information and war - wjspaniel.files.wordpress.com · agenda 1. ultimatum game 2. experiment #2 3....
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INFORMATION AND WAR PSC/IR 265: CIVIL WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS
WILLIAM SPANIEL
WJSPANIEL.WORDPRESS.COM/PSCIR-265
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AGENDA
1. ULTIMATUM GAME
2. EXPERIMENT #2
3. RISK-RETURN TRADEOFF
4. MEDIATION, PREDICTION, AND BLACK MARKETS
5. INCENTIVES TO MISREPRESENT
6. EXPERIMENT #3
7. THE CONVERGENCE PRINCIPLE
8. FIGHTING WITH NO INTENTION TO WIN
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MOTIVATION
• MODEL FOR WAR’S INEFFICIENCY PUZZLE LACKS
STRUCTURE.
– BARGAINING RANGE HAS A LARGE NUMBER OF SETTLEMENT
OFFERS THAT ARE MUTUALLY PREFERABLE TO WAR.
– HOW DO WE DECIDE ON A PARTICULAR X?
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MOTIVATION
• WE MIGHT NOT CARE IF WE ONLY WANTED TO KNOW
WHETHER WAR IS POSSIBLE OR NOT.
– BUT WE MIGHT WANT TO KNOW MORE.
• WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE BARGAINING ENVIRONMENT
BECOMES MORE COMPLICATED? DIFFERENT INFORMATION
STRUCTURE? BARGAINING OVER TIME?
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SOLUTION
• WE CAN STUDY NEGOTIATIONS.
• WE ARE GOING TO LOOK AT THE SIMPLEST FORM OF
NEGOTIATION: THE ULTIMATUM GAME.
– GOVERNMENT MAKES AN OFFER.
– REBELS ACCEPT OR REJECT.
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WHY SO SIMPLE?
• GOVERNMENTS TEND TO CONTROL THE STATUS QUO
DISTRIBUTION. MAKES SENSE THAT THEY MAKE THE
OFFERS.
• WE COULD DERIVE THE SIMILAR RESULTS WITH MORE
COMPLICATED MODELS.
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HOW TO SOLVE?
• TEMPTATION: START AT TOP AND WORK WAY DOWN.
– FIRST MOVE SHOULD COME FIRST…RIGHT?
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HOW TO SOLVE?
• TEMPTATION: START AT TOP AND WORK WAY DOWN.
– FIRST MOVE SHOULD COME FIRST…RIGHT?
– NO. WE NEED TO KNOW WHAT HAPPENS AT THE END
BEFORE WE CAN FIGURE OUT WHAT HAPPENS AT THE
BEGINNING.
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HOW TO SOLVE?
• IT’S EASIER TO START AT THE END ANYWAY.
– ACTOR MOVING LAST DOESN’T HAVE TO THEORIZE ABOUT
OTHER STRATEGIC DECISIONS.
• THEY HAVE ALREADY BEEN DONE. YOU ONLY NEED TO FOCUS ON
THE PRESENT.
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1 – X,
1 – PR – CG,
ACCEPT IF X ≥ PR – CR
REJECT IF X < PR – CR
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ACCEPT IF X ≥ PR – CR
REJECT IF X < PR – CR
PAYOFF FOR OFFERING
X ≥ PR – CR? 1 – X
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ACCEPT IF X ≥ PR – CR
REJECT IF X < PR – CR
PAYOFF FOR OFFERING
X ≥ PR – CR? 1 – X
G’S BEST ACCEPTABLE OFFER: X = PR – CR
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0 1 PR PR + CG PR – CR
R’S NET PAYOFF G’S NET PAYOFF BARGAINING RANGE
IS THIS OPTIMAL?
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0 1 PR PR + CG PR – CR
R’S NET PAYOFF G’S NET PAYOFF BARGAINING RANGE
NO, THIS IS BETTER.
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0 1 PR PR + CG PR – CR
R’S NET PAYOFF G’S NET PAYOFF BARGAINING RANGE
IS THIS OPTIMAL?
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0 1 PR PR + CG PR – CR
R’S NET PAYOFF G’S NET PAYOFF BARGAINING RANGE
NO, THIS IS BETTER.
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0 1 PR PR + CG PR – CR
R’S NET PAYOFF G’S NET PAYOFF BARGAINING RANGE
IS THIS OPTIMAL?
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0 1 PR PR + CG PR – CR
R’S NET PAYOFF G’S NET PAYOFF BARGAINING RANGE
IS THIS OPTIMAL?
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0 1 PR PR + CG PR – CR
R’S NET PAYOFF G’S NET PAYOFF BARGAINING RANGE
IS THIS OPTIMAL?
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0 1 PR PR + CG PR – CR
R’S NET PAYOFF G’S NET PAYOFF BARGAINING RANGE
IS THIS OPTIMAL?
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0 1 PR PR + CG
R’S NET PAYOFF G’S NET PAYOFF BARGAINING RANGE
IS THIS OPTIMAL?
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ACCEPT IF X ≥ PR – CR
REJECT IF X < PR – CR
PAYOFF FOR OFFERING
X = PR – CR => 1 – PR + CR
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ACCEPT IF X ≥ PR – CR
REJECT IF X < PR – CR
PAYOFF FOR OFFERING
X < PR – CR?
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ACCEPT IF X ≥ PR – CR
REJECT IF X < PR – CR
PAYOFF FOR OFFERING
X < PR – CR => 1 – PR – CG
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ACCEPT IF X ≥ PR – CR
REJECT IF X < PR – CR
PAYOFF FOR OFFERING
X < PR – CR => 1 – PR – CG
X = PR – CR => 1 – PR + CR