information warfare full spectrum information operations

Information Warfare

Full Spectrum Information OperationsFull Spectrum Information Operations

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“War is an act of violence based upon irreconcilable disagreement” FMFM 1, Warfighting.

This seminar is based upon the paper:

“Full Spectrum Information Operations”

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[email protected]@globetranz.com

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“… Gain leverage through a decisive advantage, … fight asymmetrically, … surprise the enemy, … shock the enemy

…” FMFM 1-3, TACTICS.

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“…the object of war is to impose our will on our enemy. The means to that end is the organized application or threat of violence by military force.” FMFM 1,

Warfighting.

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“Drastic changes in the nature of war are the result of developments that dramatically upset the equilibrium of war…” FMFM 1, Warfighting.

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“…You achieve a decision by the focus of effort. The focus of effort is the Commander’s bid to achieve a decision; he works to ensure all his forces and

assets support it…” FMFM 1, Warfighting.

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“… Gain leverage through a decisive advantage, … fight asymmetrically, … surprise the enemy, … shock the enemy

…” FMFM 1-3, TACTICS.

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“Drastic changes in the nature of war are the result of developments that dramatically upset the equilibrium of war… ” FMFM 1, Warfighting.

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“We must stay abreast of this process of change, for the belligerent who first exploits a development in the art and science of war gains a significant, if not

decisive, advantage.” FMFM 1, Warfighting.

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“Conversely, if we are ignorant of the changing face of war, we will find ourselves unequal to its challenges.” FMFM 1, Warfighting.

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• The Violence need not be physical. – Physical, cybernetic, and moral levels.– This is a departure from a pure Clausewitzian

view.– Information Age Warfare requires leaders,

sensors, processors, transmitters, information and shooters.

– IW Targets leaders, sensors, processors, transmitters,information and shooters.

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“Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position

cannot be held.” FMFM 1, Warfighting.

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“Attack the enemy’s reflexive image; defend the higher rank of reflection; break his will to resist; protect your own.

Force your will upon his.” The Art of Information War.

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“Generally in Information War the ideal policy is to take a state intact. To use even on round of advanced conventional

munition is inferior to this” The Art of Information War.

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“Thus, the object of war is to impose our will on our enemy. The means to that end is the organized application or threat

of violence by military force.” FMFM 1, Warfighting.

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Gateway Gateway Routers Routers

& Switches & Switches

Global Information GridExisting IA Centers

DeployedDeployedWarfightersWarfighters

TheaterTheaterInfrastructureInfrastructure& Reachback& Reachback

CONUSCONUSInfrastructureInfrastructure& Reachback& ReachbackGIIGIIGIIGII

DoD CERTDoD CERT

Service CERTsService CERTs

JCCCJCCC

TCCCTCCC

RNOSCRNOSC

GNOSCGNOSCIA CentersIA Centers

of Excellenceof Excellence

NIPCNIPC

JTF-CNDJTF-CND

RCERTRCERT

IA ReserveIA ReserveUnitsUnits

NSANSA

Service IWCsService IWCs

CINCCINC

Joint StaffJoint Staff

Camps, Posts,Camps, Posts,StationsStations

Log & SupportLog & SupportDepotsDepots

IntermediateIntermediateSupport BasesSupport Bases

Camps, Posts,Camps, Posts,StationsStations

ServiceServiceComponentsComponents

IntelIntelCentersCenters

XXXXXXXX

Key:Key:

= Centers for the monitoring & protection= Centers for the monitoring & protection of Joint and Services’ Capabilities on theof Joint and Services’ Capabilities on the Global Information Grid (GIG)Global Information Grid (GIG) Note: Bastion Defense (e.g., firewalls) at Note: Bastion Defense (e.g., firewalls) at allall sites sites

CONUS CONUS Internet & Public Internet & Public

ATM InfrastructureATM Infrastructure

OCONUS Internet & PublicOCONUS Internet & PublicATM InfrastructureATM Infrastructure

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Command And Control Warfare Pillars

• OPSEC

• Deception

• Psyops

• Electronic Warfare

• Destruction

• Information Superiority

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National Need

• There have been several embarrassingly simple attacks that have resulted in significant damage that show that the current approaches are not adequate.

• There is reason to believe that both criminal elements and our national adversaries view this area as a highly cost-effective way of confronting the U.S. without coming into direct contact with U.S. legal, political, and military power.

• The role of Information Technology (IT) in supporting key economic, political and military operations becomes continually more critical, which simultaneously creates a new ‘battle’ space . .

that in many ways is different than traditional battle spaces.

• Consequently, it is urgent to explore organizational adjustments and structures, policies, concepts of operations, and technologies to address this new form of national competion.

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Long Term National Objectives

• Develop technologies policies and procedures for the Secret Service, FBI, Department of Commerce, SPACECOM, the JTF-CND, and NSA to create the ability to ‘flag’ and protect United States Owned Global E-commerce.

• Create Predictive, not reactive, security intrusion and detection mechanism to avert criminal misappropriation, cyber terrorism and foreign adversary attacks, in such a way as to preserve and protect constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.

• Create the first Virtual Organization for a Commerce Attack Response Team ( CART )

• Create tools and methodologies to determine origination, transit path, and destination of critical electronic commerce transactions, TranSource (transactional sourcing)

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The Requirement

• Understand the Cyber Battlespace– At once . . . instantaneous and time extended

. . . local and global• Develop Cyber Defensive Tools and the Culture to match

– Provide a carefully-limited, “autonomic response” as close to the sources of the action as possible

– Detect anomalies in the critical data and functions that we wish to assure, and respond

• cueing/cross-cueing, attacker ID, path tracing, target illumination & correlation, honey pot diversion, attack rate limiting or blocking within the protected enclave

– Develop a CONOPS to bring decision makers into the detection, localization & containment process faster

Technical Revolutions - Technology, Concepts, Organizations.

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Operational & System Model

• Operational Model– Clusters of responders constituted dynami-

cally in response to critical missions, events– Rapid, informal communication to augment

traditional hierarchical reporting. Damage can occur in seconds to minutes

– Cyber-warrior must be a technical expert on cyber tactics and cyber-operations in this new battlespace

• System Model– Virtual shared dataspaces constituted

dynamically to share intrusion data, assessment, trace info, system status

– Distributed smart agents for detection, analysis, agent-to-agent notification, reaction … enabled for “first response” to multiple, simultaneous attacks

– Remote sensors to include present sensor systems, plus anomaly-based sensors and capability to act as response agents

criticalcriticalsystemssystemscriticalcritical

informationinformation criticalcriticalnetworksnetworks

CriticalFunctions

instrumentedfor anomaly

detection

Anomalydetection

AutonomicResponse

IA ResponseAugmentationto develop and

validate responsestrategies

Rapid responseRapid response

Immediate responseImmediate response

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http://www.globetranz.com/iw.html


This seminar is based upon the paper:

“Full Spectrum Information Operations”

information warfare full spectrum information operations

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