“It­sparked­interest because you have very intelligent­investors­on­both­sides­who­are­taking­opposite­sides­of­the­trade.”

Since­Q2,­2010,­quantitative­easing­has encouraged more clients to sell implied­inflation­volatility­at­levels­that­look­expensive.­In­particular,­many­market players have looked to play inflation­volatility­versus­interest­rate­volatility­–­for­example,­by­buying­interest­rate­caps­and­selling­inflation­caps at similar strikes. “We’ve seen a lot­of­clients­coming­in­on­the­same­side­as­Pimco,­viewing­the­probability­of­deflation­priced­in­by­these­options­to­be­inflated.­They­are­either­selling­the options embedded in their bond portfolios,­selling­the­options­outright­or­entering­into­some­kind­of­interest­rate­options­strategy,”­says­McDevitt.

The­transaction­made­perfect­sense­for­both­participants.­For­the­insurer,­the­0%­floors­acted­as­a­hedge­against­deflation­and­the­impact­that­would­have­on­its­equity­portfolio.­At­the­same­time,­Pimco­was­able­to­cash­in­on­0%­inflation­floors­embedded­in­its­sizable­portfolio­of­Treasury­inflation-protected securities.

8.1 Case Study

Case­Study:­Zero-Coupon­Option­Trade

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 44

9Further­Reading

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 45

Inflation­Hedging­for­Institutional­Investors Examining­dynamic­asset­allocation­strategies­for­high­inflation­scenarios­and­the­effect­of­financial­market­changes­on­inflation­hedging­instruments.

Weekly­Inflation­Research­update

Research­Inflation­Markets­Guide

Inflation­Big­Picture­Study

Please­go­to­gm.db.com/inflation­for­more­information.

9.1 Further­Reading

Further­Reading

Examining dynamic asset allocation

strategies for high inflation scenarios and

the effect of financial market changes on

inflation hedging instruments

INFLATION HEDGING FOR

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS

PU

BL

ISH

ED

BY

ALSO SPONSORED BY

MEDIA PARTNERS

JUNE | 2011

CLEAR PATH ANALYSIS IN PARTNERSHIP WITH

Global

7 October 2011

DB Inflation Report

Weekly Inflation Update

Deutsche Bank AG/London

All prices are those current at the end of the previous trading session unless otherwise indicated. Prices are sourced from local exchanges via Reuters, Bloomberg and other vendors. Data is sourced from Deutsche Bank and subject companies. Deutsche Bank does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. Thus, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. DISCLOSURES AND ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS ARE LOCATED IN APPENDIX 1. MICA(P) 146/04/2011.

Strategy Update

Change in breakevens, US & UK

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2y 5y 10y 30y 2y 5y 10y 30y

1W change in BEI

carry adjusted

GBP USD

Change in breakevens, EUR & FRF

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

2y 5y 10y 30y 2y 5y 10y 20y

1W change in BEI

carry adjusted

EUR FRF

ILB rich/cheap vs nominals

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2012 2017 2023 2028 2034 2039 2045

GBP DEM

USD FRF

ITL

Rich (-) / cheap (+) vs nominal curve

Source: Deutsche Bank

Upcoming data

Mkt Indicator Date, GMT

FRF CPI Sep 12 Oct, 05:30

DEM CPI Sep 13 Oct, 06:00

EUR HICP Sep 14 Oct, 09:00

Research Team

Markus Heider (+44) 20 754-52167 [email protected]

Alex Li (1) 212 250-5483 [email protected]

Vanshree Verma (+44) 20 754-77583 [email protected]

Mac

ro

Glo

bal

Mar

kets

Res

earc

h

Economics: This week’s PPI data point to further upward pressure on UK and euro area consumer core inflation in the coming months. Business survey price balances have continued to fall in September however, which is consistent with the view that CPI inflation will slow in 2012.

Global: 10y EUR real rates look too high relative to USD against the recent data divergence. We prefer long-end TIPS and UKTi B/Es over OATei.

EUR: The ongoing deterioration in economic data remains challenging for B/Es. In RV, we prefer the 10y sector and the DBRei-20 in particular.

GBP: While real yield valuations are challenging, the scheduled new 50y linker issue should look attractive relative to nominal gilts (in B/E and ASW), RPI swaps and B/Es in other markets.

USD: Forward TIPS B/Es have diverged from survey-based measures of inflation expectations, although declines may be exaggerated by liquidity factors.

AUD: In our view, the market is underpricing inflation risk over the short term, with the gap between RBA inflation expectations and breakevens extremely wide. Our preferred trade is long the belly in 2y/5y/10y ZCS B/E butterfly.

Asia: Inflation in Thailand & South Korea fell more than expected in September, supporting our expectations of no policy rate change at the next CB meeting.

Inflation Markets Bond Yld BEI 1M fwd ASW ASW

discnt ZC Rate Sprd

ZC-BEICPI/RPI

fcst

US CPI

TII Apr-16 -0.65 1.53 1.51 -18 14 5y 1.87 34 spot 3.8

TII Jan-21 0.05 1.83 1.82 13 31 10y 2.30 48 Dec-11 2.9

TII Feb-41 0.90 2.02 2.02 76 54 30y 2.54 52 Jun-12 1.7

EA HICPxt

DBRei 16 -0.22 1.24 1.16 -65 20 5y 1.69 45 spot 2.5

DBRei 20 0.31 1.40 1.36 -48 26 10y 1.84 44 Dec-11 2.7

OATei 40 1.44 2.07 2.06 109 39 30y 2.11 4 Jun-12 1.8

FR CPIxt

BTANi-16 0.23 1.52 1.47 21 39 5y 1.88 36 spot 2.2

OATi-19 0.68 1.68 1.65 37 35 10y 2.07 39 Dec-11 2.1

OATi-29 1.29 2.10 2.09 98 37 20y 2.18 7 Jun-12 1.5

UK RPI

UKTi-16 -1.52 2.86 2.76 -31 15 5y 3.11 26 spot 5.2

UKTi-22 -0.37 2.80 2.76 9 32 10y 3.21 41 Dec-11 5.0

UKTi-40 0.18 3.15 3.14 44 33 30y 3.50 35 Jun-12 3.7Source: Deutsche Bank

Global

1 March 2011

Global Macro Issues Issues in Inflation

Deutsche Bank AG/London

All prices are those current at the end of the previous trading session unless otherwise indicated. Prices are sourced from local exchanges via Reuters, Bloomberg and other vendors. Data is sourced from Deutsche Bank and subject companies. Deutsche Bank does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. Thus, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. DISCLOSURES AND ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS ARE LOCATED IN APPENDIX 1. MICA(P) 007/05/2010

Economics

Research Team

Markus Heider (+44) 20 754-52167 [email protected]

Mac

ro

Glo

bal

Mar

kets

Res

earc

h

Eco

no

mic

s

Abstract

The uncertainty about the longer-term inflation outlook has risen substantially since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. After 15 years or more of low and stable inflation, professional forecasters, investors and indeed central banks themselves now consider below and above target outcomes as possible, even probable. The non-standard reaction of economic policy during the crisis, the discussion about potential changes to monetary policy objectives, the run-up in public debt, but also apparent changes to the inflation process itself during the Great Moderation as well as the open inflation implications of structural trends like globalisation all have contributed to the rise in uncertainty. In this note we look at some of the main issues surrounding the inflation outlook and conclude that inflation risks for the coming years seem to be skewed to the upside of central bank targets.

March 2011

Global Inflation Markets

A guideMarkus [email protected]

All prices are those current at the end of the previous trading session unless otherwise indicated. Prices are sourced from local exchanges i R t Bl b d th d D t i d f D t h B k d bj t i D t h B k d d kvia Reuters, Bloomberg and other vendors. Data is sourced from Deutsche Bank and subject companies. Deutsche Bank does and seeks

to do business with companies covered in its research reports. Thus, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. DISCLOSURES AND ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS ARE LOCATED IN APPENDIX 1. MICA(P) 007/05/2010

10Contacts

Inflation­—Hedging­it­&­Trading­it Deutsche Bank 47

Sales

Haroon Sana [email protected] +44­20­754­73671

Matthew­Yencken [email protected] +31­2­8258­2010

Michael Durr [email protected] +44­20­754­73671

Matthew­Blackwell [email protected] +65­68­83­16­20­

Ed­Rubin [email protected] +1­212­250­0551

Tai-Zhong­Jiang­(Tai-Chu) [email protected] +81­3­5156­6186

Structuring

Daragh McDevitt [email protected] +44­20­754­52750

Xavier­Avila [email protected] +44­20­754­72731

Research

Markus Heider [email protected] +44­20­754­2167

Alex­Li [email protected] +1­212­250­5483

Trading

Stephane Salas [email protected] +44­20­754­78809

Allan­Levin [email protected] +1­212­250­7105

Katsuya Miyoshi [email protected] +81­3­5156­6205

Lionel­Arbey­ [email protected] +44­20­754­54941

Vaughan Harvey [email protected] +61­2­8258­1848

Integrated­sales,­trading,­structuring­ and research Unlike­some­of­our­competitors,­Deutsche­Bank’s­inflation­sales,­trading,­structuring­and­research­professionals­work­closely­together,­combining­strategic­and­technical­expertise­with­the­macro-economic­insights­so­important­with­this­offering.

10.1 Contacts

Contacts­–­Deutsche­Bank­Global­Inflation­Team

This­document­is­intended­for­discussion­purposes­only­and­does­not­create­any­legally­binding­obligations­on­the­part­of­Deutsche­Bank­AG­and/or­its­affiliates­(“DB”).­­Without­limitation,­this­document­does­not­constitute­an­offer,­an­invitation­to­offer­or­a­recommendation­to­enter­into­any­transaction.­When­making­an­investment­decision,­you­should­rely­solely­on­the­final­documentation­relating­to­the­transaction­and­not­the­summary­contained­herein.­DB­is­not­acting­as­your­financial­adviser­or­in­any­other­fiduciary­capacity­with­respect­to­this­proposed­transaction.­The­transaction(s)­or­products(s)­mentioned­herein­may­not­be­appropriate­for­all­investors­and­before­entering­into­any­transaction­you­should­take­steps­to­ensure­that­you­fully­understand­the­transaction­and­have­made­an­independent­assessment­of­the­appropriateness­of­the­transaction­in­the­light­of­your­own­objectives­and­circumstances,­including­the­possible­risks­and­benefits­of­entering­into­such­transaction.­For­general­information­regarding­the­nature­and­risks­of­the­proposed­transaction­and­types­of­financial­instruments­please­go­to­http://www.globalmarkets.db.com/riskdisclosures­www.globalmarkets.db.com/riskdisclosures.­You­should­also­consider­seeking­advice­from­your­own­advisers­in­making­this­assessment.­If­you­decide­to­enter­into­a­transaction­with­DB,­you­do­so­in­reliance­on­your­own­judgment.­The­information­contained­in­this­document­is­based­on­material­we­believe­to­be­reliable;­however,­we­do­not­represent­that­it­is­accurate,­current,­complete,­or­error­free.­­Assumptions,­estimates­and­opinions­contained­in­this­document­constitute­our­judgment­as­of­the­date­of­the­document­and­are­subject­to­change­without­notice.­­Any­projections­are­based­on­a­number­of­assumptions­as­to­market­conditions­and­there­can­be­no­guarantee­that­any­projected­results­will­be­achieved.­Past­performance­is­not­a­guarantee­of­future­results.­This­material­was­prepared­by­a­Sales­or­Trading­function­within­DB,­and­was­not­produced,­reviewed­or­edited­by­the­Research­Department.­Any­opinions­expressed­herein­may­differ­from­the­opinions­expressed­by­other­DB­departments­including­the­Research­Department.­­Sales­and­Trading­functions­are­subject­to­additional­potential­conflicts­of­interest­which­the­Research­Department­does­not­face.­DB­may­engage­in­transactions­in­a­manner­inconsistent­with­the­views­discussed­herein.­DB­trades­or­may­trade­as­principal­in­the­instruments­(or­related­derivatives),­and­may­have­proprietary­positions­in­the­instruments­(or­related­derivatives)­discussed­herein.­DB­may­make­a­market­in­the­instruments­(or­related­derivatives)­discussed­herein.­Sales­and­Trading­personnel­are­compensated­in­part­based­on­the­volume­of­transactions­effected­by­them.­The­distribution­of­this­document­and­availability­of­these­products­and­services­in­certain­jurisdictions­may­be­restricted­by­law.­­You­may­not­distribute­this­document,­in­whole­or­in­part,­without­our­express­written­permission.­­DB­SPECIFICALLY­DISCLAIMS­ALL­LIABILITY­FOR­ANY­DIRECT,­INDIRECT,­CONSEQUENTIAL­OR­OTHER­LOSSES­OR­DAMAGES­INCLUDING­LOSS­OF­PROFITS­INCURRED­BY­YOU­OR­ANY­THIRD­PARTY­THAT­MAY­ARISE­FROM­ANY­RELIANCE­ON­THIS­DOCUMENT­OR­FOR­THE­RELIABILITY,­ACCURACY,­COMPLETENESS­OR­TIMELINESS­THEREOF.­DB­is­authorised­under­German­Banking­Law­(competent­authority:­BaFin­-­Federal­Financial­Supervising­Authority)­and­regulated­by­the­Financial­Services­Authority­for­the­conduct­of­UK­business.­This­document­is­intended­for­discussion­purposes­only.­You­may­not­distribute­this­document,­in­whole­or­in­part,­without­express­written­permission.­Without­limitation,­this­document­does­not­constitute­an­offer,­an­invitation­to­offer­or­a­recommendation­to­enter­into­any­transaction.­The­information­contained­in­this­document­is­based­on­material­we­believe­to­be­reliable;­however,­we­do­not­represent­that­it­is­accurate,­current,­complete,­or­error­free.­Assumptions,­estimates­and­opinions­contained­in­this­document­constitute­our­judgment­as­of­the­date­of­the­document­and­are­subject­to­change­without­notice.­Any­projections­are­based­on­a­number­of­assumptions­as­to­market­conditions­and­there­can­be­no­guarantee­that­any­projected­results­will­be­achieved.­Past­performance­is­not­a­guarantee­of­future­results.­The­services­described­in­this­document­are­provided­by­Deutsche­Bank­AG­or­by­its­subsidiaries­and/or­affiliates­in­accordance­with­appropriate­local­legislation­and­regulation.­Deutsche­Bank­Securities­Inc.,­a­subsidiary­of­Deutsche­Bank­AG,­conducts­investment­banking­and­securities­activities­in­the­United­States.­Deutsche­Bank­Securities­Inc.­is­a­member­of­NYSE,­FINRA­and­SIPC.­Investments­are­subject­to­investment­risk,­including­market­fluctuations,­regulatory­change,­counterparty­risk,­possible­delays­in­repayment­and­loss­of­income­and­principal­invested.­The­value­of­investment­can­fall­as­well­as­rise­and­you­might­not­get­back­the­amount­originally­invested­at­any­point­in­time.­©­Copyright­Deutsche­Bank­AG­2012